STITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | I STITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | I Prosperity Notes Erica Bosio and Philip McGrath Fostering Engagement Between REFORMING JUSTICE Statutory Courts and Customary Law Systems © 2025 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. 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Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522- 2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Cover photo: © Simone D. McCourtie / World Bank / flickr Photo ID : SDM-IN-098 World Bank. Further permission required for reuse. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments 1 Key Findings 3 Introduction 4 The Case for Fostering Engagement between Statutory and Customary Systems  6 Understanding the Context for Engagement 7 Designing Engagement 9 Conclusion 13 References 14 REFORMING JUSTICE 1 Prosperity Notes Acknowledgments This Note was written by Erica Bosio and Philip McGrath. Generous comments were provided on an earlier version by Michael James Warren and team at the International Development Law Organization (IDLO). Reviewers of the Note included Camilo Andres Avila Ceballos, Holly Burduja, and Zoran Skopljak. Overall guidance on the Note was provided by Arturo Herrera Gutierrez, Roby Senderowitsch, and Adrienne Hathaway-Nuton. This Note is part of a series of thematic briefs produced by the Global Program on Justice and Rule of Law. The series highlights lessons learned from justice reform efforts and focuses on the “why, how, and what” of reform. This publication was funded by the World Bank’s Governance & Institutions Umbrella Program (G&I). G&I is a multi-donor trust fund established in 2022 with the generous support of the Chandler Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation. Since then, the UK Government’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), the European Union, the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), the Federal Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Austria, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) have also joined the program. To learn more, please visit www.worldbank.org/giup. For questions on this Note, please contact Erica Bosio at ebosio@worldbank.org. REFORMING JUSTICE 2 Prosperity Notes © Nugroho Nurdikiawan Sunjoyo / World Bank / flickr Photo ID: NNS-ID016 World Bank. Further permission required for reuse. REFORMING JUSTICE 3 Prosperity Notes KF. Key Findings • In many low-income countries, more than 80% of disputes are resolved using customary systems. • Customary systems are often preferred by users due to proximity, cost, speed, linguistic and conceptual accessibility, cultural relevance, and distrust in the formal system, but harmful practices must be addressed if legal pluralism is to be leveraged to increase access to fair and efficient justice services for all. • Engaging with customary actors is essential to maximize the impact of justice investments, including those through World Bank operations, though the country context may impact feasibility. This Brief examines the complex relationship between statutory courts and customary law systems, highlighting the historical context that fostered legal pluralism in many countries. It argues that attempts to replace customary practices with uniform legal frameworks have largely failed, suggesting instead that a harmonious coexistence of these systems can enhance access to justice and fairness. The Brief identifies practical mechanisms for engagement, emphasizing the need for context-sensitive approaches that recognize the ingrained nature of customary systems, especially in regions where they are preferred for their accessibility and cultural relevance. The Brief highlights several factors that should be considered when designing engagement, including state recognition; jurisdiction; articulation and documentation of customary law; referral pathways; appeal pathways; and oversight and accountability. The Brief also explores strategies for addressing harmful practices, as customary justice systems can incur human rights violations, including discrimination against women and marginalized groups, denial of fair trial rights, and the enforcement of harmful traditional punishments. REFORMING JUSTICE 4 Prosperity Notes Introduction In many countries around the world, colonial regimes outside of the court system. The systems of transplanted laws and institutions alien to the local courts and customary law both aim at resolving culture and traditions (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Pistor conflicts and managing disputes. Courts, grounded et al. 1999; Pistor et al. 2003). These institutions in statutory laws, often struggle with issues have since lived for centuries in a tense relation of accessibility, affordability, complexity, and with indigenously developed customary rules and corruption, raising questions about effectiveness. institutions, often perceived by governments as left Customary systems, steeped in community over after the imposition of state law (Moore 1986). norms and historical practices, offer localized and Consequently, there have been numerous attempts accessible justice solutions. However, they face to replace customary laws and practices in the criticism regarding consistency, accountability, and pursuit of a single, uniform system of justice, but gender biases (Bosio and Upegui 2023). these attempts have been mostly unsuccessful and Courts are the main mechanism human societies faced significant difficulties (Marc 2012; Benda- have developed to encourage justice. Empirical Beckmann et al. 2018). Today, the evolving thinking studies demonstrate the critical role of courts is that there is an equilibrium where the different in fostering a healthy