69120 DRAFT IMPROVING EXPORT INCENTIVES AND THE FREE ZONE SYSTEM IN SYRIA* Fahrettin Yagci June 2010 * Policy note prepared as part of the second phase of the Syria: Trade Policy Reform Programmatic Economic and Sector Work. 2 Table of Contents 1. Rationale and Objective of the Paper ………………………………………. 4 2. Need for Export Incentives to Enhance International Competitiveness ……. 6 3. Instruments of Export Incentives …………………………………………… 8 4. Export Incentives Currently in Place in Syria …......................…………….. 13 5. Industrial Cities in Syria ……………………………………………………. 16 6. Suggestions for Setting Up an Effective Export Incentive System ….…….. 17 7. Conclusions and Next Steps ………………..………………………………. 20 References ………………………………………………………………….. 22 3 Abbreviations EDPA : Export Development and Promotion Agency EPZ : Export Processing Zones FDI : Foreign Direct Investment FZ : Free Zones GOFZ : General Organization of Free Zones MFN : Most Favored Nation MoET : Ministry of Economy and Trade SEZ : Special Economic Zones UNCTAD : Unite Nations Conference on Trade and Development WEF : World Economic Forum WTO : World Trade Organizations VAT : Value Added Tax 4 1. Rationale and Objective of the Paper Setting up and effectively implementing an export incentive system that is compatible with the WTO rules is one of the important common features of countries that have successfully diversified their exports. This is because export incentives help reduce costs and enhance international competitiveness of the export sector and encourage foreign and domestic investment in sectors with export potential. In the past few years, Syria has started reforming its trade regime and taking complementary measures in other policy areas to create an environment conducive to diversifying production and exports away from the oil sector, but it has not yet put in place an effective export incentive framework to complement its diversification efforts1. With an average nominal protection rate of about 30 percent, the Syrian import regime increases the cost of production substantially for exports (anti-export bias) thereby hurting competitiveness of the export sector in international markets2. This is compounded by poor infrastructure services, cumbersome trade facilitation, and high administrative barriers to doing business. As a result, Syria ranks poorly in the main international indicators of competitiveness. Unless the anti-export bias in Syria’s trade regime is eliminated and its competitiveness in international markets is improved, Syria will be unlikely to diversify its exports. This will require, among other things, substantial improvement in Syrian export incentive system. This paper aims to review the export incentives currently implemented in Syria including the free zone system, identify the main weaknesses, and suggest measures to strengthen them. In particular, drawing on the best practices around the world, it explores ways to introduce a duty and tax relief scheme, manufacturing under bond arrangements, and an export processing zone system in Syria’s trade regime, and to re-orient the free zones to maximize their contribution to the Syrian economy3. The main findings and policy recommendations of the paper are summarized in Table 1. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a case for development of an effective export incentive system to eliminate the anti-export bias in Syria’s trade regime and foster its international competitiveness. Section 3 provides a summary of the main instruments of 1 The Export Development and Promotion Agency (EDPA) has recently prepared a Five-Year Plan to guide its promotional activities. The Plan includes: assisting export companies to participate in trade fairs, organizing workshops and training courses for exporters to disseminate information about enhancing quality and competitiveness, and helping exporters decrease their costs. An Export Fund was also established (financed from the Budget) to assist five priority sub-sectors (garments, cotton yarn, processed food, fruit juice, and olive oil) to promote exports. It is not clear in what form the assistance will be provided. The Plan and the Export Fund will be reviewed in detail in the next round of revisions of this paper. 2 Average MFN import tariff is 14 percent in Syria. In addition to tariffs a large number of other taxes and charges exist. Revenues collected from these taxes and charges are higher than the revenues raised from tariffs, raising the average nominal protection to about 30 percent. The anti-export bias arises from the fact that these payments made by the exporters on the imported inputs are not reimbursed when their products are exported. 3 Syrian trade reforms are reviewed in a recent report “Trade Reforms and Export Diversification in Syria: A Diagnostic Review� prepared by the World Bank (World Bank 2009a) at the request of the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MoET). The Report identified a number of in-depth follow-up studies to fill the knowledge gaps in order to prepare a comprehensive export diversification program for Syria. Strengthening export incentives including reforming the Free Zones and introducing an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) system was one of the priority areas identified by the Report for an in-depth follow up study. 5 export incentives that are widely used worldwide and would be appropriate for Syria to implement. Section 4 reviews the export incentives currently implemented and identifies its weaknesses. Based on the discussions in Sections 3 and 4, Section 5 suggests options for Syria to strengthen its export incentive policies. The final Section presents the main conclusions and proposes steps for moving forward. Table 1: Summary of the Main Policy Recommendations Main policy areas Measures taken and problems that remain Actions needed Duty and tax drawback and The Customs Law provides for duty and tax Amend the Customs Law to extend drawback to all exemption drawback for a limited list of imports. It does not imports used in production of exports and include provide for duty and tax exemption, which is exemption option in the Law to reduce costs to normally granted to established companies exporters and enhance their competitiveness in exporting all or a very large proportion of their international markets. production regularly. Drawback scheme has not Set up an effective implementation mechanism to been implemented because an implementation ensure that refunds are paid in a timely manner, and mechanism has not yet put in place. As a result, train staff and exporters. tariffs and other taxes paid by exporters on imported inputs are not reimbursed creating substantial anti-export bias. Increasing the cost of exports and adversely affecting competitiveness of Syrian products in international markets. Manufacturing under bond This is a tariff and tax exemption scheme Include this in the Customs Law. appropriate for established companies exporting a Prepare the necessary supporting policy directives large proportion of their production regularly. and set up an effective implementation mechanism. This incentive scheme does not exist in the Customs Law. Export processing zones (EPZ) EPZs are fenced industrial estates established to Include EPZ concept