SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT SEPTEMBER 2022 WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT INTERVENTIONS TO INCREASE WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT IN SOUTH ASIA? ASSET TRANSFERS AND PROPERTY LAW Najaf ZahraŦ, Amna JavedŦ, and Ana Maria Munoz BoudetŦ BACKGROUND Figure 1a: Gender Gaps in Home Ownership in South Asia (Percentage, 15-29 years) The World Bank’s South Asia Region Gender Innovation Lab (SAR GIL) is conducting a systematic review and me- Women Men ta-analysis of interventions with direct or indirect effects Regional Average 9.0 31.0 on measures of women’s economic empowerment. The Afghanistan 16.7 48.6 review focuses on changes in labor force participation, India 11.0 39.1 employment, income, and empowerment outcomes. The goal is to document what has worked and what has not for Maldives 8.0 16.2 women in the region (covering all countries: Afghanistan, Nepal 7.0 18.0 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and 30.7 Pakistan 2.0 Sri Lanka), the types of interventions implemented, and 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 identifiable gaps in knowledge and action. The review Source: The World Bank Gender Data Portal. organizes interventions in six broad categories: skills, Note: Data for Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka is not available. assets, credit, labor market, entrepreneurship, and em- powerment. This note summarizes the main findings from Figure 1b: Gender Gaps in Land Ownership in South Asia asset transfer interventions and changes in inheritance (Percentage, 15-29 years) and property right policies. Women Men Regional Average 6.9 21.6 WHAT IS INCLUDED? Afghanistan 9.6 30.9 Patriarchal norms and gendered legislation limit the abil- ity of women to own, control and distribute assets. The India 6.9 26.3 resulting gender gap in asset ownership prevents women Nepal 10.0 19.3 from taking advantage of available economic opportunities and realizing personal emotional and physical well-being. Pakistan 1.2 9.8 Table  1 shows the gender gaps in property and asset 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 ownership in South Asia. Furthermore, Figures 1a and 1b Source: The World Bank Gender Data Portal. depict gender gaps in home and land ownership across Note: Data for Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka is not available. different countries in the South Asia region. Policies and programs that enable women to access, own, and control evaluations that report on the results of programs or property and other assets are effective empowerment legislative reforms in South Asia that have tried to achieve tools that enable women to become contributing agents improved economic outcomes for women by narrowing in the economy. This note systematically reviews impact the gender gap in the distribution of assets. For this review, assets consist of productive assets and wealth transfers. Productive assets help generate cash Ŧ World Bank streams, while wealth transfers are assets passed on to SEPTEMBER 2022 | 1 Figure 2: Search Methodology Identi cation A preliminary list of Backward and forward Resources were rechecked Stage 2: Snowballing databases was searched snowballing was conducted using the World Bank Stage 1: Base Search library lists and the Stage 3: Recheck connected paper’s website Studies were stored in a The process was repeated Final studies were added snowballing repository un�l no new studies were to a thema�c database Screening iden�fied Eligibility decisions were made a�er reading the �tle and abstract of each resource. Addi�onal scoping was done to iden�fy outcomes and methodology for some ar�cles. Each study outcome was assigned to a category, either Eligibility employment, empowerment, or income. Poten�al papers were also checked for their iden�fica�on strategy. Key informa�on about programs and par�cipants was extracted for each study including type of interven�on, sample popula�on, econometric methodology, and impact details. All studies added were given unique IDs based on interven�on type, popula�on, econometric methodology/specifica�on, year, and outcomes. If a study reported impact es�mates using more than one specifica�on, it was coded using different codes for methodology/specifica�on. Key Information family, such as gifts and dowries. These include traditional note reports selected impact estimates that the reviewers asset types like livestock or agricultural equipment. The deemed most useful. analysis also includes transfers of non-agricultural assets like jewelry, gold, phones, bicycles, and bank accounts. The studies included were restricted to experimental Laws and policies in many South Asian countries prevent and quasi-experimental evaluations (such as randomized women from acquiring productive assets, so our analysis controlled trials and natural experiments) of policies or also includes evaluations of reforms of such measures. interventions implemented in any South Asian country, irrespective of date. Inclusion of an intervention was not The review includes English-language studies published limited by time, duration, frequency, or method of inter- between January 1990 and March 2020 across white and vention exposure. Figure 2 summarizes the identification gray literature (peer reviewed journals, working papers, process. Final studies were selected using a three-stage program or agency reports, and academic thesis, among filtering process. The first stage filtered select papers others) identified via an extensive search of multiple relevant to the region and programs that were specifically databases.1 Two reviewers independently searched and for women or included female beneficiaries. The second extracted data and information about projects, including stage filtered for intervention type and the third for impact effects, design, and intervention components. They methodology.2 also extracted other outcome-specific data, such as units of reporting, coefficient significance, and standard errors. Eligible studies were those that evaluated any of the If a study reported impact estimates using more than one following: specification, the reviewers recorded all of them. This • An asset transfer program that included a livestock transfer (cow, goat, chicken, buffalo) along with training and provision of other health services. 1 The search included the following databases: EconLit, Web of Science, Science Direct, National Bureau of Economic Research, Google Scholar, World Bank e-Library, UNU-WIDER, Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, Institute of Labor Economics, Center for Global Development, International Growth Center, American Economic Association (AEA), AEA 2 Second-stage search terms included dowry, inheritance, bride, bride price, cow, goat, sewing, Registry, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, RePEc Research Papers in Economics sewing machine, land, property, gold, jewelry, bicycle, seeds, fertilizer, machine, chicken, IDEAS database, and JSTOR. poultry, phone, mobile, livestock, asset, asset(s) and transfer(s). 2 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Table 1: Gender Gaps in Property Rights and Asset Ownership in South Asia Do men and Do sons and Do female and Does the law Does the law Can a woman women have daughters male surviving grant spouses provide for open a bank equal have equal spouses have equal the valuation account in the ownership rights to equal rights to administrative of same way as a rights to inherit assets inherit assets? authority over nonmonetary man? immovable from their assets during contributions? property? parents? marriage? Afghanistan ✗ ✗ ✗ Bangladesh ✗ ✗ ✗ Bhutan ✗ ✗ India ✗ Maldives ✗ ✗ ✗ Nepal ✗ Pakistan ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ Sri Lanka ✗ Source: World Bank Women, Business and the Law • A legal reform that enabled women to acquire regional reviews added 20 more relevant studies to the productive assets (land transfer, inheritance, land titling list. The process yielded a list of 59 studies that were then and property policy mandates). tested for eligibility based on in-depth analysis. The final • A financial (bank account) intervention that improved assets database has 33 impact evaluations—17 evaluate women’s access to a bank account. inheritance, land titling, and property rights mandates; 14 • A wealth transfer intervention. evaluate productive assets transfer interventions; and 2 evaluate bank account interventions. Details of the papers In addition, the studies were required to meet all the included in this review are in Table A.1. following conditions: • Used experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation methods. ASSET TRANSFER PROGRAMS • Reported outcomes for women either because they The mapped studies are categorized according to three were the direct target population or impacts for them as themes—asset plus (explained in the next section), inher- a subpopulation are reported. itance and land titling, and bank account interventions.3 • Reported required outcomes such as employment (labor The asset transfer programs include the Targeting the market outcomes, income, earnings, self-employment) Ultra Poor (TUP) model of the Bangladesh Rural Advance- and empowerment (agency, well-being, happiness). ment Committee (BRAC); Bandhan’s Graduation program, • In addition, the studies were required to meet all the Afghanistan’s TUP Program; and Heifer International’s following conditions: Smallholders in Livestock Value Chain (SLVC) program. The review also includes studies that evaluate the impact of The database search found 281,285 potential studies amendments to the 1956 Hindu Succession Act (HSA) in based on key words for all filter types. After skimming the India, Nijo Griha, Nijo Bhumi (NGNB) program4 (also in titles and abstracts of those studies, 122 were selected for further review. After more detailed scrutiny of the titles and abstracts, 39 studies were shortlisted for in-depth 3 4 The search process did not identify any programs with asset-only transfers. The government of West Bengal originally launched the land allocation program in 2006 to review. Snowballing of these 39 studies and 17 global and provide land for the poorest landless agricultural-laborer households. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 3 India), and land titling constitutional amendments (2002 assets such as van cars and rickshaws7 or commodities, and 2007) in Nepal. such as vegetables or fruits, were the main assets trans- ferred. In addition, beneficiaries received a weekly stipend, ASSET PLUS INTERVENTIONS: THE “BIG PUSH” medical counseling, hygiene training, awareness-raising MODEL information about the effects of child marriage and child For our review, we define “asset plus” interventions as labor and the importance of education through weekly bundled programs that provide additional interventions, home visits by staff. such as training, mentorship, and health facilities, along The Bangladesh TUP model has inspired replication in oth- with the asset transferred. Thirteen studies evaluate asset er South Asian countries, including in Afghanistan, India, plus interventions (programs that provide training or other and Pakistan.8 The 2015 Afghanistan TUP program9 provid- support beyond assets) in the region. Nine studies evaluate ed most participating women with cows,10 in addition to the impact of BRAC’s Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty mentoring and training for 12 months. While the program Reduction (CFPR) program (phase 1 and 2), three evaluate is like the Bangladesh model, its focus is on larger livestock the graduation program in India, and two evaluate the and it offers a health subsidy. However, it only offers Afghanistan TUP and Heifer International’s SLVC model in coaching support for shorter periods. In India, Bandhan, Nepal. a microfinance institution, implements the graduation Asset plus interventions are “big push interventions” that program, which mostly transfers goats and cows, but seek to transform the lives of women stuck in ultra-poverty5 also engages for 18 months with the beneficiaries, who through occupational change. The complete asset transfer become Bandhan’s microfinance clients upon graduation. package eases the financial and human capital constraints In Nepal, Heifer International’s SLVC also transfers livestock the ultra poor face and may therefore enable them to together with a training program seeking to transition move away from traditional, low-skilled and temporary women, households, and communities out of poverty. It occupations, and toward more secure and empowering has four main components: self-help group formation, entrepreneurial activities. technical training, values-based training, and livestock BRAC designed the CFPR6 in 2002 for poor, rural, and mar- transfer. The Heifer International model differs from the ginalized women, who lack physical capital and skills and TUP models in its unique “pay it forward” component, are constrained by socio-cultural norms that prevent them which encourages participants to pass on benefits by re- from being active economic agents. The program works cruiting new members into the program, gifting livestock with women for two years and transfers an income-gen- of the same value to others, and sharing the information erating asset (such as cows, goats, chickens, or ducks) to and knowledge they have acquired. the homestead, with the aim of sustainably increasing PROPERTY RIGHTS, LAND TITLING, AND the household’s economic and social capabilities. Along INHERITANCE POLICY with the asset transfer, eligible beneficiaries also received training on the use of the productive assets, a weekly sub- Fifteen studies evaluate the HSA amendments, one eval- sistence allowance, close supervision from program staff, uates the NGNB program, and the other evaluates two health support (such as free medical treatment, regular constitutional amendments in Nepal. Property and inher- visits by the health volunteers), and social development itance laws have historically been biased against women. initiatives (such as community support, awareness-raising The property rights of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs training). The first phase of CFPR ran from 2002 to 2006 are governed by the 1956 HSA. Under the act, daughters in the poorest three districts in Bangladesh (Rangpur, of a male dying intestate (without a will) had rights to an Nilphamari, and Kurigram). Based on promising findings, equal share in their father’s individual property, but not BRAC initiated the second phase, with expanded coverage, to the joint family property. Sons, on the other hand, had from 2007 to 2011. The expansion included urban areas of a right to joint family property at birth and were “Hindu Bangladesh in 2010 where instead of a livestock transfer, coparceners.” Being a coparcener implied that their share 7 Some beneficiaries in the urban program are given rickshaws or small vans measuring two and a half square feet with three or four wheels (Ara, et al. 2016). 5 The ultra-poor include those living under less than half of the minimum $1.25 a-day 8 The model has also been replicated in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Honduras. threshold, and hence earn 60 to 70 cents a day or less. 9 The Afghanistan TUP program was implemented by the Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance. 6 For more information on program design see Matin (2002). 10 Cows (91.5 percent), sheep (7.8 percent), goats (0.7 percent). 4 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT of the property could not be willed away, and they alone banking programs that were implemented with local could demand a division of the ancestral property while microfinance institutions—Akhuwat and Mezaan Bank in older coparceners were alive. Similar inequalities existed Multan, Pakistan, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural in Nepal before the 2002 and 2007 constitutional amend- Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) along with ments. An unmarried woman of 35 years or older was the local state government in Madhya Pradesh, India. Only equally entitled to parental property as her brothers, but two evaluations identified by the search process measured she had to return the property after she was married un- the impact of having access to a bank account on wom- less her mother, father, brothers, and brothers’ sons were en’s empowerment and labor market outcomes. Other dead. A married woman of 35 years or older was entitled mapped studies did not satisfy the eligibility criteria for to a share of her husband’s property only if they had been methodology11 and women-specific samples. Both select- married for 15 years. ed studies measure the impact of having a bank account on labor market outcomes and empowerment for women. The HSA was amended between the 1970s and 1990s and aimed to make inheritance more equitable by making women equally likely to inherit as their brothers. PROGRAM DESIGN Implementation has been staggered over time, with The final pool of selected evaluations covers policies and Kerala amending in 1976, Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil programs in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Nadu in 1989, Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994. The Pakistan.12 amendments provide unmarried women independent inheritance rights and the right to a share by survivorship PROGRAM TARGET AREAS in joint family property, equal with their brothers. Apart from the BRAC CFPR Urban program (Ara, et al. The review also maps evaluations of land titling policies— 2016), which was administered in slum habitations in the NGNB program in India and Nepal’s titling constitu- Dhaka, all other asset transfer programs operated in rural tional amendments in 2002 and 2007. The government of areas in Afghanistan, India, Nepal, or Pakistan. Property West Bengal in India launched the land allocation program rights amendments were enacted at a national level for in 2006 (amended in 2009 and then renamed Nijo Griha, India’s HSA on multiple occasions, most significantly for Nijo Bhumi in 2011) to provide land to the poorest landless this review in 2005, and in Nepal with the 2002 and 2007 agricultural-laborer households. The program focused on constitutional amendments. The NGNB homestead bill is families dependent on agricultural wages and menial labor implemented in West Bengal in India and targets poor and and living below the poverty line. Once eligible, the land landless households in rural areas. documents were issued in the woman’s name only or jointly with the woman’s name for married couples. PROGRAM SAMPLE The two constitutional amendments passed in 2002 and While all studies focus their analysis on women the nature 2007 in Nepal significantly improved land ownership and characteristics of the target population vary across for women. The 2002 amendment guaranteed equal the asset transfer types. Asset plus interventions focus on inheritance of property at birth by sons and unmarried ultra-poor women, inheritance and property rights man- daughters. It also enabled married women to share their dates target unmarried Hindu13 women, and bank account husband’s property after marriage. The 2007 amend- interventions mostly seek to benefit poor rural women. ments gave women additional security by giving sons and All asset plus programs target ultra-poor women in select- daughters equal rights to ancestral property regardless of ed countries. Ultra-poor households are characterized by their marital status. high illiteracy rates and debts, and low savings. The BRAC BANK ACCOUNTS CFPR program uses a three-step targeting procedure at a village level and then household level. In the poorest Interventions that enable women to open a regular bank districts, a participatory rural appraisal at the village-level account with local banks are important because women ranks households by wealth, these are then assessed for who have a functional bank account may have greater bargaining power with respect to decision-making and overall empowerment. Access to a bank account may 11 Studies that did not satisfy eligibility do not have a viable control group. They are either qualitative or descriptive analyses. also encourage progressive attitudes about women in 12 No programs were mapped in Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. the workforce. The review includes evaluations of two 13 Buddhist, Jain, and Sikh women are also included in some studies. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 5 eligibility. Depending on program structure, beneficiaries that encourages participants to share experiences and for the TUP program are selected using different formulas. learning, including the new wealth, with other households Misha, et al. (2019) select target beneficiaries from the in need. bottom 25 percent of households at the community level in terms of overall wealth. Bandiera, et al. 2017 select 6 The bank account interventions in the review look at the percent of the village population as defined by a partici- impact of opening a bank account on women’s economic and general empowerment outcomes. Field, et al. (2021) patory wealth ranking. Lastly, Ahmed, et al. 2009, zoom in test the impact of having greater control over earned on the bottom 10 percent of the population as identified income on women’s labor market outcomes. The interven- through a combination of geographical, participatory, and tions are of three types: proxy means test targeting. • An information-based intervention, where participants The amendments to the HSA of 1956 were enacted at a were informed that they could open a bank account, free national level in 2005. Studies in the pool of selected eval- of charge, during an upcoming account opening drive,14 uations include all women affected by the mandate in both • An information and direct deposit intervention, where reformed and non-reformed states. However, some make along with the information transfer, salaries were additional comparisons by religion (Roy 2008, Mookerjee directly deposited to women’s individual account instead 2019, Naaraayanan 2019, Heath and Tan 2019, Sapkal of their household account, and 2017, Rosenblum 2015), existence of land titles (Santos, et • Additional training along with the information transfer al. 2014, Valera, et al. 2018), land ownership (Rosenblum and direct deposit, which included stories about fictional 2015), father’s death (Brule 2010, Deininger, Goyal and women account owners and various bank services. Nagarajan 2013), or age (Roy 2015, Suteau 2020). For the Ahmad, et al. (2020) uses religious speech to encourage NGNB program, eligible families lived below the poverty women to open a savings account with a local bank. The line, relied on daily agriculture wage and menial labor. interventions include a motivational religious speech that Along with the eligibility criteria, the program selected encourages women to open an Islamic savings account; an households in order of priority, where priority was given opening fee subsidy that waived account opening costs, to laborers and artisans who had been landless for two and administrative assistance. While the first interven- generations, were women-headed households, and had tion tests the impact of bank accounts on labor market only daughters and no sons. outcomes, the second tests it on multiple dimensions of women’s empowerment. Finally, of the two bank account interventions, Field, et al. (2021) choose a sample of women from four districts Studies evaluating inheritance and property rights laws having severe gender inequalities and employed through use an exogenous historical variation that separates states the MGNREGS. Ahmad, et al. (2020) have a sample of poor and districts into reformed and non-reformed to measure Muslim women, who at the time of selection had taken the impact of policy revisions on women’s inheritance, their first microfinance loan. employment, income, and empowerment. DESIGN OF INTERVENTIONS COST OF PROGRAMS The TUP model tests the impact of being a beneficiary on Of the 13 studies evaluating asset transfer programs, only multiple empowerment measures, labor market, and in- 5 discuss program costs. The cost of the TUP package in come outcomes. The control group consists of ultra-poor Afghanistan15 averages $1,688 per beneficiary, of which women who were not selected for the TUP program. the income-generating asset accounts for $1,312, the The asset plus study by Janzen, et al. (2017) is the only consumption stipend costs $15, and a health subsidy costs study in the review that unpacks welfare impacts of the $22. In India, the TUP program costs $33116 per beneficiary, different components of the bundled treatment. The first of which the productive asset is estimated at $101, allow- treatment arm includes a full package—beneficiaries are ance at $65, and the remainder is attributed to overhead given a livestock transfer, skills-based technical training, and administration costs. Finally, in Bangladesh the BRAC and values-based non-technical training. The second arm program costs between $292 and $1,120 per beneficiary. consists only of training and the third includes a livestock transfer along with skills-based technical training, but not values-based nontechnical training. The intervention 14 Women were assisted in opening accounts. 15 Estimate reported in nominal terms. design also includes a unique “pay it forward” component 16 Estimate reported in PPP. 6 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Apart from the TUP models, Heifer International’s “pay it socially constrained and unconstrained women.22 Access forward” program (full package with the spill-over bene- to a bank account increases the aggregate labor supply for fits) costs $137 per beneficiary.17 constrained women by 0.213 and 0.193 standard devia- tions in the short and long run, respectively (in compari- son, the aggregate labor supply in the short run for uncon- PROGRAM IMPACTS strained women increases by 0.150 standard deviations). Program impacts are categorized into three groups: labor Constrained women benefit more from the intervention market, income, and empowerment. For most studies, and increase work through both the MGNREGS and the impact estimates are reported for treated women in the private sector by 0.263 and 0.226 standard deviations sample. in the short run. In comparison, unconstrained women report increased work by 0.168 and 0.153 for MGNREGS LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES and the private sector work in the short run. Ahmad, et al. (2020) do not report on any labor market outcomes. Of the 34 studies mapped for asset transfer interventions, 16 gauge the impact of asset transfer interventions on Of 16 studies that evaluate inheritance and property rights labor market outcomes for women. Labor market impacts mandates, only 4 report estimates on actual inheritance vary across studies, with most measuring women’s em- for women. Evidence on actual increases in inherited land ployment in agriculture and menial occupations. Appendix and property is mixed, with Deininger, et al. (2013) and Table A.2 provides details on the measurement and mag- Brule (2010) showing an increase in women’s likelihood nitude of impacts across studies. of inheriting actual land, and Roy (2015) showing no impact.23 Deininger, et al. (2013) show a 14.5 percentage Across the 16 studies, the review mapped 151 total out- point increase in a woman’s probability of inheriting land comes and 42 unique outcomes across short, medium, for women whose fathers had died before the reform and and long periods.18 Most studies report impacts for at 23.5 percentage point increase for women whose fathers least one labor market outcome that is significant at the had died six or more years after the reform.24 99 percent confidence interval. Farm and non-farm em- ployment increase for most women, and women spend Of the 16 papers evaluating inheritance and property additional time on productive activities, including agricul- rights mandates, only 4 report outcomes specific to the ture. Impacts are also positive for entrepreneurship and labor market for women. Where those outcomes are self-employment, with most women inclined to start their reported, women are more likely to work outside their own entrepreneurial ventures after asset transfer or policy homes, especially in professional, technical, and mana- reform.19 gerial capacities. They are also more likely to venture into entrepreneurship, with Naaraayanan (2019) reporting a Of the two studies gauging impacts of bank account inter- 16 percent yearly increase in new enterprises by women. ventions, Field, et al. (2021) report employment outcomes Asset plus interventions are successful in reducing partic- through a labor supply index developed using data from ipation in low-skill employment types, such as domestic the MGNREGS. In the short run,20 women increase their work and wage labor. The intervention also reduces the labor supply by 0.165 standard deviations of an aggregate incidence of begging among the ultra poor. Das and Misha work index. Labor supply in the private sector for treated (2010) report a 6.2 and 12 percentage point reduction, women increased by 0.166 standard deviations and for respectively, in domestic work and work as day laborers25 MGNREGS workers by 0.186 standard deviations.21 The and, Bandiera, et al. (2017) report a 26 percent reduction study also reports separate results for a subsample of in the labor supply26 for maid services among ultra-poor women. 17 Full treatment (basic intervention, values-based training, and productive asset) beneficiaries cost about $118 each, no goat (basic intervention and values-based training) beneficiaries cost $87, and no value-based training (basic intervention and productive asset) beneficiaries cost $550. The no value-based training treatment arm is more expensive than the others because 22 Socially constrained women are less likely to be active in the labor market, have low levels of the beneficiaries are not encouraged to “pay it forward” to other community members, which empowerment and are victims of norms against female work. reduces the program’s economies of scale. 23 The inconsistency in results between Roy (2015) and Deininger, et al. (2013), both of which 18 Studies report different measures of time tenure. Long run is defined as 7 and 9 years, evaluate amendments of the HSA, is likely due to methodological difference in identifying the medium term is 4 and 6 years, and short term is any time greater than one year but shorter causal effect of the reform. While Deininger, et al. (2013) exploit variation in the timing of death than the medium term (Misha, et al. 2019; Banerjee, et al. 2016; Asadullah and Ara, 2016). of a woman’s father, Roy (2015) uses variation in the timing of death of a woman’s grandfather, 19 The only exception are estimates reported by Heath and Tan (2019) and Misha, et al. (2019). arguing that the amendment relates to ancestral property owned by the grandfather. 20 One year after implementing the interventions. 24 This increase over time is due to increased awareness regarding the reform. 21 Results for aggregate labor supply are insignificant, including those for MGNREGS and 25 The incidence of begging fell from 3.5 percent in 2002 to 1.4 percent in 2008. private employment. 26 Relative to baseline. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 7 Figure 3: Labor Force Participation Outcomes for Property Law and Asset Transfer Interventions Note: The figure shows the impact of asset transfer interventions and property law mandates on labor market outcomes for women. Effect sizes shown are for selected studies. 