business environment, sets of institutions can harmoniously complement enhancing sustainable and equitable growth, each other. This thematic brief presents some improving access to public services particularly practical mechanisms for this engagement through for the poor, curbing corruption, enhancing public context-sensitive approaches. trust in the government, and restraining abuse of The goal of this Brief is to describe how countries power. Cross-country and in-country evidence have worked to strike a balance between statutory shows that court effectiveness, demonstrated courts and customary law, attempting to both by higher speed, lower procedural formalism, maximize access to justice and ensure the greatest and qualitative decisions, is a strong correlate of degree of fairness. Finding this balance has economic development and market performance proven difficult, as the conflict between control (Bosio 2024), as backlogs, slow justice, and and managing disorder has left only a narrow legal uncertainty negatively impact financial path toward achieving justice, while supporting development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999), economic growth (Djankov et al. 2003; Acemoglu labor markets (Botero et al 2004), and competition 2024). Overall, initiatives to promote collaboration and economic growth (Mahoney 2001). An efficient aim to go beyond the traditional contrasts of judiciary is critical to encouraging the entry of new tradition and modernity, formality and informality, firms and providing them the confidence to invest. and uniformity and diversity. The synergy between But the predominance of customary justice makes customary law and statutory courts can position it difficult to ignore. Fifty-three percent of Sub- legal pluralism as a cornerstone of inclusive Saharan Africans prefer to resolve their disputes governance. through customary justice (Gallup 2015). The For the purposes of this Brief, the court system is share is even higher in fragile and conflict-affected defined as the regulatory framework established settings, where it reaches 80–90 percent (Bosio and enforced by the state, while customary law and Upegui 2023). Previous studies (Chopra 2009; refers to the broad spectrum of justice providers Harper 2011; Isser 2011; Kyed et al 2011) paint REFORMING JUSTICE 5 Prosperity Notes a broadly consistent picture of user preference distrust in the formal system due to perceptions for customary law. Customary systems are often of corruption, discrimination, or ineffectiveness. preferred due to proximity, cost, speed, linguistic Figure 1 highlights the main characteristics of and conceptual accessibility, cultural relevance, statutory courts vs. customary law. lower documentary burden, and a general Figure 1: Comparison of systems Statutory Courts Customary & Informal System Judges, lawyers and other legal professionals Community leaders, elders or religious figures who are officially appointed and paid by the State who are respected or have authority within the community AUTHORITY Most often dealing with family disputes, land issues and All civil and criminal cases petty crime, though more serious crimes are sometimes included JURISDICTION Generally has statewide and/or nationwide reach, Operating at varying scales but generally are locally-rooted as defined by statute to specific communities or groups SCOPE OF INFLUENCE Enforced by community-based methods, which can include social ostracism or restitution. Enforced by state mechanisms Compliance mainly secured through social pressure and like bailiffs, police and correctional facilities community norms. Involvement of community ensures ENFORCEMENT respect for, and acceptance of, decisions May be less accessible due to complexity, More accessible to community members familiar costs of bureaucracy with the norms and leaders ACCESSIBILITY Often expensive due to legal fees, court costs etc. Generally less costly, relying more on community involvement COST Perceived to be slower Perceived to be faster SPEED Codified laws and regulations. Community norms, religious or social traditions, often not codified. Procedures are structured and often complex, Procedures can be flexible and context-dependent, involving courtrooms and formal processes often involving mediation and arbitration techniques RULES & PROCEDURES Requires official documentation and legal filings Documentation may be minimal or nonexistent DOCUMENTATION Less flexible; More adaptable to specific situations or changes through formal amendments or legislation changes in community norms ADAPTABILITY Source: World Bank. REFORMING JUSTICE 6 Prosperity Notes The case for fostering engagement between statutory and customary systems The case for increased collaboration between marginalized groups, such as people living in the statutory and customary systems is simple. poverty, women, and remote and minority groups If investments in justice are to impact the highest (Denney & Domingo, 2023). Establishing clear number of users, engagement with customary rules of engagement between state and non-state actors – which are used by significant shares of justice systems prevents conflicts and confusion. the population in many countries (see Figure 2) – is In contrast, a vague interface encourages forum necessary. The customary system may be the only shopping, where individuals with economic or entry point for enhancing access to justice for all, political power choose the most advantageous as users of these systems are disproportionately forum to resolve their cases (Swenson, 2018). Figure 2: The use of customary justice around the world 6% 49% 90% 51% 71% 12:1 6% of Nigerians 49% of Indians 90% of Soloman 51% of Ugandans 71% of Lebanese 12:1 who took action dealing with a Islanders were resort to customary