The World Bank O c t o b e r PREMnotes 2 0 0 2 n u m b e r 7 4 Public Sector Strengthening oversight by legislatures Legislative oversight of the executive branch is increasingly important for government transparency and accountability, and is receiving more support from the World Bank and other donors. About 90 percent of the world's nearly 200 Holding the executive branch sovereign states have national legislatures accountable or parliaments. With the spread of democ- Legislatures can hold the executive branch Around the world, racy and the rise of multiparty political sys- accountable through several means, such tems, these bodies are playing larger roles as questioning senior government officials legislatures are in government. Increasingly, legislatures (including ministers), reviewing or con- and their members perform four important firming executive appointments, and playing larger roles functions of governance: impeaching (dismissing) officials or even · Making policies and laws. Legislatures are the entire executive branch. Accountabil- in government representative bodies for collective deci- ity mechanisms vary by country based on sionmaking, working with the executive constitutionally defined powers of the leg- branch to deliberate policies and make islature, institutional arrangements between laws. government branches, divisions of author- · Representing citizens. Legislators give voice ity between national, regional, and local gov- to individual citizens, civil society orga- ernments, and the degree of legitimacy nizations, and business groups, repre- conferred on the legislature (Dubrow 2001). senting the needs of local constituents in In parliamentary systems (such as those policymaking. in Canada, Latvia, and the United Kingdom) · Overseeing the executive. Legislatures over- the legislature--commonly referred to as see policy implementation by the exec- parliament--helps hold the executive branch utive branch, scrutinizing its work and accountable (Mulgan and Uhr 2000) but also holding it accountable. helps form it. In these systems some or all · Recruiting future leaders. Legislatures are ministers (including the prime minister) are stepping stones and training grounds for first elected as members of parliament. They senior positions in the executive branch. hold executive branch positions because they Transcending these formal functions, leg- are leaders of the majority party or majority islatures also provide an arena where com- coalition of parties in parliament. In West- peting political forces can debate and minster parliamentary systems all ministers reach consensus on national policies and are first elected to parliament; in other sys- laws. tems some ministers are appointed by the This note addresses the oversight func- executive branch and do not sit in parlia- tion because of its significance for govern- ment. A parliamentary vote of "no confi- ment transparency and accountability, and dence" results in the immediate resignation because the Bank has initiated pilot projects of the executive branch and in some case to support this function. in the holding of new elections. from the development economics vice presidency and pover ty reduction and economic management n e t w o r k In parliamentary systems the executive plined, and so able to determine the leg- branch is also held accountable by opposi- islative agenda and compel legislators to toe tion parties. Ministers--especially the prime the party line. Second, higher public minister--are subject to questioning by spending--especially on entitlements and members of opposition parties as well as by income support--has led legislatures to members of their own party not in govern- finance transfer arrangements through leg- ment. Parliaments typically do not review islation that does not require periodic reap- the selection of ministers, though parlia- proval. Third, powerful interest groups and mentary committees review the appoint- corporate influences often lock legislatures ments of some senior officials. Specialized into agreed positions, preventing flexibility committees oversee sector policies and gov- despite frequent consultations (Schick 2001). ernment operations. But because these com- Some legislatures are responding to their Many legislatures mittees are dominated by members of the weakened positions with a burst of activism governing party, such oversight is often on budget matters. A recent study of legis- are playing bigger weak. Public accounts committees in most latures in OECD countries found that more Commonwealth countries are an exception, than half were playing a larger role in bud- roles in budget because they are usually chaired by a mem- get development than they had 10 years ear- ber of the opposition. lier (OECD 1998). Legislators have also issues and taking In presidential systems (such as those in found new approaches to oversight. Minis- Mexico and the United States) the legislature terial questioning, committee hearings, and new approaches to and the executive are separate branches of other procedures once