70839 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond The first round of Country Status Overviews (CSO1) published in 2006 benchmarked the preparedness of sectors of 16 countries in Africa to meet the WSS MDGs based on their medium-term spending plans and a set of ‘success factors’ selected from regional experience. Combined with a process of national stakeholder consultation, this prompted countries to ask whether they had those ‘success factors’ in place and, if not, whether they should put them in place. The second round of Country Status Overviews (CSO2) has built on both the method and the process developed in CSO1. The ‘success factors’ have been supplemented with additional factors drawn from country and regional analysis to develop the CSO2 scorecard. Together these reflect the essential steps, functions and results in translating finance into services through government systems—in line with Paris Principles for aid effectiveness. The data and summary assessments have been drawn from local data sources and compared with internationally reported data, and, wherever possible, the assessments have been subject to broad-based consultations with lead government agencies and country sector stakeholders, including donor institutions. This second set of 32 Country Status Overviews (CSO2) on water supply and sanitation was commissioned by the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW). Development of the CSO2 was led by the World Bank administered Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) in collaboration with the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO). This report was produced in collaboration with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and other stakeholders during 2009/10. Some sources cited may be informal documents that are not readily available. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the collaborating institutions, their Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The collaborating institutions do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the collaborating institutions concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The material in this publication is copyrighted. Requests for permission to reproduce portions of it should be sent to wsp@worldbank.org. The collaborating institutions encourage the dissemination of this work and will normally grant permission promptly. For more information, please visit www.amcow.net or www.wsp.org. Photograph credits: Getty Images Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond An AMCOW Country Status Overview Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 1 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Strategic Overview The water and sanitation sector in the Democratic Republic disbursements have lagged well behind commitments. of the Congo (DRC) suffered a great setback during the Annual investment spending for water supply and sanitation country’s long political crisis through the 1990s and early averaged only about US$65 million over the period 2007– 2000s. Since then, the sector has started to recover, albeit 08 which is roughly US$1 per capita. Most of this spending, slowly. Basic water supply and sanitation needs are still about US$55 million, was for water supply, with 95 percent immense. Today, an estimated 50 million Congolese— funded by external aid. which is 75 percent of the population—do not have access to safe water, and approximately 80-90 percent do not At this stage, weak implementation capacity measured in have access to improved sanitation. terms of annual budget utilization rates is the prime factor limiting the pace of recovery and development of the The key bottleneck that currently impedes progress DRC’s water supply and sanitation sector. Going forward, in the DRC’s water and sanitation sector is the limited the critical factors will be a renewed commitment to implementation capacity. Even as more finance is becoming pursue institutional reform and to build capacities where available, the sector struggles to absorb it efficiently, needed to enable the ongoing decentralization of the hindered by weak institutions, outdated sector policies, a sector. More resources will also have to be mobilized dearth of qualified technicians and managers, remaining for provincial water supply and sanitation—programs insecurity, and a lack of support infrastructure such as directed at rural and peri-urban communities. Under the roads and electricity. Although recent coverage trends have “maximum possible� scenario, which assumes progress crept upward, and notwithstanding the relatively successful on these fronts, the annual flow of actual expenditure mobilization of external funds, the Millennium Development could rise to about US$180 million for water supply and Goal targets for water supply and sanitation as well as the about US$25 million for household sanitation, thereby much less ambitious national targets set by the DRC’s first extending access to improved water to an additional 12 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DSCRP) for million Congolese by 2015, instead of only 6 million as the year 2015, are out of reach. estimated under the “status quo� or “business as usual� scenario. For sanitation the ‘maximum possible’ scenario New financial commitments to the sector over the period could yield improved sanitation for up to 8 instead of only 2007–08 averaged around US$170 million annually, funded 2 million Congolese. almost entirely by donors, and have since risen further. The water supply and sanitation component of the ongoing The present AMCOW Country Status Overview (CSO2) has Priority Action Program foresaw more than US$420 been produced in collaboration with the Government of million to be invested from 2009 onward. However, actual the DRC and other stakeholders. 2 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond Agreed priority actions to tackle these challenges, and ensure finance is effectively turned into services, are: Sectorwide • Improve implementation capacity and financial management across the sector. • Complete the institutional reform, in particular: o Ratify the new Water Law (Code de l’Eau) and specify a new sector policy; o Rationalize the institutional framework at federal and provincial levels to achieve clear responsibilities within the new decentralized framework; and o Progressively transfer responsibilities for infrastructure to provinces and the decentralized territorial entities (ETDs). • Introduce a more coherent, comprehensive, and detailed sector monitoring and evaluation framework. Rural water supply • Prepare provincial water programs combining investment and capacity building. • Improve implementation capacity by: o Redefining the role of the National Service for Rural Water Supply (SNHR) and the Provincial Water and Sanitation Committees (CPAEAs) in the new decentralized framework; and o Promoting the training of local water technicians and enterprises. • Ensure that increased resources are mobilized for investment in rural areas. • Expand successful existing programs—in particular, the Autonomous Community-Based Water Systems project and the Villages Assainis program. • Ensure that the SNHR borehole program builds up local capacity for operation and maintenance, drawing on the experience of the above-mentioned projects. • Formalize the status of user associations and small autonomous systems in the regulatory framework. Urban water supply • Implement the recovery plan for the national water utility (Programme de Redressement de la REGIDESO). • Revisit the choice of technologies to achieve better cost effectiveness. • Recalibrate the geographic and social targeting of urban interventions to give greater priorities to secondary urban centers and basic service provision. Rural sanitation and hygiene • Develop a sector policy within the emerging decentralized institutional framework. • Expand the Villages Assainis and Écoles Assainies programs implemented by the Ministry of Public Health in cooperation with UNICEF. • Improve Aid and Investment Management Platform’s (PGAI) monitoring by separating out tracking of rural sanitation funds. Urban sanitation and hygiene • Develop a sector policy within the emerging decentralized institutional framework. • Improve the monitoring of the PGAI by separating out tracking of urban sanitation funds. 3 An AMCOW Country Status Overview 4 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations........................................................................................................................... 6 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 7 2. Sector Overview: Coverage and Finance Trends............................................................................................... 8 3. Reform Context: Introducing the CSO2 Scorecard ......................................................................................... 12 4. Institutional Framework ................................................................................................................................ 15 5. Financing and Implementation: Absorption Capacity is the Key Constraint .................................................... 17 6. Sector Monitoring and Evaluation ................................................................................................................. 19 7. Subsector: Rural Water Supply ...................................................................................................................... 21 8. Subsector: Urban Water Supply..................................................................................................................... 24 9. Subsector: Rural Sanitation and Hygiene ....................................................................................................... 27 10. Subsector: Urban Sanitation and Hygiene...................................................................................................... 29 Notes and References ................................................................................................................................... 