SYNTHESIS REPORT IDA’s Crisis Response Window Lessons from IEG Evaluations © 2019 International Bank for Reconstruction This work is a product of the staff of The World RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONS and Development / The World Bank Bank with external contributions. The findings, The material in this work is subject to copyright. 1818 H Street NW interpretations, and conclusions expressed in Because The World Bank encourages Washington DC 20433 this work do not necessarily reflect the views of dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be Telephone: 202-473-1000 The World Bank, its Board of Executive reproduced, in whole or in part, for Internet: www.worldbank.org Directors, or the governments they represent. noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: The World Bank does not guarantee the World Bank. 2019. IDA’s Crisis Response accuracy of the data included in this work. The Any queries on rights and licenses, including Window: Lessons from IEG Evaluations. boundaries, colors, denominations, and other subsidiary rights, should be addressed to Synthesis Report. Independent Evaluation information shown on any map in this work do World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group. Washington, DC: World Bank. not imply any judgment on the part of The Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC World Bank concerning the legal status of any 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: territory or the endorsement or acceptance of pubrights@worldbank.org. such boundaries.             IDA’s Crisis Response Window Lessons from Independent Evaluation Group Evaluations A Synthesis Report April 9, 2019     Contents Abbreviations .....................................................................................................................................................v  Acknowledgments ...........................................................................................................................................vi  Key Messages .................................................................................................................................................. vii  Management Response ................................................................................................................................ix  1. Background and Context ......................................................................................................................... 1  Evolution of the Crisis Response Window....................................................................................................... 1  Purpose and Scope of the Report .................................................................................................................... 4  2. Use of Crisis Response Window Financing ....................................................................................... 6  3. Crisis Response Window Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability .................................................................................................................................................... 10  Timeliness ............................................................................................................................................................... 11  Transparency and Predictability .......................................................................................................................13  Tension with Core IDA Principles .....................................................................................................................13  4. Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results .............................................................................................................................................................................. 15  CRW Performance at the Project Level ..........................................................................................................15  Crisis Response Window Performance at the Country Level .................................................................. 17  Strengthening the Evaluability of CRW Financing ......................................................................................18  Countering Economic Shocks through the Crisis Response Window ....................................... 19  Addressing Natural Disasters through the Crisis Response Window ....................................... 23  CRW Objective of Support for Resilience Build Back Better Principles ............................................... 26  Responding to Public Health Emergencies through the Crisis Response Window ............. 28  Bibliography..................................................................................................................................................... 31  Boxes Box 4.1. Build Back Better Principles Emerge from Global Review ................................................. 27 iii   Figures Figure 2.1. CRW-Financed Operations by Region and IDA Cycle ..................................................... 6  Figure 2.2. CRW-Financed Operations Type of Crisis ........................................................................... 8  Figure 2.3. CRW-Financed Operations by Instrument Type and Fiscal Year................................. 9  Figure 2.4. CRW-Financed Operations by Approval Fiscal Year and Crisis Type ........................ 9  Figure 3.1. Time to Delivery for CRW-Financed Operations .............................................................. 12  Figure 4.1. CRW-Financed Operations and IEG Ratings...................................................................... 16  Figure 4.2. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, by Region ................................................................................................................................................................ 20 Tables Table 4.1. IEG Outcome Ratings, by Crisis Type..................................................................................... 17  Table 4.2. CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, FY10–19 .......................................... 20  Table 4.3. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, by Region, FY10–19 ................................................................................................................................................ 21  Table 4.4. Selected ICRRs for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks....................... 23  Table 4.5. CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disasters, by Region, FY10–19 ..................... 24  Table 4.6. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disaster, by Region, FY10–19 ............................................................................................................................................... 24  Table 4.7. ICRRs for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disasters ......................................... 26  Table 4.8. CRW Allocations for Public Health Emergencies, FY10–19 ............................................ 28  Table 4.9. IEG Outcome Ratings for Crisis Response Window Allocations for Health, by Region ................................................................................................................................................................ 29  Appendixes Appendix A. Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type ........................ 39  Appendix B. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing, by Crisis Type .. 50  Appendix C. Bank Performance Ratings for Crisis Response Window–Financed Operations .............................................................................................................................................................................. 52      iv   Abbreviations BBB  build back better  CLRR  Completion and Learning Report Reviews  CRW  Crisis Response Window  DPF  development policy financing  ICRR  Implementation Completion and Results Report Review  IDA  International Development Association  IEG  Independent Evaluation Group  IPF  investment project financing  All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. v   Acknowledgments This synthesis paper was prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG).  Malathi S. Jayawickrama led the team under the overall guidance of Alison Margaret  Evans (Director‐General, Evaluation), Auguste T. Kouame, Director, Human  Development and Economic Management Department and Jeffrey Chelsky, Manager,  Country Programs and Economic Management. The team comprised Erika A. Jorgensen,  consultant, and Breda Griffith, consultant. Patricia Acevedo provided administrative  support. The team would like to thank Peishan Yeo, strategy officer, Development  Finance Corporate of the International Development Association and International Bank  for Reconstruction and Development and team in Development Finance Corporate for  comments on an earlier draft of this document.  vi   Key Messages The Crisis Response Window (CRW) of the International Development Association  (IDA) evolved from a single focus on economic shocks to include two other types of  crises—natural disasters and public health emergencies. The CRW was set up as a pilot  under IDA15 to address repercussions of the global financial crisis on IDA countries.  It  was amended when made a permanent part of IDA to address the impact of natural  disasters in addition to economic shocks.  When the Ebola crisis erupted in 2014, CRW  coverage was revised to include public health emergencies as eligible for CRW  financing.  The CRW built on IDA’s experience of crisis response and the need to respond to a  perceived gap in the IDA architecture. The CRW has provided IDA with the flexibility to  support countries facing shocks within IDA cycles requiring that additional resources be  made available faster than possible under the regular IDA allocation framework.  The CRW aims to achieve several objectives: rapid response; transparency and  predictability; support for resilience in natural disaster response; and supporting long‐ term development objectives. The rapid response of CRW‐financed operations was to be  pursued through accelerated emergency procedures for internal processing– the result  has been ‘time to delivery’ shorter than World Bank averages for investment operations.  Transparency and predictability in access to CRW resources was to be pursued by  requiring that World Bank management inform the Board of Executive Directors of its  intention to draw on CRW resources for a particular operation. Support for resilience in  natural disaster response was to be pursued by including measures to strengthen  vulnerable areas in each operation, and, in more recent years, incorporating “build back  better” principles. Supporting long‐term development was to be pursued, among other  things, by protecting core spending to preserve progress in poverty reduction.   CRW funds have been requested and used regularly since 2010, and projects receiving  CRW funds have performed better than the IDA average. Over the period 2010–18, half  of CRW financing went to countries in the Africa Region, and around half has been for  response to natural disasters. The majority of CRW finance has been used for investment  project finance operations. In line with the evolving scope of the CRW, demand for CRW  resources (as well as the type of crisis that is eligible for financing) has varied across IDA  cycles, from IDA15’s response to economic shocks, to IDA16’s response to natural  disasters, to IDA17 and IDA18’s responses to all three types of crises. Implementation  Completion and Results Report Reviews show that CRW‐financed operations have  performed better than the average IDA operation in delivering project outcomes. The  reasons for good performance vary by type of crisis.  vii Key Messages Evaluations of operations receiving CRW financing to counter economic shocks identify  some common factors that underpin good performance. These include building on  existing operations, close coordination with partners, preparation for future crises,  capacity building, and resilience improvements. Speed of preparation and simple and  flexible project design contributed to success, but longer‐term objectives (such as  strengthening countries’ capacity to mitigate crises) did not receive sufficient attention,  although this may be partly due to the shorter‐term focus of operations for crisis  response. Finally, it is possible that stronger client ownership and commitment in crisis  conditions may play a role in better performance.  Evaluations of CRW‐financed operations for natural disaster response identified several  features that contributed to good performance.  Partnering with other international  institutions, careful instrument choice (including building on existing operations  through additional financing), good project design, and flexibility during  implementation were common features. Moreover, “build back better” principles of  resilience building, which are being incorporated into project preparation and  implementation, are expected to strengthen the contribution to long‐term development  objectives. Client ownership and commitment may also have bolstered performance.  Financing for public health emergencies presents few lessons to date. The small number  of operations point to the success of rapid preparation and partnering with other donors  while identifying the challenge of supporting longer‐term objectives.  Not all the objectives of the CRW are easily evaluable, especially given that CRW  financing is usually pooled with regular IDA financing for operations. To improve the  evaluability of the CRW, its use needs to be recognized in operational documents and  self‐assessments at the project and country level.  