used to foster government. In these systems presidents are accountability can also be used to attract oversight elected for fixed terms and can be removed media attention and to pressure the exec- (impeached) only if they violate the consti- utive branch. tution or break the law. There are no peri- A strong, well-developed civil society can odic votes of no confidence, and presidents help hold government accountable as well and their cabinets normally serve out their as contribute to the capacity and knowledge terms. The president appoints cabinet min- of the legislative branch. Civil society orga- isters, but these ministers are not members nizations are sources of technical expertise of the legislature--though in some countries and can provide specialized legislative com- their appointments must be confirmed by mittees with information about the effects the legislature. Other ministerial appoint- of public policies and policy alternatives. The ments are also subject to review by the legis- combined efforts of legislative committees lature, usually by specialized committees and outside interest groups are especially created to scrutinize the policies and opera- important for ensuring legislative oversight tions of a single ministry or department. during the long intervals between elections. A distinguishing feature of presidential But in many developing countries civil systems is that the majority party in the leg- society is weak. There are far fewer civil soci- islature may differ from the party of the pres- ety organizations than in OECD countries, ident and thus the party that controls the most are in urban areas, and they have less executive branch. When the president and knowledge and skills to contribute to leg- the majority of legislators are members of islative oversight. Still, the 1990s saw rapid the same party, legislative oversight is often growth and increasing sophistication in civil modest or weak. society in many developing countries-- reflecting broader processes of political lib- New roles for legislatures--and eralization and democratization. civil society Three developments have reduced the inde- Lessons from donor assistance pendence and authority of legislatures in to legislatures some OECD countries. First, political parties Rough estimates indicate that during the are increasingly well organized and disci- 1990s the Inter-American Development PREMnote 74 October 2002 Bank, World Bank, and other donors pro- procedures, strengthening political par- vided more than $200 million in loans and ties, training legislators on budget grants for legislative assistance projects. Such processes and bill drafting, and improv- projects focused on strengthening law- ing research and information capabilities making, procedural rules, bill drafting, and (Messick and Stapenhurst forthcoming). committee structures, and on improving relations with constituents, the executive Implications for the Bank branch, opposition parties, and external Future World Bank work to strengthen leg- actors (including civil society organizations islatures should focus on developing them and political parties). Assistance ranged as institutions that can achieve cross-parti- from supplying office and other equipment san goals in the national interest. Areas of to providing information and training (Mes- particular interest to the Bank include sick and Stapenhurst forthcoming). reducing poverty, improving financial over- Donors must be In 1998 the U.S. Agency for International sight, and giving voice to voters and civil Development commissioned case studies of society. intimately familiar legislative strengthening projects in Bolivia, Nearly every respondent to a recent sur- El Salvador, Nepal, the Philippines, and vey of World Bank country directors and with the Poland. It concluded that such assistance resident representatives reported at least offers much promise but poses many chal- some interaction with legislatures and leg- environments in lenges. The projects reviewed had improved islators, with many reporting substantial con- legislative performance and fostered more tact. In addition, by holding public hearings which legislative democratic approaches. But such efforts and establishing special committees, the can be weakened or even nullified by elec- process for developing Poverty Reduction assistance toral processes, shifts in institutional lead- Strategy Papers is enabling parliamentari- ership, and sudden social or cultural ans to play a key role in the Bank's coun- programs occur changes. try dialogue. Similarly, a recent analysis of U.S. gov- In lending operations, support for leg- ernment programs to strengthen foreign leg- islative committees is the most obvious way islatures acknowledged successes but to involve legislators. Specialized sectoral identified weaknesses (Carothers 1999). The and other committees that shadow gov- programs rarely changed the behavior of leg- ernment ministries and agencies can ensure islators, and the public hearings they inspired effective oversight. Such committees must were held largely