Social Safety Nets Primer

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Social Safety Nets in World Bank Lending and Analytical Work : FY2002–2007

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009-01) Andrews, Colin

During FY 2002-2007 the World Bank engaged with 118 countries on social safety net (SSN) issues, providing lending in 68, analytic products in 86, training in 87, and a combined package of all three services in 42. A review of these safety net activities shows a strong diversity with respect to the regions, types of intervention, sectors and financing instruments. This reflects evolving thought within the Bank with respect to the role of safety nets in broad development strategies, not just immediate or temporary programs. The findings of the portfolio review take into account all project and analytic documents where a thematic code of 'social safety nets' was assigned. The analysis shows a noticeable variability over time, particularly as the portfolio expanded when large or multiple countries faced economic crises. The regional distribution of safety net activities reflects the dominance of Latin America, with emerging activities in the African and South Asian context.
Reducing Error, Fraud and Corruption (EFC) in Social Protection Programs

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-01) Tesliuc, Emil Daniel ; Milazzo, Annamaria

Social Protection (SP) and Social Safety Net (SSN) programs channel a large amount of public resources, it is important to make sure that these reach the intended beneficiaries. Error, fraud, or corruption (EFC) reduces the economic efficiency of these interventions by decreasing the amount of money that goes to the intended beneficiaries, and erodes the political support for the program. While no program is immune to EFC, evidence from developed countries demonstrates that such leakage can be brought to negligible levels. In five Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (UK, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and USA) this fraction is between 2-5 percent for the SP sector as a whole. For SSN programs, which use more complex eligibility criteria and hence are more prone to EFC, this fraction is 10 percent. To achieve these results, programs have implemented a number of measures reviewed in this note. In contrast, efforts to combat or even measure EFC are quite rare in developing countries, although some programs are plagued by it.
Price and Tax Subsidies : Effectiveness and Challenges

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003-01) Mackintosh, Fiona ; del Ninno, Carlo

Many governments use price and tax subsidization to meet social protection objectives. They endeavor to reduce the cost of living for their population-or for a subset of the population-by subsidizing the price of goods or services in lieu of, or in addition to, direct income transfers. While these subsidies may distort production incentives, subsidize the non-poor more than the poor, and limit consumer choice, there are reasons why a government may choose to use some forms of pricing policy rather than make income transfers to help the poor.
Demand-Side Subsidies for Housing

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003-01) del Ninno, Carlo

Several governments in developing countries have been using demand-side programs to increase access to housing services among the poor. From the perspective of a social safety net, the main justification for providing housing assistance is that adequate shelter is a basic need that governments have a responsibility to help to fulfill, especially during times of hardship. In transition countries, assisting the poor with their housing-related expenditures can mitigate the hardship caused by planned price increases. The introduction of housing assistance in such cases makes it possible to implement reforms such as price increases or deregulation.
Strengthening Public Safety Nets from the Bottom Up

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003-01) Weigand, Christine

Public safety nets in developing countries address the vulnerability of the poor and the near-poor to income disruption, but such formal programs do not operate in a vacuum. Private and informal mechanisms may already exist. The design of public interventions requires a clear understanding of what mechanisms are already available and how (and to what extent) individuals and households use them to cope with income fluctuations. This note surveys some of those design considerations.