May 07, 2025 Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 Insights about Public Procurement: Key Findings from the B-READY Project Antoni Albert Nogués Comas and Kerenny Torres Negrón1 T his Brief examines regulatory indicators that promote rm entry, ease of contracting with the government, fairness, transparency, and best value for money in public procurement systems across 50 economies. Drawing on indicators from the novel Public Procurement category under the Market Competition topic of the World Bank’s Business Ready (B-READY) project, the analysis develops Composite Procurement Category scores categorized by economy income level. is approach o ers a new perspective on considering procurement regulations and services from a competition standpoint. e study presents the current conditions and reveals that good practices in fostering competition in public procurement can be adopted and implemented regardless of an economy's income level. Findings show a signi cant variation in the adoption of digital procurement, which a ects transparency and entry barriers, as well as disparities in gender representation, which weakens competition and dynamism in these markets. Public procurement refers to the process by which central support rms that participate in public procurement can create governments, regional or local authorities, purchase work, goods, barriers that lead to fewer bids in public tenders. Single-bidder or services from companies. e government, through its public procurement tenders (excluding framework agreements and signi cant and discretionary demand, wields considerable power to direct negotiation) reached a ten-year high in the European Union shape markets, drive competition, and foster dynamism, (EU) in 2022, according to the 2023 EU Commission's Single potentially leading to innovation, e ciency, and growth. By Market Scoreboard. While di erent mechanisms might in uence utilizing public procurement as a powerful tool, governments can this outcome, research using Tenders Electronically Daily (TED) achieve cost-e ective social and economic policy objectives. For data shows that fewer bids are observed in settings where the quality example, a modern public procurement system, designed to of procurement systems is low (Tas 2020), suggesting the sizeable provide access to all rms by removing entry and informational opportunity for improvements even in high-income economies. barriers in government markets, is associated with higher rm For this, actionable measures must be derived using a participation in tenders (Hjort et al. 2020; Knack, Biletska, and comprehensive analytical framework. e Methodology for Kacker 2019); lower prices (Adam, Sanchez, and Fazekas 2021);, Assessing Procurement Systems (MAPS), while being the gold greater innovation; and more sustainable solutions. standard for assessing procurement systems, produces few assessments annually due to its comprehensive scope and depth, Because public procurement is an essential function in public highlighting the need for complementary indicators that are administration, nearly all modern economies have enacted regularly updated. procurement rules or regulations, with 73 percent adopting digital platforms to carry out these processes (World Bank Public Measuring and benchmarking conditions conducive to higher Procurement Database 2020). However, the e ectiveness of the rm participation in tenders requires a practical overarching public procurement process in encouraging tender participation, approach that quanti es indicators annually into comparable competition, and innovation depends largely on the quality of its scores. Several e orts to diagnose and measure de ciencies in regulatory design and the complementarity of public services. competition in public procurement have considered large-scale Research shows that better procurement regulations signi cantly administrative data focused on competitive outcomes. But lack of boost bidder participation and increases scal savings (Hoekman standardization, and of concrete actionable items that can be and Taş 2022, Iimi 2006), with e-procurement among the policy tracked by policy makers, as well as poor availability of quality data interventions with the greatest positive impact in promoting for lower-income economies, makes existing databases impractical competition (Adam, Sanchez, and Fazekas 2021; Lewis-Faupel et to inform governments. Relying solely on administrative data also al. 2016). ignores the perceptions of rms, which play an important role in their decision to participate in tenders (Colonnelli, Loiacono, Even in markets with many capable suppliers, de ciencies in the Muhumuza, and Teso 2024; Cocciolo, Viganola, and Doino regulatory framework or in the provision of public services to 2024). 1 anoguescomas@ifc.org. Affiliations: World Bank, Global Indicators Group, Development Economics. For correspondence: anoguescomas@ifc.org. Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Santiago Croci Downes, Varun Eknath, Subika Farazi, David C. Francis, Norman V. Loayza, and Valeria Perotti for helpful comments. Nancy Morrison provided excellent editorial assistance. Objective and disclaimer: Global Indicators Briefs synthesize existing research and data to shed light on a useful and interesting question for policy debate. Global Indicators Briefs carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Director. All Briefs in the series can be accessed via: https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/global-indicators-briefs-series. https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/global-indicators-briefs-series. DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 Bridging this gap, the World Bank has used expert public tenders). e dual approach ensures a balance between data questionnaires to benchmark key regulations and build comparability and representativeness across and within each economy-level data sets that expand coverage to include developing economy. economies. e Benchmarking Public Procurement report (World Bank 2017a) and the Contracting with the Government indicator e B-READY Market Competition topic covers three in the former Doing Business report both involved designing and categories: (1) competition; (2) innovation; and (3) public re ning questionnaires with input from experts and administering procurement. Each category constitutes one-third of the Market them to a wider range of respondents (Nogues Comas and Mendes Competition topic. is Brief focuses on the third category only: public procurement. Consequently, all results presented in this Dos Santos 2021). Careful research and re nement of previous Brief are rescaled to re ect the focus on public procurement alone, e orts led to the establishment of the Public Procurement category rather than the broader Market Competition B-READY topic. In of indicators under the Market Competition topic of the Business addition, public procurement indicators are organized into three Ready (B-READY) project. e initial rollout includes data for 50 pillars, each of which re ects di erent aspects and perspectives on economies representing all regions and income levels, available on the business environment: (I) Regulatory Framework; (II) Public the B-READY website. e B-READY project will expand its Services; and (III) Operational E ciency. Scores in each pillar coverage to 180 economies by 2026. range from 0 to 100 (where 100 represents the best performance). To provide an aggregate public procurement score, this Brief Benchmarking public procurement from a computes the Composite Procurement Category score by averaging competition perspective: Introducing the Public the corresponding public procurement pillar scores. Full details on Procurement category of indicators in B-READY how the Public Procurement category ts into the overall Market Competition topic are shown in gure 1. A summary of the data set e B-READY methodology is founded on an analytical will be provided (as of May 1, 2023) including insights and framework consisting of three pillars: (1) Regulatory Framework; patterns observed across economies with di erent levels of income. (2) Public Services; and (3) Operational E ciency. B-READY measures business regulations comprehensively across 10 topics; e Public Procurement category measures international good Market Competition is one of them. Under this framework, practices that promote competitive, fair, and transparent primary data are collected and scored annually to create a rich data contracting processes in government markets across key set of indicators. e novel methodology combines expert dimensions of the procurement cycle. It evaluates the regulatory consultations and rm-level surveys, capturing broader dimensions framework covering tender design, procedural aspects, and contract (such as perceptions of rms regarding the ease of bidding for implementation, including environmental and gender dimensions, Structure of the Market Competition methodology and derivation of the Composite Procurement Figure 1 Category score Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: The B-READY methodology assigns specific weights to subcategories based on their relevance within each category. In other words, not all indicators within the Public Procurement category carry the same weight. The right-hand side of this figure details how the Composite Procurement Category score is computed and includes the maximum score a subcategory can achieve based on the weight assigned to it: (i) the Public Procurement category in the Regulatory Framework pillar is distributed as follows: 35 percent–Access and Firm’s Participation; 35 percent–Best Value for Money; 15 percent–Fairness of the Procurement Process; and 15 percent–Transparency of Key Procurement Documents. (ii) the Public Procurement category in the Public Services pillar is distributed as follows: 67 percent–Digitalization of Procurement Procedures, and 33 percent–Transparency of Key Procurement Documents. (iii) the Public Procurement category in the Operational Efficiency pillar is distributed equally (25 percent each). The individual weight of an indicator is the result of applying the pillar weight, the category weight, and the subcategory weight. 2 DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 as well as public services through the degree of digitalization of score consists of 53 indicators distributed among the three pillars. procurement processes. It then adds a third layer of analysis by e Public Procurement category in the Regulatory Framework measuring government e ciency in awarding contracts, making pillar has four subcategories (Access and Firm’s Participation; Best payments, and the ease of bidding, including the gender gap in the Value for Money; Fairness of the Procurement Process; and ownership and executive management of the suppliers. Transparency of Key Procurement Documents) that account for 23 indicators. e Public Procurement category in the Public Services As shown in gure 1, the Composite Procurement Category pillar has two subcategories (Digitalization of Procurement Table 1 Public Procurement category performance, composite and by pillar Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III Composite Score Regulatory Framework Public Services Operational Efficiency Greece 75.81 Estonia 90.79 Georgia 96.20 Estonia 77.31 North Macedonia 74.06 Rwanda 88.41 Samoa 87.30 Rwanda 77.19 Côte d'ivoire 71.56 Indonesia 81.75 Estonia 84.25 Georgia 75.41 Togo 70.94 Costa Rica 81.59 Botswana 83.30 North Macedonia 74.57 Portugal 67.94 Georgia 81.43 Rwanda 80.65 Costa Rica 69.07 Hungary 66.56 North Macedonia 77.46 Kyrgyz Republic 80.00 Kyrgyz Republic 68.84 Romania 65.63 Kyrgyz Republic 77.14 New Zealand 77.20 Indonesia 67.18 Botswana 64.69 Croatia 68.25 Indonesia 76.35 Portugal 66.06 Bulgaria 64.69 Greece 68.10 Bosnia and Herzegovina 75.90 Croatia 63.56 Madagascar 64.69 Viet Nam 67.94 Hong Kong SAR China 74.50 Colombia 62.81 Costa Rica 64.38 Mauritius 65.87 Philippines 72.65 Hungary 62.62 El Salvador 64.19 Hong Kong SAR China 63.17 Vanuatu 72.60 Peru 61.46 Colombia 64.00 Hungary 62.70 North Macedonia 72.20 Viet Nam 61.10 Peru 62.50 Colombia 62.54 Mauritius 71.75 Bulgaria 59.43 Rwanda 62.50 Portugal 61.43 Peru 71.55 Greece 59.20 Croatia 61.56 Singapore 59.37 Singapore 70.45 Botswana 59.17 Tanzania 61.25 Bulgaria 59.21 El Salvador 69.15 Romania 57.23 Morocco 59.38 Montenegro 54.76 Portugal 68.80 Mauritius 56.92 Sierra Leone 58.59 Slovak Republic 54.76 Bangladesh 66.55 Samoa 56.73 Bosnia and Herzegovina 58.13 Mexico 52.70 Viet Nam 66.05 Hong Kong SAR China 56.52 Samoa 57.50 Morocco 52.22 Romania 65.10 El Salvador 54.50 Estonia 56.88 Peru 50.32 Cambodia 62.75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 53.83 West Bank and Gaza 56.56 Bangladesh 48.25 Colombia 61.90 Slovak Republic 52.47 Montenegro 54.31 Nepal 47.78 Costa Rica 61.25 Morocco 51.92 Paraguay 51.25 Pakistan 44.37 Croatia 60.85 Montenegro 50.51 Slovak Republic 50.31 Paraguay 41.43 Togo 59.05 Singapore 49.73 Chad 49.63 Romania 40.95 Hungary 58.60 Bangladesh 48.27 Kyrgyz Republic 49.38 Ghana 36.35 Lesotho 57.75 Madagascar 48.15 Viet Nam 49.31 Philippines 33.17 Central African Republic 56.25 Paraguay 47.51 Georgia 48.59 Tanzania 31.90 Seychelles 54.85 Mexico 46.97 Central African Republic 47.22 New Zealand 30.87 West Bank and Gaza 54.70 Philippines 46.73 Mexico 47.13 El Salvador 30.16 Bulgaria 54.40 New Zealand 45.30 Lesotho 46.56 Botswana 29.52 Barbados 53.10 Tanzania 45.22 Timor-Leste 46.56 Sierra Leone 29.13 Timor-Leste 52.70 Togo 44.12 Ghana 45.63 Madagascar 27.46 Slovak Republic 52.35 Sierra Leone 43.56 Indonesia 43.44 Bosnia and Herzegovina 27.46 Madagascar 52.30 Ghana 43.49 Vanuatu 41.88 Samoa 25.40 Gambia 50.15 West Bank and Gaza 42.43 Pakistan 39.69 Barbados 20.63 Paraguay 49.85 Pakistan 40.52 Barbados 38.28 West Bank and Gaza 16.03 Ghana 48.50 Vanuatu 39.64 Gambia 34.38 Gambia 11.43 Iraq 47.90 Lesotho 37.79 Philippines 34.38 Lesotho 9.05 Chad 45.40 Barbados 37.34 Mauritius 33.13 Côte d'ivoire 6.98 Morocco 44.15 Nepal 37.04 Hong Kong SAR China 31.88 Timor-Leste 6.83 Sierra Leone 42.95 Timor-Leste 35.36 Seychelles 31.56 Vanuatu 4.44 Tanzania 42.50 Côte d'ivoire 34.65 Cambodia 30.31 Togo 2.38 Montenegro 42.45 Central African Republic 34.49 Bangladesh 30.00 Chad 0.00 Mexico 41.10 Gambia 31.98 Nepal 30.00 Central African Republic 0.00 Pakistan 37.50 Chad 31.68 Iraq 28.44 Seychelles 0.00 Greece 33.70 Cambodia 31.02 New Zealand 27.81 Cambodia 0.00 Nepal 33.35 Seychelles 28.80 Singapore 19.38 Iraq 0.00 Côte d'ivoire 25.40 Iraq 25.45 Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: The economies are ordered according to their scores in each of the three pillars and in the composite score: Pillar I, Regulatory Framework; Pillar II, Public Services; and Pillar III, Operational Efficiency. They are further grouped in quintiles, which are marked with varying shades of blue (with darker shades representing better performance). Whenever there is a tie between two or more economies, the economies are sorted alphabetically. 3 DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 Table 2 Summary statistics of the Composite Procurement Category score Average Median Minimum Maximum Range 51.1 50.1 25.4 77.3 51.9 Source: B-READY 2024 data. Procedures; and Transparency of Key Procurement Documents) groups stem from the presence and sophistication of e-procurement that account for 22 indicators. And the Public Procurement systems, which can contribute to lower transaction costs and category in the Operational E ciency pillar has four subcategories barriers to market entry in public tenders. (Time to Award Public Contracts; Time to Receive a Payment from a Government Contract; Firms’ Perceptions on the Ease of Analyzing performance by pillar: Trends in Bidding; Gender Gap in Government Suppliers) that account for 8 Regulatory Framework, Public Services and indicators. A detailed description of the methodology can be found in the B-READY 2024 Methodology Handbook. Operational Efficiency Figure 3 shows the distribution of the procurement category Composite Procurement Category scores: score within each of the three pillars. e Operational E ciency Identifying income group trends in the adoption pillar has the highest average score at 60.4 points, followed by the Regulatory Framework pillar with 51.1 points, and Public Services of good practices across regulations, public with 41.7 points. e variation across pillars is consistent with the services, and operational efficiency ndings of the B-READY report, although scores in the Table 1 presents scores by pillar and as a composite across the procurement category tend to be lower overall. Notably, many three pillars for the 50 economies included in the 2024 B-READY economies score below 50, particularly in the Public Services and data set. Among the 50 economies included in the B-READY 2024 Regulatory Framework pillars. While economies have, on average, report, the average Composite Procurement Category score adopted good regulatory practices to attract rms, generate trust, computed for this Brief is 51.1 points, and it is closely aligned with and improve quality and service delivery, these e orts have not the median (table 2). No economy scores 0, con rming the broad been evenly complemented by reforms supporting procurement presence of procurement rules and regulations, and this aspect systems in practice. Speci cally, there has been a signi cant lag in shows that governments create markets at all income levels. digitizing procurement procedures and information, which is Notably, the highest score of 77.3 points remains relatively modest, crucial for enhancing the e ciency and transparency of public suggesting shared challenges and opportunities across income procurement systems. groups in advancing the quality of public procurement systems. In particular, only 10 economies score any points in the indicator Pillar I–Quality of regulations that promote measuring the introduction of gender-responsive procurement market competition: Economies in all income mechanisms, such as award criteria with gender dimension, and less groups struggle to design targeted policies aimed than half of the economies score in the indicator measuring incentives for preparing bids with environmentally-friendly at attracting new suppliers components. Another result that stands out is the presence of all is pillar measures four aspects: (1) Access and Firm’s income levels in the top ve performing economies across all three Participation (includes gender); (2) Best Value for Money (includes pillars (table 1). Estonia (77.3 points), Rwanda (77.2 points), gender and environment); (3) Fairness of the Procurement Process; Georgia (75.4 points), North Macedonia (74.6 points), and Costa and (4) Transparency of Key Procurement Documents. e mean Rica (69.1 points) have been able to implement key regulations and score is 51 points and the distribution of scores has a min-max digital solutions that improve the conditions for rms to participate range of 56 points, which is the smallest among the three pillars and in tenders. the lowest contribution to the variance in the Composite Procurement Category score. Greece and North Macedonia lead From this sample of 50 economies, some preliminary trends can the top quintile scores, which, while slightly dominated by be observed. When deconstructing the Composite Procurement developed economies, also include two upper-middle-income and Category score by income level, there is a general gap between two low-income economies from Sub-Saharan Africa. ese higher- and lower-income economies that follows the link between economies (Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, and Madagascar) have economic development and institutional quality ( gure 2) (see also strengthened their regulatory frameworks as part of their World Bank 2017b). High-income and upper-middle-income development goals. Some uniformity in scores is observed across economies have higher mean scores, but as mentioned, noticeable most income groups, suggesting a path toward convergence outliers exist across all income groups. is pattern indicates that through the adoption of best practices that result from economic regardless of the level of economic development, it is possible to integration and globalization. implement good practices that promote competition in public procurement. Rwanda, a low-income economy, achieves a high Economies have adopted a higher number of good practices in score of 77.2 points through active policymaking and the extent