It will remain difficult to judge the  impact of CRW financing in practice until its use is consistently taken into account in  project and country evaluations, but recent improvements in staff guidance will help.  While it is methodologically challenging to attribute specific results to the CRW given  the pooling of resources, more explicit reference to CRW‐related activities in project and  country documents (especially in Implementation Completion and Results Reports and  Completion and Learning Reports) should help clarify the value added of the CRW.  IDA’s flexibility and responsiveness have been enhanced by the CRW; however, with  this enhanced flexibility and ability to respond quickly come potential tensions with  IDA’s performance‐based allocation and its core principle of nonearmarked financing.  As financing for IDA special windows has expanded, taking a growing share of total  IDA resources, it is vital to consider both the balance and potential trade‐offs between  greater flexibility and predictability for IDA clients and to monitor this issue. viii Management Response Management welcomes the Independent Evaluation Groups (IEG)’s three synthesis  reports related to the International Development Association (IDA): (i) Learning from IDA Experience: Lessons from IEG Evaluations, with a Focus on IDA Special Themes and Development Effectiveness; (ii) Synthesis Report on IDA Regional Window Program, 2003–17;  and (iii) IDA’s Crisis Response Window: Lessons from IEG Evaluations. Together, the reports  provide a useful summary of the existing evaluative evidence and provide valuable  inputs to the IDA19 replenishment discussions.  The synthesis report provides a succinct yet comprehensive overview of IDA’s Crisis  Response Window (CRW) and the lessons learnt to date. IEG’s findings and conclusions  complement those in the CRW Paper presented by Management at the IDA18 Mid‐Term  Review. This includes its timeliness, performance, and support for build‐back‐better.  IEG’s project‐level assessments and lessons provide added insight to our understanding  of the CRW.  Management concurs with the report’s findings on the relevance and value of the CRW.  Many IDA clients face multiple and recurrent hazards that threaten longer‐term  development. The CRW mechanism in the IDA architecture has enabled the World Bank  to respond in a timely and flexible manner to exceptionally severe events, such as health  pandemics, earthquakes, or domestic impacts of the global financial crisis. By  supplementing the core IDA allocations in such situations, the CRW has enabled  recipient states to respond to the immediate crisis in a manner that does not undermine  its longer‐term development goals. The World Bank had previously responded to a  crisis either by restructuring its country portfolio to release funds or redirecting IDA  funds from pipeline projects, thereby reallocating resources originally intended for  longer‐term development. The CRW has helped the World Bank to sustain its pre‐crisis  IDA commitments and minimize trade‐offs.  The report puts due emphasis on the fact that the performance of CRW‐financed  operations is better than that of the average IDA operation. This includes timely  preparation, leveraging existing implementation mechanisms, protecting core social  expenditure, and achieving outcomes (90 percent of CRW financing for natural disasters  and 84 percent for economic shocks were rated as Moderately Satisfactory or above).  Indeed, the CRW has had notable achievements on the ground. The CRW supported  post‐earthquake recovery in Haiti and Nepal. It helped address the Ebola crisis in  Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. It facilitated a transformative engagement in war‐torn  and cholera‐impacted Yemen in partnership with the United Nations. It helped address  the challenge of recurrent drought in the Horn of Africa. It helped several small states  respond to repeated disasters and climate shocks despite their limited fiscal base.  The report points to potential tensions of the CRW with IDA’s core principle of non‐ earmarked resources. IEG finds that although the PBA system remains the principal  basis for the allocation of IDA resources, the use of IDA’s specialized windows,  ix Management Response including the CRW, may result in “potential tradeoffs between greater flexibility and  predictability for IDA clients.” Management wishes to note that the CRW constitutes a  small percentage of total IDA resources (2–4 percent during IDA16–18). The IDA  windows have been set up to respond more fully to priorities such as crisis management  and the influx of refugees and to help crowd in more private resources. In addition, they  were created in the context of a significant scale‐up of the IDA envelope, particularly in  IDA18. The increase in non‐earmarked core resources has provided the predictability  and continuity in country allocations through the PBA. That said, Management will  continue to review IDA’s financing structure, including the CRW and other windows,  with a view to optimizing its resource allocation, balancing targeted priorities and  flexibility.    x 1. Background and Context Evolution of the Crisis Response Window From the 15th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA15)  through IDA18, the Crisis Response Window (CRW) evolved from a focus on economic  shocks to include two other types of crises—natural disasters and public health  emergencies. The CRW was set up as a pilot under IDA15 to address repercussions  related to the global financial crisis on IDA countries. When established as a permanent  part of IDA, it was amended to address the impact of natural disasters in addition to  economic shocks. CRW coverage was expanded to include public health emergencies  when the Ebola crisis erupted in 2014.  CRW built on IDA’s experience of crisis response while seeking to provide additional  flexibility. IDA already had a track record of crisis response, having played an important  role in postdisaster recovery and reconstruction. IDA had responded to natural disasters  such as the 2004 tsunami, economic crises, and public health emergencies such as avian  flu. These responses were typically financed by restructuring existing country portfolios  and reallocating country allocations. Crisis response financing tended to be ad hoc  rather than systematic and reallocation and restructuring processes could be time  consuming. The Development Committee concluded in 2009 that “the succession of  global crises and natural disasters early in the IDA15 period exposed a gap in the  international aid architecture related to systematic assistance to low‐income countries  facing large shocks on government core spending and on the poor and vulnerable”  (World Bank 2012b), and “committed to explore the benefits of a new crisis response  mechanism in IDA to protect [low‐income countries] from crises” (World Bank 2009b).  The CRW responds to a real need—to provide additional resources quickly in response  to a crisis, ensuring that such support does not come at the cost of achieving longer‐term  development goals. In fact, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluations had made  a strong case for a window like the CRW. The concept of a funding window was put  forward in the 2006 IEG evaluation on World Bank assistance for natural disasters. The  report noted “for the most vulnerable countries, contingency funding needs to be made  available, whether as part of another loan, a set‐aside in the Country Assistance Strategy  lending program, or a free‐standing catastrophe fund” (World Bank 2006). The report  advocated for more investment lending, noting that longer‐term activities, such as  mitigation, reconstruction and institution building in addition to attention to social  issues had been short‐changed in the past. Then, in the wake of the global financial  crisis, the 2011 IEG evaluation of the global economic crisis noted that low‐income  countries were far less able to bear the costs of the global financial crisis and called for  greater proactivity by the World Bank on their behalf and highlighted the role of the  1 Chapter 1 Background and Context CRW (World Bank 2011e). Last, IEG’s recent evaluation on health notes the importance  of the World Bank’s financing and coordination role in responding effectively to deadly  virus outbreaks, particularly in countries with lower institutional capacity and complex  development partner networks (World Bank 2017j).  The CRW was established as a pilot within IDA15 in response to the global financial  crisis, approved by IDA’s Executive Directors in December 2009. Its launch followed  calls from the Development Committee to consider how IDA could respond to the  challenges faced by low‐income countries affected by the global financial crisis,1 which  had followed on the heels of the food and fuel price shocks of 2007 and 2008 and had  significant and negative impacts on many non‐oil‐exporting low‐income countries. Bank  management proposed a pilot IDA CRW, which was discussed at the IDA15 Midterm  Review (World Bank 2009d).2 Implementation began in January 2010, making the CRW  available during the second half of IDA15 (January 2010 to July 2011).3 CRW resources  were additional to a country’s regular IDA allocation, since the allocation system under  IDA often made it difficult to mobilize incremental financing for IDA countries in the  face of an unanticipated shock.  The CRW was established as a permanent feature under IDA16 to address natural  disasters as well as economic crises. A permanent window was adopted as part of  IDA16 to respond to exceptional crises caused by exogenous shocks, with CRW  resources as part of a concerted international effort and accessed only as last resort  financing.4 Access to CRW resources would be triggered by evidence of an economic                                                         1 The negative impact of the crisis was transmitted through several channels (exports,  remittances, tourism and foreign direct investment) and resulted in falling growth and  employment and in higher poverty.  2 International Development Association (IDA) deputies endorsed launching the window under  the 15th replenishment (IDA15) and discussed making the window permanent as part of the  subsequent IDA16 replenishment, while emphasizing the need to ensure complementarity with  other existing mechanisms for crisis support, particularly those of the World Bank Group and  International Monetary Fund (World Bank 2009a).  3 This was supplemented by special drawing rights (SDR) 88 million from IDA investment  returns and SDR 158 million of contributions from the United Kingdom.   4 Although IDA deputies noted the need to respond to public health emergencies and epidemics,  this issue was set aside until the IDA16 midterm review since public health emergences would    2 Chapter 1 Background and Context crisis projected to reduce gross domestic product by at least 3 percentage points in a  significant number of IDA countries; or exogenous price shocks with widespread impact  across IDA countries. Access in the case of natural disasters would be triggered only if  the disaster was exceptionally severe and intense and where existing resources were  insufficient, with a presumption that a portion would be used to strengthen disaster  resilience (World Bank 2010c). The desirability of building resilience into disaster  response projects has been confirmed repeatedly and adopted as good practice, but  there is an inevitable tension with fast crisis response (UNISDR  2015; World Bank  2017b). Access to the permanent CRW was limited to crises triggered by exogenous  shocks.5 Under IDA16, Management was expected to consult with the Board of  Executive Directors shortly after a disaster occurred to indicate that access to CRW  funds would form part of IDA’s response. In most cases, a note was presented to the  Board informing Executive Directors of Management’s intention to allocate CRW funds  to a specific project and explaining the emergency to which the project responded. In  addition, CRW‐financed operations were eligible for accelerated emergency procedures  for internal processing and Board approval (World Bank 2010a, 2010b).  IDA17 saw the addition of public health emergencies to the types of crises eligible for  CRW financing. The CRW would continue to use the CRW implementation  arrangements in place under IDA16. Almost immediately, the question of inclusion of  public health emergencies arose due to the Ebola crisis. Extending the use of the CRW to  a public health emergency was first requested as part of the Board’s approval of the  Ebola Emergency Response Project in September 2014. At the IDA17 Midterm Review,  IDA Executive Directors formally expanded the eligibility criteria for CRW access to  include public health emergencies and epidemics (World Bank 2015g).  CRW continued under IDA18, with access to CRW funds for severe economic crises,  natural disasters, and public health emergencies (World Bank 2017g). The two‐stage  approval process established under IDA16 remained to ensure Board involvement and  oversight through consultation in the first stage (informing the Board of the borrowing  country’s intention to access CRW resources) and simultaneous approval of CRW                                                         require operational changes in IDA to allow for the kind of rapid financing that would be  required for an effective public health emergency response (World Bank 2010a, 2010b).  5 For example, an economic crisis triggered by poor economic management would not merit  access, while one caused by a sharp commodity price drop or a recession in major trading  partners would (World Bank 2010a).    