8 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Figure 3 depicts the labor market impacts of property law across 8 studies for decision-making, which include with- mandates and asset transfer interventions from selected in-household decision-making variables, such as women studies. are more likely to have a say in their own and their family’s health, major and minor household purchases, and activ- INCOME AND REVENUE OUTCOMES ities outside their homes (crop selection and engagement in local politics). Reported outcomes for decision-making Income impacts are mostly reported by asset plus inter- in matters related to health household expenditure are ventions. Of the 34 studies, only 7 report income-related positive27 for inheritance and land titling reforms (as shown outcomes for women. Across 7 studies, the review maps for Mookerjee, 2019 in Figure 4). Women’s decision-mak- 75 total and 41 unique outcomes across different time ing in agriculture increases between 1.3 to 23.2 units in spans and sources. Outcomes are reported as monetary Odisha and West Bengal because of the HSA amendment values, either in the local currency or dollar amount and (Valera, et al. 2018). Selected studies also report that are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. They are women are 3.4 percent more likely to have a greater say also reported in percentage increases by Bandiera, et al. in major household expenditures (Mookerjee 2019), a 13 (2017). percent increase in the likelihood of women participating The graduation program in India increased monthly in decisions about household consumption and food deci- revenue from livestock by 307 percent and for treatment sions (Santos, et al. 2014). Mishra, et al. (2016) also report households 18 months after program implementation and an increase in decision-making from 2.01 units in 2001 to by 286 percent 7 years after implementation (Banerjee, et 2.23 units in 2011 on an aggregate decision-making scale al. 2016). Yearly earnings are reported to increase by 16 taking values from 0 to 3.28 Asset plus interventions mostly percent 4 years after intervention (Bandiera, et al. 2017), report on increased social and political empowerment from $80 to $115, indicating that ultra-poor women are outcomes, with most reporting women to have a say in becoming more productive over time. decisions relevant to food, education, health, and home improvement. Men and women jointly make household OTHER EMPOWERMENT OUTCOMES expenditure decisions (Das, et al. 2014). Finally, the evalu- ation of a bundled asset transfer found women more likely Empowerment impacts are reported by 27 of the 33 stud- to vote in elections, become members of political parties, ies in the review and consist of 264 total and 118 unique and be more confident to talk to village leaders about outcomes across different samples, periods, and themes. concerns (Banerjee, Duflo and Goldberg, et al. 2015, Ba- Four studies report cumulative women’s empowerment nerjee, et al. 2016). indexes, which show interventions to have positive im- pacts on women’s overall empowerment. The remaining The review also uses measures of domestic and intimate empowerment outcomes are subcategorized as deci- partner violence as outcomes of empowerment. Three sion-making, violence, and psychosocial empowerment. studies report violence estimates. Impact on violence Some studies also report variables for marriage, mobility, is mixed, with Anderson & Genicot (2015) showing an and women’s education as empowerment outcomes. increase and Amaral (2017), and Bose and Das (2021) showing a decrease. For Amaral (2017) (as shown in Figure The results for empowerment indicators are mixed and 4) and Bose and Das (2021), total and emotional violence vary across studies. Outcomes for autonomy, violence, is reduced by 36 percent and 7 percent respectively for decision-making, and marriage are only reported for in- Hindu women in states that implemented the HSA amend- heritance and land titling interventions, while educational ments. Both authors attribute this reduction to a change attainment and psychosocial empowerment estimates in husbands’ behavior toward wives and a strengthening are also reported for bank account and asset transfer of women’s bargaining power in marriage negotiations. interventions. However, Anderson & Genicot (2015) argue that the HSA not only increased domestic violence and suicides among Across studies, decision-making is measured as a woman’s ability to participate in decisions regarding her labor, farming, household purchases, healthcare, children’s ed- 27 Mookerjee (2019) report negative decision-making outcomes for solo women decision ucation, or local politics. The ability to make decisions for makers. The inheritance amendments increased women’s joint decision-making with husband only. ones’ own health, expenditure, and children’s welfare is a 28 Authors construct an aggregate decision-making scale by summing three binary variables, crucial sign of empowerment for women in rural regions. own healthcare, household purchases, and visits to family or relatives. These variables equal one if the women have the final say (alone or with husband) for healthcare decisions, major The review reports 46 unique and significant outcomes household purchases, and visits to family or relatives, respectively, and zero otherwise. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 9 Figure 4: Violence and Decision-Making Outcomes for Property Law Mandates Note: The figure shows the impact of property law mandates on violence and decision making outcomes for women. Effect sizes shown are for selected studies. men and women, it also intensified household conflicts. women in the household and the ratio of saris and lungis31 They reason that improving property rights for women as a proxy for women’s bargaining power in the household. accentuated household conflict, which contributed to They show that program participation enabled ultra-poor increased suicide in India. women to have 0.21 more saris on average and led to a higher ratio of saris to lungis, suggesting higher bargaining Psychosocial empowerment refers to women’s ability and power for women in ultra-poor households. capacity to regulate their own lives through a positive Studies also report variables on women’s education, ease self-evolution, including feelings of increased personal of mobility, and marriage as empowerment measures. control and ownership over their lives. It includes measures Marriage-related outcomes are reported by three studies, for autonomy, self-esteem, well-being, and happiness. The with all studies reporting women’s age at marriage. Inher- review maps 10 unique outcomes across 9 studies under itance policy increased women’s age at marriage  by  0.6 this category. Asset transfer interventions report increased years on average (Heath and Tan 2019) with women in empowerment through higher psychosocial well-being, reformed states marrying 0.7 years later than women in future aspirations, social awareness, and self-reported non-reformed states (Deininger, Goyal and Nagarajan happiness. Similar results are shown for bank account 2013, Suteau 2020). The ability to pursue education is interventions and inheritance reform amendments. Inher- also a measure of empowerment for women. Two stud- itance amendments increase treated29 women’s freedom ies report on women’s access to increased education. and autonomy by 0.158 units30 and 0.17 standard devia- Roy (2015), (Deininger, Goyal and Nagarajan 2013), and tions (Roy 2008, Heath and Tan 2019). For the graduation Sapkal (2017) report 0.37–5 years of additional schooling program in India, women beneficiaries score higher on an for Hindu women who were 1–10 years old at the time autonomy index by 0.07 units (Banerjee, et al. 2011). Most of the inheritance law amendments. Finally, studies also empowerment variables are self-reported by women. To report some measures of mobility. Mobility is defined as a woman’s ability to travel freely outside the home, with- counter bias in self-reporting, Ahmed, et al. (2009) and out requiring permission from the husband or extended Emran, et al. (2014) report number of saris owned by family. Mookerjee (2019) reports increased travel to 29 Hindu, Jain, Buddhist, and Sikh women This index is the average of three variables (traveling alone to the market, health facility, and 30 outside the village) taking values 0 to 1 (Roy 2008). 31 Saris and Lungis are traditional clothing items worn by women and men, respectively. 10 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT health clinics and markets by Hindu women in states that Second, while the review is rich in terms of impacts, few implemented the HSA amendment by 2 percent and 3.5 studies measure impacts beyond 6 years, and for those percent, respectively. that do account for impacts at 7–9 years, the evidence is mixed. Misha et al. (2019) show positive entrepreneurial impacts of 10 and 12 percentage points in the short and CONCLUSION medium term for BRAC’s CFPR program in Bangladesh, The review of asset transfer interventions and inheritance however in the long run the estimate declines to 5 per- and property law reforms shows the impact of asset centage points.32 In contrast, Banerjee, et al. (2016) show transfers on women’s economic participation and broader increasing impacts for the graduation program in India, empowerment. The studies examined are concentrated when measured 7 years after intervention. mostly in Bangladesh and India, with one each in Afghani- Third, inheritance and land titling legal reforms do not stan, Nepal, and Pakistan. The search process did not find eliminate gender inequality in inheritance and asset distri- any asset transfer programs and laws that were rigorously bution on their own. The evidence on actual inheritance is evaluated in Bhutan, Maldives, or Sri Lanka. Asset transfer mixed, with some studies suggesting a more gender-egal- interventions are mostly evaluated for BRAC’s TUP pro- itarian inheritance pattern after reform and others finding gram, including programs inspired by the BRAC model in no impact. It is interesting to note that, while inheritance Afghanistan and India. For most of these interventions, a and property rights interventions improve women’s livestock transfer was offered as a bundle with other com- bargaining power in the household, there seem to be plimentary transfers, such as mentoring, health services, additional impacts on family structure—away from joint and cash stipends. Hence, it was impossible to isolate the families toward nuclear households (Mookerjee 2019). impact of the livestock transfer. The search process also Conflicts also increase within the households. And some did not find any studies evaluating the impact of non-ag- evidence suggests that parents may be gifting their share ricultural transfers, such as jewelry, phones, and bicycles. of land to sons to avoid compliance with the mandate, Neither did the search find any legal reforms other than while at the same time compensating their daughters for inheritance and property laws that would enable women the disinheritance through increased investments on their to acquire assets, such as laws related to dowry and mar- daughters’ education or dowry (Roy 2015). Moreover, riage. Finally, the search did not identify any evaluations there is tentative evidence that, in the case of the HSA, the of inheritance and property rights laws in countries other reform’s impacts on women’s empowerment and access than India and Nepal. to human capital were larger for the second generation than for the first generation of women affected by the Several observations emerge from the review of asset reform (Deininger, et al. 2014, Deininger, et al. 2013). transfer interventions and property rights mandates. First, asset transfers, whether in the form of an asset or policy, yield encouraging results for women’s economic participation through increases in employment and entre- preneurship. Income streams from productive activities, including farm and non-farm enterprises, often increase for women as well. The review of asset plus programs shows that the “big push” approach can be successful in reducing women’s employment in low-skilled and tempo- rary occupations. However, impacts on other dimensions of women’s empowerment, such as social, political, and psychological empowerment, are less clear and mostly insignificant for studies in the review. There may be several reasons for insignificant impacts. It may be that the women’s increased bargaining power and control over household expenditures, savings, and spending is still not enough to overcome gendered social norms in South Asia. It may also be that empowerment variables 32 The study also reports that those who initially worked as maids or were engaged in begging are not measured accurately since most measures are were most likely to revert to their baseline occupations, after a period as entrepreneurs. Conversely, households with support from adult children and those headed by women were self-reported. more likely to stay engaged in entrepreneurial activity in the long run. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 11 REFERENCES Bose, Nayana, and Shreyasee Das. 2021. “Women’s Inheritance Rights and Fertility Decisions: Evidence from Ahmad, Syedah, Robert Lensink, and Annika Mueller. 2020. India.” SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783585. “Uptake, Use, and Impact of Islamic Savings: Evidence Brule, Rachel. 2010. “Changes in India’s Property Rights from a Field Experiment in Pakistan.” SSRN. http://dx.doi. Regime and the Implications for Improved Gender Parity: org/10.2139/ssrn.3743428. Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Panel Ahmed, Akhter U., Mehnaz Rabbani, Munshi Sulaiman, Data for 17 Indian States.” APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. and Narayan C. Das. 2009. “The Impact of Asset Transfer https://ssrn.com/abstract=1644357. on Livelihoods of the Ultra Poor in Bangladesh.” Research Das, Narayan, Rabeya Yasmin, Jinnat Ara, Md. Kamruzzaman, Monograph Series No.39. Research and Evaluation Division, Peter Davis, Julia A. Behrman, Shalini Roy, and Agnes R. BRAC. https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738 Quisumbing. 2014. “How Do Intrahousehold Dynamics coll2/id/125248/filename/125249.pdf. Change When Assets Are Transferred to Women?” IFPRI Amaral, Sofia. 2017. “Do Improved Property Rights Decrease Discussion Paper 01317. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ Violence Against Women in India?” SSRN. http://dx.doi. ssrn.2405712. org/10.2139/ssrn.2504579. Das, Narayan C., and Farzana A. Misha. 2010. “Addressing Anderson, Siwan, and Garance Genicot. 2015. “Suicide and extreme poverty in a sustainable manner: Evidence from property rights in India.” Journal of Development Economics CFPR programme.” BRAC CFPR Working paper. https://bigd. 114: 64–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.004. bracu.ac.bd/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Addressing- Ara, Jinnat, Nusrat Hossain, Narayan Das, and Abdul Bayes. Extreme-Poverty-in-a-Sustainable-Manner-Evidence-from- 2016. “Ultra Poor and Asset Transfer in Urban Setting: CFPR-Program.pdf. Evidence from Slums in Bangladesh.” Journal of International Deininger, Klaus, Aparajita Goyal, and Hari Nagarajan. Development 28 (8): 1235–1250. https://doi.org/10.1002/ 2013. “Women’s Inheritance Rights and Intergenerational jid.3241. Transmission of Resources in India.” Journal of Human Bandiera, Oriana, Robin Burgess, Narayan Das, Selim Gulesci, Resources 48 (1). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466850. Imran Rasul, and Munshi Sulaiman. 2017. “Labor Markets Deininger, Klaus, Fang Xia, Songqing Jin, and Hari K. Nagarajan. and Poverty in Village Economies.” The Quarterly Journal of 2019. “Inheritance Law Reform, Empowerment, and Human Economics 132 (2): 811–870. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/ Capital Accumulation—Second-Generation Effects from qjx003. India.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. https:// Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, ssrn.com/abstract=2519301. and Jeremy Shapiro. 2016. “The Long-term Impacts of Emran, M. Shahe, Virginia Robano, and Stephen C. Smith. a Graduation Program: Evidence from West Bengal.” 2014. “Assessing the Frontiers of Ultrapoverty Reduction: Unpublished paper. https://economics.mit.edu/files/12031. Evidence from Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Nathanael Goldberg, Dean Reduction/Targeting the Ultra-poor, an Innovative Program Karlan, Robert Osei, William Parienté, Jeremy Shapiro, Bram in Bangladesh.” Economic Development and Cultural Change Thuysbaert, and Christopher Udry. 2015. “A multifaceted 62 (2): 339–380. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1354158. program causes lasting progress for the very poor: Evidence Field, Erica M., Rohini Pande, Natalia Rigol, Simone Schaner, from six countries.” Science 348 no. 6236. https://www. and Charity Troyer Moore. 2021. “On Her Own Account: science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1260799. How Strengthening Women’s Financial Control Affects Labor Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, and Raghabendra Supply and Gender Norms.” American Economic Review 111 Chattopadhyay. “Targeting the hard-core poor: An impact (7): 2342–75. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200705. assessment. 2011.” https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ Heath, Rachel, and Xu Tan. 2019. “Intrahousehold Bargaining, download?doi=10.1.1.592.1599&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Female Autonomy, and Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence Bedoya, Guadalupe, Aidan Coville, Johannes Haushofer, from India.” Journal of the European Economic Association Mohammad Isaqzadeh, and Jeremy P. Shapiro.2019 “No 18 (4): 1928–1968. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz026. household left behind: Afghanistan targeting the ultra Janzen, Sarah, Nicholas Magnan, Sudhindra Sharma, and poor impact evaluation.” National Bureau of Economic William Thompson. 2017. “Short-Term Impacts of a Pay-It- Research Working Paper No. w25981. https://ssrn.com/ Forward Livestock Transfer and Training Program in Nepal.” abstract=3951450 Paper presented at Agricultural and Applied Economics 12 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Association Annual Meeting, July 30–August 1, Chicago, Journal of Development Economics 114: 233–251. https:// Illinois. https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/259137/files/ doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.12.010. Abstracts_17_05_24_09_51_13_59__58_97_125_4_0.pdf. Roy, Sanchari. 2008. “Female Empowerment through Asadullah, M. Niaz, and Jinnat Ara. 2016. “Evaluating the long- Inheritance Rights: Evidence from India.” London School of run impact of an innovative anti-poverty programme: evidence Economics, London. https://www.dagliano.unimi.it/media/ using household panel data.” Applied Economics 48 (2): 107– roy.pdf. 120. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2015.1073846. Roy, Shalini, Jinnat Ara, Narayan Das, and Agnes R. Misha, Farzana A., Wameq A. Raza, Jinnat Ara, and Ellen van Quisumbing. 2015. “‘Flypaper effects’ in transfers targeted de Poel. 2019. “How Far Does a Big Push Really Push? Long- to women: Evidence from BRAC’s ‘Targeting the Ultra Poor’ Term Effects of an Asset Transfer Program on Employment program in Bangladesh.” Journal of Development Economics Trajectories.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 117: 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.06.004. (University of Chicago Press) 68 (1): 41–62. http://dx.doi. Santos, Florence, Diana Fletschner, Viven Savath, and Amber org/10.1086/700556. Peterman. 2014. “Can government-allocated land contribute Mishra, Khushbu, and Abdoul G. Sam. 2016. “Does Women’s to food security? Intrahousehold analysis of West Bengal’s Land Ownership Promote Their Empowerment? Empirical microplot allocation program.” World Development 64 (C): Evidence from Nepal.” World Development 78: 360–371. 860–872. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.07.017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.003. Sapkal, Rahul. 2017. “From Mother to Daughter: Does Equal Inheritance Property Laws Reform Improve Female Labor Mookerjee, Sulagna. 2019. “Gender-Neutral Inheritance Supply and Educational Attainments in India?” Asian Journal Laws, Family Structure, and Women’s Status in India.” The of Law and Economics 8 (1). https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle- World Bank Economic Review 33 (2): 498–515. https://doi. 2015-0028. org/10.1093/wber/lhx004. Suteau, Margaux. 2020. “Inheritance Rights and Women’s Naaraayanan, S. Lakshmi. 2019. “Women’s Inheritance Empowerment in the Labor and Marriage Markets.” THEMA Rights and Entrepreneurship Gender Gap.” Working paper. Working Papers 2020-17, HEMA (Théorie Economique, PhD Diss., Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. https://wpcarey.asu.edu/sites/default/files/2021-11/s._ https://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/pdf/2020-17.pdf. lakshmi_naaraayanan_seminar_paper.pdf Valera, Harold Glenn A., Takashi Yamano, Ranjitha Puskur, Rosenblum, Daniel. 2015. “Unintended Consequences of Prakashan Chellattan Veettil, Ishika Gupta, Phoebe Ricarte, Women’s Inheritance Rights on Female Mortality in India.” and Rohini Ram Mohan. 2018. “Women’s land title ownership Economic Development and Cultural Change 63 (2): 223– and empowerment: Evidence from India.” ADB Economics 248. https://doi.org/10.1086/679059. Working Paper Series No. 559. https://www.adb.org/sites/ Roy, Sanchari. 