in the Customs Law and prepare attract foreign and domestic companies to legislation to define the forms and operational rules produce for the export market. Incentives offered of the EPZ system. to companies operating within EPZs include tariff Priority should be given to single-factory EPZs and and tax exemption, better infrastructure services, converting sections of Industrial Cities into EPZs. streamlined customs procedure, reduced domestic taxes, etc. Individual exporting companies can be given EPZ status if they export all or very large proportion of their production. This policy instrument is not included in the Customs Law. Indirect (deemed) exports In some countries, local input suppliers to Recognize indirect exporters in the Customs Law and exporting companies are considered indirect extend duty and tax drawback and other export exporters and benefit from incentives to the incentives to them too. exporting companies. This measure helps to integrate the exporting companies into the local economy with strong backward linkages. This measure does not exist in the Customs Law. Free zones Syria has 8 free zones. They are engaged in Amend the free zone legislation to do the following: commercial activities (mainly importing and Eliminate domestic tax exemptions, but improve selling cars) as opposed to manufacturing infrastructural services. activities. More than half of their imports are sold domestically. Their contribution to export growth Lift restriction on purchases from local market to and employment creation is very limited. Fiscal strengthen backward linkages. incentives to free zones companies are too Transfer management of free zones to private sector generous. They don’t pay any taxes on income under management contracts. earned from exporting activities causing large Explore possibility of consolidating free zones to revenue losses to government. reduce operating costs. Institutional and administrative Apart from the management of the free zones, Set up an appropriate institutional and administrative framework for implementation, and there is no institutional mechanism to implement framework and staff capacity to implement the above sequencing of these reforms. any of the above incentive schemes. incentives schemes. This would require substantial technical assistance from the donor community. Considering the administrative difficulties in implementing these measures priority should be given initially to the drawback regime, followed by single- factory EPZs, particularly in the Industrial Cities. 6 2. Need for Export Incentives to Enhance International Competitiveness High costs of production and exports in Syria come from a number of sources including high import duties and taxes, poor infrastructure and trade facilitation services, and difficulties of doing business. The objective of setting up an effective export incentive system is to reduce these costs and foster export sector’s competitiveness in world markets4. Syria has a complex import regime which includes a MFN duty system with 11 non-zero bands with a maximum rate of 60 percent and an average rate of 14 percent. It also levies a long list of other taxes and charges, with which the average nominal protection rate comes to about 30 percent, one of the highest in developing countries. Such a complex import regime leads to high transaction costs and encourages corruption in customs administration. In addition, it creates substantial anti-export bias. An import duty and other charges on a product increase its price in the domestic market compared to its price in the international markets, making production for domestic market more profitable compared to production for exports, and shifting resources from export-oriented sectors to import-substitution sectors. Therefore, an import duty (and other charges on imports) is considered a tax on exports, known as anti-export bias, because it increases the cost of production for exports thereby hurting competitiveness of the export sector in international markets. Poor infrastructure services, cumbersome trade facilitation, and high administrative barriers to doing business compound the production and export costs. This is reflected in Syria’s poor ranking in three main indicators of competitiveness: Global Competitiveness Index, Global Trade Enabling Index, and Logistics Performance Index (Table 2). Among 134 countries, Syria ranked 78 in 2008 in overall global competitiveness (an average of 12 indicators), which shows about the same ranking in 2007, but a slight improvement compared to 2006. The ranking is better than overall average of 78, particularly in indicators related to basic requirements: institutions (54), health and primary education (70), and infrastructure (74), as well as market size (63) and business sophistication (76). Syria’s ranking is particularly poor in efficiency-related indicators such as labor market efficiency (123), financial market sophistication (121), technological readiness (107), and higher education and training (101). The Global Enabling Trade Index, published for the first time in 2008, is a measure of the extent to which countries have in place the factors and policies for enabling trade. Syria ranks 107 in this index among 118 countries worldwide. Among the 10 pillars in this index, Syria’s ranking is particularly poor in tariff and non-tariff barriers (117), availability and quality of transport services (116), regulatory environment (112), transparency in border administration (111), efficiency of customs administration (98), and efficiency of import-export procedures (91), while in physical security Syria ranks 33. 4 Syrian non-oil exports have shown significant growth since 2003 (See World Bank 2009a) without an export incentive system in place. However, such a good performance does not make an effective export incentive system unnecessary because the good performance was due largely to transitory factors such as Iraq War and pitfall revenue from oil in the Gulf. 7 Syria performs poor also in Logistics Performance Index, which placed the country 135 (an average of 7 indicators) in 2007 among 150 countries. The ranking was particularly low in logistics competence (145), international shipments (138), and tracking and tracing (137)5. Table 2: Ranking on various competitiveness indicators, Syria, 2006–2008 2006 2007 2008 * Global Competitiveness Index 84 80 78 Basic Requirements 69 71 71 1. Institutions 73 61 54 2. Infrastructure 78 74 74 3. Macroeconomic stability 61 98 93 4. Health and primary education 44 69 70 Efficiency Enhancers 104 100 104 5. Higher education and training 96 104 101 6. Goods market efficiency 92 81 92 7. Labor market efficiency 91 117 123 8. Financial market sophistication 122 116 121 9. Technological readiness 109 109 107 10. Market size na 62 63 Innovation and Sophistication Factor 102 82 80 11. Business sophistication 109 72 76 12. Innovation 99 93 84 Global Enabling Trade Index ** 107 Market access 115 1. Tariff and non-tariff barriers 117 2. Proclivity to trade 99 Border Administration 98 3. Efficiency of customs administration 98 4. Efficiency of import-export procedures 91 5. Transparency of border administration 111 Transport and communication infrastructure 94 6. Availability and quality of transport infrastructure 72 7. Availability and quality of transport services 116 8. Availability and use of ICTs 84 Business environment 71 9. Regulatory environment 112 10. Physical security 33 Logistics Performance Index*** 135 1. Customs 108 2. Infrastructure 131 3. International shipments 138 4. Logistics competence 145 5. Tracking and tracing 137 6. Domestic logistics costs 84 7. Timelines 118 Sources: * UNDP (2008), comprising 131 countries in 2006 and 2007, and 134 countries in 2008; ** WEF (2008), comprising 118 countries; *** Arvis et al (2007), comprising 150 countries. 