for show, to please donors. have sufficient professional staff as well as These findings highlight the need for donors a supportive infrastructure, including to be intimately familiar with the environ- research capacity, reference and library facil- ments in which assistance programs occur. ities, and communication facilities, includ- A review of donor program evaluations ing access to the Internet. The Bank can suggests that: provide valuable support in all these areas. · Stand-alone projects are less successful. Leg- It can also encourage institutional links islative assistance programs are increas- between parliaments and policy research ingly understood as complements to institutes and universities. other governance improvements, includ- The Bank has both a fiduciary and a ing efforts to promote participation and developmental interest in improving legal reform. accountability. Thus it should also help · Domestic political support is needed to build the capacity of finance and budget ensure acceptance of the legislature's role committees, public accounts committees, in democratic development. and other financial oversight committees. · Legislative assistance will continue to evolve, These committees can significantly influ- with growing emphasis on extending assis- ence the allocation of resources for poverty tance to subnational legislatures, devel- reduction and promote monitoring and oping ethics codes and asset declaration evaluation of government results through PREMnote 74 October 2002 the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Mulgan, Richard, and John Uhr. 2001. process. "Accountability and Governance." In The World Bank Institute is working with Glyn Davis and Patrick Weller, eds., Are a number of bodies--including the Com- You Being Served? State, Citizens and Gov- monwealth Parliamentary Association, Inter- ernance. Sydney, Australia: Allen and Parliamentary Union, and Parliamentary Unwin. Centre (which is helping to form the Global OECD (Organisation for Economic Co- Organization of Parliamentarians Against operation and Development). 1998. Role Corruption)--to facilitate exchanges of the Legislature. Paris. among legislators and share lessons. Com- Schick, Allen. 2001. "Can National Legis- plementing this networking is a joint World latures Regain an Effective Voice in Bud- Bank Institute­Parliamentary Centre pro- get Policy?" Paper prepared for the Legislators have ject, supported by the Dutch Governance Organisation for Economic Co-operation Knowledge Sharing Program trust fund, and Development's First Symposium of been given a greater that seeks to develop indicators of parlia- the Chairpersons of Parliamentary Bud- mentary performance and an interactive get Committees of OECD Member voice in Bank Website to aid research on parliaments and Countries--The Changing Role of Par- dissemination of best practices. In addition, liament in the Budget Process, 24­25 Jan- activities the Bank's Europe and Central Asia Vice uary, Paris. Presidency has supported the development USAID (U.S. Agency for International of the Parliamentary Network, comprising Development). 1998. "Assessment Report more than 120 parliamentarians, to increase on Assisting Legislatures in Developing dialogue between Bank managers and par- Countries." Washington, D.C. liamentarians. This note was written by Nick Manning (Lead Further reading Public Sector Management Specialist, PREM Carothers, Thomas. 1999. "Aiding Democ- Unit, South Asia Region) and Rick Stapenhurst racy Abroad: The Learning Curve." (Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, Carnegie Endowment for International World Bank Institute). The authors are grateful Peace, Washington, D.C. to Joel D. Barkan for his helpful comments; a Dubrow, Geoff. 2001. "Systems of Gover- longer version of this note, incorporating more of nance and Parliamentary Accountabil- his input, is available at www.worldbank.org/ ity." In World Bank Institute and wbi/ governance. Parliamentary Centre, Parliamentary If you are interested in similar topics, consider Accountability and Good Governance. Wash- joining the Administrative and Civil Service ington, D.C. Reform Thematic Group. Contact Ranjana Messick, Rick, and Rick Stapenhurst. Forth- Mukherjee (x34301) or click on Thematic Groups coming. "World Bank and Parliaments." on PREMnet. For more information on the World Concept note. World Bank, Washington, Bank Institute's program on strengthening par- D.C. liaments, contact Rick Stapenhurst (x33210). This note series is intended to summarize good practice and key policy findings on PREM-related topics. The views expressed in these notes are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank. PREMnotes are distributed widely to Bank staff and are also available on the PREM website (http://prem). If you are interested in writing a PREM- note, email your idea to Sarah Nedolast. For additional copies of this PREM- note please contact the PREM Advisory Service at x87736. PREMnotes are edited and produced by Communications Development Inc. Prepared for World Bank staff