of the areas of fairness and transparency in procurement procedures digitalization of activities in the procurement cycle. In contrast, compared to the areas focusing on Access to rms and Best Value some high-income and upper-middle-income economies are found for Money. However, the relative contribution of Fairness and in the lowest quintile. Most di erences within and across income Transparency to the Regulatory Framework score is smaller than 4 DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 Composite Procurement Category scores across income levels: Good performance is achievable Figure 2 even when levels of income are low Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: Each cross represents the score of an economy in its income level. Each vertical colored marker indicates the average score of a an income group. The minimum and maximum scores within each region or income group are also specified. The high-income level includes 12 economies; the upper-middle-income level, 16; the lower-middle-income level, 15; and the low-income level, 7. Similarly to the B-READY aggregate findings, the pillar in the procurement category of indicators Figure 3 with the widest average range and weakest performance is Public Services Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: For each pillar, the scores are plotted with minimum, mean, median, and maximum scores indicated by vertical lines, with corresponding scores provided. The dots, representing economies, indicate by color to which income grouping an economy belongs. The blue panels represent quintiles (with darker shades indicating better performance). 5 DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 Regulatory Framework Score of Public Procurement category by income level: Scores are higher Figure 4 in Fairness and Transparency when compared to Best Value for Money, but its relative contribution to the pillar score is smaller Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: Each bar segment represents the average score of a subcategory of indicators per income level. Subcategory scores are weighted by their relative contribution to the Regulatory Framework pillar score. The weights add up to a 100 percent and are distributed as follows: 35 percent–Access and Firm’s Participation; 35 percent–Best Value for Money; 15 percent–Fairness of the Procurement Process; and 15 percent–Transparency of Key Procurement Documents. Quality of Public Services in Public Procurement by income level: There is a wide dispersion in Figure 5 scores driven by Digital Adoption Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: Each bar segment represents the average score of a subcategory of indicators per income level. Subcategory scores are weighted by their relative contribution to the Public Services pillar score. The weights add up to a 100 percent and are distributed as follows: 67 percent–Digitalization of Procurement Procedures; and 33 percent–Transparency of Key Procurement Documents. 6 DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 the other two subcategories because they are assigned higher these economies maintain minimum functionalities such as access weights ( gure 4). While many economies successfully implement to tender notices (Lesotho) or publishing data on tenders (Cote basic transparency and fairness-oriented regulations, they struggle d’Ivoire), but lack full adoption of digital solutions to facilitate the in designing more targeted policies to attract innovative suppliers transactions between the government and its suppliers. is public or promote participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) services gap is more pressing for potential bidders facing and foreign rms in tenders. To put this into context, only 24 geographical disadvantages, as they need to travel to procuring economies have implemented tender and contractual mechanisms entities’ o ces to access or submit tender and bid documents. to attract smaller rms, while only 21 economies have designated tender methods for attracting innovative suppliers such as Pillar III–Operational Efficiency in public competitive dialogues or design contests. Not only does Best Value procurement: Firms in all income groups for Money performs the lowest across all income groups, but it also perceive difficulty with the administrative has the largest variation. Lower-middle-income and low-income economies seem to have a narrower scope in their regulatory requirements for bidding, while the gender gap frameworks regarding the provision of guardrails for procuring in government suppliers narrows as the income entities to identify abnormally low bids, guide contract value levels of economies rise estimation, and support bid decision-making. e four subcategories measured in Pillar III are: (1) Time to Award Public Contracts; (2) Time to Receive a Payment from a Pillar II–Public Services that promote market Government Contract; (3) Firms’ Perceptions on the Ease of competition: Scores in the digitalization of the Bidding; and (4) Gender Gap in Government Suppliers. procurement cycle vary significantly across Operational E ciency has the highest absolute and average score income levels among the three pillars ( gure 3). Scores for each indicator of Pillar III are calculated using the Normal Cumulative Distribution B-READY data show that the quality of public services has the Function (CDF) transformation method on a scale from 0 to 100, largest dispersion in scores among the three pillars, with a min-max with the best and worst performers de ned by the 95th and 5th range of 90 points ( gure 3). is wide range is primarily due to the percentiles of the data collected during the rst rollout phase. is uneven adoption of digital procurement processes across economies result might re ect that governments have historically focused on or the absence of a sophisticated, centralized procurement streamlining internal processes such as reducing payment delays or platform. Sophistication here refers to the range and complexity of accelerating contract awards, rather than investing in digital features o ered by the electronic procurement system. More infrastructure or public-facing services that could make sophisticated systems enhance the interactivity between procurement more accessible, inclusive, and outcome-driven. government and suppliers, such as the ability to sign electronic contracts or submit electronic invoices. e disparity in the Georgia heads the top quintile with a score of 96 points, almost adoption of these advanced features is the weakest link across and 10 points higher than the next economy, Samoa. Following the within income groups, contributing to the signi cant di erences in pattern in the other pillars, all income groups are represented in the performance. top quintile, including economies ranging from high-income like Estonia and Hong Kong SAR, China, to lower-middle and is de ciency in the adoption of advanced e-procurement low-income economies like the Kyrgyz Republic and Rwanda. But features correlates negatively with income level ( gure 5), as this occurrence across income groups is not shared across all developed economies tend to perform better in adopting subcategories measured. ere is a notable connection to income e-procurement platforms and publishing key procurement level when it comes to the gender gap in government suppliers documents, while low-income economies face challenges in ( gure 6). Wealthier economies have the highest proportion of implementation (La Cascia et al. 2023). Still, some economies government suppliers that are partially owned or managed by a across all income levels have been successful at implementing woman, averaging 45 percent. ese high-income economies also modern e-procurement platforms. Notably, the top ve economies show the smallest min-max range, indicative of a balanced gender excelling in the delivery of digitalized procurement processes representation that is closer to 50 percent. However, the represent both high-income and low-income groups. Estonia, relationship between income level and higher operational e ciency Rwanda, Indonesia, Costa Rica, and Georgia have implemented a is not uniform. In fact, variation among the upper-middle-income centralized e-procurement portal with an expanded set of group is notable, meaning that several upper-middle-income functionalities. Among the 50 economies in the current B-READY economies score poorly in this category. Some economies driving data set, 70 percent have implemented a centralized e-procurement this variability are in Latin America and the Caribbean. For portal, but the number and type of features adopted varies. Features example, 85 percent of the rms that held a government contract in like registering as a vendor and submitting tender documents are Colombia are partially owned or managed by a female, whereas in among the top functionalities implemented, adopted by 68 percent Mexico this proportion is less than 1 percent. In contrast, variation and 54 percent of economies, respectively. Some more is lower in economies in the South Asia and Middle East and North sophisticated measures, such as modules for framework agreements Africa regions, with smaller overall values in the lower end of the and e-reverse auction modules, are less frequently adopted. Even range. In Pakistan, 8 percent of government suppliers are more notable, only 21 percent of economies have digitized contract female-owned or managed, a ratio that drops to 5 percent in Iraq. signing through the e-procurement portal. is low adoption rate is signi cant because digitized contract signing enhances e ciency, What stands out in gure 7 is that all income groups seem to reduces the risk of fraud, and ensures greater transparency in have similar performances across the subcategories measured. For procurement processes. instance, all groups tend to have low scores in how rms perceive the degree of di culty in complying with the administrative Six economies in the bottom quintile are from Sub-Saharan requirements to bid. On the other hand, all income groups seem to Africa, a region notably lagging in the digitalization of procurement have a stronger performance in the time to award government systems. Most of them score below 10 points, with half scoring 0 