57739 WO R K IN G PAP E R N O .40 Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i Martin Rama Martin Rama Based on conversations Da trên các cuc nói chuyn vi C with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit Th tng Vơ Vn Kit with Professor ng Phong cùng vi Giáo s ng Phong và and oàn Hng Quang oàn Hng Quang Bilingual/Song ng WORKING PAPER NO. 40 Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i Martin Rama Martin Rama Based on conversations Da trên các cuc nói chuyn vi C with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit Th tng Vơ Vn Kit with Professor ng Phong cùng vi Giáo s ng Phong và and oàn Hng Quang oàn Hng Quang Bilingual/Song ng © 2008 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank On behalf of the Commission on Growth and Development 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 2024731000 Internet: www.worldbank.org www.growthcommission.org Email: info@worldbank.org contactinfo@growthcommission.org All rights reserved 1 2 3 4 5 11 10 09 08 This working paper is a product of the Commission on Growth and Development, which is sponsored by the following organizations: Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) U.K. Department of International Development (DFID) The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation The World Bank Group The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsoring organizations or the governments they represent. The sponsoring organizations do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the sponsoring organizations concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. All queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 2025222422; email: pubrights@worldbank.org. Cover design: Naylor Design About the Series The Commission on Growth and Development led by Nobel Laureate Mike Spence was established in April 2006 as a response to two insights. First, poverty cannot be reduced in isolation from economic growth--an observation that has been overlooked in the thinking and strategies of many practitioners. Second, there is growing awareness that knowledge about economic growth is much less definitive than commonly thought. Consequently, the Commission's mandate is to "take stock of the state of theoretical and empirical knowledge on economic growth with a view to drawing implications for policy for the current and next generation of policy makers." To help explore the state of knowledge, the Commission invited leading academics and policy makers from developing and industrialized countries to explore and discuss economic issues it thought relevant for growth and development, including controversial ideas. Thematic papers assessed knowledge and highlighted ongoing debates in areas such as monetary and fiscal policies, climate change, and equity and growth. Additionally, 25 country case studies were commissioned to explore the dynamics of growth and change in the context of specific countries. Working papers in this series were presented and reviewed at Commission workshops, which were held in 2007­08 in Washington, D.C., New York City, and New Haven, Connecticut. Each paper benefited from comments by workshop participants, including academics, policy makers, development practitioners, representatives of bilateral and multilateral institutions, and Commission members. The working papers, and all thematic papers and case studies written as contributions to the work of the Commission, were made possible by support from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the U.K. Department of International Development (DFID), the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the World Bank Group. The working paper series was produced under the general guidance of Mike Spence and Danny Leipziger, Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, and the Commission's Secretariat, which is based in the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network of the World Bank. Papers in this series represent the independent view of the authors. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition iii Acknowledgments This paper was prepared for the highlevel Commission on Growth and Development ("Spence Commission"). The views and interpretations in it are exclusively those of the author and not those of the World Bank. As an input for this paper, Professor ng Phong also prepared a background study on "Fence Breaking: the Eve of Doi Moi in Vietnam." Comments and suggestions by David Dollar, Homi Kharas, Klaus Rohland, Carolyn Turk, and Brian Van Arkadie are gratefully acknowledged. Interpretation and secretarial assistance were provided by Trn Th Ngc Dung, Lê Minh Phng, Nguyn Th Minh Hoà and Lê Bích Vân. iv Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang Abstract After decades of war, with a dilapidated infrastructure and millions of people dead, wounded or displaced, Vietnam could have been considered a hopeless case in economic development. Yet, it is now about to enter the ranks of middle income countries. The obvious question is: how did this happen? This paper goes one step further, asking not which policies were adopted, but rather why they were adopted. This question is all the more intriguing because the process did not involve one group of individuals displacing another within the structure of power. To answer this question, the paper relies on the insights of those who were actually involved in the economic experiments, conceptual discussions, and political maneuvering that led to the adoption of key reforms. Especially, it builds on a series of long and regular conversations with H. E. the late Vơ Vn Kit, one of Vietnam's leading figures. In doing so, it brings into the open the inside story of Doi Moi, a process that is not known by outsiders and remains opaque to most Vietnamese. The relevance of this exercise is not merely historical. Understanding how reforms were engineered may yield valuable lessons for other developing countries. It is also relevant for Vietnam, as two decades of rapid economic growth have resulted in dramatic changes in its economy and society. While praising the decisionmaking processes that allowed Vietnam to successfully emerge from poverty, the paper also explores the adjustments that could be needed for it to become an industrial country. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition v Contents About the Series ............................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgments ..........................................................................................................iv Introduction: Understanding DecisionMaking Processes ........................................9 A Decade in Search of Solutions ..................................................................................13 Two Decades of Comprehensive Reform ...................................................................19 Dubious Explanations of the Drive for Reform .........................................................23 Limited Confrontation and Few Losers......................................................................28 Processing and Accepting New Ideas .........................................................................32 Emerging Challenges and Risks ..................................................................................39 Which Role for the International Community? .........................................................42 Conclusion: Sustaining Reform in the Next Decade .................................................45 Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i.....................51 Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition vii Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition Martin Rama Based on conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang1 It is hard to say who the overall architect of the renovation process was because in reality there was no overall plan drawn up from the beginning to guide the process. Vietnam's transition path is such that only by traveling does the road become clear (Professor ng Phong, June 2007) Introduction: Understanding DecisionMaking Processes Vietnam is arguably one of the most successful cases in economic development in recent times. Yet, not so long ago it would have been considered a hopeless case. Decades of war had left a dilapidated infrastructure and millions of people dead, wounded or displaced. Central planning in the North and a massive foreign military presence in the South had resulted in two dysfunctional and disconnected economies. By the early 1990s, when the first somewhat reliable statistics could be compiled, income per capita was among the lowest in the world. Less than 20 years later, Vietnam is about to enter the ranks of middle income countries, and the prospect of it becoming an industrial country within a generation is not unrealistic. Over these two decades, Vietnam avoided the collapse in economic activity experienced by countries in the former Soviet Union, the plunge in government revenue suffered by China in the early stages of its transition, and the economic crisis that affected the East Asia region in the late 1990s. This strong performance has been accompanied by one of the fastest reductions in poverty ever documented. Recent macroeconomic turbulence may cast a shadow on Vietnam's accomplishments, but the turbulence is mainly the result of the 1 Martín Rama is Lead Economist for the World Bank in Vietnam (mrama@worldbank.org). H. E. Vơ Vn Kit was Prime Minister of Vietnam from 1991 to 1997. Formerly, he was acting Prime Minister (1988­90), Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Planning Commission (1982­ 86), Secretary of the Party of Ho Chi Minh City (1975­1982), and Secretary of the Communist Party in SaigonGia Dinh during the American War. H. E. Vơ Vn Kit died on June 11, 2008. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 9 unprecedented volume of capital inflows Vietnam is attracting. For sure those massive inflows show that the country is entering into a new era, facing government with new challenges. But it would be wrong to see them as the end of a success story, because they are part of it. China's growth record is usually considered to be stronger. However, since the early 1990s, exports have grown faster in Vietnam. Based on internationally comparable figures, poverty rates fell at a similar pace, if not faster too. But inequality has remained relatively stable in Vietnam, whereas it increased considerably in China. The obvious question is: how did it all happen? At a superficial level, the answer to this question is available. There are numerous studies documenting the policy reforms undertaken by Vietnam since the beginning of Doi Moi, its renovation process. There might be some remaining disagreements as to how those reforms related to observed development outcomes. For instance, some may consider that delaying privatization, as Vietnam did, resulted in slower economic growth and the buildup of contingent liabilities for the government, whereas others may argue that it prevented a collapse in economic activity and the emergence of a group of "oligarchs." But the sequence of decisions made, including the reluctance to privatize massively in the early stages of transition, is relatively uncontroversial. At a deeper level the main issue is not which policies were adopted, but rather how come they were adopted? And how come the direction of reform could be sustained for two entire decades? Shortly after reunification, the 4th Party Congress reflected a strong consensus on the planned economy model, whose superiority seemed obvious after the military defeat of much stronger, "capitalist" powers. By then, the possibility of keeping the economic model of South Vietnam on a temporary basis, raised by respected Party leaders, was not seriously entertained. Thirty years later, the 10th Congress reflected a similar consensus on the need to rely on market mechanisms wherever possible. The option of going back to a planned economy deserved no consideration. By then, the debate had gradually started shifting towards the need for "democratization," and its appropriate pace and modalities. The real question, then, is: how did Vietnam make the transition from one consensus to another? This question is all the more intriguing because the process did not involve one group of individuals displacing another within the structure of power. Unlike in other transition countries, there were no internal coups, no political purges, no open infighting.... Some of the same leaders who embraced the planned economy model in the 4th Congress were leading Doi Moi by the time of the 6th. Equally striking, the reform process did not involve heavy outside influences. Vietnamese leaders had learned from the former Soviet Union and from China about the classical socialist model and its implementation. And they were certainly observing subsequent reform experiences in these two countries, 10 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang some times with concern. They were also eagerly learning lessons from successful East Asian countries. But the renovation process of Vietnam was not an outright imitation or import of any prepackaged economic model. The international financial institutions only became active in the early 1990s. And Vietnam was always careful to avoid aid dependency, so as to retain control over its economic policies. Answers to this deeper question are not readily available. There are patchy accounts and abundant speculation as to the process through which key economic decisions came to be made. But it will be argued below that those interpretations tend to be quite removed from reality. A solid answer requires the insights of those who were actually involved in the economic experiments, conceptual discussions and political maneuvering that led to the adoption of key reforms. Such is the approach adopted in this paper, which builds on a series of long and regular conversations with H. E. the late Vơ Vn Kit. Those conversations, held in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi during most of 2007 and early 2008, were a unique privilege from a personal point of view. The generosity of Mr. Vơ Vn Kit in sharing his time and insights also made those conversations an unusually rich source of information about the decisionmaking processes of Vietnam. More broadly, this paper can be seen as the outcome of a dialogue between an informed outsider and a leading insider, with critical historical and economic inputs from colleagues on both sides. From a methodological perspective, the paper is in the spirit of policy history, more than economic analysis. Policy history is the investigation of the sources of unfolding policy developments, often requiring attention to processes that play out over considerable periods of time. It assumes that the shaping of public policy is more than a matter of change at a particular moment, to be captured through a snapshot. Key decisions are framed by prior events and processes. This time dimension implies that policy history may yield valuable insights on contemporary issues as well. As with all historic accounts, it could be argued that the outcome is somewhat onesided. Not all participants in the process stood a chance to voice their views, and a dose of subjective interpretation was involved. However, the insights offered by this approach probably outweigh its methodological limitations. The inside story of Doi Moi is not known by outsiders and, due to the political context in which reforms took place, the process through which key decisions were made remains opaque to most Vietnamese. Moreover, there are few documents to draw upon, making the personal experience of the key protagonists all the more valuable. The relevance of this exercise is not merely historical. Understanding how consensus was built on difficult economic reforms may yield valuable lessons for other developing countries, in their often frustrated quest for prosperity. Identifying the drivers of change, as well as the obstacles along the way, could Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 11 help others navigate the turbulent waters of policy reform. Such understanding could also be useful to outsiders, especially those in the development community, as they seek to influence policy outcomes and push for further reform, in Vietnam and elsewhere. Understanding how it all happened is also relevant for Vietnam, as it tries to cope with the macroeconomic turbulence created by its own success and strives to join the ranks of industrial nations. While many developing countries have reached middleincome status, very few have managed to go past that stage. Strong economic institutions are required to react to shocks in the short term, and to sustain productivity gains in the long term. Prudent monetary policy and effective financial sector supervision, the organization of efficient markets for infrastructure services, social insurance programs providing the right incentives, sound natural resource management and environmental protection, and a clean and transparent public administration will be needed for Vietnam to keep growing at a rapid pace, minimize the macroeconomic turbulence associated with massive capital inflows, and eventually become a highincome country. Two decades of rapid economic growth have resulted in dramatic changes in the Vietnamese economy and society. Linkages across sectors have become much stronger, especially through finance, so that policy mistakes can entail much higher social costs. Agglomeration effects are increasingly at play, resulting in a remarkable dynamism in the main hubs of the country, but also in a growing inequality between regions and across households. And the relationship between state and society has changed as well, with the explosion in the number and diversity of stakeholders making it more difficult for the government to collect feedback on their issues and concerns. These fundamental economic and social transformations raise new challenges for Vietnam. In the absence of a strong technical capacity to regulate and monitor increasingly complex activities, there is a risk of fundamentally misallocating resources or even wasting them in a shortterm crisis. Growing inequality and displays of conspicuous wealth could generate social resentment, especially if the prevalence of corruption casts doubts on the legitimacy of the new fortunes. Weak mechanisms to gather and process the demands of specific population groups, no matter how narrow, could encourage them to voice their frustration through unauthorized channels, resulting in political turmoil. These risks are hypothetical for now, but they have materialized before in the region, in countries at a development level similar to the one Vietnam is now attaining. It is not clear that the decisionmaking processes that allowed Vietnam to successfully emerge from poverty and become a thriving market economy will be sufficient to develop the strong economic institutions it needs to become an industrial country. While praising such processes, the paper also explores the adjustments that could be needed to take the country to a substantially higher level of development. Knowing how it all happened may thus hold the key to 12 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang building on that success and overcoming the emerging challenges and risks along the way. A Decade in Search of Solutions Understanding the success of Doi Moi requires a historical approach, one that highlights the process of trying, failing, learning and adjusting, in the hope of seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. At the time of reunification, military victory was seen as obvious proof that the economic system of the North was superior. And central planning had indeed been well suited to running the country in times of war. But the reality is that Party leaders had very limited understanding of economics, all absorbed as they were in fighting two consecutive wars. In their eyes, the model of the South was associated with French colonialism first and American aggression later, so that they could only perceive it as evil. But their education was clearly insufficient to manage a country. They possessed weak knowledge about the world and about public administration. And victory had unfortunately reduced their inclination to listen and learn. At that time, Soviet central planning appeared to be a successful model, one that had taken a backward agrarian economy all the way to space conquest in barely four decades. The few technical cadres of Vietnam had been trained mainly in the Soviet block, whose massive economic assistance also masked the deficiencies of central planning. This combination resulted in a series of almost unconditional beliefs, of deeply rooted norms, that should not be challenged. Among them were the rigid principles of state ownership, central planning and Party leadership. Reunification was in many ways a brutal period. An assertive state of mind prevailed among the leadership. This was when the decision was made to change the name of the Party (from Labor to Communist) and even the name of the country (from Democratic to Socialist Republic). This was also the time of massive reeducation programs, a euphemism for sending cadres and officers of the Saigon regime to prison on a massive scale. Reunification was also a time of overconfidence and voluntarism in relation to economic development. And in all honesty, some degree of exuberance among Party leaders was understandable, after having taken a poor rural country to victory against three of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. It is in this upbeat atmosphere that the 4th Party Congress was held. The Congress was unanimous on the need to set a direction for the development of the country as a whole, not for the North and the South separately. In practice, this implied that the people in the South had to adopt the model of the North. Participants in the 4th Party Congress were confident that this was the right Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 13 decision, one that would allow Vietnam to escape from poverty and engage in the way to prosperity. According to the view of the leaders of the time, economic success could not be difficult compared to the hardship of fighting a war. Yet, during the first few months after the liberation of the South, a small group of Party figures regrouped around Mr. Lê Dun saw merit in experimenting with the economic model of the South, at least temporarily, while keeping the socialist model in the North. Mr. Lê Dun, then identified as Mr. 3, was the soul of that period. Born in the central Quang Tri province in 1907, he became one of the first members of the Indochina Communist Party in 1930 and was made its General Secretary in 1960, a position he retained until his death in 1986. During the French war, he was the Party Secretary of the South and enjoyed a high reputation among local cadres and the population at large. In the 1950s, he had expressed reservations about carrying out land reform, northern style. In the same spirit, at the time of reunification he thought that the South could provide a useful pilot for the use of market mechanisms. However, he did not push for this idea and his views were not discussed at the 4th Party Congress. The exuberant mindset of the time had resulted in an almost absolute confidence of the Party and Mr. Lê Dun himself that Vietnam would succeed at whatever it would attempt. Military victory against the mighty United States, while owing to support from other socialist countries, was mainly attributed to an innovative, truly Vietnamese way of fighting the war. Why would not the same hold true in the struggle for economic development? While building on the experience of other socialist countries, the 4th Party Congress was seen as an opportunity to embrace a Vietnamese version of the planned economy model. This version was an attempt to rapidly industrialize agriculture, by bringing mass production to the rural sector thanks to irrigation, fertilizers and tractors. The operation of this model, in turn, required a minimum scale, which districts alone were supposed to provide. The Vietnamese version of the planned economy model thus came to be known as "the district as a fortress." In an almost surprising turn of events, this version was also Mr. Lê Dun's brainchild. One of his most cited statements was "to advance fast, strongly and directly to the socialist mass production, bypassing the stage of capitalist development." The concept of the "district as a fortress" was somewhat influenced by the , or agroindustrial complex, a model first introduced in the former Soviet Union that became popular in smaller socialist countries such as Bulgaria and East Germany. Mr. Lê Dun proposed this concept in light of the determination of the Politburo and the Central Committee to have a single economic model for the entire country. But he was genuinely enthusiastic about what he saw as an innovative approach. The Politburo accepted his views, and the "district as a fortress" approach was adopted by the 4th Party Congress. The planned economy model soon proved to be a blatant failure. Production had been forecasted to double between 1976 and 1980, but in reality it grew more 14 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang slowly than population did. The FiveYear Plan endorsed by the 4th Party Congress, which had been touted as a great leap forward to socialism, skipping the stage of capitalism development, was actually associated with a decline in living standards compared to the already harsh war period. The tension with China only aggravated matters, leading Vietnam to join the Comecon trading block in 1978, a decision it had hesitated to make for two decades. This resulted in much higher prices for imports than before, when domestic prices from the Soviet Union applied to goods shipped to Vietnam. The inadequacy of the planned economy model became more evident in the South, where reunification was associated with a dramatic change in the organization of the economy, than in the North, where no similar transformation was necessary. Cadres from the South were sent to the North to learn about central planning, but the administrative prices they were requested to enforce were totally inadequate. Industry and trade stagnated. Food shortages emerged, pushing Vietnam close to famine in the 1980s. Massive numbers of people flew the country, at the risk of their lives. Those fleeing were not only individuals with close ties with the previous regime, but also people who had contributed to the fight for independence. They all just wanted to leave, as material and spiritual lives had become unbearable. The local population gradually lost trust in the leadership, while the international image of Vietnam was seriously damaged. The feeling that the country was reaching a dead end became widespread. Even in Ho Chi Minh City, amidst a region known as the "rice basket" of Vietnam, where nature is generous and resources plentiful, people did not have enough rice to eat. Making ends meet was extremely difficult for everyone, and local leaders started to realize that the limits of tolerance were being reached. There was also a growing sense of frustration among the leadership itself, as they witnessed the failure to achieve the idealistic aspirations of the 4th Party Congress. The ensuing crisis was then not only economic, but also social and political. The "district as a fortress" was thus an innovative concept, but clearly not a correct one from an economic point of view. Towards the end of his life, in private, Mr. Lê Dun recognized the failure of his brainchild. However, it was not him but rather a set of local leaders who took on changing the course of events. They initially did so through initiatives known as the "fence breaking" experiments. What all those initiatives had in common was their reliance on market mechanisms. The local leaders behind them were desperately seeking approaches that would work, and to understand why they worked. The process required experimentation beyond what was allowed by the rules. Sometimes, dangerously so.... But all these local leaders had one thing in common, and that was to be politically "bullet proof," given their track record during the wars. Most of the "fence breaking" experiments took place in the South. This is not surprising, given that market mechanisms were a fresh memory there, and the Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 15 entrepreneurial spirit was still alive. But in addition, the South had been granted a transitional period for the collectivization of land. The final objective was to establish the same model as in the North, but there was agreement that the transformation would have to be gradual. Distorted agricultural prices undermined the incentives to cultivate and trade, and the prospect of having to get organized in cooperatives and collectives had eroded the farmers' enthusiasm for reunification. But at least the foundations for a supply response were present. "Fence breaking" experiments in agriculture mainly involved allocating land to farmers and directly contracting with them at prices above those set by the plan. This approach had precedents in the North, even before reunification. In 1966, Mr. Kim Ngc, the Party Secretary of northern Vinh Phuc province, had already experimented with it. But in 1968 Mr. Trng Chinh, the chairman of the National Assembly, a member of the Politburo and the chair of the Central Committee on Theory, convened a meeting of all key Party leaders and read a long statement denouncing the Vinh Phuc experiment. Mr. Kim Ngc was severely criticized because of his support for "illegal" contracting and the experiment was terminated. Circumstances were more favorable after reunification, especially in the South, where supply was more responsive. And where direct contracting was used, living conditions improved visibly. What had been treated as a dangerous deviation in the late 1960s started to be seen as innovative "unbundling" one decade later. Examples of "fence breaking" experiments are quite telling. In the late 1970s, villagers in the North were struggling to make ends meet. Many of those in Doan Xa commune had chosen to migrate to the nearby city of Haiphong and become beggars. In 1979, some of those remaining in the commune argued that it was necessary to farm out the land to individual households. The proposition was put to vote and supported by nine to one. But the inhabitants of Doan Xa also agreed not to leave any paper trail of this decision, swearing secrecy and mutual support if the authorities were to discover the "sneak contract." The result was a sixfold increase in crop volume and a dramatic improvement in living standards. News of this development soon reached the Party leadership at the district level, and a team of investigators was sent to the commune. The initial reaction was not to renew the Party membership of the local leaders. But gradually, information about this experiment spread, and Doan Xa became a model for the entire district. By 1980 the Party Secretary of Haiphong, Mr. Bùi Quang To, had not only extended the contracting approach to the entire province: he also vowed to lobby the Party Central Committee so that the approach could be scaled up nationwide. Knowing that Mr. Trng Chinh would be reluctant to endorse farming contracts, he first exposed the "spontaneous" farming out process to Mr. 16 