3 Chapter 1 Background and Context resources and specific operations in the second stage. As part of IDA18’s effort to  expand financing to promote resilience through crisis preparedness and response, the  CRW was scaled up to special drawing rights (SDR) 2.1 billion and adjustment of  financing terms was allowed for the most severe natural disasters (World Bank 2017g).6  After the IDA18 Midterm Review, the Board approved reallocating $750 million from  the CRW as demand for CRW resources up to that point had been modest.  Purpose and Scope of the Report This IEG synthesis paper takes stock of experience with IDA’s CRW, making use of IEG  evaluative evidence. The paper synthesizes findings from existing evaluations and  information on CRW performance during its pilot stage under IDA15 and subsequent  IDA cycles, to inform stakeholders and promote learning. The audience for this paper is  primarily internal, including management, Executive Directors (including the  Committee on Development Effectiveness), and IDA deputies.  Attribution of results to CRW resources is methodologically challenging given the  comingling of CRW and regular IDA resources in most CRW‐financed operations. But  IEG evaluations provide some basis for assessing CRW contribution to outcomes and the  achievement of its objectives. CRW financing is usually used to augment financing for  other IDA‐supported interventions. This makes it difficult to attribute results to any  single source of financing. The frequent use of CRW funds for additional financing also  complicates any effort to separate results linked to CRW from other results.  Nevertheless, IEG evaluations at the project, country, and sector levels provide useful  information from which an assessment of CRW implementation can be derived.  The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief  discussion of the CRW’s objectives, focusing on timeliness of CRW‐financed  interventions and adherence to IDA governance arrangements. The third section  considers performance of CRW‐financed projects and the associated country results,  making use of IEG evaluations, including separate consideration of performance in  response to economic shocks, natural disasters, and public health emergencies. It also  draws on relevant IEG thematic and sector evaluations. The 145 projects that have  received CRW financing during the reviewed period were matched with 59 associated  Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews (ICRRs), 44 country strategy                                                         6 IDA financing terms would be adjusted for countries exposed to severe natural disasters leading  to significant damage and losses of over one‐third of gross domestic product.   4 Chapter 1 Background and Context Completion and Learning Report Reviews (CLRRs) and their predecessors, and four  Country Program Evaluations. 5 2. Use of Crisis Response Window Financing The pilot CRW under IDA15 provided financing to many IDA countries to assist them in  mitigating the impact of the global financial crisis. Funding was SDR 1.053 billion (about  $1.6 billion), of which SDR 806 million (about $1.3 billion) came from unallocated IDA  general resources (about 13 percent of the estimated financing needed to protect core  spending in non‐oil exporting IDA‐only countries) (World Bank 2009d). These IDA  resources were additional to a country’s regular IDA allocation. Fifty‐six IDA‐only  countries were recognized as eligible for these funds.1 CRW funds were allocated among  these countries based primarily on estimated crisis impact and need (World Bank  2010a).2 By the end of IDA15, $1.4 billion had been committed (figure 2.1).  Figure 2.1. CRW-Financed Operations by Region and IDA Cycle a. Regional CRW-financed operations by IDA cycle b. IDA cycle CRW-financed operations by Region Note: One project in Africa and its additional financing, both in IDA17, were regional, covering three African countries. AFR = Africa; CRW = Crisis Response Window; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; IDA = International Development Association; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia. CRW resources under IDA16 were not fully used. IDA deputies had set aside  SDR 1.335 billion (about $2 billion) for the CRW for IDA16, about 4 percent of IDA16                                                          1 Reflecting the ongoing impact of the food and fuel price crisis, 23 IDA countries were excluded  because they were significant oil exporters, had higher income levels, or were in arrears to IDA or  the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  2 The projected decline in gross domestic product growth was used as the main indicator of crisis  impact, whereas per capita gross national income was used to indicate need.  6 Chapter 2 Use of Crisis Response Window Financing resources. By the end of IDA16, $937 million had been committed for 27 new operations  or as additional financing to existing well‐performing operations that could effectively  respond to crisis conditions. Of these, a special CRW allocation of $500 million went to  Haiti to support recovery efforts after the 2010 earthquake. The unused amounts in the  CRW were redistributed, with about $470 million reallocated to IDA’s Regional  Integration Program at the time of the IDA16 Midterm Review and about $540 million  carried over to the IDA17 CRW (see figure 2.1; World Bank 2010a, 2013, 2015c).  Demand for CRW financing exceeded expectations during IDA17. At the start of IDA17,  SDR 0.6 billion (about $840 million) had been allocated to the CRW (World Bank 2014a).3  At the Midterm Review (November 2015), resources of $900 million were added as  demand was higher than expected. This constituted a doubling in size from IDA16.  Resources were fully used (World Bank 2018d). By the end of IDA17, $1,752 million had  been committed for 37 new operations or as additional financing. To date under IDA18,  $350 million have been committed for six new operations or as additional financing (see  figure 2.1).  Since its inception, the CRW has been used regularly, with countries in the Africa  Region accounting for half of CRW commitments. Over the entire period, CRW‐financed  projects included 145 loans (for 139 operations).4 Total IDA commitments for these loans  totaled $ 7.7 billion, of which the CRW provided $4.4 billion. A few countries drew  repeatedly on the CRW: Haiti ($608 million in CRW financing for 16 projects); Nepal  ($389 financing for five projects); Yemen, Republic of ($364 million for three projects);  and Ethiopia ($356 million for four projects; figure 2.1, panel b, and figure 2.2, panel b).5  Financing in response to natural disasters has taken up about half of cumulative CRW  resources. Out of the total CRW financing provided, 37 percent of (57 percent of  operations) responded to an economic crisis, 49 percent (39 percent of operations) to a  natural disaster, and 14 percent (4 percent of operations) to a public health emergency  (figure 2.2).                                                         3 But it was noted in the final report launching IDA17 that, in the event of exceptional  circumstances, Crisis Response Window (CRW) funding could be exceeded, subject to approval  by the IDA Board of Executive Directors (World Bank 2014a).   A given project may receive more than one loan with CRW financing. A parent project with  4 CRW financing may receive additional financing, part or all of which came from the CRW.  5 These four countries accessed more than $300 million each from CRW to date. Another seven  countries accessed $100 to $300 million each.   7 Chapter 2 Use of Crisis Response Window Financing Figure 2.2. CRW-Financed Operations Type of Crisis a. CRW-financed operations by type of b. CRW-Financed operations by Region and type of crisis crisis Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. AFR = Africa; CRW = Crisis Response Window; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia. Investment project financing (IPF) has been the instrument of choice in the majority of  CRW‐financed operations. They accounted for 86 percent of CRW commitments and 110  projects (of 145 total), out of which 63 (about half of commitments) were for additional  financing. Development policy financing (DPF) constituted 13 percent of commitments  and 34 operations. Although overall use of CRW funds has varied sharply year by year,  investment projects have remained dominant (figure 2.3).  The demand for CRW resources has varied across IDA cycles even as the types of crises  eligible for access has expanded. After its first two years, little CRW finance was called  on to address economic crises, while starting in FY12, the need for CRW financing for  natural disasters has varied year by year, with heaviest use in FY17. Public health  emergencies were less frequent, with only two years when CRW financing was  requested (figure 2.4).  8 Chapter 2 Use of Crisis Response Window Financing Figure 2.3. CRW-Financed Operations by Instrument Type and Fiscal Year Note: One investment project and its additional financing, both in FY15, were regional, covering three countries. FY = fiscal year. Figure 2.4. CRW-Financed Operations by Approval Fiscal Year and Crisis Type   Note: A public health emergency investment project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. FY = fiscal year. 9 3. Crisis Response Window Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability The objectives of the CRW can be found in a series of IDA papers.1 The discussion of the  CRW includes a long and shifting list of objectives. Under the pilot, the key objective  was to help countries deal with the impact of the global economic crisis by providing  additional resources for short‐term crisis mitigation to reduce the impact on countries’  long‐term development activities. It was expected that CRW would provide financial  assistance to protect core spending on health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure  and agriculture. Teams were encouraged to use instruments which would result in  projects being rapidly implemented (World Bank 2009d).  When permanent CRW was established, its key objective was to protect core spending in  the short‐term and avoid derailing long‐term development objectives. Other aims were  (i) establishing a more systematic approach for IDA to respond to severe crises caused  by exogenous shocks; (ii) enhancing IDA’s capacity to provide rapid response and  effectively participate in global disaster response efforts; and (iii) providing additional  and predictable financing to countries hit by crises. Since natural disaster response was  added to the CRW, a portion of CRW resources was to be used to strengthen disaster  resilience with eligibility for only exceptionally severe and intense disasters. A two‐stage  process for eligibility was designed to ensure a systematic, predictable, and transparent  allocation of CRW resources (World Bank 2010c). It was emphasized that special IDA  windows like the CRW should not undermine core IDA objectives.  How did the CRW perform against these objectives? Some areas are easier to assess than  others, and four of those against which performance can be judged are considered in this  report.2 They are the objectives of (i) rapid response, (ii) transparency and predictability,                                                         1 The main IDA reports in which CRW objectives are discussed are World Bank 2009c, 2009d,  2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012, 2015f, and 2018e.  2 The IDA18 midterm review report on CRW addressed a different list of CRW objectives and  found that the CRW has generally performed well against them. The report presents evidence  that the CRW responded to the most severe crises. It argues that burden‐sharing was reasonable  so that access to CRW remained a last resort, with CRW funding comprising less than one‐sixth  of overall planned crisis response including other donors (although this ratio was not validated    10 Chapter 3 Crisis Response Window Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability (iii) support for resilience, and (iv) supporting long‐term development objectives. Rapid  response or the timeliness of CRW response to crises is discussed below. Transparency  and predictability, as operationalized through the CRW eligibility process, is also  discussed. Consideration of CRW’s performance in helping countries return to their  long‐term development path is the focus of chapter 4, which also looks at support for  resilience to future natural disasters and whether recently, CRW has helped countries  comply with the principle of “build back better” (BBB). A brief discussion of the  implications of special window financing for IDA core allocations concludes this  chapter.  Timeliness Quick response is essential in addressing a crisis, and there are indications that IDA’s  responses to various crises have been more rapid because of the CRW. The speed of  response to the global financial crisis was striking. With financing from CRW, IDA  prepared and delivered 51 operations ($884 million in CRW financing) between  February and end‐June 2010. For natural disasters, IDA teams mobilized quickly,  typically sending a team within a week of receiving a request from the government.  