POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2720 International Migration and Global capitalism, vintage 21 st century, is less friendly to the Global Economic Order the international migration of unskilled people than were An Overview previous waves of globalization (such as that of the late 1 9th century). A freer Andres Solimano regime for international migration could help to reduce global economic inequality, improve the allocation of world resources, and ease labor shortages during periods of rapid growth. But the flight of human capital, talent, and entrepreneurs can be detrimental for developing countries. The World Bank Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth U November 2001 I POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2720 Summary findings Global capitalism, vintage early 21st century, favors the world output (although the distributive consequences for movement of goods and capital across national borders sending and receiving countries vary). International more than it does the movement of people. It was not migration tends to reduce income disparities across always this way. The first wave of globalization, in the countries. But it can increase inequality within labor- second half of the 19th century and the early 20th, came scarce receiving countries by moderating the growth of with massive international migration. Around 60 million wages, because of the associated increase in the supply of people migrated from Europe to the countries of the labor. In contrast, in sending countries emigration can New World (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and have an equalizing effect by reducing the supply of labor the United States) over a period of 40 years or so. In a and raising wages. sense, current globalization has a smaller degree of Still, international migration is bound to have a "cosmopolitan liberalism" in the dimension of positive,effect on long-run growth in receiving countries international migration. by keeping labor costs down, increasing the profitability While there is consensus on the benefits of an open of investment, and raising national savings. For sending trade regime and relatively liberal capital movements, countries, the impact on growth depends on the pool of that consensus rarely extends to the free movement of labor and human resources that emigrate. In labor- people. Solimano examines this difference in the abundant developing countries with chronic "freedom to become global" by looking at both standard unemployment (or labor surplus), the growth-depressing trade theory, basically the Mundell theorem of trade and effects of emigration can be small (compensated in part migration as substitutes, and the ensuing analytical by labor remittances). Nevertheless, the emigration of developments and empirical evidence around the highly educated people, professionals, and national Mundell result. He then looks at this asymmetry in investors can have a detrimental effect on long-run today's global economic order from the perspective of income levels and growth rates for sending countries. freedom, individual rights, and transnational citizenship, From a global perspective, however, world output as well as the potential of international migration to would be expected to increase if people could freely reduce global inequality. move across the planet from areas of low labor Preventing factor (labor or human capital) movements productivity to areas of high labor productivity. From from lower- to higher-productivity activities (countries) the viewpoint of global economic freedoms, the result may entail a global welfare loss in terms of forgone would be equally positive. This paper-a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to study the process of globalization and its links with economic development. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Ana Regina Bonfield, room MC3-354, telephone 202-473-1248, fax 202-522-3518, email address abonfield@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at asolimano@eclac.cl. November 2001. (41 pages) The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the excnange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the narnes of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are er.tirely those of the authors. Thev do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries tbey represent. Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN OVERVIEW By Andres Solimanol Macroeconomics and Growth Development Economics Research Group The World Bank Excellent research assistance from Ximena A. Clark is greatly appreciated. Detailed comments to an earlier version by Jeffrey Williamson are acknowledged. Rodrigo Vergara also provided comments to an earlier version of this paper. 2 1. Introduction Global capitalism, vintage early 21st century, favors more the movement of goods and capital across national borders than the movement of people. This was not always this way. The first wave of globalization of the second half of the t9th century and early 20th century came along with massive international migration. Around 60 million migrants from Europe went to the countries of the New World (Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and the United States) over a period of 40 years or so. While there is consensus on the benefits of an open trade regime and a relatively liberal capital movements, that consensus rarely extends to free movement of people across countries. This paradox regarding the differences in the " freedom to become global" between human-made objects (goods and money) and actual people, makes for an interesting phenomena to be understood and explained. This paper reviews the issue by looking at both standard trade theory, basically the Mundell theorem of trade and migration as substitutes the ensuing analytical developments and empirical evidence around the Mundell result. Then, the paper looks at this asymmetry of the current global economic order from the angle of considerations of freedom, individual rights and transnational citizenship as well as the potential of international migration to reduce global inequalities. Historically, in the first wave of globalization of the second half of the 19h century until 1914 or so, the expansion of international trade and capital mobility, because of reduced transport costs, came along with mass migration. In that period, the direction of the migration flows was mainly from Europe to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the U.S. and Canada. An important effect of international migration in that period was to contribute to convergence of per capita national income levels and factor prices in the "Atlantic Economy" in that period. In the current wave of globalization, the direction of migration is predominantly South - North, say from Asia, Africa and Latin America to the U.S. and Western Europe, although some recent important migration flows have been " North- South" as it was the 3 case of the massive immigration from Russia to Israel in the early to mid 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the last two decades of the 20Ih century, migration flows although not reaching the proportions of the first globalization wave, have been significant. In particular, during the 1990s, with a booming U.S. economy, the migration flows to the U.S. increased quite sharply, particularly from Mexico, Central America and Asia. Interestingly, increased trade and capital mobility seems to be associated with more rather than less migration (as the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell theory would have suggested). In fact, both analytical and empirical work on international migration in recent decades suggest that trade and migration tend to be complementary phenomena. This paper, organized in eight sections including this introduction, reviews a broad range of conceptual, policy issues and empirical evidence on the relationship between globalization and international migration. Section 2 provides empirical evidence on the flows on international migration since the mid 19th century to the late 20th century; the magnitude and evolution of foreign population in OECD countries and some socio- economic characteristics of migrants (to the U.S.). Section 3 focuses on the determinants of international migration and its skill composition. Is international migration (or migration rates) dominated by the movement of unskilled labor? How important is the migration of professionals and highly- educated people nowadays, say brain-drain type of migration? Empirical evidence on international migration and its skill composition to the United States during the 1990s is provided here as well as evidence on mass migration of well-educated people from Russia to Israel in the early 1990s. The section also presents the relationship between trade and migration both from the viewpoint of the predictions of theory and the historical evidence on the subject. Then, section 4 turns to the evolution of policies and public attitudes toward migration in the countries of the New World since the 19th century up to the present through different periods of world economic history. In section 5, the paper discusses the links between migration, growth, convergence and global and national (within country) inequality. What is the impact of migration on the rate of economic growth in both recipient and sending countries? Does growth precede migration or, conversely, does migration precede growth? Does 4 migration, particularly of unskilled labor amplifies (reduces) existing inequality in receiving (sending) countries? What is the role of migration in driving convergence of incomes/real wages across sending and receiving countries? Finally the paper (sections 6 and 7 ) discusses two separate issues related to migration: humanitarian crisis (of increasing occurrence in the 1990s) and the role of considerations of freedom, individual rights and transnational citizenship in assessing international migration. The paper concludes, in section 8, with closing remarks about the main findings of this study. 