- _, ..£ ______:_:._,_ _ .......:..;; : 1 ,,, ) . . \ ' . .. INTERNATIONAL BAHK FOR RECONSTRUCTION Aim DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PRESS FOR INr:EDIATE RELEASE Press Release No. 82 February 18, 191:.8 Address by John J. McCloy., President of the International Bank for Reconstr1.1ctton and Dovelopnen·'.:., broadcast over Station CFCF., Nontrea,l, Canada, under the auspices of the Canadian Club of hontreal, 1:30 P.H., E.S.T • ., Wednesday, February 18, 1948. I have little doubt that 1948 wl.11 be recorded in history as a year of great decisions - decisions which w.111 deterr.ti.ne not only the cour:-Je of events in Z11rope but equally the future dejtiny and economic well-being of this hemi r,pnere. The peopl'3 of Canada have given ample eY1.dence they are well aware tLat th,:; ~)ros:1erity of all natj_-:.ms is interlinked and that active trade among naticns stimulates improved living standards, toleri:mce and peace, Perhaps Canada is eve::.·, more aware of the interdependence of the nations on trade than otb'"r countries. Her economic position is i:mportan-t;ly depe21dent upon a healthy flc,.r of foreign trade and l:.er post-war record in aid of other nations' efforts to s~imulate the:i.r tran.e is a bright one. I.t is interest:i.ng I think to com- pare the nosi tion of Ca.nada ·wit..~ that of the United States in regard to inter- national trade. .Although tb3 exports a.ncl imports of the United Stat.es co11sti- tut0 by far the greatest single factor in international trade United States 8xports amounted iri 1947 to onl;;r about 6% of the United States gross national )rod,1.ct, and the imports to only about 2ii~. In Canada, however, in 19L. . 7 exports amounted to over 20% of the gros,s national product and imports to a."uo,1t 19%0 ~!hereas tbe relative intE1rnational trade figures are significant and int,~r1c,3tinr·:, they cannot be taken a.s ·l:,he :ole gauge of thG relative intereat of' the two co,mtrlen in internat,ional trade. Both countries have been twice impelled ,.ri thin one generation to send their best blood abroad in an a. tt,empt tu stabilize conditions in Europe. Both are deeply tied in to the welfare and culture of the Western Hemisphere as well as with Europe and Asia, and both arc Sl'.ch important members of' the world comrauni ty of' nations as to make their mutual ::1attern of international aid a natural, and indeed a necessary, develop- ment of tb~ policies of both countries. Canada's recoinition of the importance to her ~f international trade impelled her to take a leading and early part in helping to solve the sSirious prcbJ.Grr:s of reconstruction and development with which the p0st,-war world has been fa.~ed., Canada's counsel and cooperation were invaluable in the deliberations which led to the creation of the International. Da.'lk and the !nterna.tioni;tl Monetary Fi.l.Ild. The names of Towers, Bryce, Rasminsky, Parkinson and Pineo - all Canadians and all good - mark the path of' the progress of these two in- stitutions., Canada's financial contribution to less fortunate countries has, as I have indicated, been outstanding. Although attention is normally con- centrated on the imHense sums which the United States has provided in the last fow years for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, Canada's generosity has, I believe 9 been proportionately greater, V'nitod States fi.nancie.l assi$tnncc through 1947 is estirr.atod to a.mount to about ·:;,125 !)er ce.11i ta, while comparable - ·-•.,_c-,---·....,._....,_..,._~ ,.;Li'_ e -2- Ca.nadi~n assistance is estimated at about C167 per capita. If the difference in economic strength between the two countries is taken into account, the com- parison between the .American and Canadian contributions is even more striking. It was the design of the founders of the International Bank when they drew uri its Articles of Agreement in Bretton Woods, l1ew.Hampsl:ire, in 1944, that the Bank would, to a large extent, replace national governments as the principal source :for the international financing required for post-war reconstruction. The basic conception at Bretton Woods - and I think it was a sound one -I' was that inter-governmental financing, while necessary for relief purposes as in the case of UNRRA, was not appropriate for long-range reconstruction and develop- ment. That field, it was .felt, was primarily one for private capital. But :Lt was also recognized tnc,t, at the conclusion of the war, the need for international financing would be so large, and the risks so great, that ;,,rivate capital alone would not be available in the sizeable amounts required without some form of governmental guarantee. The Bank is, I believe, a rather unique institution in that, although it is an inter-governmental organization, it relies prinarily on tho private investment corru.mmi ty and not u·.,')n its member governments for the major part of its loanable re3ources. '1:hc Bank ts sub.scribed capital is slightly above (~8 billion, but only 2% of this amount ... about (;i65,ooo,ooo - is paid in by the i• I member governments in go:. d or United States dollars. An additional 18% is paid in the local .::urrency of each member; this 18%, however, is available for loans only with the permission of the country concer11ed. The remaining 80~l of the capital subscription of each member is subject to call by the Bank only if necessary to moet the Bank's o\m obliga tio~1s • This 80;.s of the capital, in other worlds, is a guarantee fund designed to safeguard private purchasers of the Bank's bonds; it is not available for lending purposes. Since the need today is ::,rimarily for United States dollars, and since only the United States has given permission to tho Bank to use its full 18% for loans, the immediately available loanable resources of the Bank derived from its ce.pi tal amount to only about ~;1730,000;,000. For loanable funds in excess of this amount, the Bank must rely on the sale of its bond3 to private investors,, And in this resort to investors and their capital the Bank r1ust cor.1pete with the offerings of straight government s0curities and high grade private investment securitios. There are a number of consequences which result from this r0liance of the Bank upon the private ::.nvcstr:.ent funds. Tho most obvious is that the Bank must endeavor to make sound loans for, despite the guarantee providod by the 80% unpaid portion of the capital si..1.br:icriptions of the members, private inve~ tors will not entrust their money to the Bank unless they are convinced that it has sound operating policies. This rules out loans for relief purposes or for political purposes or any loans which do not have a reasonable prospect of repayment, It means that the Bank's eriphasis must be on loans which are in themselves productive and which have good prosp8cts of repayment. This does not mean and has not meant that the Bank will not loan ·unless a private banker would also loan. In fact tho Articles of the Bank require that it must first satisfy itself that no private financing is available to the borrower before it will ma.kc its funds available. Both as to the type and amount of loans the Bank has moved and is prepared to move in fields which ........ -··g, ....... ,'FWf' @m I re ttte c·r- aa:sfWlr:4tw~·:fM::Wtk - 3 - f'or one reason or anotlJ.er at any given time strictly private invest:mont 1.s not pre 1Jared to cover or is incapable of covering. An equally ::..mportant consequ0nce of the Bank's rolio..nM on ti1e private investmont rr:.ar!rnt is that tho Bank has not, and canno"c. speedily acquire, hugo sums to lend for rocon.:1truction and development plU'!)OSos. Ue hav-3 thus far sold (;250, 000, 000 of our bonds, and I hop0 that in ch.1.0 coFrse, as moro inve s,- tors co}:;lo to understand the nature of our orr;anizati:m and to have confiC::ence in its o~::i01cations, we 1.vill be able to borrow very sizeable additional s:,1.ms. Bu:t tho process will, at bcist, bo a gradual one. There was a poriod, I believe, when it was tho common concept that tho Bank was created to f'inance at one ti:rrre tho accumulated Five Yoar Plans of th3 worlc. Hot only is this not ths:J truo concopt of tho 3ank, it is a conco1 Jt which is utterly incapable o:i.' fulfilLnont by any single institution, international bank or othorwiso. What tho Bank is is somotM.n[1,' much mora EJff'ectivo, much more realistic and in the long rlm mu'.::h moro dosirablo - a cont;Lnuous international banking facility tied into t:bo f1::iw of privD.te capital available to &11 for modorato but economically strategic ':')rojocts wiwre foroi;;:n cxchango is nocdod to supplement tho onorgios and re;sourccs of the locaEty whoro tho project is located. Tho E2nk, it is tr .10, does not E;tFJ.;ct out with ull thf) monoy nvo.ilable 1 to it which prosr:raably tho E,.1.ropoan Reccvor:r Prograr;: will bo in a position to distribi:to but in a very tr1..1.:.i sens,., it has 2:r3utcr p,:,tontia.ln than the l:arsr:.all Plan for it is tho b:::-idge b0tween gov Jrl'lr:1ont 18nding and the roinsti tution of private capital invostmcnt. I vonturo to say tl at no amount of go'mr:ri...mont lending or .