2015. “Empowering women? Inheritance default/files/publication/453696/ewp-559-women-land- rights, female education and dowry payments in India.” title-ownership-empowerment.pdf. STAY CONNECTED We gratefully acknowledge funding from the South Asia Trade Facilitation Program (SARTFP) and the Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (UFGE). SARTFP is a trust fund administered by the World Bank with financial contribution from the Government of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. UFGE is a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank to SARGENDERLAB@WORLDBANK.ORG advance gender equality and women's empowerment through experimentation and knowledge creation to help governments and the private sector focus policy and programs on scalable WORLDBANK.ORG/SARGENDERLAB solutions with sustainable outcomes. The UFGE is supported with generous contributions from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Wellspring Philanthropic Fund. 12 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT SEPTEMBER AUGUST 13 2022 | 11 JUNE 2021 APPENDIX Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Region Policy/program Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program description evaluated Inheritance, land titling, and property rights 1. Female India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: National Family Health Survey Empowerment to HSA 1956 amendment difference (NFHS) 2005–2006 through Inheritance Rights: Sample: Women with average 4 years of Evidence from education and 34 years of age India Sanchari Roy Control Group: Non-Hindu women and (2008) women marrying before the reform Treatment Group: Hindu women marrying after the reform 2. Do improved India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: Crime data from: 1) Information on property rights to HSA 1956 amendment difference first-stage reports to the police from decrease violence National Crime Record Bureau records, against women in 2) yearly publications of crime statistics India? of crimes, 3) crimes under Dowry Sofia Amaral Prohibition Act, Immoral Traffic (2017) (Prevention) Act, and Indecent Representation of Women (Prevention) Act Sample: Married women who are wives of household heads Control Group: Women in non-reform states Treatment Group: Women in reform states 3. Gender-Neutral India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: National Family Health Survey Inheritance Laws, to HSA 1956 amendment difference (NFHS) 2005–2006 Family Structure, Sample: Women aged 15–49 years of age and Women’s Status in India Treatment: Hindu women, belonging to a Sulagna reform state married after the reform Mookerjee (2019) Control: Non-Hindu women, belonging to non-reform states 4. Suicide and India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: The data for the annual suicides for property rights in to HSA 1956 amendment difference men and women in each state come India from the National Crime Records Bureau Siwan Anderson, of India 1967–2004 Garance Genicot (2015) Sample: Women of approximately 29 years Control Group: Women in non-reform states marrying after the reform Treatment Group: Women in reform states marrying after the reform 33 Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act 2005: Policy amendment that granted unmarried daughters independent inheritance rights and the right to share inheritance by survivorship in joint family property, equal with their brothers. 14 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Region Policy/program Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program description evaluated Inheritance, land titling, and property rights 5. Women’s India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: NFHS 2005–2006. Inheritance Rights to HSA 1956 amendment difference Sample: Rural Hindu married women and Fertility aged 15–49 with at least one child Decisions: Evidence from India Control Group: Women in non-reform Nayana Bose, states marrying after the reform Shreyasee Das (2021) Treatment Group: Women in reform states marrying after the reform 6. Women’s India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: Inheritance and entrepreneurship Inheritance Rights to HSA 1956 amendment difference data from, (i) Rural Economic and and Demographic Survey (REDS) 1999, and Entrepreneurship (ii) All India Census of Micro, Small, and Gender Gap Medium Enterprises (MSM) S. Lakshmi Naaraayanan Sample: Siblings in the early reform (2019) states with a positive amount of family landholdings and experiencing parental death Control Group: Individuals belonging to the four religious groups— Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, and Sikhs—to which the inheritance reform applied Treatment Group: Individuals belonging to all other religions on whom the reform did not apply 7. Intrahousehold India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: National Family Health Survey bargaining, female to HSA 1956 amendment difference (NFHS) 2005–2006 autonomy, and Sample Survey Employment and labor supply: Unemployment modules (rounds 1983, theory and 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2004) evidence from India Sample: Married women 15–49 years of Rachel Heath, Xu age Tan (2019) Control Group: Girls below the 10th percentile of the age at marriage distribution at the time the HSA was passed in states to those of girls above the 90th percentile of age at marriage for non-Hindu women (Muslim and Christian) Treatment Group: Girls below the 10th percentile of the age at marriage distribution at the time the HSA was passed in states to those of girls above the 90th percentile of age at marriage for Hindu women SEPTEMBER 2022 | 15 Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Region Policy/program Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program descrip�on evaluated Inheritance, land titling, and property rights 8. Changes in India India Amendments Inheritance policy Regression Data: (1) Na�onally representa�ve panel property rights to HSA 1956 amendment discon�nuity data collected across 17 Indian states regime and the from 1971 un�l 2006–2008 by the implica�ons for Na�onal Council of Applied Economic improved gender Research (NCAER)’s Rural Economic and parity Demographic Survey (REDS) Rachel Brule Sample: Households with fathers who a�er (2010) the HSA’s implementa�on in their state Control Group: Reform non-beneficiaries Treatment Group: Reform beneficiaries 9. Women’s India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: Rural Economic and Demographic Inheritance Rights to HSA 1956 amendment difference Survey (REDS) 2006 and Intergenera�onal Sample: Data from three genera�ons Transmission of Control Group: The inheritance of land to Resources in India males and females by fathers who died Klaus Deininger, before and a�er the amendment of the Aparajita Goyal, Act across non-reform states Hari Nagarajan (2013) Treatment Group: The inheritance of land to males and females by fathers who died before and a�er the amendment of the Act across non- reform states 10. Inheritance law India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: 2011 follow up to the Rural reform, to HSA 1956 amendment difference Economic and Demographic Survey empowerment, (REDS) 2007 and human capital Sample: 1,204 households and 2,931 accumula�on: genera�on III descendants Second genera�on effects from India Control Group: Male and female siblings Klaus Deininger, in a household where the mother was Songqing Jin, Hari not affected by the HSAA K. Nagarajan, Fang Xia (2019) Treatment Group: Male and female siblings in a household where the mother was affected by the HSAA 11. Empowering India Amendments Inheritance policy Triple Data: Rural Economic and Demographic women? to HSA 1956 amendment difference-in- Survey (REDS) 1999 Inheritance rights, difference Sample: Women aged 10–20 years at the female educa�on �me of the reform and dowry payments in India Control Group: Women who were 21 Sanchari Roy years or older (2015) Treatment Group: Most treated group consists of women who were 10 years or younger at the �me the reform was passed in their state; women who were 11–15 years old at the �me form a “par�ally treated” group, women who were 16–20 years old at the �me are “least treated.” 16 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Region Policy/program Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program description evaluated Inheritance, land titling, and property rights 12. From Mother to India Amendments Inheritance policy Difference-in- Data: Two rounds of Employment and Daughter: Does to HSA 1956 amendment difference Unemployment Survey of the National Equal Inheritance Sample Survey Organization conducted in Property Laws 1999–2000 (55 th round) and 2004–2005 Reform Improve (64 th round) Female Labor Sample: Women in reformed and non- Supply and reformed states. Women in the sample Educational population enjoy on average 2.22 years Attainments in India of educational attainment and average Rahul Sapkal 4.13 months of employment duration (2017) Control Group: 1) Non-Hindu women in reform states and 2) Women aged 11–21 years at the time of the reform in reformed states (comparison between cohorts in reformed states) Treatment Group: 1) Hindu women in reformed states and 2) Women aged 1– 10 years at the time of the reform in reformed states (comparison between cohorts in reformed states) 13. Inheritance Rights India Amendments Inheritance policy Triple Data: Indian Human Development and Women’s to HSA 1956 amendment difference-in- Survey (IHDS) 2012 Empowerment in difference Sample: Married Buddhist, Hindu, Jain, the Labor and and Sikh women aged 15–50 years Marriage Markets Margaux Suteau Control Group: Women at least 21 years (2020) old at the time of the amendment as well as women of all ages living in states that did not amend the HSA. Treatment Group: Women in reformed states who were 10 years old or younger at the time of the amendment in their state. 14. Unintended India Amendments Inheritance policy Quadruple Data: National Family Health Survey (NFHS) Consequences of to HSA 1956 amendment difference-in- from 1992 to 1993, 1998–1999, Women’s difference and 2005–2006. Inheritance Rights Sample: Married women 12–25 years of on Female age having at least 1 child Mortality in India Control Group: Non-Hindu and non-land- Daniel Rosenblum owning households in reform states (2015) Treatment Group: Hindu land-owning households in reformed states and who lived after the reforms were enacted. 