A BACKGROUND PAPER >> SOCIAL PROTECTION Adaptive Social Protection in the Caribbean: Building Human Capital for Resilience Rodolfo Beazley and Asha Williams January, 2021 This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) with external contributions. The sole responsibility of this publications lies with the authors. The findings, analysis and conclusions expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of any individual partner organization of The World Bank (including the European Union), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent, and therefore they are not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. Although the World Bank and GFDRR make reasonable efforts to ensure all the information presented in this document is correct, its accuracy and integrity cannot be guaranteed. 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Table of contents Acknowledgements 1 Abbreviations 2 1 Introduction 3 2 Poverty and vulnerability in the Caribbean 5 3 ASP conceptual framework 10 4 Traffic light system for improving ASP readiness 13 4.1 Traffic light system: foundational investments 13 4.2 Traffic light system: ASP investments 17 5 Overview of social protection in the Caribbean 22 6 ASP experiences and assessment of service delivery readiness 31 6.1 ASP experiences in the Caribbean 31 6.1.1 Natural disasters 31 6.1.2 COVID-19 pandemic 34 6.2 Readiness of social protection delivery systems 38 6.3 Traffic Light Assessment of Select Countries 57 7 Conclusions and priority actions 69 Bibliography 77 Acknowledgements This work is a background note to the Advisory Services and Analytics (ASA) “Revisiting resilience in the Caribbean: A 360° approach.” The note is one of three Human Development notes to the ASA, which also include Education and Health. The note was authored by Rodolfo Beazley and Asha Williams. Valuable comments and contributions were received from Clemente Avila, Caroline Tassot, Nancy Banegas, Rashmin Gunasekera, Thibaut Humbert, Keren Charles, Michael Fedak, Ursula Martinez, Miriam Montenegro and Julie Rozenberg. The authors are especially grateful for the suggestions and feedback provided by peer reviewers, Junko Onishi and Thomas Bowen. 1 Abbreviations ASP Adaptive Social Protection BOOST Building Opportunities for Our Social Transformation CCRIF SPC Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility Segregated Portfolio Company CERC Contingent Emergency Response Component DRF Disaster Risk Financing DRM Disaster Risk Management ECT Emergency Cash Transfer GDP Gross Domestic Product GIS Geographic Information Systems HR Human Resources IMF International Monetary Fund IVACC Index of Vulnerability to Climate Shocks (Índice de Vulnerabilidad ante Choques Climáticos) JECT Joint Emergency Cash Transfer LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LFS Labor Force Survey MLSS Ministry of Labour and Social Security MoEQ Ministry of Equity, Social Justice, Local Government and Empowerment PAP Public Assistance Program PATH Program of Advancement Through Health and Education SIUBEN Single Beneficiary System (Sistema Único de Beneficiarios) SLC Survey of Living Conditions SP Social Protection SSN Social Safety Net UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund VNA Vulnerability Needs Assessment WFP World Food Program 2 1 Introduction The Caribbean region is highly exposed to different types of shocks, some with devastating effects, ranging from climate change and disasters to external economic stresses and epidemics like the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Most Caribbean economies are small and open, and reliant on tourism and foreign investments, combined with high levels of poverty, which makes countries in the region vulnerable to such shocks. Shocks disproportionally affect the poor because they are often not only more exposed to them (e.g. due to their geographical location), but they are also more vulnerable to their effects. The sources of resilience available to the poor are more limited, and therefore they are often less equipped to anticipate, absorb, and recover from shocks. The social protection (SP), health, and education sectors play key roles in helping people to build human capital for resilience. These sectors contribute to strengthening the capacities of households and individuals, and in particular the poor, to anticipate, absorb, and recover from shocks. In this regard, ensuring business continuity for these services during shock events is crucial, alongside developing the capacity to rapidly adapt and deploy adequate support to people affected by shocks. Adaptive Social Protection (ASP) is concerned with how SP programs, services and systems can contribute to addressing covariate1 shocks through