31 5 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Acronyms and Abbreviations AFD French Development Agency (Agence OECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation Française de Développement) and Development – Development Assistance AfDB African Development Bank Committee AMCOW African Ministers’ Council on Water O&M Operations and maintenance BTC Belgian Technical Cooperation (Coopération OPEX Operations expenditure Technique Belge) PEASU Semi Urban Water Supply and Sanitation CAPEX Capital expenditure Project (Projet Eau et Assainissement en CNAEA National Water and Sanitation Committee milieu Semi Urbain) – African Development (Comité National d’Action de l’Eau et de Bank l’Assainissement) PAP Priority Action Programs (Programmes CPAEA Provincial Water and Sanitation Committees d’Actions Prioritaires) (Comités Provinciaux d’Action de l’Eau et PEMU Urban Water Supply Project (Projet l’Assainissement) d’Alimentation en Eau potable en Milieu CSO(2) Country Status Overviews (second round) Urbain) – World Bank DHS Demographic and Health Survey PGAI Aid and Investment Management DFID Department for International Development Platform (Plateforme de Gestion des (UK) Aides et des Investissements) – Ministry of DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo Planning DSCRP Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PNA National Sanitation Program (Programme (Document de la Stratégie de Croissance et National d’Assainissement) – National de Réduction de la Pauvreté) Directorate of Hygiene ETD Decentralized Territorial Entities (Entités REGIDESO National Water Utility Company (Regie de Territoriales Décentralisées) Distribution d’Eau) GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische RSH Rural sanitation and hygiene Zusammenarbeit, a German technical RWS Rural water supply cooperation agency SNHR National Service for Rural Water Supply GDP Gross domestic product (Service National de l’Hydraulique Rurale) GNI Gross national income SWAp Sector-Wide Approach JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund KFW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German UPPE-SRP Poverty Reduction Strategy Formulation Development Bank) Steering Unit (Unité de Pilotage du JMP Joint Monitoring Programme (UNICEF/WHO) Processus de l’Elaboration de la Stratégie de M&E Monitoring and evaluation Réduction de la Pauvreté) MDG Millennium Development Goal USH Urban sanitation and hygiene MICS Multiple-Indicator Cluster Survey (UNICEF) UWS Urban water supply NGO Nongovernmental organization WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene ODV Office of Roadways & Drainage (Office des WHO World Health Organization Voiries et Drainage) WSP Water and Sanitation Program Exchange rate: US$1 = 906 Congolese Francs.1 6 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 1. Introduction The African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) commissioned the production of a second round of Country Status Overviews (CSOs) to better understand what underpins progress in water supply and sanitation and what its member governments can do to accelerate that progress across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).2 AMCOW delegated this task to the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program and the African Development Bank who are implementing it in close partnership with UNICEF and WHO in over 30 countries across SSA. This CSO2 report has been produced in collaboration with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other stakeholders during 2009/10. The analysis aims to help countries assess their own service delivery pathways for turning finance into water supply and sanitation services in each of four subsectors: rural and urban water supply, and rural and urban sanitation and hygiene. The CSO2 analysis has three main components: a review of past coverage; a costing model to assess the adequacy of future investments; and a scorecard which allows diagnosis of particular bottlenecks along the service delivery pathway. The CSO2’s contribution is to answer not only whether past trends and future finance are sufficient to meet sector targets, but what specific issues need to be addressed to ensure finance is effectively turned into accelerated coverage expansion in water supply and sanitation. In this spirit, specific priority actions have been identified through consultation with government and other sector stakeholders. A regional synthesis report, available separately, presents best practice and shared learning to help realize these priority actions. 7 An AMCOW Country Status Overview 2. Sector Overview: Coverage and Finance Trends Coverage: Assessing Past Progress the access statistics adopted by DRC sector planners and stakeholders in the DSCRP and a 2008 UNDP report4 are Between 1990 and the early 2000s, as the Democratic based on extrapolations from known water service points Republic of the Congo reached the low point of its long and the judgment of sector experts. The calculations are political crisis, access to safe water regressed from an generally seen as the best available within the sector, but estimated 34 percent of the population to only 22 percent. suffer from major uncertainties resulting from an opaque Investments dried up, sector institutions collapsed, and method of compilation, incomplete underlying records, infrastructure was abandoned and destroyed, while the and the lack of a standardized definition of access to safe population grew by more than 30 percent and urbanization water in terms of distance to the source, daily volume per intensified. capita, reliability, and quality. Recent data suggest that the advent of relative stability As Table 1 highlights, the DSCRP access statistics also differ since the mid-2000s has been associated with a halt, and considerably from the “coverage rates� found by recent even slight reversal, of this negative trend in the sector. nationally representative surveys (Multiple Indicator Cluster Access rates to safe water are believed to have increased Survey—MICS2, Enquête 1-2-3, Demographic and Health slightly to around 24 percent nationally in 2008, that is, Survey – DHS), which are used to calculate the figures of from 12 percent to 17 percent in rural areas and from the global UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Programme 37 percent to 38 percent in urban areas. These national (JMP).5 Probable reasons for this discrepancy are outlined access estimates, however, conceal large disparities in Section 6 on Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). In between regions. Data on access to improved sanitation general, the more pessimistic DSCRP access statistics are suggest stagnation at a very low level, with approximately considered more realistic, find wider acceptance among 10–20 percent of people having access to hygienic feces sector stakeholders, and are therefore primarily used in disposal. this report. The rehabilitation and development of water supply It should be noted, however, that in spite of the different services is one of the five priorities (Cinq Chantiers) to level of access shown by sector-estimates and survey- which the government committed itself; it is given priority statistics respectively, the trends they describe are very in the 2006 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper similar. Both show a collapse in safe water access after (DSCRP I). Sector planners recognized that the Millennium 1990, and a stabilization and slight recovery since the Development Goal (MDG) target of halving the proportion mid-2000s, and low-level stagnation or only minor of those with no access to basic services by 2015, relative improvement for access to improved sanitation. The post- to 1990 levels, was out of the DRC’s reach and set lower 1990 collapse is less apparent in the case of the JMP trend targets. The current national targets specified in the lines, which are derived using linear regression of multiple DSCRP are indicated in Figure 1 and call for the following: household surveys. (a) raising access to safe water from 22 percent in 2005 to 49 percent by 2015; and (b) raising access to improved Figure 1 illustrates that current trends are insufficient to sanitation from 9 percent to 45 percent. The MDG targets reach either the national targets for water or sanitation for water supply and sanitation are 70 percent and 55 or the more ambitious MDGs. As this report will argue, percent, respectively.3 however, if key reforms to improve implementation capacity are implemented, the DRC could come significantly closer A word of caution regarding the use of water and sanitation to reaching its targets than past trends suggest (here access statistics in the DRC must be introduced at this point: referred to as the “maximum possible� scenario). 8 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond Table 1 Inventory extrapolation-based access rates compared to survey-based coverage rates 1990 2004/05 2008 Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Access rate (DSCRP/UNDP) Safe water 68% 21% 34% 37% 12% 22% 38% 17% 24% Improved sanitation 10% 11% 11% 9% 10% 10% 9% 11% 10% Access rate (JMP, survey-based) Safe water 90% 27% 45% 82% 28% 45% 80% 28% 46% Improved sanitation 23% 4% 9% 23% 19% 20% 23% 23% 23% Sources: DSCRP/UNDP/JMP. Investment Requirements: More Funds economic services (banking, transport suppliers, and so on). Necessary, but the Key Constraint is The actual utilization of committed funds is generally less Implementation Capacity than 50 percent in public projects.6 Major ventures such as the World Bank’s Urban Water Supply Project (PEMU), The water and sanitation sector in the DRC has evolved supported by an International Development Association to a point where direct financial constraints have given Grant of US$190 million, have been held up and delayed way to a lack of implementation capacity as the primary by weak implementation capacity. While the drive for limiting factor for development. Large aid flows have more funding will have to be sustained, finance cannot been mobilized for the rehabilitation of water supply be turned into outputs as long as these implementation installations and services, but the effective utilization of capacity constraints are not resolved. The slow pace of investments has been slowed down by institutional and implementation will, in turn, affect resource mobilization administrative dysfunction, weak capacity as well as the as financing partners, pressed for evidence of results, general lack of supporting infrastructure, logistics, and assess the performance of their initial engagements. Figure 1 Progress in water supply and sanitation coverage, and projected and possible development Water supply Sanitation 100% 100% 80% 80% Coverage Coverage 60% 60% 40% 40% 20% 20% 0% 0% 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 National estimates National estimates Projection of historic trend (national estimates) Projection of historic trend (national estimates) National target National target “Maximum possible� scenario “Maximum possible� scenario JMP estimates JMP estimates MDG target MDG target Sources: DSCRP 2007/UNDP 2008 and JMP 2010 report. 