~;ovcrrunont 0 grants can fo:l'.' a su.stainod period of timo sorve the noocls of tho world and it is only by tho reinvigoration of p1'iv3.tc trade :1.11d crodi t that sustained recovery and devoJ,.opmont can bo maintained thronghout tho w0rld. Business and trade, tho lifo of nntions; can only be Sl,stninod by a floxiblo and continuous system of credits and not by a sGrios of govu.·m11c.:nt benefits dependent upon invol-lled and intermi ttont parliar:1entary procockros. It is this reliance upon tho prisrato investor which tnon is not only the limitation of tho Bank's activitios, it is also on0 o::: its groat eloDe:'lts of strength. Anothot' :_J:ri.nciplo of tho Bank wherein its strength as well as tho hope of future economic stability lias is that of constant inspoction and aRJraisal of the use of tho proc~ods of its loans. I am not a banker by r,rof,iSSion and perhaps it is natural being new in th::, field that I should fool as I do a.bout tho need for much greater j_n:f"ornation in this :matter of international aid. It is only relatively recently that people generally have become awar.o of the all illlportant ma.ttor of tho trc.nefor problom in the fi.:;ld of into:rnatior..al lendi:ng. Too many foreign loans in the pa:;;t have left behind a sad train of ill feeling on the pa!'i of both the lender and the r9ceivor, and much of the good effect of international aid has been dissipated by reason of this fact. If tho proceeds of loans can be traced to the projoct.s and an ap:Jraisal made of tho productivity of tho projects and tho pnrt ·they play :i.n tho re- construction and development of a country the Bank and ~orhaps othorsrnay be able to take advantage of this experience in future finai11cing. !_ - - - - - - - - ~ = = = = = = = = - = = . _ . . ............................iiiiiii_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -4- • There are othor procedures of the Bank which I hope will prove affective but perhaps the Bank itself represents tho greatest experiment of all. Hore we have 46 nations joined together, each contributing to the Bank's capital and r-eproscntod by a relatively small board of directors. We have e.n international staff consj_sting of many n.:1:bionalit:tos all of whom I boliovc aro objoctiYcly dotorrni.nod to maintain an effectively fun~tioning international banking faciJ..ity. Tho directors arc all rcprcsentativos of their various countries but whereas they owe d .1ti0s to their respective countries they also have tho responsibil:L ty 1 direct to the Bank :md tho other members of the Bank for tho soundness of its loans and, its successful operations. The staff, on .the other hand, aro not re,rooentativcs of countries from which they come and they owe their undivided allogianc0 to tho Bank. The wholo constitutes an objective group to deal with th.:i various probloms of inter11ational financing which come before them. They are trained men, kr.owledgoablc in the affairs of tho world as well as in economics and tt0y know tho succr:iss of their institution is depc.:mdent upon the reca.rd in which it is hold thro1..1[ghout thJ world by its borrowers, tho suppliers of ito capital, and the general public. As an opera.ting organization it docs not tr:Ji:o on tho as;::,:;0ts of a parlia:mont or an c.sr30mbly of nations. It will, of cours '• be subj(;ctoc1 to strains and pulls of intoror:1t such as all other organi.... zatio11s, not e.lono international ones, undergo but. I hop~ that wh(:m a little more time pa.ssos a.nd tho Bank gets more and g:;.~oater roots down it will serve not only as an example of a sound financial institution but as o.n oxaDplo of how !lk1.ny differon-l:. nntionalitios can effectively operate togothor in the solution • of day to day pro blm,1s • I should lik0 to taJ.k to you at groatnr l01'"5i.ih about tho BanJ,: 1 its capital structure, lending potentials, its policies and the rathor extra... ordinary security bc11.ind its own obligat:i.ons. I wish r:iorcly at this time to add that tho Bari.Jc docs not, e.s some think, lcmd exclusively to govcrr.!Ill.onts or their agencies. It can and will lond to private l"loncorns. Horcovor, it can guarantee; thG lo:ins cf others as well as undcrVjTi te or othoriviso :?articipatc in loans wh:i.ch may be made by private capi ta.1. Its 11.rticlos do require, however, that tho govornmont of' tho country in wh.i..ch any :::ircject to bo financed is located, guara.ntoo tho pa;ymont of tho principal and intorost of tr..c loan. With- out this requirement in today 1 s controlled foreign exchange situation tho Bank would not bo able to land effectively. I was told that in spi-':.o of 11ry connection w:i.th an international agency or, perhaps oven because of lt, I should -comment upon the Unitod States E1..1ropean Recovery Program. Tho1,,1,gh I am a ci tizon of tho Uni tod States I am also an -Official of an international a~cncy and i:;omotimos I find it a trifle difficult to di.stinguish nicely botwoor: Up two positions. Thero were hit.;h ho1Jos c1t B1•otton Woods that tho Bank would bo ablo to take c::i.ro of all thiJ world I s post-1.;nr noods. It rri.;:,idly bocar:,o apparent, however, that tho w:i.do ga:)S which uore developing in tho b,2,lanco of paym.3nts of Gho groat European nations coul.d not bu f.'inancod by any kmk cons ti tutod e.s was tho Infor- national Bank or indo0d, by any bank "'tall. The result was tho concept of the European Recovcr-J Program. I have on othor occasions cx:Jrossod rcy viow,s with respect to tho need for, anc! feasibility of, tho European Rocovory Program. It docs not conflict • - 5 - with the Bank and its objectives - of course, it greatly aidD them- In brief, I believe that that progrrun, if carried through wi tt boldness, imaginc.tion and vigor by both tho participating cou....'ltrios and by the United Sto.tcs, can 100.d to a successful rcorgarrl.zation of the economics of Western Europe. The part- ii::ipating countries, collectively considered, constitute ono of tho two gr0atost productive areas on earth. They have a physical plant at their disposal which com:9ares favorably with over. the productive potential of -i:hc United States. They h.1vo a great mass of 11eoplo with outstanding cultural traditions, tcchnico..l abilitr 1111d political :maturity. Thoy arc possessed of a will to work ha.rd, if need be to endure o.ustori ty over a long :_)Griod o.f timo to achieve recovery. Certainly, tho astounding progress mE1.de by Wostorn Europe since tho end of tho war, dcspi-te the vast destruction, the .fup.damontnl diaruption of trade, the loss of foreign invostments and shipping, and tho ciovastating effects of tho woathcr, evidence this will to rocovcir. The fact that aid from Canada and tho United States and. othel' countries contributed to this result is only evidence of tho officac~ of such aid in the EJtimulation of people I s recuporativo powers. Tho main reason, in short, to support an aid program for Euro,e lios not in Europe 1 <3 weakness but in hor inherent strongth, Tho human assets and pror" .::tivo capacity of Europe arc, however, not • alone enough. A successful reorgo.nization of tho Western European economy requires some new money; it requires, oven mo;re, whol0-hco.rtod cooporo..tion by the recipient nations in taking thoso far-rGaching measures of 0conomic 1mific- ation and reform which o..r0 almost. u:nivcrs:1lly acc;opted a.s csscntial to recovery. Th0se measures include fin::mcio.l and monetary stf.Lbilizution, a.nti-:i.nflationary measures, Glimination of inefficient businGss and lo.bor practices, roduction of trade barriers and many others. Not all of t:1ese somc,·..rhat limi tcd r0forms can be put into effect overnight; r;,.any of th~m in fact can be achieved only as a result of gradual dovelopmont. Thcy will be difficult of accorr.p1ishmont, but if the proposed roorgo.nization of Europe is to succeed, I believe it is essential that real progress b0 rri.ade in those directions. The European Rccov0ry Program gives tho participating countries a grco.t opportunity to ~ovo, ~y collective action at leaGt toward a bettor intogration of their economies and toward a bettor realization of tho collective strongth of those economies. Tho initiative and cooperation which Europe shows in this rcs~ect as well as in hor ability to restore a trade balance with the dollar areas, will determine tho cfq.cacy