preventive, preparedness, and response actions: that is, adapting and using the capacity of the SP sector, typically developed for addressing idiosyncratic shocks, to enhance the resilience of households – and of the poor in particular. Exposure to shocks, on the one hand, and the ongoing development and expansion of SP systems in the region, on the other, call for investing in ASP to strengthen resilience. While ASP is still a fairly new policy area, Caribbean governments have been increasingly leveraging SP systems to provide support to people affected by shocks. This paper assesses the performance and readiness of SP systems in the Caribbean to help people anticipate, absorb, and recover from shocks. The paper examines how appropriate the coverage, benefits, and scope of the current SP systems are for addressing poverty risks and vulnerabilities; and how appropriate the current programs and their delivery processes are for meeting resilience objectives. The paper builds on the research conducted by the World Bank on ASP in the Caribbean - in particular - on a compendium of guidance notes providing operational guidance on select ASP topics in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 1 Shocks are covariate if they affect a large number of households or individuals, otherwise they are idiosyncratic. This paper focuses on covariate shocks. 3 the corresponding synthesis note of that series (World Bank, 2020a)2. The paper also relies on other studies conducted by the World Bank to assess the readiness of SP systems to support Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in several countries in the Caribbean, and on the research conducted by other organizations, most notably the World Food Program (WFP). Household survey databases from Jamaica and Saint Lucia have also been used for the assessment of SP performance. Finally, the paper is aligned with the World Bank’s global framework for ASP outlined in a recent flagship publication (Bowen et al., 2020). The remainder of the report continues as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the poverty and vulnerability landscape in the Caribbean. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework for ASP. Section 4 presents a traffic light system to assess the maturity of ASP systems in the Caribbean. Section 5 assesses the performance and outcomes of SP in the region, with a focus on the adequacy of spending, coverage, and benefits. Section 5 looks at the recent experiences in the use of SP to respond to shocks in the Caribbean, and assesses the readiness of the delivery systems, and presents the traffic light assessment for select countries. Section 7 presents the conclusion and proposes some priority actions for ASP. 2 The selected topics covered by the guidance notes were: 1) Towards Adaptive Social Protection Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Synthesis Note on using Social Protection to Mitigate and Respond to Disasters and Climate-Related Risks(World Bank, 2020a); 2) Post-Disaster Household Assessments and Eligibility Determination for Post-Disaster Social Protection Benefits(World Bank, 2020b); 3) Making Social Protection Information Systems Adaptive(World Bank, 2020c); 4) Tailoring Adaptive Social Safety Nets to Latin America and the Caribbean(World Bank, 2020d); 5) Using Social Work Interventions to Address Climate and Disaster Risks in Latin America and the Caribbean(World Bank, 2020e); and 6) Disaster Risk Finance for Adaptive Social Protection(World Bank, 2020f). 4 2 Poverty and vulnerability in the Caribbean This section briefly describes the poverty and vulnerability context in the Caribbean. In general, access to recent poverty estimates and relevant household survey databases is very limited in the region. Against this backdrop, this section presents data gathered from different sources. In some cases, the data provided is not very recent in some cases, and some of the estimates in this and the next sections rely on several assumptions. However, these assumptions help frame the assessment of ASP performance in the region, given data constraints. Caveats are presented when relevant. Poverty in the Caribbean remains high, with usually not less than one-fifth of a country’s population in poverty. The most recent estimates available show that in Barbados 17.5% of the population was poor in 2016, in Dominica 28.8% in 2010, in Dominican Republic 22.8% in 2018, and in Saint Lucia 25.0% in 2016. On the lower end of the scale, Jamaica recorded a poverty rate of 12.6% in 2018, down considerably from its previous rate of 19.3% in 2017. Figure 1: Poverty headcount (%) – most recent data available 45.