PREM Notes

176 items available

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https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9424

This note series is intended to summarize good practices and key policy findings on poverty reduction and economic management (PREM) topics.

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 12

Building Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity in the Republic of Yemen
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-03) Ivins, Ingrid; Hwang, Helena
This note disseminates key lessons learned from the World Bank financed project in the Republic of Yemen, monitoring and evaluation of the poverty reduction strategy paper and reform programs, which established and operationalized a poverty reduction strategy monitoring unit. The approaches used, such as a study tour to Uganda, focused international training sessions, and the successful work on improving and minimizing the number of indicators, provide some lessons learned for other countries seeking to build monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity. Policy makers learned from Uganda s good practices of connecting accountability with resource allocation and of the importance of a strong and independent statistics office. The Republic of Yemen s experience also illustrates the value of having a powerful M&E champion to support such a significant initiative. Finally, the inclusion of civil society organizations in the planning process and in M&E outputs, especially on the central level and on policy matters, increased popular support and was an important factor in building M&E capacity.
Chile's Monitoring and Evaluation System, 1994-2010
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-08) Dussauge Laguna, Mauricio I.
The Chilean Management Control and Evaluation System (Sistema de Evaluacion y Control de Gestion) is internationally regarded as a successful example of how to put into place a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. Chilean M&E tools are the product of both cross-national lesson-drawing, and national policy learning experiences. The main M&E tools are centrally coordinated by the Ministry of Finance's Budget Office (Direccion de Presupuestos, or DIPRES) and promote the use of M&E information in government decision-making processes, particularly those related to the budget. These M&E tools have been, however, subject to a number of criticisms. As a result, the experience described in this note does not necessarily offer a model that can, or should, be easily transferred to other countries with different institutional contexts. Furthermore, this note does not reflect the latest changes, nor does it try to offer guidance for the future. However, the Chilean experience summarized here, covering the period of 1994-2010, provides interesting examples and highly relevant lessons about the benefits and limitations of M&E design and implementation.
The Canadian Monitoring and Evaluation System
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-06) Lahey, Robert
Performance measurement, monitoring, and evaluation have long been part of the infrastructure within the federal government in Canada. With more than 30 years of formalized evaluation experience in most large federal departments and agencies, many lessons can be gained, not the least of which is the recognition that the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system itself is not static. The Canadian government has a formalized evaluation policy, standards, and guidelines; and these have been modified on three occasions over the past three decades. Changes have usually come about because of a public sector reform initiative such as the introduction of a results orientation to government management, a political issue that may have generated a demand for greater accountability and transparency in government, or a change in emphasis on where and how M&E information should be used in government. This chapter provides an overview of the Canadian M&E model, examining its defining elements and identifying key lessons learned.
The Australian Goverrnment's M&E System
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-03) Mackay, Keith
Countries from all over the world have shown an interest in Australia's experience in creating a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system that supports evidence-based decision making and performance-based budgeting. The Australian M and E system in existence from 1987-97 was generally considered to be one of the most successful and was driven by the federal Department of Finance (DoF). This note discusses the genesis, characteristics, and success of this particular system and briefly considers the Australian government's approach to M and E after the system was abolished. The contrast between these two periods provides many valuable insights into success factors and challenges facing successful M and E systems, and into implementing evidence-based decision making more broadly.
Use of Social Accountability Tools and Information Technologies in Monitoring and Evaluation
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-02) Sharma, Rajiv
This note attempts to cover the basic concepts relating to the use of social accountability and information technology to monitor and evaluate public services and other governance processes that affect citizens. With the help of simple though practical examples that use these concepts, the note explains how to bring a qualitative change in monitoring and evaluation by making the whole process more citizen centered and outcome oriented. In turn, these practices can help improve the quality of service delivery. The note also covers a few country-specific initiatives from India to support the related arguments.
Defining the Type of M&E System : Clients, Intended Uses, and Actual Utilization
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010-09) Briceño, Bertha