of American aio.. The Uni tod States can holp to ma.kc the hard we.y easier, but ;Ln tho ond by fc.r tho greater load must inevitably be assumed and borne by Europe itself. The overriding importance of the Recovery Program to Europe must not be allowed to obscure the almost ~qunlly great i:r.:portance of tho program to tho countries of tho HostGrn Homisphoro. Tr,o benefits which t:i:c nations of tho New World will derive from o.. Euro,o restored to economic health o.ro corta.inly not less thn.11 tl:oso which the r0st of tho world wi.11 rcooivo. In both tho case • of Canada.. and the Latin American co,.mtrics thrJre ex:i.st continuing dor.1estic economies but in both there is a cor·t.ain triangulo. tion (.If their foroign trt;.1.dc without which their ontiro economics would be seriously prejudiced. For years Canada bus bought more from the United Ste.tos than she h::i.s sold to the United l - 6 - States, but she has sold more to Europe than sho he.s bow;ht from Europe. Formerly Canada could roly on the ability to convert her Europoan curroncios, mainly sterling, into dollars and thu:::; hor accounts wore roughly bala:r..cod. In tho Ccc,30 of Latin Amor:i.ca, or ~.t least in several of the large 0x;;,9rt.i11g countries of Latin A.rnori.ca, tho situation wo.s the so.n!o. Grain, cattle anc1. oth.:ir fo.::id.stu.ffs could not bo sold to tho uni tod States but ccrtc~in otJ:wr raw r:;at-,r.t~..ls ai1d finishod products could bo. ~Tnat those countries could not export to the Un.1.tod States they in large po.rt could dispose of in Euro,)o or in non-dollar areas. ~'le m2y talk about tho rocste.blishmcnt of now routes of tro.de, and new routes of trade do devolo9 over t;1e years and over the ccmturios, but they take time to dovolop. And tho actuali tj,es and potentials of Et1.ropoan produ.ct:i.on etr.d consumption :J.re fo.r too v::ist to think of being ablo to igmlre them today in any oovolvpmont of iI0storn Hemisphere economy. The restoration of tho E1.1rop00.n IP.arbt and tho r.Jstoration of the European proclucor is therefore probably the most important single boon that tho Uni tf.1d Sto.tes can furnish to oth0r 11estqrn HGrriisphoro countries today.. A more immodio.to r,:suJ:t of such aid would be the amount of so-called off-shore purc]:•:3.sos which tho f1.ocovory :?J.nn would nhkc possible in tho Hestern H0r:1isphcrc. Somo :::,2.6 billion, I am informed, is roughly estimated to be tho figure for the f5.rst fiftcon months, of uhich ~~1.8 billion is estimated to rco.ch Latin America. It is truo, of cour3~, tho.t all of this will not bo dirJtributod ovonly through0ut all La.tin American countries but without it - some of t~10 nost impc:;:,tant econo:mios of the .::troa would bo most soriously handi- ' ' capped. I-Ioreovor, it should afford to cr.rtnin Latin American countries at loo.st tho m1;3,:ms by whicl1 capital can bo formed to assist in tho dovolopmont of.' other neighboring countries. Even in the co.se of tho loans me.de th1.1s f nr by tho In'f+)rnc~ tiono.l Ba.nk, it is possible to ·Grace the direct b,:mofi ts which tho cauutrios of this horni- sphoro outside the Uni tad .Sta tos dori vo from fi ~:io.ncfo.l a.ssist2.nco to Europa. The Bank has thus fc.r maclo four loans, aggregating (~/,..97 million, to .Franco, r:.-,lland, Donmn.rk n.nd Luxembourg. As of F'obruary 1, about ::J40 million had boon disbi.;:-:-sed against thoBo loans. Of this amount, roughly ·:)~2 m:i.1,lion was expended by tho borrowing countries in Latin .Amorico. and nbout ~;;12 million in Canada, Th0so figuros rc::9resont only' tho cx:.)endi turos wo ho..vo thus far tro.ood and as time goes on it is bound to increase. By pointing out the advantages o.orived by Lo.tin America from financial assi.stancc t,, Europ(, I do not want tG be understood as :i.n any way d:Lepa.raging either the noed for or tho desirability of r.i.dditional international investment of capital directly in Latin America, To the contrary, I 'ooliovo that further development of tho productive :ootontia.1 of Latin America, with its v:13t rosourees, constitutes one of the great opportunities for rcaliit:ition of a sou...'1d world economy. Now lot mo so1md a note of warning, Do not, I bog of you, oJ...1)cct too much of tho Europoan Recovory Progrnra. Its scopo is so large ri.r1d its ad.Tinis- · tration so fraught ui th diffic1,.1.ltios that t,horG lCO bow1d· to bo crudi tics, misundorstai--idin~s and no doubt some rather weird rosul ts, No ono mnn or group of men combines all tho wisdom, pationco, fir:mn~ss, oncr~.r, a.ncl. tact to co:r..duct -7- • such a program with both full efficiency a.r.d full approbation. There will be fleriou.s l!'.istaJrns r'!ade I fca.:i:· on the sirlo of tl:e United States and equally serious ones made on tho Europea::.1. s:!.de. Operations will be comluctod e:;,:1::i.rontly under a propaganda barrn.ge designed constantly to disparage the :i.:-rograr: and exy.,loit any xris+..akes. iion of bi~hest calibre on both sides of the water must be selectccl to administer th0 pro:;ram and even. then the best that we can hope for is that m:i3te.:rns bo kept to a miniJJILun. It is a most difficult thing oven far individue..ls to give or acco)t aid on a large scale decorously and w:iso1y. It doos not require m1.rnh imag:~nation to sec the ;">i tfr.lls that can :,)lagne tl·"is e:z:tro.- ordinc.ry attempt on th:i :?art ,'Jf the United dtatos to aid other natj_ons. In spite of tho irritations, blasted hopes nnd inevitablo difficulties which will ensue it s'.:101.;.ld alwa?s be kept in mind that thcro is no cotnpt:ro.ble histo::ical ~Jrocodo11t of a grao.t !)Owor attemptin:;; to p!'otoct its int.or..:isto by helping ot;10rs (a.mcng whom arc soI'ile of its nest !JOWcrful com~JotH:,ors) on such a scale to hecomo strong and indo~xmclont. Histo17 hc~s many oxar??los of just tho r0vorso. As ono uho has had an O),Y)ortuni ty to obsorvo sor,1ow:1at closely the r.:i.ttor lone record of Ar.lorican aid in tho form of such outst,.u,.diY'.g measP.ros e.s Lend Loe.so, tto UN?IHA contri- butions, tho support, of tho Brotton Woods institutir)l1s, end sir.u.lar American cxprGssions of SU!)port to kss fo:..·tunatoly r:d.tuc.ted poo:plus I say that all who int0rpret this now form of aid in t.::r:;,;;.s cf e. selfish materi.al intcrust, search for nGw mnrl~ot::i, ,J.nd simib.r si.nist0r dnsigns ma}::G a grc.vc mistake. The solid supp?rt for o.11 such ~,rograms has not C(')mo f'rcr.1 those who arc so disposed. It ha{'; come from a ;_Jcrfcctly amnz:Lne; core of hmnc..ni t,aricm instincts in tho men and women of the Uni tod States who consh;toi:tly and geno:i.~ously respond to the c..ppoals • of those in need of help. Tho fri:r..g0s of sue\ m.i.:pport can be appoaJ.od to on tho basis of selfish motives but the body '.)f tho sup,y:rt co:mos from tl:is olomont of public opinion to which I refer. This may becm:io the r.1ore difficult to boliovc when the Con§;rJssiono.l debates get under way but it will nonetholcs1;, ror,1a.in true. There is :inothor note of war1d.ng I bolievs should be roglstor0d. It must be kept in mind that the Euro_?oan Roceivery Program will at best only result in a ;,)artial, not a full, recovery. It will nqt bri11g c.bout :i.n any near £'ut,1:,1re a European union in any wa.y con.parable to the 1.;nion of the .States of t!1e Uni tod States or tho Provinces of Canada, and we should not e::q)cct. or evon hopo that it will. The succe~s of the program should not ho judged by whothor or not such a union is achieved. Tho main ob,joctive of the Rccovory Pl ogram is to help 1 Europe balance its e.cc:ounts with .the- o.roas that sup~.:ily it with its food and raw materials. In doing this there i$ ~roat need for coop0ra.tic•n a:nd collo.lioro.tion botwoan thorrn who detormino tho fundo.ncntal economic policies cf their rcs:,Gctivo conntrios - common consideration of tho problons of oxcl:ango, of inn.o.tion nnC tho availa.bili ty ')f intra.. Europoan roc.:iurco:1 and production facilitivs, a tomporing of nationnl ri·m.lric3 and selfish interests. Those stc~xi wo can hope for o.nd ovon require. Thoy mny t:roll loo.cl. in th0 futvro to somotbing r;1oro ccmcrGtc and something more ,significant pol:: ticalJ.y, but lot 1..ts not confuse our objoct:J.vos. Tho first objocc.ivo is tho roc,wo1•y ,f Eurr.i~')o, )'.lot its JX;litioo.l inkJro.tic,n, 3.nd it is tho extent to which tho .firBt obj )ctivo is brcugh+, ab0ut tho.t uhould moc.s11re tho success of tho plan of Secretary l:o.r::ihall • • Lot no and as I bog::in. Stressing tho no,3ds of Europo o.nd tho stinmla.tion of balanced trade between tho nations, in Canada, o.nd purticulo.rly in this groat Atlantic port, is ccLrrying coals to Newcastle. Your record speaks for its0lf. I have only g:i.von you plo.titudos Jou alroaci.y fully c0mprohond,