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Jamaica Bahamas Trinidad Barbados Antigua and Dominican St Kitts and St Lucia Dominica St Vincent Grenada Belize (2018) (2013) and Tobago (2016) Barbuda Republic Nevis (2016) (2010) and the (2008) (2009) (2005) (2007) (2019) (2007/2008) Grenadines (2007/08) Sources: Country Poverty Assessment Reports and Living Conditions Surveys 2005-2018. (see bibliography) The overall lack of frequent and periodic household surveys to measure poverty, resilience and many other wellbeing dimensions, is a constraint for policy design in 5 the region. Although there are countries with periodic surveys, like Belize (labor force surveys - LFS), the Dominican Republic (LFS and surveys of living conditions - SLC), Jamaica (LFS and SLC), and Saint Lucia (LFS), this is, overall, a challenge in the region. For some countries, there is no household data (no LFS nor SLC) for over 10 years, limiting the ability to implement evidence-informed policy and program decisions. In addition to the high poverty levels, the Caribbean region is exposed to different types of shocks, with potentially considerable adverse effects. Disasters caused by natural hazards are frequent in the Caribbean. In particular, intense storms such as hurricanes have had devastating effects in recent years (World Bank, 2020a). For example, Hurricane Ivan in 2004 damaged 90% of Grenada’s infrastructure (Wallemacq et al., 2018), while, more recently, Hurricane Maria damaged 90% of Dominica’s housing stoc k (Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017). Table 1 shows the economic losses caused by the largest hurricanes and tropical storms in the last five years. Countries like Dominica, the Bahamas, Saint Martin, and Sint Maarten have faced huge losses due to these types of events. Table 1: Economic losses produced by recent hurricanes and storms Economic losses Economic losses Event Country/territory (billions US$) (GDP %) Hurricane Dorian (2019) The Bahamas 3.40 365 Hurricane Irma (2017) Sint Maarten 2.50 797 Hurricane Irma (2017) Saint Martin 4.10 584 Hurricane Maria (2017) Dominica 1.46 259 Tropical storm Erika (2015) Dominica 0.48 90 Source: Inter-American Development Bank - IDB (2020), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA (2020) and Wallemacq et al. (2018) Disasters not only have devastating effects in the region, they are also more frequent than they were in earlier decades. Figure 2 shows that the frequency of disasters has been increasing over time. Figure 2: Occurrence of disasters caused by natural hazards in the Caribbean: 1950–2020 6 Source: EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 2020 Beyond disasters caused by natural hazards, the region is also exposed to external economic shocks, epidemics, and migration, among other shocks. Most Caribbean economies are small, open, and rely heavily on tourism, foreign direct investment, and remittances, which tend to be badly affected by global crises or crises in tourist sending countries and trade partners, such as the United States and United Kingdom. For example, Caribbean countries were strongly affected by the global financial crisis of 2008–09: Antigua and Barbuda suffered one of the sharpest contractions in growth globally following the crisis, with GDP growth declining to -12.1% in 2009 (12.07% lower than the previous year), and only rebounding to positive levels in 2012. Grenada recorded -6.61% GDP growth in 2009, while Barbados -5.1%. Trinidad and Tobago’s economy shrank by 4.4% in 2009, recovered in 2010, and then contracted further in 2010 and 2011.3 Net foreign direct investment to the region, traditionally the largest source of external financing, declined from an average of US$5.1 billion over 2007-2008 to US$2.9 billion in 2009, with particularly large contractions in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Jamaica (Gold et al., 2010). In relation to epidemics, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is not only having adverse health impacts in the region, but also negative economic effects, which are likely to increase poverty and vulnerability. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that growth in the region is going to contract by 6.2% in 2020, leading to the deepest recession in more than half a century. The collapse of the tourism sector, which accounts for 50% to 90% of GDP and employment in some countries, is already severely affecting most countries in the region. The steep drop in commodity prices is affecting commodity exporters such as Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago through a loss in exports and fiscal revenues. 