Yemen’s Compounding Burdens: From Drought to Hunger MENA FCV ECONOMIC SERIES BRIEF Issue #3 | March 2025 This is part of a new series of notes analyzing Yemeni households have shown remarkable resilience recent economic and social developments against multiple shocks, but it is slowly eroding after and special issues in Fragile, Conflict, and having exhausted typical coping strategies, so there is Violence (FCV) situations in the Middle East increasing reliance on “last-resort” coping strategies and North Africa (MENA). The analysis also such as taking children out of school, child labor, child serves as background material for the Yemen marriage, and exploitative and hazardous work (World Country Climate Development Report.1 Bank 2024). Abstract The Yemeni economy is still directly and indirectly In this brief we combine granular climate data on flooding, reliant on oil, agriculture, and government services, drought and extreme heat, and district level food inse- despite shrinking oil output, crop yields, and govern- curity data and conflict data, to produce district level ment revenues. GDP per capita fell about 54 percent estimates of the number and percentage of those expe- between 2015 and 2023, with the further collapse of oil riencing multiple deprivations. We find that around half production and public sector driving most of this descent of Yemenis are exposed to at least one climate hazard (World Bank 2023b). Today, Yemeni workers appear to of either extreme heat, drought, or flooding. Moreover, a be increasingly dependent on agriculture for employment quarter of the population suffers from the compounding despite the precariousness of the sector to climate-related effects of food insecurity and exposure to climate hazards. hazards and limited water resources. Amongst the main Most districts that see the highest levels of compounding income earner in the household, 28 percent of men and food insecurity and exposure to climate hazards have 23 percent of women are both most likely to cite agri- also been impacted by the ongoing conflict. To hasten culture as the sector of employment, the most out of all post-conflict recovery, investments are needed that are sectors (World Bank 2024). more area targeted, including shock responsive social protection, agriculture, and water management initiatives In a comparative perspective, Yemen is one of the most to mitigate the long-term harm caused by multiple and food insecure countries in the world. In May 2023, intersecting shocks and resulting deprivations. the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and WFP 1. Introduction 1 The Brief is prepared under the guidance of Eric Le Borgne Given the longstanding conflict, many Yemeni house- (Practice Manager, EMNMT) and Željko Bogetic (Lead Econo- holds are subject to multiple, overlapping depriva- mist, EMNMT) by a team comprising Alia Aghajanian (Senior tions. These include insufficient food consumption, very Economist, EMNPV), Steve Penson (Data Science Consultant, limited access to adequate school and health facilities, EMNPV), Sandra Baquie (Economist, IMF), Chitra Balasubra- in addition to exposure to violence, and related internal manian (Extended Term Consultant, EMNPV), Alan Fuchs (Lead displacement (World Bank 2024). Worse-off households Economist, EMNPV) and Juul Pinxten (Economist, HMNSP). 2 The Yemen Human Development Survey (YHDS) was collected are also more likely to live in districts that are dispropor- by the Social Fund for Development and World Bank in 2021 tionately exposed to conflict and climate-related shocks and covers a range of human development and socio-economic such as flooding and drought, according to a household variables in areas under the Internationally Recognized Govern- survey conducted in areas under control of the Interna- ment. Further information can be found in the Yemen Poverty tionally Recognized Government (IRG) (YHDS 2021).2 and Equity Assessment (World Bank 2024). 2 YEMEN’S COMPOUNDING BURDENS: FROM DROUGHT TO HUNGER designated Yemen one of eight “hunger hotspots”—coun- 2. Data sources tries where a significant proportion of the population suffers from acute food insecurity and where hunger levels We consider six separate sources of geographical data may increase in the near future (WFP and FAO 2023). in this brief: This places Yemen in the company of Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and the Sahel countries A. Gridded population data (in particular Burkina Faso and Mali). Similar to Yemen, For a more granular understanding of population these are all fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) affected distributions in Yemen, we rely on gridded popula- countries. tion data that draws from official sources and remote sensing data. WorldPop 2024 uses a top-down Amid severe food insecurity and protracted conflict, constrained methodology, derived from governorate Yemen is particularly vulnerable to climate hazards level population figures published by the 2024 Humani- that could further impact the availability and afford- tarian Needs Overview (HNO) (UNOCHA 2024) and ability of food or exacerbate the displacement and a human settlement mask.6 The HNO calculates popu- infrastructure crisis. Yemen is the most vulnerable and lation figures at a district level using official projections least ready to the challenges of climate change amongst from the Central Statistics Office from the 2004 popula- MENA countries, and ranks 27th globally according tion census, in addition to adjustments made for internal to the ND-GAIN index of readiness and vulnerability.3 displacement. Yemen’s climate is varied across the country and different areas have seen high temperatures combined with Using a range of geospatial layers, the district level strong humidity, flooding during the monsoon season, figures are then used to estimate the population within a or droughts during the dry season (World Bank 2023a). 