contracts. When it comes to paying government suppliers, points (Chad, Central African Republic, and Seychelles). Some of variation is greater. E ciency is greatest in Georgia, with an 7 DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 Higher-income economies have higher average shares of government suppliers that are partially Figure 6 owned or managed by women (percent), but variation is wider in Upper-middle-income economies 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% High-income Upper-middle-income Lower-middle-income Low-income Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: The figure presents data on the distribution by income level of the percent of firms partially owned or managed by women among those that held a government contract in past three years. The box plots show female representation ( percent) in government suppliers by income level, with circles representing the percentage of individual economies and “X” markers showing group averages. The high-income level includes 12 economies; the upper-middle-income level, 16; the lower-middle-income level, 15; and the low-income level, 7. Operational Efficiency in public procurement: Scores are high, but gender gaps and payment Figure 7 timeliness variations are notable across income levels Source: B-READY 2024 data. Note: Each bar segment represents the average score of a subcategory of indicators per income level. A normal Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) transformation method is applied to each indicator to sort best practices in the sample of 50 economies (see B-READY 2024 Methodology Handbook for more details). A lower time to award or time to receive a payment, a more positive perception on the ease of bidding, and a supplier gender ratio closer to 50 percent female have a higher relative position of performance and hence yield higher scores. Subcategories are then weighted equally (25 percent each) to compute the Operational Efficiency pillar score. 8 DECIG – Global Indicators Briefs No. 31 average of 16 days, followed by Morocco (21 days), and New globalization. Results for the Operational E ciency pillar show Zealand (23 days). Performance is lowest in Lesotho, where that e ciency is not exclusive to wealthier economies. However, government suppliers might wait an average of 152 days to receive disparities exist in the gender gap in government suppliers, payment from a contract. Some high-income economies are also in with higher-income economies demonstrating better gender the bottom quintile: namely, Greece (81 days) and Barbados (89 representation. days). Payment timeliness is a fundamental aspect in rm participation (Barrot and Nanda 2020; Conti, Elia, Ferrara, and What is pressing for the majority of economies in the current Ferraresi 2021), particularly for small and medium enterprises that context is to address the disparities that public procurement can perceive a higher risk in bidding due to the impact on their create when it restricts economic opportunity, distorts market nancial liquidity. functioning, and is not used with the vision to create new and qualitative markets and jobs. A careful design of regulations and Leveraging data to drive reforms in public investing in public-facing services and digital infrastructure is procurement to promote entry and competition necessary to reduce barriers to entry while aligning procurement in government markets objectives with broader development goals such as sustainability, innovation, rm participation, and job creation. Procurement systems may remain technically functional but could miss the Public procurement plays a crucial role in driving economic and opportunity to drive meaningful improvements if reforms remain social policy objectives globally. B-READY introduces a set of narrow in scope and do not consider competition. global and comparable indicators on public procurement within the Market Competition topic. e analysis of the Public With this rich data set policy makers can identify areas of Procurement category indicators reveals that e ective public improvement by type of policy-reform actions, whether it is the procurement practices are achievable regardless of an economy enactment of new legislation or standardized procurement being wealthy, further emphasizing the key ndings of the documents, the implementation of digitalized procurement B-READY 2024 report (World Bank 2024). e largest variation is systems, or streamlining procurement requirements and processes observed in the adoption of digital procurement procedures and to attract more rms and entrepreneurs into government markets. processes, which signi cantly a ects the e ciency and transparency By addressing the identi ed gaps and leveraging good practices, of public procurement systems, and their ability to reduce market economies can foster competition, innovation, and e ciency in entry barriers. e convergence of good practices across economies public procurement, ultimately contributing to sustainable in Pillar I is likely driven by the impact of economic integration and economic development. 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