GET Note

18 items available

Permanent URI for this collection

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9409

The GET Note -- Recently Asked Questions Series captures the knowledge and advice from individual engagements of the World Bank’s Global Expert Team (GET) on Public Sector Performance.

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Now showing 1 - 8 of 8

Managing and Monitoring Grand Design Public Administration Reforms

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-08) Verheijen, Tony

A grand design attempt at public administration reform can be thought of as any centrally designed, multiple agency reform program or process designed to modernize or improve the performance of administrative structures at the center of Government, usually with a focus on addressing persistent underlying inefficiencies. International practice shows that reforming selected central institutions (especially those that hold the purse strings) is a different matter altogether from addressing performance issues in large ministries with a service delivery mandate. Therefore, it is of critical importance to ‘unpack’ these particular reforms and uncover the persistent issues that arise in countries attempting to pursue such reforms. The four grand design cases highlighted here were selected for their comparability in terms of size and economy, and as examples of reforms from different regions. The cases presented here are Brazil, Nigeria, Russia and Tanzania. Each of these cases has specific characteristics, based on a unique country or reform context, but they share the features of a broad, across-the-board reform approach (in three of the four cases with a clear sub-national dimension that is distinct from the national one). This note focuses on the three critical design aspects of such reforms: a) reform coherence, b) effective anchorage and, c) blending technocratic solutions with substantive service delivery improvements.
Does the Public Sector HRM System Strengthen Staff Performance?

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-12) Manning, Nick ; Watkins, Joanna ; Degnarain, Nishan

An important objective of any Human Resource Management (HRM) system in Government is to motivate staff to perform well. This GET note looks at several HRM levers that Governments have at their disposal to influence staff performance. In particular, some of the most common levers in the public sector include: effective recruitment and retention of staff; strong staff engagement in the organization’s mission; well-designed incentives for staff to perform as well as ‘opportunities to perform’; tailored training and capacity building; and high quality performance dialogues with staff and effective follow up. In designing a HRM system that utilizes these levers effectively, this GET Note shows that it is more important to diagnose the root cause and understand the major issues of poor performance, before proposing reform actions. This paper proposes three important design questions for managers of HRM systems to assess whether they have a well-designed HRM system. 1) Does the HRM system provide both ‘external incentives’ and ‘opportunities to perform’? Does the HRM system provide the right balance between short and long term incentives? And are the broader, supporting aspects of the HRM system working effectively? The note concludes by highlighting that even where the HRM system is well designed, careful consideration must be given to two further aspects: a) how to implement reforms to improve the design of the HRM system, and b) how to ensure that a well-designed HRM system is operating effectively.
Kazakhstan : Note on Senior Civil Service Pay

(Washington, DC, 2011-03) World Bank

This report examines the pay-setting arrangements for senior civil servants in three settings: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Singapore. It concludes that: a robust analytic approach for pay setting seems to be sufficient to maintain some general sense of legitimacy in the process, but is not the dominant driver of pay levels; external consultancies are employed significantly to obtain data on salaries for comparable positions in the private sector; the hay method is used in many settings and the World Bank analytic approach is not dissimilar to that used in many governments; however, governments are different to the World Bank in some critical ways. Like the Bank, they are driven by the need to establish a system which is seen to be legitimate both to staff and to the funders; thus, while the institutional arrangements for managing and overseeing the pay-setting process are, also, very much concerned with ensuring legitimacy for the resultant pay settlement, and so involve some significant delegation to signal that the recommendations are somewhat independent, the final decision for pay is ultimately made by government on political as well as fiscal and economic grounds; and the numbers of political advisors outside of the formal schemes is modest and does not seem to have a strong influence on the pay-setting process for senior staff in the settings studied.
Managing a Sustainable Results Based Management (RBM) System

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-03) World Bank

This note presents a framework for thinking about public sector results based management (RBM) systems, with a particular focus on the issues line agencies face in complying with mandates and directives from central agencies on monitoring and evaluating performance. It also provides five lessons learned from RBM systems of relevance for countries pursuing results based management reforms. Taking a system's view of results based management reveals a number of different approaches and techniques used across the public sector to improve results.
Driving Performance through Center of Government Delivery Units

(Washington, DC, 2010-11) World Bank

Several governments around the world have recently established delivery units at the center of government to drive performance improvements. This development may be in addition to whole-of-government reforms to improve performance, such as citizen charters, service agreements, or performance reporting. Given rising interest in public sector performance innovations, this note provides an overview of center-of-government delivery unit arrangements, including key factors for success, with a particular focus on one of the first incarnations of a central delivery unit - the United Kingdom's Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU).
Overview of Public Sector Performance Assessment Processes in Japan

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010-08) Matsuura, Miki ; Watkins, Joanna ; Dorotinsky, William

The Government of Japan began introducing evaluation techniques in 2001 within the context of a Central Government reform program that involved the establishment of new ministries and the integration and abolition of existing ministries. Japans approach emphasizes assessing policies and activities, and then incorporating results into future planning and budgeting, with a focus on making public sector programs and activities more efficient. This is a synopsis of Japans experience with public sector performance assessment processes between 2001 and 2010. This note presents a range of initiatives underway in Japan, including policy and activity evaluation, as well as the spending review exercise designed to make public sector service delivery more efficient. The intention of this note is not to necessarily endorse Japans approach, but rather to document it as a case study.
Service Delivery Reviews in Canada and the U.K.

(Washington, DC, 2009-08) World Bank

This brief describes in detail Canada's policy on alternative service delivery and service delivery reviews in the UK, such as the prior options reviews, better quality services and best value reviews, market testing, and fundamental expenditure reviews. Links are provided to relevant documents and case studies.
Getting More from a Fiscal Stimulus

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009-07) Thomas, Theo

The severity and global nature of the current financial and economic crisis has increased the role expected of fiscal policy in stimulating national and global demand, protecting vulnerable groups, and investing for future growth (International Monetary Fund, or IMF 2009). For those that can afford it, this means quickly designing and implementing fiscal stimulus packages. These new challenges have arisen while governments across the world have, for some time, been reforming their budget management frameworks to improve public sector performance to better meet complex and ever-rising obligations. While there is a risk that the short-term stimulus diverts attention from longer-term performance reforms, this note suggests that 'performance-informed budgeting' can help countries better address the challenges of the current financial and economic crisis. Specifically, how governments might enhance the impact of their fiscal stimulus through three interrelated performance-informed areas: i) reprioritizing public spending to maximize the impact of the stimulus measures; ii) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of operational expenditures to avoid waste and maximize the available fiscal space; and iii) accelerating investment expenditures, to both stimulate demand and build for future growth.