Merit, Discrimination, and Democratization—An Analysis of Promotion Patterns in Indonesia’s Civil Service∗ Social Development World Bank April 10, 2018 Abstract What effect does democratization have on meritocratic practices in the civil service? De- mocratization increases performance incentives within the bureaucracy. This leads to more meritocracy for individuals with performance-enhancing characteristics, such as educational attainment, which cross-cut political cleavages. When politicized cleavages align with civil servants’ performance-enhancing characteristics, democratization increases discrimination. We test this argument using administrative data from Indonesia that covers the full universe of ca- reer histories of all 4+ million currently active civil servants. We exploit the exogenous timing of Indonesia’s democratization in 1999, paired with an individual-level panel data design, for identification purposes. We find strong evidence that democratization amplified the positive effects of educational attainment on career advancement but simultaneously worsened the ca- reer prospects of female and religious minority civil servants. We replicate these patterns for the staggered introduction of direct elections at the district government level. The gender and religious minority penalties are strongest for promotions at the lowest levels of the administra- tive hierarchy and for employees of departments under the leadership of conservative Muslim parties. Increased female leadership in the bureaucracy does not alleviate these penalties. ∗ This paper has benefited tremendously from the valuable feedback of Erwin Ariadharma, Lily Hoo, Dewi Susanti, Gael Raballand, Paula Rossiasco, Nils Weidmann, Bill Liddle, Sara Watson, Sarah Brooks, Erin Lin, Patrick Kuhn, Hillary Johnson, Jonathan William Lain, Margaret Roberts, Martin Williams, Saad Gulzar, Mai Hassan, Dan Honig, Kate Baldwin, Dan Mattingly, SP Harish, Priya Mukherjee, Daniel Rogger, Zahid Hasnain, Kanchan Chandra, Leonid Peisakhin, participants at the ESTA Workshop at the University of Konstanz, seminar participants at OSU, seminar participants at Yale University, workshop participants at Johns Hopkins, brownbag participants at the World Bank, and seminar participants at William & Mary and NYU Abu Dhabi. We are indebted to BKN for sharing their data and collaborating on this project and to Yulia Herawati, Findi Firmanliansyah, Titiana Irawati, Fera D Miasari, and Siti Zulva from the World Bank’s Social Development Program for cleaning and putting together the dataset. 1 Introduction Democratization is expected to lead to improved public goods provision (Persson & Tabellini 2000, Besley 2006, Stasavage 2005).1 Given the increased electoral pressure to improve public service delivery, does does a transition from autocracy to democracy also increase meritocratic practices within the civil service? Since meritocratic norms and practices, like advancing the careers of the most skilled bureaucrats irrespective of their political loyalties, are perceived to increase the performance of the civil service (Evans & Rauch 1999, Rauch & Evans 2000, Pepinsky et al. 2017), one might expect as much. Existing empirical research on the emergence of modern “Weberian” states has also linked democratic rule to meritocracy and the passage of civil service reform laws that formally enshrine meritocratic principles (Ting et al. 2013, Theriault 2003). We argue that democratization has a conditional effect on the use of meritocratic practices in the civil service. Democratic accountability generates a performance incentive that increases the value of a capable and meritocratic bureaucracy. Yet competition in a newly democratized country can also intensify the politicization of societal cleavages that were suppressed under autocratic rule. This intensification of identity conflicts can engender increased discrimination in the public realm (Zakaria 1997, Bourne 2012, Bermeo 2016). These conflicts carry over to the civil service, since the bureaucratic state apparatus is one main battle ground in the competition over political power. We contend that a more open and democratic political arena can generate space in which to discriminate against specific identity groups for political gain, which limits (or even reverses) meritocratic advances in the civil service. In practice, this means that when individual markers of potential performance do not align with political cleavages, meritocratic practices can be applied without resistance; when they do, democratization instead engenders increased discrimination. We study this dynamic in the context of Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1999. For 31 years Suharto’s regime exercised firm control over Indonesian politics and society via the military, the ruling Golkar party, and, crucially, the country’s state bureaucracy. Civil servants were tasked with (and rewarded for) executing the will of the autocratic leadership—ranging from collecting 1 While there is some debate over the empirical strength of this claim (Ross 2004), an extensive literature has provided largely supportive evidence across a range of contexts (Huber et al. 2008, Stasavage 2005, Miller 2008, Besley & Burgess 2002, Gerring et al. 2012, Kudamatsu 2012) 1 taxes, executing laws, and providing public goods to spying on their fellow citizens, denying access to government services based on political allegiances, and facilitating rent seeking by regime in- siders. The country’s unexpected transition to democracy placed electorally accountable political leaders in charge of the vast civil service. Yet did this macro-level institutional change towards electoral accountability at the top meaningfully affect the internal operation of Indonesia’s civil service? Specifically, did democratization align the career trajectories and promotion patterns of civil servants with meritocratic principles? Applying our argument to the Indonesian case, we develop observable implications about democ- ratization’s effect on the role of educational attainment, gender, and religion on career advancement in Indonesia’s civil service. Educational attainment is a commonly used proxy for skill and ability in the private sector (Card 1999); it has also been used to measure the quality of public officials (Besley & Reynal-Querol 2011, Ferraz & Finan 2011), and has been found to increase the productivity of politicians and civil servants (Martinez-Bravo 2017, He & Wang 2017). Educational attainment was also not a salient cleavage in Indonesian politics before or after the fall of the Suharto regime. We expect that highly educated civil servants will advance faster and further in their careers after democratization than under autocratic rule because the performance incentives under democratic rule favor competency. At the same time, we expect that female civil servants and religious minori- ties will experience increased discrimination under democracy compared to autocratic rule. While rising gender and religious diversity is likely to increase the productivity of the civil service, due to widening the pool of capable civil servants and reaping the rewards of diverse teams (Rasul & Rogger 2015, Besley et al. 2017, Herring 2009, Pitts 2009), both gender and religion have be- come increasingly politicized in Indonesia’s democracy. During the Suharto era, extreme forms of identity politics and discrimination were kept in check by the need for regime survival (Aspinall 2005, Hefner 2000). Democratization opened the political arena for more conservative Muslim par- ties (Buehler 2008; 2013), the outbreak of ethnic and religious violence (Bertrand 2008, Tajima 2014), and discrimination against religious minorities (Crouch 2011b), which has led to the overall intensified politicization of gender and religious identity. We test these two predictions in the first micro-level study of promotion patterns under a dictatorship that transitioned to a democracy. Our data draw on the full administrative records 2 of Indonesia’s current civil servants, who number over 4 million. We trace back each current civil servant’s career from 1980 up until 2015 and assess the effects of educational attainment, gender, and religion on the probability of promotion before and after democratization. Our research design exploits three levers for causal identification. First, we use the fact that Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1999 was unexpected; thus the regime is unlikely to have changed its hiring and promotion patterns in anticipation of regime change. Second, we include individual-level fixed effects. This allows us to estimate the effects of democratization based purely on within-individual comparisons of career trajectories before and after democratization. Third, we produce estimates for a sample of pre-1999 hires, in case individuals entering the civil service under democratic rule are fundamentally different in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics. We find strong and robust evidence that the premium for educational attainment has substan- tially increased post-democratization. A civil servant with a post-graduate degree doubles his or her chances of promotion under democracy compared to autocratic rule. By contrast, we find that discrimination against women and religious minorities has intensified under democratic rule. We substantiate the importance of elections for producing these patterns by ruling out alterna- tive explanations, like differential rates of educational attainment by gender or the subsequent implementation of decentralization reforms. We also leverage a secondary natural experiment—the staggered introduction of direct elections for district governments—to document that the patterns we observe apply when democratic competition intensifies at the local level. Our findings are most pronounced for promotions in the early stages of an individual’s career and for employees of national ministries headed by members of conservative Muslim parties, and do not abate with increased female leadership in the civil service. Despite the robustness of our results, our study has two important limitations. First, we do not study selection and recruitment into the civil service. Our analysis only covers civil servants’ careers. While norms of meritocracy (or practices of discrimination) for recruitment and promotion are likely to be similar, our findings only speak to the latter. Second, our data do not include information on retired individuals who left the civil service during the study period. However, since the vast majority of civil servants work until retirement, selection bias due to shifting retirement patterns is likely to be limited. 3 Our analysis makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, understanding the conditions under which capable “Weberian” bureaucracies have emerged throughout history is one of the most important questions in comparative politics. Well-known theories emphasize long, his- torical processes of incremental state-building, driven by the threat of war (e.g., Tilly 1990, Thies 2009). We build on work that focuses on the effects of democratization and electoral competition on changes in the civil service (Geddes 1994, Ting et al. 2013). Our findings suggest that democra- tization has meaningful effects on the role of meritocracy in the civil service, but can also generate incentives for increased discrimination. Our paper is the first to draw on micro-level administrative data that covers the full population of civil servants from a developing country before and after democratization. As such, it offers a unique and completely novel empirical view of micro-level changes in a state’s bureaucracy. Second, a growing literature has charted the different ways in which electoral competition can trigger discriminatory practices in democratic regimes (Zakaria 1997, Bourne 2012, Bermeo 2016). This is also related to specific forms of discrimination with respect to gender and ethnic or religious identity. For example, there seems to be little evidence that democratization improves female representation in politics (Paxton et al. 2010, Fallon et al. 2012). Several studies have documented links between the heightened salience of ethnic or religious identities, elevated tensions and increased identity-based discrimination and electoral competition (Chandra 2004, Eifert et al. 2010). Our study adds an important component to this literature. By assessing democratization’s impact on women’s and religious minorities’ representation in the civil service, we shed theoretical and empirical light on the complex interplay among meritocracy, representation, and illiberal tendencies in democracies. Finally, previous studies on the effects of democratization on public goods provision have been characterized by two deficiencies. First, prior work has mostly focused on downstream outcomes, like government expenditures or infant mortality (e.g., Stasavage 2005, Kudamatsu 2012), and has largely neglected the more immediate impacts of institutional change on the management of actual government service providers. Understanding the internal organization, management, and perfor- mance of civil service units in the context of democratic reforms is a crucial first step in the analysis of public goods provision. The second deficiency is that traditional work on democratization has 4 failed to emphasize the incredible lack of turnover in terms of political and bureaucratic personnel that characterizes state institutions even after democratic reforms. While a handful of studies have explored the persistence of autocratic elites and how they shape institutions in the wake of democ- ratization (Albertus & Menaldo 2014), and the consequences of elite persistence on public goods provision after democratization (e.g., Martinez-Bravo 2014, Martinez-Bravo et al. 2017), this line of inquiry has focused on the changing role of the authoritarian political elite. We broaden inquiry along those lines by studying the state itself—specifically, the management of civil servants under different types of political regimes. 2 Autocratic Rule, Democratization, and the Civil Service Meritocracy is an integral component of a modern “Weberian” bureaucracy, which has impor- tant implications for the delivery of public services, growth, and improvements in human welfare (see e.g., Pepinsky et al. 2017, Evans & Rauch 1999). While scholars and policy-makers agree in principle on the core features of an effective civil service—formalized entrance exams, secure tenure, the importance of meritocratic recruitment and promotion, and the non-politicization of jobs—bureaucracies in many countries fall short of that ideal (Rauch & Evans 2000). State bu- reaucracies typically grew out of rulers’ personal staff and traditionally represented pure patronage positions (Grindle 2012).2 Only gradually did modern bureaucratic apparatuses de-emphasize civil servants’ personal loyalty to the ruler. The literature identifies several reasons for the development of modern Weberian bureaucracies. Most prominently, bellicist theories emphasize the need to generate revenue (see e.g., Dincecco 2015, Saylor & Wheeler 2017) and the threat of war (e.g., Tilly 1990, Thies 2009) as core drivers in the development of capable state bureaucracies. A lack of fiscal resources, paired with geo-political insecurity and credible internal threats by the masses (Doner et al. 2005) or specific colonial lega- cies (Kohli 2004) are also associated with the deliberate construction of a legal-rational civil service. For the U.S. context, some have suggested meritocracy is introduced in the bureaucracy when the transaction costs of managing a patronage system rise too high (Johnson & Libecap 1994) or when 2 China is a notable exception: it employed civil service entrance exams for over 1,300 years (Bai & Jia 2016). 5 rising private sector wages become more attractive than brokered civil service appointments (Sorauf 1960). Others have identified the length of head of states’ tenure in office as a main driver of merit adoption in bureaucracies (Lapuente & Nistotskaya 2009). Although some autocracies develop highly capable state bureaucracies due to the reasons men- tioned above, many struggle to abandon the use of patronage to fill jobs in the civil service. This is partially explained by the “loyalty-competence” trade-off in dictatorships (Egorov & Sonin 2011, Zakharov 2016, Zudenkova 2015). Dictators need capable civil servants who can implement their policy agenda. But capable agents can expect to be in high demand by potential future rulers, or could build independent bases of power in the state apparatus with which to launch a challenge to the ruler. This dilemma leads many autocratic rulers to favor mediocre—but loyal —civil servants (such as personal cronies or family members). A personally loyal but low quality civil servant is of little value to a challenger, and hence has nothing to gain from regime change; nor are they likely to build an independent base of power in the bureaucracy. This preference for personal loyalty stands in stark contrast to the ideal type of Weberian bureaucracy, which is characterized by loyalty to the rule of law, bureaucratic procedure, and allegiance to the office of the executive—not the individual occupying it. We focus on the role of an important institutional change that may usher in meritocratic laws and practices in the civil service: democratization. Democratic rule imposes performance incentives on the bureaucracy that make meritocratic practices more valuable to leaders. Democratization entails a variety of institutional, political, and social changes, but at its core requires a change in the rules of leadership selection. Competitive, free and fair elections are the cornerstone of demo- cratic accountability and dramatically affect the incentive structure of rulers. Elections provide a mechanism to hold leaders accountable and make public policy responsive to the preferences of the voting population (Besley 2006). A large empirical literature has documented a positive rela- tionship between democratization, suffrage extensions, and competitive elections and public goods provision (e.g., Huber et al. 2008, Stasavage 2005, Miller 2008, Besley & Burgess 2002, Gerring et al. 2012, Kudamatsu 2012). If voters demand better public services, politicians have an incentive to build an effective state apparatus that can deliver in core areas like health care, education, and basic infrastructure. Com- 6 petitive elections might also generate incentives to create programmatic parties, which in turn increases legislative oversight and limits patronage in the bureaucracy (Cruz & Keefer 2015).3 Incumbent politicians might also abandon the benefits of a politicized bureaucracy in response to specific changes in the competitive environment. Ting et al. (2013) study the introduction of general civil service reforms in the United States and argue that moves toward increased meritocracy in the civil service are most likely in an electoral environment in which politicians have reasonably long time horizons, institutional reforms are costly, and incumbents are expected to lose in the future. In this context, incumbents are wary of a future in which former opposition parties take control of a bureaucratic spoils system and prevent a return of the former incumbent to power for long periods of time. Whichever specific mechanism is at play, electoral competition might be correlated with a reduction in patronage hiring. We agree with previous studies that democratization increases the demand for meritocratic practices in the civil service, but argue that this effect is conditional. Meritocracy requires promot- ing the best-performing civil servants and engaging in general management practices that increase the bureaucracy’s productivity. Observationally, this means promoting civil servants with specific characteristics, such as educational attainment. While not a perfect proxy for civil servants’ qual- ity, skill, or ability, a large literature on human capital in economics has argued that education predicts earnings, which indicates that it proxies for skill—or at least the ability to signal one’s skill level (Card 1999). Educational attainment has also been widely used in the study of political selection and the quality of political candidates (Besley & Reynal-Querol 2011, Ferraz & Finan 2011). For example, a massive expansion of schooling in Indonesia in the 1970s has been found to have increased both the educational attainment of candidates for public office and the quality of public goods provision (Martinez-Bravo 2017). Empirical work on bureaucracies has also found that educated civil servants perform better at poverty alleviation (He & Wang 2017). Rewarding merit in practice is likely to be correlated with promoting better-educated civil servants. Increasing diversity in the bureaucracy is another way to enhance the quality of the civil ser- vice. In many countries, the civil service is heavily male dominated, especially in leadership posi- tions (Rogger 2017, {United Nations} 2015). In many developing countries, the state apparatus is 3 Reliance on patronage jobs can also decline as a function of intra-party competition (Kemahlioglu 2011). 