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang Lê Dun, who had the reputation of being practical. Mr. Lê Dun soon visited the province to assess the situation in person; he was enthused by what he saw. Shortly after, Prime Minister Mr. Phm Vn ng visited in turn and expressed sympathy for the difficulties the villagers had faced. By the time the Haiphong leadership could finally expose the situation to Mr. Trng Chinh, who was by then the President of Vietnam, he did not make any comment. This time nobody was disciplined, and by 1981 the Party Secretariat had officially endorsed the contracting approach for the entire country. Flexibility was also introduced in the industrial sector, with production plans gradually broken down into several tiers, known as Plans 1, 2 and 3, with highernumber tiers allowing enterprises a greater independence in making production decisions and selling their products on the market. Radical breakthroughs took place in specific organizations, localities and firms. Informal trading was also allowed, increasingly, in commerce. Meanwhile, in Ho Chi Minh City bold "fence breaking" steps had included buying rice from farmers at the market price, in spite of it being five times higher than the price set by planners in Hanoi. In an eventful breakfast convened in 1979 by Mr. Vơ Vn Kit, Party Secretary for the city at that time, the local bank agreed to provide the necessary funding, and the finance and trade departments committed to complete the administrative formalities. Mme. Ba Thi, the director of the city's food products company, was requested to lead the unit that would purchase rice throughout the Mekong delta. This unit came to be known as "the rice smuggling committee," a nickname that suggests how risky its activities were. Mme. Ba Thi actually expressed her concern of being arrested if she had to travel to Hanoi, to which Mr. Vơ Vn Kit answered that he would make sure that she got food while in prison. Eventually, a sufficient supply of rice was secured for Ho Chi Minh City. Not only did Mme. Ba Thi escape prison: she ended up being awarded the Hero title instead. Even bolder steps were undertaken subsequently. After Vietnam had joined Comecon, in 1978, Ho Chi Minh City faced many bottlenecks in imports. To address them, the local authorities allowed Chinese traders to make contacts in Singapore and Hong Kong, China and to buy products such as tobacco, fabric and gasoline, and to buy agricultural and fishery products in Vietnam to pay for the imports. To evade control by the centrally managed customs authority, goods were traded at "sea mark number zero," with no transaction recorded. After a few successful deals of this sort, the People's Committee of the City authorized lower levels of government to establish companies with names beginning or ending in "imex," to directly handle foreign trade. Soon, some of them were booming. Cholimex had eight factories, one of them assembling electronic products. Others had cold storage facilities to preserve their export items. The activities of the "imexes" gradually expanded to other regions, including Northern provinces. Before Doi Moi, exports by these "imexes" Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 17 already exceeded the centrally controlled exports of Vietnam to market economies by a factor of ten. Having the Party leadership tolerate, then embrace and finally scale up the "fence breaking" experiments required a careful strategy by the local leaders who had initiated them. Such a strategy was inspired by the warfare theory developed by Mr. Lê Dun to fight the American army and its Southern ally. Its main thrust was to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy, given its overwhelming power, and instead to gradually undermine its determination. In his own words, the goal was "not to defeat the Americans but to defeat the invading spirit of America." This was to be accomplished by choosing isolated units as targets, dealing with them one at a time, sapping the morale of the enemy, and eventually winning by attrition. During the war, this approach had gained much praise in Vietnam, proving that sophistication was more important than strength. The group of local leaders adopting this approach to foster economic reform included Mr. Vơ Vn Kit as one of its most respected figures, but also several Party Secretaries at the provincial level and many directors of stateowned enterprises. In trying to promote change on a broader scale, they did not want to subvert Party hierarchies. They respected the country leadership and did not aim to uproot it; instead, they wanted it to change its mind and come to a new consensus. But they knew that this would not be easy, as "fence breaking" experiments were initially seen with suspicion by senior leaders. For instance, upon arrival to Ho Chi Minh City airport the Minister of Foreign Trade at that time, Mr. Lê Khc, commented that he could detect the smell of Yugoslavia in the air. And that sounded more as like threat than a compliment. At the time, the Politburo had about ten members, but in reality a few of them concentrated most of the decisionmaking power. This narrower group included the Secretary General, the President, the Prime Minister and the head of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee. Having an open discussion of the "fence breaking" experiments with the Politburo in its entirety would have been selfdefeating, as even the reformminded would not have dared to challenge the collective on a taboolike issue. Instead, the fence breakers identified the mechanisms at work in each of the experiments and targeted the key Politburo members who would be more interested in learning about them. Those members were approached on an individual basis, and invited to see first hand the experiment selected for demonstration purposes. Even then, senior leaders would not be presented with full information about the experiments, but only with their more positive aspects, highlighting the difficulty being addressed, and the way in which "fence breaking" helped overcome such difficulty. Often, local leaders had to pose as emergency fire fighters, as opposed to determined innovators. A systematic effort was also made to avoid any discussion of the "sacred principles" endorsed by the 4th Party Congress. Key Politburo members were instead exposed, one at a time, to 18 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang functioning enterprises, to improved living standards, and to local populations supportive of the Party. Avoiding confrontation is actually one of the main principles of the Party in Vietnam. To abide by this principle, cross referencing was chosen as part of the strategy; for instance, by mentioning to the targeted senior leader that some other key member had witnessed another, similar experiment, and had expressed support. Local leaders were repeatedly asking for permission to travel to Hanoi, to expose what they had accomplished and request the authorization to pilot new initiatives, in the spirit of those already acknowledged as successful. By the time the support of the four key Politburo members had been secured, largerscale economic reform was at hand, without having to resort to wasteful fights, purges or internal coups. Among insiders, the exciting years during which consensus was built in favor of the "fence breaking" experiments came to be known as "the beautiful period." And the series of episodes leading to the new consensus was seen as captivating at every turn, like the road from Phan Rang to Dalat. In the end, innovative local leaders who could have been whistled out were entrusted to hold the whistle, and to build upon their "fence breaking" experiments. They were invited to Hanoi, not to be thrown into jail, but to take upon bigger responsibilities. This is how Mr. Vơ Vn Kit became the chairman of the State Planning Commission first, then Deputy Prime Minister, and finally Prime Minister. Mr. Bùi Quang To, the Party Secretary of Haiphong who had scaled up direct contracting, was promoted to Head of the Central Committee on Inspection, in Hanoi. The Chairman of Haiphong, Mr. oàn Duy Thành, became Minister of Trade and subsequently Deputy Prime Minister. And Mr. Nguyn Vn Chính, the Party Secretary of southern Long An province, who had adopted a highprice contracting policy, was promoted to Minister of Food, then to Deputy Prime Minister. By then, economic difficulties and the blatant failure of the planned economy model had made the norms embraced by the 4th Party Congress much less sacred. The time for change had finally come. Two Decades of Comprehensive Reform Largescale economic renovation, Doi Moi, was embraced by the 6th Party Congress, which was held in 1986, only months after Mr. Lê Dun's death from a prolonged illness. By then, the prevailing mindset had changed, and an agreement could be reached on the urgency of renovation. The agreement included the need for the Party to provide a critical assessment of what had been accomplished in terms of economic development, accepting responsibility for the failures, and proposing remedial action. This decision was a breakthrough of historical significance. It marked at turning point, from decline to recovery. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 19 Above all, it represented the beginning of a change in the main economic mechanism, from plan to market. The 6th Party Congress represented a remarkable success in terms of consensus building. Discussions were not always smooth, and participants needed to be reminded, time and again, of the value of reconciling differences. Those who wanted to move fast had to agree to slow down. Those who preferred a slower pace were asked to speed up. The end result was a middle course, restraining the fast movers and speeding up the slow ones. The compromise was to see Doi Moi as a process, whose momentum was to be built up over time in light of experience. One clear illustration of the tensions at play concerns international relations. One group wanted to improve ties with all countries, including former enemies. Another favored a more cautious approach, still sticking to alignment with the socialist block, out of fear of weakening Vietnam's position and eventually making it fall. The compromise here was to make friends with all countries, but not to change colors. The stated goal was global integration, not ideological dissolution. Slogans were introduced by the Party to remind its members of Vietnam's decision to embrace socialism and to call for awareness of any signs of misdirection or disorientation. The general agreement, for quick and slow movers alike, was to always work within the framework of the Party resolutions. Having to move within clearly delimited boundaries had both advantages and disadvantages. But in retrospect, when comparing resolutions over time, all the way to that of the 10th Party Congress, it is clear that this agreement allowed sustained economic reform. The 6th Party Congress also embodied a shift in leadership mechanisms, from individual to collective. Strong personal leadership is not uncommon in East Asian countries, socialist or not. Mr. Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore and Mr. Park Chung Hi in the Republic of Korea are obvious examples of this. In Vietnam, individual leadership played a very important role during the war effort. Mr. H Chí Minh, in particular, had enormous prestige among the population. Subsequently, from the late 1960s until his final illness, Mr. Lê Dun became the dominant figure in Vietnamese politics. His credibility derived from his contribution to the victory over the American army and the liberation of the South. But the example of the district as a fortress approach also showed that strong individual leadership could result in incorrect economic choices. Centralized decision making was thus replaced by strong leadership but without individual leaders. There was a move towards balancing the weight of different regions (North, Center and South) in the overall distribution of senior positions. Accumulation of multiple positions by the same person was not allowed. Retirement rules were strictly enforced, even if this could result in losing highly qualified individuals. Promotions within the Party structure often involved testing an individual's ability to operate and deliver in a province he or 20 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang she was not originally from. And decisions could not be reached without previous consultation and debate, initially within the Party, increasingly reaching out beyond its boundaries. From then on, it became very difficult to single out a decision maker. In lieu of an individual, there was a team whose members were waiting for each other. In the absence of a prestigious leader providing a sense of direction, the collective was the decisionmaking body. This made it more important to thoroughly discuss the issues. The collective thus became a way to mobilize intellectual resources, both from inside and outside the Party. And a consistent effort went into avoiding the division of the Party into factions, waiting for each other, and favoring solidarity over division. An illustration of this new approach was the process followed to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Politburo delegated the decision on whether to become a member of ASEAN to a standing committee. But viewpoints within this committee were very different, and the debate became so heated that in the end a vote was needed to break the deadlock. Three members of the committee favored joining ASEAN, whereas one adamantly opposed. But once the votes were cast, the Party enforced discipline, and went ahead with the choice of the majority. This kind of discipline ensured the continuity of Doi Moi as a process. The first, critical step in this process was to change the mechanism to set the price of rice. Initial moves in this direction had happened in the context of the "fence breaking" experiments, starting in 1979. But those experiments had been geographically scattered. Across most of the country, the subsidy mechanism remained in place, resulting in the supply of rice being insufficient and an inefficiently allocated. The story of this first step is revealing of the way decisions were made by the collective. It was argued that an instruction by the Prime Minister, liberating the market, would lead to selfregulation, akin to a magic wand. Initially, this proposal was met with resistance for fear that reliance on market mechanisms would amount to abandoning socialism. It was noted, however, that the market predated capitalism, so that it could not be deemed a capitalist invention: it was rather an ingenious invention of mankind. This way of reconciling a practical goal with broader principles was far removed from anything a Western advisor could have said in favor of market mechanisms. But in Vietnam's political context the proposal became acceptable, and the instruction was signed by the Prime Minister. The result was so convincing that several other food markets were liberated shortly after. Even in disaster prone areas, food shortages receded. The disappearance of food rationing became the first tangible success of economic reform in Vietnam. It helped build support for doing away with the subsidy mechanism and letting goods and services flow freely. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 21 As for socialist objectives, such as ensuring some degree of equality, they could be catered for using other policy instruments. Land reform played a fundamental role in this respect. Between 1986 and 1993 a large fraction of Vietnam's agricultural land was distributed to rural households, on a remarkably egalitarian basis. The combination of deregulated food markets and autonomy for farmers to make cultivation decisions resulted in a dramatic increase in food supply. It also boosted the incomes of rural households. By then, barely more than one fifth of Vietnam's population lived in urban areas. While living standards were consistently meager at the time, urban dwellers tended to be better off. The sequence of reforms was such that economic growth got kickstarted in the countryside, where poverty was more prevalent, and deeper. This is one of the reasons why inequality barely increased over the Doi Moi period, whereas poverty rates plummeted. At the risk of simplifying, three main strands can be identified in the economic reform process. The focus of the first one, which includes the liberalization of the price of rice and other key products, was to introduce stronger incentives for suppliers of goods and services, be they public or private. The monopoly of state trading companies was abolished and international trade barriers were gradually reduced. Entry by the private sector was authorized in an increasingly large number of sectors and a regime supporting foreign direct investment (FDI) was approved. The management of stateowned enterprises (SOEs) was gradually freed from administrative interference and policy lending was taken out of stateowned commercial banks (SOCBs). Transaction costs for enterprise registration were substantially lowered, whereas the equitization process resulted in a gradual divestiture of state assets, increasingly affecting large SOEs and bringing in strategic investors. A second group of measures aimed at upgrading the mechanisms through which budget allocations are made and resources channeled. Strengthening public financial management and increasing its transparency were key ingredients of this effort. There was also a transfer of responsibility for budget appropriations to the National Assembly and People's Councils, with decisions on almost half of public expenditures shifted by now to subnational levels of government. Currently, the exercise of state ownership rights in SOEs and SOCBs is being moved out of agencies with responsibility for setting or implementing policies, into a sovereign wealth fund. The management of public investments is being revamped as well. The centralized compilation of a priority list by the Ministry of Planning (MPI) is being replaced by a more transparent management of the project cycle, from budget allocations to implementation units. As Vietnam approaches middleincome status, a third set of more complex innovations is currently taking shape. The policy agenda is evolving from the structural reforms needed to transition from plan to market, to the institutional 22 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang reforms needed to sustain growth over time, and allow Vietnam to eventually become an industrial country. Building on the landmark Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States (USBTA), accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is leading to a substantial upgrade in legislation and standards, while fostering competition in services. An ambitious banking reform roadmap includes the creation of a modern central bank in charge of monetary policy, strengthened supervision of the financial sector, and the equitization of SOCBs. If anything, the recent macroeconomic turbulence shows how much more progress is needed on this front. In infrastructure sectors characterized by network externalities, efforts aim at creating markets and encouraging private sector entry. The health sector is starting a move from supplyside to demandside funding, with the ambition of attaining universal coverage for health insurance. A similar transformation is taking place in relation to oldage pensions, from a transfer program for public sector workers to an insurance scheme accessible to an increasingly larger share of the population. Some of the biggest challenges in relation to these more complex innovations concern the governance area. There has been progress in streamlining bureaucratic processes and reducing red tape. But there is concern that public administration reform has not progressed as steadily as hoped. There is also a strong determination to fight corruption, through the strengthening of government systems, an increased openness to complaints and denunciations, and the monitoring of the assets of civil servants and their immediate families. But there is also recognition that in a booming economy there are enormous opportunities for graft, and corruption will be difficult to uproot. Even the emerging concern for environmental protection has a clear governance dimension, as sound natural resource management and regional development planning will be essential for development sustainability. When considered together, these three main sets of policy changes amount to a comprehensive economic reform, spanning all policy areas, but conducted in a pragmatic manner. The comprehensive nature of the changes undertaken is at odds with the idea, widely accepted these days, that development efforts must focus on just one or a few "binding constraints." In Vietnam, on the contrary, it would seem that no stone was left unturned. The flip side of this diversity of reform initiatives is often their uneven progress across sectors. Dubious Explanations of the Drive for Reform Securing the continuation of Vietnam's success at developing its economy and reducing poverty requires a better understanding of the forces underlying Doi Moi and the revamping of collective decisionmaking mechanisms that took place around the 6th Party Congress. Identifying the drivers of change can also Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 23 help pinpoint new obstacles that might have emerged over these two decades of comprehensive reform. But it may be useful to first dispel some commonly held views, which might look plausible at a first glance but do not shed so much light in practice. One of those commonly held views sees the reform process as the outcome of a struggle between "reformers" and "conservatives." In this view, key decision makers stood on one or the other side of some invisible line whereas circumstances, from economic hardship to natural death, gradually shifted the balance of power in favor of the reformist camp. And there is no doubt that circumstances helped. However, on a closer examination this view is problematic on more than one count. To begin with, circumstances kept changing, but the speed of reforms did not seem to be affected. If anything, the relative hardship resulting from the East Asian crisis was associated with a slowdown of reforms, not with their acceleration. Moreover, it is very difficult for outsiders to tell who was on which side of the alleged, invisible line. For instance, Mr. Vơ Vn Kit has been often portrayed by Western observers as a determined communist. The fact that he was from a family of poor farmers made him trusted by his comrades and paved the way for him to become a member of the Politburo at the 4th Party Congress. And with absolute confidence in communism and in the Party leaders, he implicitly endorsed the adoption of the economic model on the North across the entire country. However, he subsequently realized the problems with this model from his own experience in Ho Chi Minh City, and became one of the leading figures in the "fence breaking" experiments and in the drive up to the 6th Party Congress. Even Mr. Lê Dun, on the surface a hardliner, was a more complex and subtle figure than it could seem at a first glance. While he was in charge of liberated territories in the South, during the French war, he did not favor land reform Chinese style. He did not want to prosecute landlords, and instead tried to convince them to voluntarily and temporarily surrender the use of their assets. Only landlords who were closely collaborating with the French colonial regime saw their assets confiscated on a permanent basis. Subsequently, when the country was reunified, Mr. Lê Dun was personally in favor of keeping the economic model of the South as a pilot to experiment with market mechanisms, at least on a temporary basis. As for the "district as a fortress" initiative, incorrect as it might have been from an economic point of view, it was probably an attempt to bypass the slogans of proletarian dictatorship and class struggle. Following Marxist principles, each Party Congress was expected to identify the "fundamental contradiction" that needed to be solved. At reunification, many in the Party saw the tension between capitalism and socialism as such a fundamental contradiction. If so, victory required crushing the capitalists. Mr. Lê Dun moved into identifying a different contradiction, one between obsolete, smallscale farming and mass industrial production. Within this approach, there was no 24 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang clear enemy to defeat. From this perspective, the "district as a fortress" was not as bad a choice as its economic consequences might suggest. Mr. Lê Dun did not make his reasoning explicit, at least not publicly. But his close assistants knew about his political motivation. Had it not been for him, reunification would have been a much harder time. Beyond the specific examples of Mr. Vơ Vn Kit and Mr. Lê Dun, what comes out of the "beautiful period" is not a story of reformers defeating conservatives, but rather one of a reformist mindset gradually winning over. Former conservatives were not displaced, they were convinced. One telling example is that of Mr. Trng Chinh, who replaced Mr. Lê Dun as General Secretary of the Party in 1986. It can be argued that Mr. Trng Chinh was initially a conservative, strictly adhering to the "untouchable" principles of MarxismLeninism. But as part of the "fence breaking" experiments, he and Mr. Phm Vn ng were respectfully invited to pay visits to the field and see by themselves. This reality check, not involving any confrontation, triggered a change in their perspectives and eventually led to their support to Doi Moi. It can even be argued that this willingness to switch to new thinking is a characteristic of politicians in Vietnam. Not only Mr. Lê Dun and Mr. Vơ Vn Kit but also many others were conservative at some point in their life and reformers at some other point. In fact, some switched from being reformminded initially to becoming more conservative over time. Ignoring this dynamic interplay of ideas and just classifying the key actors in antagonist camps is a simplification that does not help understand how economic reforms came to be embraced in Vietnam. One variation of the "reformers versus conservatives" view associates the latter with the old generation, trained in the former Soviet block, and the former with a younger group, more exposed to Western ways of thinking. This, again, is a dubious simplification of the mechanisms at play. The key steps in the reform process were all handled by people without any formal Western training and with limited exposure to the outside world. This is clearly illustrated by their dull "packaging" of presentations and arguments, their limited fluency in English, and the resulting frustration by Western experts, often more responsive to PowerPoint presentations, catchy phrases and buzz words. Perhaps the most obvious rebuttal of this simplified view is provided again by the example of Mr. Vơ Vn Kit, who is widely recognized as one of the champions of reform in Vietnam. Not only did Mr. Vơ Vn Kit lack any formal Western training: as he was actively advocating for further reform in recent years, he could not be considered young, not even by the lenient standards of East Asian societies. A similar pattern can be found at lower levels in the hierarchy. Another interpretation of economic reforms in Vietnam sees them as the belated triumph of the South over the North. In a way, the North would have won the war, but the South would have taken the country back in times of peace. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 25 This interpretation has some appeal, given the obvious differences between Vietnamese people from the South and the North. The former tend to be more pragmatic, more impatient, and more freespirited too. The latter are often tougher, more cultivated, more frugal, and more disciplined. This interpretation is also supported by the history of "fence breaking" experiments, which took place massively in the South. Moreover, until recently statistics on exports per person, FDI per person, or private investment per person, in the most dynamic provinces on each side, showed the Southern ones routing those in the North. However, from the point of view of reforms, the main difference between South and North is one of initial development levels. The North had been subject to central planning for two decades and had suffered enormously from the American war. Reunification did not make any substantial difference in living standards; if anything, peace improved the wellbeing of the population. On the contrary, the South was used to market mechanisms, had a better infrastructure, and a more capitalintensive agriculture. The shift to central planning, even under its "district as a fortress" version, represented a dramatic transformation, and clearly not for the better. It is not surprising that most "fence breaking" experiments happened there, relying on the more recent experience of the population with market mechanisms and a still lively entrepreneurial spirit. As the "fence breaking" experiments clearly proved the merits of abandoning the subsidy approach and a new mindset took over, it was not only people from the South who embraced economic reform. A large fraction of cadres in government and the Party came from Nghe An and Ha Tinh, two northern provinces. On the other hand, Mr. Lê Dun, often portrayed as a hardliner, was born in the center of the country, and was in many ways a man of the South. Overall, the South still does better in economic terms, which is not surprising given its higher initial development level. But the gap is narrowing by now. The fastestgrowing province in Vietnam, since the early 1990s, has been northern Quang Ninh. And in terms of its dynamism, the "triangle" between Hanoi, Haiphong and Halong is already starting to resemble a coastal province in China. A closer examination of provincial performance shows success stories both in the South and in the North, mainly where the local leadership is committed to reform. Given the practice to send cadres with high potential to prove themselves in provinces they are not originally from, local leadership may not even be truly local. Finally, another commonly held view of economic reforms in Vietnam sees them as a struggle between a grassroots movement and the central authority of the Party. Depending on the version, reforms worked because Vietnam abandoned communism, or are bound to eventually fail because it did not fully abandon communism. Beyond divergences on the outcome of this alleged struggle, in this interpretation the leadership was unable to correctly read emerging signs that were obvious to all, being as oblivious to economic realities 26 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang as it was appreciative of wartime opportunities. The reform process was therefore bottom up, and not top down. One implication of this view is that the government was not responsible for the dramatic improvement in living conditions, but rather an unnecessary irritant. This interpretation is correct in highlighting the importance of local developments in generating change, as illustrated by the "fence breaking" experiments. But it ignores the role played by Party structures in transforming those local developments into largerscale reforms. The local leaders who launched this dynamic were actually high in the Party structure, and this is one of the reasons why they were "bullet proof." Many of them were Party Secretaries at the provincial level, as was the case with Mr. Vơ Vn Kit in Ho Chi Minh City, Mr. Nguyn Vn Hn in An Giang, Mr. Nguyn Vn Chính in Long An, or Mr. Bùi Quang To in Haiphong. Many, again starting with Mr. Vơ Vn Kit, had also shown extraordinary courage during the independence wars. Mr. oàn Duy Thành had earned his credentials in the Con Dao prison. Mr. Nguyn Vn Chính had been a leader in some of the fiercest battles in the Mekong Delta. Mr. Nguyn Vn Hn was a resolute activist in the occupied zone. Mr. Nguyn Vn Phi, director of the Ho Chi Minh City department for foreign trade overseeing the "imexes," had carried out secret underground activities in Saigon. And Mr. Nguyn Nht Hng, director of Vietcombank in Ho Chi Minh City, was involved in secret overseas financial transactions. These were mostly people who had fought in the war, had been tested for their political beliefs, and were trusted by the Politburo. What these local leaders did was not to subvert the existing order, but rather to convey to higher levels in the structure the solutions they had come up with, out of their own ingenuity and that of the local population. And this is why they received attention from more senior leaders. Admittedly, the "fence breaking" experiments that paved the way for comprehensive reform later on were conducted on the fringes of the system, at the very edge of legality. However, those who led the experiments still had confidence in the Party, and this is why they respectfully raised their concerns. The hierarchy, in turn, was responsive and gave consideration to those concerns. It is clear that not all those who tried to introduce changes were successful. But the economic difficulties associated with the old mechanism somehow reduced the opposition towards fencebreakers. As a result, fences were broken locally, but dismantled centrally. In 1979, in an effort to overcome hardship, the 6th Plenum of the Party's Central Committee implicitly endorsed fencebreaking actions by issuing a policy on "untying production." In 1980 local authorities were authorized by the central government to export and import directly, thus legitimizing the "imexes." In 1981, the Secretariat authorized contractual arrangements throughout the agricultural sector of Vietnam. And in 1981, the threetier system for enterprises was legalized, together with the Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 27 promotion of horizontal relations among enterprises and between enterprises and the market. Doi Moi substantially amplified this trend. But it also took place within the context of Party resolutions, not outside them. In sensitive areas, moving from local experiments to nationwide policy required the endorsement of the Politburo. The drive for reform was thus processed inside the Party, not against it. What these commonly held views on economic reforms share is their depiction of the underlying politics in confrontational terms. In all cases, the implicit hypothesis seems to be the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium, involving a tension between two antagonistic camps. The identity of those in each camp varies slightly depending on the specific view considered, from reformers versusconservatives to youngversusold to SouthernersversusNortherners to grassrootsversusleadership. And those who hold these views appear to sympathize with one of the two camps. Simplifying, their support goes for a more or less idealized group of young grassroots reformers from the South, even if the boundaries or membership of such group would be difficult to spell out. This overlap between interpretation of a political process and alignment with one set of participants in it, in turn, suggests that the most commonly held views about reform in Vietnam are not that scientific. It is difficult not to sense in these views a deep antipathy for communism, the regime of the North, the influence of the former Soviet block or some combination of them. Regardless of whether such antipathy is justified or not, it may taint the interpretation of facts and thus reduce its usefulness. In a way, it feels as if those holding these views about economic reform in Vietnam, unlike those who undertook the "fence breaking" experiments or implemented the reforms under Doi Moi, were still fighting the Vietnam war. Limited Confrontation and Few Losers The reform process of Vietnam is better understood as a basically cooperative way of processing change, in which key participants went to great lengths to avoid "defeating" others, even if that entailed costly compromises. The willingness not to create losers was most obvious at the economic level. But it can also be found at the political and ideological levels. Seeking consensus seems to be a longrooted tradition in Vietnam, one that some historians trace back to the kings of the 13th century. Regardless of its origins, it can be argued that this tradition also permeated the Communist Party. Over its history, it is difficult to pinpoint a major political purge or an episode where one group of Party members physically suppressed another. While a centralization of power took place during the American war, the 6th Party Congress reinstated consensus building as the main decisionmaking mechanism. Power then shifted back from individual leaders to the collective. In 28 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang a strict application of the principle of "democratic centralism," the minority had to align with the Party line. Once a resolution was passed, there was no further questioning, and everybody was called to support its implementation. Internal debate was encouraged in the process of making a decision. But lively debates, or even fights over ideas, did not amount to factionalism. In practice, when consensus could not be reached, participants tended to adopt the "wait and see" attitude, rather than try to impose their views. The search for consensus was not without costs. Its flip side was, at times, the adoption of watereddown policy measures, not going to the root of the problems being addressed. And the process to adopt key measures was often protracted. This has resulted in frustration among Western experts, who have complained repeatedly about the slow pace of reform in Vietnam, despite the fact that progress on development outcomes (from output to exports to poverty) was among the fastest in the world. For instance, it is clear that Vietnam could have signed the USBTA much earlier than it did, and it possibly could have entered the WTO earlier than China. But a group of senior leaders approached these two critical steps to global integration in a cautious manner, and needed time to come to terms with them. Similarly, many thought that the resolution of the 10th Party Congress was not up to the new challenges faced by Vietnam at the time. But they agreed to live with that decision. The determination to avoid conflict was also brought to bear on international affairs. As part of the Doi Moi process, Vietnam chose to disengage from factionalism in the global arena. One of the decisions of the 6th Party Congress was to befriend all countries in the world, including former enemies. Before, a distinction was made between three groups of countries. Those in the socialist group, embracing "proletarian internationalism," were seen as siblings. Countries in the Third World group, which had in common their efforts to free themselves from colonialism, were considered friends. The remaining countries, capitalist and imperialist, represented the enemy; for different reasons China also fell in this last group. But this classification had isolated Vietnam, and the 6th Party Congress decided to do away with it. Seeking to treat the United States and China as partners, rather than enemies, represented a major step away from confrontation. Economic reform was also associated with a clear attempt to avoid creating losers in the ideological arena. There were limits not to trespass in this respect, with a thin line separating the acceptable "renovation" from the unacceptable "peaceful evolution." Moving from the subsidy system to market mechanisms was never presented as the rejection of socialist principles, but rather as a tool for their implementation. Agreement was reached that markets were not a capitalist invention. And to make it clear that economic reform did not amount to ideological renunciation, the expression "market economy with a socialism orientation" was coined. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 29 Many would question the vagueness of this concept. It suggests a stronger emphasis on equality and a bigger role for the state, compared to a "capitalist" market economy. But beyond that general statement, it is difficult to identify specific implications on how markets should be organized. And yet, this very vagueness might have helped avoid a potentially difficult ideological discussion. The compromise here was to move ahead on economic reforms, but not to question the Party's "sacred principles." This was a way to give reassurance to those who were concerned about abandoning Vietnam's political system. For instance, when the leaders of Haiphong vowed to extend the contracting approach to the entire nation, the first thing they set up to do was to read carefully the statement by Mr. Trng Chinh, criticizing the Vinh Phuc experiment. This was to push for reform without embarking in an ideological confrontation. A similar ambiguity is at play when the Party continues to identify itself as the representative of "workers," despite the fact that an increasingly large fraction of its members is made of successful entrepreneurs. In practice, from the 6th Party Congress onwards the notion of "class struggle" has been downplayed. Insisting on a struggle, any struggle, would have been at odds with the effort to rely on consensus as the main mechanism for the collective to make decisions. But openly abandoning the class struggle would have amounted to renouncing Marxist principles, which in turn would have alienated a substantial constituency within the Party. Vietnam's success in adopting comprehensive reforms is also associated with the determination to avoid creating losers from a material point of view. In this respect, the focus on poverty reduction and social inclusion can be seen as application of the Pareto principle, according to which a reform can be considered welfare improving only if at least some people benefit from and nobody is made worse off because of it. Not making losers was easy in the initial stages of Doi Moi, given that the situation was extremely difficult for almost everyone. With the country at the edge of famine, no one could do much worse. So initially there was no need to think about compensating anyone for the consequences of economic reforms. However, as the economy emerged from extreme crisis conditions the move from the subsidy system to market mechanisms could have had a negative impact on specific population groups, or have favored some groups much more than others. Policy measures adopted after the initial stages of the Doi Moi process tried to prevent both declines in living standards and increases in inequality. Consider the reform of SOEs, which aimed at enhancing the authority of directors to make decisions without administrative interference. Those directors could lose from market liberalization and the privatization of state assets. But they were spared. The introduction of stronger incentives to maximize profits was done in such a way that insiders could appropriate a significant share of those profits through bonuses and other additional payments (some of them not 30 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang official). As for privatization, the initial phases of the equitization process allowed SOE directors to become partial owners of the enterprises they managed. Workers in the public sector, probably the only large group that would have qualified as privileged under the subsidy system, were also spared. When some basic forms of social protection such as access to oldage pension were extended to the formal private sector, the benefits of public sector workers were grand fathered, with the budget making up for unpaid social security contributions. A cash compensation program was also set up for redundant workers from SOEs. In its initial phase, the amount of compensation was determined in a hurry, to cope with the factory closures prompted by the collapse of trade with the former Soviet block. Subsequent stages saw a deliberate effort to set compensation at a level that would make redundant SOE workers roughly indifferent to job separation. Tracer surveys of separated workers reveal a relatively high level of satisfaction with the assistance received, suggesting that the effort was successful. This program has been maintained for years, in spite of its considerable cost to the budget. The overall growth strategy also had the effect of raising the income of agricultural households, which were certainly not part of the public sector elite. The eminently egalitarian redistribution of agricultural land, combined with the liberalization of trade in commodities, did much to boost rural living standards and reduce poverty. The measures taken to attract FDI, to a large extent in labor intensive sectors, also provided an avenue out of poverty for unskilled rural migrants. The commercialization of agriculture and the rapid creation of wage employment were thus instrumental in preventing great increases in inequality, in spite of the fast pace of economic growth. More recently, a sound system of intergovernmental transfers has been put in place, to redistribute resources from richer to poorer provinces. The move towards greater fiscal decentralization, in 2002, led to the establishment of transparent rules to allocate budget funding to lower levels of government, first for recurrent expenditures and subsequently for capital expenditures. Combined with targeted programs aimed at providing benefits to specific population groups, these budget allocation norms result in substantial income redistribution. With some of the poorest provinces receiving the equivalent of half of their GDP through transfers of this sort, the volume of resources channeled to lagging regions in Vietnam is much larger, in relative terms, than it ever was in the European Union. This arrangement, again, is an illustration of the deliberate effort of the Vietnamese government to preserve social inclusion, hence to minimize resentment and social tensions as the country grows richer. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 31 Processing and Accepting New Ideas Because of its ability to minimize confrontation and to avoid creating many losers, the reform process in Vietnam can be better understood as a basically cooperative undertaking, with policy changes driven by the acceptance of new approaches by the leadership, rather than by the victory of one group of insiders over another. This interpretation, in turn, makes it important to understand how information and views are collected, processed, and brought to the attention of those with the authority to approve them and to launch their implementation. What makes a new idea interesting and potentially acceptable? At some point, specific innovations may seem too bold or too radical, given the historical context, to be given serious consideration. For example, the proposal by Mr. Lê Dun in September 1975 to keep the economic system of the South on a temporary basis, so as to experiment with market mechanisms, falls into this category. But other daring innovations ended up being accepted by the Politburo and other senior members of Party and government. Where did the impetus come from? At the risk of simplifying, there are three main sources of innovative ideas: international experience, local think tanks, and experimentation on the ground. The relative importance of these sources varies depending on the circumstances. International experience featured prominently in the policy orientations of Vietnam, even before reunification. For instance, there was an important role of Chinese advisors until the mid1950s, when Maoism was seen as classic theory by many Vietnamese. The Chinese version of land reform became popular, and its implementation led to extremely grave consequences. It took a public statement by Mr. H Chí Minh to revert this trend. As a result, from 1956 onwards Chinese orientations such as the great leap forward, people's communes or the Cultural Revolution were watched with greater concern. For Vietnamese leaders, the Cultural Revolution represented a brutal attempt to suppress divergence of opinion in the face of economic decline. From that point onwards, the Chinese influence on Vietnam receded, with the ties between the two countries being completely severed after reunification. Reliance on Russian experts became more common during the American war, when the direct influence of the Soviet block became stronger. There was of course recognition of the differences between, say, the Soviet Union and countries like Romania, Hungary or Poland. In fact, the Bulgarian experience was an important inspiration for the "district as a fortress" approach of Mr. Lê Dun. The shift towards the model of the Soviet block became unambiguous around the time of reunification. 32 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang Towards the end of the American war, Vietnam invited two delegations of economic advisors from the Soviet block. The first one, from East Germany, arrived in 1973; the second one, from Russia, in1974. Size considerations explain the interest in East Germany. Russia was deemed as too big an economy for its experience to be directly relevant for Vietnam. However, not much of practical value came out of these missions. Another socialist country whose size was commensurate to that of Vietnam was the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 1973, Mr. Lê Dun had sent a delegation there. It was led by Mr. Trn Phng, head of the Institute of Economics and a direct advisor to Mr. Lê Dun. But the delegation was unimpressed. Upon its return Mr. Trn Phng reported that there was nothing for Vietnam to learn from the economic model of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Shortly after reunification, those external models which Vietnam had been studying initiated their own transitions. In China, Mr. Deng Xiao Ping came to power in 1978 and initiated the reform process in 1979. However, this was also a time of military conflict between the two countries. At that time, Vietnamese leaders regarded China's economic reforms and the fourmodernization drive with suspicion, as the initiative of an enemy and a betrayer of socialism. There was more receptiveness to the changes happening in Russia, with the assumption of power by Mr. Mikhail Gorbachov in 1985, and his move towards glasnost and perestroika. The government of Vietnam was definitely interested in these experiences, and open to adopt new ideas that would work. However, such openness did not lead to outright copying. For instance, Russia went through economic reform but also through political reform. From a Vietnamese perspective, the latter was a source of considerable turbulence, undermining the Party's authority and interfering with the smooth implementation of economic reforms, so that it was not seen as a model to imitate. As for Western countries, for quite a long time Vietnamese leaders had very limited information about them. There were aware of the socialist model, which they perceived as successful, and felt a sense of solidarity with other socialist countries. They also knew that there were a number of politically independent countries with their economies built alongside the capitalist model, which they lumped together in a Third World group. But their knowledge of the specifics of a market economy was totally insufficient to serve as guidance for economic reforms. And Third World ideas did not have any significant impact either. The first serious exposure to economies organized along different principles was in the East Asia region. Military intervention in Cambodia had resulted in a complicated external situation for Vietnam. On the diplomatic front, that was the worst time ever, with criticism coming from all quarters, including from otherwise friendly socialist countries (not to mention China's vehement opposition). In 1988, Mr. Vơ Vn Kit met then with Singapore's Mr. Lee Kwan Yew, who stated that a precondition for the normalization of relations with Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 33 Vietnam was its withdrawal from Cambodia. Such withdrawal had already been decided by the time of the meeting, which facilitated the dialogue and transformed Mr. Le Kwan Yew into an important reference for Vietnam. His optimism about the country's potential made him an enthusiastic advisor of senior leaders. The spectacular economic success of Singapore certainly made it a model to learn from. And the combination of market principles with a considerable degree of political control made it particularly attractive to the Vietnamese government. The Republic of Korea became another country for Vietnam to watch. As a technical assistance program was set up by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), one of its first uses was to fund a study tour to Seoul, in 1990. The delegation was led by Mr. Trn Xuân Giá, who was then chairman of the Office of Government and later became Minister of Planning and Investment. The delegation was impressed by the speed at which the Republic of Korea had developed after the end of its own devastating war. In a telling reflection of the difficult times Vietnam was going through, it alternated between official banquets, to honor the victors of the Vietnam war, and meals on sidewalks, to save on UNDP per diems, which amounted by then to months of salaries. Donor assistance played an important role too. Having maintained a continuous presence in Hanoi, the Swedish were influential in sponsoring workshops, bringing experts and funding study tours. As the momentum of reform gathered pace, the government also maintained an active dialogue with Japanese experts, whose views on economic strategy often varied from those of their Western colleagues. The normalization of the relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions formally took place in 1993. But contacts had been established earlier than that. In 1989, an important initiative was undertaken to separate budgetary functions from central bank functions; to move the commercial operations of the State Bank of Vietnam to commercial banks; and to authorize the establishment of joint stock banks, credit cooperatives, and foreign bank branches. Mr. Vơ Vn Kit was the first Deputy Prime Minister at the time. To handle this eminently complicated issue he took an unprecedented approach in the socialist system, namely to set up two independent groups of specialists to conduct studies and provide advice. Mr. Vơ Vn Kit listened carefully to the advice of the two groups and combined their most suitable proposals for the development of an ordinance on the banking sector. Mr. Hunh Bu Sn was then charged to contact the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which shortly after sent a mission to Vietnam to help finalize the legal documents for this important reform. The UNDP, which together with Sweden was among the few donors with a presence in Vietnam, was instrumental in mobilizing expertise from the World Bank before the normalization of the relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions. 34 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang Still, for quite a while several senior leaders saw those institutions with suspicion, as controlled by industrial countries and in particular by the United States. At first, they were mainly treated as a source of finance. And the government of Vietnam was keen to avoid depending too much on their resources, so as to keep policy choices fully under its control. As the sense of suspicion was gradually dispelled and the relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions matured, more importance was attached to their technical inputs and economic analyses. But throughout the 1990s the government stuck to its choices when the recommendations were not deemed wellsuited to the circumstances of Vietnam, as in relation to rapid privatization for instance. Over time, the relationship with the World Bank was substantially deepened, to the point where Vietnam is by now the largest borrower from its concessional lending arm, the International Development Association, except for India. The World Bank also acquired an increasingly important role as coordinator of the donor community and purveyor of analytical work. From 2001 onwards, a regular cycle of policy lending operations was established, with an increasingly large number of donors supporting it, through both funding and technical inputs. These operations only involved strict policy conditionality at their inception, gradually evolving into a mechanism to ensure the coherence, timeliness and content of policy reforms. On the other hand, the relationship with the IMF became increasingly loose, with disbursements stopping in 2002 and the last lending program expiring in 2004. On the surface, the fallout was over a technical issue, namely the possibility of subjecting the central bank to external auditing. But the fact that no side wanted to compromise reflected a growing disagreement on the speed of policy reforms, especially in relation to the privatization of SOEs and SOCBs. Vietnamese leaders had also been sensitive to critical views from senior policy makers in the region on the way the IMF had handled the East Asian crisis of 1997. Universities and research centers started to be established by independent Vietnam at the end of the 1950s. Examples include the Economic Institute, created in 1960 under the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) and the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), founded in 1978. However, until well into the Doi Moi process, the contribution by these institutions to economic reform was quite limited. This can be explained both by their official mandate and their human resources policy. The mandate was to support the leadership, not to provide independent views. In particular, following economic developments and policy debates in market economies was not part of the mandate. As for their human resources, key advisors and researchers were selected by the Central Committee of the Party after clearance from its Personnel Department. As a result, those recruited tended to be chosen on the basis of their political loyalty, ideological alignment, or ability to interpret the views of the leadership, more than on their technical merit. Not surprisingly, Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 35 their basic knowledge was drawn from the classical works of Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin and most of their reference books were of Russian origin. During the decade in search for solutions, "informal" think tanks actually made a more important contribution to economic reform than mainstream institutions. The case of Ho Chi Minh City is telling in this respect. In 1976, unsatisfied with the official economic advice received from the North, and aware of the limited technical knowledge of the team in charge of running the city, Mr. Vơ Vn Kit established a unit in charge of mobilizing the intellectual resources from the former regime in the South. The goal was to ask for honest advice, confront the views from all sides, and to choose in each case the recommendations that seemed more appropriate. One of the members of this unit was Dr. Nguyn Vn Ho, a specialist in macroeconomic policy. More striking was the participation of Mr. Nguyn ("Jacky") Xuân Oánh, a former Deputy Prime Minister of the regime of the South and a Harvardtrained economist whose father had a close relationship with the resistance. The work of this unit was not without frustrations. After some time, discouraged by the fact that few of his suggestions had been retained, Dr. Nguyn Vn Ho asked for the permission to leave the country with his family, which was granted. Developments accelerated around 1984. By then Mr. Lê Dun's health had deteriorated and his personal prestige was undermined by the failure of the "district as a fortress" approach, which people saw as his idea. In parallel, the role and prestige of General Secretary Mr. Trng Chinh were on the rise. Mr. Trng Chinh convened a group of highly respected, openminded specialists to help develop thinking innovations. This group was led by Mr. Hà Nghip and Mr. Trn Nhâm. Jointly with a dozen other experts from various sectors, this group was directly involved in the preparation of the contents of the 6th Party Congress. In subsequent years a number of researchers and journalists started to report on the "fence breaking" experiments and to analyze the reasons for their success. First in a cautious way, more openly over time, workshops and seminars were held to provide information to senior leaders and even to the Politburo. This intellectual ferment greatly contributed to the reform momentum that led to the 6th Party Congress. By then, the role of think tanks and research institutions started to be seen in a more positive light. A change in the role played by mainstream think tanks and research institutes is noticeable since Doi Moi. In 1989, the Institute for International Relations undertook to translate Mr. Paul Samuelson's famous economics textbook into Vietnamese. Lacking the resources to pay for the copyright, it wrote to the author, who graciously waived any fees for Vietnam. Gradually, other books and documents were translated, and courses on the market economy were organized. Also in 1989, a team from the World Bank institute in charge of training was even invited to give a course on inflation and stabilization, with attendance by the Prime Minister and various ministers. 