5 See World Bank (2009a) for a more detailed analysis. 8 3. Instruments of Export Incentives A variety of instruments are used to enhance international competitiveness and attract foreign and domestic investment in export oriented sectors. This paper focuses on the following four of them, which are more relevant for Syria today: duty and tax drawback or exemption, manufacturing under bond, bonded warehouses, export processing zones and free zones. Duty and tax drawback and exemption Under these schemes, the portion of imported raw materials and intermediate inputs that are actually used in the production of exports are not required to pay duties and taxes (all taxes other than service charges) that would otherwise be applicable if they had been imported for domestic use. In the case of “drawback� option, duties and taxes that were paid on importation of goods are refunded once the manufactured goods, in which the imported inputs are incorporated, have been exported. In the exemption option, duties and taxes are not paid at the time of importation6. Exporters prefer the exemption option because they don’t have to pay the duties and taxes first and then wait for a refund that is usually delayed – a clear cash-flow advantage for exporters. The governments normally prefer the drawback option because of the possibility of diversion of the imported goods into the domestic market without the payment of duties and taxes – a clear risk of revenue loss. With drawback, the government receives the revenue and so controls the refund process7. In many countries the balance between the interests of exporters and the government are achieved by adopting both schemes. The drawback scheme, which is administratively simpler, is applied in the case of new or occasional exporters, who don’t have a long track record on their business practices. The exemption scheme is a better option for reputable manufacturers who regularly export a specified minimum percentage of their production (say, at least 80 percent). Under this option, the manufacturer may be asked to lodge a security with the customs administration for the value of customs duties and taxes otherwise payable. The manufacturer also has to maintain specified records that document the details of imports, production and exports which are needed for the post-transaction audits undertaken by the customs to determine the duty and taxes to be paid on the amount of the final manufactured product sold in the domestic market. In both options, technical calculations, called “rate of yield�, are needed to determine the ratio of the imported materials used in per unit of output agreed between the manufacturer and customs. On the basis of the percentage of total production exported against that sold in the domestic market and the “rate of yield� the eligibility for duty and tax drawback and exemption is determined. Duty and tax have to be paid on the portion of production sold in the domestic 6 Exports are also exempt from domestic taxes such VAT and sales and excise taxes. 7 Normally the drawback is total. However, in some cases import duties and taxes are charged on any waste that derives from processing or manufacturing of the exported goods. The amount of waste is calculated and agreed between the manufacture and the customs administration. 9 market. The calculation of “rate of yield� is a complex process. In some cases it is determined for each manufacturer. In others, the rate is set for subsectors or products. The rates are reviewed and adjusted, as needed. Manufacturing under bond This is a variation on the exemption option utilized in a number of countries including the US, Canada, India, Tanzania, etc. Under this scheme the manufacturer operates within a specific bonded factory or warehouse that must be licensed and controlled by the customs administration, and lodges a financial security to cover any duty and tax liability otherwise payable on the imported inputs. This scheme is appropriate for businesses that have a high proportion of imported dutiable inputs or that assemble goods that consist entirely of imported dutiable components. Governments normally set a minimum of production that must be exported for companies to be eligible for this scheme. The administrative cost of this scheme is high because there are annual licensing and bonding requirements. Also, the raw materials remain locked up in the controlled premises subject to a joint customs/manufacturer removal from the controlled premises into production8. That is, there is a significant reliance on physical controls over the movement of goods to avoid fraud and misuse. In some cases, procedures based on risk management and post-transaction audits can be utilized as a substitute for physical controls to mitigate the administrative costs. For this, proper record keeping is necessary for a few years after the goods are exported. Bonded warehousing In contrast to the above schemes, bonded warehousing does not involve any manufacturing activity. It is essentially a storage facility for a limited period of time. In some cases, minor value additions are made while the goods are in storage such as packaging, re- packaging, etc. Under this scheme, imports go to customs-approved warehouses without the payment of import duties and taxes, and stored there until the goods are re-exported or are sold in the domestic market. In the latter case, the import duties and taxes become payable. This scheme is appropriate in situations where it is not known at the time of importation how the imported goods will finally be disposed off. The operator of the warehouse normally posts a security to cover the total duty and taxes deferred on the goods that are kept in the warehouse. The administrative cost of this scheme is also high because it involves a high degree of physical controls of the buildings and operations by the customs administration. Usually, the areas of the warehouse that contain non-duty paid goods are secured by a double-lock system – locks held by the customs and the operator. Note that the incentive schemes presented above are fiscal arrangements designed to offset the adverse impact of the import duty regime on export competitiveness. As noted, implementation of these schemes is difficult and may result in high administrative costs. The difficulties may be due to poor legislation, inefficient business processes, inadequate 8 In China, customs authorities may dispatch a customs officer to be stationed at the producer’s premises to exercise control. 