7 also more homogeneous than the wider population in terms of ethnic or religious identity, and is dominated by politically powerful groups, often as a consequence of colonial legacies (Wucherpfen- nig et al. 2016). If the civil service excludes specific identity groups, like women or religious minorities, from promotions ex ante, the pool of high-quality individuals shrinks, thus reducing the chances of promoting the most skilled individuals. Female and minority civil servants might also have a better understanding of (and ability to relate to) recipients of state services, knowledge that is particularly valuable for improving public service delivery (Duflo 2012). More generally, the literature on the productivity of teams has argued that diversity increases performance (Lazear 1999). Diverse teams have an advantage in problem solving for difficult tasks due to differences in perspectives, i.e., ways of formulating problems, and heuristics, i.e., approaches to problem solving (Hong & Page 2001, Herring 2009). Diverse teams are also more likely to be innovative than homogeneous teams (Herring 2009). Work on gender quotas in politics has documented that increasing female representation substantially improves the quality of political leaders (Besley et al. 2017). Empirical work on bureaucracies and firms has also provided evidence that diversity increases employee job satisfaction (Pitts 2009) and productivity (Rasul & Rogger 2015, Herring 2009, Pitts 2009).4 If democratization unconditionally increases the incentives for meritocracy, we would expect promotion premiums for educational attainment to increase, and any pre-existing levels of discrim- ination of female and minority civil servants to decrease during a transition from autocracy to democracy. We argue that this expectation overlooks the extent to which democratization enables the politicization of identity cleavages: when performance-enhancing characteristics of civil servants cross-cut pre-existing political cleavages, democratization will increase their associated career pre- mium. By contrast, when civil servants’ characteristics align with politicized cleavage structures, democratization can lead to increased discrimination, amplifying the associated career penalties. 4 For a general review of the literature, see Shore et al. 2009. 8 2.1 Observable Implications for the Indonesian Context What are the observable implications of this argument in the context of our empirical case In- donesia? Indonesia’s civil service, traditionally dominated by Muslim men loyal to the Suharto regime, would likely generate productivity gains after democratization by promoting highly edu- cated individuals and considering more women and religious minorities for leadership positions in the bureaucracy. This would favor the most skilled civil servants, widen the pool of candidates con- sidered for promotion, lead to a better understanding of the needs of recipients of services provision, and increase productivity via improved problem solving. We contend that of these three characteristics (education, gender, religion), education does not align with political cleavage structures in Indonesia. Educational attainment does not meaningfully structure cleavages in Indonesian politics, and there is no organized political constituency that would find the notion of educated civil servants rising to leadership positions objectionable. Given this lack of politicization, democratization’s increased pressure for improved performance leads to an uninhibited demand for educated civil servants as compared to autocratic rule. While education likely always carried a premium for promotions, even under autocratic rule, we expect this premium to increase as a consequence of democratization: H1 Education: Democratization amplifies the positive effect of education on promotions. By contrast, increasing gender and religious diversity in the civil service in order to improve meritocracy and performance generates more political opposition under democracy in Indonesia. While female and religious minority civil servants were discriminated against under autocratic rule, the overarching goal of regime survival deterred the extreme marginalization of groups. President Suharto enforced clear limits on ethnic and religious discrimination and violence, for example by blocking the ascendancy of radical political parties or hardline Islamic fundamentalists (Aspinall 2005, Hefner 2000). Although Suharto’s regime did not actively elevate many women to positions of power, it did not systematically prevent women from joining the civil service. Even the discrim- ination of ethnically Chinese Indonesians was limited by an informal bargain between the regime and wealthy Chinese businessmen that separated spheres of influence (Chua 2008). Democratization, in turn, weakened the state’s ability to control political conflict over these 9 pre-existing cleavages, which immediately led to an outbreak of religious and ethnic violence in the aftermath of democratization (Bertrand 2004, Tajima 2014). Even though outright violence has dissipated, the country’s democratic political arena substantially changed after the fall of the Suharto regime; more extreme ideologies have found a political voice, representation, and influence. For example, while the electoral fortunes of conservative Muslim parties have fluctuated since 1999, they currently hold seats in many local or regional legislatures and the national parliament (Hamay- otsu 2011). Electoral competition has also led to the passage of local shari’a ordinances in some districts (Buehler 2008). Open discrimination against small religious minority groups, like the Ah- madiya sect, but also restrictions on church construction by mainstream Christian denominations, have increased since 1999 (Crouch 2011a). Increasingly, radical groups like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) have demonstrated their political influence.5 Democracy has allowed for the emergence of an intolerant form of “Islamic populism” (Hadiz 2016). The growing influence of radical Muslim thought has affected the perceived role of women in society, emphasizing more conservative gender roles (Suryakusuma 2012). We argue that while gender and religion are potential characteristics that can be used as heuris- tics to increase productivity in the civil service, both also map onto important political cleavages. The increased politicization of gender and religion in Indonesia’s public sphere has extended to the civil service, and generated political constituencies that object to women or religious minorities holding civil service management positions. While women and religious minorities are likely to have suffered discrimination in the civil service under autocratic rule, we expect this discrimination to have become more unfettered after democratization: H2 Gender and Religion: Democratization amplifies the negative effect of being female or a religious minority on promotions. 5 For example, during Jakarta’s recent 2017 gubernatorial election, the mobilization of conservative Muslims and the FPI resulted in false accusations of blasphemy against the Christian and ethnically Chinese incumbent governor and a win for the Muslim challenger. 10 3 Indonesia’s Civil Service and the Transition to Democracy Indonesia’s civil service has its origins in a system of courtiers from the Javanese aristocracy (priyayi ) and the Dutch colonial administration. The Dutch system of indirect colonial rule em- ployed the indigenous aristocracy as intermediaries, merging the administrative layer of the colonial state with the pre-existing social strata of traditional leaders (Vickers 2005). This created a hybrid between a traditional patrimonial bureaucracy and a Western Weberian conceptualization of the state apparatus (Evers 1987). At the end of the colonial period, Indonesia’s civil administration only numbered around 50,000 individuals; the highest echelons were typically occupied by Dutch citizens (Tjiptoherijanto 2014). After independence in 1945, the Indonesian government, pursu- ing an explicit strategy of state building and rejecting the legacy of Dutch colonial rule, created a unitary government structure. The new civil service replaced the indigenous aristocracy as an extension of the colonial state with a new class of nationalist activists who had fought for indepen- dence. This led to the first drastic expansion of the civil service, which granted enormous influence to political parties in the appointment of civil servants (Feith 1962), leading to the creation of a bloated and ineffective civil service (p. 124-125, Vickers 2005). Between 1965 and 1998 Indonesia was governed by a starkly centralized authoritarian regime under the leadership of General Suharto. After taking power Suharto severed the link between independence-era political parties and the civil service (Warwick 1987). His “New Order” regime centralized decision-making power around the presidency and ruled the country with the help of the military, the ruling party Golkar (Golongan Karya, “functional groups”), and the civil service. The latter two were intimately intertwined. The Golkar party started as an association of functional groups, one of which was of civil servants. Golkar became a political vehicle for the regime and a highly effective tool for winning authoritarian elections. All civil servants were required to support Golkar; they constituted a core support pillar for the New Order regime. Windfall revenue from oil and gas allowed President Suharto to engage in a number of expansive government projects in the 1970s,including the expansion of the civil service (Evers 1987). Law 8/1974 of the New Order regime placed all civil servants under the strict control of the central government. Clientelism and patronage were widespread methods to sustain regime support, and became a constituent feature of the civil service under Suharto (McLeod 2000). This heavily centralized system of 11 autocratic control centered around Suharto and his immediate circle of cronies, who controlled access to positions that allowed the abuse of state power for private gain (McLeod 2008). Merit considerations for promotions in the civil service were clearly subordinate to the goals of rent seeking, political patronage, and maintaining regime stability (McLeod 2008). Indonesia’s sudden transition to democracy, triggered by the East Asian financial crisis, dra- matically changed political institutions. The country began its fast progression towards democratic accountability, holding national and local elections in 1999, while simultaneously passing a massive decentralization reform (Crouch 2010). Indonesia delegated essential government responsibilities to the district level, paired with a system of revenue sharing and regional redistribution. To help districts shoulder these newly acquired responsibilities, over 2 million civil servants, particularly teachers and health care workers, were reassigned to district governments, which reduced the degree of control by national ministries and agencies. Since democratization, Indonesia’s civil service has increased from around 3.6 million in 2006 to roughly 4.5 million (about 1.7% of the population) today; civil servants are employed by 629 national, regional, and local governments and agencies. Its size is comparable to the bureaucracies of other countries in the region (Tjiptoherijanto 2007). This sizable workforce costs the state about 25% of its total revenue. The civil service as a whole operates under the supervision and guidance of three national departments and agencies: the state Ministry for Administrative Reforms (MenPAN, Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara), the National Institute of Public Administration (LAN, Lembaga Administrasi Negara), and the National Civil Service Agency (BKN, Badan Kepegawaian Negara). Civil service is a highly sought after career path in Indonesia; there are generally multiple applicants for each available position. Civil servants are selected via a nationally administered entrance exam, which is plagued by corrupt practices including scams for preparatory courses, the leveraging of familial connections, and the outright purchase of civil service positions (Kristiansen & Ramli 2006, Tidey 2012). Civil servants’ salaries are determined by strict schedules that account for the level of responsibility, local cost of living, and job type. Despite the popularity of civil service jobs, the overall monetary compensation is comparatively low, especially for higher-level jobs in the bureaucracy (Tjiptoherijanto 2014). A number of official and unofficial allowances and non-pecuniary benefits supplement their basic salary (e.g., special allotments of 12 rice, holiday bonuses). While democratization has changed Suharto’s centralized ‘franchise system’ of patronage and corruption in the civil service, corruption has remained a pervasive—and even desired—feature in Indonesia’s civil service given the structurally low level of salaries (McLeod 2000; 2008). Official civil service reforms after democratization have only slowly impacted the actual op- eration of Indonesia’s bureaucracy. Reform law No.43/1999 allowed for increased flexibility to supplement civil servant salaries, depending on the local cost of living, and codified a merit-based personnel management approach. The more ambitious Law No.5/2014 laid the regulatory ground- work for the modernization of the civil service, in particular by codifying the assessment of job performance and merit principles, but substantive change has been slow. The Indonesian civil service has traditionally been dominated by somewhat educated Muslim men, especially in leadership functions. Civil servants’ average educational attainment ranges from some college education to a completed bachelor’s degree among the 25 largest government departments. Within the hierarchy of the civil service, educational attainment increases with rank: top-level officials, on average, have advanced degrees. The smaller role of women in the civil service mirrors bias against women in Indonesia’s private sector (Wright & Crockett Tellei 1993). While political reforms introduced gender quotas for female candidates in legislative elections (Shair- Rosenfield 2012), quotas have not been introduced in the civil service. In 2015, in the two top levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy in national ministries, 72.2% and 78.1% of employees were men, respectively (based on the authors’ calculations). The vast majority of female civil servants are employed as teachers and nurses. While female representation in the civil service has improved since the 1970s, this pattern of male dominance has a long tradition and reflects deep-seated societal norms and biases (Wright & Crockett Tellei 1993, Azmi et al. 2012). Recent surveys of women in the civil service indicate that female civil servants are often overlooked in promotion decisions, or decide to reject offers of promotion because they require relocation to remote provinces (Azmi et al. 2012). Female civil servants are also rarely perceived to be the main breadwinners for their households; instead, they are often expected to put family over career aspirations. These cultural factors have inhibited the career advancement of female civil servants. The civil service overall roughly matches the religious breakdown of the population. In the 13 2010 census 87.18% identified as Muslim, 6.96% as Protestant, 2.91% as Catholic, 1.69% as Hindu, 0.72% as Buddhist, 0.05% as Confucian, and 0.13% as other. Among civil servants the distribution features more religious minorities: 0.82% Muslim, 0.04% Catholic, 0.11% Protestant, 0.02% Hindu and very small numbers of Buddhist, Confucian, or “Other.” At higher ranks within the civil service, religious minorities, i.e., non-Muslims, are less well represented than in the overall civil servant population. Section B in the Appendix provides more detail. 4 Research Design To assess the effects of democratization on promotion patterns in Indonesia’s civil service we use the BKN Civil Servant Database, which was created by the authors, in collaboration with Indonesia’s civil service agency (BKN, Badan Kepegawaian Negara) and the World Bank’s Jakarta office. It contains information on all of the country’s 4+ million currently active civil servants (i.e., it excludes retired employees).6 The data include an individual entry for each civil servant, which details basic characteristics like gender, age, religion, educational attainment, place of birth, current workplace, job type, civil service rank, and date of entry into the civil service.7 We supplement this database with information on each individual’s past job assignments—including workplace, work location, job type, and associated rank—to construct a panel dataset with the civil-servant-year as the unit of analysis. Observations begin when an individual enters the civil service and end in 2015.8 For example, a teacher who started in 1980 would generate a total of 36 civil-servant-year observations. Since the vast majority of civil servants spend their entire 30–40 year career in government service, our data cover a large portion of individuals who were active since the early 1990s. The data thus allow us to observe individual career trajectories before and after Indonesia’s sudden democratization in 1999, which was triggered by the Asian financial crisis (Crouch 2010, Pepinsky 2009). While rumors before this time hinted that Suharto was in poor health and was 6 The database excludes military personnel, police officers, and members of BIN, Indonesia’s spy agency. 7 We have no official information on civil servant salaries, but official remuneration is determined by each civil servant’s rank, job assignment, and age. 8 We restrict our analysis to civil-servant-years after 1980 in order to exclude the small number of individuals who serve longer than the mandatory retirement age allows. 