who took action to In Liberia,the to resolve a dispute would turn aware of actors while only resolve a dispute customary system justice problem to a village elder or community leaders around 10% turn to did so by engaging is used 12 times as did so via the local leader while as potential justice lawyers or the outside of the the much as the formal statutory court or just 15% would providers, while formal system statutory courts, system for divorce. through a lawyer turn to a lawyer 40% were aware of (HIIL Survey, 2024) lawyers or State- This ratio climbs to (HIIL Survey, (DAKSH survey, the formal courts sponsored 40:1 for other 2023) 2017) (UNDP Survey, institutions (HIIL family- related 2019) Survey, 2017) disputes (World Bank, 2023) Despite the compelling case for engaging with fewer rights compared to White women. This customary justice, governments and development integration of informal rules could unintentionally (or partners face a range of difficulties and risks doing intentionally) perpetuate divisions based on social so. The most significant risk involves the alignment status, ethnicity, or religion (Harper, 2011). Other with international human rights standards. Certain difficulties are associated with channeling funds traditional customs can exacerbate social and to actors that are perceived as non-governmental, gender disparities, as they may entrench dominant as well as a frequent political desire to maintain interpretations of customs and solidify existing authority over the delivery of justice. External actors power dynamics. For example, in Zimbabwe, often lack knowledge about the different versions of before the introduction of a new marriage law, the customary law, the negotiable nature of customary acknowledgment of distinct customary laws for justice and the power differentials involved in inheritance had resulted in Black women having defining customary law (Ubink, 2018). REFORMING JUSTICE 7 Prosperity Notes Understanding the Context for Engagement Customary systems are highly context dependent. justice in most countries and will play a key role They can be under the purview of the Executive – for in engaging with customary systems in a way that example, the Ministry of interior – or the Judiciary, ensures progress. or have a different institutional setup altogether. The interactions between customary systems and The Executive (mostly Ministry of Justice) and the the courts can significantly vary country by country Judiciary will thus remain the natural and most ranging from suppression to full integration, across relevant counterparts of the World Bank’s work on many models (Figure 3). Figure 3: Spectrum of relationships between customary and statutory courts 1. 2. 3. 4. Banned or Tacitly Encouraged with Qualified Full Accepted Limited Support Endorsement Integration • Fully proscribed by law • No formal recognition • Limited formal recognition • Becomes a facet of the formal or actively discouraged but encouraged by hierarchy or system • Certain jurisdictional role state actors • No legal status but activities •Formalized routes of entry, • Financial and other supports are ignored or tacitly accepted • Certain indirect support appeals and oversight provided by the state or referral of grievances Source: Adapted from Forsyth (2013), and Harper (2011). At one end of the spectrum, Model 1 represents on traditional customs, albeit under minimal state a state’s active suppression of non-court justice regulation. The alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems, outlawing their participation in case system in Somalia (Box 1) demonstrates how this management. This reflects a government’s desire can be an effective model, particularly in post- for control over judicial processes. This model conflict environments. was evident in several states during colonial and Model 3 provides for the granting of exclusive post-independent periods—Cote d‘Ivoire, Mali, jurisdiction to alternative systems over specific Mozambique, and Niger abolished or prohibited the legal areas like family law or minor offenses. This practice or use of customary law in the immediate jurisdiction is usually geographically or ethnically wake of independence (Marc 2012). defined, with the informal systems making final Model 2 introduces a degree of state support. decisions within their purview. For example, Here, the state indirectly encourages and supports the Rondas Campesinas in Peru are used for customary systems without formally endorsing the resolution of certain offences within certain their authority but acknowledges their utility in geographical areas. This phase in the spectrum areas where official systems might be lacking. may also be enhanced by not only recognizing This model offers limited legislative recognition to but also enforcing decisions made by non-state these systems, allowing them to enact rules based systems through state mechanisms, preventing REFORMING JUSTICE 8 Prosperity Notes readjudication in state courts but allowing appeals, In Model 4, the customary law system is fully thus balancing effectiveness with autonomy. That integrated into the formal state judiciary, as operates is the case in Sierra Leone, where local bodies in countries like Botswana and Nigeria. There, the administering customary law work alongside the non-state system is not just recognized but also courts. The courts provide oversight and ensure becomes an integral part of the constitutional that customary practices align with national laws court hierarchy, aimed at bureaucratic and cultural and human rights standards, fostering a symbiotic adaptation. In such countries, decisions by relationship. customary courts need to align with constitutional provisions, particularly regarding human rights. Box 