10 administrative structure, and lack of skilled staff. Implementation of these schemes is also open to fraud and misuse. One way to reduce the anti-export bias of the trade regime thereby reducing the need for the drawback and exemption schemes is to maintain the import duties at a minimum with a few bands and small variation among them. This alternative may result in large revenue losses and should be complemented with revenue enhancing measures. Special economic zones Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is used as a general term to encompass a wide range of modern free zone types utilized by both developed and developing countries. The names they are given include: Free Zones, Free Trade Zones, Special Economic Zones, Free Ports, and Export Processing Zones, etc. They are generally defined as geographically delimited areas administered by the public or private sector, offering various fiscal incentives and other advantages to companies, which are physically located within the zones for their production and export sales. The objective of these incentives is to offset some aspects of an adverse investment climate, cumbersome legal and administrative environment, and weak infrastructure services, and to encourage foreign and domestic companies to invest in export-oriented sectors9. It is estimated that there are about 3,000 zones in 135 countries worldwide10. They create over 68 million direct jobs and over $500 billion worth of direct income. The number of zones and the countries hosting them continues to grow. In this paper we will focus on two types of zones, which are more relevant in the case of Syria. They are Export Processing Zones and Free Zones. Export processing zones Export processing zones (EPZs) are industrial estates aimed generally at attracting foreign direct investment to manufacture for foreign markets. EPZs vary widely in terms of incentives, eligibility for incentives, location, and ownership. Incentives offered to the companies operating within the EPZs include: duty and tax free imports, exemption from domestic taxes such as corporation and income tax, total or partial exemption from labor and foreign exchange regulation, better infrastructure services, subsidized rent and utilities, one-stop administrative arrangements, and streamlined customs procedures. To be eligible for operating in an EPZ (and, receive the available incentives), normally all of the output from the zone must be exported to a third country (an approach adopted by the East Asian countries). Some countries allow a percentage of sales into the local market (usually 20 percent or less). The EPZ incentives do not apply to the sales in the local market. EPZs are all areas that are legally regarded as outside the customs territory of the country in question. Because they are subject to independent customs and tax policies, such zones are treated as separate countries from a customs perspective. Consequently, these zones’ sales to the 9 Some SEZs are established as “growth poles� to revitalize economically distressed areas particularly in the UK, France, and the US. 10 FIAS (2008), p. 7. 11 host country and purchases from it are considered as host countries imports and exports, and are subject to its trade regime. The size and location of EPZs vary considerably. They are usually set up near major transportation networks – sometimes as part of a port or airport area. They may comprise an entire city or an individual factory (see below). Sometimes, they are developed as general industrial estates or specialized manufacturing zones catering to the unique needs of targeted industries (textile, software, processed food, electronics, etc). Earlier EPZs were established and managed by the public sector. Private sector increasingly plays an important role in setting up and managing EPZs. According to the FIAS database, 62 percent of the 2,301 zones in developing and transition countries are presently developed and operated by the private sector. This ratio was less than 25 percent in 1980s11. Contracting private management for government-owned zones or lease of government zone assets by a private operator is now very common. A formal public-private partnership has also become a popular arrangement. Good examples of the latter arrangement in the region are Agaba Industrial Estate in Jordan and Gaza Industrial Estate in West Bank and Gaza. In these arrangements, public sector’s responsibility includes financing all external infrastructure (roads, utility connections, etc.) and providing land on long-term lease basis. The private operators finance all internal infrastructure and manage the zones. Other options for private sector participation include concession agreements, management contracts, and build-operate-transfer arrangements. EPZs have been effective in promoting manufacturing exports12 and increasing employment, but they have not been uniformly successful. Broadly speaking, many EPZs in East Asia and Latin America have been successful, most of them in Africa have failed to meet the expectations. Success depends on a large number of factors including the selection of sites, incentive packages, management, ownership, administrative environment, and broader policy environment in which they operate. Experience shows that the following factors are particularly important for success:  Clear legal, institutional, and administrative arrangements. The incentive framework, eligibility criteria, environmental and labor standards, institutional and regulatory frameworks, and administrative procedures governing the zones as well as the rights and obligations of the developers/operators and the government have to be defined in a transparent way to allow the zones operate smoothly and efficiently.  Integration with the local economy with strong backward linkages. The zones would make the maximum contribution to the local economy if they increasingly source their inputs from the local economy. Selection of zone sites is therefore important to enable such linkages are established in a cost effective way. To encourage backward linkages, some countries consider sales of local companies to the zone based enterprises as 11 FIAS (2008), p. 2. 12 In many countries EPZs accounted for a major share of country’s total exports in 2005. Examples include: Nicaragua (79.4 percent), Bangladesh (75.6 percent), Philippines (78.2 percent), Bahrain (68.9 percent), Morocco (61.0 percent), Madagascar (80.0 percent). For a detailed discussion see FIAS (2008), p.35. 12 “deemed� exports, allowing the local suppliers also benefit from duty and tax drawback and other export incentives (Local input suppliers are considered indirect exporters).  Designing the EPZ system as an integral part of a broader private sector development and export promotion strategy. Experience shows that EPZs are most successful when they are used as a supplement to economy-wide reforms as opposed to creating isolated enclaves. With a weak general business environment and investment climate, the host country would lack credibility to attract FDI in the EPZ and would be unable to supply the EPZ enterprises the necessary inputs at competitive prices.  Reliance largely on good infrastructure and streamlined procedures rather than incentives. A common obstacle to success for EPZs is the use of generous fiscal and financial incentives to offset other disadvantages such as inadequate infrastructure, inefficient management, and poor location. Such a heavily incentive focused approach to zone development results in large revenue losses for the government, but fails to contribute significantly to export growth and employment creation. The thrust of attractiveness of the EPZs should be based primarily on its service orientation rather than its incentive package.  Effective management. Poor management of the zones is often one of the important causes of poor performance. On the whole, the EPZs that operate under private ownership or some form of public-private partnership (concession agreements, management contracts, etc.) are better managed and more profitable compared to the government-run zones. These zones tend to offer better facilities and amenities, have better client orientation, and run on cost recovery principles.  Mixing up various manufacturing and commercial activities to take advantage of the benefits of economic clusters. EPZs are increasingly developed on an integrated basis as parts of broader industrial, commercial, and residential townships. These integrated development projects enables the companies to take advantage of the complementary activities and allow the developers to offset the relatively low profitability of industrial property with higher margin commercial and residential facilities. Hybrid EPZs. A flexible EPZ model is the hybrid EPZs. They are typically sub-divided into a general zone open to all industries and separate EPZ area reserved for export-oriented EPZ-registered enterprises. They are preferred particularly in most central and eastern European and Latin American countries. Outside these regions, hybrid EPZs also exist in China, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Turkey Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia. Industrial Cities in Syria are good candidates for hybrid EPZs (see below). Single factory EPZ scheme. Factories do not have to locate within a designated zone to receive incentives and privileges. Exporting companies, if they satisfy the requirements, can operate as single factory EPZs. The single factory scheme is similar to manufacturing under bond scheme. An important difference is that single factory programs provide a larger set of incentives. A key advantage of this program is that it can grant export incentives to exporting companies that had been established before the EPZs were set up and cannot relocate their 13 factories in the EPZs. The single factory scheme is implemented successfully in many countries. It is particularly widespread in sub-Saharan Africa. The US, Mexico, and Sri Lanka also have single factory EPZs. Free zones The main difference between free zones and EPZs is that free zones offer warehousing, storage, simple processing such as sorting and re-packaging, and distribution facilities for trade, transshipment and re-export operations, whereas EPZs emphasize manufacturing for exports. Free Zones are essentially bonded warehouses operated on a larger scale. They are the most suitable SEZ model for countries in transit trade routes. They lack the necessary infrastructure for manufacturing activities, and have limited capacity to create employment. Most of the SEZs in the Middle East are Free Zones. 4. Export Incentives Currently in Place in Syria Syria’s Customs Law provides for a number of incentive schemes to promote exports. They include a duty and tax drawback scheme, bonded warehousing arrangements, and a free zones system (Articles 115-167)13. Duty and tax drawback scheme (Articles 166, 167): These two articles provide for total or partial reimbursement of the duties and other taxes paid for importation of some raw materials and intermediate inputs if they are used in production of exports. But, they don’t provide for the exemption option. The Customs Law leaves the issuance of guidelines for implementation of the drawback policy to the Customs Administration in consultation of the MoET. These guidelines have not yet been issued and the drawback policy has not been implemented. In October 2006, the Customs Administration issued a list of products (at 2-digit level of the product list) eligible for drawback in subsectors such as food, textile, mining, electronics, plastics, glassware, paper products, and telecommunication. The Customs Administration also set up a committee which included the representatives of the Chambers of Industry, to determine the institutional modalities of implementation of the drawback scheme. After a few meetings, this committee has become defunct before reaching any conclusion. Bonded warehousing: The Customs Law distinguishes between four types of bonded warehouses based on the type of processing undertaken before the products are exported (Articles 115-138). These are: real warehouses (for re-packaging, distribution, etc), special warehouse (for maintenance work), artificial warehouse (for duty-free sales), and industrial warehouses (for minor manufacturing). They are all exempt from import duties and taxes, if the products are exported. Import duties and taxes are paid on the portion of their sales in the domestic market. The Customs Law allows for a storage period of one to three years. The Customs Law also stipulates that bonded warehouses would operate under the control of the Customs Administration. To date, no license has been issued for these warehouses. This is 13 The Customs Law, which was revised in 2005, also includes temporary entry and re-exports options. They are not discussed separately here, because they are normally covered under the bonded warehousing and free zones arrangements. The Law does not provide for establishment of EPZs. 14 explained mainly by the fact that the specified activities in this scheme are undertaken by the free zones. Free zones: The Customs Law provides for broad guidelines for the establishment of free zones (Articles 139-151). Under these guidelines the General Organization for Free Zones (GOFZ) was established in 1971 to set up and operate free zones under the MoET. The Investment Law of Free Zones, enacted in 1972 and revised in 2003, defines the operational rules of free zones (GOFZ 2003)14. The Investment Law of Free Zones allows nine categories of activities in the free zones15. To date, licenses have been issued by the GOFZ only for commercial and industrial activities16. The private sector is permitted to develop and manage free zones under the supervision of the GOFZ and the Customs Administration, but so far there has not been much interest from the private sector. Private companies operating in the free zones either lease the warehouses and other installations from the GOFZ or construct their own buildings in the free zones under a land lease contract. In terms of incentives, all activities in the free zones are exempt from all import duties and taxes as well as all domestic taxes and charges if the processed products are exported. Companies operating in the free zones also benefit from subsidized land and utilities. In case of commercial activities, imported products in the original or modified form could be sold in the domestic market. For the portion of local sales, all duties, taxes and charges have to be paid. The industrial activities are expected to be export-oriented. Companies engaged in industrial operations in the free zones are allowed to sell a percentage of their production in the domestic market not more than 25 percent of their exports. Imported goods are allowed to stay in the free zones no more than five years. Exports from the free zones do not benefit from preferential treatment in the importing countries with which Syria has a FTA, because these products are not considered as products of Syrian origin. Syria has eight free zones developed and managed by the GOFZ: Adra Free Zone (developed in 1974), Tartous Free Zone (1974), Damascus Free Zone (1975), Damascus International Airport Free Zone (1975), Aleppo Free Zone (1975), Lattakia Free Zone (1978), Lattakia Free Port (2003), Al Yarobia Free Zone (2008). The free zone in Dar’a is a joint venture. It is managed jointly with Jordan. Despite substantial fiscal and financial incentives, the performance of free zones is disappointing in terms of employment creation and foreign exchange earnings. The existing structure of the free zones is primarily focused on commercial/trading as opposed to manufacturing activity, with currently 99 percent of the value of all goods movement falling in the commercial category (Table 3). A significant share of commercial transactions in the free zones involves importation of cars for either re-exporting or sale in the domestic market. Only seven percent of the companies in these zones are foreign companies, despite very attractive 14 The Government is planning further revisions in the Investment Law of Free Zones. 15 They are: commercial, industrial, banking, hotel and restaurant, information centers, informatics, cargo services, health services, other services. 16 Damascus Free Zone has companies with licenses for transportation and catering activities. 15 incentives. Less than a third of their production is exported. Employment in free zones has fallen significantly since 2006 with Syria’s participation in GAFTA. Table 3: Performance of export processing zones, 2002–2008 Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Number of companies 654 678 712 786 932 1,009 1,215 Foreign 32 41 52 58 62 63 86 Local 622 637 660 728 870 946 1129 Structure of production (%) Manufacturing 4.1 2.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 1.0 Commercial 95.9 98.0 99.1 99.2 99.4 99.0 Composition of sales (%) Sold abroad 26.2 22.3 23.5 37.9 43.1 32.3 Sold domestically 73.8 77.7 76.5 62.1 56.9 67.7 Total invested capital (mio USD) 535 546 557 627 653 706 777 Foreign 199 289 Employment (thousands) 15.0 15.7 16.8 18.0 22.0 9.4 9.0 Share of labor force (%) 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.36 0.15 0.29 Source: GOFZ Note: Blanks indicate that data were not available. A key weakness of the Free Zones System is that the value of raw material and semi- finished goods the Free Zone companies can purchase from the local market is limited to SYP 500,000. This policy seriously restrains backward linkages of the companies in the Free Zones and the integration of these companies with the local economy. The objective should be encouraging purchases from the local economy to increase indirect employment. An assessment of the current incentive system: To date, with the exception of the free zones system, none of these schemes have been operationalized with the necessary supporting legislation and institutional arrangements. As a result, they are not implemented. The free zones system, the only export incentive instrument currently in place, focuses primarily on commercial as opposed to manufacturing activities. Only one percent of the value of all free zones’ activities is considered manufacturing. Companies in the free zones import everything duty and tax-free and pay no domestic taxes and fees, and receive subsidized land and utilities. Compared to these generous incentives (and significant revenue loss for the government), their contribution to employment generation and foreign exchange earnings is negligible. Employment created in the free zones is about 0.3 percent of total employment in Syria. And, only one-third of the output they produce is exported (mainly re-export of products with minor modification). Consequently, Syrian trade regime continues to have significant anti-export bias – an important barrier to export diversification. The system creates discrimination against exporting companies operating outside the Free Zones and costs large revenue losses to the government. Therefore, designing and effectively implementing an export incentive system that eliminates disincentives for exports, enhances competitiveness, and minimizes fiscal burden on the 16 government is a key component of an export diversification program in Syria. The main elements of such a system will be discussed in Section6 below. 5. Industrial Cities in Syria Syria has established four industrial cities since 1999 as part of its industrialization program. They are modern integrated industrial and residential estates equipped with all necessary infrastructure, business, social, and educational services. They can play an important role in diversification of exports if complemented with the right export incentive measures. They are briefly introduced in this section and their possible role in export diversification as hybrid EPZs is discussed in the next section. The industrial cities are constructed close to the major transportation networks in the main governorates; Aleppo (Sheikh Najjar), Homs (Hasia), Damascus (Adra), and Deir Ezzor (Deir Ezzor). They operate under the Ministry of Local Administration. With the exception of Deir Ezzor, where development has started only recently, the supporting infrastructure in all industrial cities has been largely completed and almost half of the area allocated for industry has been sold to 6,946 companies (of which 221 are foreign companies). About 61 percent of these companies are constructing their factories, and 18 percent already started production (Table 4)17. A key advantage of setting up a factory in an industrial city is the subsidized land. Companies can buy or lease plots at very reasonable prices. One-stop facility is provided to the investors in the industrial cities to set up their businesses, construct their factories and get their utilities connected very quickly. Also, companies in the cities are allowed to clear their imports at their factories. The land allocated to the industrial cities is divided into industrial, residential, management, and green areas, and service centers and main streets. The industrial areas are subdivided into zones according to the type and size of industries and whether these industries are polluting or not. Infrastructure services include: transportation including railroads, power, telecommunication, wastewater and sewage system, and industrial and drinking water. Pre- treatment of wastage is done in factories. The wastage is then sent to the main treatment plants operated by the Industrial City Administration. Substantial new investment and technical assistance are needed to enhance the capacity and operational efficiency of the main treatment plants. The industrial cities also include residential buildings for employees, recreational facilities, medical centers, schools, banks and post offices, and shopping areas. 