9 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Although improving the capacity to absorb finance and mobilize and effectively disburse these sums is currently realize infrastructure efficiently is currently the priority out of reach for the DRC, the CSO2 estimates that key concern in the sector, the volume of finance will also have reforms and a concerted effort to mobilize funding could to rise further if the immense needs of the population of raise annual investments to around US$180 million in the DRC are to be met. Here, the CSO2 analysis provides the water sector, and US$25 million for sanitation in estimates of the amount of funding that (a) can credibly the coming years. These “maximum possible� amounts, be absorbed if key reforms are carried out, and (b) would effectively implemented, would be well above investment be required to reach national targets. The CSO2 costing flows in the recent past, as shown in Table 2 and discussed model estimates these finance requirements based on in greater detail in Section 5 on Financing. The “maximum the best available per capita cost data for various water possible� scenario also assumes that public investments and sanitation technologies, matched with statistics on will leverage user contributions, at different rates technology prevalence in the DRC and the number of depending on subsector (Figure 2).7 If realized efficiently, additional persons to be served to reach national targets this could extend access to safe water to an additional from current (DSCRP) estimates of access. The absorptive 12 million Congolese between 2010 and 2015, instead of capacity under the so-called “maximum possible� only 6 million if current trends continued unchanged. For scenario has been judged based on past spending, and sanitation, the “maximum possible� scenario could yield an analysis of existing institutional structures, possible improved sanitation for up to 8 instead of only 2 million reforms, and realistically achievable mobilization of funds. Congolese by 2015. While the lack of comprehensive, reliable statistics in the DRC undermines the precision of financial estimates, it The CSO2 estimates assume a considerable shift from is possible to provide at least a picture of the order of expensive household connections to more cost effective magnitude of the challenges faced by the sector. and affordable standpipes (bornes fontaines) in urban areas, which are assumed to increase from around 10 The annual public capital investment (that is, not counting percent to 30 percent of safe water access. A more general private contributions) required to reach the ‘national review of technology choices could help reduce operating targets’ is thus estimated as US$260 million for water costs and improve affordability, for instance by relying supply, of which US$70 million is needed for the rural whenever possible on ground water and springs rather subsector and US$190 million for the urban subsector; than on surface water that requires more treatment, which US$190 million is needed for sanitation (US$30 million for has generally been the solution of choice for REGIDESO, rural and US$160 million for urban). While the capacity to the national water utility company. Note that operation Figure 2 Required vs. anticipated (public) and assumed (household) expenditure Water supply Sanitation Required CAPEX: Required CAPEX: public ($260M) and private ($30M) public ($190M) and private ($130M) 0 100 200 300 400 0 100 200 300 400 US$ million/year US$ million/year Public CAPEX (max. possible anticipated) Public CAPEX/max. possible (anticipated) Household CAPEX (assumed) Household CAPEX (assumed) CAPEX Gap CAPEX Gap Source: CSO2 costing. 10 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond Table 2 Coverage and investment figures8 Coverage National CAPEX required Actual Projected CAPEX in Projected access targets (national expenditure max. possible in 2015 targets) 2007-2008 scenario “Maximum Current 1990 2008 2015 Total Public Public Household possible� trend % % % US$m/year % Rural water supply 21% 17% 36% 80 70 25 60 10 30% 23% Urban water supply 68% 38% 65% 210 190 30 120 15 50% 29% Water supply total 34% 24% 49% 290 260 55 180 25 38% 27% Rural sanitation 11% 11% 46% 50 30 5 15 10 25% 12% Urban sanitation 10% 9% 45% 270 160 5 10 10 10% 9% Sanitation total 11% 10% 45% 320 190 10 25 20 20% 11% Sources: DSCRP and CSO2 costing. and maintenance (O&M) costs are not captured by these of magnitude of the challenges, and distil a key message: estimates. O&M costs would have to be covered by user mobilizing more finance is still necessary, especially for fees, but at present this is generally not achieved in the peri-urban and rural communities, but the key constraint DRC. is the lack of capacity to effectively disburse funds and implement projects at scale. As these issues underline, precise estimates of capital investment requirements and anticipated expenditure Bottlenecks can occur throughout the service delivery are difficult in the DRC, given the lack of comprehensive pathway—all the institutions, processes and actors that and reliable statistics about current coverage, unit costs, translate sector funding into sustainable services. The rest likely household contributions, actual cost recovery, of this report evaluates the service delivery pathway in current budgets, and technology choices. However, the its entirety, locating the bottlenecks and presenting the basic estimates given here do at least indicate the order agreed priority actions to help address them. 11 An AMCOW Country Status Overview 3. Reform Context: Introducing the CSO2 Scorecard The water and sanitation sector in the DRC is now in of reform progress along the service delivery pathway. The the midst of fundamental reforms initiated by the new CSO2 scorecard assesses the building blocks of service Constitution (2006), the laws for the reform of public delivery in turn: three building blocks which relate to enterprises and the disengagement of the state (2007), enabling services; three which relate to developing new and the Decentralization Law (2008), which has moved services; and three which relate to sustaining services. responsibilities away from the central government. A Each building block is assessed against specific indicators comprehensive new Water Law has been in development and scored from 1 to 3 accordingly.9 The scorecards for since 2007. Its final draft was accepted in a broad each subsector are displayed in Sections 7 to 10 of this stakeholder review in September 2010, to be tabled late report, but key insights are summarized here. Analyzing 2010. Basic targets for the water and sanitation sector have the service delivery pathway of the DRC in this systematic been formulated in the DSCRP (2006), and two successive way reveals a number of key points in greater detail. Priority Action Programs (PAP I & II) have undertaken first steps to attain these. The DSCRP I (2007–10) and associated PAPs provide a basic planning framework that will extend through 2010 until Going forward, the key reform objective will be to pass the rollout of DSCRP II (2011–15) and the related Five-Year the proposed Water Law and then translate the new Development Plan currently under preparation. At least in framework into reality by developing a clear sector policy the urban water sector, institutional responsibility is clearly and streamlining the institutional structure accordingly, as assigned to the national utility REGIDESO, which has its well as reinforcing capacity. So far, reform efforts have been own planning tools. Yet, compared to a peer group of the focused on the national water utility REGIDESO, which is poorest low-income African countries (with gross national responsible for urban water supply and a natural target of income, GNI, below US$500 per capita)10 the DRC’s water reform efforts given its central importance in urban areas supply and sanitation enabling environment is still lagging and its remaining capacity. The government has launched behind (Figure 3). There are a number of reasons for this. a comprehensive operational and financial reform program (Programme de Redressement Opérationnel & Financier) First, even though the existing DSCRP and associated PAPs combining reform, commercialization, upgrading of provide basic targets, key priorities, and some investment management, and investments. While also affected preparation, they do not yet amount to comprehensive, by the broad reforms in the legal framework, the rural detailed, sectorwide planning. In particular, there is no water sector, and sanitation in general, have received less nationwide policy or planning for rural water supply. This systematic attention so far. These subsectors have seen a subsector is formally the responsibility of the National trend from ad hoc initiatives by the UN and aid agencies, Service for Rural Water Supply (SNHR) within the Ministry in particular UNICEF and Belgian Technical Cooperation of Rural Development, but its current capacity is weak. (BTC), toward more programmatic approaches addressing Sanitation and hygiene improvements are integrated capacity and sustainability concerns. However, dedicated in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programs and empowered institutions and specific, comprehensive targeting rural communities and schools, as is the case planning frameworks are still largely absent. for the Villages Assainis and Ecoles Assainies programs implemented by the Ministry of Public Health with support This basic overview puts the service delivery pathway in from UNICEF. But these have yet to be scaled up and fully context, which can now be explored in detail using the institutionalized. Urban sanitation has been the object CSO2 scorecard, an assessment tool providing a snapshot of only limited ad hoc interventions. The absence of 12 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond policy and the fragmentation and dysfunction of central An efficient service delivery pathway must also ensure that structures nominally in charge of urban sanitation remain services, once developed, are sustainable. This requires major obstacles to any advances commensurate with the ensuring the continuous functionality of infrastructure scale of the challenge. and uptake by the population; achieving cost recovery; allowing basic autonomy and business planning of A further factor that constrains the enabling environment operators; and monitoring sector development efficiently. in the DRC is the national budgeting process. Budgeted Some steps to put these basic elements of sustainability amounts are generally insufficient to meet stated targets; in place have been taken, with basic monitoring through the budget process is opaque and largely irrelevant as it national household surveys (DHS, MICS, Enquête 1-2-3) does not capture external flows which account for more taking place regularly, relatively autonomous business than 95 percent of expenditure. Since 2005 the balance planning at least by the urban utility REGIDESO, and some of the state contribution to the sector has been negative success in ensuring sufficient uptake to at least keep up as the state failed to meet its water bills of about US$30 with population growth. However, in general, sustainability million annually, and only made limited contribution to remains weak: functionality of infrastructure is mediocre administrative expenses (about US$1 million) and to at best, cost recovery is low, tariff reviews limited to some REGIDESO investments (averaging about US$4 million per areas and not followed up on, and spare part markets are year over 2006–08). underdeveloped. The key bottleneck in the service delivery pathway across Overall, the CSO scorecard shows that the DRC still lags