Items in this collection
PublicationArgentina - Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) : Accounting and Auditing(Washington, DC, 2007-07) World BankStrengthening corporate financial reporting is important for Argentina, as the country seeks to foster confidence in the local business community in order to stimulate investments, both local and foreign. In addition, strong corporate accounting practices enable local banks and financial institutions to monitor adequately their businesses risks, credit and otherwise, which is essential at a time when the Argentine banking sector emerges from the crisis triggered by the events of December 2001. Sound accounting and auditing is therefore essential to the stability of Argentina's banking sector. This report analyzes Argentina's corporate financial reporting and auditing practices with a view to supporting the Government's strategy to: (a) improve the investment climate for Argentine companies; (b) foster trade competitiveness by aligning the standards of reporting and governance with practices that are prevalent among the country's main trading partners; and (c) ensure greater transparency in both the private and public sectors. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), International Standards on Auditing (ISA) and good international practice, particularly among the other large countries in Latin America, have been used as benchmarks for this exercise. A study of corporate governance practices was conducted in parallel, which findings complement those of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) accounting and auditing. PublicationChile : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems(Washington DC, 2004-06) World BankThe legal and institutional framework governing creditor rights and insolvency proceedings in Chile reasonably complies with expectations of a modern, credit-based economy, although some shortcomings affect the full effectiveness of credit risk management and resolution: Financial institutions over-rely on real estate as collateral. Pledges are not enough developed because legislation on secured interests over movable assets is fragmented and the publicity and registration mechanism for pledges are not sufficiently reliable. Individual enforcement proceedings are lengthy and complicated, both for secured and unsecured creditors. Enforcement proceedings using executory instruments take 1 to 3 years, whereas creditors not enjoying such instruments use ordinary proceedings whose duration is even longer (3 to 5 years). Insolvency legislation is integrated into the country's broader legal and commercial system, providing a liquidation proceeding whose average duration, however, is 2 to 3 years. The Insolvency Law also governs judicial reorganization proceedings but classification of creditors for voting is not allowed, which may be a relatively significant rigidity in an environment where most financial credit is secured. Treatment of contractual obligations in insolvency is not sufficiently developed in the Insolvency Law, which also lacks clear provisions on how to deal with subordination debt agreements and financial contracts in bankruptcy. Provisions to deal with insolvency cases of a cross-border nature are fairly antiquated and not responsive to solve main problems typically present in those cases. Corporate workouts would be significantly increased if out-of-court plans approved by a majority of creditors were able to be converted into prepackaged restructuring plans that bind dissenting minorities. The judicial framework for commercial enforcement and insolvency proceedings is generally perceived as being independent and reliable, although most courts deal with an excessive number of processes. Notwithstanding, there are no commercial courts nor courts specializing in insolvency in Chile. Insolvency administrators are independent professionals supervised by the Bankruptcy Commission, a body meeting the requirements of an independent regulatory institution. The Bill on Second Capital Market Reform, submitted to Congress, is a relevant step in the right direction to make Chilean creditor rights and the insolvency system more effective. PublicationArgentina : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems(Washington, DC, 2002-06-01) World BankIn 1995, Argentina enacted a new modern insolvency law that substantially improved corporate liquidations and rehabilitations. After almost seven years of experience, some legal and institutional weaknesses persist: (1) corporate workouts are difficult in practice; (2) the unified insolvency regime causes severe problems in judicial interpretation of many legal provisions, causing court congestion with insolvency cases; (3) an uneven playing field discourages rehabilitation; (4) a lack of insolvency specialization among judges impedes efficiency and uniformity in large commercial centers; and (5) sindicos are perceived as lacking objectivity and sufficient expertise to manage complex restructurings. Liquidation proceedings take 1-5 years (depending on complexity), while reorganizations average 1½-2 years in jurisdictions with specialized judges (Mendoza, Cordoba) and 2-3 years in the others. To immediately improve the system, a new workout mechanism should be introduced to deal with systemic levels of corporate distress. In the medium term, other aspects of the legal and institutional framework should be improved.