15. Women’s land title India Amendments Land titling policy Instrumental Data: Rice Monitoring Survey 2016 ownership and to HSA 1956 variable collected by the International Rice empowerment: estimation Research Institute Evidence from India Sample: The 6,378 households were Harold Glenn A. categorized into three groups: no land Valera, Takashi title, men’s name on title, and women’s Yamano, Ranjitha name on title. Puskur, Prakashan Chellattan Veettil, Control Group: Women without land titles Ishika Gupta, Treatment Group: Women with land titles Phoebe Ricarte, Rohini Ram Mohan (2018) SEPTEMBER 2022 | 17 Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Region Policy/program Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program descrip�on evaluated Inheritance, land titling, and property rights 16. Can Government- India Nijo Griha, Nijo Land �tling policy Inverse Data: Quan�ta�ve data from NGNB Allocated Land Bhumi program propensity households 2010–2012 Contribute to Food score- Security? weighted Sample: Eligible families were defined as Intrahousehold regression those that relied on daily agricultural Analysis of West wage labor, food gathering from Bengal’s Microplot common property, or menial labor, and Alloca�on Program that lived below the poverty line Florence Santos, Control Group: Women without land �tles Diana Fletschner, Vivien Savath, Treatment Group: Women with land �tles Amber Peterman (2014) 17. Does Women’s Nepal 2002 and 2007 Land �tling policy Inverse Data: Nepal Demographic and Health Land Ownership cons�tu�onal probability Surveys—rounds 2001 and 2011 Promote Their amendments weight Empowerment? propensity Sample: “Ever married” women of ages Empirical Evidence scores 15–49 from Nepal Control Group: Women without land Khushbu Mishra, Abdoul G. Sam (2016) Treatment Group: Women with land Bank account 18. Uptake, Use, and Pakistan Access to a bank Bank Account + Linear Data: 1) Administra�ve data about Impact of Islamic account administra�ve help, probability borrowers from Akhuwat, 2) Primary Savings: Evidence religious models data from a baseline survey and follow- from a Field mo�va�onal speech up surveys, 3) Administra�ve data from Experiment in and subsidy Meezan Bank about the use of the Pakistan savings accounts, 4) Data from Syedah Ahmad, par�cipants’ check (log) books, which Robert Lensink, indicate the number of withdrawals and Annika Mueller their respec�ve amounts (2020) Sample: Mostly married Muslim women (95%) with average age of 38 years, four grades of schooling, and from poor household Control Group: Women who received only standard promo�onal training Treatment Group: Women who received religious mo�va�onal speech, subsidy, and administra�ve help 19. On Her Own India Access to a bank Bank account + short Difference-in- Data: Administra�ve data and two waves Account: How account training on how to difference of household survey data conducted one Strengthening use the local bank and three years a�er interven�on Women’s Financial kiosks implementa�on Control Impacts Sample: Women part of Mahatma Gandhi Labor Supply and Na�onal Rural Employment Guarantee Gender Norms Scheme (MGNREGS); poor, middle-aged Erica Field, Rohini women with very limited educa�on (less Pande, Natalia than one year on average), see Table 1; Rigol, Simone their husbands are on average 5 years older Schaner, Charity and have 3 more years of schooling Troyer Moore (2021) Control Group: Constrained women Treatment Groups: Unconstrained women 18 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Policy/program Region Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program descrip�on evaluated Asset plus: Livestock transfer + microenterprise training, health counseling, village networks, and community development 20. No Household Le� Afghani- Targe�ng the Livestock transfer + Difference-in- Data: 1) Ultra-poor household survey at Behind stan ultra poor skills training, difference, baseline (spring 2016) and a follow-up Afghanistan program – mentoring, access to intent to treat survey (summer 2018); 2) Saliva samples Targe�ng the Ultra BRAC 34 savings account es�mator were collected to measure cor�sol Poor Impact levels, a neurobiological marker of Evalua�on stress; and 3) Village and market surveys Guadalupe Bedoya, Aidan Sample: Ultra-poor women with low levels Coville, Johannes of consump�on, human capital, asset Haushofer, ownership, and psychosocial well-being Mohammad Control Group: Women receiving the full Isaqzadeh, Jeremy TUP package Shapiro (2019) Treatment Group: Women that did not receive the TUP package 21. Short-Term Nepal Heifer Livestock transfer 35+ Difference-in- Data: Household survey data collected Impacts of a Pay- Interna�onal’s self-help group 36 difference, before any interven�on in mid-2014 and It-Forward Smallholders in forma�on, technical intent to treat again in mid-2016 Livestock Transfer Livestock Value training, 37 and value- es�mator and Training Chain (SLVC) based trainings 38 Sample: SLVC beneficiaries Program in Nepal program Sarah A. Janzen, Control Group: Women receiving the Nicholas P. interven�on package Magnan, William M. Thompson Treatment Group: Women not receiving (2017) the interven�on package 22. “Flypaper effects” Bangla- Challenging the Livestock transfer + Difference-in- Data: BRAC Research and Evalua�on in transfers desh Fron�ers of trainings, 39 s�pend, 40 difference, Division (RED) collected panel data targeted to Poverty health access, 41 and intent to treat collected in three rounds, 2007 (baseline), women: Evidence Reduc�on – social development es�mator 2009, and 2011 from BRAC’s Targe�ng the ini�a�ves 42 “Targe�ng the Ultra Poor – Sample: Ultra-poor women Ultra Poor” (BRAC CFPR- program in TUP) Phase 2 Control Group: Program non-recipients Bangladesh Shalini Roy, Jinnat Treatment Group: Program recipients Ara, Narayan Das, Agnes R. Quisumbing (2015) 34 While the program is similar to the standard TUP program model, a few important differences exist: a) Coaching support lasts for 12 months instead of 18–24 months; b) A health subsidy is included that does not exist in other programs; c) The focus of asset provision is on cows rather than smaller livestock assets like goats, pigs, and chickens; and d) Asset values transferred are larger than other programs where data exist. 35 Two dove cotes. 36 Women’s self-help groups meet regularly and are encouraged to create group savings accounts. 37 Beneficiaries are trained on technical topics including nutrition, home gardening, fodder development, and improved animal management. They are given cash support for planting home gardens ($5) and fodder production ($10). 38 Beneficiaries are trained on Heifer International’s cornerstone principles, which include accountability; sharing and caring; sustainability and self-reliance; gender and focus on the family; genuine need and justice; improving the environment; full participation; training, education, and communication; and spirituality. The values-based training encourages beneficiaries to “pay it forward.” 39 Training was provided on the use of the productive assets for income-generating activities. 40 Approximately 175 taka (about $2.50) per week. 41 Free medical treatment, regular visits by the health volunteer (Shasthyo Shebika) for preventive disease. 42 Community support and awareness-raising training. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 19 Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Policy/program Region Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program description evaluated Asset plus: Livestock transfer + microenterprise training, health counseling, village networks, and community development 23. How Far Does a Bangla- Challenging the Livestock transfer + Linear Data: Four-round panel data set Big Push Really desh Frontiers of training, stipend, regression collected in three northern districts Push? Long-Term Poverty health access, and with inverse (Nilphamari, Kurigram, and Rangpur) of Effects of an Asset Reduction – social development propensity Bangladesh where the TUP pilot was first Transfer Program Targeting the initiatives weighting implemented (2002–2004). on Employment Ultra Poor – Trajectories (BRAC CFPR- Sample: Ultra-poor women Farzana A. Misha, TUP) Wameq A. Raza, Control Group: Program non-recipients Jinnat Ara, and Ellen van de Poel (2019) Treatment Group: Program recipients 24. The Long-term India Bandhan’s Livestock transfer + Intent to treat Data: Program data 2007–2015 Impacts of a Targeting the training, life skills estimates Graduation Hard coaching, weekly Sample: The beneficiaries are identified Program: Evidence Core Poor consumption through a participatory process in a from West Bengal program (THP) support, access to a village meeting, followed by a verification Abhijit Banerjee, savings account, and visit by the organization’s staff Esther Duflo, health services Raghabendra Control Group: Program non-recipients Chattopadhyay, and Jeremy Treatment Group: Program recipients Shapiro (2016) 25. Ultra-Poor and Bangla- Challenging the Income-generating Propensity Data: Program data January 2010–July Asset Transfer in desh Frontiers of asset 43 + stipend, 44 score 2010 administered by Research and Urban Setting: Poverty health counseling, matching Evaluation Division of BRAC Evidence from Reduction – awareness training, 45 Slums in Targeting the training on hygiene 46 Sample: Eligible and non-eligible Bangladesh Ultra Poor – households from urban slums Jinnat Ara, Nusrat (BRAC CFPR- Zaitun Hossain, TUP) Urban Control Group: Program non-recipients Narayan Chandra Das and Abdul Treatment Group: Program recipients Bayes (2016) 26. Targeting the India Bandhan’s Productive asset 47 + Difference-in- Data: Program data March 2008 and Hard-Core Poor: Targeting the stipend, 48 livelihood difference September 2009 An Impact Hard counseling, 49 training Assessment Core Poor and mentoring 50 Sample: Households have, on average, Abhijit Banerjee, program (THP) slightly fewer than four members and, Esther Duflo, most households have women as heads, Raghabendra an average landholdings less than 0.04 Chattopadhyay acres, small houses, and an average per and Jeremy capita monthly consumption is Rs. 415 Shapiro (2011) Control Group: Non-selected eligible beneficiaries Treatment Group: Selected eligible beneficiaries 43 Instead of livestock, the urban BRAC CFPR-TUP program provided women with a productive asset, such as commodities that can be traded or sold. The participants were transferred assets such as a van of two and a half square feet or a two-wheeler van of two and a half square feet, along with vegetables or fruits to be sold. Some participants were given tea-making utensils with some snack items or attire such as sari, salwar kameez, or multiple goods such as small toys, tiny utensils for children, ornaments. The trading items were chosen according to their skill and, most importantly, their interest so that they can start self-employment. 44 30 taka for consumption smoothing so that they do not sell off the transferred assets. The daily stipend continued for 26 weeks after the intervention started. 45 Information about the effect of child marriage, child labor, and importance of education through weekly home visits by the CFPR-TUP program staff. 46 The participants also received training on sanitation practices such as washing hands with soap after returning from work, using the toilet, and before eating in the weekly meetings. 47 Livestock or related inventory, such as fodder and sheds. 48 Rs. 90 are disbursed weekly for 14–40 weeks. 49 Beneficiaries are also counseled on savings and required to save Rs. 10 (approximately $0.25) per week at these meetings. 50 These meeting are primarily provide information and training on topics related to the household’s enterprise (such as proper care for livestock) as well broader social and health issues. 