100m by 100m cell (WorldPop 2024). These geospatial Most recently, heavy seasonal rains have caused wide- layers include: Microsoft Buildings footprint, Global Human spread damage and displacement, affecting approxi- Settlements Layer, Night lights (Visible Infrared Imaging mately 500,000 people since July 2024.4 Each of the Radiometer Suit), distance to roads, and built-up surface climate hazards, which are likely to increase in size and and volume. Population density (population per km2) was frequency in the near future, are likely to have direct and calculated at a district level by dividing the total population indirect effects on health, productivity, and food supply. by the district's total area.7 Map 2.1 shows the estimated 2024 population distribution with most of the population In this brief, we explore the overlapping deprivations living in the west of the country. A majority of the country that conflict-affected Yemenis face by estimating the (70 percent) tend to live in rural areas (HBS 2014). number of people who experience food insecurity and climate vulnerability at the same time and consider Unfortunately, accurate population data is one policy, investment, and spatially targeted responses to of main data gaps in the country, as there has not reduce deprivations and limit the impact on the poor. been a population census since 2004. The Household By combining geographically gridded climate data on Budget Survey conducted in 2014 was used as a partial flooding, drought and extreme heat and district level food update, but large scale internal and external migration insecurity data, we produce district level estimates of the and displacement over the course of the conflict is likely number and percentage of those experiencing multiple deprivations.5 This is also overlayed with a district level conflict score to highlight the geographical patterns of 3 2021 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) compounding vulnerability. Despite working in a limited Country Index [link] data environment (typical of FCV settings), this brief 4 https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unfpa-yemen-flash- demonstrates how existing and publicly available data update-3-heavy-rains-and-flash-floods-place-lives-risk-yemen can be used innovatively to tackle pertinent policy ques- 5 This analysis is stems from the Yemen Poverty and Equity tions. The area-based analysis is extremely useful for Assessment 2024, and is in part supported by the Whole-of- targeting purposes, especially in an environment of dwin- Economy Climate Change Program MENA: Social Change, dling international and development assistance financing Equity and Just Transition. 6 The constrained approach makes use of built settlement data, that is concerned with increasing resilience in the face of multiple shocks. The analysis exploits a novel data set specifically Microsoft Building Settlements, to focus on grid cells identified as containing buildings/built settlement. Uncon- that combines public geospatial drought, heat stress and strained methodology makes use of all grid cells, even if they flooding data, permitting a more granular and multifac- are not identified as containing buildings/built settlement. eted examination of linkages between climate shocks 7 Stevens, et al. (2016) provides a full summary of the WorldPop and deprivations than is usually the case. methodology. MENA FCV ECONOMIC SERIES BRIEF 3 Population density data, 2024 (includes the International Recognized Map 2.1    Government (IRG) and Houthi areas) Source: Authors’ rendering based on data from WorldPop. to have affected these numbers. According to phone From the start of the conflict, the food crisis in Yemen surveys, around a quarter of the population are currently was understood to be one of access rather than avail- internally displaced (World Bank 2024). Most internal ability. Food is generally said to be available in markets, displacement has occurred within the same district, while prices have risen sharply over the course of the which could indicate reliability of the district level conflict and household incomes have become increas- constrained WorldPop population numbers, but until a ingly precarious and failed to keep pace with inflation.9 new census is collected the accuracy of this data is not During the first few years of the war, Houthi-controlled fully understood. areas had the worst food security outcomes. But since 2019, the situation has reversed. The depreciation of the B. District level food insecurity Riyal in IRG areas drove a surge in the price of basic Over half of Yemenis are food insecure and malnour- goods in IRG areas after 2019 while prices in Houthi- ished. More specifically, 53 percent of the population, controlled areas, along with the Riyal, remained relatively or around 17 million Yemenis, are classified in acute stable.10 Higher prices had a knock-on effect on food food insecurity and malnutrition situation according to security in IRG areas. the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). A combination of data from face-to-face annual food The IPC data have not been updated since December security assessment, monthly phone surveys conducted 2022 because of restrictions and impediments to data by WFP, and subject matter experts, is used to determine the IPC of each district in Yemen on an annual basis.8 8 https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/where-what/ The number of individuals in phases 1 (minimal/none), 2 (stressed), 3 (crisis), 4 (emergency) and 5 (catas- asia/yemen/en/ 9 See for example, Yemen: Global wheat supply dynamics and trophe/famine) is then estimated. The district-level Map their impact (ACAPS 2022): “While food markets are generally 2.2 shows a high concentration of food insecurity in the functional and food commodities remain available, affordability western part of the country, with pockets of more severe remains to be the main challenge for Yemenis”. food security in the governorates of Saadah, Hajjah, 10 When converted to dollars using prevalent exchange rates, Amran, Marib, Hodeidah, Raymah, Dhamar, Al Dhale’e prices for many goods are slightly higher in Houthi-controlled and Abyan. areas (ICG 2022). 4 YEMEN’S COMPOUNDING BURDENS: FROM DROUGHT TO HUNGER Map 2.2    Population in IPC 3+ and IPC 4+ by district, as of December 2022 Population in Crisis-to-Famine level food insecurity (IPC 3+) by district, as of December 2022. a)  IPC 3+ caseload 16.9 million. Population in Emergency and Famine level of food insecurity (IPC 4+) by district, as of b)  December 2022. IPC 4+ caseload 6 million. Source: Authors’ rendering based on data from IPCinfo. collection. Monthly Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Phase 4 or worse (ACAPS et al. 2024).12 This marked an based on phone survey data shows 60 percent of the increase of 400,000 people (16%) from the 2.5 million population to have inadequate food consumption, and identified in the January JMR modeling. some of the highest levels were reported in 2024. This is due to a reduction of humanitarian aid in Houthi controlled areas and further depreciation of the currency 11 There was a partial update released in October 2024 but and inflation in IRG areas.11 Most recently the Joint Moni- this only covered IRG areas toring Report (JMR) indicates that in April 2024, 2.9 12 The JMR does not provide indicators for IPC phase 3 (Penson million people live in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC et al. 2024). MENA FCV ECONOMIC SERIES BRIEF 5 C. Drought qat was consuming 36 percent of Yemen’s total renew- Crop areas along the western coast are particularly able water resources and 32 percent of all groundwater susceptible to drought. The FAO Agriculture Stress withdrawals (McCracken 2012). Index (ASI) is a tool developed by the Food and Agri- culture Organization to detect agricultural areas with D. Heat Stress Index a high likelihood of water stress/drought. This data Extreme heat, or heat stress, is a concern along the includes observations of land surface temperatures and coastal areas and within the desert of Hadramout. vegetation indices, such as the Normalized Difference The heat stress index (HI) is a measure that combines Vegetation Index (NDVI). NDVI is a measure of the state air temperature and relative humidity to determine an of plant health based on how the plant reflects light apparent temperature—how hot it actually feels. It is to at certain frequencies. The ASI identifies areas where assess the risk of heat-related illnesses, such as heat stroke vegetation is under stress due to insufficient water avail- and heat exhaustion, especially during hot weather. ability. In Map 2.3, the index is calculated in identi- The index is based on the premise that high humidity fied cropland areas, and cells where 30 percent of reduces the body's ability to cool itself through perspira- the cropland area are affected by drought more than tion, making it feel hotter than the actual air temperature. 20 percent of the time are highlighted in brown. These This is why, at high humidity levels, the heat index can areas are mostly along the western coast as well as be significantly higher than the actual air temperature. central Hadramawt. Map 2.4 identifies parts of the country where apparent temperature reaches deadly levels for over three consecu- Increased qat production in certain areas poses a tive days in a year, with a darker color indicating higher further threat to drought and water supply. The World temperatures. These are concentrated along the coastal Bank’s Yemen Country Economic Memorandum finds a areas of the country, in addition to the inner land areas of 40 percent increase in qat production in selected Yemeni Hadramout and Al Mahrah. regions from 2016 to 2021, and suggest that qat is expanding at the expense of other food crops given its E. Flooding high profitability (World Bank 2023b). However, qat Yemen has a history of recurrent and devastating production is extremely water intensive---before the conflict floods, which have caused substantial damage to infra- Areas at risk of drought: 30% of cropland affected by severe drought Map 2.3    more than 20% of the time Source: Authors’ rendering based on FAO agricultural stress index. 