PREM Notes

176 items available

Permanent URI for this collection

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9424

This note series is intended to summarize good practices and key policy findings on poverty reduction and economic management (PREM) topics.

Items in this collection

Now showing 1 - 9 of 9

Mobilizing Civil Society to Fight Corruption in Bangladesh

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-10) Landell-Mills, Pierre

A successful anti-corruption strategy must have a free press to voice public opinion and report cases of corruption, an effective and politically neutral mechanism to investigate and prosecute corruption, and a reliable judicial process to punish wrongdoing when it is proved. It is rare to find all these elements in a developing country. without considerable public pressure, governments are unlikely to foster the transparency and accountability needed to curb malfeasance by public officials. Consequently there is a major role for civil society organizations to campaign for such reforms. This is the mission of the national chapters of Transparency International. This Note discusses the crucial role played by the Bangladesh chapter of Transparency International in pressing for the implementation of corruption reform, publicizing well-researched facts about corruption, and lobbying for additional measures.
Understanding Poverty Reduction Impacts with Innovative Monitoring and Evaluation

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-10) Garcia, Marito ; Alderman, Harold ; Rudqvist, Anders

Monitoring and evaluation systems are often the least addressed component of project design, and implementation. Yet, such systems have considerable potential for enhancing the impact of projects, and the understanding of poverty reduction impacts. This note addresses what makes effective monitoring and evaluation, where both quantitative, and participatory methods are needed to assess a project's impact on poverty. It examines the case of the Uganda Nutrition and Early Childhood Development Project, a process-driven, locally prioritized program, being implemented by a network of nongovernmental organizations, that motivates communities, and provide information to project participants. The project relies on systematic monitoring of inputs and outputs, and, community participation in planning, and monitoring facilitates bottom-up feedback. The note further highlights a randomized experimental design, i.e., a baseline and follow-up surveys, that assess the impact of project activities, of communication and information, and of grassroots management training, and income generation activities for community welfare. The benefits of proactive monitoring and evaluation are that it enables timely inputs into management decision making, and that the quantitative methods used, are important determinants for assessing, and verifying a project's impact.
Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption

(Washington, DC, 1999-06) World Bank

Corruption is bad for development. Leaving aside the morality of bribe taking, influence peddling, embezzlement, and other abuses of power for personal or narrow group gain, corruption impedes investment and growth and exacerbates poverty and inequality. Human beings are prone to self-seeking behavior. What constrains individual behavior and makes it conform to larger collective ends includes the laws that form the core of norms and institutions. Corruption can never be completely or permanently eliminated. Effective and durable corruption control requires multiple, reinforcing, and overlapping institutions of accountability. And where corruption is endemic, these institutions need to be of three kinds: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and external accountability.
Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-06) Diamond, Larry

Corruption can never be completely or permanently eliminated. The question is, how can it be controlled? How can a country move from a situation where corruption may be the norm to a situation where corruption is morally intolerable and behaviorally rare? To control corruption, the expected costs of engaging in corruption must be dramatically increased. Public officals must perceive a substantial risk that if they engage in corrupt conduct they will lose their offices, forfeit illegally acquired wealth, and even go to prison. Implementing such sanctions aganist corruption requires an institutional framework to control corruption. Effective and durable corruption control requires multiple, reinforcing, and overlapping institutions of accountability. Where corruption is endemic, these institutions need to be of three kinds: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and external accountability. The primary institutions of horizontal accountability are the law, anti-corruption bodies, the ombudsman's office, public audits, and the judicial system. Institutions of vertical accountability include an independent electoral commission, independent mass media, and nongovernmental organizations. External accountability encompasses extensive international scrutiny and support.
Looking for More from Adjustment : Africa's Experience

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-05) Pape, Elizabeth

By the mid-1990s, after more than 15 years of adjustment lending, it had become clear that adjustment programs in Africa had not accelerated growth or reduced poverty, except in a handful of countries. The main reasons? Recipient governments did not "own" the reform programs, and they perceived the conditionality attached to the programs as being imposed on them. Adjustment programs were often unresponsive to country conditions and changes in external circumstances. In most cases the World Bank and recipient governments did not have a shared vision of what adjustment programs were supposed to achieve. In response to this diagnosis, in 1995 the Bank's Africa Region introduced the Higher Impact Adjustment Lending (HIAL) initiative. The initiative aimed to achieve a quicker, stronger, broader, and longer supply response from structural adjustment programs by: 1) increasing country selectivity and strengthening government ownership; 2) allowing more flexibility in adjustment operations--in particular, introducing new tranching mechanisms; and 3) introducing performance indicators to define expected results and assess actual outcomes. This note describes how the approach and design of these operations were adapted to achieve higher impact.
Using Surveys for Public Sector Reform

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-05) Reinikka, Ritva

Diagnostic surveys can provide vital information for decisionmakers when institutional weaknesses inhibit a more regular flow of information. If strategically designed, a survey can help induce policy change by pointing directly to the main bottlenecks, making it easier for policymakers to find solutions. This note summarizes two cases in Uganda where diagnostic surveys proved particularly useful. The first case involves public spending on health and education; the second considers tax administration from the perspective of taxpaying firms.
Does Debt Management Matter? YES

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-02) Kiguel, Miguel A.

Debt management can reduce financial vulnerability by limiting liquidity, and rollover risks. This note reviews Argentina's debt management strategy, towards improving the country's credit rating to an investment grade, providing flexibility, liquidity, and opportunity. However, the risks of refinancing can be larger for domestic currency debt, than for foreign currency debt. Lessons from Argentina's experience suggest that volatile flows can be dealt with, through prudential regulation in the banking sector, and overall sound policies in capital markets. Furthermore, avoiding the conversion of private debt into public debt, also helped Argentina overcome the crisis; but perhaps, the biggest challenge is to develop new indicators of financial vulnerability, which should put more weight on stocks of debt, and other financial assets, rather than on flow indicators, such as the current account deficit.
New Frontiers in Diagnosing and Combating Corruption

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1998-10) Kaufmann, Daniel ; Pradhan, Sanjay ; Ryterman, Randi

The World Bank has helped Albania, Georgia, and Latvia measure corruption and design strategies to combat it and improve governance. This note explains how empirical surveys can inform and transform the policy dialogue, so that a workable anticorruption agenda can be established. Early results are given as well as emerging conclusions. Also, challenges in performing these surveys are highlighted, as well as in translating survey results into institutional reform priorities.
Corruption and Development

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1998-05) Gray, Cheryl W. ; Kaufman, Daniel

This public sector note analyzes the issue of the growing recognition and discussion of corruption, and in turn facilitates addressing its costs and causes. Through the examination of corruption causes in developing countries and transition economies, it is suggested that prevailing bribery, hence corruption, imposes a significant tax on foreign direct investment in all regions. Thus the cost of capital for firms increases greatly. The note focuses on the creation of a political will and constructive pressure, as well as assistance from international organizations and donors in fighting corruption, by supporting government reforms in economic policies, institutions, and the pursuit of a healthy civil society.