2. A Look at the Evidence on International Migration: 1820-1998 Historically, periods of growing international trade and capital mobility have been accompanied by increasing -rather than declining-flows of international migration. In fact, as mentioned before, it is estimated that around 60 million Europeans migrated to the labor-scarce, resource abundant New World countries (U.S., Canada, Argentina, Brazil and Australia) in the second half of the 19'h and early 20th century, in what is considered the "age of mass migration" (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). As shown in Table 1, from 1870-1920 more than 26 millions of migrants from all over the world went to the US. That period, up to the onset of World War I, known also by economic historians as the first wave of globalization, was also a period of rapid growth of international trade, boosted by a decline in transport and communication costs associated with the development of the railway systems, steam-ship, electricity and the telegraph. More recently, during the second wave of globalization, an increase in international migration to the U.S. is observed in the 1980s and 1990s vis a vis previous decades. In fact, while there were about 1 million migrants per decade in the 1940s and 2.5 million migrants in the 1950s, immigration rose to near 7.5 million migrants per decade in the last two decades of the 20'h century, say the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1). It is interesting to notice that while most of the migration in the 19h century to the main receiving country of the New World, say the United States, were Europeans (slightly more than 91 percent of total migration in the period 1820-1870 and 88 percent of total migration in the period 1820-1920), that percentage of European migration to the 5 U.S. declined to around 14 percent in the period 1971-1998. The main source region of immigration to the U.S. was Latin America (46 percent of the total), followed by, immigration from Asia (34 percent) in the period 1971-98. In terms of individual countries and for the whole period of 179 years (1820-1998) shown in Table 1, Mexico, Cuba and the Dominican Republic are the principal Latin American sending countries of immigrants to the US. The main Asian sending countries were the Philippines, China, Korea and India, and the main European sending countries are Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Ireland. Immigration flows represented, on average, around 7 percent of the total population of the U.S. in the period 1871-1920; later on that percentage declined to 2.5 percent in the last third of the 20th century.2 On the other hand, Table 2 shows an important increase in estimated illegal migration in the U.S. during the 1990s, from 3.3 millions in 1992 to 5 millions in 1996. As for legal migration in the last decades, Latin American countries are the principal origins of illegal immigrants in the US, with the largest contingents of illegal migrants coming from Mexico. It's interesting to note that Mexican illegal immigrants are not only the largest group (with a share of 75 percent in 1996) , but they also present the highest growth rate (104 percent) of increase in a period of only four years. Other important sending countries of illegal immigrants are El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Canada and the Philippines. For the rest of OECD countries, the share of foreign population over total population of the receiving country has been rising in the period 1988-1997, in particular for Austria, Denmark and Luxembourg. As shown in table 2, this share was the highest in Luxemburg (34.9 percent), followed by Australia (21.1 percent, data for 1996), Switzerland (19 percent) and Canada (17.4 percent, data for 1996). In turn, OECI) countries with less than 3 percent of foreign population are Japan, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Appendix Table A-1 presents information on the nationality of the foreign population for selected OECD countries. The composition of the foreign population of 2 Looking at a 'stock measure', when considering the period 1820-1870, the immigrant population to the U.S. represented on average, roughly, 32 percent of the total U.S. population. 6 these countries reveals the importance of factors such as distance and to some extend language (and/or cultural affinities) in the decision to migrate. That may explain, for instance, that 60 percent of Japan's foreign population in 1997 was from Korea and China (75 percent if the Philippines is also included), that 71 percent of Luxembourg's foreign population this year was from Portugal, Italy, France and Belgium, and that 25 percent of the foreign population in the US in 1990 was from Mexico and Canada. Another interesting feature is the high presence of African (mostly from Morocco) in some European countries. That is the case of France, for which almost a 40 percent of its total foreign population in 1997 was from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and the case of Netherlands and Spain for which 20 percent and 18 percent if their respective foreign populations were from Morocco this year. Finally, Turkish and former Yugoslavian populations are also shown to be important in most European countries. For instance, Turkish present a share of 29 percent of the total foreign population in Germany in 1997, 17 percent in Netherlands, and 15 in Denmark, while former Yugoslavian represent 23 percent of the total foreign population in Switzerland in 1997, 14 percent in Denmark and 10 percent in Germany. Regarding the skill composition and other socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants of the 1990s to the U.S.3, table 4 and 5 show some interesting features. In terms of educational attainment, the Hispanic population has, in general, lower shares of people with high school and BA degrees than other populations living in the US (Asian and Afro-American, see Table 4). The exception is the Afro-American population, which has in general a lower share of people with high school degrees than the Hispanic one. In contrast, Asians show better educational attainment levels than whites, Hispanics and Afro-Americans. It is interesting to note, however, the great disparities among the Hispanic population in terms of education, being the Cubans (and Other Hispanic too) the group with the highest shares of educated people and the Mexicans the one with the lowest shares.4 With respect to the economic conditions of these populations, Table 5 shows that the Hispanic population have similar median incomes than the Afro-American one, but 3 Similar information is not available for the rest of the OECD countries. 7 incomes of about 60 percent and 54 percent of the White and Asian population's incomes respectively. At the same time, the share of Hispanic families living below the povertv level (25 percent, again similar to the share for the Afro-American population) is almost 3 times the share of the White population and more than twice the one for the Asian population living below the poverty level. This income pattern is consistent not only with their educational level, but also with the unemployment rates of these populations. The Hispanic group presents similar unemployment rates than the Afro-American one, and higher rates than for the White and Asian groups5. In turn, the Asian population presents higher level of education and median income than the White one, although a bigger share of families living below the poverty level and a slightly bigger unemployment rate too than the White population. 3. Who Migrates and Why ? Most of the time, people migrate abroad in search for better economic opportunities for the migrants and their families offered by foreign countries compared with the economic opportunities found at home. In fact, unemployment, low wages, meager career prospects for highly educated people, significant country risk for national investors in the home country are all factors that propel people to emigrate abroad. In addition, there are non-economic reasons to emigrate such as war, ethnic discrimination, political persecution at home, etc. It is worth noting that these factors were important in the 1990s in Africa (e.g. Somalia, Rwanda crisis), in the Balkans and former Yugoslavia, in some former Soviet Republics, in Colombia, in South America. In addition, the choice of the country of immigration is often dictated by the existence of a network of family, friends and connections that have previously migrated to that specific country.6 An interesting question on the magnitude of the flows of 4 Another alternative comparison would be to compare education attainment and other socio-economic characteristics of foreign population with respect to reference groups in the sending countries. 5 As for the educational level, we observe that among the Hispanic population, Cubans and Mexicans are the groups with better-off and worse-off economic conditions, respectively. 6 More formally, migration equations usually include as determinants the following variables: real wage (or real per capita income) differential between sending and receiving countries, a lagged migration variable capturing persistence effects and possibly social network considerations, and a one or two decade-lagged demographic variable. 8 international migration is posed by Borjas (1999): why, given very sizeable wage differentials between countries (for example, while Sweden's per-capita income is about U$ 25,000 per year, Ethiopia's is just around U$ 100 per annum7) we don't observe larger flows of international migration between the two nations? In other words why we do observe too little international migration? Borjas' emphasizes the role of cultural differences across countries-language, traditions, family relationships - as an important dampening factor to international migration. Another explanation, complementary to the cultural factor, is policies. If migration policies in host countries aren't favorable to immigration they can also deter migration but not completely as it seems implied by the rise in illegal migration to receiving countries observed in the 1990s. In fact, Hatton and Williamson (2000) discuss the low rates of emigration from Africa, given 'emigration fundamentals', that would call for much longer emigration flows from Africa than observed; an explanation for reduced migration from Africa is the existence of immigration restrictions that prevent African emigration. Another reason is that the costs of migrating are simply too high to be afforded by very poor African migrants. Globalization and the development process in general alters, over time, the structure of production and the demand for labor. As incomes rise people consume more services: people travel more (the cost of air-traveling has substantially declined in recent years), go more often to restaurants, the entertainment industry expands, the demand for housing cleaning and maintenance services increase, etc. Some of these activities are very intensive in unskilled labor and these jobs are increasingly refused by nationals of rich countries. This provides an incentive for low-skill workers to migrate to higher income countries and enroll in these activities. Under globalization, firms-often multinational corporations- are increasingly considering as an endogenous variable the location of production across the globe in response to country - differentials in the cost of labor (adjusted by productivity), in tax regimes, business regulations and in the overall investment climate. The fact is that manufacturing plants of international corporations are increasingly conducting production 7 Data from the World Development Indicators 2000 (The World Bank). 9 in low wage countries of Asia and Central America . This trend reduces the incentives for workers to emigrate as new job- opportunities are open at home. In an attempt to identify the determinants and changes in skills of new migrants to the U.S. Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998) report the difficulties of making definite assessments on this matter without adequately considering the nature of the legal migration regime and migration data in the U.S. The data on immigrants captures legal migrants with the status of U.S. residents (people with "green cards"), a status often granted to the migrant after living and/or working in the U.S. for several years. The empirical analysis of the paper tends to show since the mid 1980s the average skill of new U.S. legal immigrants has risen relative to that of the U.S. population.8 The authors mention also that these increases in the skills of new legal migrants are due in part to changes in immigration laws in the U.S. that favor the admittance of people with skill that are scarce in U.S. labor markets. Another look at the issue is provided by Carrington and Detragiache (1998). These authors investigate the magnitude of the "brain drain" from developing countries through migration to developed economies. Using data of the U.S. Census of 1990 the authors find significant evidence of 'brain drain' from migrants coming from Caribbean, Central America and some Asian and African countries. This is a serious problem pointing towards a flight of human capital from developing countries. A recent case of large scale (north-south) migration of highly educated people in the 1990s took place from Russia to Israel . In fact, from late 1989 through 1996, it estimated that 670,000 Russian Jews arrived to Israel, increasing the total Israeli population by 11 % and the labor force by 14 % (see Gandal, Hanson, Slaughter , 2000). The data reported in that study shows that the shares of the Russian population with college (university) education is considerable higher, in 1996, than the share of other Israeli workers and the total labor force with college education. Given the size of the Russian immigration and its degree of educational attainment, the immigration shock represented a substantial upgrading of the total labor force in Israel (and a relative downgrading of the labor force in the Russian economy and society). 8 From Table 4, we also observe an increase in the ratio of educated people of Hispanic to White population in the 1990s. 10 a) What does Trade Theory say about Trade and Migration ? In a classic article published in 1957, Nobel Prize Robert Mundell demonstrated, analytically, that under a set of special conditions (constant returns to scale, perfect competition, no distortions) international trade (movement of commodities) is a substitute for factor movements, including the movement of people. The main reason driving this result was that the equalization of factor prices through international trade would create no incentive for capital or labor (people) to move across national boundaries. Subsequently, the relaxation of some assumptions of the Mundell model regarding economies to scale, factor endowments, costs of mobility , distortions have shown that migration and trade can be complements rather than substitutes (see Schiff, 1996 and Faini, de Melo and Zimmermann, ch.1, 1999). Moreover, the factor price equalization process through international trade may take a long time-several decades - to operate when there are large per-capita incomes differentials between the trading partners. For example, in the context of NAFTA while Mexico has a GDP per capita in 1999 of around U$ 4,500 the per capita income of the U.S. is near U$ 31,0009 this year. That large income differential between two countries having a large common border generate very significant incentives for migration from Mexico to the U.S. In turn, such large income differentials are not uncommon among developed and developing countries so to generate powerful incentives for international migration.10 The Mundell result of trade as a substitute for migration provides a rationale for expecting that a reduction of trade restrictions in industrial countries can reduce the pressures for international migration. However trade opening may not be enough to dampen international migration to rich economies in view of the large income differentials between rich and poor countries we observe today in the world. 9 Data from the World Development Indicators 2000 (The World Bank). 10 It is important to note that the fact the Mexican economy grew fast in the second half of the 1990s, must have helped to finance emigration, a process that entail various costs. 11 4. The Evolution of Policies Towards Migration: Past and Present It has been observed that policy regimes tend to be more open for international trade and capital movement than for immigration. Is that a correct characterization of reality? How have policies toward international migration evolved in the last century or so? What devices have (are) governments used (using), historically and currently, to either encourage or deter foreign immigration to their countries? a) Immigration Policies in the First Wave of Globalization." Let's start with a brief overview of the main migration policies in the countries of the New World in the mid-to-late 19h century and early 201h century. By mid-19th century, Argentina granted land to facilitate immigrants to settle there and the government financed the costs of moving and housing for immigrants. The pro- migration climate of the ruling elite in Argentina at that time was captured by the phrase, coined by the Argentinean thinker Juan Baustista Alberdi, "To Govern is to Populate".'2 However, gradually, policies supporting immigration became less generous . In 1916, new legislation introduced restrictions for different classes of immigrants (e.g. disabled people, unaccompanied women with children, etc.) and by the 1920s policies became definitely less favorable for immigration as part of a global trend associated with less favorable economic conditions and the onset of nationalistic attitudes towards immigration. In Australia, in the 19h century, immigration policies tended to favor those coming from British Commonwealth countries by subsidizing the transportation of immigrants and supporting them at arrival. At the same time they restricted the immigration of Chinese citizens through taxes and quotas. Some of these laws were repealed afterwards and then adopted again. In the early 20rh century Australia naturalization laws became aligned with England's. Brazil also encouraged emigration and settlements through subsidies, special benefits for land acquisition and other budget support; in particular, it is considered that immigration helped to substitute the effects on 11 The main reference on immigration policies of the new world countries during the first wave of globalization is Timmer and Williamson (1996). More direct sources are Holloway (1997) for Brazil and Solberg (1970) for Argentina and Chile. 12 See Solberg (1970). 12 labor supply of abolition of slavery in the late 19'h century, for the sugar -producing areas (north-east) and coffee-producing areas in the Sao-Paulo province.'3 Later on, like in the cases of Argentina and Australia, Brazilian, legislation became more restrictive in the first two decades of the 20th century. In the second half of the 19th century U.S. immigration legislation went through different changes. It became federal rather than state legislation. Racial considerations were important: Chinese immigration was restricted in 1888 and the Chinese Exclusion Act suspended all Chinese immigration for 20 years. In 1917 a new Immigration Act established a literacy test for immigrants and in 1921 quotas were established to restrict immigration. In general immigrants from Canada, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the U.S. were treated more favorably than immigrants coming from Asian countries. In Canada by the 1860s the parliament granted autonomy to the provinces to handle immigration issues and policies. Land was offered at reduced prices to encourage immigrants to settle in Canada. In 1910 immigration from Asian countries was restricted through a higher head tax than that of immigrant of non-Asian countries. Summing up, immigration policies in the countries of the New World were, on the whole, liberal in the 1 th century; in addition, immigration flows were in several cases, promoted and encouraged by the governments of New World countries in response to the need for increased labor supply to support rapid economic expansion. However, these policies became gradually more restrictive towards the end of that century and the early 20'h century, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s. Ethnic discrimination (against migration from Asia, in particular from China) was a common practice, particularly in Australia, Canada and the US; a feature apparently absent in Argentinean and Brazilian immigration policies at that time. b) Migration Policies in the Second Wave of Globalization: The Late 20th Century. The direction of international migration flows changed significantly during the 201h century. As mentioned before, in the first wave of globalization migration was 13 See Holloway (1977). 13 mainly from east to west say from Europe to the U. S. and Canada and from north to south (from Europe, mainly, to Argentina, Australia, Brazil). In contrast, since the second half of the 20th century and intensified in the 1980s and 1990s -- the second wave of globalization-- the main flows of migration have been from Latin America, Africa and Asia to the US and Europe. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the soviet block. significant migration flows to western Europe (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom and Finland) and Israel have taken place from former socialist countries. The main recipient country, the U.S. underwent significant changes in the legislation regarding migration since the 1960s.14 The 1965 amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act was intended to facilitate migration to the U.S., ending ethnic discrimination biases of previous legislation. This new piece of legislation regulated immigration through a preference system according to family status regarding US citizens and encouraged immigrants with skills in short supply in the U.S. Nationality quotas were still in effect but an attempt was made to avoid ethnic discrimination. That legislation was changed again in 1986 in an attempt at trying to curb illegal immigration through tightened border control while at the same time creating schemes of regularization of aliens.15 In turn, another law amendment in 1996 sought to further reduce illegal migration through a new Illegal Immigrant Reform and Responsibility Act. The changes in immigration policies in the U.S. reflect the recognition of the incentives to migrate to the U.S. because of the economic opportunities available to everybody, including migrants; at the same time, this legislation tries to reduce illegal migration rather than focus in its ethnic composition as in the past. In Europe, since the 1990s, immigration policies are increasingly defined at supra-national level by the European Union (EU). The main feature of EU migration policies is a sharp distinction between the EU and non-EU origin of the migrants. There is a dual EU immigration regime in which every EU citizen has full rights to reside and 14 For a discussion of U.S. immigration policies since the 1960s, see Sassen (1998) and Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998). 15 People that benefited from this law in the U.S. obtained permit enabling them to remain in the country until they met the conditions for obtaining a permanent residence permit. 14 work in any country of the Union. In turn, citizen from non-EU countries face several restrictions to immigration and need working visas to reside legally and work in the EU. During the 1990s, OECD countries have tended to favor trade agreements over common markets with third countries (taking the EU as a unity) as the later arrangement would imply free immigration policies within a common market area. In the case of NAFTA, liberalization of trade and investment between the U.S. and Canada with Mexico did not include a relaxation of the barriers to entry of migrants from Mexico to the U.S. (rather NAFTA tightened them) In the case of the EU, an interesting case is Turkey, a country with large emigration flows towards Europe. The EU signed a trade agreement with Turkey but postponed, for later periods, negotiations for full membership in the EU. In a recent paper, Wellish and Walz (1998) have explained the grater preference by receiving countries (e.g. the OECD ) for free trade over free immigration in that the degree of domestic redistribution of income and social benefits is lower in the case of free trade. As domestic redistribution may hamper growth and pose an extra burden on the public finances of the host country, national government in receiving countries tend to prefer free-trade over free-immigration. 