17 For detailed information about the industrial cities, visit the following websites: www.aic.org.sy, www.a-ic.org, www.eng.ic-homs.sy. 17 Table 4: Syria’s Industrial Cities (As of May 2010) Sheik Deir Adra Najjar Hasia Ezzor Total Total area (hectares) 7,000 4,412 2,500 2,850 16,767 Estimated cost (srp million) 30,000 16,000 9,000 12,000 67,000 Date of opening for investment 2004 2004 2004 2010 - Area of industrial plots (hectare) 1,610 1,163 758 680 4,211 Industrial area already allocated to licensed 870 669 346 12 1,897 companies (hectare) Number of companies licensed 3,374 2,777 765 30 6,946 Of which foreign companies 108 70 34 9 221 Number of factories under construction 1,630 1,401 313 10 3,354 Number of factories where production already 229 448 116 - 793 started Number of workers 36,452 31,500 16,346 1,057 85,355 Source: Ministry of Local Administration, Industrial Cities and Zones Directorate 6. Suggestions for Setting up an Effective Export Incentive System Syria will need to introduce the following measures to create an effective export incentive system to be able to eliminate the anti-export bias in its trade regime, reduce costs and enhance competitiveness in international markets, and attract investment in export-oriented sectors. A. Reforming the duty and tax relief policy The concept of duty and tax drawback exists in Syria’s Customs Law, but the provisions in the Customs Law limit this benefit to only a list of imports. This should be corrected ensuring all imported inputs to be eligible for duty and tax drawback, if they are used in production of exports. The reform policy should also include the option of duty and tax exemptions for established manufacturing companies exporting all (or almost all) their production operating outside the free zones. In light of these guiding principles, secondary legislation and directives need to be introduced to set up the institutional framework for effective implementation. This would require substantial technical assistance including the training of the staff and the exporters, which could be better provided by donors with strong presence in the country. It is advisable to implement the drawback option first because it is relatively easier to implement compared to the exemption option. A key problem that has been experienced in many countries in implementation of the drawback policy is the long delays or non-payment of the refunds nullifying the benefits of this 18 policy. In most cases, this problem arises because import duties and taxes go into the general revenue of the annual budget but refunds have to be made from specific budget items, which are inadequately funded. In most cases, the exporters have to wait for the next budget to receive their refunds. Adequate funding is therefore an essential component of implementation of the drawback policy. An alternative to be considered is the retention of part of the import revenue by the Customs Administration for prompt payments of refunds. Complexity of the procedures and lack of transparency and trained personnel also cause delays in payments, and fraud and misuse of the system18. The objective of the duty and tax relief measures is to offset the anti-export bias created by the import regime. An alternative to this policy would be reducing the import duties and taxes to zero thereby eliminating the need for these measures. This would have significant revenue implications. Also, some of the competing domestic sub-sectors may not yet be ready for full import competition. Therefore, this alternative does not seem to be feasible at this stage in Syria. B. Introducing a manufacturing under bond scheme As noted earlier, this scheme is appropriate for companies that have a high proportion of imported dutiable inputs and that export a large part of their production. These companies operate outside the free zones and usually have a long and good track record in exports. To be eligible for the duty-free importation under this scheme, Governments normally set a minimum of production that must be exported. It is advisable to include this option also in the Customs Law and make the necessary institutional and procedural arrangements for implementation. Effective implementation of this scheme to avoid fraudulent transactions would require physical controls over the flow of goods in and out of the bonded area. It is therefore administratively costly. An alternative to physical controls, in the case of larger well-established companies, is to use risk management methods and post-transaction audits to reduce the administrative costs. C. Designing and implementing an EPZ system appropriate for Syria EPZs have been successfully used in many countries to attract FDI and expand manufacturing exports. A key weakness of the Syrian trade regime is that it does not take advantage of this important incentive policy. It is advisable to include the EPZ option in Syria’s trade policy in appropriate forms that would fit best in the current institutional arrangements for manufacturing production. Developing new fenced area EPZs should not be a priority for Syria. They are costly to establish, and there are better alternatives. The single-factory EPZs seem to be the most appropriate option for Syria at this juncture. This would be an effective incentive to attract FDI in export oriented subsectors particularly in the industrial cities given excellent infrastructure services they offer for manufacturing activities. As noted earlier, an additional advantage of the 18 To mitigate payments delays, Brazil uses a voucher system where refunds are made in the form of vouchers which could be used for the payment for future imports. This may speed up the payments but would not offset the adverse cash-flow effect of delays. 19 single-factory EPZ option is that it allows the existing companies to benefit from its incentives without relocating in the EPZ area. Converting sections of industrial cities into EPZs (that is, making industrial cities hybrid EPZs) should also be considered to take advantage of their good infrastructure and administrative services. Embedded in a broader manufacturing environment, the EPZ companies have a better opportunity to establish strong backward linkages with other companies helping the formation of economic clusters within industrial zones. Good administration is essential for EPZ system to be successful. Where appropriate, periodic self-assessment and audit by dedicated and independent group of auditors within customs should replace physical controls, in order to reveal the possible mismatch between the amount of imported inputs and exports over a period of time and possible diversion of output into the domestic market. This approach is far more cost-effective and efficient than a transactional approach that matches individual export declarations with individual imports declarations. For this to work, the companies need to have the capacity to prepare and keep the necessary records, and the Customs should develop a database on beneficiary companies for efficient profiling and targeting of potential non-compliant transactions. D. Expanding duty and tax drawback and exemption to “deemed� exports To maximize the benefits of export incentives to the economy, it is essential that the exporting companies eligible for incentives are integrated into the local economy with strong backward linkages – that is, exporting companies source their inputs increasingly from the local economy. Establishing industrial clusters in the form of industrial zones or cities is one way to encourage integration. Another option used by some countries is to extend duty and tax drawback or exemption benefits to local companies that are supplying inputs to qualifying exporters, because such transactions are typically “deemed� exports. In this incentive option, the local input suppliers are considered as indirect exporters. It would be useful to introduce the “deemed� export benefits in Syrian trade regime to be implemented after the drawback system is fully and effectively in place. E. Reforming the free zones system In their current form, the contribution of the free zones to the Syrian economy is very limited in terms of net foreign exchange earnings and direct and indirect employment creation compared to the large revenue losses they cause to the government. Urgent reforms are needed to improve their contribution to the national economy. The proposed reforms would include:  Moving away from excessive incentives to provision of better infrastructure and administrative services. This would involve imposing all applicable domestic taxes after a transition period of three years, during which infrastructure services are improved.  Lifting restrictions on purchases from the local market, and encouraging stronger backward linkages to increase value addition and better integration with the local economy to create indirect employment. 20  Gradually transferring the management of the free zones to private sector under management contracts after carefully determining the relative responsibilities of the government, private operators, and the companies operating within the free zones.  Exploring the possibility of consolidating the existing free zones to reduce the operating costs rather than establishing new ones. F. Prioritizing and sequencing reforms Taking account of the administrative difficulties in implementation of the proposed incentive measures, reforms should be carefully sequenced. It is advisable to start implementation with the drawback and free zone reforms followed by introduction of manufacturing under bond and single factory EPZ options once experience is gained in implementation of the drawback policy. Fenced EPZs and “deemed exports� should be considered at a later stage. 7. Conclusions and Next Steps By taking stock of its current incentive measures aimed at promoting non-oil exports, this paper identified the main weaknesses in these arrangements, and proposed, in light of best practices worldwide, initiatives to improve Syria’s export incentive system, which is a pivotal component of an export diversification program it needs to develop and put in place. These proposals will need to be turned into an action plan for implementation. The main constituent elements of this action plan would be the following.  Creating awareness and securing political commitment to reforms. The reform process will need to start by building consensus among all stakeholders in the government and the private sector on the importance of eliminating the anti-export bias in Syrian trade regime for promotion of export diversification, and on the policy measures proposed in this paper to achieve this objective. This consensus should then be reflected in high level political support and commitment to reforms. Dissemination workshops and sensitization campaigns should be organized to bring together all parties concerned including the concerned public institutions, private sector and the donor community.  Preparing the legal base to launch the reform process. This should start with amending the Customs Law and Investment Law of the Syrian Free Zones to incorporate the proposed changes in the principal legislation. The major changes would include amendments in drawback provisions, introduction of the exemption option, manufacturing under bond, “deemed exports� and EPZ schemes, and restructuring the fiscal incentives granted to free zone companies. The secondary legislation, policy directives, and implementation procedures and institutional arrangements will also need to be prepared including a new EPZ legislation.  Setting up an appropriate administrative framework for effective implementation. International experience shows that most export incentive arrangements fail because of 21 administrative failures. It is therefore essential to create the right administrative environment to manage implementation effectively and efficiently. Institutional responsibilities in implementing each incentive instrument, the role of the public and private sector in management, clear procedural steps in the implementation process that would balance the precautions to avoid fraud and the objective of efficiency, and a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating export promotion strategy are among the major decisions to be made.  Promotional and marketing activities to attract investment in export-oriented sub-sectors. Once the policy environment is improved, it is necessary to draw up a promotional and marketing program to encourage foreign and domestic investment in export-oriented subsectors. The program would clearly describe the opportunities Syria would offer and present it as a “full service� investment location in the Middle-East. The program, to be implemented by the Export Development and Promotion Agency (EDPA), would include: preparation of literature to describe the opportunities, policies, and benefits, organization of road shows in targeted countries (and for targeted sub-sectors), and maintenance of a quality up-to-date website.  Training staff and exporters. Syria has no experience in implementing the type of policies proposed in this paper. Adequate training of the staff as well as the exporters before the implementation of the program starts is essential for the success of the reforms. It is advisable to recruit trainers with hands on experience in countries where export incentives are effectively implemented. Field trips to successful exporting countries could also be included in the training programs.  Securing significant technical assistance for successful implementation of the action plan. As noted above, the success of the proposed program depends on effective implementation, which will require setting up the right institutions with staff adequately trained. Syria will need substantial technical assistance to meet these institutional, administrative, and training needs to put in place a world class implementation framework. 22 References Arvis, Jean François, Monica Alina Mustra, John Panzer, Lauri Ojala and Tapio Naula (2007), Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy, Washington, DC: The World Bank FIAS (2008), Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone Development. GOFZ (2003), Investment Law of the Syrian Free Zones. UNDP (2008), First National Competitiveness Report of the Syrian Economy 2007, Damascus, Syria: United Nations Development Program WEF (2008), The Global Enabling Trade Report, Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum World Bank (2009a), “Trade Reforms and Export Diversification in Syria: A Diagnostic Review�, draft report. World Bank (2009b), Duty and Tax Relief and Suspension Schemes: Improving Export Competitiveness.