6 YEMEN’S COMPOUNDING BURDENS: FROM DROUGHT TO HUNGER Areas of risk of extreme heat: Temperature reaches deadly levels over Map 2.4    3 consecutive days per year Source: Authors’ rendering based on heat stress index created by GFDRR index. Areas at risk of flooding: 10% chance of water level exceeding 50cm Map 2.5    Source: Authors’ rendering based on FATHOM data. MENA FCV ECONOMIC SERIES BRIEF 7 structure, agriculture, and human lives. To measure this At Ta’iziyah, Sabir Al Mawadim, Salah, Jabal Habashi climate hazard, historical hydrological data determines districts in Taiz governorate, Ma’rib, Harib, Sirwah district the frequency of flood events of different magnitudes in Ma’rib governorate, Hays and At Tuhaytah districts in across geographical areas. The FATHOM data source Al Hodeida, and Qa’tabah district in Ad Dali’. estimates the probability of a flood event reaching or exceeding a certain level. Map 2.5 shows the parts of 3. Results the country where there is a 10% chance each year (or a 1 in 10 chance, often referred to as the return period Around a fifth of the population is exposed to each of or recurrence interval) that there is a flood event occur- the following climate hazards: drought, extreme heat, ring that exceeds the 50cm water level. These areas and flooding. Map 2.3 to Map 2.5 identify the areas are concentrated further inland compared to the areas most at risk of climate hazards, but we next assess how of extreme heat, and concentrated in governorates of much of the population live in these areas. By overlaying Raymah, Ibb, Taiz, Al Dhale’e and Hadramout. indicators of extreme hazards with population data from Worldpop, we estimate the number of people exposed F. Conflict to extreme weather events within each cell of the gridded Conflict events have been frequent and volatile since map. In Yemen, 6.7 million individuals are exposed to the start of the war in 2015, however they have also drought (Map 3.1), 7.2 million to extreme heat (Map been concentrated in certain regions of the country. 3.2), and 7.4 million to flooding (Map 3.3); about 20 ACLED has recorded a range of these conflict events, percent of the population for each category. including armed battles, communal clashes and violent demonstrations, as well as reported fatalities from these There is significant geographical overlap in areas events. In Map 3.6 a conflict score is created from the where people are exposed to extreme heat and average of five variables collected between May 2023 drought. This implies that some areas, such as the coast- and May 2024: district level conflict incidents and line, are at risk of being impacted by a diverse set of fatalities, neighboring districts incidents and fatalities,13 and a binary variable indicating frontline districts. The districts with the highest conflict scores are Maqbanah, 13 These variables are first standardized to allow for aggregation. Conflict exposure score by district. Red line indicates the IRG/Houthi Map 2.6    delineation Source: Authors’ rendering based on FATHOM data. 8 YEMEN’S COMPOUNDING BURDENS: FROM DROUGHT TO HUNGER Distribution of population exposed to drought Map 3.1    Source: Authors’ calculations based on FAO agricultural stress index and WorldPop 2024 data (Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024 and Balasubramanian et al., 2024). Note: White area is not cropland and does not have a corresponding Agricultural Stress Index. Distribution of population exposed to extreme heat Map 3.2    Source: Authors’ calculations based on heat stress index created by GFDRR index and WorldPop 2024 data (Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024. MENA FCV ECONOMIC SERIES BRIEF 9 Distribution of population exposed to flooding Map 3.3    Source: Authors’ calculations based on FATHOM data and WorldPop 2024 data (Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024 and Bala- subramanian et al., 2024). weather shocks with potential compounding effects, shown in Map 3.5. On average, 26 percent of Yemenis particularly as coping strategies have been eroded due are living in areas subject to food security crisis and to repeated shocks. When also considering exposure to exposed to at least one extreme climate-related hazard. conflict related events, the vulnerability levels are likely The top five districts that see the highest number of indi- to be even higher. This overlap is not unexpected, as viduals affected by potential compounding shocks are many of these exposure variables reinforce each other. Marib city in Marib governorate, Abs in Hajjah gover- For example, drought is likely to take place in areas of norate, Bani Al Harith and Sanhan wa Bani Bahlul in extreme temperature. Sanaa governorate, and Bayt al Faqih in Al Hodeidah governorate. Combined, these districts are home to Around half of Yemenis are exposed to at least one more than one and a half million Yemenis exposed to climate hazard of either extreme heat, drought, or compounding shocks. flooding. The gridded data on population exposed to hazards is combined to provide the number of individ- Most of the districts that see the highest exposure to uals in each cell exposed to at least one climate-related at least one climate-related hazard and food insecu- hazard. The distribution of this population is seen in Map rity are also heavily affected by the conflict. Out of 3.4, where darker cells imply a larger exposed popula- the top 50 districts with the