14 unlikely to remain in office much longer (Fisman 2001), neither the eventual timing of his departure nor the regime’s transition to democracy was widely expected. The president and his ruling Golkar party had garnered 74.51% of the popular vote and 76.47% of seats in the legislature in the 1997 elections, which suggests that the regime was still strong at that point. We exploit this sudden, unplanned transition for identification purposes. Since Suharto’s ruling coalition did not anticipate his downfall or an imminent transition to democracy, promotion patterns in the civil service before 1999 very likely followed an established logic that supported the regime’s needs. After 1999, the shift toward democratic elections placed elected politicians in control of the civil service, which might have led to a change in promotion practices. Note that Indonesia serves as a hard test of our theoretical expectations since nearly all of the elites in the military, civil service, and ruling party retained their positions. Democratization might be expected to have changed recruitment patterns into the civil service. For example, more regime-critical individuals might have opted to enter the civil service after 1999, which could have changed the composition of civil servants in terms of either observable or unobservable characteristics. To address this concern, we analyze a sub-sample of our data that only includes individuals hired before 1999. These individuals were subject to the same recruitment process under autocratic rule. For this set of observations we can compare an individual’s chances of promotion before versus after 1999. We estimate the effects of democratization in an event study setting. We observe the effect of civil servants’ individual characteristics on their career trajectories before and after 1999, allowing for the effects to differ: yidpgt = αi + γd + ηp + ρg + τt + β · xit + δ · post-1999t · xrestricted it + idpgt , where yidpgt is a binary dependent variable indicating a promotion event in year t, αi is an individual-level fixed effect, γd is a civil service department fixed effect, ηp a province-of-birth fixed effect, ρg a rank fixed effect (explained below), and τt a year fixed effect. Our analyses always include year effects to model secular changes in promotion patterns, but varying combinations of group fixed effects. In the most lenient specification we combine department and province-of-birth 15 effects, which allows us to estimate the baseline effects of individual characteristics xit . In the most conservative specification we include the more general individual-level fixed effects, which absorb the individual-level covariates and province-of-birth fixed effects. To capture the effects of democratization, we include an interaction term of a post-1999 dummy variable with our set of individual-level predictors of interest (xrestricted it )—education, gender, and religious affiliation. The constituent term for the post-democratization dummy is always absorbed in the year fixed effects. The coefficient δ is our main effect of interest, because it captures the extent to which democratization has changed the effects of individual-level characteristics after the transition to democracy. Overall, causal identification is plausible in this case because the exogenous nature of the de- mocratization reform, paired with our battery of fixed effects, ought to render the influence of unobservable characteristics negligible. We estimate these models using a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) method and cluster standard errors at the individual level.9 4.1 Measurement and Variable Definitions To measure career progression in Indonesia’s civil service we rely on the official echelon classification system, which indicates the level of hierarchy a management-level civil servant has attained (see Figure A4 in the Appendix). We use this system to generate an ordinal variable that captures all possible steps on the bureaucratic career ladder. The vast majority of civil servants (e.g., teachers and health care workers) lack an echelon level (and are thus coded 0) since they have no management responsibilities.10 For civil servants with management responsibilities, official grades range from the lowest level of V to the top levels of Ia and Ib.11 . Civil servants in echelons Ia and 9 All estimations were implemented using the statistical software R version 3.4.2 on Ohio State University’s Unity cluster. 10 These civil servants are typically classified as functional employees. Civil servants who have a minimal grade on the echelon scale are structural employees and have some management responsibilities. 11 While we include echelon V in the analysis, Indonesia’s ASN no longer recognized this level in Indonesia’s Law No. 5 Year 2014 on Civil Service Apparatus 16 Ib include heads of national agencies, inspector generals, and deputy cabinet secretaries.12 . We define the remaining levels of our 0–11 echelon variable to map these ranks accordingly. We use this classification system to create a variable that records a promotion event. Since moving up the echelon scale is the most important indicator of career advancement, we generate a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for each civil-servant-year with a positive change in the echelon variable, and 0 otherwise. For our robustness tests we also use the 0–11 ordinal echelon rank variable as an alternative outcome measure.13 We are primarily interested in the differential effects of educational attainment, gender, and religious affiliation before and after democratization. To measure educational attainment we create a variable that can take six distinct categorical outcomes: elementary school (reference category), junior high school, senior high school, diploma I/II/III (equivalent to one to three years of college), diploma IV/bachelor (four years of college), and post-graduate degree. Gender is a simple dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for individuals identified as female in the database, while religious af- filiation is captured in seven distinct categories: Muslim (reference category), Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Other. In our models without individual-level fixed effects we include two additional covariates that are important predictors of career advancement and might correlate with educational attainment, gender, or religion—a civil servant’s age and their total years of work experience in the civil service; both are simple count variables. The fixed effects cover the individual’s province of birth, to account for the influence of cultural and ethnic networks in the civil service, and department unit fixed effects. The latter control for unobserved confounders at the unit level, to account for the fact that some departments, such as the central bank, might have specific demands for educational attainment or are governed by department-specific norms. Last, some of our model specifications include fixed effects to indicate an individual’s golongan or rank.14 12 Civil servants employed by Indonesia’s district governments (the third, but functionally important, level of government) can attain at most an echelon rank of IIa 13 We also consider a coarser categorical grouping with five outcomes, combining several of the echelon ranks, and our results remain the same. 14 Golongan is a parallel classification scheme that indicates an alternative form of hierarchical attainment. There 17 Figure 1 shows the share of promotions per civil-servant-year among male and female civil servants before and after 1999 (top panel), the same for low (elementary or junior high school) and high (bachelor or post-graduate degree) levels of education, and Muslim versus non-Muslim individuals. The raw percentages suggest five interesting patterns. First, female civil servants experience fewer promotions than their male counterparts across the board. Second, this penalty seems to be larger after 1999. Third, civil servants with higher levels of education have a higher rate of promotion. Fourth, this premium for educational attainment is higher after 1999. Fifth, non-Muslim individuals experience a slightly higher promotion rate, but it is unclear whether this difference has changed substantially post-1999 and which specific groups increased their promotion rates. The next section investigates the extent to which these patterns hold up to more stringent regression analysis. are four ranks an individual can reach, which are largely a function of educational attainment and age. Golongan does not directly indicate career progression in the civil service, since even teachers, who are typically below the echelon classification, can attain the highest rank. However, a minimum golongan is necessary to advance on the echelon scale. 18 1. Pre−1999 2. Post−1999 0.02 Share of Promotions Gender Female Male 0.01 0.00 Female Male Female Male Gender 1. Pre−1999 2. Post−1999 0.025 0.020 Share Promotions 0.015 Education High Low 0.010 0.005 0.000 High Low High Low Education 1. Pre−1999 2. Post−1999 0.015 Share Promotions 0.010 Religion Muslim Non−Muslim 0.005 0.000 Muslim Non−Muslim Muslim Non−Muslim Religion Figure 1: Share of Promotions before and after Democratization by gender, Educational Attainment (high = bachelor or post-graduate degree, low = elementary school or junior high school), and Religion. 19 5 Promotion Results We begin by assessing the effects of educational attainment on promotions. Table 1 displays coefficient estimates for a variety of models. Model (1) is our lenient specification with individual- level covariates, province of birth, department, and year fixed effects. Model (2) replaces province of birth with individual-level fixed effects, and Model (3) adds golongan fixed effects. Models (4)–(6) have the same specifications, but we only use the sample of civil servants who were hired before 1999 to facilitate counterfactual comparisons. Starting with Model (1), the table shows that educational attainment has a positive and statistically significant (below the 1% level) effect on promotions before 1999. For example, civil servants who acquired a post-graduate degree are three percentage points more likely to be promoted in any given year. The unconditional probability of promotion in the sample is only 1.5%, which implies a 200% increase in relative probability for civil servants with post-graduate degrees. Clearly, although loyalty may matter to autocratic rulers, competence was still rewarded in Indonesia’s civil service before 1999. The interaction terms in Model (1) indicate that the premium for educational attainment in- creased after 1999. In effect, the same civil servant with a post-graduate education experienced an additional three-percentage-point increase in the probability of being promoted after 1999 vs. before the transition, which represents a doubling of the education premium. The same is true for nearly all categories of educational attainment above elementary schooling. Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities implied by Model (1) for the effects of post-graduate education before and after 1999. Models (2) and (3) provide additional evidence of this shift in the value of education in pro- motion decisions. While in these models we cannot identify the baseline premium for educational attainment before 1999, we can still estimate the differential change after democratization. In both models we find clear evidence that the premium for education increased under democracy. Models (4)–(6) provide further support for this pattern. Even when we restrict our sample to individuals hired before 1999, we still find statistically and substantively important effects of democratization on the premium associated with educational attainment. The increase in promotion probabilities ranges across models and levels of education from 1–3 percentage points. 20 This provides strong support for Hypothesis 1, indicating that democratic oversight has dra- matically shifted promotion patterns within the civil service and strengthened meritocratic norms that favor highly educated individuals. Table 1: Promotion Analysis: Education Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post-Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 0.0001 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.002 −0.003 (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post-Democratization 0.0003 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Education: Senior High*Post-Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post-Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post-Democratization 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) Education: Post-Graduate*Post-Democratization 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674125) 0.11 (df = 48153553) 0.11 (df = 48153537) 0.11 (df = 30130174) 0.10 (df = 29137554) 0.10 (df = 29137538) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. ∗∗ Significantat the 5% level. ∗ Significantat the 10% level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 21 Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Promotion for Low and High Levels of Educational Attainment before and after Democratization 22 Table 2 presents the same set of models but with a focus on the effect of gender. Model (1) indicates that female civil servants before 1999 were, on average, 0.2 percentage points less likely to be promoted than comparable men. This penalty is equivalent to 13% of the baseline probability of promotion. This penalty for women increased by a full percentage point post-1999: the interaction term between gender and the post-1999 dummy is estimated at −0.01, which is statistically signif- icant below the 1% level. Figure 3 compares the predicted probabilities of promotion for male and female civil servants pre- and post-1999, based on Model (1). We find nearly identical estimates for this increase in the penalty across Models (2)–(6). Regardless of the specification or sample, the data clearly indicate that democratization has substantially worsened the career prospects of female civil servants, which supports Hypothesis 2. 23 Table 2: Promotion Analysis: Gender Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post-Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 −0.0001 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.002 −0.003 (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post-Democratization −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674129) 0.11 (df = 48153557) 0.11 (df = 48153541) 0.11 (df = 30130178) 0.10 (df = 29137558) 0.10 (df = 29137542) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. ∗∗ Significantat the 5% level. ∗ Significantat the 10% level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 24 Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Promotion for Male and Female Civil Servants before and after Democratization 25 Another way to test Hypothesis 2 is to look at the representation of religious minorities in the civil service. We explore the role of bias against minority religions by interacting our dummy variables for religious affiliation with the post-1999 dummy. Table 3 presents our main findings. Model (1) indicates that affiliates of minority religions generally suffered a career penalty prior to 1999. Protestants, Catholics, and especially Confucians all experienced statistically significant penalties compared to Muslim civil servants. This penalty generally increased after 1999 when we focus on the models with individual-level fixed effects— despite the overall increase in the share of non-Muslim civil servants. In particular, we find a fairly consistent pattern of increased discrimination against Protestant, Confucian, and Hindu civil servants. Each of these categories experienced a consistent penalty post-1999 that diminishes the position of these minority groups. While the increase in the penalty is quite substantial for Hindu and Confucian civil servants, the effect is very small for Protestants. There is no evidence of changes in promotion rates for Catholic or Buddhist civil servants. Figure 4 visualizes the effect of being Confucian before and after democratization (the figure is based on Model (1) to be consistent with earlier figures); it is unsurprising that the effects are largest for the Confucian category, because Confucian civil servants are nearly universally ethnically Chinese and subject to widespread exclusion.15 Overall, while the representation of non-Muslim civil servants has increased in Indonesia’s civil service post-1999 and Figure 2 also indicates an increase in promotions, this has not led to uniformly better promotion chances for all religions after controlling for other covariates. There is a substantial amount of variation in changes to promotion rates after 1999 across different non-Muslim categories. 15 Given that Ethnic Chinese Indonesians, the most excluded minority category, often identify as Catholic or Protestant, we are likely underestimating the degree of discrimination experienced by this group. 26 Table 3: Promotion Analysis: Religion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post-Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.002 0.002 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.02∗ −0.02∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.001 0.002 (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post-Democratization 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ −0.0003∗ −0.0004∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Catholic*Post-Democratization −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0004 0.0000 −0.0004 −0.0004 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Buddhist*Post-Democratization −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) Hindu*Post-Democratization −0.001∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) Confucian*Post-Democratization −0.01 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) Other*Post-Democratization −0.004 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 (0.01) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674124) 0.11 (df = 48153552) 0.11 (df = 48153536) 0.11 (df = 30130173) 0.10 (df = 29137553) 0.10 (df = 29137537) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. ∗∗ Significantat the 5% level. ∗ Significantat the 10% level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 27 Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Promotion for Muslims and Confucians before and after De- mocratization 28 6 Robustness Checks & Mechanisms Our main findings indicate that democratization has increased the premium on educational attain- ment but simultaneously lowered it for female civil servants and some religious minorities. In this section we report a number of robustness checks for the overall results and then implement a series of auxiliary tests to further unpack the underlying mechanism. 6.1 Model Specification To investigate whether our model specification affects our results, instead of using the binary promotion event as our outcome variable, we repeat the estimations in Tables 1, 2, and 3, using the 0–11 ordinal echelon level as the dependent variable. This change has no impact on our substantive findings of the effect of democratization when estimated via OLS (see Section D in the Appendix) or an ordered probit model (see Section E).16 6.2 Variation by Year To test whether the effects of education, gender, and religion truly changed as a consequence of the democratization in 1999, we use a flexible specification that interacts our variables of interest with the year dummies. This allows us to trace changes in the effects of education, gender, and religion over the full time period. We estimate the same models as before, but for simplicity, we construct a single dummy variable indicating higher educational attainment, based on whether a civil servant has completed a bachelor’s degree or acquired a post-graduate degree and a simple non-Muslim dummy for religion. Appendix Tables A7, A8, and A9 report regression coefficients for the interaction terms. Figure 5 shows the varying differential effects by year above the baseline effects. The patterns strongly support our initial findings. The top panel shows that the higher education premium dramatically shifted upward in 2001. Similarly, the penalty for female civil servants increased substantially in 2001. This is plausible since the transition to democracy likely took 1–2 years before any change in the top political leadership had real effects on promotion patterns in the civil service. The shift is a bit weaker for the penalty for non-Muslim civil servants, 16 For the ordered probit model we rely on an 8% random sample due to memory problems in the estimation. 29 likely due to heterogeneity within the non-Muslim category. Nonetheless, the plot indicates that the penalty became statistically significantly more negative after 1999. 30 Effect of Education 0.000 0.005 0.010 q 1981 q 1982 q 1983 q 1984 q 1985 q 1986 q 1987 Baseline by Year q 1988 q 1989 q 1990 q 1991 q 1992 q 1993 q 1994 q 1995 q 1996 q Democratization 1997 q Non−Muslim Effect 1998 q 1999 q 2000 q 2001 −0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010 q 2002 q q 1981 2003 q q 1982 2004 q q 1983 2005 q q 1984 2006 q q 1985 2007 q 1986 q 2008 q q 1987 2009 q q 1988 2010 q 1989 q 2011 q 1990 q 2012 q 1991 q 2013 q 1992 q 2014 q 1993 q 2015 q 1994 q 1995 q 31 1996 q Democratization 1997 Female Effect q 1998 q 1999 q 2000 −0.015 −0.010 −0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010 q 2001 q q 2002 1981 q q 2003 1982 q q 2004 1983 q q 2005 1984 q q 2006 1985 q q 2007 1986 q q 2008 1987 q q 2009 1988 q q 2010 1989 q q 2011 1990 q q 2012 1991 q q 2013 1992 q q 2014 1993 q q 2015 1994 q 1995 q 1996 q Democratization 1997 q 1998 q 1999 q 2000 q 2001 q 2002 q 2003 q 2004 q 2005 q 2006 q 2007 q 2008 q 2009 q 2010 q 2011 q 2012 q 2013 q 2014 q 2015 Figure 5: Differential Effect of the Education Premium, Gender, and Religion Penalty over the 6.3 Decentralization Figure 5 shows a structural break around 2001, which might indicate that the 2001 decentraliza- tion reforms, rather than the macro-level introduction of democratic accountability, caused the observed shifts in the promotion patterns within Indonesia’s civil service. As mentioned above, the decentralization reforms instituted electoral accountability at the local level and transferred primary responsibility for public services like education and health care to the district level, which involved re-assigning more than 2 million civil servants from the central government to the district governments. To determine whether this transfer of oversight responsibility was the real driver of changes in promotion patterns,17 we re-ran our regressions excluding individuals who were trans- ferred to district governments from our sample. Section G reports the results for the education and gender models (see Tables A10, A11, and A12), which indicate that employees unaffected by the decentralization reforms still experienced an increase in their educational premium and the penalty for female and religious minority civil servants. Therefore we are reasonably confident that an increase in democratic accountability, rather than decentralization, is driving our results. 6.4 Local Elections To further demonstrate that changes to political accountability —not decentralization —are driving our findings, we exploit the introduction of direct local elections in 2005. District governments are headed by local mayors who were previously elected indirectly via local legislatures. This process was fraught with political corruption and backroom deals, and produced local leaders who were not particularly accountable to the local population. The 2005 electoral reform created a much more competitive local electoral process (Erb & Sulistiyanto 2009), and we exploit its staggered introduction over a five-year period for identification purposes. The timing of the introduction of direct elections was determined by the end terms of sitting incumbents, which in turn depended on their dates of appointment under the Suharto regime. Thus from 2005 onward, district governments successively switched to direct and more competitive local elections, allowing us to generate an 17 Although the decentralization reforms increased local political accountability and mirror the country’s national- level shift to democracy, an effect driven by political decentralization would lead us to a slightly different interpretation of our findings. 32 exogenously determined indicator of treatment. This natural experiment has already been exploited by a number of previous studies (e.g., Skoufias et al. 2014, Pierskalla & Sacks 2017). We create a subset from our original panel of civil servants, selecting only district-level employees in the post- 2000 period, to test whether the introduction of local elections had a similar impact on the effects of education, gender, and religion. Given that district heads are the final arbiters of promotions within district governments and the timing of the introduction of local direct elections varies across years, we have a powerful design to check the robustness of our initial results. We estimate the following type of model: yidpgt = αi +γd +ηp +ρg +τt +κ·zdt +β ·xit +η ·Local Electionsit +δ ·Local Electionsit ·xrestricted it + idpgt This model has a similar structure to our initial specification, but includes district government fixed effects γd instead of the more general department fixed effects, the same set of individual-level controls xit , and additional, time-varying district-level control variables zdt . We include a dummy variable for incumbent district heads running for re-election, the effective number of parties in the local legislature, the vote share of the Golkar and PDI-P party in the local legislature, an index of the quality of local services provision,18 natural resource revenue per capita, total revenue per capita, a Gini index of consumption inequality, logged total population of the district, the number of people below the poverty line per capita, and logged GDP per capita. The main difference to our prior specification is the inclusion of a time-varying binary indicator of the introduction of local elections, Local Elections, which we also interact with the categorical education measure, the gender dummy, and religious affiliation. We estimate the same set of models as in Tables 1, 2, and 3, varying the set of fixed effects and excluding post-1999 hires. Tables A13, A14 and A15 in the Appendix report our findings. We find two noteworthy patterns. First, we find that the introduction of direct elections has increased promotion rates overall (except for civil servants with only primary education). Second, the introduction of direct elections has shifted the premium and penalty of educational attainment and gender, respectively. As before, we find that educational attainment has a positive effect 18 Based on access to safe water, safe sanitation, enrollment levels, the presence of asphalt roads, and the number of births attended by skilled staff. 33 on promotion rates before a district government switches to a system of direct elections. This effect increases, and the difference is statistically significant for most educational categories. Our finding that the change in effect size is typically smaller than in our national sample is plausible, since democratization already has an overall national effect, and highly educated civil servants have fewer opportunities to advance in district governments compared to national ministries. For female civil servants, we find the same patterns as before. In district governments before the introduction of direct elections, women experienced a one-percentage-point penalty in their chance of being promoted. After the introduction of direct elections this effect worsens by 0.4–1 percentage point, depending on the model (the interaction effect is consistently statistically significant at the 1% level). We find the same for religious minorities. In particular, Confucian, Hindu, and Other religious affiliation leads to an increased promotion penalty after the introduction of direct elections. These findings enhance the credibility of our main results and provide further evidence that changes in electoral accountability, not decentralization or other, possibly unobserved contemporaneous shocks, caused the changes to the education premium and gender and religion penalty. 6.5 Alternative Explanations for Gender Bias In this section we attempt to further unpack the penalty for female civil servants. One mechanism could be that women experienced an increased penalty post-1999 because the simultaneous in- creased demand for highly educated civil servants disadvantaged women. If men have better access to family resources, they are more likely to acquire educational credentials. Although Indonesia has a better record in female educational attainment than other Muslim-majority countries, evidence shows that men have traditionally received more access (Oey-Gardiner 1991). Increased demand for educational attainment, paired with the limited supply of highly educated females, could generate our observed patterns. To explore whether this is the case, we estimate models that include triple interactions between gender, education, and democratization (see Table A20 in the Appendix). We find that it is not: the additional penalty for women as a consequence of the transition to democracy persists even at the highest levels of educational attainment. It could also be the case that women’s labor market opportunities improved after 1999 more generally, and therefore that the most qualified female civil servants left government service and, by 34 extension, our sample. However, we believe sample attrition is unlikely to explain our findings. In general, few civil servants leave government service prematurely, due to the threat of lost pensions. We also find no evidence that women left the civil service in rising numbers after 1999. Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the share of female civil servants in district and provincial governments from 2005–2015, calculated using BKN aggregate data summaries. There is no indication of a substantial reduction in the number of female civil servants in the government workforce; in fact, there was a slight increase during this time period. Other research also suggests that labor market opportunities for women, especially in the formal sector, have not substantially improved since 1999: women still enjoy fewer chances to enter the labor market and experience pay discrimination (Oey-Gardiner 1999, Buchori & Cameron 2012). One important factor that might affect women’s career prospects in the context of democrati- zation is the degree to which female leadership controls promotion decisions. Using our database, we calculate for each department the share of women at the highest echelon ranks (Ia and Ib). We include this variable as an additional control in our models and further interact it with the gender variable and the democratization dummy. We find two noteworthy results (see Table A16 in the Appendix). First, female leadership leads to more promotions after democratization compared to before. Second, this increased rate of promotions benefits men, not women. Under democratic rule, female leaders in Indonesia’s civil service are likely to favor male civil servants over females. This is in line with our argument that stresses the rising politicization of specific identity cleav- ages like gender, such that even high-level female civil servants have to secure their influence by disproportionately promoting men. 6.6 Islamic Party Ministers and Changing Attitudes 6.7 Islamic Party Ministers and Changing Attitudes Another way of testing the discrimination mechanism for gender and religion is to exploit the party affiliation of Indonesian ministers in the post-1999 era. Indonesian governments have featured a broad range of parties in oversized cabinets, which has elevated members of conservative Muslim parties to positions of influence. If our suggested mechanism is correct, we would expect female and religious minority employees of ministries led by the most conservative ministers to experience 35 larger promotion penalties than employees of other government units. To test this theory, we coded the party affiliations of all ministers from 1999 to 2015. We classify a minister to be religiously conservative if he or she belongs to one of the parties considered to be “Islamist” instead of “Islam- inclusive” or “secular-inclusive” (following Baswedan 2004. See also Mietzner 2014). We focus on our sample of national-level employees from 1999 onwards. We interact a dummy variable for ministry leadership by a conservative Islamic party with our gender and religious affiliation dummies. Appendix Tables A18 and A19 report our results. As expected, we find that in democratic Indonesia the promotion penalty for female civil servants is larger in ministries led by members of conservative Islamic parties. We find a similar, albeit weaker, pattern for religious affiliation. Civil servants with a religion identified as “other” experience a stronger promotion penalty under Islamic party leadership. The lower level of statistical significance might simply be because there are few minority (e.g., Confucian) civil servants in national ministries. For a final piece of suggestive evidence, we consider changes in cultural attitudes at the mass- level. If democratization has led to the rise of political actors that champion more conservative gender and religious norms, we also would expect to observe associated changes in attitudes at the mass level. To investigate this, we turn to the World Value Survey from 1999 and 2006. We identified a series of questions that capture attitudes about gender and religious norms and were included in both rounds of the survey. We compare responses to questions about whether politicians should believe in god, whether attending university is more important for boys than girls, whether men make better leaders, and if being a housewife is as valuable as working. The comparison of responses between 1999 and 2006 reveals that in this time period attitudes have become more conservative with respect to the role of religion and traditional gender roles. This is consistent with our argument about increased discrimination as a consequence of the politicization of cleavages after democratization. Finally, the Appendix includes sections on the role of patronage politics (N), the role of Javanese origin (O), and the heterogeneity of effects across ranks in the hierarchy (P). The latter analysis indicates that our results are strongest for initial promotions to the echelon hierarchy. 36 7 Conclusion In this paper we analyze the micro-level effects of democratization on career trajectories in the civil service. Dictators often face a difficult trade-off between promoting capable or loyal bureaucrats to positions of power. Promoting purely on merit and disregarding personal loyalty elevates the risk that powerful bureaucrats will conspire against the ruler and replace him or her. This implies that dictatorships are unlikely to strongly emphasize merit when deciding who to promote. Democracies, by contrast, are under popular pressure to improve the provision of public goods and services. We argue that this general pressure for greater meritocracy in a democracy’s civil service is conditioned by pre-existing political cleavages. If civil servants’ performance-enhancing characteristics cross-cut political cleavages, democratization leads to the implementation of meritocratic practices. For ob- servable markers that align with these political cleavages, democratization increases discrimination. In Indonesia, this perverse effect is due to the increase in the politicization of gender and religion. Democratization has opened up the political arena to empower political actors with more radical ideologies that oppose gender and religious equality. We test our two hypotheses using a unique natural experiment in Indonesia. The sudden and unplanned transition to democracy in 1999 allows us to compare promotion practices during and after authoritarian rule. We draw on detailed, micro-level information on all currently active civil servants in Indonesia. This allows us to study the effects of education, gender, and religion before and after 1999, only relying on within-individual variation. We find clear evidence that the premium for educational attainment has increased substantially post-1999. At the same time, we find that career advancement for women and religious minorities has worsened under democratic rule. While our findings are specific to Indonesia, its experience is not atypical in the developing world. Its large state apparatus, high levels of ethnic and religious diversity, traditional gender norms, and history of both autocratic and democratic rule make it a useful case to shed light on the internal operation of a civil service under dictatorship and democracy. We leave it to future work to test whether our findings generalize to other cases and contexts. Conceptually, our findings indicate that democratization has profound effects on practices in the civil service, but not always as predicted by theories of democratic accountability. 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Social Choice and Welfare, 44(3), 473–492. 46 A The Echelon Hierarchy 47 President Cabinet Echelon Ia: Secretary General, Director General, Head of Agency Echelon Ib: Staff Member, Regional Secretary Echelon IIa: Head of Bureau, Expert Staff of Governor Echelon IIb: Head of Regional Bureau, Expert Staff of Mayor Echelon IIIa: Head of Division, Head of Regional Office, Subdistrict Head Echelon IIIb: Secretary of Subdistrict Echelon IVa: Head of Subdivision, Urban Village Head Echelon IVb: Secretary of Urban Village Echelon Va: Head of Senior Highschool Functional Employees: Accountant, Teacher, Nurse, Agricultural Extension Worker Figure A1: The Echelon Hierarchy 48 B Descriptive Overview Table A1: Average Education, Share of Women, and Religious Affiliation Across Echelon Levels Echelon Avg Edu % Female % Muslim % Catholic % Protestant % Hindu % Buddhist % Confucian % Other Echelon Ia, Ib 5.713 0.276 0.888 0.032 0.067 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 Echelon IIa, IIb 5.761 0.163 0.792 0.047 0.140 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 Echelon IIIa, IIIb 5.645 0.215 0.791 0.048 0.141 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.000 Echelon IVa, IVb, V 4.627 0.349 0.817 0.042 0.121 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 All Civil Servants 3.600 0.494 0.823 0.042 0.111 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 49 C Raw Distribution of Echelon Ranks 50 1. Pre−1999 2. Post−1999 1. Pre−1999 2. Post−1999 5 6 4 4 3 Density Density Gender Education Female High Male Low 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Echelon Level Echelon Level (a) Gender (b) Education 1. Pre−1999 2. Post−1999 4 Density Religion Muslim Non−Muslim 2 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Echelon Level (c) Religion Figure A2: Distribution of echelon ranks (excluding 0) before and after democratization and various sub-groups. 51 D Echelon-Level as Dependent Variable Table A2: Echelon Analysis: Education Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.17∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.48∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.21∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.08∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.04∗ −0.03 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.05∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.29 −0.38∗∗∗ (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.06 −0.06 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.01∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 0.23∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 0.20∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 0.47∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 1.11∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,835 51,674,835 51,674,835 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.17 0.67 0.67 0.13 0.51 0.51 Adjusted R2 0.17 0.65 0.65 0.13 0.49 0.49 Residual Std. Error 1.04 (df = 51674126) 0.67 (df = 48153554) 0.67 (df = 48153538) 0.88 (df = 30130174) 0.68 (df = 29137554) 0.68 (df = 29137538) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 52 Table A3: Echelon Analysis: Gender Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.23∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.23∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.52∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 1.38∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.08∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.04∗ −0.03 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.06∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.32 −0.40∗∗∗ (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.06 −0.06 (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.28∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,835 51,674,835 51,674,835 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.16 0.67 0.67 0.13 0.51 0.51 Adjusted R2 0.16 0.65 0.65 0.13 0.49 0.49 Residual Std. Error 1.04 (df = 51674130) 0.68 (df = 48153558) 0.68 (df = 48153542) 0.89 (df = 30130178) 0.68 (df = 29137558) 0.68 (df = 29137542) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 53 Table A4: Echelon Analysis: Religion Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.08∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.09∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.04 −0.02 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.05∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.47∗ −0.34∗∗ (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.04 −0.02 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.21∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.24∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.24∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.53∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 1.39∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.03∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) Catholic*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Buddhist*Post Democratization 0.001 0.002 0.002 −0.01 0.002 0.002 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.01∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ 0.01 −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) Confucian*Post Democratization 0.19 −0.16∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ (0.24) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) Other*Post Democratization −0.03 −0.005 −0.005 −0.06 −0.005 −0.005 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,835 51,674,835 51,674,835 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.16 0.67 0.67 0.12 0.50 0.50 Adjusted R2 0.16 0.65 0.65 0.12 0.49 0.49 Residual Std. Error 1.04 (df = 51674125) 0.68 (df = 48153553) 0.68 (df = 48153537) 0.89 (df = 30130173) 0.68 (df = 29137553) 0.68 (df = 29137537) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 54 E Ordinal Probit Model 55 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Female −0.82∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Post Democratization 6.18∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 6.13∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) Age 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 2.03∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) Education: Senior High 4.13∗∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗ 4.13∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) Education: Diploma I/II/III 3.18∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) Education: Diploma IV/S1 4.96∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) Education: Post-Graduate 6.17∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 6.16∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) Protestant 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) Catholic 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ −0.05 (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) Buddhist −0.39∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.02 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) Hindu −0.27∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) Confucian −9.22∗∗∗ −13.14∗∗∗ −7.50∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ −3.86∗∗∗ (0.17) (0.17) (0.09) Years in Civil Service −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female:*Post Democratization −0.10∗∗∗ (0.03) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.16 (0.18) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 1.49∗∗∗ (0.09) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 2.43∗∗∗ (0.10) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 2.08∗∗∗ (0.09) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 2.59∗∗∗ (0.09) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.27∗∗∗ (0.04) Catholic*Post Democratization 0.21∗∗∗ (0.06) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.38∗∗∗ (0.04) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.28∗∗∗ (0.06) Confucian*Post Democratization −2.11∗∗∗ (0.00) Other*Post Democratization 4.56∗∗∗ (0.09) Num. obs. 4832515 4832515 4832515 ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05 Table A5: Ordered Probit, with year fixed effects 56 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Female −0.90∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) Post Democratization 7.35∗∗∗ −1.67∗∗∗ 7.29∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Education: Junior High 3.40∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.16) (0.07) Education: Senior High 5.19∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 5.19∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) Education: Diploma I/II/III 3.75∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 3.75∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) Education: Diploma IV/S1 5.37∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) Education: Post-Graduate 6.32∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗ 6.32∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) Age 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) Catholic −0.02 −0.02 −0.11 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) Buddhist −0.37∗ −0.37∗ 0.24∗∗ (0.17) (0.17) (0.09) Hindu −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ 0.08 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) Confucian −14.74∗∗∗ −14.70∗∗∗ −12.87∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other −12.84∗∗∗ −12.86∗∗∗ −9.96∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.13∗∗∗ (0.03) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 7.77∗∗∗ (0.18) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 8.87∗∗∗ (0.04) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 9.31∗∗∗ (0.06) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 8.88∗∗∗ (0.04) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 9.13∗∗∗ (0.04) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.02 (0.04) Catholic*Post Democratization 0.10 (0.06) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.70∗∗∗ (0.08) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.31∗∗∗ (0.06) Confucian*Post Democratization −2.40∗∗∗ (0.00) Other*Post Democratization −3.20∗∗∗ (0.00) Num. obs. 2604898 2604898 2604898 ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05 Table A6: Ordered Probit Models with only employees hired before 1999 and year fixed-effects 57 F Varying Effect by Year Table A7: Promotion Analysis: Education, Varying Effects by Year Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Higher Education 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) 1981*Higher Education 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1982*Higher Education 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1983*Higher Education 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1984*Higher Education 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1985*Higher Education 0.002∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0001 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0001 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1986*Higher Education 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1987*Higher Education 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1988*Higher Education 0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1989*Higher Education 0.004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1990*Higher Education 0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1991*Higher Education 0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1992*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1993*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1994*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1995*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1996*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1997*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1998*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 1999*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2000*Higher Education 0.01∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0003 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2001*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2002*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2003*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2004*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2005*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2006*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2007*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2008*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2009*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2010*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2011*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2012*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2013*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2014*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2015*Higher Education 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0004 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.02 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674099) 0.11 (df = 48153523) 0.11 (df = 48153507) 0.11 (df = 30130148) 0.10 (df = 29137524) 0.10 (df = 29137508) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 58 Table A8: Promotion Analysis: Gender, Varying Effects by Year Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Female 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) 1981*Female −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1982*Female −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1983*Female −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1984*Female −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1985*Female −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1986*Female −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1987*Female −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1988*Female −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1989*Female −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1990*Female −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1991*Female −0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1992*Female −0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1993*Female −0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1994*Female −0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1995*Female −0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1996*Female −0.01∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1997*Female −0.01∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1998*Female −0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1999*Female −0.01∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 2000*Female −0.01∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 2001*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2002*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2003*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2004*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2005*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2006*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2007*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2008*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2009*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2010*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2011*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2012*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2013*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2014*Female −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2015*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674095) 0.11 (df = 48153523) 0.11 (df = 48153507) 0.11 (df = 30130144) 0.10 (df = 29137524) 0.10 (df = 29137508) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 59 Table A9: Promotion Analysis: Religion, Varying Effects by Year Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Non-Muslim −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) 1981*Non-Muslim −0.0000 −0.0003∗ −0.0003∗ −0.0001 −0.0003∗ −0.0003∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1982*Non-Muslim −0.0002 −0.0004∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0004∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1983*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0003 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1984*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0002 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1985*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1986*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1987*Non-Muslim −0.001∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗ −0.001∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1988*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1989*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1990*Non-Muslim −0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 −0.001∗ 0.0003 0.0003 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1991*Non-Muslim −0.0000 0.0005∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ −0.0002 0.0005∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1992*Non-Muslim −0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 −0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1993*Non-Muslim 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 −0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1994*Non-Muslim 0.001∗ 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1995*Non-Muslim 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1996*Non-Muslim 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1997*Non-Muslim 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1998*Non-Muslim −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 1999*Non-Muslim −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0004 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 2000*Non-Muslim −0.0004 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2001*Non-Muslim 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2002*Non-Muslim −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0002 −0.0000 −0.0000 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2003*Non-Muslim −0.001 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0004 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2004*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0004 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2005*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0003 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2006*Non-Muslim 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2007*Non-Muslim −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.001∗ −0.001∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2008*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 2009*Non-Muslim 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 2010*Non-Muslim −0.0001 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 2011*Non-Muslim −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 2012*Non-Muslim −0.0002 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 2013*Non-Muslim −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2014*Non-Muslim 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 2015*Non-Muslim 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.02 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674104) 0.11 (df = 48153523) 0.11 (df = 48153507) 0.11 (df = 30130153) 0.10 (df = 29137524) 0.10 (df = 29137508) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significant at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 60 G National Employees Table A10: Promotion Analysis: Education, National Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ −0.0001 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.002 0.003 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 0.005∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 8,064,868 8,064,868 8,064,868 3,532,868 3,532,868 3,532,868 R2 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.14 (df = 8064702) 0.13 (df = 7423345) 0.13 (df = 7423329) 0.14 (df = 3532705) 0.13 (df = 3414818) 0.13 (df = 3414802) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 61 Table A11: Promotion Analysis: Gender, National Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.001∗∗ −0.001 (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.001 −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.001 0.003 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 8,064,868 8,064,868 8,064,868 3,532,868 3,532,868 3,532,868 R2 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.14 (df = 8064706) 0.13 (df = 7423349) 0.13 (df = 7423333) 0.14 (df = 3532709) 0.13 (df = 3414822) 0.13 (df = 3414806) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 62 Table A12: Promotion Analysis: Religion, National Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01 0.02∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.0000 0.001 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.02 0.02 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.001 −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Catholic*Post Democratization 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.001 0.01 0.01 0.02∗ 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Confucian*Post Democratization −0.003 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Other*Post Democratization −0.02∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ (0.01) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 8,064,868 8,064,868 8,064,868 3,532,868 3,532,868 3,532,868 R2 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.14 (df = 8064701) 0.13 (df = 7423344) 0.13 (df = 7423328) 0.14 (df = 3532704) 0.13 (df = 3414817) 0.13 (df = 3414801) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 63 H Local Elections 64 Table A13: Promotion Analysis: Local Elections and Education Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Education: Junior High 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Elected Leader −0.004∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.01∗ −0.01∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Incumbency −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) ENP 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Golkar Share 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) PDI-P Share 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Services Provision 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Natural Resource Revenue pc 0.00∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Gini Index −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) Total Revenue pc 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Log(Population) −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Poverty pc −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Log(GDP pc) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Education: Junior High*Elected Leader −0.0000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Education: Senior High*Elected Leader 0.001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Elected Leader 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Elected Leader 0.004∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Post-Graduate*Elected Leader 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 10,485,948 10,485,948 10,485,948 5,971,194 5,971,194 5,971,194 R2 0.03 0.26 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.25 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.13 (df = 10485464) 0.12 (df = 8799033) 0.12 (df = 8799017) 0.12 (df = 5970710) 0.11 (df = 5267349) 0.11 (df = 5267333) Notes: 65 ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Table A14: Promotion Analysis: Local Elections and Gender Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Elected Leader 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.004∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.01∗ −0.01∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Incumbency −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗ −0.0003∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) ENP 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Golkar Share 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) PDI-P Share 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Services Provision 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Natural Resource Revenue pc 0.00∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Gini Index −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) Total Revenue pc 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Log(Population) −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Poverty pc −0.0004 0.001 0.001 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Log(GDP pc) −0.001∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Female*Elected Leader −0.004∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 10,485,948 10,485,948 10,485,948 5,971,194 5,971,194 5,971,194 R2 0.03 0.26 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.25 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.13 (df = 10485468) 0.12 (df = 8799037) 0.12 (df = 8799021) 0.12 (df = 5970714) 0.11 (df = 5267353) 0.11 (df = 5267337) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 66 Table A15: Promotion Analysis: Religion and Local Elections Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Protestant −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.001 −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Elected Leader −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.004∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Incumbency −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗ −0.0003∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) ENP 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Golkar Share 0.01∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) PDI-P Share 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Services Provision 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Natural Resource Revenue pc 0.00∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Gini Index −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) Total Revenue pc 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Log(Population) −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Poverty pc −0.001 0.0003 0.0003 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Log(GDP pc) −0.001∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Protestant*Elected Leader 0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) Catholic*Elected Leader 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Buddhist*Elected Leader 0.003 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.003 −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) Hindu*Elected Leader −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Confucian*Elected Leader −0.01 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.0005) (0.0005) Other*Elected Leader 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 10,485,948 10,485,948 10,485,948 5,971,194 5,971,194 5,971,194 R2 0.03 0.26 67 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.25 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.13 (df = 10485463) 0.12 (df = 8799032) 0.12 (df = 8799016) 0.12 (df = 5970709) 0.11 (df = 5267348) 0.11 (df = 5267332) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. I Gender, Education, and Democratization 68 Table A16: Promotion Analysis: Education and Gender Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0002 (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.002 −0.003 (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.0005 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) Education: Junior High*Female 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High*Female −0.0001 0.002∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Female 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Female −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Post Democratization*Female −0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization*Female −0.0002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.0005 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization*Female −0.003∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization*Female −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization*Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.16 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674114) 0.11 (df = 48153547) 0.11 (df = 48153531) 0.11 (df = 30130163) 0.10 (df = 29137548) 0.10 (df = 29137532) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 69 J Overall Share of Women in District and Provincial Governments 70 50% 40% % Female Civil Servants 30% 20% 10% 0% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Year Figure A3: Overall share of female civil servants in district and provincial governments. 71 K Female Leadership Table A17: Promotion Analysis: Gender and Female Superiors Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Female (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Pct Female Leadership 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Age (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Confucius (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Pct Female Leadership −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Female*Post Democratization −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) Pct Female Leadership*Post Democratization −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) Female*Pct Female Leadership* PD 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) Sample Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 51,674,835 51,674,835 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.51 Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.65 0.65 0.49 0.49 Residual Std. Error 0.11 (df = 48153556) 0.11 (df = 48153553) 0.10 (df = 29137557) 0.10 (df = 29137554) 0.68 (df = 48153557) 0.68 (df = 48153554) 0.68 (df = 29137557) 0.68 (df = 29137554) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 72 L Islamic Party Minister Table A18: Promotion Analysis: Gender and Islamic Leadership, National Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Islamic Party Minister 0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.001 −0.001 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.0003 −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.0003 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗ −0.0004 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.01 −0.003 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Islamic Party Minister −0.001∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 7,056,727 7,056,727 7,056,727 2,524,727 2,524,727 2,524,727 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.19 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.14 (df = 7056583) 0.14 (df = 6415226) 0.14 (df = 6415210) 0.15 (df = 2524586) 0.15 (df = 2406699) 0.15 (df = 2406683) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 73 Table A19: Promotion Analysis: Religion and Islamic Leadership, National Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Islamic Party Minister 0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.0002 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.01 0.002 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.0003 −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Islamic Party Minister 0.001∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.0003 0.0003 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Catholic*Islamic Party Minister 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) Buddhist*Islamic Party Minister 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) Hindu*Islamic Party Minister 0.0002 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) Confucian*Islamic Party Minister 0.02∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other*Islamic Party Minister −0.003 0.001 0.001 −0.02 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.0003) (0.0003) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 7,056,727 7,056,727 7,056,727 2,524,727 2,524,727 2,524,727 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.19 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.14 (df = 7056578) 0.14 (df = 6415221) 0.14 (df = 6415205) 0.15 (df = 2524582) 0.15 (df = 2406695) 0.15 (df = 2406679) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 74 M Change in Attitudes 75 Figure A4: Mean Responses in 1999 and 2006 to World Value Survey Questions. 76 N Patronage Politics and Promotions So far, our analysis has ignored the role of patronage politics in the civil service. This omission is potentially dangerous because patronage politics in Indonesia has certainly changed with democra- tization. Under the Suharto regime the civil service was tightly controlled by a small circle of au- thoritarian elites around the Suharto family. This “franchise” system of corruption allowed Suharto to control and, if needed, limit the extent of rent-seeking by lower level regime insiders (McLeod 2008). After democratization, this system has been replaced by clientelistic competition between a multitude of oligarchic groups and patronage networks (Hadiz 2004, Robison & Hadiz 2004). Under autocratic rule centralized decision-making curbs lower-level corruption because a single decision- maker can internalize the externalities associated with corruption in the civil service (MacIntyre 2003). With a more diffuse power structure, civil servants engaged in corruption and patronage face a collective action problem that leads to an overall increase in the volume of corrupt or clientelistic exchanges. This might imply that civil servants that are the most adept at democratic patronage politics are most likely to rise through the ranks. While likely true, there is no strong indication that patronage politics can explain our findings. For one, there is no reason why patronage politics should reward highly educated but punish female civil servants. The growing prominence of female politicians, in part due to electoral quotas, should also elevate female civil servants that are central to patronage networks. We do not doubt though that patronage politics plays an important role in the Indonesian civil service, it might just operate orthogonally to the changes documented in our analysis. In fact, we will exploit one aspect of patronage for an additional test of our theoretical argument. Patronage politics is often tied to the electoral calendar and we expect elevated promotion rates in elections years. Since we argue that democratization has created room for taste-based discrimination of certain minority groups, this should also extend to patronage politics. In other words, even when promotions are tied to elections and represent political rewards, we expect variation based on gender and religious minority status. To test this expectation, we generate a dummy variable that indicates the national election years of 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. We then interact this election year dummy with the gender variable, restricting our analysis to the post-1999 time period (see Table A22). We find that election years are associated with increased promotion rates in general. This is consistent 77 with classic patterns of patronage politics during election years (Hanusch & Keefer 2013). This patronage benefit though is much larger for male civil servants. While men experience an increase in their promotion probability by one percentage point, women only experience an increase of 0.6 percentage points. We find a similarly diminished election year effect for religious minorities (see Table A22). In contrast, the election year benefit is highest for individuals with high levels of educational attainment. Again, this is suggestive of a mechanism that rewards non-politicized markers of merit, like education, even in the context of patronage politics. Table A20: Promotion Analysis: Gender and Election Years Promotion Promotion Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) Election Year 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) Age 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.003∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.06∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) Catholic −0.003∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 −0.06∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Confucius −0.02∗∗∗ −0.28 (0.01) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) Other −0.002 −0.05 (0.004) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) Female*Election Year −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) Sample Full Full Full Full Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Province FE Yes Yes No No Individual FE No No Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,835 51,674,835 R2 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.66 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.64 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674163) 0.11 (df = 48153590) 1.07 (df = 51674164) 0.68 (df = 48153591) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 78 Table A21: Promotion Analysis: Education and Election Years Promotion Promotion Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) Election Year 0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.06∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.001) Education: Junior High 0.003∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.02∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.06∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) Age 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) Catholic −0.003∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 −0.06∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Confucius −0.02∗∗∗ −0.28 (0.01) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) Other −0.002 −0.05 (0.004) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) Education: Junior High*Election Year −0.0002 0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.001) Education: Senior High*Election Year 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.001) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Election Year 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.001) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Election Year 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.001) Education: Post-Graduate*Election Year 0.01∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.001) Sample Full Full Full Full Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Province FE Yes Yes No No Individual FE No No Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,835 51,674,835 R2 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.66 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.64 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674159) 0.11 (df = 48153586) 1.07 (df = 51674160) 0.68 (df = 48153587) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 79 Table A22: Promotion Analysis: Religion and Election Years Promotion Promotion Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) Election Year 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0002) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) Buddhist −0.0005 −0.05∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Confucian −0.02∗∗∗ −0.30 (0.01) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) Other −0.003 −0.05 (0.004) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) Age 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.003∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.06∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) Protestant*Election Year 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) Catholic*Election Year 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) Buddhist*Election Year −0.003∗∗ −0.002 −0.02∗∗∗ 0.005 (0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01) Hindu*Election Year 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.01∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) Confucian*Election Year −0.01 −0.01 0.09 −0.05∗∗∗ (0.005) (0.004) (0.09) (0.01) Other*Election Year 0.004 0.003 −0.01 −0.03 (0.004) (0.004) (0.03) (0.03) Sample Full Full Full Full Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Province FE Yes Yes No No Individual FE No No Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,835 51,674,835 R2 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.66 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.64 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674158) 0.11 (df = 48153585) 1.07 (df = 51674159) 0.68 (df = 48153586) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 80 O Effects of Being Born in Java We exploit another feature of Indonesian politics to test our argument. The Suharto regime (and the Indonesian government more generally) has been dominated by individuals from Java. This general dominance of Java over the Outer Islands has historically generated a lot of resentment but has not manifested as a salient national political cleavage under democratic rule.19 This is in part due to electoral rules that forbid the formation of regional parties and enforce a national structure on parties competing in national-level elections. Given the lower salience of the regional cleavage, we would expect that democratization has eroded the privileged position of civil servants from Java post-1999. This exactly what we find. Post-1999, Javanese civil servants experience a penalty (likely form a higher baseline). Table A17 reports results for interaction models for all provinces. 19 With the exception of separatism in Aceh and Papua. 81 Table A23: Promotion Analysis: From Java Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) From Java (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 −0.0000 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.002 −0.003 (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) From Java*Post Democratization −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 51,674,834 51,674,834 51,674,834 30,130,880 30,130,880 30,130,880 R2 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.18 Adjusted R2 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.15 Residual Std. Error 0.12 (df = 51674129) 0.11 (df = 48153557) 0.11 (df = 48153541) 0.11 (df = 30130178) 0.10 (df = 29137558) 0.10 (df = 29137542) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 82 Table A24: Promotion Analysis: Regional Origins Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 1 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 3 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 4 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 7 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 8 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 9 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 10 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 11 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 12 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 13 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 14 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 15 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 16 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 17 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 18 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 19 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 20 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 21 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 22 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 23 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 24 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 25 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 26 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 27 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 28 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 29 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 30 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 31 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 32 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 33 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 34 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 −0.0000 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.002 −0.003 (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) 1*Post Democratization 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004∗ 0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 2*Post Democratization −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 3*Post Democratization −0.003∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.0005 −0.001 −0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 4*Post Democratization 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 830.002 (0.002) 0.005∗∗ (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 5*Post Democratization 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 6*Post Democratization 0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 7*Post Democratization 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) P Heterogeneity Across Echelon Levels Our theoretical argument and empirical analysis has treated promotions across the echelon hierarchy as roughly similar. We now explore if there exists potential heterogeneity in our effects across different echelon levels. This is a largely exploratory exercise and not rooted in strong theoretical expectations, hence we avoid overly strong interpretations of our results. We start by restricting our sample to the population of individuals that eventually ended up on the echelon scale. In essence, we exclude career teachers and health care professionals that never attain any management responsibilities, since these civil servants might be very different on unobservable characteristics. We re-estimate our models with promotion events and the echelon rank as outcome variable (via OLS and ordered probit). Overall, we find the same substantive results as before. Results change slightly, and in more interesting ways, once we restrict the sample to only the population that already is at least rank IV/V. This excludes from the analysis the first essential promotion from functional to structural employee, an important milestone in a civil servant’s career path. For the population of civil servants that have made that first initial leap, our results are the same as before when we estimate models with the echelon rank as our outcome measure (via OLS). With the ordered probit specification we still find an intensification of the gender and religious mi- nority penalties but we now also find evidence for a reduction in the education premium post-1999. For our standard binary dependent variable promotion we also find a reduction in the education premium post-1999, no significant changes the gender penalty post-1999, and an intensification of the religious minority penalty after democratization. These patterns suggest the presence of at least some heterogeneity in our findings. While the gender and religious minority findings are mostly stable, the education finding seems to switch signs for some levels of the echelon hierarchy. There are several reasons why this might be the case. First, this might be due to a limited amount of variation in educational attainment at higher echelon levels. Once a civil servant has overcome the first promotion hurdle, there is less variation in educational attainment between competitors and this variable becomes a worse predictor. In addition, there is a huge numerical bottleneck for promotion opportunities at level IIa, because district-level employees max out at that rank and there are much fewer positions available at higher rank at the national level. This might cause odd bunching of fairly high educational attainment scores at medium echelon levels, which is likely 84 to have intensified after 2001 due to the decentralization reforms. This may explain the potential muting of educational premiums after 1999 at higher echelon levels. On the other hand, there could be substantive reasons for this pattern. For example, education, as a proxy for skill, might matter for the first promotion but at higher ranks other, unmeasured attributes start to matter a lot more. Political skills and connections might be the determining factor for promotions to the high-level ranks, while narrow technical expertise might actually be a hindrance (see our discussion of patronage above). To investigate this heterogeneity even further, we subset our data to isolate specific promotion events for each echelon rank. I.e., we take the population of functional employees and evaluate their probability of promotion to echelon rank IV/V. Then, we take all individuals on echelon rank IV/V and analyze promotions to echelon rank III. We repeat this exercise for each specific echelon level and report separate coefficient estimates. This exercise corroborates our initial patterns but also reveals more clearly the heterogeneity implied by the findings based on echelon employees only. First, for initial promotions from functional to structural employees, we uniformly confirm our main findings. This implies that our argument most strongly applies at the first important career juncture in the civil service. For specific promotions to subsequent echelon ranks, this disaggregated analysis reveals that the educational premium is reduced (but not overall negative) after 1999 for promotions from level IV/V to III and III to II. Depending on the type of degree, the premium increases again for promotions from level II to I. This shows that the positive effects of democratization in terms of rewarding skill do not apply uniformly. Second, for gender we find that the intensification of the gender penalty after 1999 is driven by first promotions. Once a female civil servant has overcome this hurdle, the gender penalty decreases after 1999. This might be because scrutiny intensifies at the highest echelon ranks and discrimination due to illiberal tendencies and taste-based discrimination meets some resistance by top-level political actors. This suggests that the politicization of the gender cleavages, as it plays out in the civil service, is most relevant at the district-level but follows a different dynamic at the highest levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Third, we find evidence that the increase in the discrimination of religious minorities as a consequence of democratization is similar across all levels of the echelon hierarchy. 85 Table A25: Promotion Analysis: Education, No Terminal Functional Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.01 0.01 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.0003 −0.002 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01 0.02 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.002 −0.005 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.11∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.01 0.03 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization −0.01 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 0.02 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 0.02 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 7,145,619 7,145,619 7,145,619 3,453,368 3,453,368 3,453,368 R2 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.12 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.09 Residual Std. Error 0.31 (df = 7144910) 0.30 (df = 6663765) 0.30 (df = 6663749) 0.30 (df = 3452664) 0.29 (df = 3339721) 0.29 (df = 3339706) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 86 Table A26: Echelon Analysis: Education, No Terminal Functional Employees Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −2.60∗∗∗ −2.62∗∗∗ (0.51) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High −3.49∗∗∗ −3.51∗∗∗ (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III −3.59∗∗∗ −3.60∗∗∗ (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 −3.35∗∗∗ −3.41∗∗∗ (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate −3.26∗∗∗ −3.31∗∗∗ (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.03∗∗ −0.02 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.22∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.04 −0.02 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian 0.09 (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.06 0.17 (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.004∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.89∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ (0.37) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.23) (0.23) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 1.67∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ (0.33) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 1.79∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ (0.33) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 2.17∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ (0.33) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 2.64∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ (0.33) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 7,145,619 7,145,619 7,145,619 3,453,368 3,453,368 3,453,368 R2 0.36 0.61 0.61 0.37 0.57 0.57 Adjusted R2 0.36 0.58 0.58 0.37 0.56 0.56 Residual Std. Error 1.83 (df = 7144910) 1.48 (df = 6663765) 1.48 (df = 6663749) 1.85 (df = 3452664) 1.56 (df = 3339721) 1.56 (df = 3339706) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 87 Table A27: Promotion Analysis: Gender, No Terminal Functional Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.002∗ 0.0002 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.004 0.02 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.0003 −0.002 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01 0.02 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.002 −0.005 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.11∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.01 0.03 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 7,145,619 7,145,619 7,145,619 3,453,368 3,453,368 3,453,368 R2 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.12 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.09 Residual Std. Error 0.31 (df = 7144914) 0.30 (df = 6663769) 0.30 (df = 6663753) 0.30 (df = 3452668) 0.29 (df = 3339725) 0.29 (df = 3339710) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 88 Table A28: Echelon Analysis: Gender, No Terminal Functional Employees Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −2.09∗∗∗ −2.19∗∗∗ (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High −2.36∗∗∗ −2.66∗∗∗ (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III −2.36∗∗∗ −2.66∗∗∗ (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 −1.82∗∗∗ −2.22∗∗∗ (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate −1.31∗∗∗ −1.79∗∗∗ (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.03∗∗ −0.02 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.22∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.04 −0.02 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian 0.15 (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.07 0.18 (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.003∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.25∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 7,145,619 7,145,619 7,145,619 3,453,368 3,453,368 3,453,368 R2 0.36 0.61 0.61 0.37 0.57 0.57 Adjusted R2 0.36 0.58 0.58 0.37 0.55 0.55 Residual Std. Error 1.83 (df = 7144914) 1.49 (df = 6663769) 1.49 (df = 6663753) 1.86 (df = 3452668) 1.57 (df = 3339725) 1.57 (df = 3339710) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 89 Table A29: Promotion Analysis: Religion, No Terminal Functional Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.004 0.001 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.04 0.04 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.01∗∗∗ 0.003 (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.07 0.06 (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.004 0.02 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.02 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.003∗ 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.005∗ −0.002 −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Confucian*Post Democratization −0.11∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Other*Post Democratization −0.07 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 7,145,619 7,145,619 7,145,619 3,453,368 3,453,368 3,453,368 R2 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.12 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.09 Residual Std. Error 0.31 (df = 7144910) 0.30 (df = 6663765) 0.30 (df = 6663749) 0.30 (df = 3452664) 0.29 (df = 3339721) 0.29 (df = 3339706) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 90 Table A30: Ordered Probit, No Terminal Functional Employees Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Education: Junior High −1.11∗∗∗ −0.03 −1.11∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.19) (0.06) Education: Senior High −1.05∗∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗ −1.05∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) Education: Diploma I/II/III −1.09∗∗∗ −2.02∗∗∗ −1.09∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) Education: Diploma IV/S1 −0.40∗∗∗ −1.30∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) Education: Post-Graduate 0.17∗∗∗ −1.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) Female −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) Post Democratization 5.39∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ 5.35∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) Age 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) Catholic 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.08 (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) Buddhist 0.26∗ 0.26∗ 0.19∗∗ (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) Hindu 0.01 0.01 0.46∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) Other 0.23 0.23 0.23 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) Years in Civil Service 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.32∗∗∗ (0.03) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization −1.06∗∗∗ (0.20) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 0.54∗∗∗ (0.05) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 1.09∗∗∗ (0.06) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 1.07∗∗∗ (0.04) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 1.53∗∗∗ (0.05) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.17∗∗∗ (0.04) Catholic*Post Democratization 0.15∗ (0.07) Buddhist*Post Democratization 0.07 (0.06) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.48∗∗∗ (0.06) AIC 1177696.35 1177071.94 1177756.60 BIC 1178325.66 1177747.03 1178420.24 Log Likelihood -588793.17 -588476.97 -588820.30 Deviance 1177586.35 1176953.94 1177640.60 Num. obs. 688381 688381 688381 ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05 91 Table A31: Promotion Analysis: Education, Only Echelon Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.13∗∗ 0.12∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.001 −0.01 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.004∗ −0.001 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01 0.01 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.0001 −0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.13∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.02 0.02 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.01 −0.06∗ −0.06∗ 0.08 −0.06∗ −0.06∗ (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization −0.16∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization −0.22∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization −0.26∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization −0.30∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 3,714,700 3,714,700 3,714,700 1,232,100 1,232,100 1,232,100 R2 0.09 0.36 0.36 0.12 0.35 0.35 Adjusted R2 0.09 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.28 Residual Std. Error 0.39 (df = 3713991) 0.35 (df = 3232846) 0.35 (df = 3232830) 0.42 (df = 1231396) 0.38 (df = 1118453) 0.38 (df = 1118438) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 92 Table A32: Promotion Analysis: Gender, Only Echelon Employees Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.18∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.23∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.27∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.24∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.001 −0.01 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.004∗ −0.001 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01 0.01 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.0003 −0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.13∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.02 0.02 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 3,714,700 3,714,700 3,714,700 1,232,100 1,232,100 1,232,100 R2 0.09 0.36 0.36 0.12 0.35 0.35 Adjusted R2 0.09 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.28 Residual Std. Error 0.39 (df = 3713995) 0.35 (df = 3232850) 0.35 (df = 3232834) 0.42 (df = 1231400) 0.38 (df = 1118457) 0.38 (df = 1118442) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 93 Table A33: Promotion Analysis: Religion, Echelon Employees Only Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.02 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.22∗ 0.21∗ (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.19∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.13∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.28∗ 0.25 (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.18∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.23∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.27∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.24∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.21∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.21∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.23∗∗ (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.19∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Confucian*Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other*Post Democratization −0.28 −0.31∗ −0.31∗ −0.26 −0.30∗ −0.30∗ (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 3,714,700 3,714,700 3,714,700 1,232,100 1,232,100 1,232,100 R2 0.09 0.36 0.36 0.12 0.35 0.35 Adjusted R2 0.09 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.28 Residual Std. Error 0.39 (df = 3713991) 0.35 (df = 3232846) 0.35 (df = 3232830) 0.42 (df = 1231396) 0.38 (df = 1118453) 0.38 (df = 1118438) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 94 Table A34: Echelon Analysis: Education, Echelon Rank DV, Only Echelon Employees Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.17 −0.17 (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High −1.63∗∗∗ −1.74∗∗∗ (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III −1.40∗∗∗ −1.54∗∗∗ (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 −1.29∗∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗ (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate −1.09∗∗∗ −1.25∗∗∗ (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.19∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.57∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.01 −0.04 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.77∗∗∗ (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.06 −0.11 (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization −1.24∗∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0004 −1.27∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 (0.40) (0.06) (0.06) (0.30) (0.06) (0.06) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization −0.13 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.30 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ (0.27) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization −0.01 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ −0.09 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ (0.28) (0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 0.36 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ (0.27) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 0.69∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ (0.27) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 3,714,700 3,714,700 3,714,700 1,232,100 1,232,100 1,232,100 R2 0.32 0.83 0.83 0.31 0.82 0.82 Adjusted R2 0.32 0.81 0.81 0.31 0.80 0.80 Residual Std. Error 0.99 (df = 3713991) 0.53 (df = 3232846) 0.53 (df = 3232830) 1.14 (df = 1231396) 0.61 (df = 1118453) 0.61 (df = 1118438) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 95 Table A35: Echelon Analysis: Gender, Echelon Rank DV, Only Echelon Employees Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.07∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −1.37∗∗∗ −1.23∗∗∗ (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High −1.84∗∗∗ −2.13∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III −1.50∗∗∗ −1.75∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 −1.04∗∗∗ −1.19∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate −0.51∗ −0.56 (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.57∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.01 −0.04 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.76∗∗∗ (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.06 −0.13 (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.27∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 3,714,700 3,714,700 3,714,700 1,232,100 1,232,100 1,232,100 R2 0.31 0.83 0.83 0.30 0.82 0.82 Adjusted R2 0.31 0.80 0.80 0.30 0.80 0.80 Residual Std. Error 0.99 (df = 3713995) 0.53 (df = 3232850) 0.53 (df = 3232834) 1.14 (df = 1231400) 0.62 (df = 1118457) 0.62 (df = 1118442) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 96 Table A36: Echelon Analysis: Religion, Echelon Rank DV, Only Echelon Employees Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon Echelon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.01 −0.06 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.07 −0.01 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.51 0.49 (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.14∗∗ 0.05 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.76∗∗∗ (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.55∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.19∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −1.36∗∗∗ −1.22∗∗∗ (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High −1.83∗∗∗ −2.11∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III −1.49∗∗∗ −1.73∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 −1.03∗∗∗ −1.18∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate −0.50∗ −0.54 (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.04 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗ (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) Buddhist*Post Democratization 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.58 0.12 0.12 (0.54) (0.23) (0.23) (0.53) (0.23) (0.23) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.16∗∗∗ −0.09∗ −0.09∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.09∗ −0.09∗ (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Confucian*Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other*Post Democratization 0.50∗∗∗ 0.43 0.43 0.84∗∗ 0.43 0.43 (0.15) (0.58) (0.58) (0.39) (0.57) (0.57) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 3,714,700 3,714,700 3,714,700 1,232,100 1,232,100 1,232,100 R2 0.31 0.83 0.83 0.30 0.81 0.81 Adjusted R2 0.31 0.80 0.80 0.30 0.80 0.80 Residual Std. Error 0.99 (df = 3713991) 0.53 (df = 3232846) 0.53 (df = 3232830) 1.14 (df = 1231396) 0.62 (df = 1118453) 0.62 (df = 1118438) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 97 Table A37: Ordered Probit models with only Echelon employees Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Education: Junior High −3.82∗∗∗ 9.37∗∗∗ −3.80∗∗∗ (0.14) (0.36) (0.11) Education: Senior High −5.06∗∗∗ 6.35∗∗∗ −5.05∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.18) (0.03) Education: Diploma I/II/III −4.08∗∗∗ 6.56∗∗∗ −4.06∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.22) (0.04) Education: Diploma IV/S1 −2.96∗∗∗ 6.89∗∗∗ −2.94∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.17) (0.03) Education: Post-Graduate −2.03∗∗∗ 7.20∗∗∗ −2.01∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.17) (0.03) Female −0.21∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) Post Democratization 0.48∗∗∗ 11.53∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) Age 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.60∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ −0.15 (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) Catholic 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) Buddhist 0.65∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 6.13∗∗∗ (0.16) (0.16) (0.08) Hindu −0.26∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) Other 0.97∗∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.97∗∗ (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) Years in Civil Service 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.38∗∗∗ (0.08) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization −13.72∗∗∗ (0.38) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization −11.70∗∗∗ (0.18) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization −10.90∗∗∗ (0.22) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization −10.10∗∗∗ (0.17) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization −9.47∗∗∗ (0.17) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.76∗∗∗ (0.12) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.33∗ (0.16) Buddhist*Post Democratization −5.64∗∗∗ (0.08) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.94∗∗∗ (0.15) AIC 446547.82 446128.53 446440.13 BIC 447145.17 446769.32 447070.06 Log Likelihood -223218.91 -223005.26 -223162.06 Deviance 446437.82 446010.53 446324.13 Num. obs. 384976 384976 384976 ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05 98 Table A38: Promotion Analysis: Education, Functional to IV/V Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.003 −0.003 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.0001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 50,759,588 50,759,588 50,759,588 29,671,408 29,671,408 29,671,408 R2 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.19 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.16 Residual Std. Error 0.10 (df = 50758879) 0.09 (df = 47248744) 0.09 (df = 47248728) 0.08 (df = 29670702) 0.08 (df = 28678341) 0.08 (df = 28678325) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 99 Table A39: Promotion Analysis: Education, IV/V to III Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.33∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.47∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.48∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.001 −0.01∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.003 −0.002 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.01 0.05 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.001 −0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.01 −0.04 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization −0.21∗ −0.17∗ −0.17∗ −0.03 −0.16∗ −0.16∗ (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization −0.24∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization −0.31∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization −0.34∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization −0.39∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 2,799,454 2,799,454 2,799,454 772,628 772,628 772,628 R2 0.10 0.47 0.47 0.14 0.47 0.47 Adjusted R2 0.10 0.37 0.37 0.14 0.40 0.40 Residual Std. Error 0.37 (df = 2798746) 0.31 (df = 2368532) 0.31 (df = 2368517) 0.42 (df = 771930) 0.35 (df = 681469) 0.35 (df = 681455) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 100 Table A40: Promotion Analysis: Education, III to II Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.01 −0.0000 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.44∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.004 0.003 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.005 0.002 (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.03 −0.07 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.01 −0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian 0.06 0.07 (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.01 0.06 0.06 −0.03 0.06 0.06 (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization 0.03 −0.05 −0.05 0.09 −0.05 −0.05 (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization −0.14 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization −0.29∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.20∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization −0.35∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 744,478 744,478 744,478 350,678 350,678 350,678 R2 0.08 0.39 0.39 0.12 0.40 0.40 Adjusted R2 0.08 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.30 Residual Std. Error 0.42 (df = 743771) 0.38 (df = 620674) 0.38 (df = 620659) 0.42 (df = 349976) 0.37 (df = 302419) 0.37 (df = 302407) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 101 Table A41: Promotion Analysis: Education, II to I Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.01 0.02 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.14∗ 0.18∗∗ (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.45∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.02∗∗∗ 0.005 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.005 0.001 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.002 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.01 0.03 (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.04 −0.004 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.22∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High*Post Democratization −0.004 −0.02 −0.02 0.02 −0.02 −0.02 (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Senior High*Post Democratization 0.09 −0.05 −0.05 0.12∗∗ −0.05∗ −0.05∗ (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) Education: Diploma I/II/III*Post Democratization 0.16∗ 0.16 0.16 0.20∗∗ 0.16 0.16 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) Education: Diploma IV/S1*Post Democratization −0.09 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) Education: Post-Graduate*Post Democratization −0.21∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 158,853 158,853 158,853 101,723 101,723 101,723 R2 0.09 0.49 0.49 0.11 0.46 0.46 Adjusted R2 0.09 0.37 0.37 0.11 0.36 0.36 Residual Std. Error 0.45 (df = 158153) 0.37 (df = 129312) 0.37 (df = 129296) 0.44 (df = 101028) 0.37 (df = 85416) 0.37 (df = 85401) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 102 Table A42: Promotion Analysis: Gender, Functional to IV/V Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.0005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Other −0.003 −0.003 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 50,759,588 50,759,588 50,759,588 29,671,408 29,671,408 29,671,408 R2 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.19 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.16 Residual Std. Error 0.10 (df = 50758883) 0.09 (df = 47248748) 0.09 (df = 47248732) 0.08 (df = 29670706) 0.08 (df = 28678345) 0.08 (df = 28678329) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 103 Table A43: Promotion Analysis: Gender, IV/V to III Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.20∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.21∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.24∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.21∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.17∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.001 −0.01∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.003 −0.002 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.01 0.05 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.001 −0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.01 −0.03 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 2,799,454 2,799,454 2,799,454 772,628 772,628 772,628 R2 0.10 0.47 0.47 0.14 0.47 0.47 Adjusted R2 0.10 0.37 0.37 0.14 0.40 0.40 Residual Std. Error 0.37 (df = 2798750) 0.31 (df = 2368536) 0.31 (df = 2368521) 0.42 (df = 771934) 0.35 (df = 681473) 0.35 (df = 681459) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 104 Table A44: Promotion Analysis: Gender, III to II Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.06∗∗ −0.05∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.03 −0.02 (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.28∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.28∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.22∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.20∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.004 0.002 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.005 0.002 (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.03 −0.07 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.01 −0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.06 0.07 (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 744,478 744,478 744,478 350,678 350,678 350,678 R2 0.08 0.39 0.39 0.12 0.40 0.40 Adjusted R2 0.08 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.30 Residual Std. Error 0.42 (df = 743775) 0.38 (df = 620678) 0.38 (df = 620663) 0.42 (df = 349980) 0.37 (df = 302423) 0.37 (df = 302411) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 105 Table A45: Promotion Analysis: Gender, II to I Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.17∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.01 0.03 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.26∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.32∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.29∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.27∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.01 0.0004 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.002 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.04 0.05 (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.04 −0.0005 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.22∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Female*Post Democratization 0.19∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 158,853 158,853 158,853 101,723 101,723 101,723 R2 0.09 0.49 0.49 0.11 0.46 0.46 Adjusted R2 0.08 0.37 0.37 0.11 0.36 0.36 Residual Std. Error 0.45 (df = 158157) 0.37 (df = 129316) 0.37 (df = 129300) 0.44 (df = 101032) 0.37 (df = 85420) 0.37 (df = 85405) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 106 Table A46: Promotion Analysis: Religion, Functional to IV/V Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.001 −0.001 (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0005 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.003 0.004 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.01∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization 0.0002 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.004 −0.005∗ −0.005∗ −0.01∗ −0.005∗ −0.005∗ (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.0004 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) Confucian*Post Democratization −0.003 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) Other*Post Democratization −0.01 −0.01∗ −0.01∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗ −0.01∗ (0.01) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 50,759,588 50,759,588 50,759,588 29,671,408 29,671,408 29,671,408 R2 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.19 Adjusted R2 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.16 Residual Std. Error 0.10 (df = 50758878) 0.09 (df = 47248743) 0.09 (df = 47248727) 0.08 (df = 29670701) 0.08 (df = 28678340) 0.08 (df = 28678324) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 107 Table A47: Promotion Analysis: Religion, IV/V to III Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.02 0.01 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.34∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian −0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.32∗∗ 0.29∗ (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.20∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.21∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.23∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.21∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.17∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02∗ −0.01 −0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.08∗∗∗ −0.04∗ −0.04∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.04∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.36∗∗∗ −0.31 −0.31 −0.30∗∗ −0.30 −0.30 (0.11) (0.26) (0.26) (0.13) (0.25) (0.25) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.20∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Confucian*Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Other*Post Democratization −0.33∗ −0.50∗∗ −0.50∗∗ −0.42∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 2,799,454 2,799,454 2,799,454 772,628 772,628 772,628 R2 0.10 0.47 0.47 0.14 0.47 0.47 Adjusted R2 0.10 0.37 0.37 0.14 0.40 0.40 Residual Std. Error 0.37 (df = 2798746) 0.31 (df = 2368532) 0.31 (df = 2368517) 0.42 (df = 771930) 0.35 (df = 681469) 0.35 (df = 681455) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 108 Table A48: Promotion Analysis: Religion, III to II Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant −0.01 −0.01 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist 0.19 0.21 (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.04 0.04 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Confucian 0.06 0.07 (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) Female −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0004) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.03 −0.01 (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High 0.29∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.29∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.23∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.21∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) Protestant*Post Democratization −0.15∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.11∗∗ (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.23 −0.22∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.30∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.22∗∗ (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) Buddhist*Post Democratization −0.04 0.0001 0.0001 −0.05 −0.0005 −0.0005 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Hindu*Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 744,478 744,478 744,478 350,678 350,678 350,678 R2 0.08 0.39 0.39 0.12 0.40 0.40 Adjusted R2 0.08 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.30 Residual Std. Error 0.42 (df = 743772) 0.38 (df = 620675) 0.38 (df = 620660) 0.42 (df = 349977) 0.37 (df = 302420) 0.37 (df = 302408) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 109 Table A49: Promotion Analysis: Religion, II to I Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion Promotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant 0.04 0.05 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Catholic 0.07 0.08 (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) Buddhist −0.33∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Hindu 0.20∗∗ 0.13 (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) Other 0.22∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) Female 0.02∗∗ 0.005 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Junior High −0.01 0.03 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Senior High 0.24∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma I/II/III 0.30∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Diploma IV/S1 0.28∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Education: Post-Graduate 0.26∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) Years in Civil Service −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) Protestant*Post Democratization −0.05 0.03 0.03 −0.05 0.03 0.03 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Catholic*Post Democratization −0.08 −0.09 −0.09 −0.07 −0.08 −0.08 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) Buddhist*Post Democratization 0.43∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ (0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) Hindu*Post Democratization −0.16∗ −0.12 −0.12 −0.14 −0.12 −0.12 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) Other*Post Democratization (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Sample Full Full Full Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Pre-1999 Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Province of Birth FE Yes No No Yes No No Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Golongan FE No No Yes No No Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 158,853 158,853 158,853 101,723 101,723 101,723 R2 0.09 0.49 0.49 0.11 0.46 0.46 Adjusted R2 0.08 0.37 0.37 0.10 0.36 0.36 Residual Std. Error 0.45 (df = 158154) 0.37 (df = 129313) 0.37 (df = 129297) 0.44 (df = 101029) 0.37 (df = 85417) 0.37 (df = 85402) Notes: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗ Significantat the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 110