C. Journal articles published externally

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Should Aid Reward Performance? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia

(American Economic Association, 2014-10) Olken, Benjamin A. ; Onishi, Junko ; Wong, Susan

We report an experiment in 3,000 villages that tested whether incentives improve aid efficacy. Villages received block grants for maternal and child health and education that incorporated relative performance incentives. Subdistricts were randomized into incentives, an otherwise identical program without incentives, or control. Incentives initially improved preventative health indicators, particularly in underdeveloped areas, and spending efficiency increased. While school enrollments improved overall, incentives had no differential impact on education, and incentive health effects diminished over time. Reductions in neonatal mortality in non-incentivized areas did not persist with incentives. We find no systematic scoring manipulation nor funding reallocation toward richer areas.
Should Aid Reward Performance?: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia

(American Economic Association, 2014-10) Olken, Benjamin A. ; Onishi, Junko ; Wong, Susan

We report an experiment in 3,000 villages that tested whether incentives improve aid efficacy. Villages received block grants for maternal and child health and education that incorporated relative performance incentives. Subdistricts were randomized into incentives, an otherwise identical program without incentives, or control. Incentives initially improved preventative health indicators, particularly in underdeveloped areas, and spending efficiency increased. While school enrollments improved overall, incentives had no differential impact on education, and incentive health effects diminished over time. Reductions in neonatal mortality in nonincentivized areas did not persist with incentives. We find no systematic scoring manipulation nor funding reallocation toward richer areas.
The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh

( 2009) Olken, Benjamin A. ; Barron, Patrick

This paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied Indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips, during which they observed over 6,000 illegal payments to police, soldiers, and weigh station attendants. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints, we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments. We further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes, including third-degree price discrimination and a menu of two-part tariffs. Our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy.