SABER – TEACHERS | OVERVIEW SERBIA 76463 The Importance of Teacher Policies Research suggests that teacher quality is the main school-based predictor of student achievement and that several consecutive years of outstanding teaching can offset the learning deficits of disadvantaged students (Hanushek & Ri�vkin 2006; Nye, et al. 2004; Park & Hannum 2001; Rivkin, et al. 2005; Rockoff 2004; Sanders 1998; Sanders & Rivers 1996; and Vignoles, et al. 2000). However, it is not yet clear exactly which teacher policies can raise teacher effectiveness (Goldhaber 2002 and Rivkin, et al. 2005). Thus, devising effective policies to improve teaching quality remains a challenge. There is increasing interest across the globe to attract, retain, develop, and motivate great teachers. While the World Bank has ample experience in supporting teacher policy reforms in developing countries, until recently there was no systematic effort to offer data and analysis that can provide policy guidance on teacher policies. A new tool, Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER)-Teachers, fills this gap by collecting, analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating comprehensive information on teacher policies in primary and secondary education across a range of different education systems.i In this report, we discuss the findings from the application of SABER-Teachers in Serbia. Our goal is to enable policymakers to learn about how other countries address the same policy challenges related to teacher management and thus how to make well-informed policy choices that will lead to improved learning outcomes.ii Overview of SABER-Teachers SABER-Teachers collects data on 10 core teacher policy areas in order to offer a comprehensive overview of teacher policies in each education system (see Box 1). It is important to highlight that SABER-Teachers’ main focus is on the policies formally adopted by education systems. While in some cases the data collected also address how the teacher policy goals are achieved in practice, the nature of our data collection approach (based on interviews with key informants and official document review) do not allow for a thorough assessment of policy implementation. Therefore, complementary research will be useful in most settings. Box 1. Teacher policy areas 10 Teacher Policy areas Requirements to enter and remain in teaching Compensation (salary and non-salary benefits) Initial teacher education Retirement rules and benefits Recruitment and employment Monitoring and evaluation of teacher quality Teachers’ workload and autonomy Teacher representation and voice Professional development School leadership 1 SABER – TEACHERS | OVERVIEW SERBIA To analyze these data and offer informed policy guidance, SABER-Teachers uses data collected on the 10 policy areas to assess progress on eight teacher policy goals. These goals were identified through a review of evidence of research studies on teacher policies, and the analysis of policies of top performing and rapidly improving education systems. By classifying countries according to their performance on these goals, SABER - Teachers can help diagnose the key challenges that countries face in ensuring they have effective teachers. The 8 teacher policy goals are presented in Figure 1. Figure 1: 8 Teacher Policy Goals SABER-Teachers used three criteria to select these teacher policy goals. They are: (i) linked to performance through evidence provided by research and studies; (ii) a high priority for resource allocation; and (iii) actionable, that is, actions governments can take to improve education policy. The eight teacher policy goals exclude other objectives that countries might want to pursue to increase the effectiveness of teachers. These were excluded because there is to date insufficient empirical basis on which to make specific policy recommendations, either because evidence on policy interventions in that area remains unclear or because the top-performing education systems take very different approaches to reach these objectives.iii For a more detailed report on the eight teacher policy goals and the evidence supporting this selection, please see Vegas, et al. (2010). 2 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers Established Clear expectations guide teachers’ work. in school planning, and take part in internal Expectations for student and teacher evaluations. performance influence how potential entrants perceive the profession. The clearer these Teachers particularly need enough time to expectations are, the more likely a school complete all tasks outside of class time. In high- system is to get the type of teacher it seeks. performing systems, up to 50 percent of Second, expectations guide teachers’ work. The teachers’ work time is for conducting tasks more specified they are, the better teachers can other than teaching. High-performers such as organize their time and resources to meet Japan focus most of the non-teaching time on them. Finally, expectations can help align the professional development and curriculum goals of different key aspects of the profession planning. Serbia’s policies are similar: teachers (e.g., pre-service training, professional are expected to devote 60 percent of their development and teacher appraisals). The more working time to teaching, 30 percent to institutionalized these expectations are, the preparing lessons, 5 percent to administrative more likely all of these aspects will be working duties, and the remainder to extracurricular towards a common purpose and thus the more tasks. likely it will be achieved. Figure 2. Official Teacher Tasks SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers school systems can use to reach this goal: (1) expectations for what students should know and be able to do, and how teachers can help students reach these goals; (2) useful guidance on teachers’ use of time to be able to