highest populations exposed tion. to climate shock and food insecurity, 28 of them are also considered to be high or medium intensity conflict A quarter of the population suffers from the districts (see Map3.5). The conflict is likely to have left compounding effects of food insecurity and expo- a legacy of destruction to the economy and infrastruc- sure to climate hazards. The gridded data on the ture that will make climate mitigation more challenging, number of individuals exposed to at least one climate leaving households more vulnerable to climate hazards. hazard is then aggregated up to the district level. When This further underscores the compounding nature of combined with the district-level prevalence of acute food vulnerability in Yemen, and highlights how districts most insecurity (IPC3+), the number of individuals in a district impacted by climate hazards are likely to be the least exposed to a climate-related hazard and food crisis is prepared. 10 YEMEN’S COMPOUNDING BURDENS: FROM DROUGHT TO HUNGER Individuals exposed to one climate-related hazard Map 3.4    Source: Authors’ calculations using data sources in Map 3.1,Map 3.2, and Map 3.3 (Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024.and Balasubramanian et al., 2024). Individuals exposed to one climate-related hazard and food insecurity, Map 3.5    with districts identified as medium or high intensity conflict Source: Authors’ calculations using data sources in Map 2.2, Map 2.6 and Map 3.4 (Yemen Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024.and Balasubramanian et al., 2024). MENA FCV ECONOMIC SERIES BRIEF 11 4. Implications for policy living in areas at risk of climate related hazards and shocks, save and pay for basic necessities such as food, medi- These multiple, intersecting deprivations are likely cation and other health services. The key climate related to cause long-term intergenerational harm that may aspect here is that if shocks are recurrent or are predicted prevent current and future generations to fulfill their to occur in a certain area—cash transfers can be provided capabilities and opportunities. After almost a decade of ahead of time, as shown in the case of Bangladesh (Pople conflict much of the infrastructure needed to support and et al. 2021).15 Besides cash transfers, skills and temporary invest in these generations has eroded, and unfortunately employment support can be directed to increase climate districts with the highest levels of intersecting deprivations sensitive behaviors and livelihoods. Training in basic skills are also highly conflict affected. In response, beyond the in WASH and health practices can help promote sustain- positive impact that peace would have, implementing able land and water management which mitigate the inci- shock-responsive and climate smart social protection dence of, and if they do occur, impact of, shocks as done and humanitarian aid programs can help address these in Nepal (Rigolini 2021). heightened and overlapping vulnerabilities. Remaining engaged, even in areas experiencing conflict, is perti- Incorporating a shock-responsive element to an nent. And once there is peace, investing in rebuilding existing program is well in line with successful infrastructure will ensure that households and communities programs in other contexts, such as Kenya’s Hunger are more resilient in the face of future climate hazards Safety Net Program and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety while also boosting human capital. Net Program (World Bank 2020). In Bangladesh, social protection interventions were targeted based on both The Yemen Country Climate and Development Report household level poverty as well vulnerability to shocks (CCDR) further details a range of recommenda- (Bastagli and Holmes 2014) while in Niger, composite tions and interventions that can mitigate some of the geographic data on vulnerability to climate shocks was expected impact of climate change in Yemen, which used to determine target locations (World Bank 2019). include increased and unpredictable rainfall and Flexible social protection (and humanitarian aid) program floods, an increase in extreme temperatures, and design, accompanied with precise and layered data on longer, hotter dry periods. Promoting resilient agricul- climate vulnerability such as that described in this report, ture and water management practices and investing in can help make interventions more impactful and signifi- infrastructure, particularly in districts identified at risk to cant to those most in need and when they need it most. extreme heat and drought, will be essential for a climate resilient Yemen. As documented in the CCDR, interven- In Yemen, shock responsive social protection is nascent tions can include the cultivation of trees, such as palm but growing. When a cyclone hit Socotra in October trees, to act as windbreaks and counter sand encroach- 2023, the World Bank financed, UNICEF supported, ment; the cultivation of drought-resistant crops such as and Social Fund for Development (SFD) implemented, sorghum and millet; and the rehabilitation of agricultural cash transfer program was able to respond within two terraces and water harvesting infrastructure. Improving weeks. All cash transfer beneficiaries (5,734 house- grain storage, food management systems and market holds, 29,712 people) on the island received transfers linkages will be essential for translating investments in worth US$ 22–45, in addition to their base benefit, agriculture to food security. Strengthening early warning and outside of the usual payment cycle. In another systems will be essential for better targeting of programs change from usual practice, beneficiaries were reached and more modern disaster risk management. Beyond these recommendations, in this section we consider how social protection systems can be leveraged to mitigate 14 As presented in a forthcoming book titled The State of and respond to climate shocks. Social Protection (World Bank Forthcoming), see Ganong et al, (2021); Gyori (2021); Hidrobo et al, (2018); Hill et al, Generally, there is evidence that social protection (2019);; Ralston et al, (2019); Ulrichs and Slater (2016). programs help households prepare for, cope with, and 15 In Bangladesh, households that received cash transfers before adapt to shocks.14 More specifically, climate resilient social floods were 36 percent less likely to go a day without eating protection has helped reduce climate vulnerability while and, 3 months after the floods still had higher adult and child facilitating adaptation and mitigation responses (Gyori, food consumption and wellbeing. In Niger, a multiyear cash Diekmann, and Kuhne 2021; Rigolini 2021) for benefi- transfer program was shown to have helped mitigate negative welfare impacts as a result of droughts. Households that had ciaries most at risk to climate shocks. It does this providing increased savings and earnings from agriculture and “off farm short term income support via cash transfers which can businesses” were protected when shocks took place (Premand also help build long term resilience by helping households, and Stoeffler 2020). 12 YEMEN’S COMPOUNDING BURDENS: FROM DROUGHT TO HUNGER via mobile payment teams with the support of the Al References Kuraimi Bank.16 The World Bank and UNICEF are plan- ning to enhance shock responsiveness of cash trans- ACAPS. 2022. “Yemen Global Wheat Supply Dynamics fers in Yemen with the aim of recognizing other shocks and Their Impact.” Theamtic report. Amman, Jordan: besides flooding, and to also include heightened food ACAPS Analysis Hub. https://www.acaps.org/ insecurity. As these shocks have affected both IRG and fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20220825_ Houthi controlled areas, the project has also ensured acaps_thematic_report_yah_global_wheat_supply.pdf. a balance of support to both areas, through a conflict sensitive component of the program. The data and anal- ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, World Bank, WFP, and WHO. ysis discussed in this brief can be leveraged to identify 2024. “Yemen Joint Monitoring Report.” 3. Amman, the districts most at risk to these compounding shocks. Jordan: ACAPS Analysis Hub. file:///C:/Users/ And, given the success of a digital payment pilot in eight wb553173/Downloads/Yemen%20JMR%20-%20 districts during the December 2023 payment cycle, this Bimonthly%20Update%20on%20FNS%20Report%20 modality could be scaled up as an option for all cash No%203%20June%202024.pdf. transfer beneficiaries, which would further increase the speed of shock response. Bastagli, Francesca, and Rebecca Holmes. 2014. “Delivering Social Protection in the Aftermath of a Shock: Beyond cash transfers, other social protection inter- Lessons from Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan and Viet ventions in Yemen have played an important role in Nam.” https://odi.org/en/publications/delivering- building resilience to climate change. For example, social-protection-in-the-aftermath-of-a-shock-lessons-from- cash for work and community asset development bangladesh-kenya-pakistan-and-viet-nam/. programs supported by the World Bank and UNDP have contributed to improved natural resource management by Ganong, Peter, Fiona Greig, Max Liebeskind, Pascal generating employment in activities such as road reha- Noel, Daniel M. Sullivan, and Joseph Vavra. 2021. bilitation, water conservation, watershed management, “Spending and Job Search Impacts of Expanded Unem- improvement of rural irrigation infrastructure and commu- ployment Benefits: Evidence from Administrative Micro nity disaster preparedness. The World Bank’s social Data.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY. https:// protection project has also supported communities in papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3784008. building resilience to the impacts of recurring disasters (floods, droughts, and climate-induced locust infestation). Gyori, Mario, Katharina Diekmann, and Elena Kuhne. It has also facilitated this by eliciting existing knowledge 2021. “The Importance of Social Protection for Climate in communities on how to mitigate these risks through Change Mitigation in LMICS: Success Stories and construction techniques and resource management.17 In Opportunities for the Future.” GIZ. https://socialpro- the absence of a unified government, a common charac- tection.org/sites/default/files/publications_files/GIZ_ teristic of FCV countries, working through local institutions Social_Protection_CCM_LMICs.pdf. has been instrumental in achieving program objectives, sustainably. This component too, could leverage data to HBS. 2014. “Yemen Household Budget Survey.” further align with districts and communities most vulner- able and facing climate risks. 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