After information was collected, usually in a Post‐Disaster Needs Assessment  undertaken in coordination with development partners, a request was made to the  Board via a technical briefing to access CRW. The median time from the disaster date  and the Board technical briefing was 86 days (World Bank 2018e).3  CRW operations have been timely, with average “time to delivery” much shorter than  the average for World Bank IPF operations, and their speed in disbursing financing has  been improving. Time to Delivery (average number of months for an investment project  to move from concept note review to first disbursement) has fallen steadily, from an  average of 20 months in FY10 to below six months since FY15 (figure 3.1).4 By this  measure, CRW‐financed operations have performed significantly better than World  Bank–wide averages for investment operations. CRW‐financed operations have also  been timely in disbursement when gauged by median time from approval to first                                                         ex post). Further, within the Bank Group, countries with greater uncommitted performance‐ based IDA allocations at the time of a crisis received relatively less CRW financing (adjusted for  crisis severity), according to the report. Last, the IDA midterm review concludes that the CRW  exercised flexibility when needed in special cases like the Ebola crisis (World Bank 2018e).  3  There is no benchmark for this indicator.   For time to delivery, the mean rather than the median is used, matching practice for World  4 Bank–wide statistics.  11 Chapter 3 Crisis Response Window Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability disbursement, with an average of 4.8 months (compared with 7.1 months for other IDA  operations). CRW funded IPF median time from approval to disbursement of 5.5 months  was shorter than other IDA IPF time to disbursement of 8.1 months, while CRW‐ financed DPF time to disbursement of 1.5 months was shorter than for other IDA DPFs  (2.3 months), as reported in the IDA18 Midterm Review report on CRW (World Bank  2018e). This better‐than‐average and improving performance is evidence of the CRW’s  success in timely preparation and processing of operations.  Figure 3.1. Time to Delivery for CRW-Financed Operations Note: Investment operations only. Time to delivery is average number of months from concept stage to first disbursement. For some operations missing concept review dates, the date of technical briefing to the Board is used. Years with data from fewer than five operations are omitted. Due to limited data, additional financing are included in the CRW operations. World Bank–wide data only available starting in FY12. The mean is used to allow comparison to World Bank reporting. The overall mean for FY10–17 for CRW operations was 14.2 while the median was 11.9 (and the World Bank average was 26.6). Without additional financing, the average for CRW operations for FY10–17 is 15.2. For some operations missing concept dates, the date of technical briefing to the Board is used, which raises the average time to delivery of CRW operations. By all these calculations, CRW operations were timely. Speed in preparation and time to disbursement varied depending on the type of crisis,  with public health emergency projects moving extremely fast. CRW operations for  economic shocks had an average time from concept review to fist disbursement of 19  months while those for natural disaster averaged 11 months. The six public health  emergency projects averaged 3.5 months from concept review to first disbursement. As  discussed in chapter 4, CRW timeliness may reflect the decision to attach CRW financing  to operations likely to proceed quickly all the way to disbursement, in line with CRW  guidance for teams to use instruments which result in projects being rapidly  implemented (World Bank 2011d).  12 Chapter 3 Crisis Response Window Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability Transparency and Predictability A second objective of the CRW—transparency and predictability—was operationalized  through the CRW eligibility process, with good compliance. The two‐stage process for  access to CRW resources was designed to ensure a systematic, predictable, and  transparent allocation of CRW resources, and CRW operations have followed the  procedures set up for access. CRW‐financed operations are required to lay out the  justification for access to CRW funds in technical briefings to the Board, providing  evidence that the country has been hit by an eligible crisis. The requirement for  consulting with the Board on access to CRW was established with IDA16.5 Since then, all  use of CRW has required an Eligibility Note submitted to the Board in advance of  project preparation, except for Haiti. The response to Haiti’s earthquake was instead  discussed with the IDA deputies as part of IDA16. However, important information in  the Eligibility Notes was rarely incorporated into project documentation, and while  acknowledgment of CRW funding was usually included in project documents, it rarely  made it into project or country evaluations. These omissions have made it difficult to  assess the adequacy of transparency and predictability, or achievement of other  objectives discussed in the Eligibility Notes, beyond confirming compliance with the  governance arrangements for access to CRW funds.  Tension with Core IDA Principles IDA’s flexibility in response to special situations has been enhanced by the CRW which  has proven to be useful complement to the IDA performance‐based allocation system.  But concerns have been voiced that the increasing use of special windows for IDA could  undermine the performance‐based allocation system. Special IDA windows have grown  as a share of total IDA commitments, from 8 percent in IDA15 to 16 percent in IDA17.  Within this total, CRW financing during IDA16 constituted about 1.5 percent of total  IDA commitments, doubled to about 3 percent during IDA17 and underwent a  significant scale‐up in IDA18 to about 4 percent of much‐expanded IDA resources,  which was adjusted downwards in response to modest demand to about 3 percent at the  time of the IDA18 Midterm Review (World Bank 2018f). As the use of IDA special  windows has expanded, taking a growing share out of total IDA resources, Bank  Management has argued that it is important to consider the trade‐offs between the  additional responsiveness of the windows and “the core IDA principle of non‐ earmarked country funding, which provides predictable, countercyclical funding in                                                         5 The establishment of the CRW as a permanent window included a requirement to prepare a  note for the Board on eligibility for access to CRW resources (World Bank 2010c).  13 Chapter 3 Crisis Response Window Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability alignment with client priorities” (World Bank 2018d). The trade‐offs associated with  greater use of special windows and the core IDA principle of nonearmarked financing  could benefit from monitoring. 14 4. Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Another objective of the CRW is to return crisis‐affected IDA countries to their long‐ term development paths. CRW financing is intended to help protect core spending on  health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure, and agriculture in the short‐term,  thereby avoiding an erosion of progress achieved or a derailment of progress toward  long‐term development objectives. Progress toward this objective was assessed by  reviewing IEG project and country‐level evaluations for CRW‐financed operations and  try to assess the contribution of CRW. Findings and lessons at the project level from  ICRRs and from the available country evaluations are reviewed and then grouped  according to the type of crisis addressed. Suggestions on how to improve the  evaluability of CRW’s contribution to development effectiveness are included.  Attributions of the impact of CRW financing is made challenging by the fact that CRW  funds are typically blended with other financing in supporting a project or operation.  Omission of references to CRW financing in some project and most country documents  further complicates attribution of impact. Moreover, CRW is rarely acknowledged in  project or country evaluations. Nevertheless, and while the number of evaluations of  CRW‐financed operations completed to date is limited, they still provide valuable  insights on the impact of the CRW and on how to improve the design and  implementation of CRW‐financed operations to strengthen development effectiveness.  CRW Performance at the Project Level IEG ratings are available for many CRW‐financed operations, but the bulk have not yet  been evaluated. In total, IEG has rated 40 percent of CRW‐financed operations  constituting 23 percent of CRW financing (or 59 projects and $1.0 billion). Not  surprisingly, older projects are more likely to have been rated, and many newer  operations have yet to close.1 Almost two‐thirds of IDA15 CRW projects have been  rated, compared with a quarter of IDA16, 10 percent of IDA17, and none for IDA18.  Since the CRW began as a vehicle to address economic shocks in the wake of the global  financial crisis, almost 60 percent of projects responding to economic shocks have been  rated, constituting 50 percent of financing, but only small proportions of natural disaster  or public health emergency operations have been rated (Figure 4.1, panel a).                                                         1 For IDA16, 20 of 27 operations remain active; 33 of 38 IDA17 operations are active and all six  IDA18 operations are active.  15 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Figure 4.1. CRW-Financed Operations and IEG Ratings a. CRW-financed operations rated by IEG (no.) b. IEG ratings of CRW-financed operations Note: A given project may receive more than one loan with CRW financing. A parent project with CRW financing may receive additional financing, part or all of which came from the CRW. Multiple projects with CRW financing may be rated together by IEG as part of a series. Health Emergency is public health emergencies. CRW = Crisis Response Window; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. CRW‐financed operations have performed better than the average IDA operation for  project outcome and for Bank performance. Of the CRW operations with completion  reports reviewed by IEG, 80 percent of operations (and 85 percent of financing) were  rated moderately satisfactory or higher for outcome.2 This performance surpasses that of  all of IDA (68 percent by number and 75 percent by commitments rated moderately  satisfactory or higher for projects closed during FY12–14). Within this group, as for IDA  overall, IPFs appear to have performed better than DPFs, but the sample is  small.3 Ratings for Bank performance are moderately satisfactory or better for 86 percent  of CRW‐financed projects (88 percent of financing) and also surpass overall IDA  performance (70 percent of operations or 79 percent of commitments for projects closed  during FY12–14 (figure 4.1, panel b; table 4.1; appendix C).                                                          2 Outcome ratings are based on ratings for (i) the relevance of objectives; (ii) efficacy or  achievement of the project development objective; and (iii) efficiency (for invest investment  policy financing (IPF) only).  3 Within rated CRW operations, 87 percent of IPFs were moderately satisfactory or higher for  outcome compared with 70 percent of development policy financing (DPFs), with a sample  composed of 32 IPFs and 27 DPFs. This performance is better than for IDA overall, with  71 percent of FY12–14 IPF operations rated moderately satisfactory or higher and 60 percent of  DPFs.   16 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results The performance of CRW‐financed operations for economic shocks was the strongest.  More than 80 percent of rated economic shock operations (and 84 percent by financing)  were rated moderately satisfactory or better by IEG. About 70 percent of natural disaster  operations (and near 90 percent by financing) were rated moderately satisfactory or  better. Too few public health emergency operations have been rated for the average to  mean much yet. The first wave of CRW operations, prepared rapidly during the last 18  months of IDA15, have performed very well (figure 4.1, panel b; table 4.1).  Table 4.1. IEG Outcome Ratings, by Crisis Type Public Health Economic Shock Natural Disaster Emergency All CRW Operations o/w: o/w: o/w: o/w: Proj. IDA CRW Proj. IDA CRW Proj. IDA CRW Proj. IDA CRW Rating (no.) ($, m) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) ($, m) HS 1 55 5 — — — — — — 1 55 5 S 11 275 129 3 415 110 — — — 14 690 239 MS 27 1,379 598 4 73 65 2 80 20 33 1,532 683 MU 8 336 110 3 28 28 — — — 11 364 138 U 1 71 16 — — — — — — 1 71 16 NR 34 1,623 765 47 2,772 1,994 4 620 600 85 4,965 3,359 Total 82 3,738 1,622 57 3,288 2,197 6 700 620 145 7,726 4,439 Note: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional covering three countries. — = not available; comm = commitment; CRW = Crisis Window Response (commitment); HS = highly satisfactory; IDA = International Development Association (commitment); IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; m = millions; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; Proj. = projects; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. A common factor in poorly performing operations is a failure to take account of limited  government capacity and the higher risks of complex projects or programs. For the  nearly 20 percent of projects with moderately unsatisfactory ratings or worse, one lesson  commonly recorded in ICRRs is that project or program design often did not sufficiently  take into account the limited implementation capacity of the government. Especially in  the wake of a crisis, project design should account for the capacity of country  counterparts. For development policy operations, the complexity of prior actions and the  degree of coordination needed between government departments should be a critical  input in designing reform programs.  Crisis Response Window Performance at the Country Level A review of country‐level evaluations found that CRW financing was infrequently  mentioned in self‐evaluations (Completion and Learning Reports) or the IEG reviews.  