subsectors concerns the development of new infrastructure, behind its economic peer group of African countries in all that is, the weak capacity of the DRC to effectively and three sections of the service delivery pathway—enabling, equitably implement projects and achieve outcomes on the developing, and sustaining. As highlighted earlier, the ground. Disbursement rates for funds committed across DRC’s water supply and sanitation sector is particularly subsectors are generally below 50 percent. Procedures lacking in its capacity to absorb and effectively disburse to systematically involve local stakeholders in planning funds, implement projects, and thus develop new services and implementation are yet to be fully institutionalized on the ground (Figure 3). and implemented. Current infrastructure development is off-track for reaching either the national, or the more Figure 3 ambitious MDG, targets. Water quality standards, where Average scorecard results for enabling, developing, and sustaining service delivery, and they exist, are generally not enforced. There are no set peer-group comparison allocation criteria to achieve an equitable distribution of funds throughout the country or between subsectors. Enabling To a considerable extent, the underlying reasons for these problems in developing new infrastructure relate to the general weakness of the state in the DRC, which is only slowly emerging from major armed conflict and political turbulence, with a vast, inaccessible and politically polarized territory, scarce human capital, and a lack of basic support infrastructure such as roads and electricity. More specifically, as Section 4 will outline, the institutional framework in the water and sanitation sector, which is Sustaining Developing meant to deliver these basic services, is fragmented and dysfunctional, and in the middle of a reform process that Democratic Republic of the Congo average scores is yet to be fully realized. Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 Source: CSO2 scorecard. 13 An AMCOW Country Status Overview The subsequent Sections 4 to 6 highlight progress and national income. The related indicators are extracted from challenges across three thematic areas—the institutional the scorecard and presented in charts at the beginning framework, finance, and M&E—benchmarking the DRC of each section. The scorecards for each subsector are against its peer countries based on a grouping by gross presented in their entirety in Sections 7 to 10. Table 3 Key dates in the reform of the sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Year Event 2006 New Constitution 2006 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSCRP) 2007 Laws on the reform of public enterprises and the disengagement of the state 2008 Law on Decentralization 2010 New Water Law endorsed by sector stakeholders and submitted to Parliament 14 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 4. Institutional Framework Priority actions for institutional framework • Ratify the new Water Law (Code de l’Eau) and specify a new sector policy. • Rationalize the institutional framework at federal and provincial level to achieve clear responsibilities within the new decentralized framework. • Progressively transfer responsibilities for infrastructure to provinces and the decentralized territorial entities (ETDs). In the DRC, responsibilities for water supply and sanitation main depository of technical capacity on water supply are currently parceled out among several central ministries matters. Currently, it is active in cities at a reduced scale and agencies; none of them are in the position to and 20 percent of its networks, serving mostly secondary coordinate policies or take an overview of all ongoing towns, are inactive. REGIDESO operates under the programs. The multiplicity of public actors and the lack of administrative and financial oversight of the Ministry of a focal point that is able to project a coherent vision and State Portfolio (Ministre du Portfeuille) and under the to federate sector actors hamper the development of the technical oversight of the Ministry of Energy, which is sector. After the ratification of the new Water Law, the responsible for UWS policies. Under the ongoing reform of key priority relating to the institutional framework will be public enterprises, which is supported by the World Bank, to rationalize it at federal and provincial levels to achieve REGIDESO is being transformed into a public enterprise clear responsibilities and empowered institutions in the with commercial statutes (see Section 8). new decentralized framework. At present, this is not yet the case: Rural water supply (RWS): The SNHR within the Ministry of Rural Development is nominally responsible for Sectorwide institutions: The Ministry of Planning is RWS. However, whatever capacity the SNHR had built in responsible for the elaboration and monitoring of the the 1980s in terms of equipment and installations, had DRC’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies: the been reduced to almost nothing by the mid-2000s due to DSCRP I (2007–09), and the DSCRP II (2010–13), which obsolescence, war, and looting. Under the Constitution is currently under preparation. The specialized units of (2006) and the Decentralization Laws (2008) RWS will the Ministry of Planning include the Poverty Reduction primarily be the responsibility of the provinces. The Strategy Formulation Steering Unit (UPPE-SRP, responsible SNHR has indicated its intention to move away from for planning and monitoring) and the Aid and Investment implementation and management of RWS systems and to Management Platform (PGAI), which monitors aid flows. focus primarily on advocacy, planning, technical support, Besides its role in overall development planning, the and monitoring while establishing closer relationships Ministry of Planning is involved in the water supply and with the provinces. It is supported in this endeavor by the sanitation sector through its National Water and Sanitation AfDB under the Semi Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Committee (CNAEA), which has a broad mandate for Project (PEASU).11 It is not clear whether the recently policy development, programming and monitoring, as launched SNHR borehole program (see Section 5) follows well as coordination at the inter-ministerial level and with this principle. development partners. The latter function is organized through the so-called GT13 group, which is co-chaired by The Ministry of Public Health is also engaged in RWS through the Ministry of Environment and one of the partners active the Villages Assainis and Écoles Assainies programs. These in the sector (rotating). benefit from the technical and financial support of UNICEF and are active in all 11 provinces, operating through Urban water supply (UWS): In UWS, the national the local Health Zones (Zones de Santé). Sanitation and water utility REGIDESO remains the central actor and the hygiene education are integrated in both programs. 15 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Another significant actor in RWS is a multi-donor program Figure 4 supporting community-based autonomous water Scorecard indicator scores relating to supply systems (Programme d’Appui aux Systèmes AEP institutional framework compared to peer group Autonomes). Executed by the BTC, this program is active (see endnotes)12 in five provinces. It works with communities in rural and RWS peri-urban areas to develop water supply systems. It is linked to the CNAEA at the center, as well as its provincial equivalents (CPAEAs). Going forward, the program will need to serve as an example for the necessary expansion of water supply and sanitation services under decentralized, USH UWS provincial programs. Rural and urban sanitation: Fragmentation and ineffectiveness of existing institutions is an even greater challenge in the sanitation subsector. There is no national RSH sector policy beyond basic target setting in the DSCRP. Democratic Republic of the Congo average scores The two central institutional structures with a nominal Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 mandate for sanitation interventions—the National Sanitation Program/National Directorate of Hygiene Source: CSO2 scorecard. (PNA) within the Ministry of Environment, and the Office of Roadways and Drainage (OVD) within the Ministry of and municipal authorities, within a framework of national Infrastructure, Public Works and Reconstruction—are policies and regulations defined at the center. The dysfunctional and severely resource constrained. The PNA transition from the current jumble of central institutions is supposed to have a particular focus on vector control to a streamlined decentralized framework will require a through local brigades at the municipal (communes) and well thought-out strategy founded on a shared vision of district (territoires) levels, but its current reach is extremely the new institutional architecture, with clear definition of limited. roles and responsibilities at the level of the provinces and the center. Related reform programs will have to deal with In rural areas, the primary interventions are the sanitation the rationalization of central institutions and the build-up components of the Villages Assainis and Écoles Assainies of capacity at all levels. programs supported by the Ministry of Public Health and UNICEF. Interventions in urban areas are limited The proposed Water Law would streamline the legal and ad hoc, such as the planned construction of 1,154 and institutional framework for the management and institutional latrines (222 in Kasangulu, 262 in Lisala, development of water resources. The proposed Law and 670 in Tshikapa) under the AfDB-supported PEASU regroups responsibilities for water under two ministerial project. The responsibilities for sanitation will eventually dockets: water resource management, and public water be anchored in municipal and local authorities with supply services. Key concerns for the latter include: (a) some role at the center for norm setting, overall policies, delegation of O&M to operators, public or private; (b) and resource mobilization and monitoring. At present, local recovery of at least O&M costs; and (c) recognition of however, capacities and resources are limited and the the role of users’ associations. institutional framework ill defined. The adoption of the proposed Water Law will set the stage Institutional reforms: The implementation of for the development of a water services policy in 2011. decentralization is the major institutional challenge facing It will have as its main objective the drawing up of the the water supply and sanitation sector over the coming institutional framework for decentralization, and defining decade. The DRC’s Constitution (2006) and the subsequent and rationalizing roles and responsibilities at all levels. This Laws on Decentralization (2008) put water and sanitation will be a crucial step to address the current weaknesses in services under the primary responsibility of the provinces the service delivery pathway. 