_____ Es As POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2595 Unrestricted Market Access The European Union, Japan, and the United States have for Sub-Saharan Africa recently announced initiatives to improve market access for How Much Is It Worth the poorest countries. How would these initiatives affect and Who Pays? Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world? Elena Ianchovichina Aaditya Mattoo Marcelo Olarreaga The World Bank Development Research Group Trade U April 2001 POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2595 Summary findings The European Union, Japan, and the United States have Japanese and European agricultural markets, especially recently announced initiatives to improve market access the heavily protected Japanese market for meat and for the poorest countries. lanchovichina, Mattoo, and certain cereal grains. Olarreaga assess the impact on Sub-Saharan Africa of The smallness of Sub-Saharan Africa's trade ensures these initiatives and others that might be taken. that the costs of trade diversion for the Quad, other They find that fully unrestricted access to all the Quad developing countries, and the world would be on the countries (Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the whole negligible. One concern, however, is that United States) would produce substantial gains for Sub- preferential access to protected markets might lead Sub- Saharan Africa, leading to a 14 percent increase in non- Saharan Africa to produce goods in which it does not oil exports ($2.5 billion) and boosting real incomes by have a global comparative advantage, and the future about 1 percent ($1.8 billion). Most of these gains would erosion of these preferences might lead to adjustment come from preferential access to the highly protected costs. This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the implications of improved market access for developing countries. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896, fax 202-522-1159, email address ItabadaCaworldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at eianchovichinaCaworldbank.org, amattooCaworldbank.org, or molarreaga@worldbank.org. April 2001. (29 pages) The Policy Research Workig Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessanily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countnies they represent. Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center Unrestricted Market Access For Sub-Saharan Africa: How much is it worth and who pays? Elena lanchovichina Aaditya Mattoo Marcelo Olarreaga Development Research Group, World Bank JEL classification: Fl 1, F13 Keywords: Duty-free access, least developed countries, Sub-Saharan Africa. We are grateful to Ataman Aksoy, Uri Dadush, Simon Evenett, Lawrence Hinkle, Bernard Hoekman, Will Martin, Francis Ng, Arvind Subramanian and David Tarr and seminar participants at the World Bank for valuable comments; to Gerard Durand, Alice Enders, Daniel Morales and Javier Suarez for helpful advice and data on tariffs; to Emiko Fukase for help in converting data from the Harmonized System to the GTAP commodity classifications; and to Lili Tabada for excellent assistance. 1. Introduction Improved market access for the poorest countries is widely seen as necessary to support their development effort and also as a critical element of a new "Development Round" of multilateral trade negotiations. Japan, the European Union and the United States are among those who have recently announced initiatives, supported by multilateral institutions like the WTO and the World Bank. While the measures differ in coverage, conditions and clarity, they have one thing in common: improved access is to be preferential, i.e. only the poorest countries will benefit. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to assess the value of alternative initiatives for a subset of Sub-Saharan African countries, henceforth referred to as SSA. Our definition of SSA includes thirty seven countries in the region and excludes the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and seven other Southern African countries (for a list of countries included in our SSA definition see Table 1).1 Second, to identify the implications of these initiatives for the rest of the world. Any liberalization is likely to benefit consumers in the preference granting countries. But preferential access for SSA exports will necessarily divert trade away from other exporters, many of whom are likely to be in other developing countries. And will also lead to a loss in tariff revenue for the preference-granting country. We first depict these effects in a simple partial equilibrium model, and then empirically assess their importance using a computable general equilibrium model. A case study of the impact on SSA seems worthwhile for at least three reasons. First, all but three of the thirty seven countries in SSA have been classified as Least Developed Countries (LDC) or Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), and are therefore likely to be part of any LDCs or HIPC initiative by the European Union, United States, Canada and Japan (the QUAD). This region, with a population of 500 million, has a GDP per capita of 320 dollars (or less than a dollar per day). Second, the legislation recently I We discuss the reasons for exclusion of some Sub-Saharan African countries from the SSA region in the footnote to Table 1. 