1: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Somalia ENHANCING COMMUNITY JUSTICE IN SOMALIA: THE IMPACT OF ADR CENTERS The ADR Somalia program, from January 2019 to September 2023, aimed to integrate Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) centers into Somalia’s justice system, focusing on bridging the gap between formal institutions and customary and informal justice. With 15 centers established nationwide, the program targeted improved justice outcomes, especially for women and marginalized groups. The centers operated with a community-centric approach, involving diverse adjudicator panels including elders, sheikhs, women, and internally displaced persons. They resolved disputes through negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, promoting community-based enforcement and voluntary compliance. The impact assessment highlighted: • A 97.3% user satisfaction rate for timely case resolution. • Over 71% satisfaction with the decisions made. • A sense of inclusivity, with 93% feeling their views were respected, notably improving women and youth participation. Challenges remained in aligning justice with human rights standards. Recommendations for improvement include: • Increasing women’s representation as adjudicators. • Strengthening ties between ADR processes and the formal legal system. • Enhancing outreach through mobile services to reach remote communities. The ADR Somalia program demonstrates the effectiveness of inclusive, community-based justice reform in post- conflict settings, fostering legal compliance and access to justice for all societal members. Source: International Development Law Organization (2024). Note: The ADR Somalia program was funded by the Government of the Netherlands and implemented by IDLO between January 2019-December 2021 and July 2022-September 2023, with the aim of promoting access to justice through the establishment of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Centers. The achievements highlighted in this Box were the result of the Program’s own impact assessment conducted between August-November 2023. REFORMING JUSTICE 9 Prosperity Notes Designing Engagement When designing an engagement, several factors accountability (Figure 4). These factors should should be considered: (i) state recognition; (ii) not be considered in isolation; instead, they need jurisdiction; (iii) articulation of customary law; to work together to create a comprehensive and (iv) referral pathways; (v) appeal pathways; (vi) effective strategy for leveraging different actors in handling harmful practices; and (vii) oversight and delivering justice. Figure 4: Decision points for engagement design 1. State recognition 7. Oversight 2. and Jurisdiction accountability Designing 6. Engagement 3. Handling Articulation of harmful customary practices law 5. 4. Appeal Referral pathways pathways Source: World Bank REFORMING JUSTICE 10 Prosperity Notes 1. State recognition 2. Jurisdiction Where appropriate, formally recognizing customary Establishing clear guidelines about the types systems within national constitutions or legal of justice problems that can be handled by frameworks is crucial for ensuring a coherent people- customary systems vs. statutory courts is a major centered justice system. Beyond recognition, step to maintain the integrity of both systems and enacting laws that clearly define the role, scope, and to minimize forum shopping, which can lead to limitations of customary systems within the broader conflicting decisions, lack of accountability, and justice system allows them to operate efficiently decreased public confidence in both systems. within the national legislative framework. Engaging Most commonly, customary law providers enjoy with community leaders and practitioners during jurisdiction over family law, property disputes, the legislative process ensures recognition of local and petty crimes, though in some countries their values and practices, thereby promoting community jurisdiction is expressly limited to civil cases buy-in and compliance. (Cuskelly 2011). For example, Kenya’s judiciary Recognition of customary law can take different has guidelines that clarify the jurisdictional forms (Cuskelly 2011). At the weakest level, boundaries between formal courts and traditional constitutions have provisions relating to the dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly for protection of culture and tradition. The wording of civil cases involving family and land disputes, while such provisions ranges from a duty on the State to Malawi and Nigeria limit customary law jurisdiction protect and promote culture or traditions, as done to specific civil disputes (McConkie 2023). In some in Bangladesh, Benin, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lao People’s regions of the world, certain issues feature more Democratic Republic, Mozambique, and Pakistan, to prominently than others. In Latin America and the a general right or freedom to culture or tradition, as Caribbean, constitutional provisions on customary practiced in Central African Republic, the Gambia, law frequently expressly reference land. Paraguay, and Mongolia. for example, provides extensive constitutional guarantees with respect to land tenure, and The constitutions of some countries contain community ownership, indirectly giving indigenous provisions relating to institutional arrangements, people jurisdiction over certain land disputes (Art. such as the recognition of chiefs or guarantees 64 of Constitution of Paraguay of 1992, as revised of non-abolition of such authorities in Angola and in 2011). Democratic Republic of Congo. Some constitutions establish councils of chiefs or traditional leaders, When the jurisdiction of customary law providers sometimes with extensive powers. The Constitution is not clearly