20 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Policy/program Region Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program description evaluated Asset plus: Livestock transfer + microenterprise training, health counseling, village networks, and community development 27. A multifaceted Ethiopia, Bandhan’s Productive asset + ordinary least Data: Program data program causes Ghana, Targeting the stipend, livelihood square (OLS) lasting progress Honduras, Hard counseling, training regressions Sample: Ultra-poor women for the very poor: India, Core Poor and mentoring Evidence from six Pakistan, program (THP) Control Group: Non-selected ultra-poor countries and Peru households Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Treatment Group: Selected ultra-poor Nathanael households Goldberg, Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, William Parienté, Jeremy Shapiro, Bram Thuysbaert, and Christopher Udry (2015) 28. How Do Bangla- Challenging the Livestock transfer + Difference-in- Data: Program data collected in 2007, Intrahousehold desh Frontiers of training, stipend, difference, 2009, and 2011 Dynamics Change Poverty health access, and intent to treat When Assets Are Reduction – social development estimates Sample: Ultra-poor women Transferred to Targeting the initiatives Women? Ultra Poor – Control Group: STUP-eligible women not Narayan Das, (BRAC CFPR- given the transfer Rabeya Yasmin, TUP) Phase 2 Jinnat Ara, Md. Treatment Group: STUP-eligible women Kamruzzaman, given the transfer Peter Davis, Julia A. Behrman, Shalini Roy, Agnes R. Quisumbing (2014) 29. Addressing Bangla- Challenging the Livestock transfer + Difference-in- Data: Program panel data from 2002, Extreme Poverty in desh Frontiers of training, stipend, difference, 2005, and 2008 a Sustainable Poverty health access, and intent to treat Manner: Evidence Reduction – social development estimates Sample: Ultra-poor women from CFPR Targeting the initiatives programme Ultra Poor – Control Group: Program non-recipients Narayan C Das, (BRAC CFPR- Farzana A Misha TUP) Phase 1 Treatment Group: Program recipients (2010) 30. Evaluating the Bangla- Challenging the Livestock transfer + Difference-in- Data: Program data from 2002, 2005, long-run impact of desh Frontiers of training, stipend, difference, 2008, and 2011 an innovative anti- Poverty health access, and OLS poverty Reduction – social development regression, Sample: Ultra-poor women programme: Targeting the initiatives propensity evidence using Ultra Poor – score Control Group: Non-selected ultra-poor household panel (BRAC CFPR- matching households data TUP) Phase 1 M Niaz Treatment Group: Selected ultra-poor Asadullaha, Jinnat households Ara (2016) - 51 These assets include livestock and those relevant for small-scale retail operations, tree nurseries, and vegetable growing. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 21 Table A.1: Included Studies and Program Details ID Title and author(s) Policy/program Region Asset transfer type 33 Methodology Program descrip�on evaluated Asset plus: Livestock transfer + microenterprise training, health counseling, village networks, and community development 31. Labor Markets and Bangla- BRAC’s Income-genera�ng Difference-in- Data: Program data from 2007 (baseline), Poverty in Village desh Targe�ng the asset 51 + s�pend, difference 2009, 2011, and 2014 (follow-up) Economies Ultra Poor assistance visits, Oriana Bandiera, (TUP) program training, health Sample: Ultra-poor and near-poor Robin Burgess, support, community households, mostly middle- and upper- Narayan Das, Selim development, class households Gulesci, Imran financial Control Group: Program non-recipients Rasul, Munshi management training Sulaiman (2017) Treatment Group: Program recipients 32. The Impact of Bangla- Challenging the Income-genera�ng Difference-in- Data: Program data from 2002 and 2004 Asset Transfer on desh Fron�ers of asset + business difference, Livelihoods of the Poverty development propensity Sample: Ultra-poor women Ultra Poor in Reduc�on – training, enterprise score Bangladesh Targe�ng the management matching Control Group: Program non-par�cipants Akhter U. Ahmed, Ultra Poor – assistance, subsistence Mehnaz Rabbani, (BRAC CFPR- allowance, health care Treatment Group: Program par�cipants Munshi Sulaiman, TUP) Phase 1 facili�es, and building Narayan C. Das social support network (2009) 33. Assessing the Bangla- Challengeing the Produc�ve asset52 + Difference-in- Data: Program data from two panels Fron�ers of Ultra desh Fron�ers of microenterprise difference, 2002 and 2005 Poverty Reduc�on: Poverty training, func�onal difference-in- Evidence from Reduc�on – literacy, improved difference Sample: Ultra-poor women Challenging the Targe�ng the health matching Control Group: Program non-par�cipants Fron�ers of Poverty Ultra Poor – Reduc�on/Targe�ng (BRAC CFPR- Treatment Group: Program par�cipants the Ultra-poor, an TUP) Phase 1 Innova�ve Program in Bangladesh M. Shahe Emran, Virginia Robano, Stephen C. Smith (2014) - The physical assets include livestock (cow/bull, duck, hen, and so on), other productive assets (such as a fishing net, rickshaw van, and “big trees” producing sticks, small lumber, fuelwood, or fruit) and 52 household durable goods such as tubewells, blankets, beds, chairs and tables. 22 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT Table A.2: Reported Labor Market Outcomes Reporting Units Outcome Effect (Naaraayanan 2019) Women’s Inheritance Rights and Entrepreneurship Gender Gap Percentage increase Entrepreneurship, new women enterprises 1.3*** (Heath and Tan, 2019) Intrahousehold Bargaining, Female Autonomy, and Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence from India Percentage Point Working in the last 7 days 6.1*** Work for self -2.2** Work for another 6.8** Work all year 5.5** Work for cash 6.3** Work away from home 4.9** Works in professional 3.1** (Sapkal,2016) From Mother to Daughter: Does Equal Inheritance Property Laws Reform Improve Female Labor Supply and Educational Attainments in India? Months Employment 7.595*** (Field et al. 2021) On Her Own Account: How Strengthening Women’s Financial Control Impacts Labor Supply and Gender Norms Standard deviation units Aggregate Labor Supply Index, short run 0.165∗∗∗ Aggregate Labor Supply Index, long run 0.045 (Bedoya et al. 2019) No Household Left Behind Afghanistan Targeting the Ultra Poor Impact Evaluation Percentage Points Labor participation 22*** (Roy et al. 2015) “Flypaper Effects” in Transfers Targeted to Women: Evidence from BRAC’s “Targeting The Ultra Poor” Program in Bangladesh Percentage Points Work inside homes 16.7*** Work outside homes -8.00*** (Misha et al. 2019) How Far Does a Big Push Really Push? Long-Term Effects of an Asset Transfer Program on Employment Trajectories Percentage points Adopting entrepreneurship, 2002–2005 10.1*** Adopting entrepreneurship, 2002–2008 2.3 Adopting entrepreneurship, 2008–2011 -7.3*** Adopting entrepreneurship, 2002–2011 -5.1*** (Banerjee et al. 2016) The Long-Term Impacts of a Graduation Program: Evidence from West Bengal 53 Minutes Minutes spent on productive activities in last day 58.152***, 22.766**, 33.521*** Minutes spent on agriculture 1.216, -0.108, 8.749*** Minutes spent on livestock activities last day 64.325***,28.314***,14.183*** Minutes spent on own business in last day 5.826, 1.546, 14.199* Minutes spent on paid labor in last day -13.116, -7.387, -3.098 (Ara et al. 2016) Ultra-Poor and Asset Transfer in Urban Setting: Evidence from Slums in Bangladesh Mean hours per day Self-employment 1.29*** Day labor -0.05 Service -0.13 Work at hotel/restaurant 0.06 Housemaid -0.05 (Banerjee et al. 2015) A multifaceted program causes lasting progress for the very poor: Evidence from six countries 54 Minutes India, Total minutes spent on productive activities in last day 58.6***, 24.6*** - India, minutes spent on agriculture in last day 1.32, -0.11 53 Endline 1 was conducted 18 months after (January 2009–November 2009), Endline 2 was conducted 30 months after (June 2010–February 2011) and Endline 3 was conducted 7 years (September 2014–March 2015) after the asset transfer (February 2007–March India, minutes spent tending livestock in last day 2008). 64.7***, 28.7*** 54 Impacts are reported from endline 1, conducted one year after the end of the program, and endline 2, conducted three years after the treatment began. SEPTEMBER 2022 | 23 Table A.2: Reported Labor Market Outcomes Reporting Units Outcome Effect (Banerjee et al. 2015) A Multifaceted Program Causes Lasting Progress for the Very Poor: Evidence from Six Countries 54 India, Total minutes spent on productive activities in last day 58.6***, 24.6*** India, minutes spent on agriculture in last day 1.32, -0.11 India, minutes spent on own business in last day 6.26,2.81 India, minutes spent on paid labor in last day -13.7, -7.12 Pakistan, total minutes spent on productive activities in last day 4.07, 9.77 Pakistan, minutes spent on agriculture in last day 3.11,5.72 Pakistan, minutes spent tending livestock in last day 6.74*,3.86 Pakistan, minutes spent on own business in last day -1.58, -0.15 Pakistan, minutes spent on paid labor in last day -6.21, -1.37 (Das et al. 2014) How Do Intrahousehold Dynamics Change When Assets are Transferred to Women? Percent relative to control group Work inside homes 16.7*** Work outside homes -8.00*** (Das and Misha 2010) Addressing Extreme Poverty in a Sustainable Manner: Evidence from CFPR programme55 Percent of sample Farm self-employment 36.0***, 25.8*** Day labor -13.0***, -14.6*** Non-farm salary employment 0.02, 0.40 Non-farm self-employment 3.0***, -0.60 Begging -1.40***, -1.5 Servant -8.70***, -7.4 (Asadullah and Ara 2016) Evaluating the Long-Run Impact of an Innovative Anti-Poverty Programme: Evidence Using Household Panel Data 56 Difference measure Farm self-employment 34.7***, 25.6***, 2.6 Day labor -12.2***, -14.1***, -9.3*** Non-farm salary employment 0.1, 0.2, -0.1 Non-farm self-employment 1.7**, -0.8, -0.6 Begging -1.6***,1.4**, -1.1* Servant -7.4***, -7.5***, -5.3*** (Suteau 2020) Inheritance Rights and Women’s Empowerment in the Labor and Marriage Markets Days Labor force participation 8.599 (Banerjee et al. 2011) Targeting the Hard-Core Poor: An Impact Assessment Minutes 57 Time spent working 61.25*** (Bandiera et al. 2017) Labor Markets and Poverty in Village Economies 58 Percent comparison to Labor supply in livestock rearing 217 control (hours) Labor supply in agriculture -17 Labor supply in maid services -26 Labor supply in all activities 17 Note: *p < 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p < 0.01 a Percent changes. 55 Impacts are reported from 2002–2005 and 2002–2008. 56 Only difference-in-difference impacts from 2002–2005 (short run), 2002–2011 (medium run) and 2002–2011 (long run) are reported. 57 Time spent on various activities is minutes spent in the last 24 hour. 58 Impact measured at 2 and 4 years. 24 | SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT