PREM Notes

176 items available

Permanent URI for this collection

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9424

This note series is intended to summarize good practices and key policy findings on poverty reduction and economic management (PREM) topics.

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 14

Reducing Court Delays : Five Lessons from the United States

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-12) Messick, Richard ; Shuker, Nan ; Pace, Nicholas ; Ostrom, Brian

For almost 50 years judges, lawyers, and policymakers in the United States have experimented with ways to speed up the processing of civil and criminal cases. Several lessons have emerged from this effort: a) Delays cannot be legislated away. b) Commitment is essential. c) Incentives must be addressed. d) Solid empirical analysis is crucial. e) Successful programs may not reduce delays. Perhaps the most surprising is that a well-conceived delay reduction program can improve the quality of the justice system even if it ultimately has little effort on case processing times.
Mobilizing Civil Society to Fight Corruption in Bangladesh

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-10) Landell-Mills, Pierre

A successful anti-corruption strategy must have a free press to voice public opinion and report cases of corruption, an effective and politically neutral mechanism to investigate and prosecute corruption, and a reliable judicial process to punish wrongdoing when it is proved. It is rare to find all these elements in a developing country. without considerable public pressure, governments are unlikely to foster the transparency and accountability needed to curb malfeasance by public officials. Consequently there is a major role for civil society organizations to campaign for such reforms. This is the mission of the national chapters of Transparency International. This Note discusses the crucial role played by the Bangladesh chapter of Transparency International in pressing for the implementation of corruption reform, publicizing well-researched facts about corruption, and lobbying for additional measures.
An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-10) Das-Gupta, Arindam ; Engelschalk, Michael ; Mayville, William

The World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. Corrupt actions include the unilateral theft of public property by its steward and multi-party transactions in which beneficiaries bribe officials. Corruption can exist at all levels of public administration--from the highest officeholder to the lowest functionary. Because tax and customs administration often figure among the corrupt government agencies in developing countries, Bank projects that reform these administrations should include anti-corruption efforts. Any strategy to combat corruption must limit the motives and opportunities for public officeholders to abuse their positions. This should be done directly for unilateral corruption, while for multi-party corruption it can also be done indirectly by focusing on the supply side of bribes. Although we do not know enough to identify optimal anti-corruption strategies for different country situations, there is no one-size-fits-all strategy. Various elements from the menu of possibilities must be integrated into a coherent package. The Bank's approach in this area, outlined in this report, is in broad agreement with that of the International Monetary Fund. This report examines the motives and opportunities for corruption, and discusses incorporating strategies in reform projects, current country approaches, and lessons learned from experience.
Private Participation in Port Facilities : Recent Trends

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-09) Sommer, Dirk

The private sector has become increasingly involved in the operation of common-user port facilities during the 1990s, following public sector dominance of the sector since the 1940s. During the past decade the reform of port administration has gained momentum in industrial and developing countries alike. Between 1990 and 1998, 112 port projects with private participation reached financial closure in twenty-eight developing countries, with investment commitments totaling more than US$9 billion. Most projects are in East Asia and Latin America, and most are long-term concessions. This Note provides an overview of the emerging trends in developing countries and outlines the main issues for the future. These issues include sustaining competition at a regional level, across networks, and with other transport sectors, such as road and rail.
Assessing Political Commitment to Fighting Corruption

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-09) Heilbrunn, John ; Keefer, Philip

Rarely discussed 15 years ago, the commitment of political leaders to reform--that is, their willingness to implement and sustain reform--is now widely accepted as crucial for aid effectiveness. Nowhere is political commitment more important--and more difficult to sustain--than in implementing reforms to fight corruption. Governments increasingly seek external assistance to meet this challenge. More than any other public sector reform, reducing corruption may threaten poltical coalitions and a government's survival--and threats to political survival weaken the resolve of even the most committed leaders. This Note describes methods that might be used to objectively evaluate a government's political commitment to reducing corruption, whether petty, grand or systemic.
Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption

(Washington, DC, 1999-06) World Bank

Corruption is bad for development. Leaving aside the morality of bribe taking, influence peddling, embezzlement, and other abuses of power for personal or narrow group gain, corruption impedes investment and growth and exacerbates poverty and inequality. Human beings are prone to self-seeking behavior. What constrains individual behavior and makes it conform to larger collective ends includes the laws that form the core of norms and institutions. Corruption can never be completely or permanently eliminated. Effective and durable corruption control requires multiple, reinforcing, and overlapping institutions of accountability. And where corruption is endemic, these institutions need to be of three kinds: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and external accountability.
Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-06) Diamond, Larry

Corruption can never be completely or permanently eliminated. The question is, how can it be controlled? How can a country move from a situation where corruption may be the norm to a situation where corruption is morally intolerable and behaviorally rare? To control corruption, the expected costs of engaging in corruption must be dramatically increased. Public officals must perceive a substantial risk that if they engage in corrupt conduct they will lose their offices, forfeit illegally acquired wealth, and even go to prison. Implementing such sanctions aganist corruption requires an institutional framework to control corruption. Effective and durable corruption control requires multiple, reinforcing, and overlapping institutions of accountability. Where corruption is endemic, these institutions need to be of three kinds: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and external accountability. The primary institutions of horizontal accountability are the law, anti-corruption bodies, the ombudsman's office, public audits, and the judicial system. Institutions of vertical accountability include an independent electoral commission, independent mass media, and nongovernmental organizations. External accountability encompasses extensive international scrutiny and support.
Looking for More from Adjustment : Africa's Experience

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-05) Pape, Elizabeth

By the mid-1990s, after more than 15 years of adjustment lending, it had become clear that adjustment programs in Africa had not accelerated growth or reduced poverty, except in a handful of countries. The main reasons? Recipient governments did not "own" the reform programs, and they perceived the conditionality attached to the programs as being imposed on them. Adjustment programs were often unresponsive to country conditions and changes in external circumstances. In most cases the World Bank and recipient governments did not have a shared vision of what adjustment programs were supposed to achieve. In response to this diagnosis, in 1995 the Bank's Africa Region introduced the Higher Impact Adjustment Lending (HIAL) initiative. The initiative aimed to achieve a quicker, stronger, broader, and longer supply response from structural adjustment programs by: 1) increasing country selectivity and strengthening government ownership; 2) allowing more flexibility in adjustment operations--in particular, introducing new tranching mechanisms; and 3) introducing performance indicators to define expected results and assess actual outcomes. This note describes how the approach and design of these operations were adapted to achieve higher impact.
Using Surveys for Public Sector Reform

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-05) Reinikka, Ritva

Diagnostic surveys can provide vital information for decisionmakers when institutional weaknesses inhibit a more regular flow of information. If strategically designed, a survey can help induce policy change by pointing directly to the main bottlenecks, making it easier for policymakers to find solutions. This note summarizes two cases in Uganda where diagnostic surveys proved particularly useful. The first case involves public spending on health and education; the second considers tax administration from the perspective of taxpaying firms.
Public Expenditure Reviews : Progress and Potential

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-04) Swaroop, Vinaya

The note reviews the potential of public expenditure reviews as objective analysis of a country's public spending issues, and in advancing the development agenda in the Bank's client countries. It examines the experiences with these reviews, setting the approach for improving them, finding that: most public expenditure reviews define the public sector deficit as the central government deficit, while relevant macroeconomic variables are being ignored; those reviews do not examine the rationale for public intervention, as an analysis on the efficiency of the public budget allocation; do not integrate capital, and recurrent expenditures, thus sidesteps the issue of future recurrent cost implications of the capital budget, introducing uncertainty regarding the sustainability of policies, and projects; and, only a minimal percentage of public expenditure reviews, adequately focus on institutional issues, such as budget management, or incentives in the public sector. The note suggests questioning the exercise of these reviews, as to what will its performance accomplish, and who should participate in the review, followed by a focused process, ensuring ownership, poverty reduction, and information dissemination, to finally build an analysis based on two complementary themes: getting policies right, and building well-functioning institutions to deliver efficient public services.