defined by law, its reach is usually of Eswatini, for example, establishes a Council de facto extended. In Liberia, ambiguity around of Chiefs, responsible for advising the King on the jurisdiction of the formal and customary customary issues and considering Bills that could systems generates the intervention of the latter in alter or affect customary authorities, cultural matters outside its jurisdiction, further extending activity, customary courts, or customs. Similarly, customary law’s role in delivering justice (Bosio the Constitution of the Philippines allows for the 2023). Although traditional leaders are aware that creation of a body to advise on policies affecting they should only deal with minor criminal cases Indigenous communities. and refer serious crimes to the formal courts, there is often ambiguity on how to interpret the degree of severity of the crimes that are brought before them. This ambiguity may lead to different REFORMING JUSTICE 11 Prosperity Notes interpretations among customary actors even Three countries have constitutional mandates within the same country. This lack of homogeneity to codify customary law – Chad, Ghana, and in the application of customary norms with the the Marshall Islands (Cuskelly 2011). Chad’s boundaries of a single country goes beyond the constitution provides that customary rules are issue of jurisdiction and often extends to the merits only applicable in the relevant communities, if of the case. Different regions, ethnic groups, tribes, codified. Ghana’s constitution devolves duties to etc. frequently apply different customary norms. the National House of Chiefs to conduct study, The unwritten, fast-evolving, and relational nature interpretation, and codification of customary law. of customary law contributes to inconsistencies In the Marshall Islands, the Parliament is required and ambiguities, and is an important factor to to declare customary law by Act and may also consider when planning engagement. supplement established rules of customary law. Several countries have established a hierarchy 3. Articulation and documentation of between customary and statutory law, with clear customary law preference for the latter. In Namibia, for example, Documenting in writing of these often-unwritten customary law may be repealed or modified by rules of customary laws can improve consistency statute. Similarly, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, and Togo and predictability in their application. This process dictate that the law may establish procedures for can help to integrate customary systems with certifying customs and harmonizing them with the formal legal frameworks while preserving their constitution. Bolivia’s Constitution expresses a flexibility and relevance. Where customary laws hierarchy that clearly subordinates customary laws are not well-recorded or available for inspection, to the constitution and international law, and only there is a risk of inconsistent application, lack of recognizes customs that have been codified into transparency and accountability, and potential “indigenous legislation.” human rights violations. In Ghana, authorities have been codifying customary land laws to 4. Referral pathways provide a more predictable and consistent legal framework while preserving traditional practices Jurisdictional boundaries between customary (Atuguba 2023). and statutory courts operate more effectively alongside efforts to guide justice seekers to the Several countries require statutory courts to dispute resolution forum that is best suited to their apply customary laws, which are made simpler problem type, thus ensuring a smooth transition and more predictable when customary law and proper handling of cases and ideally employing is written and documented. Sierra Leone, for a complementary approach. Clear referral example, defines common law as including the pathways between customary and formal justice rules of customary law. Similarly, the Democratic systems ensure that justice seekers are directed Republic of Congo established that courts shall to the appropriate forum, thereby improving access apply customary law not contrary to public order. A to justice and safeguarding rights. This people- common feature is that several countries prohibit centered approach often seeks the cooperation customary provisions that are contrary to human of customary authorities to refer relevant case rights, gender rights, the constitution, other laws, types such as serious crimes, sexual offences, and or public order. Vanuatu established extensive family violence to the police or other State justice community consultations to ensure that formalized authorities, rather than resolving them within laws accurately reflect local values and practices. family or customary mechanisms (IDLO 2023). REFORMING JUSTICE 12 Prosperity Notes In India, Lok Adalats serve as an alternative 6. Mitigating and preventing harmful dispute resolution forum and refer unresolved practices cases to formal courts (National Legal Services Authority). In Nigeria, customary courts customary Identifying and eliminating harmful practices within courts deal with cases involving personal law, customary systems is crucial for protecting human such as marriage and inheritance. But, if a case rights and ensuring that these systems contribute involves issues that fall outside the jurisdiction to equitable and just outcomes for all community of customary law, or if there is a conflict with members, particularly vulnerable groups. statutory law, customary courts are required to Where harmful practices persist, they will likely refer the case to statutory courts. In Kenya, cases perpetuate discrimination, violence, and human that involve violations of constitutional rights or rights abuses. Uganda has