36 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang The composition of the two independent groups set up by Mr. Vơ Vn Kit to study and give advice on banking reform is equally revealing of the spirit of the time. One of the groups consisted of scientists who had been trained in the Soviet block and held highranking positions in government. The other group consisted of banking specialists from the old regime in the South. Between 1989 and 1993, a critical contribution was made by a project set up in the Office of the Council of Ministers under the leadership of Mr. V Tt Bi. This project put together funding from the UNDP and various agencies, and used it to translate a large amount of material, organize ministerial level seminars, and send young economists and lawyers to study abroad. From this group emerged individuals who were later instrumental in international trade negotiations and the formulation of new regulations for business development. By now, several of the mainstream think tanks and research institutes are playing a much more active role in informing public policies and supporting economic reform. CIEM has made important contributions to the legal framework for doing business, including enterprise registration, corporate governance and investment approvals. It has also conducted rigorous evaluations of the impact of SOE equitization. VASS has been the focal point for the sectoral studies supporting the negotiations for WTO accession, and is playing an important role in the analysis of poverty and related social issues. The Institute of Labor Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA) is making increasingly important contributions in relation to labor policies and social insurance. Equally valuable initiatives are under way at the Ministry of Health, in relation to health insurance, and at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in relation to power sector reform. In all cases, a drive towards increased analytical rigor is noticeable. Underlying this upgrading of the technical input to public policy is the availability of better data. For quite some time, hard evidence was not an essential input for policy making in Vietnam. No sophisticated impact evaluations were needed to realize that the "fence breaking" experiments were associated with better economic outcomes. The channeling of resources to the poor could rely on the classification of households produced by local authorities, often involving consultations with villagers and even direct voting on the list of "poor households." As the economy becomes more developed, and the policy issues more complex, the tools needed to inform economic policy become more sophisticated too. The first official effort to estimate GDP took place in 1989. The first nationally representative household survey for Vietnam was conducted in 1993, with funding from UNDP and technical support from the World Bank. Since then, surveys of that sort have become part of the core business of the General Statistics Office (GSO). Samples are much bigger and the frequency of data production is higher. Since 2000, GSO has also conducted annual enterprise surveys. The quality and accessibility of budget data has also improved substantially, thanks to sustained efforts by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). And Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 37 experimentation is under way on governance indicators. On the other hand there is considerable room for improvement in critical areas such as monetary policy and the financial sector, public expenditures at subnational levels, public debt data, and the balance of payments. In the end, major policy decisions still require the blessing of the Politburo. The viewpoints of VASS on WTO accession would not had been so relevant if it were not for the ability of its chairman, Dr. Hoài Nam, to convey them to the Prime Minister, especially prior to the 8th round of negotiations, in 2004. At that time, several leaders were still approaching accession from a "concessions" perspective, rather than from a "development" perspective. Similarly, the support of the Politburo for an ambitious roadmap for banking reform, secured in 2006, was greatly facilitated by the personal involvement of Dr. Cao S Kiêm, former Vicechairman of the Economic Commission of the Party. This was after almost one year of lowkey technical work by a small group of domestic and foreign experts. The impact of technical inputs like those produced by research institutes and think tanks is clearly amplified when an effective communication channel exists with senior leaders. Such communication still involves "bullet proof" mediators, who can convince the highest instances of the Party of the merit of new ideas, without running the risk of being labeled as revisionists. For important reforms, the mere technical soundness or attractive packaging of technical inputs is not enough. Senior leaders must be convinced that recommendations are based on the reality of the country, would serve its best interests, and would be compatible with political stability. To some extent, this cautious attitude can be seen as a legacy of the decade in search of solutions. At the time, assistance from other socialist countries might actually have delayed economic reforms, by masking the deficiencies of central planning. More importantly, the blind copying of outside models, not wellsuited to the realities of Vietnam, appeared as a mistake not to repeat. This was true of the models of China and the former Soviet block. After Doi Moi, the same caution applied to the "lessons of international experience" or "best practice models" advocated by Western experts without first making sure that they were relevant in Vietnam's case. This cautious attitude was reinforced, from 1989 until the early 1990s, by the collapse of the former Soviet block. Senior leaders were then concerned about the implications of "peaceful evolution," and this is how slogans such as "integrate but do not dissolve" and "renovate but do not change colors" came to be coined. In an almost paradoxical manner for a country ruled by a Communist Party, this cautious attitude and the emphasis on relevance have led to a deep sense of mistrust of anything that may look ideological, regardless of whether it is inspired on the "sacred principles" of socialism or on economic "first principles." Inductive reasoning tends to be favored over deductive approaches. Piloting new ideas and extensively discussing the outcomes is a common practice, one which 38 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang represents a defensible approximation to policy evaluation. And there is no scaling up of the pilots until consensus has been reached on their merits. Admittedly, this process takes time and often leads to frustration, especially among Western experts who are not aware of its history. But the Vietnamese approach to processing and accepting new ideas also reduces the risk of major policy blunders and costly policy reversals. This approach is clearly an important legacy of the decade in search of solutions and the "fence breaking" experiments. Emerging Challenges and Risks The basically cooperative way in which new ideas on economics were processed and accepted by the Vietnamese leadership over the last two decades may explain why the country was so successful at raising living standards, reducing poverty and avoiding major crises. But continuity should not be taken for granted as Vietnam moves into the ranks of middleincome countries. Its own success is confronting the country with new challenges, and the mechanisms underlying Doi Moi may be less wellsuited to address them than they were to support the transition from plan to market. Simplifying, the emerging challenges for Vietnam can be classified into three main categories. First, as the economy has become more integrated, both domestically and internationally, the effects of inadequate policy decisions can be greatly amplified. Financial crises, in particular, are among the biggest risks usually faced by middleincome countries. They are an even bigger risk in Vietnam, given the unprecedented capital inflows the country is attracting as a result of its own success. Second, as agglomeration effects favor rapid productivity growth in the urban hubs of the country, maintaining moderate levels of inequality will become increasingly difficult. In a context where corruption is still widespread, the legitimacy of wealth could be called into question, resulting in social discontent. And third, as the economy has become more diversified and the number of stakeholders has exploded, channeling their feedback to the government will become more difficult. Failure to acknowledge the change in the relationship between state and society could in turn fuel political turmoil. These three risks have actually materialized in the region before, affecting other countries at a development level similar to that Vietnam is currently attaining. In Thailand, inadequate supervision of the financial sector and the liberalization of the capital flows combined with inappropriate exchange rate policies resulted in the Thai baht crisis, subsequently compounded by an excessively tight budgetary policy. While the country recovered from the turmoil, it has not managed to return to its previous growth performance. In Indonesia, three decades of rapid economic growth had raised incomes across the board, but a small urban group with very good connections at the highest Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 39 levels of power became conspicuously rich. Resentment about this apparently ill acquired wealth contributed to the Suharto backlash, and since then Indonesia's economy has not done so well. In China, high inflation and urban unemployment led to social unrest and alienation in the late 1980s. One visible manifestation of the discontent was the Tiananmen Square demonstration, which the government could easily suppress, but at a considerable cost in terms of international image. The first risk, namely failing to effectively manage and guide economic developments, is amplified by the increasing financial interdependence of the economy. The last two decades have witnessed a considerable financial deepening, so that the inability of one group of stakeholders to service their debts, or their capacity to rapidly restructure their assets, can launch shock waves throughout the economy. In the past, the nonperforming loans of SOEs made SOCBs unprofitable, if not formally insolvent, resulting in a liability for the government budget. But they did not threaten the overall economic stability of Vietnam. Capital could not flow freely in and out of the country either, so that turbulence in foreign financial markets had limited consequences for Vietnam. This is not the case anymore. Both financial deepening and international capital mobility can increase economic efficiency, but they also create vulnerabilities requiring highly capable economic management. The quest for consensus, in turn, has resulted in reforms advancing at different paces across sectors. The resulting imbalances also reduce the capacity of policy makers to control economic developments. For instance, consensus was reached on the need to accede to the WTO earlier than on the urgency to reform the financial sector. To some extent, this sequencing was justified. WTO commitments were used as a way to "lock in" major economic reforms, including increased competition in financial services. The practical irreversibility of those commitments, in turn, made the reform of the banking sector a necessity. But the result is a mismatch between a surge in capital inflows and the absence of a modern central bank, with strong capacities to conduct monetary policy and supervise the financial sector. Imbalances of this sort are also obvious in other areas. In relation to infrastructure services, and especially to electricity, the need to cope with a surge in demand is leading to massive investments before appropriate market organization and regulation are in place. As a result, capital could be inefficiently allocated, market power could be concentrated among a few players, and the price of electricity could be excessively high. In relation to the environment, industrialization is advancing at a fast pace before instruments for pollution control and natural resource management are effective. The consequences could be costly to reverse later on. In these two examples, the uneven pace of reforms may not result in shortterm crises, but the longterm consequences cannot be ignored. 40 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang The second major risk faced by Vietnam as it enters the group of middle income countries is to confront growing social resentment. By redistributing agricultural land in an equitable way and promoting FDI in laborintensive sectors, the Doi Moi process dramatically raised the incomes of rural households and unskilled workers. This in turn helped contain the increase in inequality, to a remarkable extent for a rapidly growing country. But the economy has become much more sophisticated, with a rapid transformation taking place in industries with higher value added and in services. High incomes are now associated with information technology, financial services, real estate, or upscale retailing. These sectors greatly benefit from agglomeration effects, and are bound to develop in the economic hubs of the country. The earnings gap between urban and rural areas could then increase dramatically, with those less able to integrate in this modern economy (and especially ethnic minorities) being left behind. Inequality is also bound to increase as a result of capital gains, especially in relation to land. With a booming economy, rapid urbanization and massive land conversion, properties in the "right" locations see their value surge. Knowing what the right locations are and being able to acquire the properties before the surge in prices takes place is a sure road to riches. But not everybody knows and not everybody can acquire. Insufficient transparency in zoning policies, limited issuance of landuse right certificates, inappropriate pricing of land plots and weak capacity of land administration offices all result in relatively few people making fortunes. Those who see their land reclaimed at low prices and witness how others make the capital gains can only feel aggravated. The prevalence of corruption could add to the resentment. In the poor Vietnam of the early years of Doi Moi, petty corruption was an accepted way to make ends meet. It was the individual equivalent of "fence breaking" in the face of an overregulated and inefficient system. As the economy develops, markets function more adequately and people grow richer, corruption is increasingly associated with greed, more than need. The prevalence of corruption may thus undermine the legitimacy of wealth more generally. In a context where many people can be expected to become rich in a few years, sometimes very rich, doubts about the legitimacy of wealth may lead to bitterness among those who fall behind. The third risk is more political in nature. When Doi Moi was launched, the diversity of stakeholders was very limited in Vietnam. Caricaturing only slightly, there were rural households engaged in smallscale agriculture and urban households linked in one way or another to SOEs or the government. Therefore, the diversity of issues and concerns faced by the Vietnamese people was limited too. And most of those issues were in one way or another related to securing a subsistencelevel living under very difficult conditions. Under these circumstances, it was relatively easy for the Party to gather the views of the population. It could not go wrong by favoring the average farmer in the deltas, Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 41 or the average public sector worker in the cities, even if this approach did not work so well for ethnic minority households in the highlands. Two decades later, the number of stakeholders in the Vietnamese economy has exploded. In addition to smallscale agricultural units and the public sector, there is a large group of FDI companies and a thriving private sector. Hundreds of thousands of domestic private enterprises have been created, and a large minority of Vietnamese households runs a small business of one sort or another. The diversity of production and exports has also increased remarkably, with new dynamic sectors emerging one after the other, from garments to sea products to furniture to software. And there are even a growing number of civil society organizations. These multiple stakeholders have specific concerns in product markets, in labor markets, or in their relationships with a range of government agencies. But the traditionally effective mechanisms used by the Party to gather feedback from society are not necessarily well suited to handle so much diversity. Understanding the issues faced by all these groups, and addressing them properly, amounts to an enormous information processing task. Measures are being taken to increase the government's capacity to perform such a task. But there is still a risk that specific groups of stakeholders may become alienated if their concerns are not addressed, and could seek to express their grievances in destabilizing ways. Which Role for the International Community? Over the two decades since the beginning of Doi Moi, donors and international organizations have provided both resources and advice to support the reform drive of Vietnam and to help it emerge from poverty. This process has included both successes and failures. As the country moves higher into the ranks of middleincome countries, the volume of international assistance is bound to decline in relative and even in absolute terms, which makes the next decade a very crucial one in terms of engagement. This is the time to assist Vietnam in laying the institutional foundations for it to continue on a sustained growth path, even after many donors wrap up their development cooperation. The Vietnamese government has a tested approach to policy reform, one that involves exploring new economic ideas and creating consensus around them. But in order to address the emerging challenges, this approach also needs adjustments, some of which could be perceived as threatening. Reassuring the senior leadership that this is not the case, and that the proposed adjustments are in Vietnam's best interest, may require emulating the process whereby innovators managed to convince the Politburo that relying on market mechanisms was not incompatible with the objectives of socialism. 42 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang Members of the international community will be unable to make the case for adjustments of this sort unless they are "bullet proof," as were the provincial Party leaders who carried out the "fence breaking" experiments. Outsiders will not be listened to if they seem to have a poor grasp of Vietnamese realities. And their recommendations will only be credible if it is clear that they are not driven by hidden agendas, and especially by politically motivated agendas. If there is no trust, there is little chance that new ideas volunteered by donors and international organizations will get serious consideration by Vietnam's senior leaders. The successes and failures of the last two decades are telling in this respect. At one end of the spectrum, a donor like Sweden had the necessary credibility, because it stood by Vietnam's side during the most difficult years of the American war. This tested solidarity allowed the Swedish cooperation agency to engage in a dialogue on corruption with the Party at a time when the issue was almost taboo. Probably no other donor would have been listened to. This engagement, while frustrating at times, paved the way for an important change in policy. The Party identified the fight against corruption as a top priority at the end of 2003, at which point it chose to move away from a mainly punitive anti corruption strategy to one involving systemic reforms and increased transparency. At the other end, initially there was limited trust in the Bretton Woods institutions, which were feared by some to be at the service of industrial countries in general, and the United States in particular. The World Bank had a solid engagement in relation to infrastructure development and poverty reduction programs. But skepticism remained in relation to the advice being provided on structural reforms, especially in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, when the Vietnamese leadership became more cautious. At that time, the World Bank and the IMF insisted on the privatization of SOEs and SOCBs as the cornerstone of any serious reform program. In doing so, they faced resistance from Vietnamese authorities, who preferred a more gradual approach. To encourage the government to be more decisive, the Bretton Woods institutions argued that timid reform could result in an economic meltdown. Vietnam was included in the list of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), as if its external situation was weak enough to warrant debt relief. By now it is clear that Vietnam is at low risk of external debt distress. Vietnam's growth performance was also questioned, with the Bretton Woods institutions reporting figures much below those of the government. Those alternative figures were based on simple macroeconomic consistency models, known for their sensitivity to assumptions. These bleak scenarios might have worried Vietnamese authorities for some time, but exaggeration is not a solid foundation for credibility. In 2001, an agreement was finally reached between the Bretton Woods institutions and the government on a structural reform agenda. This agreement Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 43 paved the way for a series of policy lending operations which eventually became the main platform for the policy dialogue between the government and the international community. Shortly after, Vietnam was also taken out of the HIPC list. In 2003, the World Bank retroactively accepted official statistics on growth and dropped its own alternative figures. It also accepted the government's gradualist approach in relation to SOE and SOCB reform. Its focus shifted instead towards WTO accession as the main mechanism to "lock in" further reforms. Importantly, the World Bank moved away from a negotiation approach towards an active analytical collaboration with the institutes and individuals who advised senior policy makers. This engagement approach had been used since the late 1990s with MOF and MPI, effectively, in relation to public financial management reform and planning reform respectively. Among others, it was subsequently extended to VASS, in relation to WTO accession, and to the Economic Commission of the Party, in relation to financial sector reform. Working together with those who could in turn directly discuss with senior leaders improved mutual understanding and helped build mutual trust. The IMF, on the other hand, remained unimpressed by the government's stance on SOE and SOCB reform. In 2004, a dead end was reached and the IMF's lending program formally expired. Since then its influence on Vietnamese economic policies has been more limited. Another important lesson for the international community concerns the nature of the ideas put forward for consideration. Those leading the "fence breaking" experiments were particularly careful to avoid anything that could look ideological. Instead, they emphasized the practical aspects of their innovations, including the specific problem they aimed to address and the ways in which these innovations contributed to the wellbeing of the population. Opportunities were found to pilot the implementation of new ideas, and assess their consequences. Over time, especial attention was also given to the compensation of those who could stand to lose from reform. This kind of practical, nonideological focus has not always characterized the recommendations made by the international community. In relation to economics, supposedly universal "first principles" have at times taken prevalence over a good understanding of the actual institutional constraints faced and the way in which markets are organized on the ground. On issues related to regulation, some recommendations seem to be shaped by the donor's own legal tradition, which in spite of all the caveats is treated as preferable to the alternatives. Even regarding citizen's rights and participation, there is some difficulty to think of "democratization" as something potentially different from adopting a Western political system. Regardless of whether donors are right or not regarding those first principles, legal traditions and political systems, new ideas packaged this way could look too far removed from the needs and concerns of Vietnam. As a result, they could fail to receive serious consideration. 44 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang Those leading the "fence breaking" experiments also paid especial attention to the decisionmaking process underlying policy reforms. They cautiously identified who among the decision makers could be more receptive to an innovation, and who held an implicit veto power over its scaling up. For instance, for some the most significant initiatives, such as reforming the financial sector, the Politburo needs to give its approval. And there is a preparation process leading to the discussion. Conveying the right message is thus not enough; the message also needs to be delivered to the right place. This is again an area where the successes and failures of the last two decades carry important lessons for the international community. Often, massive technical assistance was provided by donors to government units that had no authority to decide on the proposed reforms, and no real inclination to support them either. The international community may also need to learn patience. There may be no action on a specific reform initiative until consensus is reached among the key players in government and in the Party. If so, donors could be well advised to adopt the "wait and see" approach, as did so many times those leading the "fence breaking" experiments. Banging on the table may not do much to speed up matters, while it may deteriorate the relationship with government, and reduce the opportunity to contribute once the decisions are made. A natural complement of patience is comprehensiveness. Which initiatives will move fast and which will stall is seldom clear, even for insiders. Being able to provide substantive inputs across a range of policy areas increases the chance of supporting change, wherever it happens. Conclusion: Sustaining Reform in the Next Decade The consensual mechanisms that allowed Vietnam's transition from plan to market, and from poverty to middleincome levels, should continue to support its transformation past that stage, into becoming an industrial country. Seeking new ideas to improve economic management, finding ways to build consensus around them, and compensating those who could stand to lose from their adoption, should go a long way in that direction. However, adjustments may also be needed, so as to address the emerging challenges brought by two decades of rapid economic growth and social transformation. The risk of losing control over economic developments, stemming from increased financial integration and the uneven progress of reform across policy areas, requires a rapid upgrade of the government's technical capacity. The traditional approach to policy reform, which included piloting, assessing the results, building consensus, and scaling up, would be useless in the event of a financial crisis. The measures needed to support global integration, banking supervision, the regulation of infrastructure, environmental protection, or health sector reform, are basically technical in nature. The commitments made Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 45 in the process of WTO accession, or the accounting and auditing standards needed to support business transparency, build on an enormous body of internationally accepted standards and norms. Assessing the options to set the price of electricity, or to compensate health care providers, requires sophisticated microeconomic analysis. All the creativity of "fence breaking" experiments would be insufficient to move into these new areas. The search for consensus, while making policy reversals more difficult, could now lead to missed opportunities and excessively slow reactions. The "wait and see" approach, which helped minimize conflict, would entail massive costs when a crisis needs to be averted, or addressed. Competent policy units in line ministries and regulating agencies, well staffed think tanks able to conduct solid policy reviews, and strong economic departments in universities will be increasingly needed to identify the most promising measures and conduct a rigorous evaluation of their outcomes. But the experience of think tanks in the run up towards Doi Moi should be considered in this respect. Then, the most useful knowledge did not come from official institutes, staffed with researchers chosen on the basis of their political loyalty and their ability to interpret the views of the leadership. Unofficial think tanks, involving true experts, made a more important contribution. In the same spirit, the upgrading of the government's technical capacity should be based on principle of excellence, mobilizing talent from all quarters. Strengthening the technical component of economic policy will be all the more important as powerful interest groups start to emerge. Until quite recently, the Party was the only real power in Vietnam. Moreover, almost everybody stood to gain from reforms, and determined efforts went into compensating the few who would not, so that there was little economicallymotivated maneuvering to influence economic policies. At most, there was procrastination in their implementation. However, the very success of reforms has created several influential economic units that would benefit if further reforms were not adopted. Among them are the large "economic groups" supposed to become Vietnam's economic champions. These groups would benefit from retaining dominant positions in their sectors, and they would also be keen to mobilize financial resources in questionable ways. Unlike the potential losers of the earlier phases of Doi Moi, these groups have the clout to articulate and convey their preferred policies in ways that make them look as serving the public interest. Lobbying of this sort is common in most countries, industrial and developing alike. If anything, Vietnam was an exception, due to the overwhelming weight of the Party in the decisionmaking process. But as interest groups emerge, the government needs to have the capacity to scrutinize their claims on technical grounds, so as to make sure that public goals are not undermined. The risk of social resentment in the face of growing inequality requires measures both to preserve social inclusion and to fight corruption, and the 46 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang government is clearly moving in these two directions. But the magnitude of the challenge is such that success cannot be taken for granted. There are now effective mechanisms in place to massively redistribute government revenue from richer to poorer provinces, and that should help. However, financial resources alone may not be enough for the living standards of ethnic minorities to catch up with the rest. Policies taking into account the cultural specificity of these groups, from the collective cultivation of land to the use of forests as public goods to the reluctance to pursue formal education, still need to be developed. This is easier said than done, unfortunately, and nobody seems to have workable solutions to rapidly lift ethnic minorities out of poverty. The growing diversity of stakeholders also makes it more difficult to identify losers from policy changes and external shocks, and to set up effective mitigation mechanisms. In the past, creating opportunities for the directors of SOEs to benefit from liberalization and privatization, and providing cash compensation for redundant SOE workers, was enough to ensure a reform without losers. Today, there is uncertainty as to who exactly will be affected by the commitments made to access the WTO, or by fluctuations in international prices. In the presence of such uncertainty, an insurance approach is warranted. Setting up universal mechanisms effectively providing protection to all households, regardless of the source of the shocks they face, will be essential to preserve social inclusion, and with it the support for further reform. A modern social insurance system would then be the substitute for the more targeted compensation mechanisms used over the last two decades. The risk of facing social resentment would be aggravated if some of the emerging fortunes were seen as illacquired. From this perspective, containing corruption is an urgent priority and the government is taking determined steps in this direction. Eliminating red tape, increasing financial transparency, strengthening administrative systems, processing complaints and denunciations, monitoring the assets of senior civil servants and their immediate families, and regularly assessing popular satisfaction with government agencies are all steps in the right direction. However, in a booming economy the opportunities for corruption may expand more rapidly than the capacity of the government to contain it. Even determined efforts could fail to offset the perception of widespread corruption, regardless of whether it is justified or not. In practice, an effective fight against corruption may require more room for independent reporting and criticism. Subordinates or colleagues of a corrupt civil servant may know more about the specifics (which modalities, which assets?) than officials from a watchdog government body, no matter how diligent. Those asked to pay bribes in exchange for services, or losing business opportunities because others paid bribes, may be in the best position to uncover the wrongdoing. Journalists may be able to investigate and crosscheck popular gossip, helping to either defuse it or to provoke a response through appropriate administrative or judiciary channels. But for these more independent Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 47 mechanisms to work effectively, the government needs to adopt a less defensive stance. Some defamation and unjustified criticism could be the price to pay for this increased openness. But the potential benefits probably outweigh the cost. This sort of increased openness would also help defuse the third major risk faced by Vietnam as it joins the group of middleincome countries, namely the possibility of turmoil prompted by groups (no matter how small) who feel alienated. In practice, this would require gradually strengthening citizens' rights. The Vietnamese government has been better than most developing country governments at delivering social services and improving the wellbeing of the population. But it has also tended to be more defensive than others when, for any reason, the supposed beneficiaries do not feel satisfied, and voice their grievances. This should not come as a surprise. The fight against French colonialism first and then against American invasion had prompted a neglect of the law. In a process that was common to other, newly independent countries, the government ruled by decree. No objection to administrative orders was permitted, legality became more of a formality, and even the Ministry of Justice was eliminated until 1981. Nowadays, there is a clear reversal of this trend, with the enforcement of the rule of law as one of the main objectives of the reform process. Specific measures are being adopted that should strengthen the ability of citizens to convey their views, and seek redress if needed. They include the shifting of increasingly larger responsibilities to the National Assembly and People's Councils, as well as the emphasis on "grassroots democracy" at the commune level. Meanwhile, a clear vision has emerged in relation to legal and judiciary reform, and it clearly goes in the right direction. However, as for the fight against corruption, effective implementation will take time, and meanwhile some turbulence can be expected. Additional initiatives could be considered to mitigate such possible turbulence, including experiments with new feedback mechanisms from society to state. Strengthening the capacity of the National Assembly (in particular, its specialized committees) and enhancing its role in the drafting of laws would be one such initiative. In the same spirit, People's Councils should be better able to exercise their oversight functions, especially in relation to budgetary allocations. On the judicial front, upgrading legal aid services and effectively processing administrative complaints would help as well. At some point, increasing the number of candidates participating in elections for the National Assembly and allowing referendum initiatives at local levels could help channel the growing diversity of views through the system, rather than outside of it. In sum, the decisionmaking processes of Vietnam might be the main reason why the country has done so well, constantly identifying obstacles, seeking solutions, and building consensus around them. Those processes should also help Vietnam move into its next phase of development and become a middle 48 Martín Rama, conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang income country. However, their very success has resulted in fundamental changes in the Vietnamese economy and society. To address these changes, the decisionmaking processes may need some adjustment too. Reinforcing the capacity of an independent technocracy, allowing more openness in relation to corruption, or strengthening the rights of citizens may hold the key for Vietnam to sustain its success and become an industrial country within a generation. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition 49 Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i Martin Rama Da trên các cuc nói chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit cùng vi Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Li ta Tri qua hàng chc nm chin tranh vi c s h tng b tàn phá nng n, hàng triu ngi b cht, b thng hoc ly hng, kh nng phc hi và phát trin kinh t ca Vit Nam dng nh là mt iu không tng. Nhng gi ây, Vit Nam ang sp sa gia nhp nhóm các quc gia có thu nhp trung b́nh trên th gii. Thông thng, ngi ta s hi s vic ó din ra nh th nào? Bài nghiên cu này la chn mt cách tip cn mi, rng hn tr li câu hi này. Thay v́ cp n nhng chính sách ă c thc hin, bài vit i sâu nghiên cu quá tŕnh các chính sách ó c a ra nh th nào. Câu hi này c̣n thú v hn nhiu bi trong quá tŕnh a ra các quyt sách ó ă không xy ra chuyn nhóm này thay th nhóm kia trong c cu quyn lc. gii áp thc mc này, bài vit da trên hiu bit sâu sc ca nhng ngi tng thc t tham gia vào các cuc th nghim kinh t, tho lun ch trng và vn ng chính tr, dn n vic thông qua các ci cách c bn. c bit, bài vit này da trên ni dung mt lot bui àm thoi trc tip vi c Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, mt trong nhng nhà lănh o hàng u ca Vit Nam. Qua ó, bài vit góp phn làm sáng t câu chuyn bên trong ca i mi, mt quá tŕnh c̣n là iu bí n i vi nc ngoài và vn khá m h i vi phn ln ngi Vit Nam. Nghiên cu này không ch có ư ngha v mt lch s. Vic hiu rơ các cuc ci cách c khi ng nh th nào có th em li nhng bài hc quí giá cho các quc gia ang phát trin khác. Các bài hc này cng c bit có giá tr cho bn thân Vit Nam, bi hai thp k tng trng kinh t nhanh chóng ă dn n nhng thay i to ln v kinh t và xă hi. Không ch ánh giá cao các quy tŕnh ra quyt nh ă a t nc thoát nghèo thành công, nghiên cu này c̣n ng thi t́m ṭi nhng gii pháp iu chnh cn thit có th a Vit Nam tr thành mt nc công nghip. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 51 Gii thiu v tuyn tp y ban Tng trng và Phát trin do Mike Spence, ngi c nhn gii thng Nôben, sáng lp tháng 4 nm 2006 nhm gii quyt hai vn . Th nht, t l nghèo không th t gim xung mà không i kèm vi tng trng kinh t -- mt nhn xét ă b các nhà thc hành b qua không ngh ti hay a vào chin lc phát trin. Th hai, ngi ta ngày càng nhn thc rơ hn rng tri thc v tng trng kinh t không hoàn toàn rơ ràng nh ta vn tng. Do ó, mc tiêu ca y ban là "im li các lư lun và thc tin tng trng kinh t nhm rút ra các ư ngha tác ng v mt chính sách cho các th h hoch nh chính sách hin nay và trong tng lai." t́m hiu kho tàng tri thc này, y ban ă mi các nhà nghiên cu và hoch nh chính sách hàng u ca các nc ang phát trin và các nc công nghip hóa tham gia t́m hiu và tho lun các vn kinh t mà y ban thy thích hp cho tng trng và phát trin, k c các vn c̣n gây nhiu tranh căi. Các nghiên cu chuyên này ánh giá kin thc và nêu bt các ni dung c̣n nhiu tranh căi trong các lnh vc nh chính sách tài khóa và tin t, thay i khí hu, công bng và phát trin. Thêm vào ó, 25 nghiên cu quc gia ă c thc hin nhm t́m hiu các ng lc phát trin và thay i trong bi cnh riêng ca tng quc gia. Các bài nghiên cu trong tuyn tp này ă c tŕnh bày và xem xét ti các cuc hi tho do y ban t chc trong hai nm 200708 Washington, D.C., thành ph New York và New Haven, Connecticut. Mi nghiên cu u nhn c ư kin nhn xét góp ư ca nhng ngi tham gia hi tho, bao gm các nhà nghiên cu, nhà hoch nh chính sách, nhà thc hành phát trin, i din ca các t chc song phng và a phng, cùng các thành viên ca y ban. Các bài nghiên cu này, cùng toàn b các bài chuyên kho và nghiên cu quc gia vit cho y ban, ă nhn c s h tr ca C quan Hp tác Phát trin Úc (AusAID), B Ngoi giao Hà Lan, C quan Hp tác Phát trin Quc t Thy in (SIDA), B Phát trin Quc t Vng quc Anh (DFID), Qu William và Flora Hewlett, và Nhóm Ngân hàng Th gii. Tuyn tp này ă c thc hin di s ch o chung ca Mike Spence và Danny Leipziger, Ch tch và Phó Ch tch y ban, và Ban Th kư ca y ban da vào b phn Mng Nghiên cu Gim nghèo và Qun lư Kinh t ca Ngân hàng Th gii. Các bài vit trong tuyn tp này ch th hin quan im cá nhân ca các tác gi. 52 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Li cm n Bài vit này c thc hin theo yêu cu ca y ban cp cao v Tng trng và Phát trin ("y ban Spence"). Các quan im c nêu trong bài là quan im ca riêng tác gi ch không phi quan im ca Ngân hàng Th gii. Bài vit này có s dng tài liu ca Giáo s ng Phong vi tên gi "Thi k phá rào: êm trc ca i Mi Vit Nam". Chúng tôi xin ghi nhn vi s bit n các ư kin óng góp ca David Dollar, Homis Kharas, Klaus Rohland, Carolyn Turk and Brian Van Arkadie. Trn Th Ngc Dung, Lê Minh Phng, Nguyn Th Minh Hoà và Lê Bích Vân h tr dch thut và hành chính. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 53 Mc lc Li ta..............................................................................................................................51 Gii thiu v tuyn tp..................................................................................................52 Li cm n.......................................................................................................................53 Li gii thiu: t́m hiu quy tŕnh ra quyt nh .......................................................57 Mt thp k t́m kim gii pháp ..................................................................................61 Hai thp k ci cách toàn din .....................................................................................68 S lư gii không rơ ràng v ng lc ca ci cách ....................................................72 Rt ít s i u và mt vài ngi b thua thit........................................................77 X lư và chp nhn nhng ư tng mi.....................................................................81 Các thách thc và nguy c mi ni .............................................................................88 Vai tṛ nào dành cho cng ng quc t? ..................................................................91 Kt lun: Duy tŕ ci cách trong thp k ti ...............................................................94 Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 55 Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i Martin Rama Da trên các cuc nói chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit cùng vi Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang2 "Khó có th nói c ai là tng công tŕnh s duy nht ca công cuc i mi, v́ thc ra không có mt tng s c thit k ngay t u cho l tŕnh ó. Con ng chuyn i Vit Nam là loi ng mà c i th́ mi thành ng." (Giáo s ng Phong, Tháng 6 nm 2007). Li gii thiu: t́m hiu quy tŕnh ra quyt nh Vit Nam có th c coi là mt trong nhng trng hp thành công nht v phát trin kinh t trong thi gian va qua. Tuy nhiên, ch trc ó không lâu, t nc này ă tng b coi là mt trng hp ht hy vng. My thp k chin tranh ă li mt c s h tng b phá nát, hàng triu ngi cht, b thng hoc mt nhà ca. C ch k hoch hóa tp trung min Bc và s hin din quân s trên quy mô ln ca nc ngoài min Nam là nhng nguyên nhân dn n hai nn kinh t hot ng kém hiu qu và tách bit. Vào u nhng nm 1990, khi ă có nhng s liu thng kê u tiên tin cy c, th́ thu nhp theo u ngi ca Vit Nam xp vào hng thp nht th gii. Cha y 20 nm sau, Vit Nam ă chun b bc vào hàng ng các quc gia có thu nhp trung b́nh, và trin vng tr thành mt nc công nghip sau mt th h không c̣n là iu không tng. Trong ṿng hai thp k này, Vit Nam ă tránh c vt xe v kinh t mà các nc Liên xô c mc phi, s st gim trong thu ngân sách ca Chính ph mà Trung Quc phi ng u trong giai on u chuyn i, và cuc khng hong kinh t tác ng mnh n khu vc ông Á vào cui nhng nm 1990. Kt qu n tng này i kèm vi tc gim nghèo thuc nhóm nhanh 2 Martin Rama là chuyên gia kinh t trng, Ngân hàng Th gii ti Vit Nam (mrama@worldbank.org). Ông Vơ Vn Kit là Th tng Chính ph Vit Nam t nm 1991 n nm 1997. Trc ó, ông tng là quyn Th tng Chính ph (19881990), Phó Th tng và Ch nhim y ban K hoch Nhà nc (19821986), Bí th Thành y thành ph H Chí Minh (1975 1982) và Bí th Khu y Sài G̣nGia nh trong thi gian chin tranh chng M. Ông qua i ngày 11 tháng 6 nm 2008. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 57 nht c ghi nhn t trc ti nay. Mt s bt n v kinh t v mô trong thi gian gn ây có th to ra mt s bn khon v thành tu ca Vit Nam, tuy nhiên nhng bt n ó ch yu do lung vn k lc mà Vit nam thu hút c gây ra. Chc chn là nhng lung vn này cho thy t nc ang tin vào mt k nguyên mi, ng thi cng to ra nhiu thách thc cho Chính ph. Tuy nhiên s là sai lm khi cho rng iu ó s t du chm ht cho câu chuyn thành công ca Vit Nam, v́ nhng khó khn luôn song hành cùng thành công. K lc tng trng ca Trung Quc thng c xem là cao hn Vit Nam. Tuy nhiên k t u nhng nm 1990, xut khu Vit Nam tng nhanh hn Trung Quc. Theo các con s thng kê quc t, t l nghèo Vit Nam cng gim nhanh hn hay ít nht cng vi tc tng ng. ng thi, mc bt b́nh ng Vit Nam c duy tŕ khá n nh trong khi t l này ang tng áng k Trung Quc. Câu hi ây là: tt c nhng iu ó din ra nh th nào? Nh́n b ngoài, có th a ra ngay câu tr li. Có rt nhiu nghiên cu cp n nhng ci cách chính sách mà Vit Nam ă thc hin k t khi bt u quá tŕnh i mi. Có th có nhng ư kin không thng nht v mi quan h gia nhng ci cách ó và các kt qu phát trin c ghi nhn. Ví d, mt s ngi có th cho rng vic chm t nhân hóa, nh Vit Nam ă làm, là lư do làm chm li tc tng trng và tng thêm các khon n d pḥng cho Chính ph, trong khi s khác li lp lun rng iu ó giúp ngn chn không ch s sp v kinh t mà c s h́nh thành nhóm nh vi quyn lc chính tr ti cao. Tuy vy, nh́n chung ít có s bt ng trong ánh giá v tŕnh t các quyt nh c a ra, k c thái lng l i vi vic t nhân hoá i trà trong giai on u chuyn i. Nu i sâu hn, th́ vn chính không phi là nhng chính sách nào ă c áp dng, mà là ti sao các chính sách ó c la chn? Làm sao mà ng li ci cách li có th c duy tŕ sut hai thp k? Ngay sau khi thng nht t nc, i hi ng IV ă th hin s nht trí cao vi mô h́nh kinh t k hoch hóa tp trung, và mô h́nh này dng nh t ra hn hn vi bng chng c th là nhng th lc "t bn" mnh hn nhiu ă b ánh bi v quân s. Lúc này, kh nng tm thi gi li mô h́nh kinh t ca min Nam Vit Nam mà mt s nhà lănh o ng có uy tín a ra ă không c tán thành. Ba mi nm sau, i hi ng X ă th hin s nht trí tng t i vi vic cn thit phi da vào các c ch th trng trong mi trng hp có th c. Kh nng quay tr li mô h́nh kinh t k hoch hóa tp trung là không th có. n lúc này, ni dung tranh lun ă dn dn chuyn sang nhu cu "dân ch hóa", cùng vi l tŕnh và các h́nh thái phù hp. Câu hi thc s là: Vit Nam ă chuyn i t thái cc nht trí này sang thái cc khác nh th nào? Câu hi này c̣n gây ṭ ṃ hn na bi trong quá tŕnh này không có chuyn nhóm này lt nhóm kia trong c cu quyn lc. Không ging nh các nc ang chuyn i khác, ây không có các cuc o chính ni b, không có s thanh trng chính tr, không u á công khai... Mt s nhà 58 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang lănh o tng ng h mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung trong i hi IV sau này li lănh o công cuc i mi khi xng t i hi ng VI. áng ngc nhiên không kém là quá tŕnh ci cách này không chu nhiu nh hng t bên ngoài. Các nhà lănh o Vit Nam ă tham kho cu trúc và tin tŕnh thc hin mô h́nh xă hi ch ngha kinh in t Liên bang Xô vit c và Trung Quc. ng thi, chc chn h cng ă theo dơi sát sao quá tŕnh thc hin i mi hai nc này, ôi lúc vi nhng quan ngi. H cng ă t́m hiu k các bài hc thành công t các nc ông Á. Tuy nhiên, tin tŕnh i mi ca Vit Nam không phi là s bt chc rp khuôn hay du nhp bt k mô h́nh kinh t có sn nào. Các nh ch tài chính quc t ch bt u hot ng tích cc Vit Nam t u nhng nm 1990. Và Vit Nam ă luôn thn trng tránh b ph thuc vào vin tr, nhm gi vng s t ch trong vic hoch nh các chính sách kinh t. Hin cha có sn nhng câu tr li cho câu hi i sâu hn v bn cht này. Có rt nhiu báo cáo hoc suy oán chp vá v quá tŕnh mà các quyt nh kinh t ch cht c a ra. Song theo nh lp lun di ây th́ nhng cách gii thích ó u khá xa ri thc t. Mt câu tr li úng n cn phi da trên nhng hiu bit sâu sc v ni t́nh ca nhng ngi ă thc t tham gia vào các th nghim kinh t, tho lun ch trng ng li và vn ng chính tr, dn n vic ban hành nhng ci cách c bn. ó cng chính là phng pháp tip cn ca bài vit này, c xây dng da trên mt lot nhng cuc i thoi trc tip vi c Th tng Chính ph Vơ Vn Kit. Nhng cuc i thoi này, ch yu c thc hin trong nm 2007 và nhng tháng u nm 2008 ti TP H Chí Minh và Hà Ni, là nhng c hi quư báu cho nhóm tác gi. C Th tng Chính ph Vơ Vn Kit ă dành thi gian chia s nhng thông tin, cách nh́n bên trong v quá tŕnh ra quyt nh ca Vit Nam. Tài liu này cng có th c coi nh kt qu t các cuc i thoi gia mt nhà lănh o vi thông tin chiu sâu t bên trong vi nhng nhà nghiên cu bên ngoài, kt hp vi nhng ư kin óng góp quan trng v lch s và kinh t ca các ng nghip t hai phía. Xét v phng pháp lun, bài vit này c thc hin theo tinh thn t́m hiu lch s chính sách hn là phân tích kinh t. Lch s chính sách là vic t́m hiu các ngun gc h́nh thành và quá tŕnh phát trin ca chính sách, do vy thng xem xét các quá tŕnh din bin trong mt khong thi gian áng k. Lch s chính sách coi quá tŕnh h́nh thành chính sách công có ư ngha nhiu hn là s thay i din ra ti mt thi im c th, ging nh c ghi li bng mt cú bm máy. Các quyt nh c bn c a ra da trên nhng s kin và quá tŕnh din ra trc ó. Thông qua khung thi gian này, lch s chính sách có th mang li nhng hiu bit sâu có giá tr giúp làm sáng t các vn ng i. Cng ging nh các ghi chép lch s, kt qu ca phng pháp này ôi khi b xem là mang tính mt chiu. Không phi tt c mi ngi tham gia vào quá tŕnh u có c hi bày t quan im, và có c nhng din gii mang tính ch quan. Tuy nhiên, nhng thông tin chiu sâu mà phng pháp này mang li có Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 59 th khc phc nhng hn ch v phng pháp lun. Câu chuyn ni b v i mi cha c tit l ra ngoài, và do bi cnh chính tr khi din ra các cuc ci cách nên a s ngi Vit Nam vn c̣n thiu thông tin rơ ràng y v quá tŕnh ra các quyt nh ch cht. Hn th na, ch có rt ít tài liu t́m hiu, khin cho tri nghim cá nhân ca nhng ngi óng vai tṛ chính càng tr nên có giá tr hn. Vic làm này không ch có ư ngha v mt lch s. Hiu rơ quá tŕnh t c s ng thun trong vic ra quyt nh ci cách kinh t khó khn có th s là bài hc quư báu cho các quc gia ang phát trin khác trong hành tŕnh y gian kh ca h t́m n s phn vinh. Vic xác nh c các ng c dn n s thay i, cng nh nhng tr ngi trên ng i, có th giúp các nc khác nh hng trong ḍng xoáy ci cách chính sách. S hiu bit ó cng có th có ích cho nhng ngi bên ngoài, c bit là cng ng các t chc phát trin, bi h luôn c gng t́m cách tác ng ti các kt qu chính sách và khuyn khích ci cách nhiu hn na Vit Nam, cng nh bt k ni nào khác trên th gii. Vic hiu rơ các quá tŕnh này ă din ra nh th nào cng s rt hu ích i vi Vit Nam trong n lc vt qua nhng bt n kinh t v mô ny sinh t chính thành công ca ḿnh và gia nhp hàng ng các nc công nghip. Tuy nhiu nc ang phát trin ă t c v th là quc gia có thu nhp trung b́nh, song mi ch có mt vài nc vt qua c giai on ó. Cn phi có các th ch kinh t vng mnh i phó vi nhng cú sc bt li trc mt và duy tŕ vic tng nng sut trong dài hn. Chính sách tin t cn trng và c ch giám sát hiu qu i vi khu vc tài chính, vic t chc th trng hiu qu cho các dch v h tng, các chng tŕnh bo him xă hi phù hp to ra nhng ng lc úng n, vic qun lư cht ch các ngun tài nguyên thiên nhiên và bo v môi trng, cùng mt nn hành chính công trong sch và minh bch là nhng iu mà Vit Nam cn tip tc tng trng vi tc nhanh chóng, ng thi gim thiu nhng bt n kinh t v mô do lung vn ln có th gây ra, t mc ích tr thành quc gia có thu nhp cao. Hai thp k tng trng kinh t nhanh chóng ă dn n nhng thay i cn bn trong nn kinh t và xă hi Vit Nam. Mc liên kt ph thuc ln nhau gia các khu vc kinh t ln hn, c bit là thông qua kênh tài chính, khin nhng sai lm v chính sách có th kéo theo nhng chi phí xă hi cao hn rt nhiu. nh hng ca s tích t ngày càng ln, to nên s nng ng áng k ti các trung tâm kinh t chính ca t nc, song ng thi cng to nên s bt b́nh ng ngày càng tng gia các vùng và gia các h gia ́nh. Mi quan h gia nhà nc và xă hi cng thay i, vi s bùng n v s lng và thành phn tham gia. Do vy Chính ph gp khó khn hn trong vic thu thp thông tin phn hi v các vn và nhng mi quan ngi ca ngi dân. Các cuc chuyn i c bn v kinh t và xă hi ang to ra nhng thách thc mi cho Vit Nam. Vic thiu nng lc k thut mnh iu tit và giám sát hiu qu các hot ng ang ngày càng tr nên phc tp có th a li 60 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang mt s nguy c nh phân b các ngun lc không úng hay thm chí b lăng phí trong mt cuc khng hong ngn hn. S bt b́nh ng ang gia tng và s giàu có c phô bày có th gây nên s bt b́nh trong xă hi, c bit nn tham nhng tràn lan có th khin ngi ta nghi ng tính hp pháp ca nhng khi tài sn mi to dng c. C ch thu thp và x lư các yêu cu ca mt s nhóm dân c c th nào ó, dù là rt nh, nu yu kém s khin cho h lên ting bày t s tht vng thông qua nhng kênh trái phép, gây nên t́nh trng mt n nh v chính tr. Nhng nguy c này hin mi ch là gi thuyt, song thc t ă tng xy ra mt s nc trong khu vc có tŕnh phát trin tng t nh Vit Nam hin nay. Hin cha rơ liu các quá tŕnh ra quyt nh tng thành công trong vic a Vit Nam thoát khi t́nh trng nghèo ói và tr thành mt nn kinh t th trng vng mnh có phát trin nhng th ch kinh t hùng mnh cn thit a Vit Nam tr thành mt nc công nghip. Trong khi ánh giá cao nhng quá tŕnh ó, bài vit này c̣n t́m kim nhng xut iu chnh cn thit có th a Vit Nam lên mt mc phát trin cao hn hn. V́ th, vic hiu rơ các quá tŕnh này ă din ra nh th nào có th là ch́a khoá phát huy nhng thành công và vt qua nhng thách thc cng nh nguy c s xut hin trên ng. Mt thp k t́m kim gii pháp hiu c s thành công ca i mi cn có mt phng pháp tip cn mang tính lch s, nêu bt c quá tŕnh th nghim, tht bi, hc hi và iu chnh, vi hy vng nh́n thy ánh sáng cui ng hm. Vào thi im t nc thng nht, chin thng v mt quân s c xem nh là bng chng rơ rt chng t s u vit ca h thng kinh t min Bc. C ch k hoch hóa tp trung qu thc ă rt thích hp trong thi k t nc có chin tranh. Tuy nhiên, thc t th́ các nhà lănh o ng thi ó có rt ít kin thc kinh t, bi h ă dành ht thi gian và n lc cho hai cuc chin tranh liên tip. Trong mt h, mô h́nh kinh t ca min Nam trc ht gn lin vi ch ngha thc dân Pháp và sau ó là quc M, khin h ch có th xem nó nh là mt th xu xa. Do bi cnh chin tranh lúc ó, h ă không có kin thc v th gii và qun tr công iu hành và qun lư t nc mt cách hiu qu. Và tht không may, chính thng li ă làm gim nhu cu lng nghe và hc hi. Lúc ó, mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung kiu Liên bang Xô vit t ra khá thành công, ă a mt nc vi nn kinh t nông nghip lc hu tr thành cng quc chinh phc v tr ch trong ṿng cha y bn thp k. Mt s cán b k thut Vit Nam ă c ào to ch yu các nc thuc khi Xô vit c, nhng ni mà vin tr kinh t quy mô ln ă giúp che y s thiu ht và kém hiu qu ca mt nn kinh t k hoch hóa tp trung. S kt hp này là nguyên nhân dn n nhng nim tin vô iu kin, nhng chun mc ă bt r n sâu, Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 61 không th thay i. Trong s ó có các nguyên tc bt di bt dch v quyn s hu nhà nc, c ch k hoch hóa tp trung và vai tṛ lănh o ca ng. Thi k thng nht t nc, xét v nhiu mt, là mt thi k y khc nghit. Ban lănh o t ra rt quyt oán. iu này c th hin bng vic ra quyt nh i tên ng (t ng Lao ng sang ng Cng sn) và c tên nc (t Dân ch Cng ḥa sang Cng ḥa Xă hi ch ngha). ây cng là thi k thc thi các chng tŕnh hc tp ci to t, mt cách nói tránh i ca vic bt giam hàng lot nhng viên chc và s quan ca ch Sài g̣n. Thi k thng nht t nc c̣n là thi k ca s t măn và duy ư chí xét di góc phát trin kinh t. Và nói mt cách thc ḷng th́ tâm trng phn khi này ca các nhà lănh o ng là iu có th hiu c, sau khi ă a mt t nc nông nghip nghèo ói ti chin thng ba trong s nm nc thành viên thng trc ca Hi ng Bo an Liên hp quc. i hi ng IV ă din ra trong bu không khí phn khi này. i hi ă nht trí cn phi ra ng li phát trin t nc chung, không phân bit min Bc và min Nam. Trên thc t, iu này có ngha là ngi dân min Nam phi thc hin mô h́nh kinh t ca min Bc. Các i biu tham d i hi ng IV tin tng rng ây là quyt nh úng n, và quyt nh này s cho phép Vit Nam thoát khi ói nghèo và vng bc trên con ng i ti m no, hnh phúc. Theo suy ngh ca các nhà lănh o Vit Nam lúc ó, thành công v kinh t không th là mt iu nan gii, nu so vi nhng gian kh ca chin tranh. Tuy vy, vài tháng u tiên sau ngày gii phóng min Nam, mt nhóm cán b ng tp hp li xung quanh ông Lê Dun xut ư kin nên th nghim mô h́nh kinh t ca min Nam, ít nht là tm trong mt thi gian ngn, trong khi vn duy tŕ mô h́nh xă hi ch ngha min Bc. Ông Lê Dun, bí danh là anh Ba, là linh hn ca thi k ó. Sinh nm 1907 ti Qung Tr, ông ă tr thành mt trong s nhng ng viên u tiên ca ông Dng Cng sn ng nm 1930, tr thành Tng bí th nm 1960 và gi v trí này cho n khi qua i nm 1986. Trong kháng chin chng Pháp, ông là Bí th X y Nam K và có uy tín rt cao trong cán b ng viên và nhân dân. Nhng nm 1950, ông ă có ư không mun tin hành ci cách rung t theo kiu min Bc ây. Trên tinh thn ó, vào thi im t nc thng nht, ông ă cho rng min Nam có th là ni thích hp thí im vic áp dng c ch th trng. Tuy nhiên, ông ă không th kiên tŕ theo ui ư tng này và quan im ca ông ă không c a ra xem xét tho lun ti i hi ng IV. Tâm trng lc quan lúc ó ă dn n nim tin tuyt i trong ng và ông Lê Dun rng Vit Nam s thành công vi bt k mô h́nh nào. Thng li v quân s i vi nc M hùng mnh, tuy phn nào nh vào s hu thun ca các nc xă hi ch ngha khác, t c ch yu là do ng li quân s sáng to rt riêng ca Vit Nam. Vy ti sao li không th làm c iu ó trong công cuc phát trin kinh t? Tuy da vào kinh nghim ca các nc xă hi ch ngha khác, i hi ng IV là c hi xây dng mt phiên bn mô h́nh kinh t k hoch hoá tp trung ca riêng Vit Nam. Phiên bn này là s c gng nhm 62 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang nhanh chóng hin i hóa nông nghip thông qua sn xut ln nh s dng h thng thu li, phân bón và máy kéo. Vic thc hin mô h́nh này cn mt quy mô ti thiu, và cp huyn ă c la chn. Mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung theo phiên bn Vit Nam do ó c bit n vi ch trng xây dng "mi huyn là mt pháo ài". iu áng ngc nhiên là mô h́nh này cng chính là a con tinh thn ca ông Lê Dun. Mt trong nhng tuyên b c trích dn nhiu nht ca ông là "tin nhanh, tin mnh, tin vng chc lên sn xut ln xă hi ch ngha, b qua giai on phát trin t bn ch ngha". Quan im "mi huyn là mt pháo ài" phn nào chu nh hng ca mô h́nh , hay liên hip côngnông nghip, mt mô h́nh c áp dng trc tiên Liên bang Xô vit c, sau ó c nhân rng các nc xă hi ch ngha nh hn nh Bun gari và ông c. Ông Lê Dun ă xut quan im này áp ng quyt tâm ca B Chính tr và Trung ng ng trong vic xây dng mt mô h́nh phát trin kinh t duy nht cho c nc. Ông Lê Dun ă t ra rt lc quan v phng pháp tip cn mà ông xem là sáng to này. B Chính tr ă ng ư vi quan im ca ông và phng pháp "mi huyn là mt pháo ài" ă c i hi ng IV thông qua. Mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung chng bao lâu sau ă t ra tht bi nng n. Sn lng theo k hoch d kin s tng lên gp ôi trong khong thi gian t 1976 n 1980, song trên thc t li tng chm hn là mc tng dân s. K hoch 5 nm do i hi ng IV ra, vn c xem nh là bc nhy vt lên ch ngha xă hi, b qua giai on phát trin t bn ch ngha, trên thc t li gn vi s i xung ca mc sng so vi thi k chin tranh vn ă rt khó khn. S cng thng trong quan h vi Trung Quc càng làm cho t́nh h́nh ti t hn, khin Vit Nam phi gia nhp khi Comecon nm 1978, mt quyt nh mà Vit Nam ă do d sut hai thp k trc ó. iu này ă dn ti giá hàng hóa nhp khu tng mnh so vi thi gian trc ó, khi giá trong nc ca hàng hóa c sn xut ti Liên bang Xô Vit c s dng tính cho hàng xut khu sang Vit Nam. Mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung ngày càng cho thy rơ là không phù hp vi min Nam, ni mà s thng nht gn lin vi nhng thay i v c bn trong t chc hot ng kinh t, nhiu hn là vi min Bc, ni không cn phi tin hành các ci cách tng t. Các cán b min Nam ă c c ra Bc hc tp v mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung, song mc giá c hàng hóa mà h phi áp t vi bin pháp hành chính li hoàn toàn không phù hp. Công nghip và thng mi ́nh n. T́nh trng thiu lng thc xut hin, y Vit Nam gn n nn ói trong nhng nm 1980. Rt nhiu ngi liu mng ri b t nc ra i. Nhng ngi ra i y không ch là nhng ngi tng có quan h mt thit vi ch c, mà c nhng ngi ă óng góp vào cuc u tranh giành c lp. H u mong mun ra i bi i sng tinh thn và vt cht u ă vt quá sc chu ng. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 63 Do ó, s tín nhim ca ngi dân i vi lănh o b mai mt dn, ng thi, h́nh nh Vit Nam trên trng quc t cng b gim sút nghiêm trng. Suy ngh cho rng Vit Nam ang dn sp ngày càng ph bin. Ngay ti thành ph H Chí Minh, nm gia vùng c xem là "va lúa" ca Vit Nam, c thiên nhiên u ăi và di dào ngun lc, ngi dân cng không có go n. Xoay x cho sng là vic làm vô cùng khó khn i vi tt c mi ngi, và các nhà lănh o a phng bt u nhn thc c rng t́nh h́nh chng bao lâu na s vt quá sc chu ng. Ngay trong ni b ban lănh o cng có tâm trng tht vng ngày càng tng khi chng kin s tht bi do không th t c các mc tiêu lư tng mà i hi ng IV ra. Cuc khng hong din ra sau ó không c̣n n thun v mt kinh t na, mà c̣n mang tính xă hi và chính tr. Mô h́nh "mi huyn là mt pháo ài" là mt ư tng sáng to, song rơ ràng không úng hng nu xét t góc kinh t. n cui i, ông Lê Dun cng t thy s tht bi ca a con tinh thn ca ḿnh. Tuy nhiên, không phi ông, mà là mt nhóm cán b lănh o a phng ă làm thay i t́nh h́nh. Ban u, h thc hin iu ó qua nhng sáng kin c gi là "phá rào" vi im chung là chúng u c da trên các c ch th trng. Các nhà lănh o a phng khi a ra các sáng kin ó u ht sc mong mun t́m kim nhng phng pháp thích hp và c gng hiu c v́ sao chúng li hiu qu. Quá tŕnh này ̣i hi s th nghim vt quá ranh gii mà lut l cho phép, ôi khi c̣n nguy him na... Song tt c các nhà lănh o a phng này u có mt im chung, ó là v mt chính tr h u "c min tr" do nhng óng góp ca ḿnh trong chin tranh. a s các cuc th nghim "phá rào" din ra min Nam. iu này không có ǵ áng ngc nhiên, bi c ch th trng vn c̣n là kư c nóng hi ni ó, và máu kinh doanh vn c̣n chy trong huyt qun. Thêm vào ó, min Nam cng ă có mt giai on quá trc khi tin hành hp tác hoá t ai. Mc ích cui cùng cng là thit lp mt mô h́nh ging nh min Bc, song vic chuyn i c chp nhn là s din ra t t. Giá lng thc b ép theo quy nh ă làm mt i ng c khuyn khích ngi nông dân gieo trng và buôn bán, và trin vng phi vào hp tác xă, làm n tp th khin h không c̣n thy phn khi v s thng nht na. Tuy vy, ít nht nhng nn tng cho hiu ng cung vn c̣n hin hu. Các th nghim "phá rào" trong nông nghip ch yu là vic giao t cho nông dân và kư kt hp ng mua bán trc tip vi giá cao hn giá quy nh. Phng pháp này trc ây ă tng c thc hin ngoài Bc, t trc khi thng nht t nc. Nm 1966, ông Kim Ngc, Bí th tnh Vnh Phúc, ă th nghim chính sách ó. Tuy nhiên, nm 1968, ông Trung Chinh, Ch tch Quc hi, y viên B Chính tr kiêm Trng Ban T tng ă triu tp mt cuc hp lănh o ng và phát biu mt bài dài phê phán vic làm ca Vnh Phúc. Ông Kim Ngc b ch trích nng n v́ ă ng h vic khoán "chui" và th nghim này buc phi chm dt. 64 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang T́nh h́nh tr nên thun li hn sau khi t nc thng nht, nht là min Nam, ni có các iu kin cung cp lng thc d dàng hn. nhng ni thc hin c ch khoán, i sng c ci thin lên trông thy. Vic làm b xem là s chch hng nguy him vào cui nhng nm 1960 th́ mi nm sau y bt u c xem là s "g ri" y sáng to. Có nhng ví d v th nghim "vt rào" rt gây n tng. Vào cui nhng nm 1970, nông dân min Bc phi rt vt v lo ming n. Nhiu ngi dân xă oàn Xá ă b nhà ra thành ph Hi Pḥng gn ó i n xin. Nm 1979, nhng ngi c̣n li xă nói rng cn phi giao t cho các h gia ́nh. ngh ó ă c a ra biu quyt và t l ng h là 9 trên 1. Tuy nhiên, nhng ngi dân oàn Xá cng nht trí không lu li bút tích v quyt nh này, th gi bí mt và tng tr nhau nu cp trên phát hin ra vic "khoán chui" này. Kt qu là sn lng tng gp 6 ln và i sng c ci thin rơ rt. Tin tc nhanh chóng n tai lănh o Huyn y và mt oàn kim tra ă c c v oàn Xá. Phn ng ban u là không phát th ng mi cho các ng viên oàn Xá. Ri dn dn, thông tin v cuc th nghim này lan rng, và oàn Xá tr thành mô h́nh cho toàn huyn làm theo. n nm 1980, Bí th Thành y Hi Pḥng Bùi Quang To không ch cho nhân rng phng thc khoán trong toàn tnh, mà ông c̣n ha s vn ng Trung ng ng cho phép nhân rng phng thc này trên c nc. Bit rng s khó thuyt phc ông Trung Chinh ng h phng thc khoán, nên trc tiên ông To nói chuyn vi ông Lê Dun, mt ngi có ting là thc t. Ông Lê Dun ă t ḿnh i kim tra t́nh h́nh và t ra rt phn khi. Ngay sau ó, Th tng Phm Vn ng ă v thm và bày t s cm thông vi nhng khó khn mà ngi dân ni ây ang phi i mt. Cui cùng, khi lănh o Hi Pḥng tŕnh bày vn này vi ông Trung Chinh, khi ó là Ch tch nc, th́ ông không t thái ǵ. Ln này th́ không ai b k lut và n nm 1981 Ban Bí th Trung ng ă chính thc cho phép áp dng phng thc khoán trên c nc. S linh hot cng c áp dng trong lnh vc công nghip, theo ó k hoch sn xut dn c chia thành nhiu cp khác nhau: k hoch cp 1, 2 và 3. k hoch cp càng cao th́ các doanh nghip nhn c s t ch cao hn trong vic ra quyt nh sn xut và bán sn phm ca ḿnh ra th trng. Mt s t phá ă c din ra ti các t chc, a phng và doanh nghip. Công vic kinh doanh không chính thc ă c hp thc hóa, c bit trong thng nghip. Trong khi ó, thành ph H Chí Minh táo bo quyt nh "phá rào" bng cách thu mua lúa go ca nông dân vi giá th trng, mc dù mc giá này cao gp 5 ln mc giá do các nhà hoch nh Hà Ni a ra. Trong mt ba n sáng quan trng do ông Vơ Vn Kit, lúc ó là Bí th Thành y, triu tp nm 1979, mt ngân hàng thành ph ng ư cho vay vn, c̣n S thng nghip và Tài chính ha s ng ra lo th tc. Bà Ba Thi, giám c công ty lng thc, c ngh ng u n v i thu mua go ng bng sông Cu Long. n v này c bit n vi tên gi là "t buôn lu go", mt bit danh mà nghe qua Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 65 ă thy hot ng ca nó nguy him th nào. Bà Ba Thi ă bày t vi ông Vơ Vn Kit mi lo ngi có th b bt nu bà phi ra Hà Ni. Ông Vơ Vn Kit tr li rng ông s lo em cm nuôi bà nu bà b i tù. Cui cùng, thành ph H Chí Minh ă c cung cp go n. Bà Ba Thi không nhng không phi i tù mà sau ó c̣n c trao tng danh hiu Anh hùng. Sau ó là nhng bc i mnh bo hn. Nm 1978, sau khi Vit Nam gia nhp Comecon, thành ph H Chí Minh ă gp nhiu vng mc trong hot ng nhp khu. gii quyt nhng vng mc này, chính quyn thành ph ă nh các thng nhân ngi Hoa liên lc vi i tác Singapore và Hng Công mua chu mt s hàng hóa nh thuc lá, si dt, xng du, và cho h mua các mt hàng nông thy sn Vit Nam xut khu tr n. tránh s kim soát ca hi quan trung ng, hàng hóa u c trao i ti "phao s 0", không có giy t giao dch ǵ c. Sau nhng bc m u thành công, y ban Nhân dân thành ph cho phép các qun, huyn lp ra các công ty có tên "imex" u hoc uôi trc tip tin hành các hot ng ngoi thng. Ch mt thi gian ngn sau, các công ty này ă phát trin rt mnh. Cholimex có 8 nhà máy, mt trong s ó lp ráp hàng in t. Các công ty khác có kho lnh bo qun hàng xut khu. Hot ng ca các công ty "imex" nhanh chóng lan sang các a phng khác, trong ó có các tnh phía Bc. Trc i mi, xut khu ca các công ty "imex" này ă vt xa tng mc xut khu ca Trung ng sang các nc có nn kinh t th trng n 10 ln. ban lănh o ng thông cm, sau ó là ng h và cui cùng là nht trí vi các th nghim "phá rào" ̣i hi các nhà lănh o a phng ch trng th nghim phi có mt chin lc khôn khéo. Chin lc ó chu nh hng không nh ca lư thuyt chin tranh do chính ông Lê Dun son ra chin u chng li quân i M và quân i ng minh min Nam. Chin thut chính là tránh i u trc tip vi k thù, do lc lng ca i phng mnh hn, mà thay vào ó là t t p tan quyt tâm ca i phng. Theo ch trng ca ông, mc ích không phi là "ánh thng M mà là ánh bi ư chí xâm lc ca M". iu này c thc hin bng cách chn các mc tiêu riêng l, ánh lui tng b phn, làm k ch nht ư chí, và cui cùng chin thng bng cách tiêu hao sinh lc ch. Trong chin tranh, phng pháp này rt c ca ngi Vit Nam, chng t rng t duy chin lc quan trng hn sc mnh gp nhiu ln. Trong s các nhà lănh o a phng ă la chn phng pháp này thúc y ci cách kinh t gm có ông Vơ Vn Kit, mt ngi lănh o cao cp giàu uy tín và mt s Bí th tnh u, cùng nhiu giám c các doanh nghip nhà nc. Dù c gng thúc y s thay i din ra trên quy mô rng hn, h vn không mun làm khó cho lănh o ng cp cao. H tôn trng ban lănh o t nc và không h mun lt , mà ch mun ban lănh o thay i t duy và cùng i n s nht trí mi. Tuy nhiên, h bit rng vic làm này không phi là d, và ban u nhng th nghim "phá rào" ca h ă b lănh o cp cao nghi ng. Ví d, khi bc xung sân bay Tân Sn Nht, B trng B Ngoi thng 66 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang thi ó là ông Lê Khc ă nhn xét rng ông thy không khí sc mùi Nam T. Nhn xét ó mang tính rn e nhiu hn là li khen. Thi ó, B Chính tr có khong 10 u viên, song trên thc t quyn ra quyt nh ch tp trung trong tay vài ngi. Nhóm này bao gm Tng Bí th, Ch tch nc, Th tng và Trng Ban T chc Trung ng. a vn th nghim "phá rào" ra tho lun công khai trc cuc hp có ông các u viên B Chính tr th́ cm chc là t chuc ly tht bi, bi ngay c nhng ngi ng h ci cách nht cng không dám i u vi c tp th v vn huư k nh th này. Thay vào ó, các nhà ci cách phá rào xác nh tng c ch thích hp cho tng th nghim và hng ti các thành viên ch cht nào ca B Chính tr mun t́m hiu vn này. H tip cn riêng tng v và tŕnh bày trc ht v th nghim ă c chn lc. Thm chí, các v lănh o cng không c nghe tŕnh bày toàn b v các cuc th nghim, mà ch nhng mt tt, nêu bt nhng khó khn ang c tháo g, và cách thc các th nghim "phá rào" này giúp vt qua khó khn. Thng th́ các nhà lănh o a phng phi làm cho mi ngi cm thy h ging nh nhng ngi lính cu ha cu cháy khn cp, ch không t ra là nhng nhà ci cách kiên nh. H cng c gng mt cách có h thng nhm tránh tho lun nhng "nguyên tc bt kh xâm phm" mà i hi ng IV ra. Tng thành viên ch cht ca B Chính tr thay vào ó c nghe tŕnh bày riêng v vic các xí nghip hot ng tt, i sng c ci thin, và ngi dân a phng ng ḷng ng h ng. Tránh i u là mt trong nhng nguyên tc c bn ca ng Cng sn Vit Nam. Theo nguyên tc này, nhc n s ng h ca ngi khác cng là mt phn ca chin lc; ví d nói vi nhà lănh o cp cao này là mt s nhà lănh o ch cht khác cng ă c nghe nói v mt th nghim khác tng t và ă t ra ng h. Các nhà lănh o a phng thng xuyên xin phép v Hà Ni có dp tŕnh bày nhng vic h ă làm c và xin phép c th nghim nhng sáng kin mi, trên tinh thn ca nhng th nghim ă thành công. Khi ă nhn c s ng h ca c bn thành viên ch cht ca B Chính tr ri th́ công cuc ci cách kinh t trên quy mô ln ă sn sàng mà không xy ra các hành ng chng i, thanh trng hay o chính phí công vô ích. Theo nhng ngi trong cuc th́ nhng nm tháng cùng xây dng s ng thun i vi các cuc th nghim "phá rào" c gi là "thi k ti p". Mt lot các s kin dn ti s ng thun mi này c coi là con ng i ngon mc tng khúc quanh, ging nh con ng t Phan Rang lên à Lt. Cui cùng, các nhà lănh o a phng y sáng to ó, nhng ngi l ra b thi c̣i, li c giao cho trách nhim cm c̣i và tip tc phát huy các th nghim "phá rào" ca h. H c mi ra Hà Ni, song không phi tù, mà gánh vác nhng trng trách ln hn. ây cng là con ng mà ông Vơ Vn Kit ă i lên tr thành trc tiên là Phó Th tng, Ch nhim y ban K hoch Nhà nc, và sau ó là Th tng. Ông Bùi Quang To, Bí th thành y Hi Pḥng, ngi nhân rng phong trào khoán, c b nhim làm Ch nhim Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 67 y ban Kim tra trung ng. Ông oàn Duy Thành, Ch tch UBND TP Hi Pḥng c b nhim B trng Thng mi và sau ó là Phó Th tng. C̣n ông Nguyn Vn Chính, Bí th tnh y Long An, ngi áp dng chính sách khoán theo giá th trng c b nhim B trng Lng thc, sau ó là Phó Th tng. n lúc y, các khó khn kinh t và tht bi nng n ca mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung ă khin các nguyên tc mà i hi ng IV ra không c̣n là bt kh xâm phm na. Cui cùng cng ă n lúc phi thay i. Hai thp k ci cách toàn din Ch trng i mi và công cuc ci cách kinh t trên qui mô ln ă c thông qua trong i hi ng VI din ra nm 1986, ch vài tháng sau khi ông Lê Dun qua i sau mt thi gian dài b bnh nng. n lúc y, t duy chung ă thay i, và do ó có th t c s ng thun v s cp thit phi i mi. Trong s ng thun này có c s nht trí v vic ng cn ánh giá trên tinh thn t phê nhng vic ă làm c trong phát trin kinh t, chu trách nhim v nhng tht bi, và ra bin pháp sa cha. Quyt nh này là mt s t phá có ư ngha lch s. Nó ánh du mt bc ngot t suy thoái sang hi phc. Trên ht, nó ánh du s khi u ca nhng thay i trong c ch qun lư kinh t ch cht--chuyn t k hoch hóa tp trung sang c ch th trng. i hi ng VI phn ánh thành công to ln ca quá tŕnh xây dng s ng thun. Các cuc tho lun không phi lúc nào cng êm xuôi, và nhng ngi tham gia c nhc nh thng xuyên v tinh thn oàn kt trong vic khc phc nhng s bt ng. Nhng ngi ch trng cp tin phi ng ư ch i, c̣n nhng ngi bo th c thuyt phc tng tc cho nhanh hn. Kt qu là la chn tc chuyn i trung b́nh, ḱm bt nhng ngi mun tin nhanh và thúc y nhng ngi thích i chm. Nh vy, cn xem i mi nh mt quá tŕnh mà ng lc thay i c xây dng t t theo thi gian và theo kinh nghim thu c. Mt minh ho rơ nét v s cng thng lúc y c th hin trong s khác bit v quan im i vi các mi quan h quc t. Mt nhóm th́ ch trng ci thin quan h vi tt c các nc, k c nhng k thù c. Nhóm khác li mun thn trng hn, ch liên kt vi khi xă hi ch ngha, v́ lo s s làm suy yu v th ca Vit Nam và t ó s sp . S nht trí t c ây là làm bn vi tt c các nc, song không i màu. Mc ích c nêu ra là hi nhp quc t song không mt lp trng t tng. Các khu hiu do ng a ra nhm nhc nh các ng viên luôn ghi nh quyt tâm ca Vit Nam là i theo con ng xă hi ch ngha và cnh giác vi nhng lun iu ru ng hay làm chch hng. C nhng ngi ch trng tin nhanh ln nhng ngi ng h i chm u nht trí làm theo các ngh quyt ca ng. Vic phi vn ng trong nhng ranh gii ă c xác lp rơ ràng va có nhng thun li, va có nhiu bt cp. 68 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Tuy vy khi nh́n li và so sánh các ngh quyt c a ra theo thi gian, tính cho n i hi ng X, có th thy rơ ràng rng phng thc này ă cho phép duy tŕ công cuc ci cách kinh t. i hi ng VI c̣n th hin s chuyn i trong c ch lănh o, t cá nhân sang tp th. C ch lănh o da vào cá nhân không phi là him gp các quc gia ông Á, dù có phi là nc xă hi ch ngha hay không. Ông Lư Quang Diu Singapore và ông Pc Chung Hi Hàn Quc là nhng ví d tiêu biu. Vit Nam, c ch lănh o da vào cá nhân ă óng vai tṛ rt quan trng trong thi k chin tranh. c bit, ông H Chí Minh là ngi có uy tín rt ln i vi nhân dân. Tip sau ó, t cui nhng nm 1960 cho n khi lâm trng bnh, ông Lê Dun cng ă là nhân vt thng lnh trên chính trng Vit Nam. Uy tín ca ông có c là nh nhng óng góp to ln vào chin thng chng M và gii phóng min Nam. Tuy nhiên, ví d v mô h́nh xây dng huyn thành pháo ài cng cho thy c ch lănh o da vào cá nhân có th dn n nhng la chn kinh t sai lm nh th nào. C ch ra quyt nh tp trung sau ó ă c thay th bng mt ban lănh o t nc vng vàng, song không cao vai tṛ lănh o cá nhân, và có xu hng cân bng t l gia các vùng (Bc, Trung và Nam) trong phân công các v trí lănh o cp cao. Không c phép tp trung nhiu chc v vào tay mt ngi. Các quy nh v ngh hu c thc hin nghiêm túc, ngay c khi iu ó có th dn n vic mt i nhng ngi có tŕnh cao. Vic ct nhc cán b ng thng thông qua h́nh thc th nng lc iu hành và thc hin mt a phng không phi là quê hng ca cá nhân ó. Các quyt nh không c a ra mà không có s tham vn và tho lun trc, u tiên là trong ni b ng, ri sau ó ngày càng m rng ra bên ngoài. T ó, rt khó có th tách riêng mt cá nhân ra quyt sách. Thay cho cá nhân, ó có c mt tp th, ngi này ch ngi kia. Tp th là ngi ra quyt nh thay cho vic mt nhà lănh o ti cao vch ra ng li. iu này khin cho vic bàn tho k càng các vn càng tr nên quan trng hn. Do ó, tp th là ni có th huy ng mi ngun lc tri thc c t bên trong ln bên ngoài ng. Và n lc trc sau nh mt nhm tránh phân chia bè phái trong ni b ng, ch i ư kin ca nhau và t oàn kt ni b lên trên chia r. Mt ví d minh ho cho phng pháp mi này là quá tŕnh gia nhp Hip hi các quc gia ông Nam Á (ASEAN). B Chính tr giao quyn ra quyt nh có tr thành thành viên ASEAN hay không cho Thng v B Chính tr. Tuy nhiên, quan im v vn này trong ni b các thành viên cng rt khác nhau. Cuc tranh lun tr nên bt phân thng bi và cui cùng phi biu quyt tháo g vn . Ba u viên ng h vic gia nhp ASEAN, trong khi mt ngi cng quyt phn i. Dù vy, mt khi ă biu quyt th́ ng thc hin theo nguyên tc và quyt nh la chn theo a s. Bng cách này, quá tŕnh i mi ă c m bo tip tc thc hin. Bc tin u tiên, quan trng trong quá tŕnh này là thay i c ch nh giá go. Nhng bc i ban u theo hng này ă din ra trong bi cnh ca Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 69 nhng cuc th nghim "phá rào", bt u t nm 1979. Tuy nhiên, các cuc th nghim ó din ra ri rác các vùng. hu khp các a phng trong c nc, c ch bao cp vn c duy tŕ, dn n vic ngun cung cp lng thc b thiu ht và phân phi không hiu qu. Câu chuyn v bc i ban u này cho thy cách thc mà tp th a ra các quyt nh. Có ư kin cho rng mt ch th ca Th tng vi mc ích gii phóng th trng s to ra c ch t iu tit, ging nh mt cây a thn. Thot tiên, xut này ă b chng i v́ ngi ta lo ngi rng phát trin da trên c ch th trng s a n vic t b ch ngha xă hi. Tuy nhiên, cn lu ư rng th trng có trc ch ngha t bn, v́ th nó không th b coi là sn phm ca ch ngha t bn, mà là mt sáng to tài t́nh ca nhân loi. Cái cách kt hp mc tiêu thc tin vi các nguyên tc sâu rng hn y khác xa iu mà mt nhà c vn phng tây có th nói v c ch th trng. Song trong bi cnh chính tr ca Vit Nam th́ xut ó li chp nhn c, và ch th ă c Th tng kư ban hành. Kt qu t c giàu sc thuyt phc n ni ch ít lâu sau ó mt s th trng lng thc khác cng c m ca. Ngay c nhng vùng hay xy ra thiên tai, t́nh trng thiu ht lng thc cng ă gim dn. Vic xoá b phân phi lng thc là thành công hin hu u tiên ca công cuc ci cách kinh t Vit Nam. Nó cng c s ng h i vi vic t b c ch bao cp, hàng hoá và dch v c t do lu thông. Vic thc hin các mc tiêu xă hi ch ngha, nh m bo quyn b́nh ng, có th thông qua vic s dng các công c chính sách khác. V mt này, vic sa i chính sách rung t óng vai tṛ quan trng. Trong khong thi gian t 1986 n 1993, mt din tích ln t nông nghip ă c chia cho các h nông thôn tính theo b́nh quân u ngi. Vic gim mc can thip hành chính vào các th trng lng thc và giao quyn t quyt hot ng sn xut cho nông dân ă dn n kt qu là sn lng lng thc tng t bin. iu này cng giúp tng cao thu nhp cho các h gia ́nh nông thôn. Lúc này, ch có hn 1/5 dân s Vit Nam sng khu vc thành th. Trong khi i sng vn tip tc mc nghèo vào thi im ó, song ngi dân thành ph ă bt u giàu lên. Th t ca các hot ng ci cách ă thúc y c s tng trng kinh t nông thôn, ni t́nh trng nghèo ph bin hn và sâu sc hn. ây là mt trong nhng lư do ti sao t́nh trng bt b́nh ng ch tng nh trong sut quá tŕnh i Mi, trong khi t l nghèo gim nhanh. Nu nói mt cách n gin th́ có th nêu ba cu phn chính ca quá tŕnh ci cách kinh t. Trng tâm ca cu phn th nht, bao gm gii phóng giá go và các loi sn phm thit yu khác, là nhm áp dng các bin pháp khuyn khích mnh hn i vi nhà cung cp hàng hoá và dch v, không phân bit nhà nc hay t nhân. Vai tṛ c quyn ca các công ty thng mi quc doanh b xóa b và các rào cn thng mi quc t dn dn c tháo g. S tham gia ca khu vc t nhân vào nhiu ngành, nhiu lnh vc ngày càng tng và c ch h 70 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang tr u t trc tip nc ngoài (FDI) c thông qua. Các doanh nghip nhà nc (DNNN) dn dn thoát khi s can thip v qun lư hành chính và hot ng cho vay chính sách c tách ra khi chc nng ca các ngân hàng thng mi nhà nc (NHTMNN). Chi phí ng kư doanh nghip gim i áng k, trong khi quá tŕnh c phn hóa dn n vic gim dn tài sn ca nhà nc trong các doanh nghip công. Quá tŕnh này ngày càng tác ng nhiu hn n các DNNN ln và do vy thu hút các nhà u t chin lc. Nhóm th hai gm các bin pháp nhm nâng cp các c ch giúp Chính ph ra các quyt nh phân b ngân sách và ngun lc. Tng cng qun lư tài chính công và nâng cao tính minh bch trong qun lư tài chính công là nhng bin pháp chính ca n lc này. Trách nhim qun lư ngân sách cng ă c chuyn giao cho Quc hi và Hi ng Nhân dân, trong ó quyt nh v gn mt na s chi tiêu công nay ă c chuyn giao cho các cp chính quyn a phng. Hin nay, chc nng thc thi quyn s hu nhà nc các DNNN và NHTMNN ă c chuyn t các c quan chu trách nhim hoch nh và thc hin chính sách sang mt qu u t vn c lp. Vic qun lư các hot ng u t công cng ang c iu chnh li. Nhim v thit lp danh mc u tiên mà B K hoch và u t (BKHT) vn thc hin trc ây nay c thay th bng mt c ch qun lư minh bch hn các chu tŕnh d án, t phân b ngân sách ti các n v thc hin. Trong khi Vit Nam ang tin dn ti v th ca mt quc gia có thu nhp trung b́nh, mt b sáng kin phc hp th ba hin ang c h́nh thành. Chng tŕnh ci cách chính sách ang chuyn t các cuc ci cách c cu, cn thit cho vic chuyn i t c ch k hoch hóa tp trung sang c ch th trng, sang các cuc ci cách th ch, cn thit duy tŕ tc tng trng theo thi gian và cho phép Vit Nam dn dn tr thành mt quc gia công nghip. Da trên Hip nh Thng mi song phng VitM (HTMVM) có tính cht bc ngot, vic gia nhp T chc Thng mi Th gii (WTO) thúc y vic hoàn thin v c bn lut pháp và các tiêu chun, ng thi thúc y s cnh tranh trong cung cp dch v. Mt l tŕnh ci cách ngành ngân hàng nhiu tham vng bao gm vic thit lp mt ngân hàng trung ng hin i chu trách nhim v chính sách tin t và ci thin vic giám sát toàn b khu vc tài chính và c phn hóa các NHTMNN. Bin ng v kinh t v mô gn ây cho thy cn t c nhiu tin b hn na trên mt trn này. Trong các lnh vc h tng c s, mt lnh vc có tính lan ta cao, n lc chính là xây dng th trng và khuyn khích s tham gia ca khu vc t nhân. Khu vc y t bt u dch chuyn t cp kinh phí theo cung sang theo nhu cu, vi tham vng thc hin bo him y t toàn dân. Vic chuyn i tng t cng din ra i vi ch hu trí, t chng tŕnh dành cho cán b công nhân viên nhà nc sang mt mô h́nh bo him d tip cn i vi ngày càng nhiu ngi. Mt s thách thc ln nht i vi nhóm nhng sáng kin i mi phc hp này thuc v lnh vc qun tr nhà nc. Tin b ă c ghi nhn trong vic Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 71 n gin hóa các quy tŕnh hành chính và gim bt t quan liêu. Tuy vy, iu áng lo là ci cách hành chính công ă không t c tin b n nh nh mong i. Chính ph rt quyt tâm u tranh chng tham nhng, thông qua vic cng c các h thng công quyn, to iu kin cho ngi dân khiu ni và t cáo, giám sát tài sn ca cán b nhà nc và ngi thân ca h. Tuy nhiên, phi tha nhn rng trong mt nn kinh t ang phát trin nhanh chóng, có rt nhiu c hi thun li cho vic út lót, hi l, và do ó tham nhng khó có th b bng tn gc r. Ngay c mi quan ngi ngày càng cao v bo v môi trng cng liên quan nhiu n qun tr nhà nc, bi kh nng qun lư ngun tài nguyên thiên nhiêu hiu qu và lp k hoch phát trin vùng là ht sc cn thit phát trin bn vng. Khi c xem xét tng th, c ba nhóm ci cách chính sách ch cht này u hng ti ci cách kinh t toàn din, rng khp mi lnh vc chính sách, song c thc hin tùy theo thc tin. Tính cht toàn din ca các ci cách ă c thc hin khác bit vi t tng c chp nhn rng răi hin nay là các n lc phát trin phi tp trung vào ch mt hoc mt vài "ràng buc mang tính quyt nh". Vit Nam th́ trái li, có v nh không ḥn á nào li không b lt lên. Mt trái ca nhng sáng kin ci cách a dng này thng là tin b không ng u gia các lnh vc và các ngành. S lư gii không rơ ràng v ng lc ca ci cách m bo Vit Nam tip tc thành công trong phát trin kinh t và gim nghèo, cn hiu rơ hn v các ng lc ng ng sau quá tŕnh i mi và vic thay i các c ch ra quyt nh tp th din ra xung quanh i hi ng VI. Vic xác nh các ng lc ca thay i cng có th giúp ch ra nhng tr ngi mi, có th xut hin trong hai thp k din ra ci cách toàn din này. Tuy nhiên, có th có ích nu trc ht xem xét mt s quan im thông thng mà thot nh́n có v nh hp lư, song trên thc t li không giúp ích ǵ nhiu. Mt trong s nhng quan im thng gp này xem quá tŕnh ci cách nh là kt qu ca cuc u tranh gia "phe ng h ci cách" và "phe ch trng bo th". Theo quan im này, các nhà ra quyt sách ch cht ng bên này hay bên kia ca mt ng ranh gii vô h́nh, ng thi hoàn cnh, ví d khó khn v kinh t hay s qua i ca mt nhà lănh o, t t làm cán cân quyn lc nghiêng v phía phe ci cách. Và không nghi ng ǵ là hoàn cnh có thun li lúc bt u ci cách. Tuy nhiên, xem xét k hn th́ thy quan im này có vn mt vài im. Trc ht, hoàn cnh liên tc thay i, song tc ca ci cách có v không b nh hng. Ngoài ra, khó khn tng i do nh hng ca cuc khng hong ông Á c gn vi s gim tc ca ci cách ch không phi tng tc. Hn th na, ngi ngoài cuc rt khó nói ai ng bên phía nào ca ng ranh gii vô h́nh ó. Ví d, ông Vơ Vn Kit có thi ă b các nhà quan 72 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang sát phng Tây cho là mt "ngi cng sn st á". Trên thc t, vic xut thân t mt gia ́nh nông dân nghèo ă góp phn giúp ông có c s tín nhim ca các ng chí, và sau ó tr thành y viên B Chính tr ti i hi IV. Vi nim tin cao vào ch ngha cng sn và i ng lănh o ng, ông ă kiên quyt ng h vic áp dng mô h́nh kinh t ca min Bc trên toàn quc. Tuy nhiên, t kinh nghim thc tin ti TP H Chí Minh, ông ă nhn ra nhng vn ny sinh i vi mô h́nh này và tr thành mt trong nhng ngi i u ng h th nghim "phá rào" trong thi k trc i hi VI. Ngay c ông Lê Dun, ngi b ngoài th hin rơ ràng là rt cng rn, song thc t li là ngi phc tp và khéo léo hn ta tng. Khi c̣n ph trách vùng lănh th phía Nam mi c gii phóng, thi k kháng chin chng Pháp, ông ă không ng h ci cách rung t theo kiu Trung Quc. Ông không mun u t các ch t, mà thay vào ó c gng thuyt phc h t́nh nguyn và tm thi giao quyn s dng tài sn ca h. Ch có nhng a ch nào hp tác vi ch thc dân Pháp trc ây th́ mi b tch thu tài sn. Sau này, khi t nc ă thng nht, cá nhân ông Lê Dun dn u nhóm ng h vic gi li mô h́nh kinh t ca min Nam th nghim c ch th trng, ít nht là trong mt thi gian ngn. C̣n v sáng kin "mi huyn là mt pháo ài", mt quyt nh có th nói là sai lm t góc kinh t, th́ ó có l là mt c gng nhm né tránh các khu hiu v chuyên chính vô sn và u tranh giai cp. Theo các nguyên tc ca ch ngha Mácxít th́ mi i hi ng phi xác nh c "mâu thun c bn" cn gii quyt. Khi t nc thng nht, nhiu ngi trong ng xem s cng thng gia ch ngha t bn và ch ngha xă hi nh là mâu thun cn bn. Nu nh vy th́ chin thng cn t c là ánh ui nhng k theo ch ngha t bn. Ông Lê Dun ă chuyn sang xác nh c mt mâu thun khác, mâu thun gia sn xut nông nghip lc hu, nh l vi sn xut ln theo công nghip. Theo cách tip cn này th́ không có k thù rơ ràng nào cn ánh bi. Xét t lng kính này, th́ sáng kin "mi huyn là mt pháo ài" cng không phi là mt la chn quá t nh các hu qu kinh t sau ó cho thy. Ông Lê Dun không nói thng, hay ít nht là không công khai, lư do la chn ca ḿnh. Song nhng tr lư gn gi ca ông bit ng c chính tr mà ông chn. Nu không phi là ông th́ thi k sau gii phóng chc có th ă khc nghit hn nhiu. Ngoài các ví d c th ca ông Vơ Vn Kit và ông Lê Dun, iu ghi nhn c t "thi k ti p" không phi là câu chuyn v vic các nhà ci cách ánh bi nhng ngi bo th, mà chính là t tng ci cách ang dn dn chim u th. Nhng ngi bo th trc ây không b thay th, mà b thuyt phc. Mt ví d áng chú ư là trng hp ông Trng Chinh, ngi thay th ông Lê Dun cng v Tng bí th. Có th nói rng ông Trng Chinh ban u là ngi theo phái bo th, rt cng rn trong vic tuân th các nguyên tc "bt di bt dch" ca ch ngha MácLê Nin. Tuy nhiên, trong thi gian din ra các cuc th nghim phá rào, ông và ông Phm Vn ng ă c mi i thm quan thc t Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 73 và mt thy tai nghe. T vic kim tra thc t này, không gp bt k s chng i nào, h ă thay i quan im và dn dn chuyn sang ng h i Mi. Cng có th lư lun rng thái sn sàng chuyn hng sang t duy mi là c im ca các chính khách Vit Nam. Không ch ông Lê Dun và ông Vơ Vn Kit, mà c̣n nhiu ngi khác cng có lúc này theo phái bo th song lúc khác li theo phe ci cách. Thc t, li có mt s ngi chuyn t thái ng h ci cách ban u sang tr nên bo th hn theo thi gian. B qua s an xen tích cc ca các t tng và ch phân loi nhng ngi óng vai tṛ chính trong các phe phái i lp tc là ă làm n gin hóa t́nh h́nh và do ó không th hiu c làm cách nào mà ci cách kinh t có th thc hin c Vit Nam. Mt cách ánh giá khác ca quan im v "phe ci cách và phe bo th" gn mác "bo th" cho th h i trc, c ào to các nc thuc khi Xô vit c, và mác "ci cách" cho th h tr hn, c tip cn nhiu hn vi t tng phng Tây. ây li là mt cách n gin hóa không rơ ràng các c ch hin hành. Các bc i chính trong quá tŕnh ci cách c thc hin bi nhng ngi không h c ào to phng Tây và ít tip xúc trc tip vi th gii này. iu này c th hin rơ qua nhng bài tŕnh bày và tranh lun nghèo nàn, vn ting Anh ít i, do ó làm tht vng nhng chuyên gia t các nc phng tây, vn quen vi các bài tŕnh bày c son trên máy tính vi phn mm PowerPoint, s dng nhng câu ch hp dn và t ng bóng by. Có l, s ph nhn rơ ràng nht i vi quan im n gin hóa này là ví d v ông Vơ Vn Kit, c công nhn là ngi ng h mnh m cho công cuc ci cách Vit Nam. Ông Vơ Vn Kit không ch không c ào to chính quy phng Tây, ông cng không c̣n tr, ngay c so vi nhng tiêu chun ánh giá d dăi ca ông Á. Nhng trng hp tng t có th bt gp các cp lănh o thp hn. Mt cách lư gii khác v công cuc ci cách kinh t Vit Nam coi ó là chin thng ca min Nam trc min Bc. V mt mt nào ó, min Bc chin thng trong chin tranh, song min Nam ă giành li t nc trong thi ḥa b́nh. Cách lư gii này khá hp dn, nu xét n nhng s khác bit rơ rt gia ngi min Nam và ngi min Bc. Ngi min Nam thng thc t hn, ít kiên nhn hn và t do hn. Ngi min Bc cng rn hn, chu khó hn, tn tin hn và có k lut hn. Cách lư gii này c̣n c cng c bi câu chuyn v các cuc th nghim "phá rào", din ra ch yu min Nam. Hn th na, s liu thng kê v xut khu theo u ngi, FDI theo u ngi, hay u t t nhân theo u ngi, ca các tnh nng ng nht thuc mi min u cho thy các kt qu này min Nam hn hn min Bc. Tuy nhiên, nh́n t lng kính ca ci cách, im khác bit chính gia hai min Nam và Bc là xut phát im phát trin. Min Bc thc thi mô h́nh kinh t k hoch tp trung sut hai thp k và b chin tranh tàn phá nng n. Thng nht t nc không mang li thay i c bn nào v mc sng; có l, ḥa b́nh ă ci thin i sng cho nhân dân. Trái li, min Nam ă quen vi c ch th trng, có c s h tng tt hn và mt nn nông nghip c u t nhiu hn. 74 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Vic chuyn i sang mô h́nh k hoch hoá tp trung, k c di h́nh thc "mi huyn là mt pháo ài", là mt cuc chuyn i y khó khn, và rơ ràng là không theo chiu hng tt p hn. Không có ǵ áng ngc nhiên là hu ht các th nghim "phá rào" ă din ra ây, da trên kinh nghim c̣n nóng hi ca ngi dân v c ch th trng và nng lc kinh doanh c̣n nguyên vn. Các th nghim "phá rào" ă chng minh mt cách rơ ràng li ích ca vic t b mô h́nh bao cp và t tng mi ă thng th, nên không ch có ngi dân min Nam ng h ci cách kinh t. Mt s lng ln cán b lănh o ng và Chính ph xut thân t hai tnh min Bc là Ngh An và Hà tnh. Mt khác, ông Lê Dun, ngi c xem là theo ng li cng rn tuyt i, xut thân t min Trung, và xét v nhiu mt th́ có th c coi nh ngi min Nam. Nh́n chung, min Nam vn thành công hn v mt kinh t, và iu này không áng ngc nhiên bi min Nam có xut phát im cao hn. Tuy nhiên, khong cách gia hai min hin ang c thu hp. Tnh phát trin nhanh nht Vit Nam k t u nhng nm 1990 là Qung Ninh. "Tam giác" Hà Ni, Hi Pḥng và H Long ă bt u có s nng ng ging mt tnh ven bin ca Trung Quc. Nghiên cu k hn kt qu phát trin ca các a phng cho thy nhng câu chuyn v thành công có c min Nam và min Bc, ch yu nhng ni mà ban lănh o quyt tâm ci t. Vi thc tin c cán b có nng lc n th sc ti các a phng không phi là ni xut thân ca h, nên lănh o các a phng không hoàn toàn là ngi a phng. Cui cùng, mt quan im thng gp na v ci cách kinh t Vit Nam cho rng ây là cuc u tranh gia phong trào c s và ban lănh o Trung ng ng. Theo mt nhánh ca quan im này th́ ci cách din ra thành công v́ Vit Nam ă t b ch ngha cng sn, c̣n nhánh khác li cho rng cui cùng s tht bi v́ ch ngha cng sn vn tn ti. Ngoài nhng ư kin bt ng v kt qu ca cuc u tranh gi nh này, theo quan im này th́ ban lănh o ă không nhn bit úng các du hiu mi xut hin mà tt c mi ngi khác u thy rơ, do không hiu bit v thc tin kinh t nh ă tng bit nm bt các c hi thi chin tranh. Quá tŕnh ci cách, do ó, i ngc t di lên ch không phi t trên xung. Quan im này có mt ư cho rng Chính ph không có công lao áng k trong vic ci thin iu kin sng, mà thm chí c̣n có nhng lúc gây tr ngi không cn thit. Cách lư gii này úng ch ă nêu bt tm quan trng ca s phát trin i phng nhm to ra thay i, nh trng hp ca các th nghim "phá rào". Tuy nhiên, nó b qua vai tṛ ca cu trúc và h́nh thc t chc hot ng ca ng trong vic chuyn i s phát trin ca a phng thành nhng cuc ci cách có quy mô rng hn. Các nhà lănh o a phng ă to ra ng lc này thc t gi nhng cng v cao trong ng, và ây là mt trong nhng lư do khin h có kh nng "c min tr". Nhiu ngi trong s h là Bí th Tnh u, nh ông Vơ Vn Kit thành ph H Chí Minh, ông Nguyn Vn Hn An Giang, ông Nguyn Vn Chính Long An hay ông Bùi Quang To Hi Pḥng. Nhiu ngi trong Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 75 s h, ví d nh ông Vơ Vn Kit, ă t rơ s gan d phi thng trong chin tranh. Ông oàn Duy Thành ni ting nhà tù Côn o. Ông Nguyn Vn Chính ă ch huy nhng cuc chin u ác lit nht ng bng sông Cu Long. Ông Nguyn Vn Hn là nhà hot ng kiên cng trong vùng b ch chim. Ông Nguyn Vn Phi, giám c S Ngoi thng thành ph H Chí Minh, qun lư các công ty "imex", ă tng hot ng ngm ti Sài G̣n. Và ông Nguyn Nht Hng, giám c Vietcombank thành ph H Chí Minh, ă tng thc hin các hot ng giao dch tài chính quc t mt trong chin tranh. Nhng ngi này u ă tham gia chin u trong chin tranh, c th thách v chính tr và c B Chính tr tin tng. Các nhà lănh o a phng này ă không làm trái lnh mà chn cách chuyn lên các cp lănh o cao hn nhng gii pháp mà h t́m ra nh s sáng to ca bn thân và óng góp ca ngi dân a phng. Cng nh vy mà h ă thu hút c s chú ư ca ban lănh o ng. Phi tha nhn rng, các th nghim "phá rào" m ng cho công cuc ci cách toàn din sau này ă c tin hành bên l h thng, trên làn ranh gii ca s hp pháp. Tuy nhiên, nhng ngi tin hành các cuc th nghim này u gi vng ḷng tin vào ng, và ây là lư do v́ sao h nêu lên các vn mà h quan ngi vi thái tôn trng. Lănh o ng ă phn hi ngay và xem xét các mi quan ngi ó. Mt iu rơ ràng là không phi ai c gng a ra các thay i cng thành công. Nhng nhng khó khn v kinh t ny sinh t c ch c ă làm gim s phn i i vi nhng ngi th nghim "phá rào". Do ó, hàng rào mi ch b chc thng cp c s, song cui cùng li c dp b cp trung ng. Nm 1979, trên tinh thn hoàn toàn ng h phong trào "phá rào", Hi ngh Trung ng VI ă coi hành ng phá giá quy nh là "ci trói sn xut". Nm 1980, chính quyn a phng ă c phép xut nhp khu trc tip, nh ó hp thc hóa c các công ty "imex". Nm 1981, Ban Bí th ă cho phép thc hin khoán sn phm trong nông nghip. Và cng trong nm 1981, h thng ba loi k hoch cho doanh nghip cng ă c hp thc hóa, cùng vi vic thúc y mi quan h gia doanh nghip--doanh nghip và doanh nghip--th trng.. i mi ă y mnh và nhân rng xu th này. Tuy nhiên, i Mi mi ch din ra trong khuôn kh các ngh quyt ca ng ch không vt ra ngoài. nhng lnh vc nhy cm, vic chuyn t th nghim mang tính a phng sang chính sách quc gia ̣i hi phi c B Chính tr cho phép. Nh vy, ng lc cho công cuc ci cách ă c quyt nh thng nht trong ni b ng, ch không chng li ng. Mt im chung gia các quan im thng gp v ci cách kinh t ó là mô t bi cnh chính tr theo hng i u. Trong mi trng hp, gi thit ngm cho là tn ti mt trng thái cân bng phi hp tác, trong ó có s cng thng gia hai phe i lp. Vic xác nh thành viên ca mi phe có th khác nhau tu theo quan im c th, t ci cách i lp vi bo th, tr i lp vi già, Nam i lp vi Bc, n a phng i lp vi trung ng. Nhng ngi 76 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang theo nhng quan im này có v có thin cm vi mt trong hai phe. Nói mt cách n gin hn, h ng h nhóm gm các nhà ci cách tr c s t min Nam, ngay c khi ranh gii hay thành phn ca nhóm ó khó có th xác nh c. S trùng hp trong các cách lư gii mt quá tŕnh chính tr do gn nó vi mt nhóm nhng ngi trong cuc cho thy rng nhng quan im thng gp v công cuc ci cách Vit Nam hoàn toàn không mang tính khoa hc. D nhn thy trong các quan im này mi ác cm sâu sc i vi ch ngha cng sn, vi ch min Bc, hay vi nh hng ca khi Xô vit c, hoc là mt vài s kt hp ca nhng tâm lư này. Dù mi ác cm nh vy có th bin minh hay không, nó cng dn n gii thích sai v các s kin và khin cho cách gii thích ó b gim giá tr. V mt nào ó, dng nh nhng ngi gi nhng quan im nh vy v ci cách kinh t Vit Nam vn c̣n ang tip tc cuc chin tranh Vit Nam, và không ging nh nhng ngi ă tin hành th nghim "phá rào" và thc hin i Mi. Rt ít s i u và mt vài ngi b thua thit V c bn, quá tŕnh ci cách Vit Nam tt nht nên c hiu là con ng hp tác cùng to ra s thay i, mà trong ó nhng ngi tham gia óng vai tṛ ch cht ă u rt c gng tránh "ánh bi" nhau, k c khi phi chp nhn nhng s tha hip tn kém. Mong mun không ai b thua thit có th thy rơ nht góc kinh t. Song cng có th thy góc chính tr và t tng. T́m kim s ng thun có v nh là mt truyn thng lâu i Vit Nam, mà theo mt s nhà s hc th́ nó có t thi các v vua thuc th k 13. Dù ngun gc th nào i na th́ vn có th nhn xét rng truyn thng này cng rt m nét trong ng Cng sn. Trong sut lch s phát trin ca ng, khó có th ch ra mt cuc o chính ln hay mt v vic quy mô ln mà trong ó mt nhóm ng viên này b mt nhóm khác àn áp. Tuy s tp trung quyn lc có din ra trong thi k chin tranh chng M, song i hi ng VI ă mt ln na khng nh ly s ng thun làm c ch ra quyt nh chính. Quyn lc sau ó ă c chuyn t các cá nhân lănh o tr v cho tp th. Thc hin nghiêm túc nguyên tc "tp trung dân ch", thiu s phi phc tùng a s. Mt khi ngh quyt ă c thông qua th́ không c̣n hi han ǵ na, mi ngi u phi ng h vic thc hin. Tho lun ni b là vic làm c khuyn khích trong quá tŕnh ra quyt nh. Song tranh lun, thm chí nu có mc gay gt v́ mt ư tng nào ó cng không dn n t́nh trng chia bè kéo cánh. Trên thc t, khi không th t c s ng thun th́ nhng ngi tham gia thng gi thái "ch i", ch không c gng áp t quan im ca ḿnh. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 77 Quá tŕnh t́m kim s ng thun không phi là không tr giá. Mt trái ca nó là vic ôi khi phi áp dng nhng bin pháp chính sách chiu l, không i sâu vào gc r vn cn gii quyt. Và quá tŕnh thông qua các bin pháp ch cht thng b kéo dài. iu này gây tht vng cho nhng ngi ngoài cuc thiu kiên nhn, nhng ngi luôn kêu ca v tin ci cách chm chp ca Vit Nam, mc dù tin b ca các kt qu phát trin (t sn lng ti xut khu và gim nghèo) c xp vào loi nhanh nht trên th gii. Ví d, rơ ràng là Vit Nam ă có th kư kt Hip nh Thng mi VitM sm hn thc t, và ă có th gia nhp WTO trc Trung Quc. Song mt s ư kin trong lănh o cp cao ă mun x lư hai bc i quan trng tin ti hi nhp quc t này mt cách thn trng, và cn có thi gian chp nhn chúng. Tng t, nhiu ngi ngh rng ngh quyt i hi ng X không phn ánh ht c nhng thách thc mà Vit Nam phi i mt vào thi gian ó. Song mi ngi chp nhn làm theo quyt nh ó. Thái cng quyt tránh xung t cng c áp dng cho các vn quc t. Trong quá tŕnh i Mi, Vit Nam la chn gii pháp rút lui khi ch ngha bè phái trên trng quc t. Mt trong nhng quyt nh ca i hi ng VI là làm bn vi tt c các nc trên th gii, k c nhng k thù c. Trc ây, có s phân bit gia ba nhóm nc. Nhng nc trong h thng xă hi ch ngha, ng h "tinh thn quc t vô sn", c xem là các nc anh em. Nhng nc thuc Th gii th ba, cùng có chung n lc là t gii phóng khi ch ngha thc dân, c xem là bn bè. Nhng nc c̣n li, t bn hoc quc, là k thù; và v́ mt s lư do khác nhau, Trung Quc thi k ó c xp vào nhóm cui này. Tuy nhiên, cách phân loi này khin Vit Nam b cô lp, nên i hi ng VI quyt nh thay i. Chn cách i x vi Hoa K và Trung Quc nh nhng i tác, ch không phi k thù, là mt bc tin ln ri xa thi k i u. Ci cách kinh t c̣n gn lin vi c gng không to nên nhng ngi bi trn trên lnh vc t tng. V mt này, có nhng gii hn không c phép vi phm, vi mt ranh gii mng manh ngn cách các t tng "ci cách" chp nhn c và "din bin ḥa b́nh" không chp nhn c. Vic chuyn i t h thng bao cp sang c ch th trng cha bao gi c xem là t b các nguyên tc xă hi ch ngha, mà là công c thc hin các nguyên tc ó. Tt c u nht trí rng th trng không phi là sn phm riêng ca ch ngha t bn. Và làm rơ rng ci cách kinh t không dn n vic t b ch ngha xă hi, khái nim "nn kinh t th trng nh hng xă hi ch ngha" ă c t ra. Nhiu ngi s t câu hi v s không rơ ràng ca khái nim này. Nó chú trng nhiu hn n s b́nh ng và vai tṛ ln hn ca nhà nc, so vi nn kinh t th trng "t bn". Tuy nhiên, ngoài tuyên b chung chung ó, rt khó xác nh ư ngha c th ca cm t "theo nh hng xă hi ch ngha" tc là th trng s c t chc nh th nào. Và cui cùng, s không rơ ràng này có th giúp tránh mt cuc tranh lun ln y khó khn v t tng. 78 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang S tha hip ây là tip tc các cuc ci cách kinh t mà không t vn v "các nguyên tc bt di bt dch" ca ng. ây là cách trn an nhng ngi c̣n lo ngi v vic t b h thng chính tr hin nay ca Vit Nam. Ví d, khi các nhà lănh o Hi Pḥng xut ư kin nhân rng phng thc khoán trên toàn quc, iu u tiên mà h làm là c k bài phê b́nh Vnh Phúc ca ông Trung Chinh. ây là cách thúc y ci cách mà không gây nên s i u v mt t tng. Mt s không rơ ràng tng t c a ra khi ng tip tc t coi ḿnh là i din ca "nhng ngi lao ng", mc dù mt b phn ngày càng ông ng viên là nhng nhà kinh doanh thành t. Trên thc t, k t i hi ng VI, khái nim "u tranh giai cp" ă không c̣n c nhn mnh nh trc na. C gng da vào u tranh, bt k là u tranh ǵ, cng là mâu thun vi n lc xây dng s ng thun nh là c ch chính a ra các quyt nh tp th. Tuy nhiên, công khai t b u tranh giai cp cng s dn n vic t b các nguyên tc ca ch ngha Mác, và iu ó s làm cho mt b phn ng viên quay lng li vi ng. Thành công ca Vit Nam trong vic thc hin ci cách toàn din cng gn vi quyt tâm tránh to ra nhng ngi b thua thit v vt cht. V mt này, vic chú trng ti gim nghèo và hoà nhp xă hi c xem nh là áp dng các nguyên tc Pareto, có ngha là mt cuc ci cách ch có th c coi là nâng cao i sng xă hi nu ít nht có mt s ngi c hng li t ó và tt c không ai b nghèo kh i v́ ci cách. Không cho ai thua thit là vic khá d dàng trong thi k u i Mi, bi t́nh h́nh không th nào t hn na i vi hu ht mi ngi. Khi t nc ng bên b ca nn ói th́ không ai c̣n ǵ nhiu mt. Nh vy, thot u không cn thit phi suy ngh n vic n bù cho bt c ai v nhng hu qu ca ci cách kinh t có th gây ra. Tuy nhiên, khi kinh t thoát khi khng hong trm trng, th́ vic chuyn i t h thng bao cp sang c ch th trng có th ă có tác ng tiêu cc ti mt s b phn dân c c th, hoc u ăi mt s nhóm này nhiu hn các nhóm khác. Các bin pháp chính sách c áp dng sau giai on u ca i Mi ă c gng ngn nga t́nh trng mc sng suy gim và bt b́nh ng gia tng. Ví d, mt trong nhng mc ích ca ci cách Doanh nghip Nhà nc (DNNN) là nâng cao quyn t ch ca các giám c trong vic ra quyt nh, không chu s can thip v mt hành chính. Các v giám c này có th b thua thit do quá tŕnh t do hóa và t nhân hoá tài sn nhà nc. Song quyn li ca h ă không b ng chm. Vic áp dng các h́nh thc khuyn khích mnh m hn nhm ti a hoá li nhun c thc hin theo cách nhng ngi trong cuc có th thu c mt phn li nhun áng k trong s ó, dói h́nh thc các khon tin thng và tin chi tr thêm khác (trong ó có mt s khon chi tr không chính thc). C̣n v t nhân hóa th́ giai on u ca quá tŕnh c phn hóa cho phép các giám c DNNN tham gia s hu ca doanh nghip mà h qun lư. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 79 Ngi lao ng trong khu vc nhà nc, có l là nhóm ln duy nht c hng ch u ăi di mô h́nh bao cp, cng không b nh hng. Khi mt s h́nh thc bo tr xă hi c bn nh lng hu c m rng ra c khu vc t nhân chính thc, th́ các gói li ích mà ngi lao ng thuc khu vc nhà nc c hng ă tng thêm, và tin ngân sách c dùng bù p cho phn óng góp bo him xă hi cha np. Mt chng tŕnh n bù bng tin mt ă c lp ra chi tr cho ngi lao ng dôi d thuc các DNNN. Trong giai on u, mc bi thng ă c xác nh mt cách vi vàng, kp áp ng vi t́nh h́nh nhiu nhà máy óng ca do s sp v thng mi vi khi Xô vit c. Trong nhng giai on tip theo, ă có nhiu n lc c tính toán cn thn hn nhm t ra mc n bù khin ngi lao ng dôi d không c̣n lo lng v chuyn mt vic na. Các cuc iu tra tip theo c tin hành trên nhng ngi lao ng dôi d cho thy mc hài ḷng tng i cao vi s h tr nhn c, chng t n lc này ă thành công. Chng tŕnh này c duy tŕ trong nhiu nm, mc dù tn kém khá nhiu cho ngân sách. Chin lc tng trng chung c̣n nhm mc ích tng thu nhp cho các h nông dân, nhng ngi rơ ràng là không thuc khu vc nhà nc c u ăi. Vic phân chia li t ai theo b́nh quân u ngi, cng vi vic t do hóa thng mi, ă giúp nâng cao i sng và gim nghèo khu vc nông thôn. Các bin pháp c tin hành nhm thu hút FDI, ch yu vào các khu vc cn nhiu nhân công, cng to ra mt con ng thoát nghèo cho nhng di dân lao ng nông thôn không có tay ngh. Thng mi hóa nông nghip và nhanh chóng to vic làm có tr lng, do ó, là công c ngn chn s gia tng ca t́nh trng bt b́nh ng, dù cho kinh t tng trng rt nhanh. Gn ây, mt h thng iu tit ngân sách Chính ph hiu qu ă c thit lp nhm tái phân b ngun lc t các tnh giàu sang các tnh nghèo hn. Mt bc i hng ti phân cp tài chính mnh m hn trong nm 2002 ă dn n vic thit lp các quy nh công khai v phân b ngân sách cho chính quyn a phng cp thp, trc tiên là cho chi thng xuyên và hin nay là cho chi u t. Kt hp vi các chng tŕnh mc tiêu nhm em li li ích cho các nhóm dân c c th, các quy nh v phân b ngân sách dn n vic phân phi li thu nhp mt cách c bn. Mt s tnh nghèo nht nhn c ngân sách nhà nc phân b chim ti ½ GDP ca toàn tnh. Nu em so sánh v mc tng i, th́ thy t l lng ngun lc c phân b cho các vùng tt hu Vit Nam ln hn nhiu so vi Liên minh châu Âu. ây li là mt minh chng na cho n lc to ln ca Chính ph Vit Nam nhm gi ǵn s ḥa nhp xă hi, t ó gim thiu s bt b́nh và cng thng xă hi khi t nc ngày càng giàu lên. 80 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang X lư và chp nhn nhng ư tng mi Nh kh nng gim thiu i u và tránh to ra nhng ngi b thua thit nên quá tŕnh ci cách Vit Nam v c bn có th c xem là mt hành ng tp th, ó các thay i v chính sách c thc hin sau khi ban lănh o ă chp thun các phng pháp tip cn mi, ch không phi là chin thng ca mt nhóm này i vi nhóm khác trong ni b. Theo cách lư gii này, s hiu bit v quá tŕnh thu thp, x lư thông tin và quan im, a kin ngh lên cp có thm quyn phê chun và ra quyt nh thc hin tr nên quan trng. iu ǵ khin mt ư tng mi hp dn và có kh nng c chp nhn? Thông thng, các sáng kin c th có th quá liu lnh hoc quá cp tin, tu theo bi cnh lch s, có th c xem xét mt cách nghiêm túc. Ví d, ngh ca ông Lê Dun vào tháng 9 nm 1975 v vic tm thi gi li h thng kinh t ca min Nam, th nghim c ch th trng, ă b ri vào t́nh trng này. Song có nhng sáng kin táo bo khác cui cùng li c B Chính tr, lănh o ng và nhà nc chp thun. Ư tng ó xut phát t âu? Dù có th là n gin hóa vn , nhng có th nói hin có ba ngun ư tng sáng to mi: kinh nghim quc t, các nhà tri thc trong nc và th nghim thc t. Mc quan trng ca nhng ngun này có th khác nhau tùy thuc tng hoàn cnh c th. Tham kho kinh nghim quc t là nét ni bt trong nh hng chính sách ca Vit Nam, ngay t trc khi thng nht t nc. Ví d, các chuyên gia Trung Quc ă có vai tṛ quan trng cho n cui nhng nm 1950, khi ch ngha Mao Trch ông c coi là kim ch nam i vi nhiu ngi Vit nam. Vic thc hin ci cách rung t theo mô h́nh ca Trung Quc ă dn ti nhng hu qu nghiêm trng, và Ch tch H Chí Minh ă công khai tuyên b t b ch trng này. Do ó, sau nm 1956, nhng ng li phát trin ca Trung Quc nh "i nhy vt", "cách mng vn hóa" ă c Vit Nam theo dơi vi rt nhiu lo ngi. i vi các nhà lănh o Vit Nam, th́ cuc cách mng vn hóa là mt c gng tàn bo nhm àn áp nhng ai bt ng ư kin trong khi kinh t suy thoái. T ó, nh hng ca Trung Quc i vi Vit Nam gim sút, và quan h hai nc tr nên cng thng sau khi Vit Nam thng nht. Gn cui cuc chin tranh chng M, Vit Nam có mi hai oàn c vn kinh t t khi Xô vit. oàn th nht t ông c n vào nm 1973. oàn th hai t Nga vào nm 1974. Vic xem xét v quy mô gii thích lư do ti sao li mi oàn ông c. Nga là nn kinh t quá ln kinh nghim ca Nga có th phù hp ngay vi Vit Nam. Tuy nhiên, c hai oàn này u không mang li giá tr thc tin ǵ ln. Mt nc xă hi ch ngha khác có quy mô kinh t tng t nh Vit Nam là Cng ḥa Dân ch Nhân dân Triu Tiên. Nm 1973, ông Lê Dun c mt oàn sang ó nghiên cu. oàn do ông Trn Phng, Vic trng Vin Kinh t, c vn trc tip cho ông Lê Dun, dn u. Tuy nhiên, oàn ă không có n tng Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 81 tt. Khi tr v, ông Trn Phng báo cáo li rng Vit Nam không th hc c ǵ t mô h́nh kinh t ca Cng ḥa Dân ch Nhân dân Triu Tiên. Sau ngày t nc thng nht, nhng mô h́nh bên ngoài mà Vit Nam ă nghiên cu, t́m hiu, cng bt u quá tŕnh chuyn i ca h. Trung Quc, ng Tiu B́nh lên nm quyn nm 1978 và khi xng tin tŕnh ci cách t nm 1979. Tuy nhiên, ây cng là thi im xy ra xung t v trang ti biên gii gia hai nc. Vào thi im ó, các nhà lănh o Vit Nam theo dơi công cuc ci cách kinh t và 4 hin i hóa ca Trung Quc vi thái hoài nghi, coi ó là hành ng ca k thù, "k phn bi" ch ngha cng sn. C̣n nhng s thay i Liên bang Nga li c chp nhn d dàng hn sau khi Mikhail Gorbachov tr thành Tng bí th nm 1985 và khi xng "glasnost" và "perestroika". Chính ph Vit Nam chc chn rt quan tâm n nhng kinh nghim này và sn sàng tip thu nhng t tng mi phù hp vi bi cnh và iu kin Vit Nam. Tuy nhiên, s ci m ó không dn n vic sao chép nguyên bn. Ví d, Nga ă tin hành ci cách kinh t, song cng tin hành ci t chính tr. Theo quan im ca Vit Nam, ci t chính tr là ngun gc gây ra s o ln nghiêm trng, phá hoi quyn lc ca ng, cn tr vic thc hin thun li các cuc ci cách kinh t, v́ th ó không phi là mô h́nh làm theo. V phn các nc phng Tây, trong mt thi gian dài, các nhà lănh o Vit Nam ă có rt ít thông tin v các nc này. H hiu bit v mô h́nh xă hi ch ngha mà theo h là thành công, và có tinh thn oàn kt vi các nc xă hi ch ngha khác. H cng bit rng có mt s nc c lp v chính tr vi nn kinh t c xây dng theo mô h́nh t bn ch ngha, nhng h gp chung vào thành Th gii th ba. Song hiu bit ca h v kinh t th trng c th th́ hoàn toàn không dn ng cho các cuc ci cách kinh t. Kinh nghim ca các nc thuc Th gii th ba cng không có nhiu nh hng i vi Vit Nam. Ln chm trán u tiên nghiêm túc vi các nn kinh t c t chc theo các nguyên tc khác ă din ra khu vc ông Á. Vic can thip quân s vào Campuchia ă y Vit Nam vào mt bi cnh i ngoi phc tp. Trên mt trn ngoi giao, ó là thi k khó khn nht, vi bao li ch trích t khp bn phng, k c các nc xă hi ch ngha tng là bn bè (không k s phn i kch lit ca Trung Quc). Nm 1988, ông Vơ Vn Kit gp mt Th tng Singapore Lư Quang Diu, và ông này tuyên b rng iu kin tiên quyt b́nh thng hóa quan h vi Vit Nam là Vit Nam phi rút quân khi Campuchia. Vic rút quân ă c quyt nh trc thi im din ra cuc gp, to iu kin thun li cho cuc i thoi gia 2 bên và t ó ông Lư Quang Diu ă nhiu ln óng góp ư kin có giá tr cho Vit Nam. Thái lc quan ca ông Diu v tim nng ca t nc này ă khin ông tr thành mt c vn nhit t́nh cho ban lănh o cp cao ca Vit Nam. Thành công ngon mc v kinh t ca Singapore chc chn ă khin nc ngày tr thành mt h́nh mu hc tp. S kt hp gia các nguyên tc th trng vi mc kim soát áng k v mt chính tr khin mô h́nh này c bit hp dn i vi Chính ph Vit Nam. 82 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Hàn Quc là mt quc gia khác áng cho Vit Nam nghiên cu. Trong mt chng tŕnh h tr k thut do Chng tŕnh Phát trin Liên hp quc (UNDP) tài tr, mt trong nhng hot ng u tiên ca chng tŕnh là cp kinh phí cho mt oàn i nghiên cu hc hi Seoul nm 1990. oàn do ông Trn Xuân Giá, ngi sau này tr thành Ch nhim vn pḥng Chính ph và B trng B K hoch và u t, dn u. oàn kho sát ă thc s n tng vi tc phát trin nhanh chóng và thành tu ca Hàn Quc sau chin tranh. Nh n giai on khó khn mà Vit Nam vn ang phi tri qua, oàn ă ánh i các bui ón tip chính thc chúc mng chin thng ca Vit Nam trong cuc chin tranh chng M bng các ba n m bc nhm tit kim tin công tác phí do UNDP cung cp, mà tính ra cng lên n vài tháng lng. H tr ca các nhà tài tr cng óng mt vai tṛ quan trng. Thy in có mt Vit Nam t lâu và rt có uy tín trong vic h tr t chc các cuc hi ngh, hi tho, cung cp chuyên gia và tài tr cho các oàn i hc tp kinh nghip nc ngoài. Khi ci cách ă có à, Chính ph c̣n duy tŕ các cuc i thoi tích cc vi các chuyên gia Nht Bn, nhng ngi vn có quan im v chin lc kinh t khác vi các ng nghip phng Tây ca h. Vic b́nh thng hóa quan h vi các th ch Bretton Woods chính thc din ra nm 1993. Tuy nhiên, hai bên ă có liên h t trc ó. Nm 1989, mt sáng kin quan trng ă c thc hin nhm tách chc nng qun lư ngân sách ra khi hot ng ca ngân hàng trung ng, chuyn phn hot ng thng mi ca Ngân hàng Nhà nc Vit Nam sang các ngân hàng thng mi, cho phép thành lp các ngân hàng c phn, hp tác xă tín dng và các chi nhánh ngân hàng nc ngoài. Vào thi im ó, ông Vơ Vn Kit là Phó Th tng th nht. gii quyt nhng vn phc tp này, ông ă cho thành lp hai nhóm chuyên gia c lp nghiên cu và t vn, mt hành ng cha tng có tin l trong h thng Xă hi ch ngha. Ông ă lng nghe, xem xét thc hin nhng xut phù hp nht ca h trong vic son tho Ngh quyt iu chnh lnh vc ngân hàng. Ông Hunh Bu Sn c c i gp i din Qu Tin t Quc t (IMF). Mt thi gian ngn sau ó, mt phái oàn ca IMF ă sang Vit nam giúp hoàn thin các vn bn lut phc v công cuc ci cách quan trng này. Chng tŕnh Phát trin Liên hp quc (UNDP), mt trong s ít các t chc tài tr sm có mt Vit Nam, cùng vi Thy in, óng vai tṛ quan trng trong vic huy ng các ngun lc chuyên môn t phía Ngân hàng Th gii (NHTG) trc khi quan h gia Vit Nam và các th ch Bretton Woods c b́nh thng hóa. Tuy vy, trong mt thi gian dài, mt s nhà lănh o cp cao vn nh́n các th ch này bng cp mt nghi ng và cho rng các th ch này do các nc công nghip, c bit là M kim soát. Thot u, các th ch này ch c xem nh là ngun cung cp vn. Và Chính ph Vit Nam luôn tránh ph thuc quá nhiu vào ngun vn này, làm sao tip tc kim soát hoàn toàn vic a ra các la chn chính sách. Theo thi gian, khi s nghi ngi ă bin mt và quan h vi các th ch Bretton Woods ă chín mui, các ư kin óng góp v k thut và phân Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 83 tích kinh t ca các th ch này ă c coi trng nhiu hn. Song trong sut nhng nm 1990, Chính ph vn trung thành vi nhng la chn ca ḿnh. Các khuyn ngh c a ra c xem là không hoàn toàn phù hp vi hoàn cnh ca Vit Nam, ví d nh trong vn thúc y t nhân hóa. Theo thi gian, quan h vi NHTG ă tr nên sâu sc hn nhiu. Vit Nam hin nay ă là nc c vay nhiu nht sau n t Hip hi Phát trin Quc t, b phn cho vay u ăi ca NHTG. NHTG cng nm gi vai tṛ ngày càng tng trong iu phi hot ng ca cng ng tài tr và tin hành các nghiên cu phân tích. T nm 2001 tr i, mt chu tŕnh hot ng cho vay chính sách thng xuyên ă c thit lp, vi s lng các nhà tài tr ng h hot ng này ngày càng tng, thông qua h́nh thc h tr vn và h tr k thut. Các hot ng này trong giai on ban u c gn vi các iu kin cho vay nghiêm ngt, sau ó dn dn chuyn thành mt c ch linh hot nhm m bo tính nht quán, s thích hp v thi gian và ni dung ca các ci cách chính sách. Mt khác, quan h vi IMF tr nên lng lo hn vi vic ngng gii ngân vào nm 2002 và chng tŕnh cho vay cui cùng ca IMF kt thúc vào nm 2004. B ngoài, s t quăng trong quan h này là do bt ng v mt vn k thut, c th là kh nng thc hin kim toán bên ngoài i vi ngân hàng trung ng. Song thc t không bên nào chu nhng b li phn ánh s bt ng ngày càng tng v tc ci cách chính sách, c bit trong vn t nhân hóa các DNNN và NHTMNN. Các nhà lănh o Vit Nam cng rt nhy cm i vi s phê phán t phía các nhà hoch nh chính sách trong khu vc v cách thc mà IMF x lư cuc khng hong ông Á nm 1997. Các trng i hc và trung tâm nghiên cu bt u c thành lp nc Vit Nam c lp vào cui nhng nm 1950. Trong s các vin nghiên cu ch cht có Vin Kinh t, c thành lp nm 1960 thuc Vin Khoa hc Xă hi Vit Nam (VKHXHVN) và Vin Nghiên cu Qun Lư Kinh T Trung ng thành lp nm 1978. Tuy nhiên, cho n khi quá tŕnh i mi din ra, th́ s óng góp ca các vin nghiên cu này cho công cuc ci cách kinh t vn c̣n rt hn ch. iu này có th lư gii là do nhim v c giao và chính sách s dng ngun nhân lc. Nhim v ca các vin này là h tr ban lănh o, ch không phi a ra các quan im c lp. C th, nhng c quan này không có trách nhim theo dơi tin tŕnh phát trin kinh t và các cuc tranh lun chính sách trong các nn kinh t th trng. C̣n v ngun nhân lc th́ các chuyên gia c vn và nghiên cu ch cht là do Ban chp hành Trung ng ng la chn sau khi Ban T chc Trung ng thông qua. Kt qu, nhng ngi c b nhim c la chn ch yu da trên s trung thành v chính tr, s vng vàng v t tng hoc kh nng nm bt quan im ca lănh o, ch không phi da trên nng lc chuyên môn ca h. Không có ǵ áng ngc nhiên khi kin thc ca h ch yu c da trên các tài liu ca Karl Marx và V.I. Lenin và tài liu tham kho ch yu ca h ch yu xut x t Nga. Trong thp k t́m kim gii pháp, các nhà c vn "không chính thc" thc t ă óng góp phn quan trng hn cho công cuc ci cách kinh t so vi các 84 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang vin nghiên cu chính thng. Trng hp thành ph H Chí Minh là ví d áng chú ư v mt này. Nm 1976, do không hài ḷng vi ư kin tham mu chính thc v kinh t t min Bc và hiu c s hn ch v chuyên môn mang tính k thut ca ban lănh o thành ph, ông Vơ Vn Kit ă thành lp mt b phn chu trách nhim huy ng các ngun lc trí thc ca ch c min Nam. Mc ích là thu thp ư kin óng góp, i chiu quan im ca tt c các bên, và la chn trong tng trng hp nhng ư kin xut phù hp nht. Mt trong nhng thành viên ca b phn này là tin s Nguyn Vn Ho, mt chuyên gia v chính sách kinh t v mô. Ngoài ra c̣n có ông Nguyn Xuân Oánh (Jacky), cu Phó Th tng ca ch Sài G̣n c, tng c ào to ti Harvard, và cha ông là ngi có quan h mt thit vi quân kháng chin. Công vic ca nhóm c vn này không phi là hoàn toàn thun li. Sau mt thi gian, do tht vng vi vic ch có mt s ít xut ca ḿnh c s dng, tin s Nguyn Vn Ho ă xin phép ra nc ngoài vi gia ́nh và c chp thun. T nm 1984, nhng s thay i din ra nhanh hn. Vào thi im này, sc khe ca ông Lê Dun ă suy gim nhiu. S tht bi ca cách tip cn "qun huyn là pháo ài" mà mi ngi xem là ư tng ca ông Lê Dun cng làm gim uy tín cá nhân ông. ng thi, vai tṛ và uy tín ca ông Trng Chinh lên cao. Ông Trng Chinh t chc mt nhóm gm các chuyên gia có uy tín cao, t tng ci m nhm h tr ông t́m ṭi phát trin các t tng gii pháp sáng to. Nhóm do ông Hà Nghip và ông Trn Nhâm lănh o. Cùng vi hn mt chc chuyên gia các lnh vc khác nhau, nhóm ă tham gia trc tip vào vic son tho ni dung vn kin i hi ng VI. Trong nhng nm sau ó, mt s nhà nghiên cu và báo chí bt u lên ting v các th nghim "phá rào" và phân tích lư do ti sao các th nghim ó li thành công. Thot u rt thn trng, sau ó dn dn công khai hn, các cuc hi ngh, hi tho ă c t chc nhm a thông tin n vi ban lănh o cp cao và thm chí ti B Chính tr. S vn ng v tri thc này ă óng góp to ln cho ng lc thúc y ci cách, dn ti i hi ng VI. n lúc ó, vai tṛ ca các c vn chính sách và vin nghiên cu bt u c nh́n nhn tích cc hn. S thay i v vai tṛ ca các c vn chính sách và vin nghiên cu tr nên d nhn thy hn k t khi bt u quá tŕnh i Mi. Nm 1989, Hc vin Quan h Quc t ă dch cun giáo tŕnh kinh t ni ting ca Paul Samuelson sang ting Vit. Không có tin tr tin tác quyn, hc vin ă vit th cho tác gi và c tác gi ng ư min tr phí. Dn dn, các cun sách và tài liu khác c dch, và các khoá hc v kinh t th trng c t chc. Cng trong nm 1989, mt nhóm chuyên gia v ào to ca Vin Ngân hàng Th gii ă c mi n ging mt khóa hc v lm phát và b́nh n giá c, có s tham d ca Th tng và mt s B trng. Vic ông Vơ Vn Kit thành lp hai nhóm nghiên cu c lp nhm nghiên cu và t vn v ci cách ngân hàng cng là mt ví d th hin rơ ràng tinh thn i mi thi im ó. Mt nhóm bao gm nhng nhà khoa hc c ào to khi Xô Vit và ang m nhim nhng chc v quan trng trong Chính ph. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 85 Trong khi nhóm c̣n li bao gm nhng chuyên gia ngân hàng tng làm vic cho ch c. Trong khong gia các nm 1989 và 1993, mt d án ca Vn pḥng Hi ng B trng do ông V Tt Bi qun lư ă có óng góp rt quan trng. D án này s dng kinh phí c huy ng t UNDP và mt s t chc khác dch thut mt s lng ln tài liu, t chc các cuc hi tho cp b trng, và c các nhà kinh t và lut s tr i hc nc ngoài. Mt s ngi trong s ó sau này óng vai tṛ ch cht trong các cuc àm phán thng mi quc t và tham gia xây dng các quy nh mi v phát trin kinh doanh. n nay, mt s v c vn chính sách và vin nghiên cu ang óng vai tṛ ngày càng tích cc trong vic ph bin chính sách công và h tr công cuc ci cách kinh t. Vin Nghiên cu Qun lư kinh t trung ng ă có nhng óng góp quan trng vào xây dng khung pháp lư cho hot ng kinh doanh, trong ó có các quy nh v ng kư kinh doanh, qun tr doanh nghip và cp phép u t. Vin cng ă tin hành ánh giá bài bn tác ng ca quá tŕnh c phn hóa doanh nghip. VKHXHVN li là tâm im ca các nghiên cu ngành nhm h tr cho các cuc àm phán gia nhp WTO, và óng vai tṛ ngày càng quan trng trong vic phân tích t́nh trng nghèo và các vn xă hi có liên quan khác. Vin Khoa hc Lao ng và Xă hi (ILSSA) óng góp ngày càng nhiu cho vic nghiên cu các chính sách lao ng và bo him xă hi. Các sáng kin có giá tr tng t liên quan n lnh vc bo him y t hin ang c B Y t tin hành, hay liên quan n ci cách ngành in do B Công nghip và Thng mi thc hin. Trong mi trng hp, có th d dàng nhn thy xu hng nâng cao tính k thut và sc thuyt phc ca các nghiên cu phân tích. H tr cho vic nâng cao cht lng các ư kin óng góp k thut trong xây dng chính sách công là vic thu thp c các b s liu tt hn. Trong mt thi gian khá dài, s liu thc t tt không phi là mt yu t u vào thit yu i vi quá tŕnh hoch nh chính sách Vit Nam. Không cn phi tin hành các ánh giá tác ng phc tp mi nhn ra rng các cuc th nghim "phá rào" gn vi kt qu kinh t tt hn. Vic phân b ngun lc cho ngi nghèo do chính quyn a phng tin hành, thông qua vic hi ư kin dân làng hay thm chí biu quyt trc tip chn danh sách "h nghèo". Khi kinh t phát trin hn và các vn chính sách tr nên phc tp hn, th́ các công c cn thit cung cp thông tin u vào cho vic la chn chính sách kinh t cng tr nên phc tp hn. N lc chính thc u tiên c tính GDP c tin hành nm 1989. Cuc iu tra h gia ́nh mang tính i din cho toàn quc ln u tiên c tin hành vào nm 1993, vi kinh phí do UNDP tài tr và h tr k thut ca NHTG. K t ó, các cuc iu tra nh vy tr thành mt phn trong hot ng c bn ca Tng cc Thng kê (TCTK). C mu ă ln hn nhiu và tn sut thu thp s liu cng thng xuyên hn. K t nm 2000, TCTK c̣n tin hành iu tra doanh nghip hàng nm. Cht lng và kh nng tip cn s liu v ngân sách cng ă c nâng cao áng k, nh nhng n lc ca B Tài chính (BTC). Và hin b ch s v qun tr nhà nc cng ang c 86 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang th nghim. Mt khác, mt s lnh vc quan trng nh chính sách tin t, lnh vc tài chính, chi tiêu công cp a phng, s liu v n công và cán cân thanh toán c̣n yu kém và có th ci thin c rt nhiu. Cui cùng, a s các quyt sách vn cn phi c B Chính tr cho phép. Các quan im ca VKHXHVN v vic gia nhp WTO chc không c coi là phù hp n vy nu Ch tch ca Vin, TS. Hoài Nam, không có kh nng chuyn ti ti Th tng, c bit là trc thm ṿng àm phán th 8, nm 2004. Vào thi gian ó, mt s nhà lănh o vn tip cn vic gia nhp WTO t quan im "nhng b" hn là t quan im "phát trin". Tng t, vic B Chính tr ng h l tŕnh nhiu tham vng v ci cách ngành ngân hàng vào nm 2005, t c là nh có s vn ng cá nhân ca TS. Cao S Kiêm, nguyên Phó Trng Ban Kinh t Trung ng ng. Thành công này t c sau mt nm tin hành nghiên cu k thut ít ngi bit ca mt nhóm chuyên gia trong nc và nc ngoài. Thc t cho thy tác ng ca các óng góp v mt k thut ca các vin nghiên cu và c vn chính sách rơ ràng c nhân lên rt nhiu ln khi có kênh trao i thông tin hiu qu vi ban lănh o t nc. Hot ng trao i thông tin kiu ó vn có s tham gia ca các nhà trung gian "c min tr", nhng ngi có th thuyt phc các lănh t ng v giá tr ca các ư tng mi, mà không s b gn cho cái mác xét li. i vi các ci cách quan trng th́ ch có s hp lư v k thut hay tŕnh bày các ư kin óng góp k thut mt cách bt mt không thôi th́ cha . Các nhà lănh o cp cao cn phi c thuyt phc rng nhng kin ngh ó xut phát t thc t ca t nc, phc v cho nhng li ích ti cao ca t nc và phù hp vi s n nh v chính tr. mt mc nào ó, thái thn trng nh vy có th c xem nh là mt h qu ca mt thp k kim t́m gii pháp. Vào thi gian ó, s tr giúp ca các nc xă hi ch ngha khác có th trên thc t ă làm chm li quá tŕnh ci cách kinh t do che giu i nhng thiu sót ca mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung. Quan trng hn, vic sao chép mt cách mù quáng các mô h́nh ca nc ngoài, không phù hp vi thc tin ca Vit Nam, là mt sai lm không nên lp li. iu này úng trong trng hp các mô h́nh ca Trung Quc và khi Xô vit c. Sau i Mi, s thn trng ó ă c áp dng vi "các bài hc kinh nghim quc t" hay "các mô h́nh mu" do các chuyên gia phng Tây rao ging mà không cn kim tra k xem chúng có phù hp vi Vit Nam hay không. S thn trng ó càng cao hn sau s sp ca khi Liên bang Xô vit trong giai on t nm 1989 n nhng nm u thp k 90. Nhng nhà lănh o cao cp lo ngi v tác ng ca "din bin ḥa b́nh", và ó cng là lư do mt s khu hiu nh "ḥa nhp nhng không ḥa tan" và "i mi nhng không i màu" xut hin. Thái thn trng và s nhn mnh n tính thc tin này, dng nh trái ngc vi nhng im thng thy mt quc gia do ng Cng sn cm quyn. Cách tip cn này gn vi thái thiu tin tng i vi tt c nhng ǵ mang nng tính lư thuyt hay t tng, cho dù chúng có c xây dng trên Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 87 "các nguyên lư bt di bt dch" ca ch ngha xă hi hay trên "các nguyên lư c bn" ca kinh t hc. Vic lư gii theo phng pháp quy np có v c a dùng hn là các phng pháp suy din. Th nghim các ư tng mi và tho lun rng răi kt qu là phng pháp thng gp nhm t́m hiu tính phù hp và tác ng ca các chính sách a ra. Các th nghim này s không c nhân rng ra cho n khi t c s nht trí v nh hng ca chúng. Phi tha nhn rng quá tŕnh này tn nhiu thi gian và thng gây chán nn, c bit là i vi nhng chuyên gia phng tây do không nm rơ lch s ca nó. Song phng pháp tip cn ca Vit Nam trong vic x lư và chp nhn nhng ư tng mi cng làm gim thiu nguy c phm nhng sai lm chính sách ln và nhng o ngc chính sách tn kém. Phng pháp này rơ ràng là h qu quan trng ca mt thp k kim t́m gii pháp và các th nghim "phá rào". Các thách thc và nguy c mi ni Phng thc v c bn là hp tác trong quá tŕnh x lư và chp nhn nhng ư tng mi v kinh t ca ban lănh o Vit Nam trong hai thp k qua có th gii thích ti sao t nc này li thành công nh vy trong vic nâng cao mc sng, gim nghèo và tránh c các cuc khng hong ln. Tuy nhiên, tip tc áp dng nguyên trng phng pháp này khi Vit Nam bc vào hàng ng các quc gia có thu nhp trung b́nh cha hn s em li nhng thành tu tng t. Vit Nam ang i mt vi nhng thách thc mi do chính thành công em li. Do vy, c ch áp dng thành công trong quá tŕnh i Mi có th s kém phù hp hn, và thành công cng có th s b hn ch hn so vi thi k chuyn tip t mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung sang th trng. Nói mt cách n gin, các thách thc mi xut hin i vi Vit Nam có th c phân thành ba loi chính. Th nht, do nn kinh t ă hi nhp nhiu hn c trong nc ln quc t, nên nh hng ca các quyt sách không phù hp có th b nhân lên gp nhiu ln. C th, các cuc khng hong tài chính là nhng nguy c ln nht mà các quc gia có thu nhp trung b́nh thng gp phi. Nguy c này có th nghiêm trng hn i vi Vit Nam, xut phát t ḍng vn k lc thu hút c sau nhng thành công. Th hai, tác ng cng hng ca s tng trng kinh t nhanh chóng ti các trung tâm ô th ln ca t nc làm cho vic duy tŕ t́nh trng bt b́nh ng mc trung b́nh s ngày càng khó khn hn. Trong bi cnh t nn tham nhng vn c̣n ph bin, th́ tính hp pháp ca tài sn to dng c có th b nghi ng, gây nên s bt măn trong xă hi. Và th ba, do nn kinh t ă gm nhiu thành phn hn và s lng ngi tham gia ă bùng n, th́ vic a các ư kin phn hi n c vi Chính ph s tr nên khó khn hn nhiu. Vic không nm bt c s thay i din ra trong quan h gia nhà nc và xă hi có th làm bùng phát s mt n nh v chính tr. Ba nguy c này thc t trc ây ă din ra trong khu vc, làm nh hng n các nc khác có cùng tŕnh phát trin nh Vit Nam hin nay. Ti Thái 88 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Lan, các bin pháp giám sát không thích hp i vi khu vc tài chính kt hp vi chính sách t giá không phù hp ă dn n cuc khng hong ng Bt, sau ó t́nh h́nh li b làm phc tp thêm bi mt chính sách kim soát ngân sách quá cht. Tuy Thái Lan cng ă phc hi sau khng hong, song vn cha t c tc tng trng cao nh trc. Ti Indonesia, ba thp k tng trng kinh t nhanh chóng ă giúp nâng cao thu nhp trên c nc, song mt nhóm nh thành ph có quan h thân thit vi chính quyn cp cao ă giàu lên mt cách áng ng. S bt b́nh v khi tài sn c to dng mt cách m ám này ă khin cho Suharto b lt , và k t ó ti nay nn kinh t Indonesia vn cha t c kt qu tng trng kh quan. Trung Quc, lm phát và tht nghip thành th cao ă a n nhng bt n và bt b́nh xă hi vào cui nhng nm 1980. Mt minh chng rơ nét cho s bt b́nh này là cuc biu t́nh qung trng Thiên An Môn mà Chính ph có th d dàng dp tt, song cái giá phi tr là quá t cho h́nh nh ca Trung Quc trên trng quc t. Nguy c u tiên, c th là không qun lư và dn dt hiu qu s phát trin kinh t, c nhân lên bi mc ph thuc ln nhau v tài chính ngày càng tng ca nn kinh t. Hai thp k qua ă chng kin s gia