16 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 5. Financing and Implementation: Absorption Capacity is the Key Constraint Priority actions for financing and implementation capacity • Improve implementation capacity to raise disbursement rates. • Continue mobilization of new funding to close remaining financing gap. • Improve equity of funding distribution: between urban and rural areas, between Kinshasa and the provinces, and between water and sanitation subsectors. Since the resumption of international cooperation in for about 2.3 percent of total public expenditures including the early 2000s, the DRC’s water supply and sanitation aid flows in these years, that is, approximately 0.6 percent sector has attracted considerable external support, initially of the gross domestic product (GDP) and roughly US$1 directed at emergency and straightforward rehabilitation per capita per annum. The direct contributions from the interventions, but now increasingly evolving towards state have been limited and on balance negative due to multiyear programs with institutional components. the failure of public institutions to pay their water bills.14 Since 2009, the World Bank and the AfDB have helped In the years 2007–08, the annual pace of public expenditure to cover these bills as part of the drive to keep REGIDESO for the water and sanitation sector amounted to about afloat and to restore its finances. Projects by the BTC and US$65 million per year, of which US$62 million, that is, 95 the Ministry of Public Health have pioneered substantial percent, was provided by external aid. The vast majority of community contributions to water systems and latrines these funds went to the water sector, although a precise (generally between 10–40 percent), but beyond that, tracking of funds is difficult as will be outlined in the next private finance currently plays no significant role in the section. The water and sanitation sector thus accounted DRC. Figure 5 The key finance related priority in the DRC’s water and Scorecard indicator scores relating to financing, sanitation sector at present is to address the capacity compared to peer group13 constraints that hinder the effective disbursement of finance and realization of projects. While the CSO2 RWS calculations (Table 2, and Figures 1 and 2) show that additional finance is necessary if national targets are to be reached, even adequate capital acquisition will not be sufficient if a matching capacity to implement is not developed. USH UWS New commitments over 2007–08 were estimated at about US$342 million by PGAI, that is, an annual average of about US$170 million, and have since risen further. The PAP II for the water and sanitation sector foresaw more than US$420 RSH million to be invested from 2009 onward. An inventory of Democratic Republic of the Congo average scores all commitments for currently ongoing urban projects in Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 the period up to 2013 has yielded a figure of approximately US$500 million, 90 percent of which is provided by four Source: CSO2 scorecard. donors: the World Bank (43 percent), the AfDB (23 17 An AMCOW Country Status Overview percent), the Japanese International Cooperation Agency Moving forward, a related key issue will be to find a (JICA, 12 percent) and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau formula (and the administrative capacity) to distribute (German Development Bank) (KFW, 12 percent). The wide funds more equitably. Currently, UWS takes up the lion’s gap between commitments and disbursements reflects share: about 85 percent of commitments for the water the rapid build-up of assistance, but also the substantial supply and sanitation sector under the current PAP II. capacity constraints which inhibit the sector’s ability Moreover, funding allocation is heavily skewed towards to make full and effective use of the available finance. Kinshasa, which would absorb about 40 percent of current Across the water and sanitation subsectors, disbursement commitments for ongoing projects targeting specific rates are often below 50 percent, as the CSO2 scorecard cities or provinces.15 The division of funds among the analysis indicates. As Figure 5 illustrates, the DRC’s low other provinces is unequal ranging from around 10 to 15 disbursement rates, remaining financial gaps, and opaque, percent (Western Kasai, Bas-Congo, and Katanga) to less noncomprehensive sector investment planning process than 1 percent for the Eastern provinces (the two Kivus, mean that it lags among a group of low income peers in Maniema, and Orientale). The share of commitments this respect. directed at rural water supply and sanitation under PAP II is estimated at no more than US$60 million, that is, For UWS, steps to address the crucial issue of implementation less than 15 percent of the total, and it was less than 50 capacity are planned under REGIDESO’s reform program percent of actual spending in 2007–08, although the rural (Programme de Redressement Opérationnel & Financier) population will still constitute over 60 percent of the total which combines upgrading of management and in 2015, and an even larger percentage of those without investments, as described in greater detail in Section 8 access. on UWS. However, the launch of this program has been hampered by delays and dysfunction of its reform aspects Explanatory factors include continuing insecurity in as well as the investment components. the aftermath of the war as well as the “proximity bias� resulting from the fact that decision makers on In rural water, the SNHR has been working with donors both sides—government and donors—are located in such as UNICEF and the AfDB to improve its capacity, Kinshasa. In the absence of a comprehensive sector but its reach into rural areas is still extremely patchy, and investment plan it is not possible to gain an overview its institutional status and implementation responsibility and identify steps to correct imbalances over time. uncertain under ongoing decentralization. The SNHR has Getting a better balance will require a sectoral planning recently embarked on a countrywide borehole program framework structured on the basis of provincial with scant planning and with limited capacity to ensure programs. efficient use of its more than 60 drilling rigs, and to mobilize and train communities for the sustainable use Stepping up the annual utilization rates and improving of the resulting water supply systems. The lack of clear, the distribution of funding across subsectors, regions comprehensive institutional responsibility has limited and socioeconomic categories will require an added capacity building to a few major projects, such as the measure of political leadership to unblock administrative Villages Assainis implemented by the Ministry of Public constraints and to upgrade the performance of project Health with support from UNICEF in rural areas. Once implementation units. Over the medium term, unless the the proposed Water Law is passed, a new National Water pace of implementation quickens and the reforms needed Policy is expected to define institutional responsibilities to step up service delivery start to show results, funding and raise capacities in the new decentralized framework. partners may withhold further commitments. 18 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 6. Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Priority actions for sector monitoring and evaluation • Introduce a coherent and comprehensive sector monitoring and evaluation framework, in particular: o Agree on a national definition of improved water and sanitation services; o Harmonize inventory-based access statistics with household survey-based coverage figures; and o Improve the PGAI’s monitoring of aid flows by distinguishing funds by different agencies, as well as by water and sanitation subsectors. At this stage there is no coherent planning and monitoring At the national level, three types of household surveys have framework to plan and track investments and sector been carried out in recent years—MICS2 (2001), Enquête performance in the DRC. Individual projects or agencies 1-2-3 (2004/5), and DHS/EDS (2007). These provide may generate progress reports and periodic reviews, basic monitoring data on drinking water and latrine use but these are not comprehensive, institutionalized or with internationally standardized questions. However, integrated in a sectorwide framework. as pointed out in Section 2, Table 1, the coverage rates’ figures found in these surveys are generally much higher The development of such a framework would, in particular, than access figures based on infrastructure inventories. involve the adoption of standard definitions of level of The divergence between these two sets of data may be services for water supply and for household sanitation. partly explained by the fact that the household survey- It would also require the harmonization of protocols for based coverage rates capture unregistered private sources, surveys covering access to water and sanitation. substandard or overused sources, whereas the sector statistics are based on assumed users per known service Figure 6 points only. Scorecard indicator scores relating to sector M&E, compared to peer group16 Considerable uncertainty surrounds both datasets: the inventory computation method is imprecise and the original computations underlying the widely cited figures RWS cannot be traced anymore. Household surveys, on the other hand, struggle with the difficulty of obtaining a representative sample given remaining insecurity and the sheer size and remoteness of much of the DRC’s territory. More clarity may be obtained with the release of the most USH UWS recent MICS4 survey figures in late 2010. Until further clarification, the inventory-based sector access statistics are generally judged more accurate estimates of safe water and improved sanitation coverage. RSH M&E of national commitments and spending on the Democratic Republic of Congo average scores water and sanitation sector is complicated by an opaque Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 national budget process, which does not capture Source: CSO2 scorecard. domestic and external spending comprehensively, and 19 An AMCOW Country Status Overview is still not clearly linked to sector planning tools such as way and would greatly enhance the value of the PGAI the DSCRP and the associated PAPs. The planned shift database. In the urban water sector, the utility REGIDESO towards a Five-Year Development Plan (2011–15) based provides yearly audited financial reports. on DSCRP II may include steps to remedy the latter issue. While the PGAI unit of the Ministry of Planning Civil society initiatives and consumer groups, which have stores and analyzes information on commitments and been piloted in other countries such as Kenya and Uganda disbursements based on data volunteered by donors, it to put pressure on operators and government through relies on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation consumer voice mechanisms, are currently largely absent and Development – Development Assistance Committee and not institutionalized in the DRC. (OECD-DAC) typology which broadly distinguishes urban and rural interventions, but does not separate water from Strengthening the M&E framework in the DRC will be sanitation funding, nor clearly identify the individual donor crucial to improve planning and accountability, and to and disbursement agencies. Actions on these points (for measure the impact of the fundamental reforms currently example, a separation of water and sanitation) are under being implemented. 20 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 7. Subsector: Rural Water Supply Priority actions for rural water supply • Prepare provincial water programs combining investment and capacity building. • Improve implementation capacity by: o Redefining the SNHR and the CPAEAs in the new decentralized framework; and o Promoting the training of local water technicians and enterprises. • Ensure that increased resources are mobilized for investment in rural areas. • Expand successful existing programs—in particular, the ‘Autonomous community-based water systems’ project and the Villages Assainis program. • Ensure that the SNHR borehole program builds up local capacity for operation and maintenance, drawing on the experience of the above-mentioned projects. • Formalize the status of user associations and small autonomous systems in the regulatory framework. Access to safe water in rural areas of the DRC has based JMP coverage statistics indicate stagnation just declined during the country’s long political crisis between below the 30 percent mark (Figure 7 and Table 1). In 1990 and the mid-2000s—from above 20 percent to general, sector stakeholders in the DRC judge the more approximately 12 percent, according to national access pessimistic national access figures to be more realistic, statistics based on extrapolations from known water even though the precise method by which the inventory- points (DSCRP/UNDP). Access has since recovered slightly based extrapolation was carried out cannot be traced to around 17 percent. Alternative household survey- anymore. Figure 7 Figure 8 Rural water supply coverage Rural water investment requirements 100% 80% Required CAPEX Coverage 60% (public and private) 40% 20% 0% 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 0 20 40 60 80 100 US$ million/year National estimates Projection of historic trend (national estimates) Public CAPEX (max. possible anticipated) National target Household CAPEX (assumed) “Maximum possible� scenario CAPEX gap JMP, improved Source: CSO2 costing. JMP, piped Sources: DSCRP/UNDP/JMP. 21 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Figure 9 Rural water supply scorecard Enabling Developing Sustaining Policy Planning Budget Expenditure Equity Output Maintenance Expansion Use 1.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1.5 Source: CSO2 scorecard. The DRC’s rural water access statistics should thus be seen Figure 10 only as an approximation of the true situation which, Average RWS scorecard scores for enabling, in addition, varies greatly between provinces. However, developing, and sustaining service delivery, and from the available statistical evidence and sector expert peer-group comparison judgment, it is clear that the DRC is currently not on Enabling track to meet its DSCRP rural safe water target. The underperformance of the rural water sector is particularly problematic because even by 2015, a vast majority of the population will still be rural. With the current institutional structures weakened and fragmented, and the decentralization focused reforms yet to be fully implemented (see Section 4), the “maximum possible� scenario would see approximately US$60 million Developing Sustaining per annum effectively disbursed in the rural water sector in the years up to 2015. Democratic Republic of Congo average scores This would be a substantial improvement over the US$25– Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 30 million disbursed in 2007–08. Given the relatively Source: CSO2 scorecard. modest national DSCRP target (36 percent), and the cost effectiveness of rural safe water technologies such as spring protections, effectively realizing projects at this blocks that are a drag on service delivery and require rate would bring the DRC close to reaching its national attention (score 1–2, yellow); and building blocks that are goal by 2015, for which the CSO2 estimates a total capital inadequate, constituting a barrier to service delivery and a investment requirement of approximately US$80 million priority for reform (score <1, red). per year, not counting O&M needs. However, this optimal scenario assumes that the service delivery bottlenecks The chief bottlenecks concern the budget, expenditure, highlighted in the scorecard (Figure 9) are addressed, and and equity building blocks, as Figure 9 illustrates. Budget strong, capacitated provincial programs launched to give scores low because DRC budgets do not comprehensively a broad impulse to sector development as envisaged by capture all external and internal investments. They are also the decentralization reforms. opaque, in the sense that spending on rural water does not have its own budget line and is thus difficult to separate The scorecard, which shows the results for the rural water from other water and sanitation funding. Moreover, supply service delivery pathway, uses a simple color code current financial commitments still fall considerably short to indicate: building blocks that are largely in place, acting of what is needed, even though the gap is somewhat less as a driver on service delivery (score >2, green); building pronounced than in the other subsectors in the DRC. 22 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond Expenditure and equity scores result from very low Beyond government structures, lack of local construction, disbursement rates, generally of under 50 percent, the and management capacity in the private sector is also lack of clear and comprehensive reporting on expenditure, a hindrance to large-scale implementation, and should and the absence of formal criteria to distribute spending be systematically addressed. This may take the form of equitable across rural communities. training ‘universities’ organized as part of the Village/ Ecole Assainis project of the Ministry of Public Health and The capacity of the rural water service delivery pathway UNICEF, or through contracting local masons and firms to sustain services is slightly stronger than the subsector’s wherever possible. ability to develop new infrastructure but, even so, the maintenance, expansion, and use indicators are There are currently two major ongoing rural water projects barely at the average of the peer group of the poorest that can serve as examples going forward. On the one low-income African countries (Figure 10). There are no hand, the Ministry of Public Health, in partnership with regular exhaustive infrastructure inventories to ascertain UNICEF, is implementing spring protections as part of the which systems are still functional. With the exception of a broader Village/Ecole Assainis and has thereby extended number of exemplary systems under the BTC autonomous access to drinking water to over 300,000 people in 2009. systems program, rural water networks generally do The program works closely with the communities who not raise enough tariffs to cover operational costs, contribute labor and some of the materials. The other much less expansion. Supply chains for spare parts are significant rural water program is the community-based underdeveloped in the often-remote rural zones, and use autonomous water supply systems project implemented is hindered by the fact that existing water points are, on by the BTC in five provinces. It works with communities average, relatively far from households. in rural and peri-urban areas to develop basic piped water supply systems. This program is linked to the CNAEA at All these issues are, in turn, a reflection of the weak the center and to the local CPAEA in the provinces. The institutional structure as outlined in Section 4 of this program has been successful in putting in place basic piped report, as well as the general underdevelopment of the water supplies and transferring management responsibility DRC. Going forward, the key priorities will be to flesh to the communities in question. This concept of community out the ongoing reform by preparing detailed provincial autonomy in running water systems, however, could be investment and capacity building plans, as well as clearly strengthened in current regulation to clarify the status defining the new role of the federal level SNHR and the of community water schemes and protect them against provincial water and sanitation committees (CPAEAs). interference. 23 An AMCOW Country Status Overview 8. Subsector: Urban Water Supply Priority actions for urban water supply • Implement the recovery plan for the national water utility (Programme de Redressement de la REGIDESO). • Revisit the choice of technologies to achieve better cost effectiveness. • Recalibrate the geographic and social targeting of urban interventions to give greater priorities to secondary urban centers and basic service provision. Access to safe water in the DRC’s urban areas has the JMP methodology which computes a best-fit line that dramatically fallen since 1990. Government statistics, does not allow for inflection points. based on extrapolations from known connections and water points, show a fall from almost 70 percent in 1990 Sector stakeholders in the DRC tend to prefer the to below 40 percent by the mid-2000s (see Figure 11 government statistics, which are more pessimistic overall, and Table 1). Since then, the negative trend has been but suggest a recent trend-change. According to these, halted, but gains in access have been limited to around however, the DRC is not currently on track to reach its 1 percent. national DSCRP target for urban water supply. JMP statistics, based on household surveys, show the Given a relatively ambitious national urban safe water same negative trend since 1990, albeit at a higher level target of 65 percent and the high costs of urban water given that surveys capture a broader array of improved infrastructure, the CSO2 analysis estimates an annual water users (for example, those with access to private, CAPEX investment requirement of US$210 million, of unregistered sources). JMP statistics do not capture the which at least US$190 million would have to be funded recovery since the mid-2000s, but this is likely related to from public sources. Figure 11 Figure 12 Urban water supply coverage Urban water investment requirements 100% 80% Required CAPEX Coverage 60% (public and private) 40% 20% 0% 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 0 50 100 150 200 250 National estimates US$ million/year