The 145 projects that received CRW funding were matched to available country  17 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results evaluations by IEG. The review included 44 IEG reviews of country strategy self‐ evaluations (CLRRs and their predecessors), and four Country Program Evaluations.  This review found that the CRW was mentioned in country evaluations rarely, if at all.  Even in cases where an operation was financed entirely from the CRW and supported  the objectives and focus areas of the country program, this was not mentioned in the  country evaluation. Although several IEG evaluations of country programs commented  on the flexibility and responsiveness of IDA to a crisis and noted where countries  adjusted their programs to meet the emergencies that arose, they did not explain how  the CRW helped.  Exceptions are the 2016 clustered Country Program Evaluation on  small states that noted that demand for CRW finance in small states was very strong in  response to cyclones; the evaluation for Liberia (2017) which identified the role of the  CRW, both in addressing the Ebola epidemic and in providing supplemental financing  for poverty reduction DPFs; the CLRR (2016) for Mozambique, which notes “the  [Completion and Learning Report] does not report on what the World Bank did to  mitigate the risks (for the program) except for the impact of floods in early 2014 where  the World Bank provided emergency funding from the CRW”; and the Solomon Islands  2017 CLRR, which notes that the IDA allocation was leveraged by financing from the  regional IDA program as well as CRW.  Strengthening the Evaluability of CRW Financing Given the effort involved in justifying access to CRW financing ex ante, it is surprising  that ex post self‐evaluations rarely mention CRW financing. CRW‐financed operations  are required to lay out the justification for access to CRW funds in technical briefings to  the Board, but this information is rarely mentioned in project documents or in the  subsequent project or country self‐evaluations. Project documents sometimes note, for  example, that CRW financing has been used to address the financing gap caused by a  crisis but no link to results is made. Project documents do occasionally indicate that  CRW financing has been used to support objectives related to addressing the impact of  the crisis. For example, project documents for Liberia’s Second Additional Financing  Road Asset Management operation, which received CRW financing, describe how the  operation helped to prevent the erosion of core development spending in health,  education, social welfare, security and decentralization. In the Democratic Republic of  Congo, project documents describe how CRW financing helped the investment program  shift from mining and infrastructure to social sectors after the financial crisis.  To improve the evaluability of the CRW, its use needs to be more routinely recognized  in operational documents and self‐assessments at the project and country level. CRW  resources are often pooled with regular IDA financing for operations as part of an  18 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results ongoing effort under emergency situations to leverage existing operations, mechanisms  and capacity to reduce the administrative burden on the client (and the World Bank).  Many CRW operations were prepared as additional financing, which uses the  implementation arrangements and capacities of the parent project for support. This  consolidation enables the client to have common reporting requirements for both CRW  and non‐CRW funding streams. The World Bank likewise stands to gain by leveraging  economies of scale through the pooling of its internal budgetary resources. However,  this pooling of financing raises methodological challenges in evaluating the value added  of the CRW. The CRW has not become a standard part of self‐evaluation. CRW  operations were found to follow the main elements of the procedures set up for access to  CRW financing; however, at the end of the country cycle, IEG country evaluations  provide only some hints on the impact of CRW at the country level. It will remain  difficult to judge CRW financing in practice until its use is consistently included in  project and country evaluations, but recent efforts should assist. For IDA18, staff  guidance on CRW processing includes templates that specify the use and size of CRW  funds on the first page of Project Appraisal Documents. While it is methodologically  challenging to attribute specific results to the CRW given the pooling of resources, more  explicit reference to CRW‐related activities in project and country documents, especially  in ICRs and Completion and Learning Reports, should help clarify the value added by  the CRW.  Countering Economic Shocks through the Crisis Response Window CRW financing to counter the economic shocks of the global financial crisis was  substantial and delivered quickly; this part of the window was not accessed again until  FY17. CRW funding for economic shocks amounted to 82 operations totaling  $1,622 million from the beginning of the CRW pilot in mid‐FY10 to end 2018. Of these,  75 projects (with $1,106 million of CRW funding) were approved during FY10 and FY11  in response to the global financial crisis. This funding was significant for the countries  receiving it, with the allocations for FY10–11 representing 9.5 percent of countries’  regular IDA allocations. After the CRW’s launch in December 2009, 51 operations  ($884 million in CRW financing) were approved to end‐June 2010. In FY11, another 24  projects (with $516 million of CRW financing) were approved, all in response to the  global crisis. CRW funding to respond to economic shocks was not accessed again until  FY17. Altogether, CRW operations in response to economic shocks have been  undertaken by 48 countries, of which 27 were in the Africa Region. Two‐thirds of CRW  commitments went to projects in the Africa Region. Forty‐nine were new operations,  and the rest were provided as additional financing. Additional financing was extended  to well‐performing active operations that were expected to help crisis mitigation, or  19 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results where achievement of the project development objectives was threatened by crisis‐ related financial constraints. Additional financing amounted to $501 million, or  35 percent of CRW commitments aimed at countering economic shocks (figure 4.2;  appendixes A and B).  Table 4.2. CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, FY10–19 Projects CRW Commitment Region (no.) (percent) ($, millions) (percent) Africa 56 69 1,028 63 East Asia and Pacific 7 9 166 10 Europe and Central Asia 5 6 57 4 Latin America and the 4 5 60 4 Caribbean Middle East and North Africa 2 2 42 3 South Asia 8 10 270 17 Total 82 100 1,622 100 Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window. Figure 4.2. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, by Region   Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. Within CRW‐financed operations, those addressing economic crises performed better  than other CRW operations and better than IDA averages, according to IEG outcome  ratings. To date, more than half of CRW projects for economic shocks have been rated by  20 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results IEG, and 81 percent of these (84 percent of financing) received an outcome rating of  moderately satisfactory or better. IEG’s ratings of Bank performance are similar. It is  important to note that many fewer IPF operations than DPFs have been closed and rated  so the apparent superior performance of economic crisis CRW operations may not be  sustained (tables 4.1 and 4.3; figure 4.3).  IDA’s experience in implementing the pilot CRW identified important elements of  success in providing significant additional resources quickly. These included building  on existing operations, close coordination with partners, preparation for future crises,  capacity building, and resilience improvements. A World Bank report, prepared in  October 2012 for the IDA15 replenishment, reviewed IDA experience under the pilot  CRW. According to this report, the pilot CRW highlighted IDA’s comparative advantage  in responding to diverse country‐specific situations and mobilizing support to affected  sectors, helped by strong analytics. IDA country projects presented an efficient way to  intervene quickly in the wake of economic shocks either through additional financing,  which represented over 40 percent of pilot CRW resources, or through new projects that  were aligned with existing implementation capacity. In addition, IDA’s close  coordination with other development partners such as the International Monetary Fund,  the United Nations, regional development banks and bilateral partners was seen to have  helped address the critical gaps in emergency assistance and ensure a targeted response  in areas where the CRW could make the most impact.  Table 4.3. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, by Region, FY10–19 AFR EAP ECA LCR MNA SAR Total Rating (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) HS 1 5 — — — — — — — — — — 1 5 S 6 69 2 19 2 27 1 14 — — — — 11 129 MS 16 347 4 67 3 30 1 2 — — 3 10 27 598 MU 6 64 — — — — — — — — 2 46 8 110 U 1 16 — — — — — — — — — — 1 16 NR 26 527 1 80 — — 2 44 2 44 3 122 34 765 Total 56 1,028 7 166 5 57 4 60 2 42 8 271 82 1,630 Note: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional covering three countries. — = not available; AFR = Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; HS = highly satisfactory; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = millions; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; S = satisfactory; SAR = South Asia; U = unsatisfactory. The experience gained from implementing the pilot CRW drew attention to the need to  help countries prepare for the impact of multiple crises occurring simultaneously or in  21 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results close proximity, noting that climate change is expected to increase such trends (and  response to natural disasters, to which CRW was extended after the pilot, requires a  longer‐term framework of investments to build countries’ resilience over time). In  addition, the experience gained re‐emphasized the need for a continuous focus on  strengthening countries’ capacity to mitigate crises and improve their resilience (World  Bank 2012b).  Lessons from a sample of ICRRs for CRW economic shock operations emphasize that  speed of preparation and simple and flexible project design are important but longer‐ term objectives cannot be ignored. A review of ICRRs found multiple examples of CRW  financing that allowed countries to continue social spending from spending on health in  Mozambique to energy in Burundi to urban poverty in Djibouti—evidence that, at least  in some cases, the CRW’s objective was being achieved.4 ICRRs also highlighted that  project design in postcrisis situations needs to account for various constraints. Bank  teams need to strike a balance among speed, implementation risk, and project quality. In  postcrisis situations, client capacity is often weakened, and project design and  implementation should be simpler and be accompanied by technical assistance during  implementation. For example, geographic targeting with more resources allocated to  poorer households was found to work well for horizontal equity. In the case of the  Senegal project, its highly satisfactory rating can be attributed partly to its innovative  design that advocated social connection programs as the best way to achieve the water  and sanitation Millennium Development Goals. Also, the implementation structures for  ongoing operations may not fit the needs of a crisis response project, and technical  assistance for project implementation may be warranted. An emerging lesson from the  sample of ICRRs suggests that the World Bank could do more to guide the client toward  longer‐term benefits, for example, by suggesting alternatives to the system of cash  transfers in Mongolia (table 4.4). Finally, stronger client ownership and commitment in  crisis conditions may play a role in stronger performance.                                                         4 Seven Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews (ICRRS) for economic shock  operations were selected for intensive review. Six of these were operations fully financed by  CRW resources, under the hypothesis that such operations would be more likely to aim for  CRW’s high‐level objective of protecting core spending and long‐term development objectives.  The seventh was the sole operation rated highly satisfactory and so might present useful lessons.  