tng áng k ca sâu tài chính, do vy vic mt nhóm này mt kh nng tr n hay thiu nng lc tái c cu tài sn mt cách nhanh chóng có th to ra nhng cú sc cho toàn b nn kinh t. Trc ây, các khon n xu ca các DNNN ă khin các NHTMNN kinh doanh không có lăi, nu không chính thc b phá sn th́ cng khin ngân sách nhà nc thêm gánh nng phi tr. Tuy nhiên, chúng không e da s n nh kinh t nói chung ca Vit Nam. Vn cng không th iu chuyn vào hay ra khi t nc mt cách t do nên s hn lon trên th trng tài chính nc ngoài gây rt ít hu qu i vi Vit Nam. iu này hin không c̣n úng na. C vic sâu tài chính tng lên ln huy ng ngun vn nc ngoài u có th giúp nâng cao hiu qu kinh t, song cng có th to ra nhng yu im, ̣i hi phi có mt nng lc qun lư kinh t vng vàng. Quá tŕnh t́m kim s ng thun ă giúp thúc y ci cách vi nhng tc khác nhau gia các ngành. S mt cân i do quá tŕnh ó gây ra cng làm suy gim kh nng kim soát s phát trin kinh t ca các nhà hoch nh chính sách. Ví d, s ng thun v vic cn thit phi gia nhp WTO ă t c sm hn s ng thun v vic cp thit phi ci cách khu vc tài chính. mt mc nào ó, th t này là hp lư. Các cam kt gia nhp WTO ă c s dng nh là cách "trói" các cam kt ci cách kinh t chính, k c nâng cao tính cnh tranh trong cung cp các dch v tài chính. Vic không th o ngc các cam kt này trên thc t ă khin cho ci cách ngành ngân hàng tr nên cn thit. Song kt qu là s sai lch không ng b gia ḍng vn u t gia tng k lc và vic thiu mt ngân hàng trung ng hin i, có nng lc thc hin chính sách tin t và giám sát lnh vc tài chính. S mt cân i nh th này cng có th bt gp trong các lnh vc khác. V các dch v h tng, và c bit là in, s cn thit phi áp ng nhu cu tng cao ang dn ti u t t trc khi các t chc và quy tc th trng thích hp Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 89 c thit lp. Kt qu là ngun vn có th c phân b không hiu qu, quyn nh ot th trng có th tp trung trong tay mt vài doanh nghip, và giá in có th s cao ngt ngng. V môi trng, công nghip hóa phát trin vi tc nhanh trc khi nhng công c kim soát ô nhim và qun lư ngun tài nguyên thiên nhiên có hiu lc. Vic gii quyt hu qu sau này có th s rt tn kém. Trong hai ví d này, ci cách không ng b có th s không gây ra nhng cuc khng hong trc mt, song hu qu lâu dài th́ không th làm ng. Nguy c ln th hai mà Vit Nam phi i mt khi gia nhp nhóm các quc gia có thu nhp trung b́nh là phi i u vi s bt b́nh ngày càng tng trong xă hi. Bng cách phân chia li rung t mt cách quân b́nh và khuyn khích FDI trong nhng khu vc cn nhiu lao ng, quá tŕnh i Mi ă làm tng cao thu nhp ca các h nông thôn và ngi lao ng không có tay ngh. iu này ă giúp kim ch s gia tng t́nh trng bt b́nh ng mt mc áng khâm phc i vi mt quc gia ang tng trng nhanh. Tuy nhiên, nn kinh t ă tr nên phc tp hn, vi s chuyn i nhanh chóng trong các ngành công nghip có giá tr gia tng cao hn và các ngành dch v. Các ngành có thu nhp cao là công ngh thông tin, dch v tài chính, bt ng sn hoc bán l cao cp. Các ngành này u hng li rt ln do tác ng ca quy t sn xut, và do vy thng phát trin trong các trung tâm kinh t ca t nc. Khong cách v thu nhp gia khu vc thành th và nông thôn khi y có th s tng rt cao, và nhng ngi không có kh nng hi nhp vào nn kinh t hin i này (c bit là các dân tc ít ngi) s b tt hu. S bt b́nh ng c̣n có th gia tng do li nhun thu c t vn, c bit trong lnh vc t ai. Vi mt nn kinh t ang trên à tng trng, tc ô th hoá nhanh chóng và chuyn i mc ích s dng t ai t, th́ các tài sn úng các v trí "c a" có giá tr tng nhanh vùn vt. Bit chn úng nhng v trí p và có kh nng mua bt ng sn trc khi giá c tng cao là cách chc chn tr nên giàu có. Song không phi ai cng bit và không phi ai cng có kh nng mua. Thiu s minh bch trong các chính sách quy hoch, hn ch trong vic cp giy chng nhn quyn s dng t, nh giá t không phù hp và nng lc yu kém ca các c quan qun lư t ai, ó là nhng nguyên nhân dn n t́nh trng ch có mt s tng i ít cá nhân tr nên giàu có. Nhng ngi có t b thu hi vi giá n bù thp và chng kin ngi khác kim li ch có th cm thy bt b́nh. T́nh trng tham nhng ang ph bin có th khin cho s bt măn tng thêm. nc Vit Nam nghèo ói trong nhng nm u i Mi, tham nhng quy mô lt vt gn nh là cách c chp nhn kim sng. ó cng là cách "phá rào" ca cá nhân trc mt h thng có quá nhiu quy nh và thiu hiu qu. Khi nn kinh t phát trin, th trng vn hành n nh hn và ngi dân ă giàu lên, th́ tham nhng là do tham lam nhiu hn là do nhu cu bc bách. Nn tham nhng, do ó, có th làm nh hng n tính hp pháp ca nhng tài sn to dng c nói chung. Trong bi cnh mà nhiu ngi có th 90 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang tr nên giàu có trong ṿng vài nm, ôi khi rt giàu, th́ s nghi ng v tính hp pháp ca tài sn có th khin nhng ngi b tt li sau bt măn. Nguy c th ba v thc cht mang tính chính tr nhiu hn. Khi công cuc i Mi bt u, s lng các giai tng xă hi c̣n rt ít i Vit Nam. Nói mt cách hi cng iu th́ lúc ó ch có các h gia ́nh nông thôn làm nông nghip nh và các h gia ́nh thành ph ch yu gn kt vi các DNNN hay c quan Chính ph. Do vy, các vn và mi quan tâm ca ngi dân Vit Nam cng cha a dng. Và hu ht các vn v mt này hay mt khác u có liên quan n vic m bo mc sng ti thiu trong nhng iu kin vô cùng khó khn. Trong bi cnh này, ng có th d dàng thu thp ư kin phn hi ca nhân dân. Do vy s không th có sai lm trong vic h tr nhng ngi nông dân các lu vc sông hay nhng ngi làm công trung b́nh trong khu vc nhà nc ti thành th, mc dù cách tip cn này cha h tr nhóm dân tc thiu s khu vc cao nguyên và min núi mt cách hiu qu. Hai thp k sau, s lng các thành phn tham gia nn kinh t ca Vit Nam ă bùng n. B sung cho các n v nông nghip quy mô nh và khu vc nhà nc là mt nhóm ln các công ty có vn u t trc tip nc ngoài và mt khu vc t nhân ang phát trin mnh. Hàng trm ngàn doanh nghip t nhân trong nc ă c thành lp, trong khi nhiu h gia ́nh Vit Nam cng hot ng kinh doanh nh di h́nh thc này hay h́nh thc khác. Hot ng sn xut và xut khu cng ngày càng a dng, vi nhiu khu vc mi nng ng ln lt xut hin, t may mc ti thu sn, g ni tht, phn mm máy tính. Và ngày càng nhiu t chc xă hi dân s xut hin. Mi thành phn tham gia này u gp phi nhng vn quan ngi c th v th trng sn xut, th trng lao ng, hay trong quan h vi các c quan Chính ph. Song nhng c ch mà ng s dng trc ó thu thp mt cách hiu qu ư kin phn hi t xă hi không chc ă phù hp khi phi i mt vi s a dng này. Hiu ht nhng vn mà các nhóm này ang gp phi và gii quyt chúng cho thu áo là mt nhim v x lư thông tin nng n. Chính ph ang tin hành các bin pháp nhm nâng cao nng lc thc hin nhim v ó. Tuy nhiên, vn c̣n nguy c mt s nhóm có th cm thy b b mc nu các vn ca h không c gii quyt và có th t́m cách th hin s bt măn bng nhng cách thc gây mt n nh. Vai tṛ nào dành cho cng ng quc t? Trong hai thp k k t khi bt u i Mi, các nhà tài tr và t chc quc t ă cung cp c ngun lc ln ư kin t vn h tr công cuc ci cách ca Vit Nam và giúp Vit Nam thoát nghèo. Quá tŕnh này bao gm c nhng thành công và tht bi. Bi Vit Nam ang tin dn ti v th ca mt nc có thu nhp trung b́nh, nên s tin tài tr quc t có xu hng gim xung v tng i hay thm chí là tuyt i, do vy thp k ti s là giai on vô cùng quan trng xét Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 91 v mt cam kt h tr. ây là lúc cn h tr Vit Nam xây dng các nn móng th ch có th tip tc con ng phát trin bn vng, ngay c sau khi nhiu nhà tài tr ă kt thúc hot ng hp tác phát trin ca h. Chính ph Vit Nam ă áp dng phng pháp tip cn th nghim i vi ci cách chính sách, bao gm vic t́m kim nhng ư tng kinh t mi và to nên s ng thun xung quanh các ư tng này. Song có th vt qua nhng thách thc mi ny sinh, phng pháp này cng cn c iu chnh, và rt có th mt s im cn iu chnh ó b xem là nguy him. thuyt phc ban lănh o cp cao rng ó không phi là s thc và các iu chnh ó c a ra v́ li ích ca Vit Nam, có th cn thúc y mt quy tŕnh theo ó các nhà ci cách có th thuyt phc B Chính tr rng vic phát trin da vào các c ch th trng không phi là không tng thích vi các mc tiêu ca ch ngha xă hi. Các thành viên ca cng ng quc t s không th a ra các xut iu chnh này tr phi h ă c "min tr", ging nh các nhà lănh o ng a phng tng th nghim "phá rào". Ngi ngoài s không c lng nghe nu h t ra kém hiu bit v thc tin ca Vit Nam. Các xut ca h s ch có giá tr nu h chng t c rng ng sau h không có ư ǵ, c bit là nhng ư mang ng c chính tr. Nu không có s tin tng th́ s có rt ít c hi các ư tng mi mà các nhà tài tr và cng ng quc t a ra s c các nhà lănh o Vit Nam xem xét mt cách nghiêm túc. Nhng thành công và tht bi trong hai thp k qua là s minh chng khá in h́nh v mt này. Mt mt, có mt s nhà tài tr, ví d Thy in, nhn c s tin cy nhiu bi Thu in ă sát cánh cùng Vit Nam trong nhng nm tháng khó khn nht ca cuc chin chng M. T́nh oàn kt ă kinh qua th thách này cho phép c quan phát trin Thu in tham gia vào cuc i thoi v tham nhng vi ng ngay t khi vn này vn c̣n là mt iu huư k. Có l lúc ó s không có nhà tài tr nào khác c lng nghe ư kin. S tham gia này, tuy ôi lúc có tht vng, song ă m ng cho mt thay i chính sách quan trng. ng ă xác nh ly cuc u tranh chng tham nhng làm mt trong nhng u tiên hàng u và t cui nm 2003, ng quyt nh chuyn t chin lc chng tham nhng mang tính cht trng pht là chính sang mt chin lc bao gm ci cách v h thng và nâng cao tính minh bch. Mt khác, trong giai on u, các th ch Bretton Woods c tin cy rt ít, do quan ngi rng các th ch này phc v cho các nc công nghip phát trin nói chung và M nói riêng. NHTG ă tham gia sâu vào các chng tŕnh phát trin h tng và gim nghèo. Song s nghi ngi vn c̣n i vi các ư kin t vn v ci cách c cu, c bit là sau cuc khng hong ông Á, th́ ban lănh o Vit Nam tr nên thn trng hn. Vào lúc ó, NHTG và IMF ă khng khng gi ư kin v vic t nhân hóa rng răi các DNNN và NHTMNN, coi ó là nn tng cho công cuc ci cách thc s. Bng cách ó, h ă vp phi s phn ng ca Chính ph Vit Nam, bi Chính ph mun áp dng mt cách tip cn t t hn. khuyn khích Chính ph quyt oán hn na, các th ch Bretton Woods ă a ra lư l rng ci cách không mnh dn có th khin nn kinh t b sp . 92 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Vit Nam ă tng b a vào danh sách các nc nghèo vay n nhiu (HIPC), nh th là t́nh h́nh n nc ngoài ă ti t n mc iu kin c xoá n. n nay th́ ă rơ rng t́nh h́nh n nc ngoài ca Vit Nam vào mc có nguy c thp. Kt qu tng trng ca Vit Nam cng b nghi ng khi các th ch Bretton Woods a ra nhng con s thp hn nhiu so vi s liu báo cáo ca Chính ph. Lư do là nhng s liu ó (do các th ch Bretton Woods a ra) c da trên các mô h́nh n gin kim tra tính nht quán ca kinh t v mô, vn nhy cm vi gi thit ca các mô h́nh này. Nhng kch bn lnh lùng này ă khin Chính ph Vit Nam lo lng mt thi gian, và s phóng i khó có th là nn tng tt cho s tin tng ln nhau. Cui cùng, Chính ph và các th ch Bretton Woods ă t c mt tha thun v mt chng tŕnh ci cách c cu vào nm 2001. Tha thun này ă m ng cho mt lot các hot ng cho vay chính sách, và cui cùng ă tr thành b chính cho i thoi chính sách gia Chính ph và cng ng quc t. Không lâu sau, Vit Nam ă c gch tên khi danh sách HIPC. Nm 2003, NHTG bt u chp nhn trên nguyên tc hi t các s liu thng kê chính thc v tng trng và b vic t tính b s liu khác ca riêng ḿnh. NHTG cng chp thun phng pháp thc hin tng bc ca Chính ph i vi vic ci cách h thng DNNN và NHTMNN. Trng tâm ca NHTG c chuyn sang h tr vic Vit Nam gia nhp WTO, coi ó là c ch m bo cho các ci cách tip theo. iu quan trng là NHTG ă chuyn t phng pháp àm phán sang ch ng hp tác nghiên cu phân tích vi các vin nghiên cu và cá nhân tham mu cho các nhà hoch nh chính sách cp cao. Phng pháp này ă c s dng rt hiu qu t cui nhng nm 1990 vi B Tài Chính và B K Hoch và u T trong lnh vc ci cách qun lư tài chính công và ci cách quy tŕnh lp k hoch. Sau ó, phng pháp cng c s dng vi VKHXHVN trong vn gia nhp WTO, vi Ban Kinh tTrung ng trong vn ci cách khu vc tài chính. Phng thc làm vic cùng vi nhng chuyên gia có th trao i trc tip vi lănh o cp cao ă giúp nâng cao s hiu bit và tin tng ln nhau gia hai bên. Trong khi ó, IMF vn tip tc xem quan im ci cách h thng DNNN và NHTMNN ca Chính ph Vit Nam là không có tính thuyt phc. Nm 2004, chng tŕnh cho vay ca IMF ă chính thc ht hn và k t ó, nh hng ca t chc này i vi chính sách kinh t ca Vit Nam b hn ch nhiu. Mt bài hc quan trng khác i vi cng ng quc t có liên quan n bn cht ca nhng ư tng s c a ra xem xét. Nhng ngi tng tin hành th nghim "phá rào" u c bit thn trng tránh nhng ǵ có v mang tính t tng. Thay vào ó, h nhn mnh tính thit thc ca nhng sáng kin i mi, bao gm nhng vn c th mà h nh gii quyt và cách thc mà các sáng kin ca h có th óng góp cho li ích ca nhân dân. H ă t́m c các c hi th nghim thc hin các ư tng mi và ánh giá hu qu. Theo thi gian, s chú ư c bit ă c dành cho vic n bù cho nhng ngi có th b thua thit v́ ci cách. Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 93 Nhng xut do cng ng quc t a ra không phi lúc nào cng t trng tâm vào tính thc tin và không mang tính t tng. V kinh t, "nhng nguyên tc u tiên" c coi là ph thông ôi khi c t lên trên s hiu bit v nhng yu im th ch trên thc t và cách thc t chc th trng ti ch. V nhng vn liên quan n iu tit, mt s xut dng nh xut phát t chính khung pháp lut truyn thng ca nhà tài tr, và c a dùng hn các la chn khác mc dù ă có nhiu cnh báo. Ngay c v vn quyn li và s tham gia ca công dân, khó có th ngh "dân ch hóa" là cái ǵ ó khác hn h́nh mu c rút ra t h thng chính tr phng Tây. Cho dù các nhà tài tr có úng hay không i na v các nguyên tc u tiên này, các khung pháp lư và h thng chính tr truyn thng, các ư tng mi c nhp khu trn gói theo kiu này có v quá xa vi i vi các nhu cu và mi quan tâm thc t ca Vit Nam. Kt qu là chúng có th không c xem xét mt cách nghiêm túc. Nhng ngi i u phong trào th nghim "phá rào" c̣n c bit chú ư n quá tŕnh ra quyt nh a ti các ci cách chính sách. H rt thn trng t́m hiu xem ai trong s các nhà lănh o có th sn sàng chp nhn cái mi hn và ai ngm gi quyn ph quyt vic nhân rng sáng kin mi. Ví d, i vi mt s sáng kin quan trng nht nh ci cách khu vc tài chính, s cn có s phê chun ca B Chính tr. Và có c mt quá tŕnh chun b a vn ra tho lun. Truyn t úng thông ip cha ; thông ip c̣n cn phi c chuyn n úng a ch. ây li là mt lnh vc mà trong ó thành công và tht bi trong hai thp k qua em li nhng bài hc quan trng cho cng ng quc t. Thông thng, hot ng tr giúp k thut quy mô ln c các nhà tài tr cung cp cho các c quan Chính ph không có thm quyn quyt nh các ci cách c xut, và cng không có ư nh ng h h. Cng ng quc t cng cn hc cách kiên nhn hn. Có th s không có hành ng nào áp li mt sáng kin ci cách c th cho n khi t c s ng thun gia các nhà lănh o ch cht trong ng và Chính ph. Nh vy, các nhà tài tr có th s c khuyên áp dng phng pháp "ch i", ging nh nhng ngi th nghim "phá rào" ă làm rt nhiu ln. p bàn p gh không th làm s vic tin trin nhanh hn c, mà có th làm hng quan h vi Chính ph và gim bt c hi óng góp khi quyt nh c a ra. Mt s b sung t nhiên ca kiên nhn là tính toàn din. Ngay c nhng ngi trong cuc cng ít khi bit trc nhng sáng kin nào s tin nhanh và sáng kin nào s b tŕ hoăn. Kh nng a ra các ư kin óng góp cht lng cao cho nhiu lnh vc chính sách khác nhau làm tng thêm c hi h tr s thay i, cho dù s thay i din ra âu. Kt lun: Duy tŕ ci cách trong thp k ti C ch ng thun, thành công trong vic giúp Vit Nam chuyn i t mô h́nh k hoch hóa tp trung sang kinh t th trng và t nghèo ói lên t mc thu 94 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang nhp trung b́nh, cn c duy tŕ giúp Vit Nam vt qua giai on thu nhp trung b́nh tr thành mt nc công nghip. Vic t́m kim nhng ư tng mi nâng cao cht lng qun lư kinh t, t́m cách xây dng s ng thun i vi các ư tng ó và n bù cho nhng ngi có th b thua thit v́ các ư tng ó cn tip tc c thc hin theo hng này. Tuy nhiên, có th cn có s iu chnh, làm sao gii quyt c nhng thách thc mi xut hin sau hai thp k phát trin kinh t vi tc cao và chuyn i v mt xă hi. Nguy c ánh mt s kim soát i vi phát trin kinh t, xut phát t s hi nhp tài chính ngày càng tng và tin b không ng u ca ci cách gia các lnh vc chính sách, ̣i hi phi nhanh chóng nâng cao nng lc k thut ca Chính ph. Phng pháp tip cn truyn thng i vi ci cách chính sách, trong ó bao gm th nghim, ánh giá kt qu, xây dng s ng thun và nhân rng, s là vô ích trong trng hp xy ra khng hong tài chính. Các bin pháp cn thit h tr quá tŕnh hi nhp quc t, giám sát ngành ngân hàng, iu tit h tng, bo v môi trng hoc ci cách khu vc y t, v c bn u mang tính k thut. Các cam kt gia nhp WTO, hay các chun mc k toán và kim toán cn thit h tr s minh bch trong kinh doanh, c xây dng trên mt b các tiêu chun và ch tiêu c th gii công nhn. Vic ánh giá các la chn nhm quy nh giá in hay mc thù lao cho cán b y t ̣i hi phân tích kinh t vi mô phc hp hin i. S sáng to kiu các th nghim "phá rào" s là không x lư các lnh vc mi này. T́m kim s ng thun, tuy có hiu qu trong ngn chn o ngc chính sách, có th dn ti vic b l các c hi và phn ng quá chm. Phng pháp "ch i", vn giúp gim thiu s xung t trc ây, nay s kéo theo nhng tr giá rt ln khi cn y lui hay x lư mt cuc khng hong. Các n v chính sách có nng lc thuc các b ngành và c quan Chính ph, các c quan tham mu có i ng chuyên gia gii có th thc hin các ánh giá chính sách chun xác, và các khoa kinh t mnh ca các trng i hc s ngày càng c cn n xác nh các bin pháp nhiu tim nng nht và tin hành ánh giá cn k các kt qu thu c. Tuy nhiên, v mt này, kinh nghim v các nhà tham mu trong giai on trc i Mi cn phi c xem xét. Trong thi k ó, nhng kin thc có ích nht li không xut phát t các vin nghiên cu chính thc, vi i ng nghiên cu c la chn trên c s ḷng trung thành v chính tr và kh nng hiu ư lănh o. Các nhà tham mu không chính thc, gm nhng chuyên gia gii thc s, ă có nhng óng góp quan trng hn nhiu. Cng trên tinh thn ó, vic nâng cao nng lc k thut ca Chính ph phi c da trên các nguyên tc v s u tú, huy ng nhân tài t tt c các ni. Vic tng cng v khía cnh k thut trong hoch nh chính sách kinh t s ngày càng tr nên quan trng bi các nhóm li ích ln ang bt u xut hin. Măi cho n gn ây, ng vn nm quyn lc ti cao Vit Nam trong hoch nh chính sách kinh t. Hn th na, cho ti nay hu nh ai cng c hng Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 95 li t ci cách, c̣n nhng ngi không c li th́ cng nhn c s n bù, cho nên hu nh không có s vn ng nào xut phát t lư do kinh t nhm c gng gây nh hng ti các chính sách kinh t. Nhiu lm th́ cng ch là s tŕ hoăn thc hin. Tuy nhiên, chính thành công ca ci cách ă to ra mt s n v kinh t có nh hng ln và h là nhng ngi s tip tc hng li nu ci cách không c duy tŕ. Trong s này có nhng "tp oàn kinh t" ln, có kh nng s tr thành nhng u tàu kinh t ca Vit Nam. Các tp oàn này s có li nu duy tŕ c v trí thng lnh trong lnh vc kinh doanh ca h, và h c̣n rt sn sàng huy ng các ngun tài chính bng nhng cách thc áng t du hi. Không ging nhng ngi có kh nng b thua thit trong thi k u i Mi, các tp oàn này có kh nng thuyt phc và vn ng cho các chính sách mà h có li theo cách khin cho h trông ging nh ang phc v cho các li ích công. Kiu vn ng hành lang th này không xa l ǵ nhiu nc khác, c các nc công nghip ln các nc ang phát trin. Có l, Vit Nam là mt ngoi l nh sc mnh áp o ca ng trong quá tŕnh ra quyt nh. Tuy nhiên, do các nhóm li ích ang xut hin, Chính ph cn phi có nng lc nghiên cu k lng các xut yêu cu ca các nhóm li ích nh các tp oàn kinh t v mt k thut, làm sao m bo rng các mc tiêu công không b phá hoi. Nguy c v s bt măn trong xă hi do s bt b́nh ng tng lên ̣i hi va bo toàn quá tŕnh ḥa nhp xă hi, va chng tham nhng, và Chính ph rơ ràng hin ang i tin theo c hai hng này. Song tm quan trng ca thách thc này ln n mc không th coi thành công là iu ng nhiên. Hin có mt s c ch hu hiu giúp phân phi li áng k ngun thu ca Chính ph t các tnh giàu hn sang các tnh nghèo hn, và iu này chc chn ă h tr nhiu cho các tnh nghèo. Tuy nhiên, ch các ngun lc tài chính không thôi th́ không nâng cao mc sng ca các nhóm dân tc thiu s ngang bng vi nhng nhóm c̣n li. Cn tip tc xây dng các chính sách có tính n c im vn hóa ca các nhóm dân tc này, t canh tác t ai tp th, s dng rng nh là tài sn chung n tâm lư ngi không mun i hc. Không may là nói th́ d hn làm, và cha ai a ra c các gii pháp kh thi giúp các nhóm dân tc thiu s thoát nghèo. S a dng ngày càng tng ca các bên liên quan cng làm cho vic xác nh nhng nhóm b thua thit do nh hng ca thay i chính sách, cú sc t bên ngoài và xây dng c ch gim nh thit hi tr nên khó khn hn. Trong nhng nm trc, vic mang li c hi hng li cho nhng nhà qun lư DNNN thông qua c phn hóa/t nhân hóa các DNNN và tr cp tin cho lao ng dôi d dng nh ă tin hành ci cách mà không làm ai b thua thit. Ngày nay, vic xác nh chính xác nhóm nào b tác ng bi các cam kt, ngha v WTO hoc do thay i giá c trên th trng quc t không h d dàng. Trong trng hp này, bo him có th là mt cách tip cn phù hp. Xây dng nhng c ch ph cp bo v hiu qu mi h gia ́nh trc các cú sc h gp phi, cho dù nhng cú sc ó phát sinh t ngun nào, là iu rt quan trng m bo s ḥa nhp xă hi và ng h i vi nhng ci cách tip theo. Mt h thng bo 96 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang him xă hi hin i có th là s thay th tt i vi c ch bi thng cho nhóm i tng xác nh hoc mc tiêu c th c áp dng trong hai thp k gn ây. Nguy c phi i mt vi s bt măn trong xă hi càng trm trng thêm nu mt s tài sn mi to dng c coi là phi pháp. T lng kính này, kim ch nn tham nhng là mt u tiên cp bách và Chính ph ang thc hin nhng bc i cng quyt theo hng này. Xoá b t quan liêu, tng cng tính minh bch tài chính, cng c h thng hành chính, x lư khiu ni, t cáo, giám sát tài sn ca các quan chc cp cao và ngi thân trong gia ́nh h, và ánh giá thng xuyên mc hài ḷng ca ngi dân vi các c quan Chính ph, là nhng bc i úng hng. Tuy nhiên, trong mt nn kinh t ang tng trng nhanh, các c hi cho tham nhng tng có l c̣n nhanh hn nng lc kim ch tham nhng ca Chính ph. Do ó, có th ngay c quyt tâm cng không ngn c cm nhn rng tham nhng ang lan tràn, dù iu ó trong thc t có úng hay không. Trên thc t, mt cuc u tranh chng tham nhng có hiu qu cn các báo cáo ánh giá và phê b́nh mang tính c lp c a ra thng xuyên hn và t nhiu ngun hn. Các nhân viên di quyn hay ng nghip ca mt quan chc tham nhng có th bit chi tit (h́nh thc nào, tài sn nào?) nhiu hn là các quan chc t c quan thanh tra ca Chính ph, cho dù h có mn cán th nào i na. Nhng ngi b ̣i a hi l i li dch v hay nhng ngi b b l mt c hi kinh doanh v́ ngi khác a hi l u vào v trí thun li phát hin các vic làm sai trái. Các nhà báo cng có th iu tra và kim tra chéo các tin n, giúp tháo g hoc thúc y vic gii quyt các v vic ó theo các kênh hành chính hoc pháp lut. Song các c ch c lp hn này hot ng hiu qu, Chính ph cn có thái ít bao che hn. Mt s li bôi nh hay ch trích thiu công bng có th là cái giá phi tr cho s ci m ngày càng tng này. Tuy nhiên, nhng li ích tim tàng có l có giá tr hn chi phí b ra rt nhiu. S ci m hn này cng s giúp tháo g nguy c ln th ba mà Vit Nam ang i mt khi gia nhp nhóm các nc có thu nhp trung b́nh, c th là kh nng xy ra s ln xn v chính tr mà các nhóm (dù nh) có cm giác b b mc gây ra. Trên thc t, iu này s ̣i hi vic tng cng dn các quyn công dân. Chính ph Vit Nam t ra hiu qu hn Chính ph nhiu nc ang phát trin khác v mt cung cp các dch v xă hi và nâng cao phúc li cho ngi dân. Song Chính ph Vit Nam cng có thái bao che nhiu hn so vi các nc khác khi v́ mt lư do nào ó, nhng ngi l ra c hng li li không cm thy hài ḷng và lên ting kêu ca. iu này không có ǵ áng ngc nhiên. Cuc chin chng thc dân Pháp và sau ó là cuc chin chng s xâm lc ca M ă làm ny sinh tâm lư thiu tuân th pháp lut Vit Nam. Ging nh nhiu quc gia mi c c lp khác, trong hoàn cnh ó Chính ph iu hành bng các sc lnh. Không ai c phép làm trái các mnh lnh hành chính, lut pháp Nhng quyt sách khó khn: Vit Nam trong giai on chuyn i 97 c̣n mang nng tính h́nh thc, và thm chí B T pháp cng b băi b cho n tn nm 1981. Hin nay, xu hng này rơ ràng ă o ngc, vi vic ly thc thi pháp lut làm mc tiêu chính ca quá tŕnh ci cách. Các bin pháp c th ang c thc hin, qua ó tng cng kh nng bày t chính kin ca công dân và ̣i hi c n bù nu cn. Trong s các bin pháp này có vic chuyn nhiu trách nhim hn na cho Quc hi và Hi ng Nhân dân, cng nh nhn mnh nguyên tc "dân ch c s" cp xă. Trong lúc này, mt tm nh́n rơ ràng ă c h́nh thành i vi vn ci cách lut pháp và t pháp, và hot ng này rơ ràng ang i úng hng. Tuy nhiên, v u tranh chng tham nhng, vic thc hin có hiu qu s mt nhiu thi gian, nên trong lúc này, mt s vn có th xy ra. Nhng sáng kin b sung có th cn c xem xét nhm gim nh tác ng ca nhng vn ó, k c vic th nghim mt s c ch mi thu thp ư kin phn hi t xă hi cho lănh o nhà nc. Nâng cao nng lc ca Quc hi (c th là các U ban chuyên trách ca Quc hi) và cng c vai tṛ ca Quc hi trong biên son lut s là mt sáng kin trong s ó. Cng trên tinh thn này, Hi ng Nhân dân phi có nng lc thc thi các chc nng giám sát ca ḿnh, c bit là trong vn phân b ngân sách. Trên mt trn t pháp, vic nâng cao cht lng các dch v tr giúp pháp lut và gii quyt hiu qu các khiu ni hành chính cng là nhng bin pháp cn thit. mc nào ó, vic tng thêm s lng ng c viên tham gia ng c vào Quc hi và cho phép t chc trng cu dân ư cp a phng có th giúp thu thp các ư kin ngày càng a dng thông qua h thng chính thc, hn là xy ra bên ngoài h thng. Tóm li, có th chính quy tŕnh ra quyt nh là lư do chính mang li thành công áng k cho Vit Nam trong vic xác nh, t́m kim gii pháp và xây dng s ng thun gii quyt nhng tr ngi trong tin tŕnh ci cách. Và quy tŕnh ra quyt nh này có th s tip tc giúp Vit Nam trong giai on phát trin tip theo và tr thành mt nc thu nhp trung b́nh. Tuy nhiên, nhng thành công ă t c cng ă to nên nhng thay i kinh t--xă hi cn bn i vi Vit Nam. vt qua nhng thay i ó, có th cn mt s iu chnh nht nh i vi quy tŕnh ra quyt nh. Tng cng nng lc cho mt c ch k tr c lp, nâng cao s ci m trong chng tham nhng, tng cng quyn công dân có th s là ch́a khóa Vit Nam tip tc thành công và tr thành mt nc công nghip trong ṿng mt th h. 98 Martin Rama, tṛ chuyn vi C Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, Giáo s ng Phong và oàn Hng Quang Eco-Audit Environmental Benefits Statement The Commission on Growth and Development is committed to preserving endangered forests and natural resources. The World Bank's Office of the Publisher has chosen to print these Working Papers on 100 percent postconsumer recycled paper, processed chlorine free, in accordance with the recommended standards for paper usage set by Green Press Initiative--a nonprofit program supporting publishers in using fiber that is not sourced from endangered forests. For more information, visit www.greenpressinitiative.org. The printing of all the Working Papers in this Series on recycled paper saved the following: Trees* Solid Waste Water Net Greenhouse Gases Total Energy 48 2,247 17,500 4,216 33 mil. *40 inches in height and 6­8 Pounds Gallons Pounds CO2 Equivalent BTUs inches in diameter The Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper Series 31. Chilean Growth Through East Asian Eyes, by Homi Kharas, Danny Leipziger, and R. Thillainathan, June 2008 32. Population Aging and Economic Growth, by David E. Bloom, David Canning, and Günther Fink, July 2008 33. Early Life Nutrition and Subsequent Education, Health, Wage, and Intergenerational Effects, by Jere R. Behrman, July 2008 34. International Finance and Growth in Developing Countries: What Have We Learned, by Maurice Obstfeld, August 2008 35. Policy and Institutional Dynamics of Sustained Development in Botswana, by Gervase Maipose, August 2008 36. Exports of Manufactures and Economic Growth: The Fallacy of Composition Revisited, by William R. Cline, August 2008 37. Integration with the Global Economy: The Case of Turkish Automobile and Consumer Electronics Industries, by Erol Taymaz and Kamil Yilmaz, August 2008 38. Political Leadership and Economic Reform: the Brazilian Experience, by Henrique Cardoso and Eduardo Graeff, September 2008 39. Philippines Case Study: The Political Economy of Reform during the Ramos Administration (1992­98), by Romeo Bernardo and Christine Tang, September 2008 40. Making Difficult Choices: Vietnam in Transition, Martin Rama, based on conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang, November 2008 Forthcoming Papers in the Series: Policy Change and Economic Growth: A Case Study of South Africa, by David Faulkner and Christopher Loewald (November 2008) International Migration and Development, by Gordon H. Hanson (November 2008) Electronic copies of the working papers in this series are available online at www.growthcommission.org. They can also be requested by sending an e-mail to contactinfo@growthcommission.org. Commission A fter decades of war, with a dilapidated infrastructure and millions of people dead, wounded or displaced, Vietnam could have been considered a hopeless case in economic development. Yet, it is now about to enter the ranks of middle-income countries. The obvious question is: how did this on Growth and Development happen? This paper goes one step further, asking not which policies were adopted, but rather why Montek Ahluwalia they were adopted. This question is all the more intriguing because the process did not involve one Edmar Bacha group of individuals displacing another within the structure of power. Dr. Boediono To answer this question, the paper relies on the insights of those who were actually involved in Lord John Browne the economic experiments, conceptual discussions, and political maneuvering that led to the adop- Kemal Dervis ¸ tion of key reforms. Especially, it builds on a series of long and regular conversations with H. E. the Alejandro Foxley late Vơ Vn Kit, one of Vietnam's leading figures. In doing so, it brings into the open the inside story Goh Chok Tong of Doi Moi, a process that is not known by outsiders and remains opaque to most Vietnamese. Han Duck-soo The relevance of this exercise is not merely historical. Understanding how reforms were engi- neered may yield valuable lessons for other developing countries. It is also relevant for Vietnam, as Danuta Hübner two decades of rapid economic growth have resulted in dramatic changes in its economy and society. Carin Jämtin While praising the decision-making processes that allowed Vietnam to successfully emerge from poverty, Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski the paper also explores the adjustments that could be needed for it to become an industrial country. Danny Leipziger, Vice Chair Trevor Manuel Mahmoud Mohieldin T ri qua hàng chc nm chin tranh vi c s h tng b tàn phá nng n, hàng triu ngi b cht, b thng hoc ly hng, kh nng phc hi và phát trin kinh t ca Vit Nam dng nh là mt iu không tng. Nhng gi ây, Vit Nam ang sp sa gia nhp nhóm các quc gia Ngozi N. Okonjo-Iweala Robert Rubin Robert Solow có thu nhp trung b́nh trên th gii. Thông thng, ngi ta s hi s vic ó din ra nh th nào. Bài nghiên cu này la chn mt cách tip cn mi, rng hn tr li câu hi này. Thay v́ cp Michael Spence, Chair n nhng chính sách ă c áp dng, bài vit i sâu nghiên cu quá tŕnh các chính sách ó c Sir K. Dwight Venner a ra nh th nào. Câu hi này c̣n thú v hn nhiu bi trong quá tŕnh a ra các quyt sách ó Ernesto Zedillo ă không xy ra chuyn nhóm này thay th nhóm kia trong c cu quyn lc. Zhou Xiaochuan gii áp thc mc này, bài vit da trên hiu bit sâu sc ca nhng ngi tng thc t tham gia vào các cuc th nghim kinh t, tho lun ch trng và vn ng chính tr, dn n vic thông qua các ci cách c bn. c bit, bài vit này da trên ni dung mt lot bui trao i trc tip vi The mandate of the c Th tng Vơ Vn Kit, mt trong nhng nhà lănh o hàng u ca Vit Nam. Qua ó, bài vit Commission on Growth góp phn làm sáng t câu chuyn bên trong ca i mi, mt quá tŕnh c̣n là iu bí n i vi nc and Development is to ngoài và vn khá m h i vi phn ln ngi Vit Nam. gather the best understanding Nghiên cu này không ch có ư ngha v mt lch s. Vic hiu rơ các cuc ci cách c khi there is about the policies ng nh th nào có th em li nhng bài hc quí giá cho các quc gia ang phát trin khác. Các and strategies that underlie bài hc này cng c bit có giá tr cho bn thân Vit Nam, bi hai thp k tng trng kinh t nhanh chóng ă dn n nhng thay i to ln v kinh t và xă hi. Không ch ánh giá cao các quy tŕnh rapid economic growth and ra quyt nh ă a t nc thoát nghèo thành công, nghiên cu này c̣n ng thi t́m ṭi nhng poverty reduction. gii pháp iu chnh cn thit có th a Vit Nam tr thành mt nc công nghip. The Commission's audience Martin Rama, based on conversations with H. E. Vơ Vn Kit, is the leaders of developing with Professor ng Phong and oàn Hng Quang countries. The Commission is supported by the governments of Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and The World Bank Group. www.growthcommission.org contactinfo@growthcommission.org