implemented reforms statutory provisions must be referred to the formal to eliminate practices such as female genital court system. mutilation (FGM), combining legal reforms with community education campaigns (UN Volunteers The Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy in 2019). Nepal combats harmful practices like Somalia and Kenya’s Alternative Justice Systems child marriage through legislative measures and Policy are successful examples of policy frameworks community awareness programs, working with that explicitly integrate customary actors and traditional leaders to promote human rights and practices into national level people-centered justice gender equity (Girls not Brides 2023). policy. Program impact assessments and studies demonstrate instances of incorporating principles of In 1996, in consultation with the communities under inclusiveness, financing arrangements, jurisdictional their purview, the traditional justice institutions of boundaries, and coordination mechanisms (Lee Gereb (Ethiopia) codified rules outlawing harmful 2023; Ardila and Ospina 2024). traditional practices (Kahsay, 2022). Two main strategies are used to enforce these rules. Firstly, they conduct biweekly awareness programs at 5. Appeal pathways religious centers to influence community attitudes Implementing appeal mechanisms of customary and social norms, particularly regarding harmful decisions allows for higher judicial scrutiny and traditional practices. Secondly, if violations occur, ensures that justice decisions can be reviewed, they impose formal punishments as a last resort. enhancing fairness and accountability. Enabling This approach combines education and enforcement appeal pathways should reduce the risk of unfair to promote positive change within the community. or biased decisions going unchallenged, potentially Namibia managed to combat harmful practices increasing trust in the justice system. For instance, against women by enhancing their role in in Kenya, Sierra Leone, and the Philippines, customary justice systems (Ubink, 2018). Driven decisions in customary, community-based, and by both government initiatives and societal faith-based justice institutions can be appealed demands for change, the Uukwambi Traditional up as high as the Supreme Court. In Botswana, Authority (TA) in northern Namibia implemented customary courts have an appeal process where reforms across three key areas: modifying harmful cases can be escalated to higher customary customary norms affecting women, promoting courts or formal courts. In South Sudan, the Local women’s involvement in dispute resolution, Government Act allows for appeals from the C and increasing the number of female traditional Courts (highest customary court) to be heard by leaders. These reforms led to positive shifts in county courts (lowest statutory court). customary practices. New female leaders were REFORMING JUSTICE 13 Prosperity Notes well-received by their communities and performed operate transparently and fairly, adhering to effectively. Traditional court meetings became agreed-upon standards and human rights norms. more inclusive, with increased female participation In Kenya, the NGO, Kituo Cha Sheria monitors the and a perception of equal treatment for both administration of customary justice processes, genders. Additionally, a new norm was established providing transparency and fairness in justice to protect widows’ property rights, leading to administration (Pathfinders 2023). And in Sierra a decline in the practice of relatives claiming a Leone, a United Nations Peacebuilding Fund widow’s property upon her husband’s death. project implemented by Cordaid rolled out Overall, these changes significantly enhanced “responsiveness and accountability plans” that women’s positions within the customary justice enabled young women and men to monitor the system, particularly in Uukwambi. adherence of customary justice providers to public commitments around inclusiveness and human Generally, constitutional provisions related to rights standards (UNDP, 2020). customary law prescribe that such traditions or culture be consistent with the constitution itself Embedding paralegals in communities to support and fundamental human rights, with Ghana and and train customary justice providers or to Uganda offering useful examples. Colombia, Peru, assume services such as mediation, investigation, and Venezuela also recognize the authorities negotiation, advocacy, and community education of Indigenous peoples and state that they may can increase oversight and accountability. In exercise functions according to their own law, if they South Sudan, paralegals have acted as conduits for are not contrary to the constitution, national law, advocacy on rule of law and human rights issues, fundamental human rights, and/or public order. helping to provide equal protection for women and minorities in certain instances (IDLO 2017). 7. Oversight and accountability In Indonesia, the State has invested significantly in paralegal deployment to enhance the quality Establishing oversight and accountability of customary justice provision (Berenschot and mechanisms ensures that customary systems Rinaldi, 2018). 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Lessons about Access, Power and Participation in Non-state Justice Systems”. Dev Change. 2018 May 4;49(4):930– 950. doi: 10.1111/dech.12415 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme.2020. Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund Project Document. New York, NY: UNDP. https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/ documents/40000/prodoc_gtw_210219.pdf Prosperity Notes REFORMING JUSTICE | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | I 18 STITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | I