Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima .com dobe tock.a 12 - s hit19 米国戦略爆撃調査団／ PRESENTED BY 米国国立公文書館 This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. About Tokyo Development Learning Center (TDLC) Launched in 2004 in partnership with the government of Japan, the Tokyo Development Learning Center (TDLC) is a pivotal World Bank program housed under the Global Practice for Urban, Disaster Risk Management, Resilience and Land (GPURL). Located in the heart of Tokyo, TDLC serves as a global knowledge hub that aims to operationalize Japanese and global urban development knowledge, insights, and technical expertise to maximize development impact. TDLC operates through four core activities: Technical Deep Dives (TDDs), Operational Support, Partnership & Collaboration, and Outreach & Dissemination. For more information, visit www.worldbank.org/tdlc. TDLC website Acknowledgements This case study was prepared by Hiromi Akiyama (Research Consultant) with the research and editorial assistance of Shin Tanabe (Knowledge Management Analyst) under the guidance of Christopher Pablo (Team Lead, Tokyo Development Learning Center) and Angelica Nunez (Practice Manager, Global Unit, Urban, Disaster Risk Management, Resilient and Land, Global Practice). It draws on the initial work prepared in March 2023 with Swati Sachdeva (Urban Specialist) and Ellen Hamilton (Lead Urban Specialist) under the guidance of Maitreyi Das (Director for Trust Funds and Partnerships). Research support was provided by Ibrahim Ali Khan (Consultant). The study was enriched by the contributions from the Urban Planning Division, the Urban Development Coordination Division, the Housing Policy Division, and the International Peace Promotion Division of the City of Hiroshima, and the Peace Promotion Project of the Hiroshima Prefecture Government. The team is grateful for their support and cooperation. Dr. Norioki Ishimaru (Director, Research Institute for All Things Hiroshima and Regional Revitalization Co., Ltd.), Mr. Michihiro Nakagawa, and the Motomachi Project team led by Dr. Kei Nakamura also provided keen insights into Hiroshima's reconstruction. The team would like to thank colleagues at the Tokyo Development Learning Center (TDLC) and the Planning and Coordination Division at the City of Hiroshima. The case study could not have been completed without the generous support from the Government of Japan. The affiliation and title of each person are as of March 2024. Contents Executive Summary..................................................................................................................................................................................................................4 Part 1: Navigating Multiple Urban Crises.................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Cities Navigating Crises..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Postcrisis Rebuilding...........................................................................................................................................................................................................8 Case Study: Hiroshima Emerging from Multiple Crises............................................................................................................................ 10 Part 2: Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction........................................................................................................................................................... 1 1 Background and Early History.....................................................................................................................................................................................12 The Destruction of the War........................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 In the Early Days: Emergency Response and Restoration............................................................................................................................ 16 Emergency Response....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 Early Restoration of the Most Critical Infrastructure and Services.................................................................................................... 18 Medium-Term: Infrastructure Restoration and Rehabilitation........................................................................................................... 20 Long-Term Reconstruction................................................................................................................................................................................................22 Planning for Reconstruction........................................................................................................................................................................................22 Financing for Reconstruction......................................................................................................................................................................................32 Housing Recovery and Redevelopment................................................................................................................................................................... 36 Temporary Housing for the Displaced................................................................................................................................................................. 36 Changes to City Planning for Housing Needs................................................................................................................................................. 38 Urban Upgrading in the 1960s and 1970s........................................................................................................................................................... 39 Economic Recovery and Citizen Engagement.....................................................................................................................................................40 Local Economic and Industrial Recovery...........................................................................................................................................................40 Citizen Engagement and Outreach....................................................................................................................................................................... 42 Post-reconstruction Urban Expansion and Development...........................................................................................................................44 Lessons Learned to Navigate Urban Crises............................................................................................................................................................46 References...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................48 Figures Figure 1.1. Key Stages of Reconstruction and Priorities in Hiroshima.................................................................................................. 10 Figure 2.1. Hiroshima’s Expansion from Administrative Merger and Land Reclamation........................................................12 Figure 2.2. Map of the Destruction of Hiroshima and Key Locations in the City......................................................................... 14 Figure 2.3. Hiroshima City War Damage..................................................................................................................................................................23 Figure 2.4. Hiroshima City Plan for Reconstruction (November 1946)............................................................................................... 24 Figure 2.5. Comparison of the Reconstruction Plans across Revisions............................................................................................. 28 Figure 2.6. Location of Selective Demolition (left, July 1945) and the Peace Boulevard (right, October 1966)....... 30 Figure 2.7. Kenzo Tange’s Design Plan for the Peace Memorial Park, 1949.................................................................................... 3 1 Figure 2.8. Location of Motomachi Housing, 1966.............................................................................................................................................37 Tables Table 2.1. Percentage of Buildings Destroyed by Fire Versus the Explosion.....................................................................................15 Table 2.2. War-Damaged Area Emergency Measures................................................................................................................................... 20 Table 2.3. Content of the First Hiroshima City Plan for Reconstruction (November 1946)....................................................25 Table 2.4. Advocacy and Policy-making Process for the Peace City Law......................................................................................... 26 Table 2.5. Peace Memorial City Construction Plan (Revised Plan)........................................................................................................ 29 Boxes Box 2.1. Alternative Plans ....................................................................................................................................................................................................25 Box 2.2. Stories of Donations and Public Support............................................................................................................................................ 34 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 3 Executive Summary Today’s world faces multiple crises, and cities are at the forefront of managing the consequences of those crises. Cities face increasingly complex challenges of urban destruction, forced displacement, financial and economic recession, food and energy insecurity, supply chain disruptions, and worsening health and safety conditions. As the primary responders to crisis and the main agents for rebuilding after crises, cities are tasked with the difficult mandates of providing housing, inf rastructure, and basic services to citizens and planning for recovery and reconstruction. Considerations of inclusivity, resilience, and green development raise new questions of how to build back better in spite of the resource constraints that many cities inevitably face. The city of Hiroshima, which emerged from total destruction nearly seven decades ago, provides valuable lessons of postcrisis reconstruction, long-term urban regeneration and development, and the coordination of policy, institutional arrangements, and wider citizen and private sector engagements. Fifty thousand to 80,000 people and about 90 percent of city-center functions and infrastructure were lost, and the initial stages of emergency response and restoration were extremely diff icult. Wartime emergency response plans barely worked and alternative and spontaneous actions were necessary. In the medium-term recovery period of a few months to a few years, the national government created a budget for the restoration of infrastructure and basic services, focusing on key sectors first and expanding gradually. The long-term reconstruction planning was led by both the national government’s policy setting and the local government’s city planning in accordance with national principles. To overcome severe budget and resource constraints, Hiroshima successfully advocated for special budgetary treatment f rom the national government, pieced together various funding sources to develop segments of the city to manage and maintain civic life and industry, and took a staged approach by focusing on the most critical services first and then moved to a wider, more inclusive, and more resilient urban development. At every stage of postwar recovery, Hiroshima was pressed to address the changing needs of its citizens within the constraints of available resources and to make changes to previously set plans. Key lessons from Hiroshima include the following: (1) the early restoration of critical infrastructure and services must occur in stages with a comprehensive assessment of damage; (2) effective prioritization of key issues to use the limited resources is critical, as temporary solutions devised with time and resource constraints often end up being permanent solutions; (3) f inancing reconstruction often poses a considerable challenge and funds should come f rom multiple sources; (4) early planning with a vision of future solutions is critical; (5) strong and persistent political will help navigate the long process of reconstruction; (6) reconstruction can be an opportunity to build a greener, more resilient, and more inclusive city; (7) the government is not the only actor in the rebuilding process— civilians and the private sector are also critical agents; and (8) urban regeneration is a long-term endeavor that requires sustained engagement to build a better city. This paper is structured as follows: Part I briefly discusses the context of multiple crises that today’s world faces. Part II presents a case study of Hiroshima’s postwar urban recovery from short-term, medium-term, and long- term perspectives. In addition to the government-led reconstruction processes that focus on inf rastructure recovery and city planning and designs, housing recovery is discussed in detail. The roles of citizens and the private sector in contributing to the city’s recovery are summarized, and further urban regeneration and expansion after the city’s rebuilding concluded is discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of key lessons that Hiroshima’s experience offers to other cities navigating multiple crises. 4 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part 1: Navigating Multiple Urban Crises Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 5 Part 1: Navigating Multiple Urban Crises The current world faces widespread complexities triggered by multiple crises. Since 2020, the COVID-19 Compounding crises follow complex paths of cascading pandemic has stressed countries through greater impacts via interdependent systems. While analyses global poverty, wider income inequality, worsened of multiple crises that encompass both conflicts preexisting fiscal and debt challenges, and disruptions and disasters are still slim, the literature on multiple in human capital accumulation and supply chains disasters has identified the different configurations (World Bank 2022). The Russian Federation’s invasion of of multiplicity. 2 Some sequences of disaster events Ukraine in February 2022 further heightened the global follow direct, linear causal paths—either compounding need for food, safety, and basic services by triggering hazards (where destructive sequences of events are food and energy shortages, a rising cost of living, triggered by an initial hazard event, such as a tsunami and economic recession. Characterized as “the most triggered by an earthquake), or cascading hazards complex, disparate and cross-cutting set of challenges” (where multiple hazards occur in the spatial or temporal in several decades (Lynch 2022), the current crises are proximity as a result of both direct and indirect impact a combination of “old” and “new” risks—the “old” risks f rom an initial hazard event, such as technological of inflation, fiscal instabilities, trade wars, social unrest, emergencies triggered by natural hazards). However, and a threat of nuclear warfare that the world has cascading disasters happen on a nonlinear, complex experienced before, complicated by the relatively “new” path, with interconnected and interdependent systems developments and levels of debt crises, low growth, between the hazard, critical infrastructure and service deglobalization, human capital decline, and climate systems, and the preexisting vulnerabilities, thus change impacts including drought, floods, storms, heat increasing the impact well beyond the original temporal waves, and wildfires (World Economic Forum 2023). The and spatial point (Cutter 2018; Pescaroli and Alexander world has seemingly entered an “Age of Crisis” (Bjerde 2018). When a disaster causes disruptions in energy 2023). or transport, the disruptions increase the reach and duration of the disaster impact to a wider population The novelty of the current crisis lies in the extent of the while triggering other events.3 When disasters intersect complexity in which multiple crises are happening at the with armed conflicts or violence, the result is an same time and amplifying uncertainties. Conflicts and increased complexity of paths of cascading effects that disasters together result in new internal displacements exacerbate one another’s damage through a prolonged every year; the total number of internally displaced emergency situation. In contrast to a disaster event that persons (IDPs) in the world reached the record high of is limited to a short period of time and thus restoration 71.1 million at the end of 2022 (62.5 million people were and rebuilding can start within a few weeks to months displaced as a result of conflict and violence and 8.7 at most, response and reconstruction from a conflict million as a result of disasters) (IDMC 2023). Combined need to happen across a timescale, often while the with cross-border refugees f rom conflicts, violence, conflict situation is ongoing (Kruczkiewicz et al. 2021). and human rights concerns, 108.4 million people were In these cases, considerations of rebuilding must start forcibly displaced worldwide at the end of 2022 (UNHCR while navigating emergencies and vulnerabilities. 2023). Those who are forced to relocate lose their homes, jobs, access to food and health care, and community. Yet countries in fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) settings have limited institutional capacities to manage the shocks and help mitigate the adverse consequences for the population (Van Bronkhorst and Bousquet 2021). Crisis response requires a tailored approach according to each country’s context, but the disparate shocks of multiple crises interact with one another and result in even more overwhelming outcomes than the sum of the comprising crises (Tooze 2022)1. 1 Various expressions describe the interaction of multiple crises at once: polycrisis (Tooze 2022), megathreats (Roubini 2022), and the “confluence of calamities” (Gergieva, Gopinath, and Pazarbasioglu 2022) to name a few. 2 Disasters, including natural hazard and anthropogenic events, are just one aspect of crises. In addition to disasters, crises can also include a conflict element (armed conflict and violence). 3 One such example was unusually cold weather experienced in Tajikistan in 2007–08 that triggered food insecurity and an energy crisis, affecting the population with reduced incomes and service disruptions in health, water, and education (Kelly 2009). 