22 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Table 4.4. Selected ICRRs for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks Project IDA CRW IEG Country Project ID ($, m) ($, m) Rating Burundi Emergency Energy Project from IDA CRW P122217 15 15 MS Central African Economic Management and Governance P120534 9 9 MU Republic Reform Grant III Djibouti Urban Poverty Reduction Project P120190 3 3 MU Mongolia Second Development Policy Financing P117421 30 30 MS Mozambique Health Commodity Security Project P121060 39 39 MS Senegal Water and Sanitation P109986 55 5 HS Tanzania Second Social Action Fund P120881 35 35 S Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); HS = highly satisfactory; ICRR = Implementation Completion and Results Report; IDA = International Development Association; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. Addressing Natural Disasters through the Crisis Response Window CRW financing to address natural disasters included 57 projects accounting for  $2.2 billion in commitments. During IDA16, the CRW was used almost exclusively by  countries that had been affected by natural disasters. Twenty‐six projects financed from  CRW, totaling $937 million, addressed the fall‐out from cyclones in Samoa and Tonga,  drought in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, the earthquake in Haiti, and floods in  Mozambique, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In  addition, a regional Horn of Africa project responded to drought. During IDA17,  twenty‐six projects for natural disasters were financed from CRW, totaling $ 1.2 billion,  for cyclones in Vanuatu and Tuvalu, drought in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,  Mozambique, earthquakes in Nepal, floods in Solomon Islands, Malawi, Myanmar,  famine/drought in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Republic of Yemen, and a  hurricane in Haiti. During IDA18 so far, $70 million in CRW funds have been allocated  for hurricane recovery in Dominica and a cyclone in Tonga. Notably, 39 of the 57 CRW‐ supported projects intended to address natural disasters were designed in the aftermath  of extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, cyclones or hurricanes. These  weather events are linked to climate change. Viewed in this light, the CRW reinforces  IDA’s commitment to strengthening long‐term climate change adaptation.  CRW financing for natural disasters flowed mostly to the Africa and Latin America  regions and has favored IPF. About one‐third of natural disaster‐related commitments  have been for projects in the Africa Region, with almost an equal share in the Latin  America region. Of the 57 projects with CRW financing for natural disasters during  IDA16, IDA17, and IDA18, IPF was the most common instrument used, with only six  23 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results uses of DPFs and one Program‐for‐Results. Out of the 57 operations, 28 were additional  or supplemental financing (table 4.5; appendixes A and B).  Table 4.5. CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disasters, by Region, FY10–19 Project CRW Commitment Region (no.) (percent) ($, millions) (percent) Africa 18 32 753 34 East Asia and Pacific 12 21 212 10 Europe and Central Asia 1 2 100 5 Latin America and the Caribbean 19 33 694 32 Middle East and North Africa 4 7 138 6 South Asia 3 5 300 14 Total 57 100 2,197 100 Few natural disaster CRW‐financed operations have been rated by IEG; to date, three of  the 10 projects rated have fallen short on outcomes. Of 57 natural disaster projects, only  10 (and $203 million in CRW financing) have been rated by IEG. Seven have been rated  moderately satisfactory or above for outcome as well as Bank performance. Three  projects were rated moderately unsatisfactory—two of which were rated moderately  unsatisfactory for both outcome and Bank performance, the third of which was rated  moderately satisfactory for Bank performance (table 4.6; appendix C).  Table 4.6. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disaster, by Region, FY10–19 AFR EAP ECA LCR MNA SAR Total Rating (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) (no.) ($, m) HS 2 100 1 10 — — — — — — — — 3 110 S — — 2 7 — — 1 8 0 0 1 50 4 64 MS — — 1 3 — — 1 20 1 5 — — 3 28 MU — — — — — — — — — — — — — — U 16 653 8 192 1 100 17 666 3 133 2 250 47 1,994 NR 18 753 12 212 1 100 19 694 4 138 3 300 57 2,197 Total 2 100 1 10 — — — — — — — — 3 110 Note: — = not available; AFR = Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; HS = highly satisfactory; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = millions; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; S = satisfactory; SAR = South Asia; U = unsatisfactory. ICRRs for CRW‐financed operations addressing natural disasters identify features that  contributed to better performance—partnering with other international institutions,  careful instrument choice, good project design, and flexibility during implementation.  24 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Development outcomes for IPFs in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia and a DPF in Samoa  were rated satisfactory for development outcome. Contributing to this rating for the  health and nutrition project in the Horn of Africa was the successful partnering with  other agencies, in particular, UNHCR. This partnering helped to generate substantial  efficiency gains. Instrument choice was difficult for Samoa, given the combination of a  need to disburse funds rapidly after a cyclone but also for longer‐term reforms, a  development policy operation was selected. The instrument choice for Ethiopia – IPF –  provided suitable support to the program and facilitated ongoing program evaluation,  learning and adjustments. The importance of good project design that included advance  analytic work and technical design in addition to addressing client capacity was a key  lesson that emerged from these three projects. For Haiti’s urban project, redesign was  needed at the midterm review, as a consequence of which the project was able to set up  a strong foundation for disaster response efforts in public neighborhood  infrastructure.  By comparison, (complex) project design and (weak) client capacity  influenced the moderately unsatisfactory rating for a Second Additional Financing for  Power Access and Diversification in Djibouti’s energy project and the DPFs for Haiti and  Tuvalu. As for economic shock operations, client ownership and commitment may play  a role in boosting performance (table 4.7).  25 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Table 4.7. ICRRs for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disasters IDA CRW IEG Country Project ($, millions) ($, millions) Rating Djibouti Second AF for Power Access and Diversification 5 5 MU Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Project Third Adaptable 370 70 S Program Loan Haiti Economic Reconstruction and Growth 20 20 MU Development Policy Credit Haiti Urban Community-Driven Development Project 8 8 MS Horn of Horn of Africa Emergency Health and Nutrition 30 30 S Africa Project Nepal Road Sector Development Project 55 50 MS Samoa Development Policy Operation 15 10 S Samoa Agriculture and Fisheries Cyclone Response 5 5 MS Solomon Economic Reform and Recovery Operation 5 2 MS Islands Tuvalu Supplemental Financing for Second 3 3 MUa Development Policy Operation Note: AF = Additional Financing; CRW = Crisis Response Window; DPO = development policy operation; ICCR = Implementation Completion and Results Report Review; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. a. The ICRR notes that MU was the rating given to the entire series of DPFs for Tuvalu, focusing primarily on DPO1 and DPO2 with an IDA commitment (revised) of $7.5 million and $7.7 million (actual), with little information on the CRW- financed supplemental operation. CRW Objective of Support for Resilience Build Back Better Principles The CRW committed to strengthen resilience to future shocks as part of the response to  natural disasters, which in recent years has translated to adoption the principle of BBB.  Although the CRW is designed to provide speedy responses to crises—in this case,  natural disasters—it also aims to foster resilience to future natural disasters, despite the  inevitable tension between these two goals.5 Since it is expected that CRW financing will  be applied to well‐designed operations, those addressing natural disasters should, in  theory, already apply BBB principles in their design (box 4.1).                                                         5 When the permanent CRW was established, it was specified that “unless addressed by  preexisting projects, CRW resources would be provided under the presumption that a portion of  these resources would be used to strengthen disaster resilience” (World Bank 2010c).  26 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Box 4.1. Build Back Better Principles Emerge from Global Review “Build back better” was set out as part of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015, and it is considered good practice in World Bank operations (UNISDR 2015, World Bank 2017b). Recently, a 2018 World Bank report, Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience Through Stronger, Faster and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction, examined extensive evidence on disaster resilience and proposed“build back better principles as good practice. Build back better leads to repaired or replaced assets being more resilient, and the recovery process being shorter, more efficient, and not leaving anyone behind. The report reviewed experience in 149 countries, including 17 small island states. It found that, in small island states in particular, better postdisaster recovery and reconstruction efforts reduced annual losses by an average of 59 percent. When countries rebuild stronger, faster and more inclusively after natural disasters, they can reduce the impact on people’s livelihoods and well-being by as much as 31 percent, potentially cutting global average losses from $555 to $382 billion per year (Hallegatte 2018). CRW‐financed operations for natural disaster response since the establishment of the  Sendai Framework in 2015 have generally followed BBB principles, with some projects  incorporating elements of resilience building such as better construction standards, new  technologies, and improved government capacity. A sample of CRW‐financed  operations illuminates how BBB is being incorporated. Five disaster relief projects with  CRW financing approved during IDA15, IDA16, and IDA17 that included BBB were  selected to see how those elements were incorporated into design and implementation.  The projects from Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Tonga, and Bosnia and Herzegovina  include a variety of detailed BBB actions. In Bangladesh, the project is funding new  technologies for farmers to improve resilience to saline water inundation and studies to  assess reconstruction of shelters and embankments that would withstand disasters.6 The  Malawi project is helping reconstruct critical public infrastructure (roads, schools and  health facilities) to improved standards and developing national building codes. The  Nepal project is financing multihazard resistant core housing units, applying resilient  and innovative technologies for constructing rural homes. In Tonga, the project is  strengthening government ability to BBB and supporting retrofitting and construction of  dwellings according to “resistant standards.” The Bosnia and Herzegovina project  supports better resilience of infrastructure to future flooding and landslides. Although  ICRRs are not yet available, supervision reports on the Bangladesh project, which has  been under implementation the longest, provide some early lessons: (i) supporting  country systems is critical for timely response; (ii) multisector projects require adequate  planning for coordination and implementation arrangements; (iii) land acquisition  procedures for emergency situations need to be accelerated; (iv) a well‐defined results                                                         6 Note that because the Bangladesh project was part of the pilot CRW during IDA15, it is defined  as responding to an economic crisis, the underlying reason for which is a cyclone.  27 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results and monitoring and evaluation framework enhances achievement of outcome; and (v)  regular community consultations can guide the appropriate choice of investments and  generate practical improvements to increase impact.  Responding to Public Health Emergencies through the Crisis Response Window During IDA17, the CRW was used to respond to a public health emergency (Ebola) as an  exception to CRW policy, and the CRW was expanded to include such crises. Six public  health emergency projects have been approved, with CRW financing of $620 million.  The World Bank was a vital member of the coalition against the Ebola outbreak in West  Africa in 2014 and 2015 and mobilized needed financial resources (World Bank 2017j).  Part of this response was $420 million from the CRW for Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and  Sierra Leone in 2015. Most recently, in 2017, IDA allocated $200 million from the CRW to  the Republic of Yemen to cope with one of the world’s worst cholera outbreaks amid  continuous conflict that had driven gross domestic product down by 40 percent. The  World Bank responded within two months with additional financing of $200 million in  the form of an IDA grant completely financed by CRW resources (table 4.8).  Table 4.8. CRW Allocations for Public Health Emergencies, FY10–19 Projects CRW Commitment Region (no.) (percent) ($, millions) (percent) Africa 5 83 420 67 Middle East and North Africa 1 17 200 32 Total 6 100 620 100 Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. CRW = Crisis Response Window. There is yet little evaluative evidence about the public health emergency CRW  operations, but the two available ICRRs point to the success of rapid preparation and  partnering with other donors while falling short on longer‐term objectives. It is worth  noting that while a postdisaster CRW operation is designed and implemented in the  aftermath of a crisis, a public health emergency operation is often designed and  implemented during an ongoing epidemic, a factor which may contribute to variations  in performance. The two evaluated projects are moderately satisfactory on outcome and  Bank performance. The Sierra Leone DPF aimed to strengthen budget management and  reduce fiscal risks heightened by the Ebola epidemic as well as improve public  transparency and accountability. It was rated moderately satisfactory due to shortfalls in  strengthening longer‐term fiscal management. The other ICRR is for a Guinea DPF,  which aimed to strengthen management of public funds in response to the Ebola crisis  28 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results and address related macroeconomic and fiscal shocks. Processing had a compressed  schedule of six weeks and was undertaken in close cooperation with a multidonor  support group. While the operation introduced monitoring and accountability  arrangements critical to ensuring effective use of donor support and triggered early  steps toward public financial reform, none of the original targets were fully achieved.  