5. Migration, Growth, Convergence and Inequality A traditional subject in the analysis of migration focuses on its impact on labor markets variables such as unemployment levels and real wages of native workers in host countries. A more sympathetic attitude towards immigration tends to develop in booming periods of low unemployment and labor shortages in recipient countries; in turn, less favorable attitudes to migration arise in periods of slack and high unemployment. For example, the protracted period of prosperity and rapid growth of the U.S. economy in the 1990s has attracted significant migration to this country and, towards the end of the decade, generated a much more liberal political attitude towards immigration even by the labor unions, which have traditionally been hostile to immigration. 15 The impact of international migration on key variables such as the rate of economic growth and inequality (between and within countries) is the subject of the next two sections. a) Migration and Growth The interaction between long run growth and migration is a complex issue. A first question is regarding causality. Does rapid growth in receiving countries invite more immigration? Conversely, what is the effect of migration on the rate of economic growth of receiving and sending countries? Historically, say in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century, the economic opportunities opened in the growing, resource- rich, New World constituted a powerful magnet for immigration from, the labor abundant countries of Europe. So drawing from this historical experience, it is apparent that more rapid growth and expanding opportunities in the host country often precedes immigration. In tum, immigration can be also a positive factor in boosting growth in receiving countries. There are several channels connecting migration with growth at work here, linked with both the labor market (for different skill levels) and the macroeconomics of savings and investment. Starting with the labor market, international migration can ease labor market shortages therefore relaxing a labor constraint for growth, often present in relatively labor scarce economies. In fact, since the late 1990s, the U.S. companies in the information sector and communications equipment have employed intensively foreign computer engineers and information experts from India, China and other developing countries to keep up with the human resources requirements of a rapidly growing sector. In addition, back to history, the migration of people with entrepreneurial capacities and a favorable attitude towards risk-taking is likely to have contributed, positively, to wealth creation, colonization and innovation in the countries of the New World during the first wave of globalization. Turning to the macroeconomics of saving and investment, another channel through which migration can increase growth in the host country is by moderating the growth of wages in a growing economy, therefore contributing to keep profits high rising 16 the profitability of investment and accelerating growth. This is an investment-led growth mechanism. Another mechanism from migration to growth may operate through savings. As international migration tends to rise profits in receiving countries and profit-earners have a larger propensity to save than wage earners, the net result is an increase in overall national savings and an increase in growth.16 By a symmetric logic these mechanisms can account for a growth- depressing effects of emigration in sending countries. The transfer of human capital and entrepreneurs from one country to the other can be predicted to have a positive growth effect in the recipient country and a negative growth effect in the sending country because the sending country loses scarce human capital, talented people and entrepreneurs. From the perspective of world output and to the extent that people move from countries with lower labor-productivity to countries with higher labor-productivity (because better organizational and institutional infrastructures, better technology or more capital per person) then the level of world output will increase with free international migration, although the distributional consequences of migration can be against the sending country that "export" scarce human capital and entrepreneurial talent. There is no doubt that 'brain drain' is, indeed, a serious problem in many developing countries because of its adverse growth effects. However, restricting international migration of highly educated people seems unlikely to be the right solution. More sensible policies would be to create attractive economic conditions at home for highly educated people to stay in their home countries. b) Migration and Convergence, Global and National Inequality In assessing the impact of migration on inequality an important distinction is between global inequality17 and national (within country) inequality.18 If international migration represents a movement of people from relatively low wage countries to nations 16 This assumes that all savings are automatically invested and that there are no keynesian problems of transforming savings into growth because of deficient aggregate demand (See Solimano, 1996). 17 Lindert and Williamson (2000) show that while in the last two hundred years national (within country) inequality has remained more or less constant, inequality across countries has increased significantly. 18 See Solimano (1998, 2000) for an analysis of national inequality from the viewpoint of the theory of distributive justice and the links between growth and inequality under alternative growth model closures. 17 with higher wages, international migration will contribute to reduce global inequality (at least of labor incomes) by reducing the real wage gaps between sending and receiving countries. This is in turn, a key element in the whole discussion about convergence. O'Rourke and Williamson (2000, ch. 2) report that around 60 percent of the wage convergence in the " Atlantic Economy" (Europe, U.S., Canada) between 1870 and 1900 is explained by the collapse of the wage gap between Europe and the New World following massive international migration from Europe to the New World. The authors mention that the story of convergence is one of lower real wages in labor abundant Europe catching-up to the higher wages of workers in the labor scarce New World. In addition, within the New World, lower-wages countries such as Argentina and Canada were catching up with higher-wages countries such as the U.S. and Australia. In addition, the authors argue for a positive correlation between globalization (late 19'4 century and mid to late 20th century ) and convergence with convergence interrupted with the de-globalization of the inter-war period , say from 1914 and 1950. Interestingly, the authors argue that both migration and trade were the critical factors contributing to convergence (see ch.9), with capital flows playing little or no role in income convergence. Another important discussion is the effect of migration and, more generally of globalization, on national income distribution (particularly of labor incomes). In the 1980s and 1990s, it has been observed in countries such as the U.S. an increase in wage inequality coinciding with greater external integration (globalization) of the U.S. economy. In turn, a similar discussion took place in the late 19'h century in the U.S. in which mass immigration is attributed to have played an important role in keeping domestic real wages of unskilled labor from rising in spite of a booming economy. The explanations for the rising wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s and its possible links with globalization has been explored under different analytical frameworks with relatively inconclusive results. Borjas (1994, 1999) shows that globalization is associated with a worsening of wage differentials for unskilled labor in the U.S. in the last two decades; part of this trend is related to globalization forces, with migration explaining around two-thirds of that increase in wage inequality and trade the other third. It is important to observe, though, that others factors such as technological change -e.g. 18 the information revolution-- have probably contributed to wage inequality if technical progress saves unskilled labor and increases the demand for high-skill labor. In fact, it seems that the studies that give more importance in explaining the increase in wage inequality in the U.S. to technical change than trade integration have often disregarded the effect of migration as an important globalization factor. Theory suggests that migration, of predominantly unskilled labor, reduces the supply of this class of labor in the sending country, therefore rising the salaries of unskilled workers and narrowing wage income distribution, therefore generating an egalitarian trend in the sending countries (though at lower per-capita income levels if emigration reduces growth at home). However, these trends need to be confirmed empirically for developing countries and the empirical evidence seem to be scarce in this realm. 6. Migration and Humanitarian Crisis An important cause of international migration during the 1990s is associated with humanitarian crisis, often referred as the problem of "refugees" and/or "asylum seekers". This is not causally related to globalization in a direct way but humanitarian crisis have become more frequent in the current era of globalization. As table 6 shows, the total number of asylum-seekers in OECD countries increased from 435,000 people in 1989 to 839,000 in 1992 (peak year) and declined to its level of the late 1980s by the end of the 1990s. In terms of individual countries, Germany and the United States stand out as the main receivers of asylum-seekers in that period. Also from Table 6, we can observe that the relative importance of asylum seekers with respect to the total inflows of foreign population has been increasing for some countries during the last three years, particularly for Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia.19 19 This could be associated to the following phenomenon. As immigration controls of different countries have been tightened during the last years in order to reduce illegal immigration, it has been observed (in Europe and in the US) that immigrants -with no possibilities of legally entering a country- have started to claim for entrance under the asylum seeker status. Given the nature of this claim, hard to deny and also difficult to verify as sometimes asylum seekers arrive at the borders with no documentation at all, this pose a problem to the receiving countries, which must allow the asylum seekers to stay during the period their status is processed (confirmed or denied). This creates incentives for the illegal immigrants to enter as 19 The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s gave rise to a complex process of nation-building in the former soviet republics that was often accompanied by large flows of migration across former soviet republics, and the massive emigration of Jewish population to Israel that we documented before. Another example of the disintegration of a