This is the second note in a monthly series on government monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems led by the PREM Poverty Reduction and Equity Group under the guidance of Jaime Saavedra, Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, and Keith Mackay, with contributions from several World Bank colleagues. The main purpose of this series is to synthesize existing knowledge about M&E systems and to document new knowledge on M&E systems that may not yet be well understood. The series targets World Bank, donor staff who is working to support client governments in strengthening their M&E systems, as well as government officials interested in learning about the uses and benefits of M&E and in adopting a more systematic approach toward M&E in their governments.
Implementing Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys for Results : Lessons from a Decade of Global Experience
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009-11) Gurkan, Asli; Kaiser, Kai; Voorbraak, Doris
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) can serve as a powerful tool to inform prevailing public financial management (PFM) practices and the extent to which government budgets link to execution and desired service delivery objectives and beneficiaries. Since the first PETS in Uganda in 1996, tracking exercises have now been conducted in over two dozen other countries, often as part of core analytical and advisory work related to PFM. This note synthesizes the findings and lessons from a number of recent PETS stocktaking exercises and indicates their potential benefits for enriching PFM and sectoral policy dialogues in a variety of country settings. Key findings include: (i) PETS have proven to be useful as part of a broader policy strategy aimed at improving service delivery results; (ii) PETS has become a brand name for very different instruments, but at its core there is a survey methodology that requires skilled technical expertise and a solid knowledge of budget execution processes; (iii) policy impact in a variety of PETS experiences could be further strengthened by stronger country ownership and effective follow-up; and (iv) the Bank could enhance PETS results through strategic partnering, and greater emphasis on dissemination and communication strategies aimed at involving actors who can foster actions on the ground.
Reducing Corruption : Lessons from Venezuela
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2000-05) Gonzalez de Asis, Maria
Providing information to the public is an essential but insufficient step in making local government more transparent. A participatory process is also needed, both to ensure accountability and to reinforce healthy relationships between people and government. Empirical data linked to a participatory program for institutional reform are key for eliciting broad interest in administrative organization--enabling citizens to improve municipal management. A recent World Bank program in Campo Elias, Venezuela, used an innovative and effective approach to build participatory institutional frameworks and to apply best practices in public policymaking. As a result corruption has fallen and services are delivered more efficiently. The program, which ran from April 1998 to December 1999, involved the World Bank Institute, the municipal government, and civil society. The experience shows the powerful benefits that come when local political will, technical capacity to execute reforms, and strong partnership with civil society are mixed to enhance efficiency, equity, and transparency.
Mobilizing Civil Society to Fight Corruption in Bangladesh
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-10) Landell-Mills, Pierre
A successful anti-corruption strategy must have a free press to voice public opinion and report cases of corruption, an effective and politically neutral mechanism to investigate and prosecute corruption, and a reliable judicial process to punish wrongdoing when it is proved. It is rare to find all these elements in a developing country. without considerable public pressure, governments are unlikely to foster the transparency and accountability needed to curb malfeasance by public officials. Consequently there is a major role for civil society organizations to campaign for such reforms. This is the mission of the national chapters of Transparency International. This Note discusses the crucial role played by the Bangladesh chapter of Transparency International in pressing for the implementation of corruption reform, publicizing well-researched facts about corruption, and lobbying for additional measures.
Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999-06) Diamond, Larry
Corruption can never be completely or permanently eliminated. The question is, how can it be controlled? How can a country move from a situation where corruption may be the norm to a situation where corruption is morally intolerable and behaviorally rare? To control corruption, the expected costs of engaging in corruption must be dramatically increased. Public officals must perceive a substantial risk that if they engage in corrupt conduct they will lose their offices, forfeit illegally acquired wealth, and even go to prison. Implementing such sanctions aganist corruption requires an institutional framework to control corruption. Effective and durable corruption control requires multiple, reinforcing, and overlapping institutions of accountability. Where corruption is endemic, these institutions need to be of three kinds: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and external accountability. The primary institutions of horizontal accountability are the law, anti-corruption bodies, the ombudsman's office, public audits, and the judicial system. Institutions of vertical accountability include an independent electoral commission, independent mass media, and nongovernmental organizations. External accountability encompasses extensive international scrutiny and support.