improve instruction at the school level. In Serbia, there are clear expectations for what students and teachers are supposed to do. Serbia has defined a set of national standards that inform teachers of required subject content and measurable indicators of learning that should be achieved by students at different grades. In addition, the tasks that teachers are expected to carry out are officially stipulated, Source: SABER-Teacher Data and recognize the diversity of teacher tasks outside of basic instruction. Figure 3. Official Time Spent Teaching 70% Primary Secondary 60% Policies recognize the diversity of teacher tasks 50% 60% 60% and provide time to complete them. 40% 50% Laws and regulations in Serbia recognize the 30% 37% 32% 37% 33% 33% diverse tasks of teachers. Teachers are 20% expected to teach, supervise students, grade 10% 0% assessments, integrate student populations, Serbia Japan South Korea Hungary stand in for absent teachers, mentor teachers, Source: SABER-Teacher Data participate in administrative tasks, collaborate 3 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 2. Attracting the Best into Teaching Emerging Attracting talented people to become teachers Teacher compensation includes benefits but is essential for several reasons (Guarino, does not vary with performance. Teacher pay is Santibáñez & Daley 2006). More capable subject to a specific scale that does not account applicants make more capable teachers (Boyd, for teacher effort or results. People who could et al. 2008). Top candidates maximize the be tomorrow’s high-performing teachers may impact of teacher training. When the quality of instead enter a profession that explicitly student teachers is low, training is likely to rewards hard work or high performance. focus more on making up for their weaknesses and less on building strengths. Finally, luring top Working conditions are unattractive. Working talent into teaching has a multiplier effect: conditions, such as student-teacher ratios and qualified teachers raise the esteem of the physical conditions play a role in job profession, which further attracts strong satisfaction. While there are standards of candidates. SABER - Teachers considers four infrastructure in Serbia, only 35 percent of policy levers school systems can use to reach school buildings meet these requirements. this goal: (1) minimum requirements to enter Future teachers may prefer to go work in training and teaching; (2) competitive pay; (3) professions in more attractive environments. appealing working conditions; and (4) attractive career opportunities. Effective teachers have opportunities to grow and advance in their careers. Opportunities for In Serbia, teachers are required to have an growth over a lifetime attract talented people advanced degree but have no other to the career and raise the prestige of the meaningful requirements. In Serbia, secondary profession. In Shanghai, talented members of school teachers are required to complete a the profession may later become administrative bachelor’s degree, and primary school teachers and academic leaders. Similarly, in Serbia, are required to complete a bachelor’s degree teachers may apply to become principals and and additional teacher-specific coursework. lead teachers. Career advancement in Serbia is Despite a rigorous education requirement, influenced by past teacher performance. teachers are not required to complete any other requirements to become a teacher, such Figure 4. Requirements to enter the profession as completing a written examination, interview, or practical assessment or have prior classroom experience. With only one path to enter the profession, Serbia may be limiting the pool of potential teachers. In Serbia, all teachers must pass through a consecutive training model, whether they are beginning their careers or are experienced non-teaching professionals. Successful education systems offer alternative paths to the profession for mid-career professionals, which include tailored curriculum or different requirements. Source: SABER-Teacher Data 4 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 3. Preparing Teachers with Useful Training and Experience Established Teachers need to be equipped with the skills program. Research has shown that practical they need to be effective in the classroom. Few experience is an important factor in teaching individuals are born effective teachers. quality. The more practical experience teacher Teachers need subject matter knowledge, entrants have, they the better prepared they classroom management skills, and lots of will be for their job. In Serbia, while current practice in order to be successful in a reforms will require teachers to gain teaching classroom. In addition, preparation puts all practice, policies stipulating the details of the teachers on an equal footing, giving them a requirement do not yet exist. If fully common framework to work and improve their implemented, these programs have the practice. potential to make teachers more effective in the classroom and reduce teacher turnover. SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers school systems can use to reach this goal: (1) Figure 5. Models of teacher training, Selected minimum standards for pre-service training Systems programs; (2) required classroom experience for all teachers. Serbia lacks the necessary regulation to require adequate teacher preparation. Although there is a law requires a minimum amount of pre-service training, there are no policies for accreditation or detailing do not yet exist. Teacher training colleges are not yet required to undergo certification. Those who want to become a primary or Source: SABER-Teacher Data secondary school teacher are required to complete coursework beyond a bachelor’s degree. However, there are no official Figure 6. Percent of applicants admitted to stipulations or recommendations for how much teacher preparation programs time teachers must dedicate to pedagogy 100% theory, instruction methods, or subject content. 17% 80% Entrance to teacher preparation programs is 60% not very selective; in 2011, there were 1061 40% applicants to teacher education programs and 20% 92% 908 (86%) gained entry. Entry is not determined 0% by needs of the teaching profession. Singapore Serbia Source: SABER-Teacher Data Teacher entrants are not required to have practical experience through a mentoring 5 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 4. Matching Teachers’ Skills with Students’ Needs Emerging Ensuring that teachers work in schools where their skills are most needed is important for Serbia has formally identified subjects with an promoting equity and efficiency. Strategic insufficient supply of teachers but has limited teacher deployment is a way to ensure all means to redress shortages. In almost all students in an education system have an equal countries, teachers of certain subjects are of opportunity to learn. Without purposeful particularly high demand. Respondents in incentives, teachers tend to gravitate towards Serbia identified a shortage of teachers in schools with better working conditions, which mathematics and foreign languages, especially often serve students already performing well English. While the government recognizes (Boyd, et al. 2005a; Hanushek, et al. 2004). shortage subjects, they do not provide Second, it is a way of ensuring teachers are incentives to attract more teachers to these distributed efficiently—i.e., to minimize the subjects and increase the supply of teachers of number of surplus teachers at a given grade, those subjects. High performers identify, subject, or geographic area. Finally, ensuring monitor, and use incentives to attract teachers teachers are a good match for their school can of shortage subjects. For example, when the also increase their effectiveness and reduce United Kingdom faced shortages of turnover rates (Boyd, et al. 2002, 2005b; mathematics and science teachers, they offered Jackson 2010). payments to people studying to become teachers in those subjects to defray education SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers costs (OECD, 2011). school systems can use to reach this goal: (1) incentives for teachers to work in hard-to-staff Figure 7. Incentives for Teachers in Hard-to- schools; and (2) incentives for teachers to teach staff Schools, Selected Systems critical shortage areas. Some policies exist to distribute quality teachers in all schools. Attracting effective teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools, which may serve students from disadvantaged populations, is a challenge for many countries, and often requires a complex set of incentives. Using seniority as a basis for approving transfer requests may permit the most seasoned teachers to leave hard-to-staff schools, leaving less experienced and potentially less capable teachers at underserved schools. In Serbia, transfers are not determined by teacher Source: SABER-Teacher Data experience. In Serbia, official policy dictates that teacher transfers are based exclusively on school needs. 6 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 5. Leading Teachers with Strong Principals Emerging The quality of school leaders is second only to internship or mentoring program to help classroom teaching as a predictor of student administrators be practiced when they start learning (Eberts & Stone 1988; Leithwood, et their job. Additionally, some high-performing al. 2006). Quality principals attract and retain systems provide incentives for principals to quality teachers (Boyd, et al. 2009; Ingersoll improve school quality: Serbia does not provide 2001a, 2001b; Papa Jr., Lankford & Wyckoff any such incentives. 2002). In addition, capable principals can spearhead much-needed change at the school Principals are expected to support teachers in level, so having strong leaders is important not improving their instruction. More than just only to ensure acceptable levels of performance administrators, effective principals support but also to drive improvements. Finally, good teachers in their work. Principals in Serbia are principals can facilitate teachers’ work and explicitly expected to support teachers to continuous improvement. The more capable a improve instruction and their classroom principal is, the more he or she can support practice. Principals are expected to serve as teachers, create a sense of community, make leaders in their schools, and take part in teacher teachers feel valued and ease their anxiety and school evaluations, enumerating teacher about external pressures (Mulford 2003). responsibilities. SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers Figure 8. Requirements to become a Principal, school systems can use to reach this goal: (1) Selected Education Systems education system’s investment in developing qualified school leaders; (2) decision-making authority for school principals to support and improve instructional practice. In Serbia, principals must complete specific coursework, but may lack practical experience. To ensure principals are trained at their job, they must have a minimum number of 3 years of professional teaching experience, possess a degree beyond a bachelor’s degree and complete a written test. However, their preparation does not require any practical learning experience, such as an internship or Source: SABER-Teacher Data taking part in an induction program. While principals may have the skills that can be taught in a classroom, they may lack the practical experience needed to be effective. Some high- performing systems require participation in an 7 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 6. Monitoring Teaching and Learning Established Assessing teacher effectiveness is essential to internal performance evaluations, but the devise strategies for improving learning results of teacher performance evaluations can outcomes. First, teacher and student not be tracked over time. It is not known evaluations help identify good practices, which whether these policies are put into practice. can then be shared among the teaching staff to improve school performance. Second, Few mechanisms are used to evaluate teacher identifying low-performing teachers and performance. Research suggests that no single students is necessary to support them in a method of evaluating teacher performance is timely manner. Education systems need to be failsafe. Most high performing systems conduct able to know when to provide struggling teacher evaluations using a multiplicity of classrooms with adequate support to improve. mechanisms of data collection and varied Finally, such information is useful for criteria for assessment. In Serbia, performance accountability purposes. evaluations include only self-assessments, principals, and classroom observation as SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers sources. The most effective evaluation methods school systems can use to reach this goal: (1) make use of student achievement data and availability of data on student achievement in external evaluators. order to inform teaching and policy; (2) adequate systems to monitor teacher In Serbia, a variety of criteria are used to performance; (3) multiple mechanisms to assess teacher performance. These include evaluate teacher performance. subject matter knowledge, teaching methods, student assessment methods, and student There are few methods to monitor student academic achievement. performance throughout the system. National student assessments can help authorities Figure 9. Methods Used to Monitor Teachers identify student groups, schools, and classes that are in need of attention. In Serbia, the only national assessment is the final examination at age 14. While this assessment allows student scores to be tracked to teachers, earlier assessments could help identify struggling individual and groups of students in need of greater teacher training or more focused or tailored resources. There are some systems in place to monitor teacher performance. In Serbia, official policy Source: SABER-Teacher Data resquires teachers regularly participate in 8 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 7. Supporting Teachers to Improve Instruction Emerging Helping teachers be more effective in the addition, they include teacher peer learning classroom is vital. All teachers can improve, within the schools. High-performing systems regardless of how effective they are at one use professional development activities that are point in time. Support mechanisms are practice oriented, including teacher networks, necessary to help teachers reach their potential visits to observe highly effective teachers, and and perform at their best. Thus, during periods mentoring or coaching opportunities. of transitions, teachers will need additional help to sustain their performance. Finally, support Teacher professional development is assigned mechanisms can go a long way in preventing based on perceived needs. To ensure support is burnout and reducing turnover. Even motivated customized to each teacher’s needs, high teachers may choose to leave if they are performing systems use performance consistently ineffective, do not know how to evaluations to develop customized professional improve and receive little support. development plans or assign mentors. In Serbia, SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers self and principal evaluations inform school systems can use to reach this goal: (1) professional development, but may result in availability of teacher professional development being assigned a supervisor. opportunities; (2) activities that are focused on collaboration and instructional improvement; Figure 10. Required Days per Year of (3) making sure teacher professional Professional Development development is assigned based on needs. Teachers are required to take part in a short period of professional development. Teachers in Serbia are required to take part in 20 hours of professional development annually. Given the high returns of effective professional development, Serbia would benefit from Source: SABER-Teacher data increasing the number of hours of professional development. The topics covered in Figure 11.Professional Development Methods professional development are extensive, and include instructional practice, classroom management, and content knowledge. Serbia’s policies prioritize some highly effective mediums of professional development. Research suggests that effective teacher professional development is collaborative and provides opportunities for the analysis in-situ of instructional practice, as opposed to one-time workshops or conferences. Methods used in Serbia’s activities include trainings that focus on improving teacher practice by incorporating classroom observation and evaluation of teacher competencies into professional development. In Source: SABER-Teachers data 9 SABER – TEACHERS | COUNTRY REPORT SERBIA | 2012 8. Motivating Teachers to Perform Latent Adequate incentives for teachers can There are some minimum mechanisms to hold contribute to effective teaching and learning. teachers accountable. Requiring teachers to First, incentives are a way for school systems to meet some standards in order to remain in the signal their seriousness in achieving certain teaching profession can facilitate the removal of goals. The more aligned incentives are with the ineffective teachers. In Serbia, primary and behaviors and outcomes they want to produce secondary school teachers are required to in teaching, the more likely they will obtain participate in professional development and them. Second, incentives are also a way to performance evaluations as a requisite to recognize teachers’ work. Teaching is a maintain their credentials. However, they challenging job and incentives can let teachers cannot be dismissed for poor performance, know the results they have achieved are valued incompetence, or absenteeism. so that they continue working hard to sustain them. Finally, some types of incentives can also Additionally, it is vital to be able to remove influence the profile of the teaching profession unsafe teachers from the profession. In Serbia, and make it more competitive, dynamic, and teachers can be dismissed for misconduct and performance-driven. child abuse. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers Teacher compensation is not linked to school systems can use to reach this goal: (1) performance. To align teacher incentives, linking career opportunities to teachers’ systems that are most effective at motivating performance; (2) having mechanisms to hold teachers provide incentives to perform well by teachers accountable; (3) linking teacher providing incentives such as performance compensation to performance. bonuses. In Serbia, high performing teachers do not receive bonuses as rewards for their work. Promotions, but not hiring practices, are In addition, performance evaluations have no informed by performance. To ensure teachers effect on teacher compensation. are capable before granting them long-term contracts, authorities need both a probation Figure 12. Incorporating Teacher Performance period upon initial hires and the right to not offer long-term contracts to teachers who do not perform during the probation period. In Serbia, there is a mandatory probation period, but performance on the job does not factor into whether teachers receive appointments. Promotions decisions, on the other hand, are informed by past performance. Source: SABER-Teachers data 10 Summary of Key Policy Options Policy Goal and Levers 3. Preparing Teachers with Useful Training and Experience Although recent reforms will incorporate teacher competencies and provide teaching practice, some some policies are necessary .  Serbia could elucidate the requirements for the opportunities for teacher candidates to acquire classroom experience. 4. Matching Teachers’ Skills with Students’ Needs Policies do not exist to ensure sufficient quality teachers in hard-to- Emerging staff schools.  Serbia could formally identify hard-to-staff schools, monitor the overall supply of teachers in such schools, and provide incentives for teachers to enter and remain in those schools.  Serbia could provide incentives to teachers of mathematics, foreign languages, and other shortage subjects such as higher pay, better promotion chances, or loan forgiveness. 5. Leading Teachers with Strong Principals Principals must have teaching experience and specific coursework, but Emerging not practical administrative experience.  Serbia could develop a system for required internships or require experienced principals to serve as mentors of new principals. 8. Motivating Teachers to Perform Serbia requires probation periods of new teachers, but does not use Latent determine hiring or compensation based on performance.  Serbia could institute formal reviews or some other means of assessing performance before extending contracts.  Serbia could institute formal performance reviews that affect compensation. 11 References Argys, L. M., & Reese, D. I. (1995). "Unionization and School Productivity: A Reexamination." Research in Labor Economics, 14, 49-68. Ballou, D., & Podgursky, M. (2002). "Returns to Seniority among Public School Teachers." Journal of Human Resources, 37(4), 892-912. Baugh, W. H., & Stone, J. A. (1982). 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"Teacher Unionization and the Quality of Education in Peru: An Empirical Evaluation Using Survey Data." Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. i In order to offer guidance to policy makers in client countries on how to raise education quality, the Education Unit at the World Bank’s Human Development Department has launched Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER), an initiative that seeks to collect information about different education systems’ policy domains, analyze it to identify common challenges and promising solutions, and make it widely available to inform countries’ decisions on where and how to in vest in order to improve education quality. SABER - Teachers is one such policy domain. ii The focus of the initiative is the design of teacher policies as opposed to their implementation on the ground. A number of complementary activities will be looking at implementation in a sample of countries as this will involve a different methodological approach and will require more financial and human resources. iii For example, SABER-Teachers collects information on teacher organizations (as part of the policy a rea of “teacher representation and voice�) and will make it publicly available. Yet no clear trend has emerged regarding whether (and if so, how) government s should engage with these organizations in policy formulation or consultation. To be sure, many studies have looked at the impact of unionization on schools’ productivity (Argys and Reese, 1995; Eberts and Stone, 1986; and Hoxby 1996), student learning (Kingdon and Teal, 2008; Kleiner and Petree, 1988; Kurth, 1987; Register and Grimes, 1991; and Steelman et al, 2000) , teachers’ wages (Ballou and Podgursky, 2002; Baugh and Stone, 1982; Bee and Dolton, 1995; and Dolton and Robson, 1996), working conditions (Eberts, 1984; Murillo et al, 2002; and Zegarra and Ravina, 2003) and education policy (Goldschmidt and Stuart, 1986 and Woodbury, 1985). But even top-performing countries differ widely in how much they engage, to what extent they regulate, and how they organize teachers’ unions. Data collected by SABER-Teachers will offer guidance on how to approach these issues in the future. 13