Projection of historic trend (national estimates) Public CAPEX (max. possible anticipated) National target Household CAPEX (assumed) “Maximum possible� scenario CAPEX gap JMP, improved Source: CSO2 costing. JMP, piped Sources: DSCRP/UNDP/JMP. 24 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond Figure 13 Urban water supply scorecard Enabling Developing Sustaining Policy Planning Budget Expenditure Equity Output Maintenance Expansion Use 2.5 2 1 1.5 0.5 1 1 1.5 1.5 Source: CSO2 scorecard. Actual disbursements in the years 2007–08 have been centered on Kinshasa. According to statistics provided approximately US$30 million (PGAI). Over the next years, by REGIDESO, almost 40 percent of funds for currently a successful implementation of ongoing sector reforms ongoing projects in specific provinces go to Kinshasa. could allow annual realizations of up to US$120 million Consequently overall output, that is, realizations of in public CAPEX (Figure 12): the “maximum possible� infrastructure, have been insufficient to attain sector scenario. Even though this would still fall short of targets, targets. it would be an achievement that would lead to millions more urban Congolese having access to safe water than These weaknesses reflect systematic issues within the would otherwise be the case. national water utility REGIDESO, which have limited the impact of past rehabilitation efforts and still constrain The DRC has been relatively successful in mobilizing funds infrastructure development: poor leadership, weak for the urban sector, with US$353 million out of US$420 governance, lagging operational performance (40 percent planned for the urban water sector under the PAP II in 2009 nonrevenue water) and aging distribution networks as and beyond. As the urban water sector scorecard (Figure well as depleted finances (a collection ratio of only 50 13) highlights, the policy and planning environment is percent approximately) due largely to nonpayment of relatively well developed, with clearly defined institutional water bills by the state. A large proportion of accounts are responsibility for the urban sector by the national water classified as inactive either because they are not supplied utility REGIDESO, and a basic sector policy, basic targets and planning through the DSCRP and associated PAPs. Figure 14 Despite the relatively good fund-raising and formal enabling Average UWS scorecard scores for enabling, framework, actual development of new infrastructure developing and sustaining service delivery, and is severely constrained due to a lack of implementation peer-group comparison capacity. REGIDESO developed steadily in the 1970s Enabling and 1980s and had, over time, extended its operations to 94 centers including all cities and a raft of secondary towns. While it has retained some of its previous technical capacity, its operational performance has deteriorated and its finances are in disarray. The low expenditure score is due to lagging implementation, with total disbursements only around US$30 million in 2007–08. Equity scores especially poorly because there are currently no formal Sustaining Developing rules for the distribution of funds among urban centers, and pro-poor actions are limited and not institutionalized. Democratic Republic of the Congo average scores Going forward, a greater focus on basic services for the urban poor will be crucial to reach broader sections of the Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 population. The geographic distribution of funds is heavily Source: CSO2 scorecard. 25 An AMCOW Country Status Overview or because impoverished households can no longer afford of management before being hived off. The launch of the piped services. program has been hampered by the lack of response from operators to the call for proposals for the management To address these deficiencies of REGIDESO, the contract. The ministries responsible—Energy and State government has launched a comprehensive Programme Enterprise (Portefeuille)—have moved in to review the de Redressement Opérationnel & Financier combining contract with the objective of getting the operator in place reform, upgrading of management, and investments. This by mid-2011 at the latest. program is supported by the PEMU project with a World Bank grant of US$190 million. It rests on a number of The REGIDESO rehabilitation program will unfold over reforms to address the following objectives: (a) to ensure the period 2010 to 2014 and will be accompanied by better control and regular payment of state water bills; (b) increased investments funded by the World Bank, ADB, to optimize the workforce; (c) to restructure REGIDESO’s KFW, JICA, and other donors. The investments included balance sheet; and (d) to achieve its transformation into under PEMU are focused on REGIDESO’s three main a commercial public company. The program provides for centers: Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Matadi, which the recruitment of a professional operator to strengthen account for about 70 percent of sales and 80 percent of and modernize management. The overall objective is to active connections. Other major cities and a number of lift REGIDESO’s operational performance and restore its secondary centers are included in parallel projects funded financial viability by 2014. by other partners. Given REGIDESO’s visibility and central position in the Besides the need to address capacity and regulatory urban water sector, its rehabilitation is a critical objective constraints, it is also necessary to review technology of the government. The strategy underlying the reform choices for urban water supply services to identify lower program is to rehabilitate the organization ahead of its cost alternatives, for instance, by moving from surface possible decentralization into autonomous regional or water to less treatment intensive underground sources, provincial affiliates under an institutional framework and by supporting a greater use of standpipes instead of yet to be defined. This strategy is meant to ensure that private connections. This would allow lowering unit costs, weaker and less viable centers benefit from the upgrading thus reaching more people with the funding at hand. 26 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 9. Subsector: Rural Sanitation and Hygiene Priority actions for rural sanitation and hygiene • Develop a sector policy within the emerging decentralized institutional framework. • Build on the Villages Assainis and Ecoles Assainies programs implemented by the Ministry of Public Health in cooperation with UNICEF. • Improve the PGAI’s monitoring by separating tracking of rural sanitation funds. According to government statistics (DSCRP/UNDP), access stakeholders in the DRC judge the more pessimistic access to improved sanitation in rural areas of the DRC has figures more realistic. stagnated at a low level of around 10 percent since 1990. Household survey-based estimates by the JMP paint a The DRC’s nationwide rural sanitation statistics should thus slightly different picture, showing an increase from around be seen as an approximation of the true situation, which 5 percent in 1990 to a still low, but considerably higher 23 further varies greatly across the country. Sector experts percent in 2008 (see Figure 15 and Table 1). agree, however, that the current level of coverage increase is less than what is needed to achieve national targets. The reason for this difference in level and trend of measured access is difficult to judge: surveys were conducted in the In theory, improved sanitation in rural settings can be midst of armed conflict and political upheaval and their relatively cheap, especially if local communities contribute accuracy is likely compromised; in turn, the method by to the costs of latrines, as has been achieved in the Villages which the DSCRP statistics were computed is opaque Assainis project in which basic improved latrines have been and details cannot be traced anymore. In general, sector realized for less than US$10 per capita. Figure 15 Figure 16 Rural sanitation coverage Rural sanitation investment requirements 100% 80% Required CAPEX Coverage 60% (public and private) 40% 20% 0% 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 US$ million/year National estimates Public CAPEX (max. possible anticipated) Projection of historic trend (national estimates) National target Household CAPEX (assumed) “Maximum possible� scenario CAPEX gap JMP, improved Source: CSO2 costing. JMP, improved + shared Sources: DSCRP/UNDP/JMP. 27 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Figure 17 Rural sanitation and hygiene scorecard Enabling Developing Sustaining Policy Planning Budget Expenditure Equity Output Markets Up-take Use 1.5 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 Source: CSO2 scorecard. Figure 18 feeble capacities to develop and sustain services, in which Average RSH scorecard scores for enabling, the DRC lags considerably even relative to a peer group of developing, and sustaining service delivery, and the poorest low-income African countries (Figure 18). peer-group comparison The lack of proper budgeting (budget indicator in Enabling the scorecard), efficient and equitable disbursement (expenditure and equity) and resulting insufficient service provision (output) result from the fragmented and largely nonexistent institutional and regulatory structure which was outlined in Section 4, whereas the lack of markets for spare parts and latrine construction services is more related to the DRC’s general economic underdevelopment. Sustaining Developing Most of the current activity in rural sanitation is thus Democratic Republic of the Congo average scores concentrated in the Villages Assainis and Écoles Assainies Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 programs implemented by the Ministry of Public Health Source: CSO2 scorecard. with support from UNICEF. The program is operating in all 11 provinces and has helped extend access to improved sanitation to up to 350,000 additional Congolese in 2009.17 Annual CAPEX investment requirements to reach the This is, however, still only a fraction of the population that national DSCRP target are thus estimated at US$50 million, will need to be covered to reach national targets. of which at least $30 million would have to be from public sources. In practice, however, the dispersion and Stepping up the pace of development for rural sanitation inaccessibility of many rural communities poses enormous would depend on movement on three fronts: (a) first logistical problems which the weak institutional structure and foremost, the initiation of decentralized programs is not yet equipped to deal with. Actual disbursements anchored in the provinces; these programs would in 2007–08 were probably not more than US$5 million, capitalize on ongoing projects such as Villages Assainis although some uncertainty surrounds this figure due to and build capacity in the provinces; (b) institutional reform the weak M&E at the national level which does not allow and coordinated capacity-building programs to develop the separation of water from sanitation funding, and rural a focal point for rural sanitation (and water) within from urban disbursements. provincial structures and to redefine the roles of central actors concerned; and (c) resource mobilization to step The CSO2 analysis suggests that in the “maximum up the pace of public investments towards the necessary possible� scenario, disbursements could at least be raised US$30 million annually. At this stage, however, the lack to US$15 million annually in the coming years. However, of concrete action to clarify the institutional framework this would require addressing the weak service delivery for rural water and sanitation under decentralization is pathway for rural sanitation (Figure 17), in particular the hampering the preparation of further programs. 28 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond 10. Subsector: Urban Sanitation and Hygiene Priority actions for urban sanitation and hygiene • Develop a sector policy within the emerging decentralized institutional framework. • Improve the PGAI’s monitoring by separating tracking of urban sanitation funds. National statistics for urban improved sanitation in the and do not work anymore, with virtually all treatment plants DRC indicate stagnation of coverage at a very low level of out of service. To the extent that improved sanitation is around 10 percent since 1990. Household survey-based available in cities, this is primarily due to private initiative, estimates by the JMP show the same stagnating trend line, without public control or planning, and generally very albeit at a slightly higher level of 23 percent (Figure 19). rudimentary technology. Current trends are insufficient In general, sector stakeholders in the DRC tend to prefer for the DRC to attain either its national DSCRP goal or its the more pessimistic access figures. However, as discussed overall MDG sanitation target. earlier, these should be seen as an approximation of the true situation only, which further varies greatly between Given the limited capacities in the urban sanitation sector different provinces and urban centers. at present (see Section 4 and Figure 21), it is unlikely that more than approximately US$10 million per annum Despite this qualification, it is clear from the available could be effectively absorbed, even if additional funds statistics, as well as feedback from sector experts, that were available. Needs, however, are enormous: the the urban sanitation sector is in disarray. The few historic CSO2 calculations show that if the institutional capacity wastewater networks in cities have not been maintained to implement urban sanitation programs at scale was in Figure 19 Figure 20 Urban sanitation coverage Urban sanitation investment requirements 100% 80% Required CAPEX Coverage 60% (public and private) 40% 20% 0% 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 US$ million/year National estimates Public CAPEX (max. possible anticipated) Projection of historic trend (national estimates) National target Household CAPEX (assumed) “Maximum possible� scenario CAPEX gap JMP, improved Source: CSO2 costing. JMP, improved + shared Sources: DSCRP/UNDP/JMP. 29 An AMCOW Country Status Overview Figure 21 Urban sanitation and hygiene scorecard Enabling Developing Sustaining Policy Planning Budget Expenditure Equity Output Markets Up-take Use 0.5 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 Source: CSO2 scorecard. Figure 22 As outlined in Sections 4 to 6, policy, planning and Average USH scorecard scores for enabling, budgeting for urban sanitation are largely absent at the developing, and sustaining service delivery, and national level, or to the extent they exist, fragmented, peer-group comparison opaque, and dysfunctional. Basic planning documents are limited to certain localities and, even there, yet to be implemented (for example, the Kinshasa sanitation master Enabling plan), limited to basic target setting and overall priorities (DSCRP), or costing estimates that are not tied to concrete investment plans (as for instance a 2008 UNDP study18). The developing and sustaining aspects of the service delivery pathway are even weaker: disbursement rates are generally below 50 percent, reflected in the low expenditure score. Equity is low because neither Developing procedures for local participation, nor clear formulas for Sustaining distributing funds equitably across urban communities are institutionalized. Output scores low since national and Democratic Republic of the Congo average scores MDG targets are out of reach if current trends continue, and even though sanitation behavior change tools have Averages, LICs, GNI p.p. <=$500 been developed in the course of the Villages Assainis and Source: CSO2 scorecard. Écoles Assainies programs, they are yet to be adapted and implemented at national scale in an urban context. The limited nature of sanitation spare part supply chains and place, then public investment needs would be US$160 private sector capacity to build improved latrines explain million per annum to reach the national DSCRP targets, the low markets score. Studies on handwashing behavior even assuming private contributions of up to 40 percent of and surveys on latrine use suggest that up-take is limited capital investments (US$270 million annually with private and insufficient for sector targets to be reached. requirements). Moreover, this does not include additional O&M needs, which may be funded publicly as well if they For all these reasons, the DRC scores relatively weakly cannot be met through user contributions. across the urban sanitation sector in a scorecard peer group comparison with other low-income African countries, as Mobilizing these funds needs to go hand in hand with Figure 22 illustrates. While problems relating to the DRC’s general underdevelopment will plague the subsector fixing the DRC’s service delivery pathway for urban for some time, the key goal will have to be to optimize sanitation, which is currently a series of bottlenecks (Figure performance within these broader constraints of a post- 21) that prevent available finance from being turned into conflict state. Thus, the priority will be the elaboration of sustainable services on the ground in an efficient and a clear sector policy and efficient institutions within the equitable manner. emerging decentralized framework. 30 Water Supply and Sanitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Turning Finance into Services for 2015 and Beyond Notes and References 1 World Bank, Global Economic Monitor. 2010 average. All estimates are rounded. The estimations assume a depreciation rate of 3 percent (raising the total 2 The first round of CSOs was carried out in 2006 covering 16 costs) and a user contribution (reducing total public countries and is summarized in the report, ’Getting Africa costs). On-Track to Meet the MDGs on Water and Sanitation’. 9 The CSO2 scorecard methodology and conceptual 3 In the case of water supply, the quoted MDG target, as framework are discussed in detail in the synthesis recognized in DRC itself, differs slightly from the target as report. defined in relation to the Joint Monitoring Programme’s estimate of coverage in 1990, which is the internationally 10 World Bank Atlas method. standardized practice: this JMP-derived MDG target is 73 percent—UNICEF and WHO Joint Monitoring Programme 11 PEASU: Projet d’Approvisionnement en Eau Potable et for Water Supply and Sanitation. 2010. Progress on Assainissement en milieu Semi-Urbain (US$100 million Sanitation and Drinking Water: 2010 Update. equivalent; 2008). 4 DSCRP: Document Stratégie de Croissance & de Réduction 12 Indicators relating to the institutional framework section de la Pauvreté; Ministry of Planning 2007. Note that the are: All subsectors: targets in national development plans/ statistics for 2008 are based on a similar calculation that PRSP; subsector policy agreed and approved (gazetted was carried out for a 2008 UNDP report: Democratic as part of national policy or as standalone policy); RWS/ Republic of the Congo/United Nations Development UWS: institutional roles defined; RSH/USH: institutional Programme. 2008. Evaluation des besoins de financement lead appointed. pour l’atteinte des OMD dans le secteur de l’eau et de l’assainissement en république démocratique du Congo. 13 Indicators relating to the section on financing and its implementation are: All subsectors: programmatic 5 UNICEF and WHO Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Sector-Wide Approach; investment program based on Supply and Sanitation. 2010. Progress on Sanitation and MDG needs assessment; sufficient finance to meet MDG Drinking Water: 2010 Update. (subsidy policy for sanitation); percentage of official donor commitments utilized; percentage of domestic 6 Data provided in CSO2 scorecard, collected by national commitments utilized. consultants. 14 The so-called IO (Instances Officielles) and AD (Ayant- 7 User contributions are assumed to be 10 percent in rural Droits). and urban water supply (source: BTC Projects) and around 40 percent in rural and urban sanitation (UNICEF). 15 That is, not including funds destined to undertakings of national import: planning, capacity building, reform, and 8 Due to rounding, component figures may not sum to so on. totals. The sanitation interventions considered in these estimations relate only to measures aimed at attaining 16 Indicators relating to the sector M&E section are: All basic improved sanitation directly at household level. subsectors: annual review setting new undertakings; subsector spend identifiable in budget (UWS: inc. Rural sanitation interventions are integrated with water recurrent subsidies); budget comprehensively covers sector projects and include a strong hygiene promotion domestic/donor finance; RWS, RSH, and USH: domestic/ component. donor expenditure reported; UWS: audited accounts and 31 An AMCOW Country Status Overview balance sheets from utilities; RWS, RSH, and USH: periodic 17 Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Primary, analysis of equity criteria by CSOs and government; UWS: Secondary and Professional Education. 2010. ATLAS 2009: pro-poor plans developed and implemented by utilities; Programme national village et ecole assainis. RWS/UWS: nationally consolidated reporting of output; RSH/USH: monitoring of quantity and quality of uptake Democratic Republic of the Congo/United Nations 18 relative to promotion and subsidy efforts; All subsectors: Development Programme. 2008. Evaluation des besoins questions and choice options in household surveys de financement pour l’atteinte des OMD dans le secteur consistent with MDG definitions. de l’eau et de l’assainissement en république démocratique du Congo. 32 For enquiries, contact: Water and Sanitation Program–Africa Region The World Bank, Upper Hill Road P.O. Box 30577, 00100, Nairobi, Kenya Tel: +(254) 20 322 6300 E-mail: wspaf@worldbank.org Web site: www.wsp.org