Importantly, no supervision report was prepared for this operation, partly explained by  the high‐risk operational environment, preventing adequate verification of monitoring  and evaluation data (table 4.9; appendix C).  Table 4.9. IEG Outcome Ratings for Crisis Response Window Allocations for Health, by Region AFR MNA Total Projects CRW comm. Projects CRW comm. Projects CRW comm. Rating (no.) ($, millions) (no.) ($, millions) (no.) ($, millions) S — — — — — — MS 2 20 — — 2 20 MU — — — — — — U — — — — — — NR 3 400 1 200 4 600 Total 5 420 1 200 6 620 Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. comm. = commitment; CRW = Crisis Response Window; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. Country and sector evaluations illuminate the important role of the World Bank in  fighting the Ebola epidemic, but acknowledgment of CRW assistance is scarce. The  recent IEG evaluation on Bank Group support to health services notes the importance of  capable health systems in responding effectively to deadly virus outbreaks. It noted also  that the World Bank’s financing and coordination role are more important in countries  with lower institutional capacity and more complex development partner networks,  implicitly supporting CRW’s role on health in IDA countries (World Bank 2017j). Of the  four countries that have been allocated CRW financing for public health emergencies,  country‐level evaluations are available for two. In the case of Guinea, the Ebola  Emergency Response Project and its additional financing and the Emergency  Macroeconomic and Fiscal Support Grant supported the country program objective to  contribute in the short term to the control of the Ebola outbreak and the availability of  selected essential health services, while mitigating social and economic impacts. IEG  rated this objective as achieved in its 2017 CLRR. However, the role played by the CRW  was not discussed. By contrast, the 2017 CLRR for Liberia noted that the CRW  supported the regional Ebola emergency operations and provided supplemental  29 Chapter 4 Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results financing for a the ongoing programmatic DPF series. The Ebola Emergency Response  Project and its additional financing helped to support two objectives of the country  program that targeted the improved capacity of health service delivery in selected  secondary level health facilities and improved protection of poor and vulnerable  households. Both objectives were rated as mostly achieved by IEG.    30 Bibliography 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———. 2016h. World Bank Engagement in Small States: The Cases of the OECS, Pacific Island  Countries, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Mauritius, and the Seychelles—Clustered Country Evaluation  (Executive Summary). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ExecSum‐SmallStates.pdf.  ———. 2017a. Cameroon—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY10–14. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr‐cameroon‐ 04072017.pdf.  ———. 2017b. Crisis Response and Resilience to Systemic Shocks: Lessons from IEG Evaluations.  Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.  https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26360  ———. 2017c. Kosovo—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY12–16. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  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———. 2017h. Rwanda Country Program Evaluation FY09–17. Approach Paper. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap‐rwandacpe.pdf.  ———. 2017i. Togo—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY08–17. Independent Evaluation  Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr‐togo‐05262017.pdf.  35 Bibliography ———. 2017j. World Bank Group Support to Health Services: Achievements and Challenges.  Independent Evaluation Group: Washington, DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/world‐bank‐group‐health‐services.  ———. 2018a. Benin—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY13–18. Independent Evaluation  Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/  clrr_beninfy13‐18.pdf.  ———. 2018b. The Gambia—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY13–16. Independent  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———. 2018h. Liberia—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY13–17. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/  clrr_liberia1317.pdf.  ———. 2018i. Mauritania—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY14–16. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/  clrr_mauritaniafy1316.pdf.  ———. 2018j. Nicaragua—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY13–17. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/  clrr_nicaragua.pdf.  36 Bibliography ———. 2018k. Pacific Island Countries—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY11–17.  Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.  ———. 2018l. Solomon Islands—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY13–17. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/  clrr_solomonfy1317.pdf.  ———. 2018m. Tanzania—Completion and Learning Report Review for FY12–16. Independent  Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank.  http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/  clrr_tanzania.pdf.    37   Appendix A. Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type Table A.1. Crisis Response Window Funding for Economic Shocks IDA Lending AF or IDA Comm. CRW Comm. IEG Outcome Cycle FY Country Project Name Instrument SF ($, millions) ($, millions) Rating IDA15 FY10 Senegal Water and Sanitation Millennium Project IPF 55.0 5.1 HS IDA15 FY10 Maldives Economic Stabilization and Recovery DPF 13.7 1.6 MU Credit IDA15 FY10 Haiti Infrastructure and Institutional Emergency IPF 65.0 25.0 n.a. Recovery Project IDA15 FY10 Lao People's Road Sector Project IPF 27.8 8.8 S Democratic Republic IDA15 FY10 Lesotho Second Poverty Reduction Support Credit DPF 25.0 10.2 MS and Grant (PRSCG-2) IDA15 FY10 Rwanda Sixth Poverty Reduction Support Grant DPF 115.8 29.8 MS IDA15 FY10 Republic of Social Fund for Development Phase IV IPF 60.0 38.8 n.a. Yemen Project IDA15 FY10 Nepal Second HNP and HIV/AIDS Project IPF 129.2 44.2 MU IDA15 FY10 Lao People's Lao Uplands Food Security Improvement IPF 10.0 10.0 S Democratic Project Republic IDA15 FY10 Bhutan Second Urban Development Project IPF 12.0 3.6 n.a. IDA15 FY10 Benin Sixth Poverty Reduction Development DPF 30.0 9.9 MU Policy Financing IDA15 FY10 Kenya Kenya Youth Empowerment Project IPF 60.0 30.0 S IDA15 FY10 São Tomé Additional Financing for the Social Sector IPF AF 2.1 1.1 MS and Príncipe Support Project 39 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA15 FY10 Côte d'Ivoire Third Economic Governance and Recovery DPF 90.0 15.0 MS Grant IDA15 FY10 Tajikistan Additional Financing for Energy IPF AF 15.0 15.0 MS Emergency Recovery Assistance Project IDA15 FY10 Samoa Economic Crisis Recovery Support Credit DPF 20.0 20.0 MS IDA15 FY10 Ghana Social Opportunities Project IPF 88.6 47.5 n.a. IDA15 FY10 Togo Third Economic Recovery and Governance DPF 16.3 4.3 MS Grant IDA15 FY10 Uganda Uganda Health Systems Strengthening IPF 130.0 30.0 MS Project IDA15 FY10 Nepal Additional Financing for Social Safety Nets IPF AF 47.8 44.8 MS Project IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project IPF 270.0 15.2 MS IDA15 FY10 Kenya Kenya Electricity Expansion Project IPF 330.0 29.9 n.a. IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Tanzania Strategic Cities Project IPF 163.0 10.0 n.a. IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Tanzania Agriculture Sector Development IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. Project - Second Additional Financing IDA15 FY10 Senegal Transport and Urban Mobility Project IPF 55.0 5.0 n.a. IDA15 FY10 Senegal Fourth Poverty Reduction Support DPF 43.0 9.4 MU Development Policy Financing IDA15 FY10 Nicaragua Additional Financing for Fourth Roads IPF AF 39.3 14.2 S Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project IDA15 FY10 Comoros Emergency Crises Response Project IPF 5.3 1.5 S IDA15 FY10 Afghanistan Additional Financing for Strengthening IPF AF 49.0 49.0 n.a. Health Activities for the Rural Poor Project IDA15 FY10 Mali Fourth Poverty Reduction Support Credit DPF 70.5 15.6 U IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Second Social Action Fund Project - IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. Additional Financing - Additional Credit II 40 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA15 FY10 Malawi Third Poverty Reduction Support DPF 54.0 14.0 MS Development Policy Financing IDA15 FY10 Djibouti Additional Financing for Djibouti Urban IPF AF 2.9 2.9 n.a. Poverty Reduction Project IDA15 FY10 Sierra Leone Supplemental Financing for the Third DPF 7.0 7.0 S Governance Reform and Growth Credit IDA15 FY10 Lao People's Sixth Poverty Reduction Support DPF 20.0 10.0 MS Democratic Operation Republic IDA15 FY10 Côte d'Ivoire Additional Financing for Côte d'Ivoire IPF AF 50.0 15.0 n.a. Emergency Urban Infrastructure Project IDA15 FY10 Democratic Additional Financing for the Emergency IPF AF 40.0 40.0 n.a. Republic of Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project Congo IDA15 FY10 Tajikistan Fourth Programmatic Development Policy DPF 25.4 8.6 MS Financing IDA15 FY10 Afghanistan Additional Financing for Strengthening IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. Higher Education Project and Amendment to the Development Grant IDA15 FY10 Moldova Economic Recovery Development Policy DPF 25.0 11.1 S Financing IDA15 FY10 Liberia Youth, Employment, Skills Project IPF 6.0 6.0 MU IDA15 FY10 Mauritania Additional Financing for the Urban IPF AF 25.5 15.5 n.a. Development Project IDA15 FY10 Mongolia Multi-Sectoral Technical Assistance Project IPF 12.0 7.2 MS IDA15 FY10 Guinea- Second Economic Governance Reform DPF 6.0 6.0 S Bissau Development Policy Financing IDA15 FY10 Honduras Social Protection Project IPF 40.0 18.6 n.a. IDA15 FY10 Burkina Faso Tenth Poverty Reduction Support Grant DPF 90.0 19.9 MU 41 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA15 FY10 Gambia, The Third Education Sector Project in Support IPF AF 5.5 5.5 n.a. of the Second Phase of the Education Sector Program - First Additional Financing IDA15 FY10 Togo Additional Financing for Community IPF AF 8.7 8.7 n.a. Development Project IDA15 FY10 Liberia Additional Financing for Urban and Rural IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project IDA15 FY10 Sierra Leone Youth Employment Support Project IPF 20.0 20.0 MS IDA15 FY10 Malawi Additional Financing for Third Social IPF AF 14.0 14.0 n.a. Action Fund Project (Phase II) IDA15 FY11 Benin Additional Financing for National IPF AF 12.0 12.0 S Community-Driven Development Support Project IDA15 FY11 Guinea- Emergency Electricity & Water IPF 12.7 12.7 n.a. Bissau Rehabilitation Project IDA15 FY11 Sri Lanka Small and Medium Enterprise IPF 57.4 57.4 MS Development Facility Project IDA15 FY11 Lesotho Additional Financing for the Integrated IPF AF 15.0 5.0 n.a. Transport Project IDA15 FY11 Central Third Economic Management and DPF 8.8 8.8 MU African Governance Reform Grant Republic IDA15 FY11 Malawi Additional Financing for Irrigation, Rural IPF AF 12.7 12.7 S Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project IDA15 FY11 Zambia Additional Financing for the Increased IPF AF 20.0 10.0 n.a. Access to Electricity Services Project IDA15 FY11 Bangladesh Additional Financing for the Emergency IPF AF 75.0 49.6 MS 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project 42 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA15 FY11 Central Additional Financing for the Emergency IPF AF 23.9 10.1 n.a. African Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Republic Maintenance Project IDA15 FY11 Cameroon Urban and Water Development Support IPF AF 28.7 28.7 n.a. Project - Additional Financing IDA15 FY11 Uganda Eighth Poverty Reduction Support DPF 100.0 40.1 MS Development Policy Financing IDA15 FY11 Kosovo First Sustainable Employment DPF 6.3 6.3 MS Development Policy Operation Program IDA15 FY11 Ethiopia Agricultural Growth Program IPF 150.0 86.4 MS IDA15 FY11 Gambia, The Growth and Competitiveness Project IPF 12.0 5.1 MS IDA15 FY11 Liberia Reengagement and Reform Support DPF 11.0 6.0 MS Program III IDA15 FY11 Mozambique Water Services and Institutional Support IPF 37.0 26.1 n.a. Project IDA15 FY11 Burkina Faso Additional Financing for a Transport IPF AF 16.0 16.0 MS Sector Project IDA15 FY11 Mali Additional Financing for Rural Community IPF AF 11.2 11.2 n.a. Development Project IDA15 FY11 Mozambique Health Commodity Security Project IPF 39.0 39.0 MS IDA15 FY11 Burundi Emergency Energy Project IPF 15.4 15.4 MS IDA15 FY11 Kyrgyz Emergency Recovery Project IPF 70.0 15.7 S Republic IDA15 FY11 Guyana Improving Teacher Education Project IPF 4.2 1.8 MS IDA15 FY11 Zambia Second Additional Financing for Road IPF AF 15.0 9.7 MU Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project IDA15 FY11 Mongolia Second Development Policy Financing DPF 29.7 29.7 MS IDA17 FY17 Liberia LR-PRSC III DPF 40.0 8.