3 passed by the United States Congress grants completely unrestricted access2 (no input requirements or rules of origin) to any African country with a GDP per capita below 1500 dollars. Only two of the thirty seven SSA countries in our sample have a GDP above 1500 dollars (Gabon 4800 dollars and Seychelles 7000 dollars). Third, and this is an important practical reason, existing multi-country general equilibrium models, such as GTAP, which we use in this paper, provide a standard and readily-available country aggregate for SSA. The precise coverage and status of the different initiatives is not clear. We choose to focus on five scenarios, each of which reflects in somewhat stark form, an initiative that is either underway or under consideration. These include duty and quota-free access for SSA exports of: a) apparel to the US; b) all products to the US (widest interpretation of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act); c) industrial products to Japan; d) all products except arms to the EU (latest proposal by the European Commission); e) all products to the US, EU, Canada and Japan, i.e. the QUAD. We also carry out two further simulations designed to put preferential market access in perspective. The first examines the impact on SSA of a cut in the non-preferential levels of protection in all other countries. The question we have in mind is whether SSA, having obtained preferential access to the QUAD market, would view a new round of multilateral trade negotiations with enthusiasm or apprehension.3 The second simulation compares the implications for welfare in SSA of an improvement in supply conditions with the implications of preferential access. 2 This is for an initial period of four years. The question seemns relevant because imiproved access for least developed countries is being seen as a condition for a new round rather than as a result. 4 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main effects of granting preferential access to SSA using a partial equilibrium model. Section 3 describes briefly the pattern of SSA exports in terms of products and destinations, and the current conditions of access. Section 4 discusses the assumptions and structure of the multi- country Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model used to estimate the impact of preferential access. Section 5 presents the empirical estimates under alternative scenarios. Section 6 concludes. 2. Unrestricted access for SSA: who wins and who loses? The impact of granting unrestricted access on welfare in different groups of countries can be illustrated using a simple partial model. This is depicted in Figure 1. There are three countries: one developed country, one developing country (DC) and one Sub-Saharan African country (SSA). There is only one good, which is imported by the developed country and exported by both DC and SSA. Import demand is denoted by M, export supply of the DC is denoted by XD, export supply of SSA is denoted by Xs and total (world) export supply is denoted XT .4 Imports to the developed country are subject to an exogenous tariff t , which is initially applied to imports from both DC and SSA. The tariff-inclusive export supplies of the DC and SSA are denoted by XD +t and Xs +t, adding up to total tariff-inclusive export supply of XoT. The original equilibrium price in the developed country, 0D is determined where import demand equals total world supply. The initial export quantities of the DC and SSA are respectively given by x' and x, adding up to aggregate exports of XT . Both developing country and SSA exporters 4 For simplicity of exposition, let us assume that this product is not locally consumed in DC or SSA. 5 receive the same price for their exports, p -_t, i.e. the developing country price net of the tariffs that they have to pay. FIGURE 1: PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECT OF LDC PREFERENCES p xs + t A D1++t T xl PO . p0D . . ......... ... .. ........... S S D D T TN xo xi xix x 0 X XI1 Now assume that SSA exports can enter duty-free into the developed country market, so the relevant export supply for SSA is Xs and the relevant aggregate export supply is 6 X1T . The new world price will be determined by the intersection of the import demand, M, with the new aggregate supply, X[. It is easy to show that pD < pD, so long as dX > 0.5 The intuition is straightforward. I 0 ~~~dp At the original developed country price pD, SSA exporters increase the quantity supplied because they now receive a higher price than before, i.e. Xs (pD ) > XS (pD -t). Hence, there will be an excess supply at the original price, inducing the price in the developed country to fall. But the decline in price will be less than the tariff reduction, so the price received by SSA exporters will be higher than before, i.e. pD > pD -t. The price received by developing country exporters, on the other hand, will be lower than before, D D i.e. p, -t