6 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part 1: Navigating Multiple Urban Crises Cities Navigating Crises Cities are at the foref ront of navigating these constraints in the face of a sudden surge in demand, increasingly complex crises as primary response forced to choose between providing minimum organizers, as hosts to the displaced, and as agents of necessities to sustain life and providing other amenities recovery and rebuilding. Conflicts create immediate such as shelter and services for a more dignified living demands of rehabilitating damaged critical environment for refugees (Gigliarano and Verme 2017). infrastructure, restoring basic services, and rebuilding With the increasing trend of forced displacement influx housing. Outside of the crisis epicenter, forced in urban areas, host cities also need support in scaling displacement gives rise to secondary challenges at both up the provision of services, shelter, and jobs, thereby the origin and the destination, including depopulation mitigating economic and social tensions between host from evacuation, (temporary or long-term) distortion communities and the displaced (World Bank 2017). of the labor market, new housing needs, and added demands for basic services, food, and energy4. For Cities’ efforts to manage crises are complicated by instance, there is evidence that the impact of crises the evolving situations and the need to constantly on public health is greater under multiple disasters, adapt solutions with equity and inclusivity in the short, suggesting that there is greater and more prolonged medium, and long term. In the short term, providing demand for both medical and mental health services food, supplies, and shelter to the displaced is the most and for targeted community services in these situations urgent. In the medium term, the displaced need (Leppold et al. 2022; Sansom et al. 2022). jobs and may need to move to more settled housing arrangements. As crises disproportionately affect the The forcibly displaced increasingly end up in major cities vulnerable (including women, children, the elderly, rather than camps in favor of access to jobs, housing, and the handicapped) and marginalized groups, services, and institutions to provide them. Globally, considerations of equity and social inclusion are critical 60–80 percent of IDPs and 60 percent of refugees in at least the medium term, if not from the onset of the live in urban areas (UNHCR 2020; UNHCR 2023). Cities crisis (Club de Madrid 2021). Meanwhile, food insecurity, with established provision of services, shelter, and energy instability, and a rising cost of living put pressure livelihoods are attractive to the newly displaced (World on both the citizens and the government. In the Bank 2017). The host cities are pressured to manage the long term, in which cities devise plans for rebuilding, changing labor supply and to provide support given the resettlement, and integration, the considerations mismatch in the labor market (AfDB et al. 2017). Yet the become even more complex to accommodate for urban settings where the displaced live among the local the new vision for their communities. Yet approaches residents make targeted interventions more difficult to complex crises are often fragmented and result in than in camp arrangements. There are also implications inadequate responses. A new approach is needed to for the host cities, with displacement potentially better manage the complexities, combining resource overwhelming their existing services, housing, and deployment strategies and policy responses, while public space with the inflow of new residents. Evidence maintaining flexibility in connecting them to both short- suggests that the urban forced displacement influx can and long-term strategies and adapting to changing and present equally extensive and protracted impacts for emerging risk scenarios (Kruczkiewicz et al. 2021). the local residents, leading to reduced income, loss of human capital accumulation, and worsened relations with their communities (Sultana 2023)5. Humanitarian organizations that provide support often face budget 4 In Ukraine, housing, transport, and commerce and industry are the most affected, totaling US$97 billion of direct damage and US$252 billion of indirect economic losses in the first three months of the war. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 15.1 percent in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the year before, with poverty (people living under US$5.5 per person a day) expected to rise by 19 percent (World Bank, Government of Ukraine, and European Commission 2022). 5 The surge of evacuation from Ukraine into Poland in February to March 2022 increased Warsaw’s population by 17 percent at its peak, overwhelming Warsaw’s capacity to provide help (Wądołowska 2022). With over 1.5 million Ukrainians registered to receive social benefits and access public services one year after the conflict began (according to data as of April 10, 2023)(UNHCR-ODP 2023), the Polish job market, school systems, and social welfare systems have experienced rapidly changing demand. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 7 Part 1: Navigating Multiple Urban Crises Postcrisis Rebuilding Conflicts and disasters often coincide, creating a Communities embarking on reconstruction are pressed destructive cycle that can be difficult to break out of. to choose between a set of competing priorities, Conflicts can weaken a society’s ability to prepare for, including finding a balance between the urgency of respond to, and rebuild from disasters (Vivekananda, rebuilding quickly and having a deliberative and more Schilling, and Smith 2014). The effects of disasters, such inclusive approach. Although it is ideal for recovery as natural hazards, extreme weather events, or disease decision-making to be both prompt and inclusive outbreaks, exacerbate preexisting tensions and may for local communities, that is often challenging. For lead to or increase the risks of conflict (Peters 2021). instance, the speed of recovery from the 2011 Tohoku Between 2004 and 2014, 58 percent of disaster deaths earthquake and tsunami in Japan was based on the and 34 percent of people affected by disasters occurred government’s decision to take a careful and deliberative in fragile states (Peters and Budimir 2016). Similarly, in a approach that included residents in reconstruction period of 50 years, from 1950 to 2000, disasters caused planning, as was recommended by the national by natural hazards considerably raised the possibility of government (Harrowell and Özerdem 2019). In contrast, violent civil conflicts (Siddiqi 2018). speed was prioritized in Türkiye after the 2011 Van earthquake, with a highly centralized national re- Reconstruction f rom conflicts and f rom disasters urbanization plan that aimed to address earthquake- both aim to address the significant disruptions and prone buildings by rapidly expanding the periphery of damages caused by crises with substantial human the cities (Platt and So 2014). While the consideration and economic costs (ILO 2020). Both have an essential between approaches boils down to the approach focus on rebuilding inf rastructure, housing, and that will best empower the local community being essential services, as well as addressing the needs represented in the recovery decision-making process, a of the vulnerable populations. Both involve multiple more deliberative process not only calls for more time stakeholders carrying out relief and reconstruction, from and resources but also requires sound governance local communities and national and local governments and bureaucratic capacity. Postcrisis situations often to international organizations (Harrowell and Özerdem face limitations on resources and capacity, which has 2019). However, there are certain elements unique implications for the progress of recovery. 7 to postconflict reconstruction, such as security, governance, transitional justice, and reconciliation.6 These considerations also include the choice between Activities that postconflict state building entails—such building back what has been lost and “building back as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of better.” While some cities resort to innovation to ex-combatants; addressing landmines; and building accommodate changing demographics and emerging trust in fragmented communities—add complexities to needs, others prefer to build back as much as possible the process of reconstruction and require institutional of what has been lost to their original states.8 During capacity to be effective. Long-term reconstruction the post–World War II reconstruction of European cities, faces the challenges of a lack of funding, diff iculty planners and architects interested in the relationship in coordinating multiple stakeholders, and, at times, between urban structure and social welfare aimed to political instability if the destruction is extensive (Hasic improve the urban environment to address prewar 2004). issues and to redesign urban spaces to better align with modern amenities, health, zoning, and convenience. 6 Transitional justice and reconciliation are concerned with the post conflict peacebuilding process of providing recognition to victims, addressing human rights violations through judicial redress, fostering trust toward state institutions, promoting the rule of law, and promoting social and cultural healing, all in the interest of reconciliation and the prevention of new violence. 7 In the former Yugoslavian city of Dubrovnik (in today’s Croatia), initially disorganized and underfunded reconstruction projects later turned into incremental reconstruction with signif icant local input as local competence grew, allowing authorities to improve mechanisms for reconstruction, a trajectory that contrasted with highly conceptual and bureaucratic approaches in Coventry, UK (Calame 2005). 8 The postwar Polish cities of Kalisz, Gdańsk, Warsaw, and Wrocław rebuilt not only to restore urban structures but also to accommodate the people who were displaced or disinherited by creating new communities. The cities also decided to restore the appearance of historical buildings while enhancing their technical and environmental features (Jeleński 2018). 8 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part 1: Navigating Multiple Urban Crises The reconstruction of Coventry from bombing damage inclusive and participatory processes that address highlighted sound planning for improved postwar immediate needs and root causes of vulnerability. living and became a model for recovery planning in Investing in both the people and the physical other European cities with similar prewar conditions environment plays a crucial role, with culture acting as (Calame 2005; Mason and Tiratsoo 1990).9 In older cities, the binding force for an integrated approach (Wahba, the choice between preservation and innovation is Das, and Chun 2022). It is essential to view the stages made carefully, given the social, economic, and cultural of response and recovery, from humanitarian relief to transformation that urban reconstruction brings.10 In damage assessments, to early recovery, and to long- more recent years, increasing emphasis on the Building term reconstruction, as an ongoing endeavor that Back Better principle has warranted key considerations contributes to the development of resilience and the including promoting resilience, investing in achievement of sustainable development goals. The infrastructure upgrading and urban revitalization, and timeline and framework of these stages are subject improving policies and institutions to better manage to the nature and magnitude of the crisis and the disasters (GFDRR 2020). Resilience to climate change availability of recovery resources, including human, and natural hazard events has become an increasingly technical, and f inancial resources (GFDRR 2020). pressing concern in the past decade; a 2018 study by The World Bank recently presented a framework on the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery the basis of its institutional strengths that aims to suggests that global well-being losses due to natural provide both immediate crisis response and long-term hazards would be reduced by 12 percent if all countries development support. This framework consists of four “build back stronger” in the next 20 years (Hallegatte, pillars: (1) responding to food insecurity, (2) protecting Rentschler, and Walsh 2018). To minimize future people and preserving jobs, (3) strengthening resilience, vulnerability, considerations should include addressing and (4) strengthening policies, institutions, and the existing patterns of vulnerability and discrimination investments for rebuilding better (World Bank 2022). within societies, achieving effective coordination of The World Bank intends to use these pillars to offer multilateral agencies for the best possible recovery urgent support, mitigate the medium- to long-term outcomes while also protecting the rights of affected impacts of crises, prepare for any future crises, and take populations (Hallegatte, Rentschler, and Walsh 2018), advantage of the opportunities provided by crises to and integrating disaster risk reduction measures into improve long-term development outcomes. the restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems to reduce future hazards. Recovery from a crisis is a time-consuming task, and there is no one-size-f its-all solution against various political, economic, and social considerations. Cities have diverse histories, social and urban structures, and challenges that require a catered approach to the unique conditions of individual cases. Yet successful cases of reconstruction suggest the need to connect physical recovery and social reconciliation through 9 In Coventry, UK, reconstruction from the Luftwaffe raid that destroyed 90 percent of the urban core not only focused on confronting the extensive losses but also addressed the prewar problems, employing the principles of user-centered design and functionality (Calame 2005). 10 In the Venzone village in Italy after the 1976 Friuli earthquake, the guidance of a citizens’ committee led to reconstruction of the historic town center in its original style, using over 10,000 stones from the demolished structures (Jeleński 2018). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 9 Part 1: Navigating Multiple Urban Crises Case Study: Hiroshima Emerging from Multiple Crises Hiroshima, a city in western Japan that has recovered the city rebuilt urban functions, its urban restoration f rom war devastation and its aftereffects, offers efforts extended beyond simple physical rebuilding, valuable lessons to other cities grappling with crises. incorporating equity and inclusion, and transforming Although the total destruction of the urban core the city as a symbol for peace and resilience. by atomic bombing was the main crisis, there were multiple aftereffects that presented prolonged Navigating through challenges, Hiroshima’s challenges to Hiroshima’s communities, including resurgence exceeded expectations. The extensive health problems of war victims, food shortages, a damage to critical infrastructure and basic services volatile national and regional economy, f inancial required quick thinking about how to restore and constraints, and housing shortages. Despite the rehabilitate them amid limited resources. The housing diff iculties in accessing resources, several factors shortage remained severe, while depopulation from helped Hiroshima emerge f rom the effects of the loss of lives and forced displacement strained the multiple crises: a clear f ramework for recovery set city’s revenue base, making the prospects of a future forth by the national government, strong political population return uncertain and stirring a debate will and leadership that lasted through the long about the blueprint of reconstruction. Yet the city’s reconstruction period, and the engagement of population quadrupled in 25 years and continued its citizens and the private sector that supported the urban renewal and expansion for decades (figure 1.1). 11 rebuilding process. The city led the reconstruction of Nearly eight decades after the war, Hiroshima stands infrastructure, basic services, and housing alongside out as an example of urban regeneration and recovery the prefectural government and under the guidance in the wake of tremendous hardship, providing of the national government, and advocated for greater invaluable lessons for cities currently grappling with resource allocation from the national government. As multiple crises. 11 Personal communications with Norioki Ishimaru, February 2024. Figure 1.1. Key Stages of Reconstruction and Priorities in Hiroshima Year Events Stages of Reconstruction 1945 Bombing of Hiroshima   Short term Rehabilitation of critical infrastructure Provision of temporary housing First iteration of reconstruction plan set Reconstruction Medium term 1949 Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law Reconstruction projects Land readjustment 1955 End of additional subsidies for reconstruction Long term Scale down of reconstruction 1958 Completion of reconstruction projects Housing and urban upgrading Urban expansion 1960s-70s Temporary houses rebuilt into public housing Affordable housing development 1971-74 City area expands through administrative mergers 1980 Hiroshima gains the Government Ordinance City status Strengthening urban functions City of Global Peace Source: Original figure for this publication. 10 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part 2: Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 11 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Background and Early History Today, Hiroshima serves as the economic hub of today’s city area, which has grown tenfold since the Japan’s Chugoku region and refers to itself as the war through administrative mergers, is mountainous City of Global Peace and Culture. Located in western terrain (figure 2.1).12 This place of healing that offers Japan, about 700 kilometers f rom Tokyo and 300 lush nature, including the World Heritage site kilometers from Osaka, facing the Seto Inland Sea, the Miyajima Island, and learning about peace attracts city center is on the Ota River delta. More than half of visitors from across the world. 12 As a result of mergers with surrounding towns, the city area has grown from about 70 km2 in 1945, to 87 km2 in 1970, to today’s 742 km2 (Hiroshima City 2014). Figure 2.1 Hiroshima’s Expansion from Administrative Mergers and Land Reclamation Original City of Hiroshima in 1945 Areas incorporated as a result of merger Areas increased as a result of land reclamation The current city boundaries Source: Hiroshima City 2019d. 12 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Although known as a city of peace today, Hiroshima put related inf rastructure in place, including roads, developed as a military city during Japan’s bridges, a water system, and an extension of the railway modernization. Initially a castle town surrounding from the Hiroshima station to the Ujina port that was the Hiroshima Castle in the late 16th century, the built in merely two weeks (Nunokawa and Nakagawa city became the center of an administrative unit, 2018). Hiroshima han (“domain”), with its own military that later turned into the Hiroshima regional garrison The development of military functions provided a of the Japanese Army, then the army’s 5th Division, basis for a regional economy and industry. Through which was headquartered at the Hiroshima Castle in several wars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 13 1881. The administrative restructuring during Japan’s Hiroshima continued to serve as the main port for modernization in the late 19th century established the mobilization of soldiers, where local citizens supported Hiroshima Prefecture, forming the city of Hiroshima war efforts by providing lodging, meals, military as one of 40 cities across Japan and as the prefectural logistics, and entertainment to soldiers.16 Water and capital.14 At the turn of the 20th century, Hiroshima’s sewerage infrastructures and public health facilities strategic importance increased as Japan engaged in were improved for better sanitation. In addition to wars with other countries, resulting in the expansion having nearly 40,000 army personnel stationed in of the city’s revenue scale and the facilitation of the city at various military functions, the military inf rastructure development. Hiroshima’s strategic provided the foundation of the local industries through importance was particularly bolstered by the presence steel and machineries production, use of shipyards, of a railway and a port. 15 The Sanyo Railway that manufacturing, and related services.17 Factories in and connected Tokyo and Hiroshima enabled the transport around Hiroshima supplied the army’s Provisions Depot, of soldiers from across Japan; the Ujina port enabled Clothing Depot, Branch Ordinance Depot, and the their mobilization by sea to war fronts in Asia. Hiroshima nearby Navy Arsenal. Hiroshima was a “communications even briefly became the de facto capital of Japan center, a storage point, and an assembly area for troops” during the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), when the Meiji (Manhattan Engineer District of the United States Army emperor as commander-in-chief and the Army Division 1946, 7). These developments and the involvement of of the Imperial Headquarters relocated from Tokyo to ordinary citizens in support of the military continued Hiroshima. As a hub of military mobilization, Hiroshima into World War II. 13 Hiroshima was among the six regional garrisons in Japan. Other garrisons were based in Sendai, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kumamoto. In contrast to the garrison that mainly served for domestic security enforcement, the divisions served mainly for overseas mobilization, which was essential for interstate war (JACAR, n.d., ref: C02030420000). 14 The city struggled financially in its early years owing to its repayment of the bonds used to purchase land in the previous decade. The city had issued a bond for JPY 80,000 (when the revenue of the city was about JPY 45,000) to buy up the land made available by the large-scale reclamation that created the Ujina port. The bond pressured the city to spend the bulk of its budget on redemption (Katsube 2018). 15 The local economic base was rather limited by its topographic features; limited flat land between mountains and the sea and a high salt content in the reclaimed land made the land inconducive to farming, forcing locals to rely on fishing and salt farms. Later, farmlands were lost with the construction of the Ujina port in the late 19th century. In nearby areas, most notably Kure, shipbuilding was one of the traditional industries, dating back to the 6th century (Katsube 2018). 16 During the Russo-Japanese War, 70 percent of the 950,000 Japanese soldiers were mobilized via Hiroshima. The railway alone transported over 605,000 soldiers to Hiroshima, when the city’s population stood at 130,000 (Nunokawa and Nakagawa 2018). 17 During World War II, Hiroshima housed the Second General Army Headquarters at the Hiroshima Castle, the Chugoku Area Army Service Command, and the army’s shipping unit located in Ujina. The Kure Naval District Headquarters and the Navy Arsenal were located in nearby Kure (Hiroshima for Global Peace 2014). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 13 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction The Destruction of the War Despite its strategic importance, Hiroshima survived On the morning of August 6, 1945, Hiroshima’s city with little physical damage for most of World War center was bombed in the world’s f irst use of the II until mid-1945. In 1942, the city’s population was atomic bomb, wiping out half of the city population over 419,000 (Hiroshima City 2014). By the summer and the majority of the city center (figure 2.2). More of 1945, the city’s population was reduced to about than 53,000 were instantly killed, and the death toll 255,000 following the government-mandated increased to 89,000 by the end of the year, according systematic evacuation to minimize war casualties.18 to one estimate; the city estimates about 140,000 Amid the worsening war situation and destruction died by the end of 1945 (Hiroshima for Global Peace of other major cities in Japan, Hiroshima undertook 2014). Within a 2–3 kilometer radius of the hypocenter, air defense measures along with selective building physical destruction reached 90 percent. 20 As most 19 demolition to create firebreaks. Hiroshima’s 101,600 houses were wooden structures, the city was highly houses and structures in 1941 had been reduced to susceptible to fire (Manhattan Engineer District of the 64,500 by the time of the bombing (Inami 1953). Yet United States Army 1946), which led to 85 percent of while many major cities had experienced bombing, the structural damage, rather than the direct impact Hiroshima had been spared of much of the war of the explosion (table 2.1). The estimates of property damage prior to the summer of 1945. asset losses ranged from US$46.3 million to US$58.94 million in the 1945 value, worth the annual income of 850,000 Japanese people combined. 21 Figure 2.2. Map of the Destruction of Hiroshima 4 Dust from the explosion Ota R. les mi contaminated with radiation, and Key Locations in the City 2 called fallout, fell back to earth as rain. Areas as far as 12 miles away were affected. 1 July 1945 On the 26th, the Allies Potsdam Conference demands Japan’s les Source: Nystrom Atlas n.d. unconditional surrender. The Japanese mi 5 EUROPE government rejects them on the 29th. 1. NORTH ASIA AMERICA The following day President Truman Hiroshima authorizes the use of the atomic bomb. AFRICA SOUTH ile AMERICA AUSTRALIA m Chugoku Military Army 1 District Headquarters Headquarters ANTARCTICA le 2 Within this circle, 86% of the mi people were killed instantly 5 and 10% were wounded. 0. Fukuya Ground zero Department Store Enku First Hiroshima Prefectural R. Junior High School Prefectural Office City Hall R. a Ot Red Cross Atomic Bombing of . R Hospital si Hiroshima, Japan ah Yamanaka Girls b Kyo High School August 6, 1945 3 Between here and the half-mile Mo circle, 27% of the people were Structures completely destroyed R. killed instantly and 37% Hiroshima Structures partially destroyed toya a were wounded. Honkaw High School Higher elevation s a R. Road R. Railroad ma Ten Military or government N building Civilian building 0 0.5 1 mile 0 0.5 1 kilometer © Herff Jones, Inc. 18 The national government ordered children in third grade and older to be evacuated from cities to the countryside. For example, in Hiroshima between April and July 1945, about 23,500 pupils evacuated to the mountainous northern part of the prefecture. Those who had relatives (about 15,000) lived with them, and those without (about 8,500) lived at temples and other locations together and attended nearby schools (Urabe 2016). These population figures come from the Manhattan Engineer District of the United States Army (1946, 7). 19 The selective demolition work began in Kure City in May 1944 and then in Hiroshima City a few months later, expanding on scale in February 1945 and mobilizing local school students. The day of the bombing, August 6, 1945, was when the sixth round of evacuation work was underway (Chugoku Shimbun 1982; Hiroshima for Global Peace 2014). 20 Based on the estimate of the 1946 investigation by Hiroshima City, 70,147 out of 76,327 buildings were destroyed or damaged (Hiroshima City 2014). The rate of physical destruction significantly dropped outside of the five-kilometer radius, reaching 17.6 percent. Because the urban area was concentrated on the delta flatland, the entire urban area on the flatland was lost in fire. The destruction in Nagasaki was smaller because the surrounding mountains blocked the explosion impact, and the hypocenter was closer to the industrial areas (Inami 1953). 21 In Japanese currency, this converts to JPY 695–884.1 million. The 1946 edition of Hiroshima City’s Municipal Handbook estimates the losses to be JPY 763.43 million, a 1949 report by the Economic Stabilization Board estimates physical asset losses at JPY 695 million, and the 1979 joint assessment by Hiroshima and Nagasaki estimates the total losses at JPY 884.1 million. The average annual per capita income was JPY 1,044 in 1944 (Hiroshima for Global Peace 2020). The exchange rates for Japanese yen to US dollars were 15-to-1 in 1945 after the war (the military exchange rate), 50-to-1 in 1946, and 360-to-1 in 1949. 14 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Table 2.1. Percentage of Buildings Destroyed by Fire Versus the Explosion Type of damage Complete destruction Partial destruction Total Fire 55,000 2,290 57,290 (84.4%) Initial explosion 6,820 3,750 10,570 (15.6%) 61,820 (91.1%) 6,040 (8.9%) 67,860 (100%) Source: Ishimaru 2014a. Note: The data come from the Municipal Handbook of the City of Hiroshima: 1946, based on the Hiroshima Prefectural Police official announcement as of November 1945. Hiroshima’s challenges for short-term restoration of inf rastructure and services with flooding that and long-term reconstruction included uncertainty exacerbated infrastructure damage. The shortages of about the degree of danger f rom the radiation, food and goods lasted for nearly three years, giving rebuilding the city core, and lingering effects of rise to black markets across Hiroshima (Nishimoto the war. The population of Hiroshima plummeted 2014).24 Housing shortages persisted for years, leaving by more than 45 percent, to below 140,000 many orphans on the street. While dining and (Hiroshima City 2014). Those who survived suffered entertainment slowly started catering to the needs of health complications in the ensuing years. It was the citizens,25 the regional economy had a slow start, rumored that the radiation would make Hiroshima not turning upward until 1950 when the Korean War uninhabitable for seven decades.22 Between wartime started generating military demand and stimulating censorship, the results of an investigation that Hiroshima’s factories and regional economy. concluded that little health effects f rom radiation were expected, and few alternatives, the people of Hiroshima set to rebuild their lives with no consideration of the remaining effects of radiation by cremating bodies, removing debris, demolishing destroyed buildings, clearing the land, and rebuilding houses. 23 Although the war ended, crises continued in Hiroshima. Typhoon Ida in mid-September and heavy rain in October complicated the restoration 22 Statement by Dr. Harold Jacobsen, an American scientist, as appeared in the Washington Post on August 8, 1945 (Burr 2022). 23 The wartime censorship and the postwar press code by the US-led occupation forces suppressed the fear of the effects of a nuclear weapon (Nishimoto 2014). The joint investigation by the US, the Red Cross, and a doctor representing Japan concluded that the effects of radiation were short-lived and posed no danger for those living in the impact zone. 24 In particular, the area in front of the Hiroshima railway station had the biggest concentration of black markets (Li and Ishimaru 2008). 25 The number of diners and restaurants totaled 767 a year after the bombing, which was 1.5 times more than the prewar level. Movie theaters and a dance hall had also opened by then (Nishimoto 2014). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 15 In the Early Days: Emergency Response and Restoration Emergency Response The earliest phase of emergency response and the Surviving staff members and workers of each restoration of infrastructure and services relied on sector took immediate action to carry out parts a combination of the preexisting emergency plan of the emergency action plan where they could, and spontaneous organizing of respective sectors. and they improvised spontaneous actions where Before the bombing, Hiroshima had developed the air defense plan did not work. Naturally, priority air defense plans, laying out emergency actions, was given to supporting survivors (for example, by government support functions, and related military providing f irst aid and treatment to the injured, support. However, the local governments and the obtaining and delivering food and supplies to military, all of which were located in the center of the survivors, and transporting survivors so they could city, were incapacitated during the coordination of reconnect with their families). The prefecture’s response efforts immediately after the bombing. 26 response headquarters were established at a temple The prefectural government off ice was destroyed, in the nearby Hiji mountain, and the director of the along with all five of the preselected backup locations police department led immediate relief and rescue for the prefectural government support functions operations on behalf of the governor to mobilize according to the air defense plan. The same was true what was left of the police force, the civil defense at the city level: the Hiroshima mayor was killed by the associations, and other relief personnel (Ando bombing and the city government office and its staff 2014). The prefectural headquarters requested the were engulfed in fire. Only the army’s shipping unit assistance of backup doctors, medicine, food, and at the Ujina port survived, which provided imperative other supplies f rom neighboring towns and the support for the emergency response. 27 Most of the Ministry of the Interior in Tokyo. 28 At the city level, facilities and urban functions outside of the city center in the absence of a command structure, surviving survived with little damage, yet the destruction in the off icials devised new plans related to their normal city made it difficult to deliver resources and services duties. Some of their actions are outlined below. to those who needed them in the impact area. 26 The army support functions at the Hiroshima Castle were devasted because of their proximity to the hypocenter. The commander-in-chief died and many senior officers were injured. 27 Their support only lasted about a week, as the war concluded on August 15 and subsequently all military units were disbanded. 28 Sourced from an article written by the former Chugoku Shimbun reporters 35 years later on the basis of their memory and notes (NHK Hiroshima 2020). 16 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Food Provision Interment One of the surviving city off icials, the director of Because the bombing happened in the middle of rations for the City Air Defense Headquarters, led the summer, bodies needed to be buried quickly to the provision of food for the survivors. Surviving maintain sanitation. A government order was issued the explosion at home, he learned f rom his to complete the initial round of interment (either injured colleagues that the city off ice was gone, cremation or earth burials) within three days. The and managed to reach the interim air defense military, police, and civil defense association were headquarters. As previously agreed upon by the mobilized to work on interment as soon as they could military for air defense, he borrowed a military truck identify the bodies. Despite the quick initial round, f rom the army’s Armored Division Training Center only half of the bodies were interred in the first week located in Ujina. He then went to the Provisions and the remaining work continued on a smaller scale Authority in the neighboring town, loaded the truck (Ando 2014). As the initial interments were not proper with biscuits, and drove around the city to distribute burials, the government-subsidized reburials were food to survivors on the first day (Ishii 2018). He and conducted in the following years. the director of the prefectural response headquarters then devised a plan to keep feeding survivors by Housing using resources f rom the nonimpact area. They While food, f irst aid, and quick burials required requested neighboring towns to provide rice balls and governmental and military action, those public have them delivered by vehicle or train, promising a actions did not extend to housing. In the f irst few deferred payment. months, survivors scraped together materials f rom the debris to put together tents and roofs, took First Aid and Hospitals shelter in the houses that survived the impact in the The critical first aid and hospital services were done periphery of the city, or moved outside of the city if spontaneously, as most of the city’s 50 preselected they had family and relatives beyond it (Hiroshima emergency medical and first-aid stations (including City 2018b, 260–69). With the majority of houses in hospitals) were destroyed. 29 The two hospitals that Hiroshima being rented rather than owned prior to survived with partial damage started caring for the the bombing, the population immediately outside injured immediately. Army field medics, doctors and of the bomb impact area increased for the first six to nurses from surrounding cities, and able community nine months. 30 At that time, housing was seen as a members set up f irst-aid stations across the city private matter that required no government support,31 where the injured people congregated. There were and people were largely left to find their own housing 99 f irst-aid stations and hospitals operating within arrangements, with the exception of public temporary the city on the day of the bombing and 241 locations housing provided by the government a few years operating outside the city (Tani 2009). Medical later. supplies were extremely scarce, however, and f irst- aid stations quickly had to serve simultaneously as morgues and crematories. 29 Hiroshima had designated 32 first-aid stations at mostly elementary schools and 18 stations at hospitals for first aid in case of air strike (Ando 2014). 30 Eighty thousand survivors (about 38 percent of the survivors) remained in various parts of the city, while 133,000 (62 percent) went outside of the city immediately after the bombing. Over the next several months, the population increased in the areas more than 3 kilometers away from the hypocenter, while the population within 2.5 kilometers plummeted (Inami 1953). 31 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 17 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Early Restoration of the Most Critical Infrastructure and Services The restoration of critical inf rastructure involved Electricity assessing damage quickly and repairing what The f irst phase of electricity restoration focused on could be f ixed along the way. Workers needed the area that experienced little fire damage: near the to understand the level of damage and decide Ujina port. A transformer station in that area was only what was functional, what was lost, what could be minimally damaged because it was located behind a repaired, and what resources were needed to repair hill, enabling a quick repair to restore electricity access them. The assessment and repair work happened a day after the bombing (Chugoku Electric Power simultaneously. In some sectors, infrastructure such Company 1991). Power restoration was prioritized for as electricity, trains, and streetcars could resume key facilities, including military compounds, hospitals, service relatively quickly, in a staggered manner. In hydropower plants, trains and streetcars, gas providers, these sectors, sections of infrastructure that received the media, and several key factories. Within two weeks, less damage could be quickly repaired, and then 30 percent of electricity was restored in the vicinity additional repaired sections could be gradually added. of the impact zone, and the restoration reached 100 Other services, such as piped water and gas, were percent in three months. more diff icult to resume because their restoration required repair at the full network level, and the extensive destruction of the related facilities made Transportation The railway connecting Hiroshima and other cities repairs difficult. Despite the extreme conditions of the continued running with limited service despite the destruction from the war, the restoration of electricity, damaged tracks through the high-impact area. The transportation, and alternative sources for the water collapsed roof of the Hiroshima train station was supply helped restore basic functions and a minimal immediately cleared by operators and workers.32 Trains sense of normalcy in the city. departed the same day so survivors could be transported back home or receive medical help. 33 This enabled injured survivors to receive care outside of the city. The streetcar was the main mode of public transportation within the city center and was partially restored within three days despite heavy damage. 34 The bombing destroyed 108 out of 123 streetcars, the transformer station, and 393 power poles. The surviving staff systematically assessed the damage and immediately began restoring the system piece by piece with help f rom the army’s shipping unit, which provided personnel and 300 ship masts to use as temporary power poles (Hiroshima Electric Railway 1992; RCC Broadcasting n.d.). As the main transformer station located in the adjacent city was too far to restore 32 This is according to the official records. The Sanyo Line resumed two days later and the Geibi Line resumed three days later (Hiroshima for Global Peace 2014, 80). However, later investigations that interviewed train conductors and workers reveal the train operated on the day of the bombing (NHK 2007). 33 The mapping of first-aid stations that were set up on that day also depict stations stretching to the northern part of the prefecture along the Geibi Line, implying that the survivors were transported by train that day (Ishikawa 2021). 34 The earliest restoration of streetcar service was in the 1.5-kilometer stretch between the Koi and Nishi-Temma stations. 18 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction stable connectivity in Hiroshima, the equipment of Gas the transformer station closer to the city center was The gas provider in the region received consecutive repaired. The restoration gradually extended outwards, and extensive damages. The Hiroshima Gas Company’s reaching the Hiroshima railway station two months later, Kure branch office and its infrastructure had already thus linking the intracity and intercity transportation suffered partial damages in earlier air strikes the (Hiroshima Electric Railway 1992). The streetcar service previous month. The Hiroshima headquarters office and was also affected by Typhoon Ida in September, which the production facility located 2 kilometers away were destroyed a bridge that one of the streetcar lines ran on, both destroyed by the bombing and subsequent fire. delaying the full service’s restoration until December In addition, 70 to 90 percent of gas pipes and 40 to 60 1948. percent of gas tanks suffered damage (Hiroshima Gas 2010, 14). The typhoon in September and heavy rain in Water October flooded seven rivers and wiped out 30 bridges, The restoration of the water system required a network- taking away the main gas pipes and requiring the level repair involving multiple facilities and pieces of further clearing of sludge from the surviving pipes. The equipment. The extensive damage to the water pipes only remaining production facility in nearby Onomichi and extreme weather events delayed the system’s was repaired in December 1945, but the coal shortage full restoration. The damage to the power equipment limited gas provision to only two hours per day. With stopped water pumps, emptying the reservoir in a few extensive repairs needed for the gas production and hours. An emergency repair was conducted on the provision network, limited gas service to households did power equipment and water pumps in four days, yet not resume until April 1946. the initial repairs proved to be ineffective, as damages to the water pipes caused 80 percent of the water to leak throughout the system (Hiroshima City 1995, 18). In the first few days, residents relied on river water, but it was contaminated with debris. They instead dug wells and relied on hand-pumped groundwater until the water pipes were fully restored. The service restoration extended into the medium-term recovery phase, along with that of the sewer systems. Water service recovery was further complicated by extreme weather events. Typhoon Ida in September destroyed the water pipe bridges that connected the water reservoir and the city center. It took the City Water Division eight months to fully restore water services, requiring more than 18,000 repairs of water pipes and pipe bridges (Hiroshima City 1995, 19). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 19 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Medium-Term: Infrastructure Restoration and Rehabilitation After the initial phase of recovery that focused on received funding under the War-Damaged Area the most critical infrastructure and basic services, Emergency Measures, covering 50 to 80 percent of the other services that had taken a backseat came costs: (1) burial services for victims, (2) demolition of into focus in the medium-term recovery phase unstable structures, (3) debris removal and cleaning, to restore a sense of normalcy for those who (4) water and sewer inf rastructure restoration, and remained and to start preparing for rebuilding. (5) construction of temporary housing for displaced The national government issued subsidies to local survivors (Hiroshima City 1995; Hiroshima for Global governments for rehabilitation works, and local Peace 2020). Depending on the project, the plan was governments coordinated their implementation. implemented over the course of three to f ive years Starting about eight months after the bombing (with (table 2.2). the new fiscal year), works in the following key areas Table 2.2. War-Damaged Area Emergency Measures Subsidy ratio Project Conducted (FY)a Project descriptions (Percent) Burial services of Conducted proper burials of bodies found from 1947–­49 50 under the rubble and bones that were temporarily the victims interred. Transported and processed debris, ashes, and Debris removal trash that residents cleaned out and left on the 1946–48 80 and cleaning roadside. The eastern half was done by the city, the western half by the prefecture. Separated metals in the debris to make money for the Post-War Reconstruction Project. It generated Metal collection 1946–48 80 JPY 679,000 (US$13,580 in the 1946 exchange rate) in sales to be incorporated into the reconstruction budget. Demolition of Demolished partially damaged structures to pre- 1947–48 75 unstable structures vent building collapse. Restoration of Repaired water pipes and piped bridges and reha- 1946–48 50 water systems bilitated water purification plants. Restored vacuum pump stations, cleaned and Restoration of 1946–48 66 repaired sewer pipes, and repaired manholes and sewer systems outfall sewers. Built temporary housing and public affordable Housing 1945–50 50 housing (more details are in the later section “Housing Recovery and Redevelopment”). Source: Hiroshima City 1995, 15–22. a. A note on the Japanese fiscal year: the Japanese fiscal year runs from April of a given year to the end of March of the following year. For example, FY 1945 is April 1945 to March 1946. 20 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Sewer System Education The restoration of the sewer system was partially The recovery of the education sector was led by a funded by the War-Damage Restoration Project, community effort. School instruction at public schools which enabled repairs of 10 vacuum pump stations halted for a few months, as schools were either and 52 manholes and outfall sewers, and more than destroyed or used as f irst-aid stations and school 3,500 meters of sewer pipe repair and cleaning.35 The fields turned into temporary burial fields. As school restoration work continued until early 1949. children who had evacuated to the countryside returned, they initially relied on schools far f rom Livelihood where they lived for instruction.37 Because of limited To prepare for the coming winter, the city official who space, schools conducted classes in two shifts, in the led food provision efforts for the survivors negotiated morning and in the afternoon, in packed classrooms. with the military to release its stock of clothing, To raise money for rebuilding schools that struggled blankets, and cotton textiles for civilians, an untapped f rom material and f inancial shortages, parents surplus due to the conclusion of the war. He overcame and local communities came together to support multiple bureaucratic and logistical challenges— education recovery, organizing the Education Support including a military officer who pulled out a gun to Association. This organization of parents later turned prevent the release of the stock despite an approval into a PTA (Parent Teacher Association).38 By March from the senior level—and helped citizens have warm 1947, limited service for school lunch resumed. clothing in the winter (Ishii 2018). Banking Although not considered a top priority, the banking sector resumed service thanks to the quick thinking of the Bank of Japan staff. The Hiroshima branch building of the Bank of Japan survived the explosion with only f ire damage, despite being located only 380 meters f rom the hypocenter, and the building was one of the few concrete structures that did not collapse. Working on behalf of the injured branch manager, within two days the staff decided to offer the building as a temporary space for 10 local banks to resume service. The local banks and the Bank of Japan bent rules to accommodate customers to withdraw, deposit, receive fire insurance payments, and take out loans for rebuilding. This flexibility allowed local businesses and residents to swiftly start rebuilding their lives.36 35 The sewer system lost 8 out of 13 vacuum pump stations, and damages in manholes and outfall sewers led to clogging of sewerage pipes (Hiroshima City 1995, 19). 36 From a speech by a former branch manager, Kojiro Shinohara, who started working at the Hiroshima branch a few months after the bombing upon his return from the war front. He attributes the quick resumption of service to the flexibility and commitment of the branch manager and the fact that the vault remained intact, protecting the bank bills (Shinohara 2015). 37 For instance, at Honkawa Elementary School, where almost all of the 400 students and teachers perished, returned students took classes at another elementary school 2.5 kilometers away. Eventually, three neighboring elementary schools (Honkawa, Hirose, and Kanzaki) were merged because of the depopulation of the city center, with only 200 students in April 1946 (Urabe 2016). 38 Dr. Howard M. Bell from the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP, who conducted a site visit of Honkawa Elementary School in January 1947, personally donated JPY 2,500 specifically for the repair of facilities and school supplies. He asked to remain anonymous until the rebuilding was completed (Urabe 2016). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 21 Long-Term Reconstruction Led by the national government’s setup to engage in full- after the end of the war, laid out basic principles for scale reconstruction, planning for long-term reconstruction reconstruction, including (1) setting the reconstruction started while the city was still navigating the emergency planning zone, (2) target setting for reconstruction phase, though implementation would later require planning, (3) principles for key inf rastruc ture changes to bylaws as well as land readjustment. Planning development, and (4) principles and techniques for land for reconstruction included damage assessment, devising readjustment. These principles drove cities to set basic city plans, and f inancing. The national government reconstruction plans without much consideration for set up the War Reconstruction Institute, and its quick financial viability, thus requiring the plans to be scaled development of national principles for the reconstruction down later, but the principles helped give clear directions of war-damaged cities, announced just over four months on how to rebuild war-torn cities across Japan.39 Planning for Reconstruction Planning Capacities and Institutions In planning and implementing reconstruction, the Damage assessment was led by the national government, national, prefectural, and city governments played which conducted war-damage assessments of 150 war- different roles. The national government made the damaged cities and created maps of the war damage framework for reconstruction, including policies and (figure 2.3).40 At the conclusion of the war, institutional and the institutional ground for the reconstruction of war- policy setup was done quickly by the national government, damaged cities across Japan. Hiroshima’s prefectural thanks to the prior internal discussion for reconstruction government initially led the reconstruction planning on in the Home Ministry during the war (Ishimaru 2014a, 26). behalf of the city, but eventually ceded it to the city and The government established a national-level institution joined the city’s implementation efforts, dividing the for planning postwar reconstruction, the War Damage reconstruction area between the city and the prefecture Reconstruction Board, and a national policy for rebuilding to expedite the process. The city government was 115 war-torn cities, the Basic Policy for the Reconstruction responsible for land readjustment in the 579 hectares of of War-Damaged Areas. 41 With these institutional the east side of the city, while the prefectural government arrangements, the division of labor was in place: the 115 was responsible for the 481 hectares of the west side cities designated as war-damaged areas would be rebuilt (Hiroshima for Global Peace 2020, 27). In this sense, the under the War Damage Reconstruction Board, while other city and prefecture shared the same level of authority in cities continued to be under the jurisdiction of the Home the implementation of the reconstruction process. Aside Ministry. The Basic Policy provided general guidelines from certain prefectural-level infrastructure projects, such for the reconstruction of the 115 cities and laid out as ports and river management, the city government was reconstruction plans for (1) road transportation networks, (2) the main planning body for the overall reconstruction urban parks, and (3) land use (Hiroshima for Global Peace plan. The city also was the primary actor in the advocacy 2020, 27). To aid the reconstruction process, the Special City for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law Planning Act was passed in September 1946, requiring each (henceforth referred to as the Peace City Law). city to establish a city-level War Damage Restoration Plan by November 1946 (Hein 2005). As a general rule, each city Initially, reconstruction planning of Hiroshima followed would assume financial responsibility, with some additional the national policy for other war-torn cities across Japan, funds from the national government to fill the financial though it quickly became apparent that rebuilding gap, including during the medium-term restoration phase Hiroshima would require specialized policies and funding. (as laid out in table 2.2) (Hiroshima City 1995, 24). 39 Personal communication with Norioki Ishimaru, February 2024. 40 The First Demobilization Ministry (the successor of the Ministry of the Army that dealt with matters related to the demobilization of soldiers) created maps of the areas that were damaged by air strikes to provide information to the demobilized soldiers, who wished to know the effect of the war when they returned from the war front. The map in figure 2.3 was published in December 1945. While other cities show different rounds of air strike damages, almost all of Hiroshima’s war damage is from the atomic bombing. 41 Established by the Law of the War Damage Reconstruction Board in November 1945 (JACAR, n.d., ref: A04017772900). 22 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Figure 2.3. Hiroshima City War Damage Source: National Archives of Japan Digital Archive 1945. After som e delay, local-level plannin g for Reconstruction Association in December 1945 (Hiroshima reconstruction started and official institutions and City 2019a; Ishimaru 2014a). To incorporate community mechanisms of community engagement were engagement at the official level, the mayor’s advisory established. Because of the loss and recuperation of board, the City Reconstruction Council, was organized council members, the city council took two months to in January 1946 with business leaders, industry experts, resume and replace the deceased mayor. City council and community representatives to reflect a wide variety members formed the War Damage Restoration of options and visions in the reconstruction planning Commission in November 1945, and the city government (Hiroshima City 2019a) (Box 2.1 describes some of the 42 established the Bureau of Reconstruction. At the deliberated visions). The national guidelines for roads, community level, the representatives of neighborhood parks, and land use offered a basis of discussion for the associations formed the Hiroshima City War Damage reconstruction planning 42 The reconstruction planning initially was done by both the prefecture and the city, but leadership over the planning gradually shifted to the city government, reflecting the process of postwar democratization and decentralization (Ishimaru 2014a). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 23 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Postwar planning in Hiroshima was primarily based After deliberating various proposed plans, Hiroshima on a prewar approach to urban planning, while also adopted a reconstruction plan based on the incorporating changes for improved city functions. unexecuted prewar city plan, while making a major The most efficient planning approach was to use the change to its arterial roads. The prewar city plan— preexisting system of planning and execution, which which had been partially implemented before it was mainly relied on land readjustment.43 Modern city halted because of the war—included improvements planning in Japan started in the early 20th century of urban inf rastructure and flood control, such as with the introduction of the City Planning Act (1919) in increasing the number of roads, creating new urban response to industrialization and rapid urbanization parks, and extending the streetcar network.45 This 44 in Japan. Although the implementation of many prewar plan was assessed against the city’s new needs urban development projects halted during the war, the and revised into a new reconstruction plan, focusing city planning system remained relatively unchanged mainly on public space and land use (Ishimaru 2014a). after the war. The city planning approach included The first iteration of the new city plan, the Hiroshima improvements to the urban landscape such as City Plan for Reconstruction, was put together by increasing the number of roads and parks for better November 1946 (figure 2.4), with specific plans on roads, access and reducing fire hazards. parks, and land readjustment (table 2.3). 43 Land readjustment is a tool of urban planning that determines the locations of public facilities and housing, readjusts land usage purposes and relevant land use permits, replots blocks, and has the necessary land for public purposes contributed by landowners. For details on Japan’s land readjustment system, see World Bank 2019. 44 Japan’s initial city planning primarily targeted Tokyo but gradually expanded to other cities, and it took effect in Hiroshima in 1923. Accordingly, Hiroshima established urban boundaries in 1925, land use zoning in 1927, road plans in 1928, and urban park plans in 1941. The institutions for city planning also followed, including the prefecture-level City Planning Commission, which started in 1924 (sourced from an interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023). 45 The national government implemented the City Planning Act in 1920 to control urbanization, and it came into effect for Hiroshima in 1923, enabling institutional arrangements for city planning within the city government (Hiroshima City 2019a). Figure 2.4. Hiroshima City Plan for Reconstruction (November 1946) Source: Hiroshima City 2019a 24 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Table 2.3. Content of the First Hiroshima City Plan for Reconstruction (November 1946) Category Scale Decision date Roads 24 roads (82 kilometers) October 1946 Total of 39 sites Parks Parks: 35 sites (219.67 hectares total) November 1946 Green spaces: 4 sites (62.02 hectares total) Land readjustment 1,520 hectaresa October 1946 3,263 hectares Residential areas: 2,065 hectares Total area for zoning May 1949 Commercial areas: 387 hectares Industrial areas: 811 hectares Total area of 7,297 hectares 1925 city planning Source: Hiroshima 2019b, 5. a. Although the initial plan determined to conduct land readjustment on 1,520 hectares of the city area, it was reduced to 1,060 hectares in 1952. Box 2.1 Alternative Plans Besides the reconstruction plan adopted by Hiroshima, a number of alternative plans for rebuilding the city were considered. Different visions for how to rebuild the city included (a) relocating the urban functions for fear of radiation effects, (b) rebuilding Hiroshima as a smaller city because of depopulation, and (c) raising the elevation of land to minimize future flood risks (Ishii 2018; Ishimaru 2014a). Relocating the city, raising the levels of land, or rebuilding a more compact city would require drawing a new city plan, which would complicate and delay the process of land use planning and land readjustment. As land readjustment is a long process that involves negotiations with landowners, rebuilding with minimal land readjustment would be a quicker option. Financial, time, and other resource constraints indicated that the best choice was building back what was lost using the prewar city plan. Although the overall vision settled on rebuilding the city close to what it was before, other plans that concerned parts of the city were presented, such as the greening of riverbeds and relocating the railway station closer to the city center (to the former military-use land).46 A number of ideas for the commemoration of the bombing were contributed by international experts from the early stage of reconstruction planning, such as a memorial park and museum (by Miles Vaughn), the preservation of damaged buildings near the hypocenter as memorials, the preservation of documents related to atomic bombing in the museum (by John D. Montgomery), and a memorial tower for the deceased (by S. A. Jarvie, who also proposed an alternative land use plan in the Hakushima area) (Ishimaru 2008, 2009, 2011). Owing to the anticipated difficulties of implementation, most of these plans did not materialize, with the exception of riverbed afforestation and a monument commemorating the bombing that became part of the Peace Memorial Park. The preservation of the Atomic Bomb Dome as a monument remained an idea at the planning stage; thus, the structure remained untouched until the 1960s. 46 The financial cost to relocate the station was too high (Kato 2014). Reconstruction planning in Hiroshima followed a approved reconstruction projects because of new pattern of creating a vision without much funding fiscal austerity measures. This was compounded by considerations and later scaling down to adjust signif icantly lower tax revenues in the city due to to the f iscal and resource realities. The initial depopulation and a reduction in buildings that would reconstruction plan was beyond the normal financial generate income and property taxes (Hiroshima City resources for the city, which was already devasted by 2019c). In FY 1948, the annual budget for war-damage the war and further affected by Japan’s economic restoration allocated by the national government to volatility. Japan was facing a worsening f inancial Hiroshima was JPY 50 million, far below the estimated crisis after the war, and the national government JPY 30 billion needed to rebuild Hiroshima (Hamai announced a scaling back of the previously 1967). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 25 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction A Special Law to Finance Hiroshima’s Reconstruction (Peace City Law) To obtain additional funding for reconstruction, the minister of finance to change the existing legal the city appealed to the national government. The f ramework for Hiroshima in 1946, both the mayor city’s advocacy resulted in the enactment of a and the minister were ousted in a targeted purge of special national law in 1949 targeting Hiroshima’s conservative ideology led by the Supreme Commander reconstruction. Given the reduced reconstruction for the Allied Powers (SCAP).47 Desperate for additional budget for rebuilding war-torn cities across Japan, funding, the city council passed a formal petition the city of Hiroshima negotiated with the national (“the Petition regarding Hiroshima’s Comprehensive government, stating that Hiroshima needed additional Reconstruction Measures from Atomic Bomb Damage”) financial resources. After several years of negotiations stating that Hiroshima’s reconstruction should be and advocacy, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City funded as a national project, rather than that of the Construction Law (henceforth the Peace City Law) local government, but this petition lacked support was enacted, enabling (1) increased subsidies f rom from national policy makers given the country’s fiscal the national government for reconstruction-specific conditions and the reluctance to treat Hiroshima projects, and (2) the free transfer of former military-use differently from other war-damaged cities. However, land to the city (Hiroshima City 1949). the situation was resolved in February 1949 by pursuing new legislation. This new legislation was a framework The Peace City Law was the f ruit of mul tiple that would allow Hiroshima to receive special treatment negotiations to obtain special financial measures. from the national government if it were rebuilt as a The city council approached the national government Peace Memorial City. This framework was conceived as early as November 1945 for a higher rate of financial with the cooperation of Tadashi Teramitsu and other support, with multiple attempts that followed (table 2.4) legal experts. (Ishimaru 2014a). After the Hiroshima mayor convinced 47 The purge targeted those who had supported the war. Following the purge, the first mayoral election was held to elect the mayor by popular vote (as opposed to the mayor being elected by the city council) in 1947, in which Shinzo Hamai was elected (Ishii 2018, 109–112). Table 2.4. The Advocacy and Policy-making Process for the Peace City Law Date Steps to Enactment Steps to Enactment Mayor Kihara requests special financial assistance from the nation- November 1945 Requesting special mea- al government. sures from the national January 1946 Mayor Kihara requests the (free) transfer of former military-use land. government: the transfer of national property and The Hiroshima City Plan for Reconstruction (based on the Basic November 1946 special financial measures Policy) is adopted. The petition for the nationalization of the city’s reconstruction is Advocacy for the nation- November 1948 passed by the city council. alization of Hiroshima’s February 11, 1949 The petition is distributed to Diet members. reconstruction Discussion of the written petition takes place in Tokyo with Teramit- February 13, 1949 su; the first idea of requesting for a special law comes forth. February 14, 1949 The first draft of the law is completed. February 25, 1949 Nagasaki shows interest in collaborative participation in the legislation. Advocacy for the Peace a City Law May 4, 1949 The SCAP approves the law draft. May 10, 1949 The law is passed in the lower house. May 11, 1949 The law is passed in the upper house. June 1949 Announcement of the scaling down of reconstruction projects July 7, 1949 Referendum: majority approval August 6, 1949 The law goes into effect. The law goes into effect. March 31, 1952 The construction plan is finalized. Source: Hiroshima City 2019c. a. SCAP = the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In Japan, the SCAP was called GHQ, referring to the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 26 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Hiroshima overcame these political obstacles The Peace City Law laid out a set of commitments by f raming its identify as a city of peace and by f rom the national government, as well as gaining support f rom Hiroshima-native policy responsibilities for Hiroshima City and its mayor.54 makers for a new national legislation. In the course Most importantly, the law laid out the national of drafting a petition, the identity of Hiroshima as a government’s responsibility to provide the financial “Peace Memorial City” was introduced to emphasize assistance needed for the reconstruction of t h e i m p o r t a n ce o f re b u i l d i n g H i ro s h i m a a s a Hiroshima. The law itself did not specify the extent national symbol for international peace and thus of additional funding, leaving the specific budgeting justify access to additional financial resources from to the bureaucratic procedure by the national the national government (Semba 2016). The key government (Hiroshima City 1995, 61). The law also support for national legislation came f rom, among enabled the transfer of nationally owned assets others, a Hiroshima-native senior leader in the (public land assets) as necessitated by Hiroshima’s national parliament, who rewrote the petition into reconstruction plan. 55 In return, the responsibilities 48 a draft special law. Along with revising the draft for the mayor and the citizens of Hiroshima were law text multiple times, Hiroshima’s representatives laid out as follows: (1) the Hiroshima Peace Memorial successfully gained approval f rom the SCAP49 and City should be constructed as a symbol of peace, (2) averted other potential obstacles. 50 With suff icient the city should develop cultural facilities appropriate political support at the national level, the special for a peace memorial city, and (3) the mayor and law passed the national parliament in May 1949 and the citizens of Hiroshima should be committed to gained popular support in a city referendum.51 The building a peace city (Hiroshima City 2019b). Although fear of losing f inancial support—because of a new the financial aspect of the Peace City Law ended in national fiscal austerity measure that announced the the mid-1950s—the national government’s subsidizing scaling back of previously approved reconstruction of reconstruction projects concluded in 1955—the projects—created momentum for the city to finalize city of Hiroshima is still required to report to the Diet the law; hence, a public campaign was set up.52 With twice a year on Hiroshima’s development as a part of 90 percent approval from the citizens, the act came obligations set by the law.56 into effect on the fourth anniversary of the bombing, as the f irst instance of a special act under the new Japanese Constitution; since then, 15 such special acts have been enacted.53 48 Tadashi Teramitsu, the director of the Proceedings Department of the House of Councilors, advised Hiroshima’s political representatives to use the special law framework (available under the new Japanese Constitution set in 1947) and personally drafted the law. The draft went through four revisions in three months before it was submitted to the Diet (Hiroshima City 2019a). 49 As a prior approval from the SCAP was required to enact a law during the Allied Occupation, an English translation of the draft law was submitted for approval. Contrary to the worry of the policy makers, the SCAP expressed support because the law did not ask for any financial resources from the Allied Forces. The framing of Hiroshima as a city of peace was also considered in line with the intention of the SCAP to demilitarize and democratize Japan (Ishimaru 2018). 50 The city of Nagasaki requested to join and be incorporated into the law, which would delay the law-making process. The request was declined but it was suggested that Nagasaki draft a separate special law on its own, which later became the Nagasaki International Culture City Construction Law. 51 The law was deliberated at the national parliament and passed with unanimous approval in both the upper and lower houses. Article 95 of the Japanese Constitution requires a referendum for a special law targeted at a specific public entity. The city set up a special office for the promotion of the law and launched a public campaign to get voters out to the referendum. 52 This fiscal austerity measure was announced in the Basic Policy for the Reconsideration of Reconstruction Planning (June 1949), based on the so-called Dodge Line, a fiscal contraction policy for Japan drafted by the SCAP economic adviser Joseph Dodge (Hein 2005). The Basic Policy also specified the project duration for the War-Damage Reconstruction Projects: they would be concluded by the end of FY 1955. The Ministry of Construction established the Council for the War- Damage Restoration Measures to ensure the implementation of the policy, and the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were invited to the council together with other major cities such as Tokyo and Osaka (Hiroshima City 2019a; Nakagawa 2019). Although this indicated national commitment, it was still worrisome to Hiroshima’s financial future. 53 A series of special acts were enacted between 1949 and 1951 by other cities trying to follow suit on Hiroshima’s action. The other special acts include the Nagasaki International Culture City Construction Law, which served a similar purpose as Hiroshima’s; the construction of the capital (Tokyo) and the reuse of military ports, which deals with the aftermath of the war; and others, which were concerned with developing tourist industries for the economic revival of cities (Hiroshima City 2019c). 54 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. 55 This is an extraordinary measure to Article 28 of the National Property Law. Overall, 345,530 square meters of former military land have been transferred from the national government to Hiroshima City under the Peace City Law. 56 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 27 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Finalizing the Reconstruction Plan Even after the new law for additional f inancing, 1950 focused on f ive fundamental categories (war- Hiroshima’s reconstruc tion plan un der went damage reconstruction, peace memorial facilities, chan ges an d was forced to be scaled down sewerage facilities, arterial roads, and urban public given the national government’s f iscal austerity facilities) with a total project budget of JPY 2.95 billion policy. After the Peace City Law passed, the city (about US$8.2 million), and the total budget was prepared a revised plan totaling JPY 27.6 billion further shrunk to JPY 2.70 billion (US$7.5 million) in (about US$77 million in the 1949 exchange rate), the following year. Many of the projects proposed in but eventually only one-tenth of that amount the draft comprehensive plan were not approved for was approved by the national government. In this higher subsidy rates (figure 2.5). These projects either revised plan (the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City received the same subsidy rate as other cities as part Construction Draft Comprehensive Plan, October of the existing routine mechanisms (including public 1949), the city placed a variety of projects under the housing, urban parks, and inf rastructures) or were Peace City Construction Projects in an attempt to canceled unless other funding sources were found. receive a higher national subsidy rate (Nakagawa On the basis of the approved projects, the Hiroshima 2019). The national government, however, pushed Peace Memorial City Construction Plan was finalized back. After negotiations, the approved f inancing in in 1952 (table 2.5). Figure 2.5. Comparison of the Reconstruction Plans across Revisions Hiroshima City Plan for Petition to the government Draft Comprehensive Plan Peace Memorial City Reconstruction (1946) (Feb 1949) (Oct 1949) Construction Plan (1952) Land readjustment Land readjustment Land readjustment Land readjustment Sewerage* Sewerage Sewerage Sewerage Water system* Water system Water system Water system Roads Roads Roads Roads Railways Railways Public space Public space Gas Port repairs Port repairs River management River management Parks Peace memorial facilities Peace memorial facilities Peace memorial facilities *Repairs of sewerage Educational facilities School construction and water system were Social welfare facilities Social welfare facilities funded by War-Dam- Tourism facilities Tourism facilities aged Area Emergency New road construction New road construction Measures. Sewerage expansion Water system expansion Gas system expansion Urban parks Public housing : Urban planning projects Health facilities : Prefectural and national projects Athletic facilities : Projects under the Peace Memorial City construction Children’s culture center Source: Based on Ishii 2018 and Nakagawa 2019. 28 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Table 2.5. Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Plan (Revised Plan, March 1952) Category Scale Content Peace memorial Peace Memorial Park, 1 site (12.21 hectares) facilities Peace Boulevard Including the Peace Roads 27 roads (63 kilometers) Boulevard Total of 88 sites Parks: 78 sites (219.67 hectares total) Parks For example, Chuo Park Green spaces: 8 sites (398.34 hectares total), 2 riverbank green spaces (21.32 hectares) East and West Land Land Total 1,520 hectares Readjustment Projects readjustment for Reconstruction Sewerage Covering a 1,172-hectare area 3,644 hectares Residential: 2,169 hectares Total area Commercial: 527 hectares for zoning Semi-industrial: 250 hectares Industrial: 698 hectares Total area of urban Unchanged from 1925 7,297 hectares planning ing City Law Source: Hiroshima City 2019b, 8. The two key components of the finalized Hiroshima 100-meter-wide road (f igure 2.6). 60 In addition to Peace Memorial City Construction Plan were the maintaining its role as a firebreak, the road was also main picturesque road (the Peace Boulevard) and an improvement to the urban landscape, with trees the memorial park in the city center (the Peace planted along it, and it was given a new importance in Memorial Park). 57 The city placed these projects the name of “peace,” with the contextual necessity to under the Peace Memorial City Construction Projects qualify the road construction for the higher national to facilitate the f inancing, thus adding “peace” in subsidy rate under the Peace City Law (Al-Kazei 2019). 58 their names. The Peace Boulevard is a 100-meter- wide road that runs through the city center from east The Peace Memorial Park was planned both to to west, and the Peace Memorial Park is in the center improve the urban space of the city center and of the city in place of the cluttered neighborhoods to provide a space for reconciliation and healing that existed before the war. Combined, these urban from the experience of war devastation. Although functions def ined what the new city center would creating a large urban park was seemingly a low look like, symbolizing a peace city. priority compared with other critical projects such as key inf rastructures, housing, and administrative Allocating the land for the Peace Boulevard was functions, it was seen as an important venue to achieved by the wartime selective demolition of symbolize a city of peace (Ishimaru 2014a). The two buildings for fire prevention. In postwar Japan, other large parks included in the original reconstruction cities also planned to build 100-meter-wide roads as plan—the Nakajima Park, across the river f rom the part of their reconstruction plans, but many of these hypocenter, and the Chuo Park, to be sited on the roads did not materialize because of fiscal constraints former military-use land by the Hiroshima Castle— and the challenge of procuring land.59 In Hiroshima, were combined to become the 19-hectare Peace the wartime firebreak created by selective demolition Memorial Park, which includes a museum, civic hall, of houses provided both the idea and space for the and memorials.61 57 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. 58 In the Peace Memorial City Construction Plan, the road was officially called “Peace memorial 100-meter-wide road” (Ishimaru 2014b). 59 For instance, in Tokyo, where originally 13 such roads were included in the reconstruction plan, none of the 100-meter-wide roads materialized (Hein 2005). Hiroshima’s original reconstruction plan included an additional 100-meter-wide road 2 kilometers south of the Peace Boulevard, which did not materialize owing to the scaling down of the plan. 60 By creating an east-west division with an open space, combined with the many rivers that run north to south, the city would be divided into 12 blocks and able to contain fire more easily. 61 The Nakajima Park (12.2 hectares) and a part of the Chuo Park (6.6 hectares) were combined into a memorial park. Only a part of the originally planned Chuo Park was incorporated, as the other part was repurposed into housing. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 29 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Figure 2.6. Location of Selective Demolition (left) and the Peace Boulevard (right) a. Selective Demolition (July 1945) b. Location of the Peace Boulevard (October 1966) Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan. Left image taken July 25, 1945, by US Military GSI Maps; right image taken October 23, 1966, by Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, GSI Maps. The Tange Plan for the Peace Memorial Park The design plan of the Peace Memorial Park was A-bomb Dome as the focal point at the northern end. proposed by architect Kenzo Tange through a Although the preservation of the Atomic Bomb Dome design competition, in which Tange successfully had not been determined at that time, the city had incorporated symbolism of peace in an integrated requested in the call for proposals that the building plan of various buildings. The city called for design be included in the park. Other competition proposals proposals for what would become the Peace Memorial for the park did not integrate the half-destroyed Park so it could decide the design plan of the peace remains of the Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial memorial facilities—around when the Peace City Promotion Hall (Ishimaru 2014a). Between the main Law was being finalized.62 With his prior connections building of the Peace Memorial Museum to the south to Hiroshima and having engaged in Hiroshima’s and the Atomic Bomb Dome to the north is an open- reconstruction in the early days, Tange was personally space corridor with a memorial for the victims of the 63 committed to Hiroshima’s reconstruction. Although bombing. The visitors of the memorial park would an architect, he was interested not only in designing be able to learn about Hiroshima’s experience of the individual buildings, but also in the composition atomic bombing, commemorate the deceased, and and design of urban spaces, which distinguished renew a vow for peace, and the Tange plan offered an his approach to the memorial park from other ideas ideal space for memorials and self-reflection (figure in the competition. His park plan included a north- 2.7). south corridor in the center of the park, with the 62 The call for proposals was circulated in May 1949, the same month the Peace City Law passed in the Diet. The proposals were due in July, and the selection was announced on August 6 (the anniversary of the bombing) of that year. 63 He had attended Hiroshima Higher School (a higher school is a higher education institution to prepare for imperial universities) and had already worked on the pilot survey for the city when he was invited to serve on the War Damage Reconstruction Board shortly after the war. He submitted a city reconstruction plan in February 1947, but it did not get selected as the city had already agreed on a basic plan for reconstruction (approved by the Reconstruction Board in July 1946). His submission to the design competition of the Memorial Cathedral for World Peace (a Catholic cathedral in Hiroshima) in 1948 also was not selected. The memorial park design competition was his third try. 30 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Figure 2.7. Kenzo Tange’s Design Plan for the Peace Memorial Park, 1949 Source: Hiroshima City 2018b This plan also faced f inancial challenges, and Because the increased national funding support the implementation required adapting the plan would conclude in early 1956, 64 the city started according to f iscal reality. On the basis of Tange’s construction of these facilities without a clear plan for park design, a supplementary budget was allocated completion (Ishii 2018, 130–32). Eventually, in light of in FY 1949, launching the construction of the Peace improved revenue conditions for the city, the facilities Memorial Park. Yet financial difficulties significantly were completed through self-f inancing by the city delayed the construction of some memorial park (Ishii 2018, 243–44). facilities, including the main building of the museum. 64 After March 1956, the level of national subsidy for the Peace Memorial Facilities Project would be reduced from 66 percent to 50 percent, the same level as equivalent projects in other cities. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 31 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Financing for Reconstruction The f inancing for Hiroshima’s reconstruction from other war-damaged cities, forcing the national was drawn from multiple sources, but much of it government to scale back the subsidy level for some came from the national government. The financial projects.66 But the Peace Memorial Facility Project, challenges for the reconstruction included postwar which included the development of the Peace inflation, the scaling down of reconstruction plans Memorial Park, would continue to receive 66 percent because of f iscal austerity, the lack of revenue, and f inancial assistance f rom the national government, the sheer scale of the reconstruction (Hiroshima compared to the standard 50 percent for urban City 2019a). Between 1949 and 1955, the Peace development projects in other war-damaged cities.67 City Law enabled additional f inancial support for The Peace City Law also enabled the gratuitous reconstruction. Hiroshima’s f inancial situation transfer of nationally owned land and property, s o m ew h a t i m p rove d a l o n g w i t h J a pa n’s h i g h substantially cutting down on the cost for Hiroshima. economic growth in the late 1950s, by which time the In Japan, the cost for purchasing land accounts for city’s revenue had increased five times over 10 years the bulk of a public facility project’s cost.68 Therefore, (Ishii 2018, 244). By the end of the additional national having the land transferred at no cost f rom the financial scheme in spring 1956, the city could afford national government would ease the f inancial urban development with its own budget. burden for the city and facilitate reconstruction. The target site was the public land stretching to the south and southwest of Hiroshima Castle, where the military facilities existed during the war and which National Funding became national property at the conclusion of the Most importantly, the Peace City Law increased the war. The land’s proximity to the city center made it a amount of funding from the national government. key site to rebuild Hiroshima’s urban functions. The It was determined that the national government prefectural government office, the city hospital, and would allocate an additional subsidy to Hiroshima, other local government buildings were placed on this which increased by JPY 31 million in FY 1949 and JPY site, and the rest of the area was used to establish 180 million in FY 1950 (in addition to the standard cultural facilities. Combined with some other subsidy level for other war-damaged cities under the properties, a total of 345,530 square meters of land War-Damage Reconstruction Projects).65 However, were transferred to Hiroshima City, and the national this extraordinary financial measure of a two-thirds government required Hiroshima to limit the land’s subsidy, specific to Hiroshima, was met by resistance use to public infrastructure or public spaces.69 65 These additional subsidies were provided in the form of a supplementary budget. For FY 1950, the national government set aside JPY 270 million specifically for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and two thirds of that amount was allocated to Hiroshima. 66 Specifically, beginning in FY 1951, the subsidy level of the urban development projects was returned to 50 percent; the subsidy level for the Peace Memorial Facility Projects was kept at 66 percent but would end in FY 1955 (Hiroshima City 1995, 61). 67 Specif ically, the two-thirds subsidy was applied to the Peace Memorial Facilities Projects between FY 1950 and FY 1955, but it was only applied to the Reconstruction Projects for FY 1950. 68 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. 69 The breakdown of the uses for the land is as follows: educational facilities (146,888 square meters), water and sewerage facilities (171,153 square meters), parks and a crematory (1,513 square meters), and public health and sanitation facilities (25,975 square meters) (Hiroshima City 2018a). The use of the land was limited specifically to parks, green spaces, public spaces, athletic fields, railways, water and sewerage facilities, canals, rivers, waste management, public cemeteries, libraries, and public schools. At first, educational facilities were not included in the criteria, but they were later added after negotiations with the Ministry of Finance (Hiroshima City 1995, 61–62). 32 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Piecing together Funding Sources Al ternative funding sources to complement Groups of Hiroshima natives living overseas con- insuff icient funds were sought to achieve some ducted a fundraising campaign and helped fund elements of urban development. This included the construction of a children’s library as well as d o n a t i o n s f ro m t h e l o c a l p r i va te s e c to r t h a t health and social welfare facilities (including or- funded the public hall, donations f rom Hiroshima- phanages, childcare centers, a maternity center, a native expatriates that funded the construction senior living facility, and single-mother residences) of a children’s library among other projects, and and provided relief supplies. nationwide private donations f rom citizens and The preservation of the Atomic Bomb Dome was companies that enabled the preservation of the made possible by private sector and personal do- Atomic Bomb Dome. nations. To fund the estimated JPY 40 million for International aid assistance, specifically from the preservation works, the city launched a public do- United States (through the Economic Rehabili- nation campaign. The local business circle again tation in Occupied Area [EROA] Fund), was used contributed, as well as many citizens throughout for the construction of two bridges along Peace the country. Boulevard: the Peace Bridge and the West Peace In 1955–56, a tree donation campaign was launched Bridge.70 to collect the trees that would be planted along The city considered public gambling as an option Peace Boulevard and in the Peace Memorial Park. for financing reconstruction, which materialized in This initiative was considered a symbolic support the city-operated bike racetrack in 1952.71 rather than a financial one, as planting trees from across Japan would symbolize the collective wish Donations f rom the local private sector enabled for peace of the Japanese people. the construction of the public meeting hall in the Peace Memorial Park, one of the three facilities in the park. The donation from the private sector also contributed to other key urban functions, including the Hiroshima bus terminal, the Hiroshima prefec- tural government office, a golf course, and a railway station building (Shinohara 2015) (See Box 2.2. for various donations that supported reconstruction). 70 The EROA Fund was part of the US postwar aid program, which approved the use of its Budget Appropriate Funds for public works in FY 1950 (Nakagawa 2019). The national government used this money to fund the construction of two bridges in Hiroshima (Hiroshima City 1995, 61). The bridges were designed by Japanese-American sculptor Isamu Noguchi as a sign of reconciliation. 71 The Draft Comprehensive Plan (October 1949) included a bike racetrack and a horse racing field as options to generate revenue for the city. After the bike racetrack was approved in November 1949, other gambling facilities were dropped in the final reconstruction plan (Nakagawa 2019). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 33 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Box 2.2 Stories of Donations and Public Support A public meeting hall with the capacity of 2,000 people was planned as part of the Peace City Construction Plan, but it did not qualify for the increased subsidy from the national government as it was not considered a unique facility to be part of the Peace Memorial Facilities (Ishimaru 2014a). Despite a public hall being planned as one of the facilities in the Peace Memorial Park, only the adjacent exhibit hall and the Peace Memorial Museum started construction, and no viable plan for building a public meeting hall existed as of 1951. The CEO of a local business, Koichi Tanaka, lamented the lack of a large gathering place and started promoting the idea of funding one so Hiroshima would be able to host a large gathering in 1953 (Shinohara 2015). Being an influential leader in the local business circle called the Futaba-Kai, he used this network to convince local businesses and launched a fundraising campaign. The Hiroshima Public Hall, with hotel accommodation facilities, was completed in March 1955 in the planned site for the civic hall, where today’s Hiroshima International Conference Center stands.a The hall’s construction started later than the museum buildings’, in November 1953. However, since the museum buildings halted construction because of financial challenges, the public hall was completed first. Personal donations from Hiroshima expatriates overseas enabled the construction of the Hiroshima Children’s Library and supported the lives of many survivors through monetary and relief supplies. Hiroshima had been a top source of Japanese emigrants since the government-promoted emigration started in the late 19th century. Hawaii and the mainland United States were top destinations of Hiroshima emigrants, who formed Hiroshima- native groups in Hawaii and Los Angeles.b Learning sporadically about the devastation of their hometown, the Japanese community’s wish to contribute to rebuilding grew. The governor and mayor of Hiroshima personally requested support from the Japanese communities overseas when some expatriates visited Hiroshima. A trader based in Los Angeles, who met with the governor during his product-purchasing visit to Hiroshima, organized a donation campaign through the Southern California Hiroshima Prefectural Association, raising US$12,000 in six months (Hasegawa 2010). The first batch of the money was turned into physical relief supplies and shipped to support welfare facilities. The second batch was wired to the city directly to fund the children’s library as a more effective and ongoing method.c Combining the JPY 4 million wired from Los Angeles and the JPY 1.25 million from individual donations by other Japanese living in the US, Hiroshima opened the children’s library in December 1952 (Hasegawa 2010). Similarly, a Hiroshima native in Hawaii, whose brother served as the chairman of the Hiroshima city council, led a donation campaign among the Japanese community, collecting over US$48,000 in five months and eventually raising a total of US$113,000.d The first batch of US$75,000 was sent to the Hiroshima prefecture to be used for relief supplies to support more than 21,000 families. The second batch of US$112,000 was wired to both the prefecture and the city, and it funded various health and social welfare facilities, including single-mother dormitories, a senior living facility, a maternity center and a newborn center, 35 childcare centers, and 8 facilities for children and the handicapped (Hasegawa 2010). The Japanese population from other countries—including Argentina, Brazil, and Peru—also contributed. 34 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction The preservation of the Atomic Bomb Dome as a memorial was undecided for years, as some citizens wished not to perpetuate the memory of the bombing.e It was not until 1965 that the city conducted a survey to get a cost estimate for preservation in response to the growing public opinion in favor of preservation.f After a five- month public donation campaign led by the mayor, the donation reached JPY 18 million.g Encouraged by the prospect, the city allocated JPY 30 million for the first round of preservation works, which was conducted in 1967. The donation eventually totaled JPY 66 million (Hiroshima City 1995, 182). Public donation was not merely a means of financing but was also seen as a way for the public to support the building of the Peace City. Some of the projects supported by public donation campaigns, such as the preservation of the Atomic Bomb Dome, could have been funded solely by the government, as the city’s revenue scale had grown. The impetus for a donation campaign may have been symbolic rather than financial, as the donation would perpetuate public support and symbolize the people’s wish for peace.h Similarly, tree donation campaigns were organized by the city government to collect trees to line the Peace Boulevard and the Peace Memorial Park, and over 3,000 trees were planted along the Peace Boulevard.i While buying trees according to the park plan may have been financially possible, the tree donation was a powerful way to show solidarity with various cities in Japan, thus perpetuating the spirit of a peace city.j a. The public hall was different from what was envisioned in the Tange Plan, stirring some debate (Ishimaru 2014b). b. Between 1898 and 1937, Hawaii received 40 percent of Hiroshima emigrants, and an additional 31 percent lived in the mainland United States, including California, Utah, and Washington (Hasegawa 2010). c. The Japanese community learned that the material supplies did not properly reach the intended recipients, and thus the director of the association contacted the mayor for ideas for more effective assistance. The mayor suggested the children’s library, which was part of the Tange Plan but remained unfunded. d. In Hawaii, not only Hiroshima natives but also the Japanese from other parts of Japan also contributed (Hasegawa 2010). e. The Hiroshima prefecture had been allocated funding from the national government to demolish the building as an unstable structure but returned the money given the ongoing debate (Hiroshima City 1995, 179–80). The building was transferred from the prefecture to the city in 1953 to be part of the memorial facilities, without a decision on its preservation or demolition. f. A petition was organized by academics and politicians, including Nobel laureate Hideki Yukawa and the architect Kenzo Tange (Hiroshima City 1995, 182). The following year, the city passed a resolution to preserve the Atomic Bomb Dome. g. Koichi Tanaka, a local business owner, was at f irst hesitant about the building’s preservation as his company had an off ice in the Industrial Promotion Hall that became the Atomic Bomb Dome and many of his employees were killed there. However, upon visiting the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in Germany that had been bombed and was preserved as a memory of the war, he became an advocate of preserving the building and encouraged local businesses through the Futaba-kai to contribute (Tanaka 1967). h. Interview with a Hiroshima city official, February 2023. i. The first campaign was conducted in 1954, calling for trees and seeds from across Japan. As the survival rate of the initial round of planting was about 55 percent due to site conditions and the adaptability of transplanting, a second campaign was organized in 1957, appealing to neighboring towns for tall trees that could survive transportation. As the trees donated to the city were a wide variety of species and different from those specified in the plans for the Peace Memorial Park and the Peace Boulevard, surviving trees were later replaced with the originally intended species as they became available (McBride et al. 2021). j. Communication with a Hiroshima city official, March 2023. The off icial completion of Hiroshima’s reconstruction projects in 1958 was marked by the Hiroshima Reconstruction Expo. The increased financial support from the national government officially ended in FY 1955, with some projects funded for an additional couple of years.72 The Expo held in the spring of 1958 showcased the completion of more than a decade of rebuilding in Hiroshima. Thirty exhibition halls were erected in the Peace Memorial Park and the Peace Boulevard. The Expo welcomed a total of 870,000 visitors (Hiroshima City 2019a). However, some aspects of recovery, especially those related to housing, remained a challenge for a few more decades. 72 The completion of reconstruction projects (namely the War-Damage Restoration Projects) had been determined by the national government in 1949 for all the war-damaged cities. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 35 Housing Recovery and Redevelopment Providing housing for citizens was among the Although the city took a demand-driven approach most pressing issues in the medium- and long- of adapting to emerging needs, the housing term reconstruction process. As houses within a shortage persisted for decades. Compared with 2-kilometer radius of the hypocenter completely inf rastructure recovery, housing was not placed as burned down, citizens migrated to overcrowded a high priority for reconstruction back then.73 While conditions in the city’s periphery or outside the city. the city government, in its Draft Comprehensive The local government was pressured to provide Plan, requested increased funding from the national housing for both the survivors and the increasing government to provide public housing, the housing returnee population in the medium term, as well did not qualify as part of the Peace Memorial City as the migrant population in the long term. Three Construction Facilities, which was intended to solutions to housing shortages were devised by distinguish Hiroshima f rom other cities as a Peace reassessing changing and emerging demands: (1) Memorial City. Housing was not seen as a distinct a temporary housing site was allocated for urgent feature of such; thus, the same funding level given to needs, (2) in the medium term, changes to the city other cities applied. Although the city and prefectural plan were made to address persistent housing governments used multiple schemes to provide shortages, and (3) urban upgrading projects were interim housing measures, housing demand far implemented in the long term. exceeded the supply for many years, leading to the construction of informal housing across the city, which needed to be addressed in the long term. Temporary Housing for the Displaced In the early reconstruction years, a temporary site g rew. T h e n a t i o n a l g ove rn m e n t ’s f u n d i n g fo r was allocated for housing to address the most urgent temporary houses subsidized 50 percent of the needs, but this temporary measure persisted as a construction of temporary houses in war-damaged permanent one for years. With 90 percent of houses cities.75 To quickly secure space, a section of nationally (5,800 houses) in the city center lost, the housing owned former military-use land in Motomachi was provision rate of the city dropped from 79.8 percent used as a temporary housing site, despite the plans before the bombing to 18.8 percent after (Inami 1953). to develop the area into a park (f igure 2.8). 76 In The survivors mostly evacuated to unharmed areas Motomachi, 1,815 temporary houses were built by the of Hiroshima and neighboring towns, and close to government, which prioritized speed over quality.77 140,000 people lived in the unburned areas of the city When the houses were completed, the competition 74 as of November 1945 (Nishimoto 2014). Those who for government-provided housing was very high, with remained in the city center lived in air-raid shelters or only about 1 in 20 applicants able to move in—in some in repaired partially destroyed houses. As demobilized cases the odds were as high as 1 out of 76 (Ishimaru soldiers and residents of former Japanese colonies et al. 2021, 54–55). In addition, 180 private homes were returned to Japan, the housing shortage in Hiroshima built there with a temporary land use approval.78 73 Comment by a former Hiroshima official, March 2023. 74 Quoting Hiroshima City Municipal Handbook FY 1977. 75 As determined in the Guidelines for the Construction of Temporary Houses in the War Damaged Cities, September 1945. 76 This area, the western section of the planned Chuo Park (70.48 hectares), was first borrowed from the national government and was used to grow vegetables to serve the immediate need of feeding people, as an interim measure until the park construction would begin (Ishimaru 2014c, 2018). But repurposing a future park site was a less complicated and quicker solution than to find another plot to build houses. 77 Across the city, 3,000 public houses were built with state aid, including 2,574 units by the city in 1946–50 and 355 units by the prefecture in 1948–50). The national government allocated the number of houses to be built (Hiroshima City 1995, 21). The city and the Housing Corporation, a quasi-government housing foundation under the Home Ministry, also built 1,800 affordable houses for sale, selling each for JPY 3,500. 78 Before the war, rental houses comprised 70 percent of all housing (Hiroshima City 1995). In the postwar years, home ownership was encouraged nationally, and the Japan Housing Loan Corporation was established (Ishimaru et al. 2021). 36 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Figure 2.8. Location of Motomachi Housing, 1966 Public housing Informal Temporary settlement housing Peace Memorial Park Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (maps.gsi.go.jp/), aerial photo taken October 23, 1966, by US Military GSI Maps. What was intended to be temporary housing wooden housing deteriorated quickly, necessitating remained permanent, and its upgrading needed upgrading within a decade. In addition, the nearby to be addressed decades later. The Motomachi area riverbed area came to be filled with informal housing, had the largest concentration of temporary housing, which made it diff icult for the city to proceed with with about 60 percent of the 3,000 public houses built the park’s development and increased the fire hazard by 1950 (Ishimaru et al. 2021). With the lack of a set of the area. Urban upgrading became a precarious ending date for temporary housing and no alternative issue that the city needed to address in the 1960s and housing sites, this housing area persisted, hampering 1970s, beyond the postwar reconstruction phase of the park development plan. Hastily built temporary Hiroshima. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 37 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Changes to City Planning for Housing Needs In the medium term, the city made changes to units, people found open spaces to build informal city planning to accommodate the continued shacks.81 For instance, informal housing remained in housing shortage. After a decade of reconstruction, the Peace Memorial Park construction site in the early the housing shortage became a political issue, in 1950s, forcing the city to conduct annual memorial which the mayoral contestant beat the incumbent by ceremonies with a backcloth behind the stage to promising to curtail some of the city’s reconstruction hide these houses from public view (Ishimaru 2014b). plans and to give priority to housing construction.79 As urban development implementation continued While the proposed idea of using some of the land for in the city in the 1950s, eviction of informal housing the Peace Boulevard for housing was unrealistic, the forced settlers to relocate elsewhere, 82 eventually new mayor needed to build additional housing as he congregating in the 1.5-kilometer stretch of the river promised. The solution was making the prolonged shore adjacent to the Motomachi public housing temporary solution officially permanent. The original area (f igure 2.8). 83 The proximity of Motomachi to plan for the park in Motomachi was scaled down the center city was attractive for many informal in 1956, reallocating 14 hectares to public housing workers who relied on unstable job opportunities (Ishimaru et al. 2021, 43). This zoning change enabled that were only available in the city center (Ishimaru the city and prefecture governments to redevelop a et al. 2021, 58). The high economic growth and section of the Motomachi temporary housing area urbanization experienced in the 1950s increased into 930 units of medium-rise apartment buildings the number of such workers in Hiroshima, further between 1956 and 1968, as the f irst phase of the growing the need for housing. Despite the house housing redevelopment.80 ownership policy that the national government now encouraged, appreciated land values as a result of The government’s effort to provide public housing land readjustment made home ownership even more still did not keep up with the housing needs, and difficult by the early 1960s (Ishimaru et al. 2021, 55). As informal housing existed throughout the city. the city’s reconstruction was officially completed and The persistent housing shortage led to about 6,000 the rest of Hiroshima revived by 1960, the riverside informal houses across the city, mostly in the riverbed informal settlement in Motomachi with nearly 1,000 areas and near the railway station (Ishimaru et al. informal houses was increasingly perceived as the 2021). Unable to win highly competitive public housing sole legacy of the war that needed to be addressed.84 79 In the 1955 mayoral election, the incumbent Mayor Hamai, who had been leading reconstruction planning and implementation in his two terms, lost by only about 1,600 votes to contender Tadao Watanabe (Watanabe gained 57,335 votes, whereas Hamai gained 55,758 votes) (Ishii 2018, 170). Watanabe criticized Hamai for his inadequacy in implementing reconstruction and promised that he would curtail the 100-meter-wide road plan to secure land for additional housing (Ishimaru et al. 2021). 80 The 930 units included 630 units of city-owned housing and 300 units of prefecture-owned housing (according to data provided by Hiroshima City). 81 At first, a demobilized soldier found the former military-use land an ideal location to restart his life, building a hut in the spring of 1946 with a few other returnees and starting to farm there. The ability to farm attracted other residents. The settlement grew to 20 houses by 1947, then to 64 by 1950. The majority of the early settlers (between 1946 and 1955) were survivors of the atomic bombing and returnees. However, in the later years, the early arrivers only consisted of 27 percent of the long-term residents of the Aioi Street area, with the majority (66 percent) arriving after 1956 and not having experienced the bombing (Semba 2016). 82 The process of land readjustment had a slow start but was well underway by the late 1950s; only 25 percent of the land readjustment had been completed by 1949, but the completion rate reached 90 percent by 1958 (Ishimaru et al. 2021). 83 The area came to be known as the Aioi Street by the locals, which derives its name from the nearby Aioi bridge from where the area stretched north (Ishimaru et al. 2021). 84 The informal settlement in Motomachi was dubbed as a “genbaku (A-bomb) slum” by the local media in the mid-1960s to highlight the remaining issue of postwar reconstruction (Semba 2016). Yet some argue that the characterization of the area as a “slum” is not appropriate, as it is not only discriminating but also takes out the social, historical, and political context that is unique to the area (Ishimaru et al. 2021). 38 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Urban Upgrading in the 1960s and 1970s As the last remaining issue of postwar reconstruction, provided temporary houses (Ishimaru et al. 2021, 68). This the city embarked on urban upgrading projects to slowly relocated residents out of the informal housing address informal housing starting in the 1960s. By community and thinned community ties. After the 1960, the reconstruction work on infrastructure and land redevelopment project launched in 1968, these informal readjustment of the city plan had been completed, as residents were made eligible to move into the newly well as the river management work for flood control constructed public housing. The Motomachi district was in western Hiroshima that was originally proposed officially designated as a residential upgrading district before the war.85 The riverbed afforestation was the only in March 1969, and those who lived in the area before remaining project, which had been delayed because the date were entitled to move into the public housing, of the presence of the informal settlement. The highly even if they had lived in informal housing without concentrated informal housing community faced severe authorization (Ishimaru et al. 2021, 77). Although the fire hazards because of the overcrowded and hastily eligibility criteria required people to prove when they constructed wooden structures.86 Between 1959 and started living there, the evidence of their residence, and 1976, 16 major fires occurred in the Motomachi informal the household registration, the local government took settlement,87 burning a total of 15,000 square meters a flexible approach to those who did not have proper and affecting 1,800 residents (Ishimaru et al. 2021, 65–66). household registration. Later, the government again The lack of public infrastructure, such as water lines bent rules to accommodate those who remained in and sewerage systems, also posed sanitation problems. the informal settlement because of their ineligibility By the late 1960s, the local government recognized to move into the public housing (Ishimaru et al. 2021, Motomachi’s informal housing settlement as the last 146–49). Eventually, 65 percent of the informal settlement major issue to be resolved, and “the postwar era of residents moved into various affordable public housing Hiroshima will not end without the improvement of this built near their former residence. 90 area” became a common saying in the government’s urban development units.88 As the afforestation project Today, the Motomachi housing area continues started in 1966 and prompted the clearing of the area, the to undergo additional upgrading and revival to local government initiated an urban upgrading project encourage new residents. At its peak, the Motomachi (the Motomachi Redevelopment Project) in 1968 to housing complex housed about 9,000 people, which provide 3,000 affordable housing units.89 The completion has dropped to about 4,000 today, with an increase of these high-rise apartments in 1978 marked the real in senior and single-member households (Hartt 2019). end of postwar reconstruction (Semba 2016). The vacant units were considered too small for the current child-rearing households, and the city upgraded The local government used a combination of them by converting two units into one larger unit to incentives and potential punishment to convince accommodate younger households (Ishimaru et al. informal settlers to move to the public housing. As a 2021, 152–53). In 2013, the city launched the Motomachi first step, before the start of the redevelopment project Revitalization Plan in cooperation with a local university. in 1963, the city government pressured informal residents To encourage young people to move in, the city made with possible punishment by issuing fine notices for it possible for young households with incomes above a illegal occupation of land. Rather than using the notices certain level and single students who would not normally to collect fines, which most residents did not pay, the be eligible for municipal housing to move in on the government intended to make residents aware that their condition that they agreed to lead community activities living arrangements were illegal, to ease the process of involving multiple generations (Hiroshima City 2020). eviction later (Ishimaru et al. 2021, 145). In the following Vacant commercial tenant spaces located on the first years, when a major fire occurred, displaced residents floor of buildings have been converted to an art space, were prohibited from moving back or rebuilding their a community resource center, and a workspace for shacks and instead they were offered relief supplies the community supporters in an attempt to revive the from the government and housed in the government- housing community. 85 The river management, including the reclaiming of the Fukushima River, had been planned before the war but halted during the war. The work resumed in 1951 to reduce the flooding risks in the western part of the city (Semba 2016). 86 The estimated population density of this area was more than double the standard (Ishimaru et al. 2021). 87 The number of fires is based on a statement by a Hiroshima city official, February 2023. 88 The same phrase was written on the monument built in October 1978 to commemorate the end of the redevelopment project. 89 The architect Masaya Fujimoto, a Hiroshima native, designed the high-rise apartments with considerations for low-cost construction. He also staggered the height of the apartments, ranging from 8 to 20 stories high, so the apartments would get sunlight and would not tower over the Hiroshima Castle nearby (Hayashi 2010). 90 Eleven percent of Aioi Street residents moved into the Motomachi public housing; the majority (47 percent) moved into the Chojuen Housing Complex (built by the prefecture) and an additional 7 percent moved to other public housing (Ishimaru et al. 2021, 142–43). Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 39 Economic Recovery and Citizen Engagement Local Economic and Industrial Recovery Local economic recovery was supported by a Exogenous factors: combination of exogenous factors and a push The war damage was focused in the city center, from the local industry. In the first few years after where only small factories were located. Larger fac- the war, Japan’s economy struggled to recover from tories were located outside of the devastated area the extensive war damage, fluctuating between (Hiroshima for Global Peace 2020, 30). Once critical hyperinflation and hyperdeflation. The people infrastructure was restored and material supply re- experienced a severe scarcity of food and goods, sumed, these factories could recommence produc- and the needs of daily survival were supported by tion. The quick infrastructure restoration process contributed to the rehabilitation of economic and the black markets that sprouted near the Hiroshima industrial activities. station (Ishimaru 2014b).91 In a local economic policy, the city of Hiroshima drafted a five-year reconstruction Labor shortages did not occur in postwar Hiroshi- ma despite the depopulation in the city center. The plan for the industry (1949) with the goal of increasing population outside the devastated area did not industrial production by 3.3 times f rom its 1948 change drastically, and labor inflow continued after level by 1953 (Hiroshima for Global Peace 2020, 30). the war owing to the large returnee population. However, the revival of the private sector was largely The increased industrial demands absorbed this left to the efforts of each company at that time. workforce into production. While economic policy did not succeed in producing The Peace City Law contributed indirectly to eco- substantial results, the long-term reconstruction of nomic recovery through national funding that sup- Hiroshima coincided with a momentary economic ported infrastructure redevelopment as well as the national government’s transfer of military-use land turn toward increased industrial production demands to the city, which eased the financial burden on the that created jobs and stimulated local industries. 92 city. The start of the Korean War in 1950 created special Heavy industries that had supported wartime mil- demands for war supplies and food, stimulating itary production aligned particularly well with Ja- demand in the manufacturing sectors (Ito 2014). pan’s postwar industrial policy. The postwar energy Hiroshima particularly benefited from this demand shift from coal to oil also benefited the waterfront boom because of its concentration of former military- industrial areas by the Seto Inland Sea. related industries, which had been privatized and turned into various types of manufacturing. A few observations on economic recovery in Hiroshima are outlined here (adopted from Shinohara 2015). 91 In Hiroshima, black markets are observed near the Hiroshima station as early as the end of August (Li and Ishimaru 2008). 92 Personal communication with Norioki Ishimaru, January 2024. 40 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction One example of the local industry supporting local Endogenous factors: economic recovery was Toyo Kogyo Co. Ltd, the predecessor of today’s Mazda Motors. Originally Military-related industries, the prewar economic established as a cork manufacturing company, it had basis of the region, were transformed after the war shifted during the war to machinery productions, and by shifting into the private sector, enabling a large- it produced rifles, airplane parts, and other machineries scale skills transfer. Factories that manufactured mainly for the navy and it provided jobs to almost 7,000 for the military, such as textile, canning, rubber, workers. Following the war, the company shifted to steel, and shipbuilding factories, restarted produc- automobile production to support the transportation tion following a temporary halt after the war and needs of postwar reconstruction (Anzai 2022). supported the recovery of the local economy. Hiroshima had a high level of human capital be- cause of local universities, including the Hiroshima University of Arts and Sciences and the Hiroshima Teachers College (predecessors to today’s Hiroshi- ma University) that existed f rom before the war. The presence of an educated labor force contribut- ed to local economic development. Hiroshima’s local private sector had strong ties; 10 major local businesses formed a group called Futa- ba-kai, which included Toyo Kogyo Co. Ltd, (today’s Mazda), the Chugoku Electric Power Company, and the Bank of Hiroshima. These businesses had a significant influence on the local economy, but also have fostered a tradition of financially support- ing public projects that benefit Hiroshima (Sankei Shimbun 2015). Their connections contributed to corporate donations for the construction of the Hi- roshima Public Hall, the city baseball field, and the preservation of the Atomic Bomb Dome, among other projects. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 41 Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Citizen Engagement and Outreach In addition to reviving the local economy, citizens The city not only brings in visitors to Hiroshima, but have also played an important role in fostering a also engages actively in public outreach and part- social fabric conducive to peace and development. nership, leading an international mayoral network, Despite the possibility that Hiroshima’s identity the Mayors for Peace95, since 1982 in collaboration would be perpetuated only as a bombed city, the with Nagasaki. The Mayors for Peace aims to main- people of Hiroshima turned Hiroshima into the city tain a network of global cities that support the that advocates for peace. Building a city of global abolishment of nuclear weapons, and it is a regis- tered nongovernmental organization with special peace and culture was Hiroshima’s promise to the consultative status with the UN Economic and national government in exchange for its financial and Social Council (ECOSOC). More than 99 percent of institutional support under the Peace City Law. With Japan’s municipalities (1,737 cities and towns) are this mandate, the city and citizen groups continue members, and over 8,200 cities throughout the to promote peace tourism and education, grassroots world participate in the network. movements for peace, and external partnership In 2012, to renew commitment to peace for the that includes overseas exchanges.93 The Peace City future, the Hiroshima prefecture developed the Law helped create the image of Hiroshima that “Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan96 that promotes exists today, but it would not have been possible research, dialogue, and education for peace. Its key without the efforts of local government and citizens research project, the Hiroshima Reconstruction and to reshape the identify of Hiroshima, f rom a city of Peacebuilding Research Project, has published re- devastation to a city of peace. The development of ports and educational materials, such as Hiroshima’s a peace city is a product of collaborative initiatives Path to Reconstruction 97 and Learning from Hiroshi- between the government (both city and prefectural) ma’s Reconstruction Experience: Reborn from the and community. Ashes , which are available in English.98 Since 2021, Hiroshima has made every November At the government level, both the prefecture and the Culture of Peace month, and it organizes var- the city have created programs to foster citizens’ ious lectures, forums, and cultural activities to en- engagement and to promote Hiroshima externally gage civil society. In these activities, the role of mu- as a city of peace. The initiatives go beyond politics sic, arts, and sports is emphasized in incubating an and education to encompass the arts, music, and environment conducive to peace. Hiroshima is one sports. Below are a few examples of government- of the few cities in Japan that houses a professional supported initiatives: orchestra (Hiroshima Symphony Orchestra 2020). Storytellers and peace volunteers are raised to continue telling accurate stories and experiences of the bombing and to pass on the spirit of peace. The survivors of the bombing have served as sto- rytellers to offer firsthand accounts of war experi- ence to the visitors of the Peace Memorial Muse- um. As the number of survivors decreases, the city is fostering the next generation of storytellers and museum volunteer staff by offering training and a certificate program (Hiroshima City 2023).94 93 Interview with Hiroshima city and prefecture officials, February 2023. 94 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. 95 “Mayors of Peace,” Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, n.d, https://www.mayorsforpeace.org/en/ 96 “Hiroshima for Global Peace Plan,” Hiroshima for Global Peace, 2019., https://hiroshimaforpeace.com/en/peace/ 97 “Hiroshima’s Path to Reconstruction,” Hiroshima for Global Peace, 2020., https://hiroshimaforpeace.com/reconstruction/ 98 “Leaning f rom Hiroshima’s Reconstruction Experience: Reborn f rom the Ashes,” Hiroshima for Global Peace, 2014., https://hiroshimaforpeace.com/en/ fukkoheiwakenkyu/ 42 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Beyond government-led initiatives, the people have money to supplement the team’s weak f inancial also inspired action. Schoolchildren-led movements base in its early years. Therefore, when the team for peace have inspired people across Japan and have won its first championship in the Central League in led government officials to take action through policy. 1975, the victory was celebrated as a symbol of Hi- The local government has also been responsive to the roshima’s recovery from war devastation, and base- ball continues to play a role in uniting Hiroshima’s actions of the people. Hence, the people of Hiroshima people (Hiroshima for Global Peace, n.d.; Nagai and the government are in a mutually reinforcing 2014). relationship to cultivate a culture of peace. Local schoolchildren initiated a movement for Almost eight decades after the war, with the majority peace in the mid-1950s that led to the commemo- of survivors no longer alive, the spirit of peace lives on ration of children who suffered from radiation-relat- among Hiroshima’s citizens. By organizing a range of ed illness with a movie, a monument, and a paper citizen and education initiatives, Hiroshima planted crane–folding campaign to symbolize peace (Hiro- seeds for fostering a culture of peace. While such shima City, n.d.). The Children’s Peace Monument, initiatives tend to scale down with the passage of where paper cranes sent from all over Japan and time, Hiroshima’s push for a peaceful world did not the world are displayed, is an integral part of the end with the completion of postwar reconstruction Peace Memorial Park today. (Hein 2005). Although the national government’s The same children’s movement in the early 1960s responsibilities under the Peace City Law have advocated for the preservation of today’s Atom- concluded, the people of Hiroshima continue to ic Bomb Dome, which convinced the mayor to internalize the responsibilities set forth in the law to conduct a pilot study for the preservation of the build a city of peace.100 structural remains that were left uncared for (Ishii 2018). This led to a larger movement across genera- tions and throughout the country, which garnered support for the public donation campaign for the building’s preservation. The Hiroshima Carp baseball team, established in 1949, has united citizens and contributed to Hiro- shima’s revival. Unlike other professional baseball teams in Japan that are created by corporate own- ership, the Carp was established without corporate ownership. To create a citizens’ baseball team that would become a uniting force, the team was origi- nally funded by the prefecture, Hiroshima City, and its neighboring cities, along with personal contri- butions from citizens.99 The team’s original baseball field was built using the donations from the private sector and was located just south of the housing area in Motomachi (Sankei Shimbun 2015). Local people took pride in supporting a baseball team that was established soon after the war, donating 99 The city and prefectural governments funded the baseball team as part of the narrative to bring hope to the war-devastated Hiroshima. 100 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 43 Post-reconstruction Urban Expansion and Development Wi th fur th er popu la t ion g row t h, Hirosh i m a because the Danbara district was not included continued its long-term urban development on in the land readjustment area for reconstruction, the basis of data-informed planning. After postwar overcrowded conditions and old structures remained, rebuilding, Hiroshima’s population boomed beyond leaving f ire risks unsolved. After reconstruction of the city’s anticipation and exceeded the early-wartime the city center concluded, urban upgrading was population faster than initially expected. By 1970, needed in this area to reduce f ire risks and to ease Hiroshima’s population bounced back to 542,000, traff ic. Similarly, while the newly rebuilt area’s having grown four times f rom the population urban landscape was improved, the bridges and after the bombing (Hiroshima City 2014). With transportation routes that connect the old and new administrative mergers in the 1970s and suburban communities remained untouched.102 By the mid- development in the 1980s, the city’s urban area and 1960s, the expansion of urban areas to suburbs population continued to grow. Hiroshima became increased the population outside of the city center, a government ordinance city in 1980, which grants and car ownership increased with the economic the city larger administrative authority to plan and growth. Increasing traffic in and out of the city center implement projects and strengthens its status as a caused congestion and necessitated upgrades to the regional economic hub.101 The city’s population stands wider transportation networks surrounding the city. at 1.18 million in 2024 (Hiroshima City 2024). The city and prefectural governments continued to From an urban-planning perspective, postwar lead the planning of long-term urban development rebuilding also left an issue of coordination in th e greater Hiroshima area through data b e twe e n t h e n ew l y re b u i l t c i ty c e n te r, t h e collection, data-informed planning, and staged surrounding old neighborhoods, and the new long-term development. In the late 1960s, the expansion into peri-urban areas. Because the prefecture, the city, and the Hiroshima Chamber postwar reconstruction focused on the destroyed of Commerce and Industr y, together with the area, the neighborhoods that escaped damage Ministry of Construction, conducted the Hiroshima remained unchanged. One example is the Danbara Area Transportation Study (HATS) to collect data neighborhood near the city center, on the eastern on people’s movement and transportation needs side of the Hijiyama hills, which remained intact (Hiroshima Council on Urban Traffic Issues 1971). On despite its proximity to the hypocenter because the basis of the data collected in this pilot study, a the hill blocked the force of the bomb’s explosion. long-term transportation development plan for the Houses in Danbara offered shelter and played a role greater Hiroshima area was developed, incorporating in enabling interim actions in the early days. However, urban highways, public transit , and land use. 101 A city designated by government ordinance is a city with a population bigger than 500,000 and it is designated under the Local Autonomy Law to perform certain administrative functions that prefectural governments would normally perform. The city government of a government ordinance city therefore has a greater authority and autonomy than other municipalities. Currently, there are 20 such cities in Japan. 102 Interview with Hiroshima city officials and a former prefecture official, February 2023. 44 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction This iteration envisioned the next two decades of landslide risks because of its geological characteristics transportation network improvements to cater to the and the expansion of residential areas into hilly needs of the growing city. However, this two-decade suburban areas. Torrential rain disasters have occurred plan was later hampered by changing economic f requently in recent years, in and out of Hiroshima and social conditions. As an alternative solution, City. In particular, the 2014 torrential rain disaster an underground subway network was proposed as caused landslides and mudslides, damaging more an extension of the existing streetcar, but this was than 4,700 homes.105 The “Reconstruction Community also too costly to be feasible given the geological Development Vision,” formulated shortly after the vulnerabilities of the river delta region. disaster, calls for rebuilding the disaster-stricken areas into a safe and disaster-resilient community through To prevent unplanned urban sprawl, the local disaster reduction efforts by the local government. government took a regulated approach to urban These efforts include the construction of facilities for expansion. The local government imposed certain disaster prevention and disaster mitigation, as well regulations on urban expansion by developers until as the voluntary activities of individual residents in highways and other urban inf rastructure were in their own communities. The city of Hiroshima will place, such as freezing development projects in the also do its utmost to support communities where northwestern region.103 Still, the original transportation residents voluntarily engage in disaster prevention network plan contributed to the long-term vision of and community development activities. what a future urban area in Hiroshima would look like. In the 1980s, an additional traff ic study was With changing demographics and emerging conducted to reevaluate the traffic needs to continue needs, Hiroshima continues to adapt to changes highway and public transportation developments. in its long-term urban planning. Today, like other This development included a new rapid transit system cities in Japan, Hiroshima anticipates emerging issues (the Astram Line) that connects the city center to from changing demographic patterns, life cycles of the newly developed town in the city’s northwestern public inf rastructure, and changing work and life 104 area. preferences of citizens. Commercial revitalization is underway in the city center, including a new sports There are examples of suburban cities affected stadium that replaces the old city baseball stadium, by extreme weather events such as torrential rain commercial and urban space redevelopment, and disasters where local residents have participated in the redevelopment of the Hiroshima station area.106 the formulation of a “Reconstruction Community These long-term urban development initiatives aim to Development Vision. ” Hiroshima City is prone to achieve the next vision of Hiroshima. 103 Interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023. 104 The new town was originally proposed in 1977 and opened in 1994 in time for the Asian Games that Hiroshima hosted (sourced from an interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023). 105 Presentation by a Hiroshima city official, March 2023. 106 Presentation by Hiroshima city official, March 2023. Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima 45 Lessons Learned to Navigate Urban Crises Hiroshima’s experience of rising from crises serves as a beacon of hope for urban restoration, regeneration, and development. At every stage of recovery, Hiroshima was pressed to address the changing needs of its citizens within the constraints of available resources and make changes to previously set plans. Hiroshima offers the following key lessons for other cities grappling with crises and rebuilding after destruction: The restoration of critical infrastructure and ser- Similarly, financing reconstruction often poses vices must occur in stages and should include a considerable challenge and should come from a comprehensive assessment of damage to ef- multiple sources. Even if planning is done, a lack fectively determine what can be repaired. Often, of funding will delay implementation of recon- the assessment and repair should happen simul- struction projects. The government and people of taneously, while determining what resources are Hiroshima pieced together available funding, both needed and available to make repair work possible. public and private, to implement different pieces When the government institution is devastated, re- and sections of urban reconstruction plans. pair work hinges on spontaneous action by respec- tive service sectors.107 Planning should take place early to help envi- sion future solutions. Hiroshima f irst embarked With an understanding that temporary solutions on planning without much financial consideration devised with time and resource constraints of- to first determine what the rebuilt city should look ten end up being permanent solutions, effective like. Despite financial constraints that necessitated prioritization of key issues within the limited re- changes later, a grand vision and specific compo- sources is critical. In postwar Hiroshima, the resto- nents of the plans regarding roads, parks, and land ration of key infrastructure and services, as well as uses that accompanied the early plans played a improvements to the overall urban landscape, were crucial role in coordinating cohesive implementa- prioritized, allowing livelihood recovery and the tion in the long term. Planning should go beyond revitalization of local industries. Other areas, such hard infrastructure and should incorporate politi- as providing upgraded housing solutions, were ad- cal, economic, social, and cultural aspects with a fo- dressed once resources became available. As prior- cus on the people who live in the affected area. An itization criteria could differ in other contexts, cities absence of a grand vision could result in disjointed need to consider what works the best for a given reconstruction projects, unplanned expansion, and situation within resource limitations. vulnerable living conditions. 107 Even in Japan, housing would be given a bigger prioritization today, as seen in more recent post-disaster reconstruction (sourced from an interview with Hiroshima city officials, February 2023). 46 Overcoming Multiple Urban Crises: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Hiroshima Part2 : Hiroshima’s Story of Reconstruction Successful reconstruction requires strong and The government is not the only actor in the re- persistent political will. The political leadership building process; civilians and the private sector of postwar mayors and Hiroshima-native national are also critical agents for navigating multiple policy makers, combined with motivated public crises. Urban regeneration is only possible when officials and successful citizen and private sector decision-makers, urban planners, public and engagement, have contributed to maintaining mo- private sector stakeholders, and citizens are all mentum for reconstruction and the construction of aligned and contribute to the execution of plans a “Peace City.” In Hiroshima, political leadership not and visions. The interactions among the public, only enabled the inflow of resources needed for the the private sector, and civil society strengthened city’s many years of rebuilding, but also institution- Hiroshima’s identity of a city of peace that lives on alized their political will in the form of law enact- today. ment, perpetuating the city’s duty to the national government and its citizens so the momentum Urban regeneration is a long-term endeavor that would not disappear when leadership changed. requires sustained engagement to make a bet- ter city. Urban renewal goes beyond rebuilding a Reconstruction can be an opportunity to build a city from damage and destruction to incorporating greener, more resilient, and more inclusive city. resilience in the face of emerging challenges and The war destruction, as devastating as it was, en- changing demographics. Today’s Hiroshima is the abled new city planning to increase the number of product of successive modifications and adapta- roads and urban public spaces that would mitigate tions accomplished by reassessing the changing hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities. Hiroshima’s pre- needs of the city over time. Citizens’ voices should war discussions of improving urban landscapes, al- also be reflected in planning to increase inclusion though halted during the war, provided a basis and and address future urban endeavors. a mode of planning and executing such improve- ments, emphasizing the importance of planning in normal times. 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