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Chad Development Policy Operations DPF SF 80.0 80.0 n.a. 43 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA17 FY17 Guinea West Africa Agric Prod Program (WAAPP- IPF AF 23.0 15.0 n.a. 1C) IDA17 FY17 Liberia Second AF LR Road Asset Management IPF AF 40.0 12.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Guinea GN: Economic Governance Technical IPF AF 22.0 7.0 n.a. Assist IDA17 FY17 Sierra Leone Productivity and Transparency Support Cr DPF 30.0 20.0 n.a. IDA18 FY18 Mongolia Economic Management Support DPF 120.0 80.0 n.a. Operation First DPF Note: Projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. AF = additional financing; FY = approval year; DPF = development policy financing; IPF = investment project financing. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available.   44 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type Table A.2. Crisis Response Window Funding for Natural Disasters IDA Lending IDA Amt CRW Amt IEG Outcome Cycle FY Country Project Name Instrument AF or SF ($, millions) ($, millions) Rating IDA16 FY12 Africa Horn of Africa Emergency Health and IPF 30.0 30.0 S Regional Nutrition Project Project IDA16 FY12 Haiti Haiti Education for All Project - Phase II IPF 70.0 70.0 n.a. IDA16 FY12 Haiti Disaster Risk Management and IPF 60.0 60.0 n.a. Reconstruction Project IDA16 FY12 Haiti Relaunching Agriculture: Strengthening IPF 40.0 40.0 n.a. Agriculture Public Services II Project IDA16 FY12 Kenya Health Sector Support Project - Additional IPF AF 56.8 56.8 n.a. Financing IDA16 FY12 Ethiopia Additional Financing Productive Safety IPF AF 370.0 70.0 S Net APL III Project IDA16 FY12 Kenya Additional Financing for Water and IPF AF 300.0 20.0 n.a. Sanitation Services Improvement Project IDA16 FY12 Djibouti Social Safety Net Project IPF 5.0 5.0 n.a. IDA16 FY12 Djibouti Second Additional Financing for Power IPF AF 5.2 5.2 MU Access and Diversification Project IDA16 FY12 Djibouti Additional Financing for Rural Community IPF AF 3.0 3.0 n.a. Development and Water Mobilization Project (PRODERMO) IDA16 FY13 Haiti Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and IPF 90.0 90.0 n.a. Access Project IDA16 FY13 Haiti Additional Financing for Infrastructure and IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. Institutions Emergency Recovery Project IDA16 FY13 Haiti Improving Maternal and Child Health IPF 70.0 70.0 n.a. through Integrated Social Services Project 45 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA16 FY13 Haiti Business Development and Investment IPF 20.0 20.0 n.a. Project IDA16 FY13 Haiti Economic Reconstruction and Growth DPF 20.0 20.0 MU Development Policy Financing IDA16 FY14 Samoa Development Policy Financing DPF 15.0 10.0 S IDA16 FY14 Mozambique National Water Resources Development IPF AF 32.0 32.0 n.a. Flood Response Project IDA16 FY14 Samoa Enhanced Road Access Project IPF 20.0 5.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Samoa Agriculture and Fisheries Cyclone IPF 5.0 5.0 MS Response Project IDA16 FY14 Mozambique Roads and Bridges Management IPF AF 39.4 39.4 n.a. Maintenance Project Phase II IDA16 FY14 St. Vincent Regional Disaster Vulnerability Reduction IPF AF 35.6 19.0 n.a. and the Project - Additional Financing Grenadines IDA16 FY14 Haiti Center & Artibonite Regional IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. Development Project IDA16 FY14 Haiti Cultural Heritage and Tourism Sector IPF 45.0 45.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Tonga Cyclone Reconstruction IPF 12.0 12.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 St. Lucia Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project IPF 41.0 17.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Haiti Urban CDD Project AF IPF AF 7.5 7.5 MS IDA16 FY14 Bosnia and Floods Emergency Recovery Project IPF 100.0 100.0 n.a. Herzegovina IDA17 FY15 Solomon Solomon Islands Rural Development IPF 9.0 4.0 n.a. Islands Program II IDA17 FY15 Solomon Economic Reform and Recovery DPO DPF 5.0 2.0 MS Islands IDA17 FY15 Malawi Floods Emergency Recovery IPF 80.0 80.0 n.a. IDA17 FY15 Nepal Financial sector stability DPC2 DPF 100.0 50.0 n.a. 46 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA17 FY15 Nepal Earthquake Housing Reconstruction IPF 200.0 200.0 n.a. Project IDA17 FY16 Solomon AF for SB-Rapid Employment Project IPF AF 1.5 1.0 n.a. Islands IDA17 FY16 Tuvalu Supplemental Financing for Second DPO DPF SF 3.0 3.0 MUa IDA17 FY16 Vanuatu Infrastructure Reconstruction and IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. Improvement Project IDA17 FY16 Ethiopia Additional Financing PSNP IV IPF AF 100.0 100.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Myanmar Flood and Landslide Emergency Recovery IPF 200.0 100.0 n.a. Project IDA17 FY17 Nepal Road Sector Development Project IPF AF 55.0 50.0 MS IDA17 FY17 Malawi Second Additional Financing for MASAF IV IPF AF 70.0 11.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Malawi Malawi Drought Recovery and Resilience IPF 104.0 9.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Madagascar Social Safety Net Drought Response IPF AF 35.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Lesotho Crisis response AF to SA project IPF 20.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Mozambique Emergency Resilient Recovery Project AF IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Mozambique Social Safety Net project IPF AF 10.0 10.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Kenya AF for the NSNP P4R AF 50.0 35.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Ethiopia ET Productive Safety Nets Project 4 IPF AF 108.1 100.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 South Sudan Emergency Food and Nutrition IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Yemen, Rep. Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project IPF AF 200.0 125.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Somalia Emergency Drought Response and IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. Recovery Project IDA17 FY17 Haiti Disaster Risk Management & IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. Reconstruction IDA17 FY17 Haiti Agriculture and Rural Development IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Haiti Sustainable Rural WSS Project IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Haiti Improving Maternal and Child Health IPF AF 25.0 25.0 n.a. 47 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type IDA18 FY18 Dominica Emergency Agricultural Livelihoods and IPF 25.0 20.0 n.a. Climate Resilience Project IDA18 FY18 Dominica Housing Recovery Project IPF AF 40.0 30.0 n.a. IDA18 FY18 Tonga Supplemental Financing to the Second DPF AF 10.0 10.0 n.a. Inclusive Growth Development Policy Operation IDA18 FY19 Tonga Additional Financing to Pacific Resilience IPF AF 14.95 10.00 n.a. Project under the Pacific Resilience Program Note: Projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. DPF = development policy financing; FY = approval year; IPF = investment project financing; P4R = Program-for-Results. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available. a. The ICRR notes that MU was the rating given to the entire series of DPOs, focusing primarily on DPO1 and DPO2 with an IDA commitment (revised) of $7.5 million and $7.7 million (actual) with little information on the CRW-financed supplemental. 48 Appendix A Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type Table A.3. Crisis Response Window Funding for Public Health Emergencies IDA Lending IDA Amt CRW Amt IEG Outcome Cycle FY Country Project Name Instrument AF or SF ($, millions) ($, millions) Rating IDA17 FY15 Guinea Ebola Emergency Response Project IPF 25.0 25.0 n.a. IDA17 FY15 Liberia Ebola Emergency Response Project IPF 52.0 52.0 n.a. IDA17 FY15 Sierra Leona Ebola Emergency Response Project IPF 28.0 28.0 n.a. IDA17 FY 15 Liberia Poverty Reduction Support Credit II DPF 30.0 10.0 n.a. IDA17 FY 15 Guinea Emergency Macroeconomic and Fiscal DPF 50.0 10.0 n.a. Support Grant IDA17 FY 15 Guinea Ebola Emergency Response Project – IPF AF 72.0 72.0 n.a. Additional Financing IDA17 FY 15 Liberia Ebola Emergency Response Project – IPF AF 115.0 115.0 n.a. Additional Financing IDA17 FY 15 Sierra Leona Ebola Emergency Response Project – IPF AF 98.0 98.0 n.a. Additional Financing IDA17 FY 15 Sierra Leona Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support DPF 30.0 10.0 MS Operation (EEFSO) IDA18 FY 18 Yemen, Rep. Yemen Emergency Health and Nutrition IPF AF 200.0 200.0 n.a. Project Second Additional Financing Note: The Ebola Emergency Response Project and its additional financing were both regional projects covering Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. They are split by country here to show financing amounts. Projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. FY = approval fiscal year; DPF = development policy financing; IPF = investment project financing. HS = highly satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 49   Appendix B. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing, by Crisis Type Table B.1. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing for Economic Shocks Projects Projects Rated IDA CRW % of % of IDA CRW % of % of Instrument No. ($, m) ($, m) IDA CRW No. ($, m) ($, m) IDA CRW Development 25 1,077.5 471.3 28.8 29.0 21 807.5 283.2 38.2 33.0 policy financing Investment project 57 2,660.8 1,150.7 71.2 70.9 27 1,308.1 574.0 61.8 67.0 financing Total 82 3,738 1,622 100 100 48 2,116 857 100 100 Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); IDA = International Development Association (commitment); m = millions. Table B.2. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing for Natural Disasters Projects Projects Rated IDA CRW % of % of IDA CRW % of % of Instrument No. ($, m) ($, m) IDA CRW No. ($, m) ($, m) IDA CRW Development 6 153.0 95.0 4.7 4.3 4 43.0 35.0 8.3 17.2 policy financing Program-for- 1 50.0 35.0 1.5 1.6 — — — — — Results Investment project 50 3,085.1 2,066.9 93.8 94.1 6 472.7 167.7 91.6 82.6 financing Total 57 3,288 2,197 100 100 10 516 203 100 100 Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); IDA = International Development Association (commitment); m = millions. 50 Appendix B Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing, by Crisis Type Table B.3. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing for Public Health Emergencies Projects Projects Rated IDA CRW % of % of IDA CRW % of % of Instrument No. ($, m) ($, m) IDA CRW No. ($, m) ($, m) IDA CRW Development 3 110 30 15.7 4.8 2 80 20 100 100 policy financing Investment project — — — — 3 590 590 84.3 95.2 0 financing Total 6 700 620 100 100 2 80 20 100 100 Note: An investment project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. ICRR Ratings for Bank Performance. CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); IDA = International Development Association (commitment); m = millions. 51   Appendix C. Bank Performance Ratings for Crisis Response Window–Financed Operations Table C.1. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations, by Crisis Type, FY10–19 Rating Not S MS MU U Rated Total Economic Shock Projects (no.) 11 30 6 — 35 82 IDA commitment ($, millions) 369 1,379 294 — 1,698 3,738 CRW commitment ($, millions) 119 594 95 — 814 1,622 Natural Disaster Projects (no.) 1 7 2 — 47 57 IDA commitment ($, millions) 30 461 25 — 2,772 3,288 CRW commitment ($, millions) 30 148 25 — 1,994 2,197 Public Health Projects (no.) — 2 — — 4 6 IDA commitment ($, millions) — 80 — — 620 700 CRW commitment ($, millions) — 20 — — 600 620 Note: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 52 Appendix C Bank Performance Ratings for Crisis Response Window–Financed Operations Table C.2. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shock, by Region, FY10–19 Rating Not Region S MS MU U Rated Africa Projects (no.) 6 19 5 — 26 CRW commitment ($, millions) 49 401 51 — 527 East Asia and Pacific Projects (no.) 2 4 — — 1 CRW commitment ($, millions) 29 57 — — 80 Europe and Central Asia Projects (no.) 2 3 — — 0 CRW commitment ($, millions) 27 30 — — 0 Latin America and the Caribbean Projects (no.) 1 1 — — 2 CRW commitment ($, millions) 14 2 — — 44 Middle East and North Africa Projects (no.) — — — — 2 CRW commitment ($, millions) — — — — 42 South Asia Projects (no.) — 3 1 — 4 CRW commitment ($, millions) — 104 44 — 122 Total Projects (no.) 11 30 6 — 35 CRW commitment ($, millions) 119 594 95 — 814 Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 53 Appendix C Bank Performance Ratings for Crisis Response Window–Financed Operations Table C.3. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disaster, by Region, FY10–19 Rating Not Region S MS MU U Rated Africa Projects (no.) 1 1 — — 16 CRW commitment ($, millions) 30.0 70.0 — — 653.2 East Asia and Pacific Projects (no.) — 4 — — 9 CRW commitment ($, millions) — 20.0 — — 192.0 Europe and Central Asia Projects (no.) — — — — 1 CRW commitment ($, millions) — — — — 100.0 Latin America and the Caribbean Projects (no.) — 1 1 — 17 CRW commitment ($, millions) — 7.5 20 — 666.0 Middle East and North Africa Projects (no.) — — 1 — 3 CRW commitment ($, millions) — — 5.2 — 133.0 South Asia Projects (no.) — 1 — — 2 CRW commitment ($, millions) — 50.0 — — 250.0 Total Projects (no.) 1 6 2 — 48 CRW commitment ($, millions) 30.0 144.5 25.2 — 1,997.2 Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 54 Appendix C Bank Performance Ratings for Crisis Response Window–Financed Operations Table C.4. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW Allocations for Public Health, by Region, FY10–19 Rating Not Region S MS MU U Rated Africa Projects (no.) — 2 — — 3 CRW commitment ($, millions) — 20.0 — — 400 Middle East and North Africa Projects (no.) — — — — 1 CRW commitment ($, millions) — — — — 200 Total Projects (no.) — 2 — — 4 CRW commitment ($, millions) — 20.0 — — 600.0 Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 55