nation-states in the 1990s was the former Yugoslavia, a move that engendered both war, ( Bosnia, Kosovo ) and massive migration among states of the former Yugoslavian Federation. In fact, for most of the countries presented in Table 6, the peak observed in 1992 is principally explained bv asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia. Appendix Table A-2 present the composition of asylum seekers, by nationality, for some selected OECD countries. In turn, acute ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone and other African countries generated massive internal displacement of population and international migration in the 1990s of people escaping from armed conflict and prosecution. Part of the exodus went to other countries of Africa and to OECD countries (see Hatton and Williamson, 2000). In 2000, there were refugees crisis in Afghanistan , East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo.20 In the Latin American context, the intensification of the internal war in Colombia, particularly in the late 1990s also produced internal displacements of more than a million and a half of Colombian moving away from areas of armed conflict.21 Moreover, large contingents of Colombians are migrating to the U.S., Spain. Central America and other destinations. In contrast, it is interesting to notice that the end of the civil wars in Central America in the early 1990s in countries such as El Salvador, did not produce a movement of migrants back to their home country. Most Salvadoran that emigrated to the United States during its civil wars of the 1980s did not return home after the conflict ceased. An irreversibility feature in international migration is clearly noticeable. The occurrence of large migration flows during humanitarian crisis is a relevant topic that clearly deserves more analysis both at the level of empirically documenting its magnitude, composition, place of destination, etc, as well as in highlighting policy asylum seekers. Also, because by the time their status is defined, they usually have already settled (get a job, start paying taxes, etc), it makes it more difficult deportation to their country of origin. 20 See New York Times, December 2000. 21 See Solimano (2001). 20 responses to the phenomena. Clearly, discussions on international architecture-that have so far privileged financial architecture-must include also the design of institutional settings to prevent and then manage, when they occur, massive emigration flows -or refugees crisis -- associated with either armed conflict and/or natural disasters. 7. Freedom, Rights and International Migration International migration involves not only economic considerations but also touches some basic issues of freedom and individual rights. A consistent view of freedom must encompass not only freedom of choice of consumption goods, freedom of which schools to send our children but also the freedom of choice of where to live and work. The later choice, in general, does not arise much controversy if exercised at the level of the nation-state; in this case, it is now conceded as a basic individual right.22 Some have argued , further, that people also must be granted a universal right to choose, in the planet, their country of residence in a sort of transnzational citizenship (see Stucliffe, 1998, and Baubock, 1994, for discussions on this concept). This issue can also be linked to the topics of exclusion and discrimination. Immigrants (let alone illegal immigrants) in general do not enjoy the same political rights such as voting and being elected for public office as natives.23 Another issue for discussion is the access of immigrants to social services and welfare benefits in the recipient migration country. As discussed before an important reason for public attitudes against immigration is the added burden on the (welfare) state in the receiving country associated with the provision of social benefits to migrants. Nevertheless, it is worth considering that illegal migrants in countries such as the U.S. (and possibly in other countries as well) pay taxes, irrespective of their legal immigration status. This discussion of the public finances consequences of migration, however important, is basically instrumental. From the viewpoint of rights (to choose where to 22 This was not always the case. In the period of slavery, this (and other rights) to slaves were denied. In more recent times, in socialist countries workers needed a permission of the state to move within their countries for work reasons; in addition emigration outside their countries was strongly curtailed by the state. 21 reside in the planet), critical considerations go beyond the fiscal aspects of immigration and touches upon issues of international citizenry and "cosmopolitan rights ", an area in flux in which consensus is still far from being obtained. A somewhat related issue is the control of illegal emigration and the effectiveness of borders control. Empirical evidence suggests that the actual effectiveness of border controls in stemming illegal immigration is limited. 24 An interesting theme is the differences between a "rights perspective" and an "economic perspective' on migration. A ranking of "freedom to move around the globe" would attach higher values to commodities than people, with goods and money having greater freedom to move than people (using Marx's terminology, this is a sort of 'commodity fetishism', at global level). In turn, people with higher skills, better marketable knowledge and more wealth have more freedom to move (in the sense of facing less restrictions to immigration in receiving countries) than unskilled people and ill-people (e.g. people with HIV/AIDS). An economic viewpoint would rationalize along efficiency and externality lines some of these differences in " freedom to become global" so to say; however, some of these differences in the ability to exercise freedom in globalization can be hard to justify from a perspectives of individual rights. 8. Concluding Remarks This paper reviewed a host of issues involving international migration, globalization, and the global economic order. International migration can be evaluated in terms of its economic effects on global and national inequality, incomes convergence, long run growth and public finances in both receiving and sending countries; in addition, a further perspective on international migration is linked to issues of individual rights, freedom to move across the planet and "global citizenship". A global economic order encompasses all these dimensions. 23 As suggested in Tables 4 and 5, immigrants in general are also discriminated in wages and access to jobs,. They tend to receive lower wages than the native population for roughly similar jobs and have higher rates of unemployment. 24 Hanson, Robertson and Spillinbergo (1999) study the effect of U.S.- Mexico border control and find that border enforcement has minimal effect of illegal migration and that immigration from Mexico has a reduced effect on wages in U.S. border cities. 22 This paper shows that global capitalism, early 21th century, is more favorable, at the level of policies, to the movement of goods and capital than the movement of people across the globe. In a sense , the degree of "cosmopolitan liberalism"25 of current globalization is less in the dimension of international migration. Economically, preventing factor (labor or human capital) movements from lower to higher productivity activities (countries) may entail a global welfare loss in terms of foregone world output (although the distributive consequences for sending and receiving countries vary). International migration was more important in the first wave of globalization of the second half of the 19'h century than in the current wave of global capitalism. In the last 150 years of world economic history, public policies toward migration have experienced large swings. They were, in general, relatively liberal, though with ethnic discrimination in the mid 19th century (particularly in Australia, United States and Canada) ; then gradually those policies became more restrictive in receiving countries with a severe tightening of immigration in the inter-war period of 1914-1950. In the late 20th century, like before, immigration policies in industrial countries have become significantly influenced by business cycle and unemployment considerations; periods of booming growth and high employment (e.g. the U.S. in the late 1990s ) have created a more favorable attitude towards immigration by politicians, labor unions and policy- makers. However, this may change again with a downturn in the U.S. and other major economies. The empirical evidence for the U.S. shows a steady trend of increased immigration in the last half of the 20th century, a trend that accelerates towards the end of the 20'h century. In fact, immigration rose from around 2.9 million people in the 1950- 60s per decade to an average of around 7.5 million in the 1980-90s. However, as a share of the total population of the U.S. these immigration flows are around a 40 percent of what they were in the period 1871-1920. In terms of the socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants, the data for the U.S. shows lower median incomes, lower levels of educational attainment (high school 25 The phrase was coined by Harry Johnson in a paper on international migration written in the mid 1960s (see references). 23 and B.A. degrees) and higher poverty incidence in Hispanics residing in the U.S. than in Asians and Whites (but higher or similar than in Afro-Americans). The early Mundell view of trade as a substitute for migration dominated the perceptions of economists on the matter for a while. However, subsequent analytical work and empirical evidence show that, historically, periods of rapid expansion of international trade (late 19'h century and late 20th century globalization waves) came along also with an increase in international migration. The view of trade as a substitute for migration has a clear policy implication: trade opening in rich countries as a way to reduce migration pressures. Nevertheless, large initial per-capita income and big real wage differentials among rich and poor countries create significant incentives to migrate, in spite of increased trade volumes and a more open trade regime (e.g. NAFTA). Another possible alternative is increased foreign aid to improve economic conditions in sending countries as a deterrent to international migration. The empirical evidence tends to show a positive correlation between globalization and international income convergence across countries of the New World in the first wave of globalization and among OECD countries in the second half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, when including developing countries, the picture of convergence is less clear. Globalization has been associated with a narrowing of gaps in per-capita income between rich countries and rapidly growing economies of East Asia, Chile, and others during the last two to three decades. Nevertheless, income divergence has been the case for Sub-Saharan Africa, several former socialist countries and Russia, and other developing countries. Moreover, the evidence attaches a greater contribution to iLnternational migration than trade and financial globalization to international incomes convergence across nations, particularly in the first wave of globalization. From the viewpoint of world distribution of income, international migration tends to reduce income disparities across countries, a feature worth considering given the pervasive income disparities among countries in the world economy. However, migration can increase inequality within countries in labor- scarce, receiving countries by moderating the growth of wages because of the associated increase in the supply of labor. In contrast, emigration can have an equalizing effect in sending countries by reducing the supply of labor and rising wages. 24 On the other hand, international migration is bound to have a positive effect on long run growth of receiving countries by keeping labor costs down, increasing the profitability of investment and rising national savings. For sending countries, the impact on growth depends on what is the pool of labor and human resources that emigrate. In labor- abundant, developing countries, with chronic unemployment (or labor surplus) the growth depressing effects of migration can be low (partly compensated by labor remittances). Nevertheless, emigration of highly- educated people, professionals and national investors, because of poor economic opportunities at home can have a detrimental effect on long run income levels and growth rates of sending countries by the flight of entrepreneurial capacities, human capital and skilled labor. From a global perspective, however, world output is expected to increase if people is free to move across the planet from areas of lower labor productivity to areas of higher productivity of labor. Also from the viewpoint of global economic freedoms, the result would be equally positive. 25 References Baldwin, R. and P. Martin (1999) "Two Waves of Globalization: Superficial Similarities and Fundamental Differences" NBER 6904, Working Paper, Cambridge MA. Baubock, R. (1994) Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration, Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar. Borjas, G:J. (1999) "Economic Research on the Determinants of Immigration: Lessons for the European Union", World Bank Technical Paper#438, September. - (1994) "The Economics of Immigration" Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 32, Issue 4, December. Bradford Delong, J. (2000) "The Shape of Twentieth Century Economic History" NBER Working Paper 7569, Cambridge MA. Carrington, W. and E. Detraigiache (1998) "How Big is the Brain Drain?" IMF, Working Paper/98/102. Faini, R., J. de Melo and K. Zimmermann (1999) Migration. The Controversies and the Evidence, Cambridge University Press. Gandal, N., G. Hanosn and M. Slaughter (2000) "Technology, Trade and Adjustment to Immigration in Israel", NBER Working Paper 7962, Cambridge MA. Hanson, G.; R. Robertson and A. Spillimbergo (1999) "Does Border Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers From Illegal Migration? NBER Working Paper 7054, Cambridge MA. 26 Hatton, T.J. and J.G. Williamson (2000) "Demographic and Economic Pressure on African Emigration" paper presented at the Conference on Population Dynamics and the Macro Economy (Harvard University, September 11-12, 2000). ----- (1998) The Age of Mass Migration. Causes and Economic Impact. Oxford University Press. Holloway, T. H. (1977) "Immigration and Abolition. The Transition from Slave to Free Labor in the Sao Paulo Coffee Zone" in Alden, D. and W. Dean (eds) Essays Concerning The Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India. A Florida International University Book. The University Presses of Florida, Gainsville. Jasso, G., M. Rosenzweig and J. Smith (1998) "The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States: Recent Trends and their Determinants" NBER Working Paper 6764, Cambridge, MA. Johnson, H. (1967) "Some Economic Aspects of Brain Drain" Pakistan Development Review. Lindert, P. and J. Williamson (2000) "Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal?", paper to be presented in a conference on Globalization in Historical Perspective "Markusen,J. and S. Zahniser (1997) "Liberalization and Incentives for Labor Migration: Theory with Applications to NAFTA", NBER Working Paper 6232, Cambridge, MA. O'Rourke, K. and J. Williamson (2000) Globalization and History. The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Economy, The MIT Press. 27 "The Century of Refugees Ends. And Continues", December, 31, 2000 The New York Times. Sassen, Saskia (1998) Globalization and its Discontents, The New Press, New York. Schiff, M. "South-North Migration and Trade. A Survey". Policy Research Working Paper, 1696, The World Bank. Solberg, C.E. (1970) Immigration and Nationalism, Argentina and Chile, 1890-1914. University of Texas Press, Austin and London. Solimano, A. (2000) "Institutional Challenges of Globalization and the Developing Countries"Policy Research Working Paper xxx, The World Bank. -- (1998), Editor, Roadmaps to Prosperity. Essays on Growth and Development. The University of Michigan Press. ----- (1999) Editor, Social Inequality. Values, Growth and the State. The University of Michigan Press. Solimano, A. (2001), Editor, Colombia. Essays on Conflict Peace and Development. The World Bank, Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Series. Solimano, A. , E. Aninat, E. and N.Birdsall, eds., (2000) Distributive Justice and Economic Development. The University of Michigan Press. 28 Sutcliffe, B. (1998) "Freedom to Move in the Age of Globalization" in D. Baker, G. Epstein and R. Pollin, eds, Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy, Cambridge University Press. Timmer, A. and Williamson, J. (1996) "Racism, Xenophobia or Markets? The Political Economy of Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties" NBER Working Paper 5867, Cambridge, MA. Wellish, D. and Walz, U. (1997) "Why Do Rich Countries Prefer Free Trade Over Free Immigration? The Role of the Modern Welfare State". European Economic Review 42, 1595-1612. Table 1: Immigration to the USA, by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence, Fiscal Years 1820-1998 Region / Country 1820-1870 1871-80 1881-90 1891-1900 1901-10 1911-20 1921-30 of Last Residence (*) Irnmigrants from all countries 7,377,238 2,812,191 5,246,613 3,687,564 8,795,386 5,735,811 4,107,209 US population (mid-decade) 23,352,000 45,245,000 56,879,000 69,851,000 84,147,000 100,941,000 ] 1 6,284,000 T9tal immigrants / US pop. 31.6% 6.2% 9.2% 5.3% 10.5% 5.7% 3.5% Earope 6,717,328 2,271,925 4,735,484 3,555,352 8,056,040 4,321,887 2,463,194 Austria (a) 7,124 63,009 226,038 234,081 668,209 453,649 32,868 Fiance 244,049 72,206 50,464 30,770 73,379 61,897 49,610 Germany (b) 2,333,944 718,182 1,452,970 505,152 341,498 143,945 412,202 Haingary 484 9,960 127,681 181,288 808,511 442,693 30,680 Irnland (c) 2,392,335 436,871 655,482 388,416 339,065 146,181 211,234 Italy 25,518 55,759 307,309 651,893 2,045,877 1,109,524 455,315 Soviet Union (d) 3,886 39,284 213,282 505,290 1,597,306 921,201 61,742 Sweden na 115,922 391,776 226,266 249,534 95,074 97,249 United K ngdom (e) 1,401,213 548,043 807,357 271,538 525,950 341,408 339,570 Asia 106,529 124,160 69,942 74,862 323,543 247,236 112,059 Clhina (f) 105,744 123,201 61,711 14,799 20,605 21,278 29,907 Hong Kong (g) na na na na na na na India 196 163 269 68 4,713 2,082 1,886 Japan 186 149 2,270 25,942 129,797 83,837 33,462 Korea (h) na na na na na na na Philippin(.s (i) na na na na na na na Turkey 301 404 3,782 30,425 157,369 134,066 33,824 Vi-tnam (g) na na na na na na na Arierica 349,171 404,044 426,967 38,972 361,888 1,143,671 [,516,716 Central Am. & Caribbean 50,596 14,114 29,446 33,615 115,740 140,583 90,668 Cuba 6) na na na na na na 15,901 Dominican Rep. (k) na na na na na na na El Salvador (k) na na na na na na na Haiti (k) na na na na na na na 3amaica (1) na na na na na na na North America 290,977 388,802 395,217 4,282 228,868 961,189 1,383,802 Canada and Newf. (m) 271,020 383,640 393,304 3,311 179,226 742,185 924,515 Mexico (n) 19,957 5,162 1,913 971 49,642 219,004 459,287 South America 7,598 1,128 2,304 1,075 17,280 41,899 42,215 Argentina (k) na na na na na na na Colombia 'k) na na na na na na na Ecuador (k) na na na na na na na Africa 648 358 857 350 7,368 8,443 6,286 Oceania 413 10,914 12,574 3,965 13,024 13,427 8,726 Table 1: Immigration to the USA, by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence, Fiscal Years 1871-1998 (continued) Region/Country 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-98 Tot. 179yrs of Last Residence 1820-1998 (**) Immigrants from all countries 528,431 1,035,039 2,515,479 3,321,677 4,493,314 7,338,062 7,605,068 64,599,082 US population (mid-decade) 127,859,000 140,474,000 165,931,000 194,303,000 215,973,000 239,279,000 263,044,000 270,561,000 Totalimmigrants/USpop. 0.4% 0.7% 1.5% 1.7% 2.1% 3.1% 2.9% 23.9% Europe 347,566 621,147 1,325,727 1,123,492 800,368 761,550 1,132,002 38,233,062 Austria(a) 3,563 24,860 67,106 20,621 9,478 18,340 13,776 1,842,722 France 12,623 38,809 51,121 45,237 25,069 32,353 29,063 816,650 Germany (b) 114,058 226,578 477,765 190,796 74,414 91,961 72,792 7,156,257 Hungary 7,861 3,469 36,637 5,401 6,550 6,545 7,564 1,675,324 Ireland (c) 10,973 19,789 48,362 32,966 11,490 31,969 54,865 4,779,998 Italy 68,028 57,661 185,491 214,111 129,368 67,254 58,346 5,431,454 Soviet Union (d) 1,370 571 671 2,465 38,961 57,677 386,327 3,830,033 Sweden 3,960 10,665 21,697 17,116 6,531 11,018 10,325 1,257,133 UnitedKingdom(e) 31,572 139,306 202,824 213,822 137,374 159,173 128,671 5,247,821 Asia 16,595 37,028 153,249 427,642 1,588,178 2,738,157 2,346,751 8,365,931 China (f) 4,928 16,709 9,657 34,764 124,326 346,747 347,674 1,262,050 HongKong(g) na na 15,541 75,007 113,467 98,215 96,047 398,277 India 496 1,761 1,973 27,189 164,134 250,786 295,633 751,349 Japan 1,948 1,555 46,250 39,988 49,775 47,085 55,442 517,686 Korea (h) na 107 6,231 34,526 267,638 333,746 136,651 778,899 Philippines (i) 528 4,691 19,307 98,376 354,987 548,764 433,768 1,460,421 Turkey 1,065 798 3,519 10,142 13,399 23,233 33,027 445,354 Vietnam (g) na na 335 4,340 172,820 280,782 241,641 699,918 America 160,037 354,804 996,944 1,716,374 1,982,735 3,615,225 3,777,281 16,844,829 Central Am. & Caribbean 21,363 71,390 167,842 571,543 875,766 1,340,139 1,245,292 4,768,097 Cuba(j) 9,571 26,313 78,948 208,536 264,863 144,578 136,711 885,421 Dominican Rep. (k) 1,150 5,627 9,897 93,292 148,135 252,035 300,065 810,201 El Salvador (k) 673 5,132 5,895 14,992 34,436 213,539 179,050 453,717 Haiti (k) 191 911 4,442 34,499 56,335 138,379 141,181 375,938 Jamaica (1) na na 8,869 74,906 137,577 208,148 139,124 568,624 North America 130,846 232,307 677,763 867,247 810,233 1,812,781 2,088,801 10,273,115 CanadaandNewf. (m) 108,527 171,718 377,952 413,310 169,939 156,938 157,564 4,453,149 Mexico (n) 22,319 60,589 299,811 453,937 640,294 1,655,843 1,931,237 5,819,966 South America 7,803 21,831 91,628 257,940 295,741 461,847 443,152 1,693,441 Argentina (k) 1,349 3,338 19,486 49,721 29,897 27,327 22,581 153,699 Colombia (k) 1,223 3,858 18,048 72,028 77,347 122,849 104,539 399,892 Ecuador (k) 337 2,417 9,841 36,780 50,077 56,315 60,031 215,798 Africa 1,750 7,367 14,092 28,954 80,779 176,893 280,230 614,375 Oceania 2,483 14,551 12,976 25,122 41,242 45,205 45,584 250,206 Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and A, Madisson (1995) for the US population. (*) The US population number shown in the period 1820-1870 correspond to 1850. (**) The population for the period 1820-1998 (last column) correspond to 1998. Notes: (a) From 1938-45, data for Austria included in Germany. (b) From 1899-1919, Germany also included data for Poland. (c) Prior to 1926, data for Northern Ireland included in Ireland. (d) From 1899-1919, the Soviet Union included data for Poland. (e) Since 1926, data for United Kingdom refers to England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. (f) China includes Taiwan since 1957. (g) Data not reported separately until 1952. (h) Data not reported separately until 1948. (i) Prior to 1934, Philippines recorded as insular travel. (1) Data not reported separately until 1925. (k) Data not reported separately until 1932. (1) Data for Jamaica not collected until 1953 (previously, consolidated under British West Indices) (m) Correspond to Canada and Newfoundland. Prior to 1920, Canada and Newfounland recorded as British North America. From 1871-98, figures include all British North America possesions. Land arrivals not completely enumerated until 1908. (n) No data available for Mexico for 1886-1894. na: not available. Table 2: Estimates of undocumented immigrants to the USA, 1992-1996 (thousands) Country of Origin 1992 1996 Increase (October) (October) (percent) All Countries 3,379 5,000 48.0 Latin America 2,219 3,765 69.7 Mexico 1,321 2,700 104.4 Dominican Republic 40 50 25.0 Haiti 88 105 19.3 Jamaica 42 50 19.0 Trinidad & Tobago 39 50 28.2 El Salvador 327 335 2.4 Guatemala 129 165 27.9 Honduras 61 90 47.5 Nicaragua 68 70 2.9 Colombia 59 65 10.2 Ecuador 45 55 22.2 Peru na 30 Other Countries 470 389 -17.2 Ireland 36 na Italy 67 na Poland 91 70 -23.1 Portugal 31 na India 28 33 17.9 Korea na 30 Pakistan 30 41 36.7 Philippines 90 95 5.6 Canada 97 120 23.7 Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service (1998), USA. Notes: na: not available Table 3.- Foreign Population (total and as % of total population), residing in selected OECD countries (a) Countries/Yrs 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Asia and Oceania Japan 941,000 984,500 1,075,300 1,218,900 1,281,600 1,320,700 1,354,000 1,362,400 1,415,100 1,482,700 % of total pop. 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 Australia na na na 3,753,000 na na na na 3,908,300 na % of total pop. na na na 22.3 na na na na 21.1 na Europe Austria 344,000 387,200 456,100 532,700 623,000 689,600 713,500 723,500 728,200 732,700 % of total pop. 4.5 5.1 5.9 6.8 7.9 8.6 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 Belgium 868,800 880,800 904,500 922,500 909,300 920,600 922,300 909.800 911,900 903,200 % of total pop. 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.9 Denmark 142,000 150,600 160,600 169,500 180,100 189,000 196,700 222,700 237,700 249,600 % of total pop. 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.7 4.7 Finland 18,700 21,200 26,300 37,600 46,300 55,600 62,000 68,600 73,800 80,600 % of total pop. 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 France na na 3,596,600 na na na na na na na % of total pop. na na 6.3 na na na na na na na Germany 4,489,100 4,845,900 5,342,500 5,882,300 6,495,800 6,878,100 6,990,500 7,173,900 7,314,000 7,365,800 % of total pop. 7.3 7.7 8.4 7.3 8.0 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.0 Ireland 82,000 78,000 80,000 87,700 94,900 89,900 91,100 96,100 118,800 114,400 % of total pop. 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.1 Italy 645,400 490,400 781,100 863,000 925,200 987,400 922,700 991,400 1,095,600 1,240,700 % of total pop. 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.0 Luxembourg 105,800 106,900 113,100 117,800 122,700 127,600 132,500 138,100 142,800 147,700 % of total pop. 27.4 27.9 29.4 30.2 31.0 31.8 32.6 33.4 34.1 34.9 Netherlands 623,700 641,900 692,400 732,900 757,400 779,800 757,100 725,400 679,900 678,100 % of total pop. 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.4 Norway 135,900 140,300 143,300 147,800 154,000 162,300 163,000 160,800 157,500 158,000 % of total pop. 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 Portugal 94,700 101,000 107,800 114,000 123,600 131,600 157,100 168,300 172,900 175,300 % of total pop. 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 Spain 360,000 249,600 278,700 360,700 393,100 430,400 461,400 499,800 539,000 609,000 % of total pop. 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 Sweden 421,000 456,000 483,700 493,800 499,100 507,500 573,400 531,800 526,600 522,000 % of total pop. 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.1 5.2 6.0 6.0 Switzerland 1,006,500 1,040,300 1,100,300 1,163,200 1,213,500 1,260,300 1,300,100 1,330,600 1,337,600 1,340,800 % of total pop. 15.2 15.6 16.3 17.1 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.9 18.9 19.0 United Kingd. 1,821,000 1,812,000 1,723,000 1,750,000 1,985,000 2,001,000 2,032,000 1,948.000 1,934,000 2,066,000 % of total pop. 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.6 North America United States na na 19,767,300 na na na 22,600,000 23,000,000 24,600,000 na % of total pop. na na 7.9 na na na 8.7 8.8 9.3 na Canada na na na 4,342,900 na na na na 4,971,100 na % of total pop. na na na 16.1 na na na na 17.4 na Total (b) 12,099,600 12,386,600 36,832,600 22,690,300 15,804,600 16,531,400 39,429,400 40,051,200 50,864,800 17,866,600 (foreign pop.) Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (World Bank). Notes: (a) Foreign (or foreign-born) population is the number of foreign or foreign-born residents in a country. (b) Calculated from the data presented in this table. na: not available from this source. Table 4: Educational attainment of the Hispanic and other populations living in the USA (as percentage of persons of 25+ years old) Education Level / Years Hispanic Population Other Populations Total Mexicans Puerto R. Cubans Central & Other White Afro- Asian South Am. Hispanics American High School grad. or higher (percent) 1991 39.0 33.0 43.1 46.6 47.3 53.8 61.3 49.2 67.6 1993 53.1 46.2 59.8 62.1 62.9 68.9 58.2 48.4 66.9 1995 53.4 46.5 61.2 64.8 64.2 68.4 58.0 49.5 61.9 1997 54.7 48.6 61.1 65.2 63.2 66.6 58.5 49.1 65.4 1998 55.6 48.3 63.9 67.8 64.9 72.2 58.8 50.7 65.0 BA degrees or higher (percent) 1991 9.7 6.2 10.1 18.5 15.1 16.2 22.2 11.5 39.0 1993 9.0 5.9 8.0 16.5 15.1 15.1 22.6 12.2 42.0 1995 9.3 6.5 10.6 19.3 13.1 14.2 24.0 13.2 38.2 1997 10.3 7.4 10.8 19.7 14.8 14.9 24.6 13.3 42.2 1998 11.0 7.5 12.0 22.2 17.4 16.0 24.8 14.7 42.1 Persons 25+ yrs old (thousands) 1991 11,208 6,518 1,261 784 1,658 986 136,299 17,096 4,158 1993 12,100 7,198 1,280 818 1,776 1,029 139,019 17,786 4,462 1995 14,171 8,737 1,437 820 2,082 1,095 141,113 18,457 4,200 1997 15,476 9,157 1,669 946 2,473 1,231 144,058 19,072 6,107 1998 16,004 9,649 1,682 952 2,599 1,163 145,078 19,376 6,381 Source: Statistical Abstract of the USA, various issues (1992-1999). Table 5: Income distribution per family and unemployment of the Hispanic and other populations living in the USA 1990-1997 Income-Poverty / Years Hispanic Population Other Populations Total Mexicans Puerto R. Cubans Central & Other White Afro- Asian South Am. Hispanics American Median Income per Family US current Dollars 1990 23,431 23,240 18,008 31,439 23,445 27,382 36,915 21,423 42,245 1992 23,912 23,714 20,301 31,015 23,649 28,562 38,909 21,161 na 1994 24,313 23,609 20,929 30,584 26,558 28,658 44,277 26,748 46,106 1996 26,179 25,347 23,646 35,616 29,960 26,171 44,756 26,522 49,105 1997 28,141 27,088 23,729 37,537 32,030 30,130 46,754 28,602 51,850 Families below poverty level Percent 1990 25.0 25.0 37.5 13.7 22.2 19.4 8.1 29.4 11.0 1992 26.2 26.4 32.5 15.2 27.0 21.8 8.9 30.9 12.0 1994 27.8 29.6 33.2 13.7 24.0 21.4 9.1 27.3 13.1 1996 26.4 27.7 33.1 12.5 19.0 29.3 8.6 26.1 12.6 1997 24.7 25.8 31.6 15.7 18.5 24.9 8.4 23.6 10.2 Income Distribution in 1997 Percent (except for Total Families) Total Families 6,961 4,292 770 383 1,018 498 59,515 8,408 2,381 Income < $5000 5.1 5.1 6.8 2.1 4.4 5.4 2.1 6.9 2.9 Income $5,000-$9,999 8.7 8.1 15.5 7.3 5.3 11.0 3.2 10.1 2.7 Income $10,000-$14,999 10.9 11.6 10.5 11.5 8.7 8.8 5.1 9.8 5.3 Income $15,000-$24,999 20.1 21.5 19.9 15.1 19.0 14.5 12.5 17.7 9.2 Income $25,000-$34,999 15.3 16.0 11.9 11.5 16.1 15.5 12.7 14.2 9.8 Income $35,000-$49,999 17.2 17.1 13.9 14.9 20.3 18.7 17.7 15.5 17.8 Income >= $50,000 22.8 20.5 21.4 37.3 26.1 25.9 46.6 25.9 52.2 Unemployment Rate Percent 1991 9.9 10.4 11.6 8.1 Na na 6.0 12.4 6.3 1993 10.6 10.7 12.8 7.8 Na na 6.0 12.9 5.7 1995 9.3 9.7 11.2 7.4 8.0 7.9 4.9 10.4 5.0 1997 7.7 7.7 9.8 6.6 7.0 7.6 4.2 10.0 4.7 1998 7.2 7.3 8.3 6.0 6.1 7.8 3.9 8.9 4.6 Source: Statistical Abstract of the USA, various issues (1992-1999), (na: not available). Table 6.- Inflows of asylum seekers (total) to selected OECD countries (a) Countries / years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 A.- Inflows of Asylum Seekers, total number Europe Austria 21,900 22,800 27,300 16,200 4,700 5,100 5,900 7,000 6,700 13,800 Belgium 8,200 13,000 15,400 17,600 26,500 14,700 11,700 12,400 11,800 22,000 D)enmark 4,600 5,300 4,600 13,900 14,300 6,700 5,100 5,900 5,100 5,700 Finland 200 2,700 2,100 3,600 2,000 800 800 700 1,000 1,300 France 61,400 54,800 47,000 28,900 27,600 26,000 20,400 17,400 21,400 21,800 Germany 121,300 193,100 256,100 438,200 322,600 127,200 127,900 116,400 104,400 98,700 Ireland na 100 na na 100 400 400 1,200 3,900 4,600 Italy 2,300 4,700 31,700 2,600 1,300 1,800 1,700 700 1,900 4,700 Luxembourg 100 100 200 100 200 200 200 300 400 1,600 Netherlands 13,900 21,200 21,600 20,300 35,400 52,600 29,300 22,900 34,400 45,200 Norway 4,400 4,000 4,600 5,200 12,900 3,400 1,500 1,800 2,300 8,300 Portugal 100 100 200 600 2,100 800 500 300 300 300 Spain 4,100 8,600 8,100 11,700 12,600 12,000 5,700 4,700 5,000 6,500 Sweden 30,000 29,400 27,400 84,000 37,600 18,600 9,000 5,800 9,600 13,000 Switzerland 24,400 35,800 41,600 18,000 24,700 16,100 17,000 18,000 24,000 41,200 United Kingdom 16,800 38,200 73,400 32,300 28,000 42,200 55,000 37,000 41,500 5/,700 North America Canada 19,900 36,700 32,300 37,800 21,100 21,700 25,600 25,700 22,600 22,600 United States 101,700 73,600 56,300 104,000 144,200 146,500 154,500 128,200 79,800 50,800 Oceania Australia 500 3,800 17,000 4,100 4,600 4,200 5,100 6,000 9,300 7,800 Total (b) 435,800 548,000 666,900 839,100 722,500 501,000 477,300 412,400 385,400 427,600 B.- Inflows of Asylum Seekers, as a percentage of inflows of foreign population (c) Europe Belgium 18.9 25.7 28.5 31.9 50.0 26.3 22.0 23.9 24.0 na Denmark 30.5 35.1 26.3 82.2 92.9 42.9 15.5 23.9 na na Finlland 4.8 41.5 16.9 34.6 18.3 10.5 11.0 9.3 12.3 na France 115.4 53.5 42.8 24.8 27.8 28.4 26.5 23.0 20.9 na Germany 15.7 22.9 27.8 36.3 32.7 16.4 16.2 16.4 17.0 r.a Luxembourg 1.2 1.1 2.0 1.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3 4.1 na Netherlands 21.3 26.1 25.6 24.5 40.4 76.9 43.7 29.7 44.9 na Ncrway 23.8 25.5 28.6 30.2 57.8 19.0 9.1 10.5 10.5 na Sweden 50.9 55.3 62.4 212.7 68.6 24.9 24.9 19.8 28.7 na S'witzerland 30.3 35.3 37.9 16.1 23.8 17.6 19.3 24.2 33.0 na United Kingdom na na na 15.8 14.7 21.8 26.7 17.1 17.5 na North America Canada 10.4 17.1 14.0 15.0 8.2 9.7 12.0 11.4 10.5 na United States 9.3 4.8 3.1 10.7 15.9 18.2 21.4 14.0 10.0 na Oceania Australia 0.3 3.1 14.0 3.8 6.0 6.0 5.8 6.1 10.8 na Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (World Bank). Noles: (a) Asylum seekers are those who apply for permission to remain in the country for humanitarian reasons. (b) Calculated from the data presented in this table. (c) Inflows of foreign population are the gross arrivals of immigrants in the country, a.Id it does not include asylum seekers. na: not available. Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries (thousands) Country of nationality / Years 1985 1990 1995 1997 (unless otherwise indicated) Japan Total foreign population 827.2 1,075.3 1,362.4 1,482.7 of which: Korea 683.3 687.9 666.4 645.4 China 74.9 150.3 223.0 252.2 Brazil 2.0 56.4 176.4 233.3 Philippines 12.3 49.1 74.3 93.3 United States 29.0 38.4 43.2 43.7 Peru 0.5 10.3 36.3 40.4 Australia / Years 1986 1991 1996 Total foreign population 3,247.4 3,753.3 3,908.2 of which: United Kingdom 1,083.1 1,122.4 1,072.5 New Zealand 211.7 276.1 291.4 Italy 261.9 254.8 238.2 Fmr. Yugoslavia 150.0 161.1 175.5 Vietnam 83.0 122.3 151.1 Greece 137.6 136.3 126.5 Belgium Total foreign population 846.5 904.3 909.8 903.2 of which: Italy 252.9 241.2 210.7 205.8 Morocco 123.6 141.7 140.3 132.8 France 92.3 94.3 100.1 103.6 Netherlands 59.6 65.3 77.2 82.3 Turkey 74.2 84.9 81.7 73.8 Spain 51.2 52.2 48.3 47.4 Denmark / Years 1985 1990 1996 1997 Total foreign population 117.0 160.6 237.7 249.6 of which: Turkey 20.4 29.7 36.8 37.5 Fmr. Yugoslavia 7.9 10.0 32.2 33.9 United Kingdom 9.7 10.2 12.5 12.8 Norway 9.8 10.2 11.5 11.9 Somalia .. 0.6 9.7 11.9 Germany 8.2 8.4 11.4 11.9 Finland Total foreign population 17.0 26.6 68.6 80.6 of which: Fmr. USSR (a) 1.6 4.2 15.9 19.0 Estonia (a) .. .. 8.4 9.7 Sweden 4.9 6.1 7.0 7.5 Somalia 4.0 5.2 Fmr. Yugoslavia .. .. 2.4 2.8 Iraq .. .. 1.3 2.4 France/ Years 1975 1982 1990 Total foreign population 3,442.4 3,714.2 3,596.6 of which: Portugal 758.9 767.3 649.7 Algeria 710.7 805.1 614.2 Morocco 260.0 441.3 572.7 Italy 462.9 340.3 252.8 Spain 497.5 327.2 216.0 Tunisia 139.7 190.8 206.3 Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries (thousands) (continued) Country of nationality / Years 1985 1990 1995 1997 (unless otherwise indicated) Germany Total foreign population 4,378.9 5,342.5 7,173.9 7,365.8 of which: Turkey 1,401.9 1,694.6 2,014.3 2,107.4 Fmr. Yugoslavia (b) 591.0 662.7 797.7 721.0 Italy 531.3 552.4 586.1 607.9 Greece 280.6 320.2 359.5 363.2 Poland 104.8 242.0 276.7 283.3 Bosnia Herzg. (c) . . 316.0 281.4 Croatia (c) . 185.1 206.6 Austria 172.5 183.2 184.5 185.1 Italy Total foreign population 423.0 781.1 991.4 1,240.7 of which: Morocco 2.6 78.0 94.2 131.4 Albania .. .. 34.7 83.8 Philippines 7.6 34.3 43.4 61.3 United States 51.1 58.1 60.6 59.6 Tunisia 4.4 41.2 40.5 48.9 Fmr. Yugoslavia (d) 13.9 29.8 56.1 44.4 Germany 37.2 41.6 39.4 40.1 Romania .. 7.5 24.5 38.1 China 1.6 18.7 21.5 37.8 Senegal 0.3 25.1 24.0 34.8 Poland .. 17.0 22.0 31.3 Luxembourg Total foreign population 97.9 113.1 138.1 147.7 of which: Portugal 29.0 39.1 51.5 54.5 Italy 20.7 19.5 19.8 19.9 France 12.6 13.0 15.0 16.5 Belgium 8.5 10.1 11.8 13.2 Germany 8.9 8.8 9.7 10.0 Spain 2.2 2.5 2.8 Netherlands Total foreign population 552.5 692.4 725.4 678.1 of which: Morocco 116.4 156.9 149.8 135.7 Turkey 156.4 203.5 154.3 114.7 Germany 41.0 44.3 53.9 53.9 United Kingdom (e) 38.5 39.0 41.1 39.2 Fmr. Yugoslavia 11.7 13.5 33.5 28.4 Belgium 22.8 23.6 24.1 24.4 Norway / Years 1985 1990 1996 1997 Total foreign population 101.5 143.3 157.5 158.0 of which: Sweden 10.0 11.7 17.3 20.6 Denmark 15.7 17.2 18.1 18.4 Bosnia Herzegov. (f) .. .. 11.5 11.6 United Kingdom 12.5 11.8 10.9 10.8 United States 10.0 9.5 8.7 8.6 Pakistan 8.4 11.4 8.6 7.5 Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries (thousands) (continued) Country of nationality / Years 1985 1990 1995 1997 (unless otherwise indicated) Portugal Total foreign population 94.7 107.8 168.3 175.3 of which: Cape Verde 27.1 28.8 38.7 39.8 Brazil 9.3 11.4 19.9 20.0 Angola 4.4 5.3 15.8 16.3 Guinea-Bissau 3.1 4.0 12.3 12.8 United Kingdom 7.1 8.5 11.5 12.3 Spain 7.1 7.5 8.9 8.8 Spain Total foreign population 242.0 278.8 499.8 609.8 of which: Morocco 5.8 11.4 74.9 111.1 United Kingdom 39.1 55.5 65.3 68.3 Germany 28.5 31.2 41.9 49.9 Portugal 23.3 22.8 37.0 38.2 France 17.8 19.7 30.8 34.3 Italy 10.3 10.8 19.8 22.6 Peru 1.7 2.6 15.1 21.2 Dominican Republic 1.2 1.5 14.5 20.4 Argentina 9.7 12.1 18.4 17.2 Sweden Total foreign population 388.6 483.7 531.8 552.0 of which: Finland 138.6 119.7 104.9 101.3 Fmr. Yugoslavia 38.4 41.1 38.4 33.6 Norway 26.4 38.2 32.3 31.0 Iran 8.3 39.0 29.3 26.2 Denmark 25.1 28.6 26.5 25.4 Iraq 3.5 7.7 21.3 24.8 Turkey 21.5 25.5 20.3 18.4 Poland 15.5 15.7 16.0 15.8 Germany 12.0 13.0 13.4 14.4 Chile 9.2 19.9 13.0 11.9 Switzerland Total foreign population 939.7 1,100.3 1,330.6 1,340.8 of which: Italy 392.5 378.7 358.9 342.3 Fmr. Yugoslavia 69.5 140.7 294.2 313.5 Portugal 30.9 85.6 134.8 136.3 Germany 81.0 83.4 90.9 94.7 Spain 108.4 116.1 101.4 94.0 Turkey 50.9 64.2 78.6 79.6 United Kingdom / Years 1985 1990 1995 1998 Total foreign population 1,731.0 1,723.0 1,948.0 2,207.0 of which: Ireland 569 478 443 448 India 138 156 114 139 United States 86 102 110 120 Ctr. & East. Europe (g) 68 58 75 100 Western Africa 43 37 87 90 Italy 83 75 80 89 Carib. & Guyana 135 82 82 79 Germany 36 41 51 75 Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries (thousands) (continued) Country of nationality / Years 1985 1990 1995 1997 (unless otherwise indicated) United States / Years 1970 1980 1990 Total foreign population 9,619.3 14,079.9 19,767.3 of which: Mexico 759.7 2,199.2 4,298.0 Philippines 184.8 501.4 912.7 Canada 812.4 842.9 744.8 Cuba 439.0 607.8 737.0 Germany 833.0 849.4 711.9 United Kingdom 708.2 669.1 640.1 Italy 1008.7 831.9 580.6 Korea 88.7 289.9 568.4 Vietnam .. 231.1 543.3 China 172.2 286.1 529.8 India 51,0 206.1 450.4 Canada Years 1986 1991 1996 Total foreign population 3,908.0 4,342.9 4,971.1 of which: United kingdom 793.1 717.7 655.5 Italy 366.8 351.6 332.1 United States 282.0 249.1 244.7 Hong Kong (China) 77.4 152.5 241.1 India 130.1 173.7 235.9 China 119.2 157.4 231.1 Poland 156.8 184.7 193.4 Philippines 82.2 123.3 184.6 Germany 189.6 180.5 181.7 Portugal 139.6 161.2 158.8 Source: Trends in International Migration, 1999 (OECD). Notes: (a) Figures include Ingrians (ethnic Finns). (b) From 1993 on, Serbia and Montenegro. (c) Included in Former Yugoslavia until 1993. Notes: (d) Excluding the data for Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina. (e) Excluding Hong Kong (China). (f) Included in former Yugoslavia until 1992. (g) Including former URSS. Table A-2: Inflows of asylum seekers, by nationality, to selected OECD countries (thousands) Country of nationality / Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 France Total inflows of asylum seekers 61.4 54.8 47.4 28.9 27.6 26 20.4 17.4 21.4 of which: Romania na 3.3 2.4 2.2 2.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.1 China na 0.8 2.4 2.1 0.4 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.7 Sri Lanka na 2.5 3.4 4.0 2.8 1.7 1.1 na 1.6 Turkey na 11.8 9.7 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.4 Zaire na 5.8 4.3 3.1 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 Former Yugoslavia na 0.4 0.9 2.4 2.5 1.9 1.4 0.9 1.0 Former USSR na 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.0 Algeria na 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.1 2.4 1.8 0.6 0.9 Germany Total inflows of asylum seekers 121.3 193.1 256.1 438.2 322.6 127.2 127.9 116.4 104.4 of which: Turkey 20.0 22.1 23.9 28.3 19.1 19.1 25.5 23.8 16.8 Former Yugoslavia 19.4 22.1 74.9 122.7 74.1 30.4 26.2 18.1 14.8 Iraq na na na na 1.2 2.1 6.9 10.8 14.1 Afganistan 3.7 7.3 7.3 6.4 5.5 5.6 7.5 5.7 4.7 Sri Lanka na 4.4 5.6 na 3.3 4.8 6.0 5.0 4.0 Iran 5.8 7.3 8.6 3.8 2.7 3.4 3.9 4.8 3.8 Armenia na na na na na 2.1 3.4 3.5 2.5 Pakistan na na na na na 2.0 3.1 2.6 2.3 Zaire na na na na na na 2.5 3.0 1.9 India na na na na na na 2.7 2.8 1.9 Bosnia Herzegovina na na na 6.2 21.2 7.3 4.9 3.5 1.7 Vietnam 1.0 9.4 8.1 12.3 11.0 3.4 2.6 1.1 1.5 Nigeria na 5.4 8.4 na na na na 1.7 1.1 Netherlands Total inflows of asylum seekers 13.9 21.2 21.6 20.3 35.4 52.6 29.3 22.9 34.4 of which: Iraq na 0.4 0.7 0.8 3.2 2.9 2.4 4.4 9.6 Afganistan na 0.6 0.3 0.4 1.5 2.5 1.9 3.0 5.9 Former Yugoslavia na 0.6 2.7 5.6 10.2 13.4 6.1 2.0 3.8 Former USSR na 0.2 1.0 0.6 1.6 4.5 1.9 1.7 2.0 Sri Lanka na 3.0 1.8 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.5 Somalia na 1.7 1.7 4.2 4.3 5.4 4.0 1.5 1.3 Iran na 1.7 1.7 1.3 2.6 6.1 2.7 1.5 1.3 China na na na na 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.2 Turkey na 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.1 Sweden Total inflows of asylum seekers 30 29.4 27.4 84 37.6 18.6 9.0 5.8 9.6 of which: Iraq na 2.0 2.2 3.2 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.6 3.1 Former Yugoslavia na 2.3 13.2 69.4 29.0 10.6 2.4 1.1 3.0 Somalia na 2.4 1.4 2.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 Iran na 4.3 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 Russian Federation na na na na 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 Turkey na 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 Afganistan na na na na 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 Syria na 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 na na na 0.1 Lebanon na 3.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 na na na 0.1 Ethiopia na 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 ng ng 0.1 0.1 Table A-2: Inflows of asylum seekers, by nationality, to selected OECD countries (continued) (thousands) Country of nationality / Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Switzerland Total inflows of asylum seekers 24.4 35.8 41.6 18 24.7 16.1 17 18 24 of which: Former Yugoslavia 1.4 5.6 14.2 na 12.1 7.5 9.0 7.5 6.9 Albania na na na na 2.0 na na na 3.1 Sri Lanka 4.8 4.8 7.3 na 1.7 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.1 Turkey 9.4 7.3 4.3 na 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.:3 1.4 Somalia na na na na 2.3 na na 0.7 0.9 Angola na na na na na 1.1 0.5 na 0.3 Lebanon 2.5 5.5 na na na na na n 0.2 United Kingdom Total inflows of asylum seekers 16.8 38.2 73.4 32.3 28 42.2 55 37 41.5 cf which: Former Yugoslavia ng ng 0.3 5.6 1.8 1.4 1.6 i1) 2.3 Somalia 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.8 3.5 1.8 2.7 Sri Lanka 1.8 3.3 3.8 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.1 1 3 1.8 Former USSR ng 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 4 2.0 Afganistan na na na 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.1 Turkey 2.4 1.6 2.1 1.9 1.5 2.0 1.8 1 5 1.4 Pakistan 0.3 1.5 3.2 1.7 1.1 1.8 2.9 1 9 1.6 China na na 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.9 Poland na na na 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.9 0.6 Nigeria ng 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.7 4.3 5.8 2.9 1.5 Iraq 0.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 Algeria ng ng ng 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.9 0., 0.7 India 0.6 1.5 2.1 1.5 1.3 2.0 3.3 2.2 1.3 Kenya ng 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.6 Zaire 0.5 2.6 7.0 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.9 0. / 0.7 Other countries 4.0 12.2 22.2 6.9 8.5 11.9 14.6 9.6 11.2 United States Total inflows of asylum seekers 101.7 73.6 123.5 104 144.2 146.5 154.5 128.2 79.8 of which: El Salvador na na ng 6.8 14.6 18.6 75.9 65.6 na Guatemala na na ng 43.9 34.2 34.4 23.2 13.9 na Mexico na na ng 0.6 6.4 9.3 9.7 9.7 na India na na ng 3.2 5.7 4.5 3.4 4.7 na Haiti na na ng 5.4 10.9 9.5 2.6 4.4 na China na na ng 3.5 14.5 10.9 5.0 3.5 na Former USSR na na 63.2 4.5 0.4 0.1 2.4 2.4 na Nicaragua na na ng 2.1 3.2 4.7 1.9 2.0 na Honduras na na ng 1.1 2.8 4.4 3.2 1.8 na Philippines na na ng 4.0 4.0 2.4 1.0 1.7 na Pakistan na na ng 3.3 4.5 3.3 2.5 1.4 na Mauritania na na ng na na na na 1.3 na Somalia na na 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.2 na Ethiopia na na 4.9 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1 na Bangladesh na na ng 1.0 3.8 3.7 1.9 1.0 na Other countries na na 54.9 23.3 37.9 39.7 20.8 12.5 na Scurce: Trends in International Migration, 1999 (OECD) (na: not available, ng: nil, or negligible). 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