3 Growth estimates are from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files: here 7 Remittance inflows, which account for about 7% of the Caribbean region’s output and exceed 15% of GDP in Haiti and Jamaica, are expected to fall sharply4. Globally, COVID-19 is expected to push between 71-100 million people into extreme poverty in 2020.5 For the Caribbean, the crisis is estimated to increase poverty in several countries for which projections have been made (see Table 2 below). Table 2: COVID-19 poverty outlook in select Caribbean countries Country Poverty Rate 2019 (%) Projected Poverty Rate 2020 (%) Dominican Republic6 12.9 14.2 Jamaica* 19.3 (2017) 23 (2020) St Lucia 18.4 22.8 Haiti** 25.9 (2018/9) 28.7 (2020/21) Source: World Bank (2020h). Notes: Estimates are for poverty based on the Upper Middle-Income International Poverty Rate ($5.5 in 2011 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). *For Jamaica, estimates are based on the national poverty line. **For Haiti, the International Poverty Rate ($1.9 in 2011 PPP) is used and data is for 2018/9 and 2020/21. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has led to the largest displacement in the recent history of Latin America and the Caribbean. Trinidad and Tobago, with tight geographical, socio-economic, and cultural linkages with Venezuela, is one of the Caribbean countries most affected by the displacement: it is among the top host countries as a proportion of the national population. By June 2020, 18,882 Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago had been registered the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).7 Furthermore, like in the rest of the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is showing that the region is vulnerable to epidemics, and that such events can have adverse health and socio- economic effects. While shocks can have an impact on anyone, the poor and vulnerable are disproportionally impacted (Hallegatte et al., 2017). This is because the poor and vulnerable – those close to the poverty line – depend on fewer and more vulnerable assets, have consumption levels closer to subsistence, and often live in regions that are more 4 https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/29/covid-19-pandemic-and-the-caribbean-navigating-uncharted-waters/ 5 Estimates are based on a baseline scenario or more severe downside scenario. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/461601591649316722/Projected-poverty-impacts-of-COVID-19.pdf 6 The Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development (Ministerio de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo , MEPyD) estimates that monetary poverty could increase by 13.4 percent points if the tourism and construction sectors contract by 90 percent, the inflow of family remittances decreases by 30 percent, and COVID-19 benefits are extended over time. 7 UNHCR, June 2020. Trinidad and Tobago Situational Report 8 exposed to hazards (i.e. coastal regions), among other factors. For example, in Dominica, a post-disaster needs assessment following Hurricane Maria estimated that poverty could increase by close to 14 percentage points if consumption impacts were left unaddressed (World Bank, 2020a). The poor and vulnerable are not only disproportionally affected by shocks – they also have fewer sources of resilience. They typically lack savings and financial instruments to smooth shock impacts, and their livelihoods are also vulnerable to shocks (i.e. agriculture, precarious employment). For example, in Jamaica only 3.7% of those in the poorest quintile have home insurance, while the ratio goes up to 58.6% in the richest quintile (Jamaica: SLC (2017). In Saint Lucia, 28.9% of people in the poorest quintile have access to bank accounts, whereas in the top quintile it accounts for 78.3% (Saint Lucia: SLC (2016). Consequently, the effects of shocks and the limited sources of resilience available to the poor can lead to negative coping strategies, including the reduction of essential food consumption, healthcare attendance, and education investments, or selling or depleting productive assets (World Bank, 2020a). Finally, shocks can result in negative coping, with long-lasting effects on human capital and overall well-being. Food insecurity, school dropouts, and other direct effects and coping strategies may have impacts that are not fully reversible and, in many ways, reinforce the inter-generational cycle of poverty. The poor also have fewer resources to recover and restore livelihoods quickly following a disaster. For instance, following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, poorer households were more dependent on temporary employment than wealthier households (Williams and Lamanna, 2016). 9 3 ASP conceptual framework This section briefly outlines the conceptual framework used for the study of ASP in the Caribbean. The conceptual framework is tailored to the different maturity or development levels of the SP systems in the region. Moreover, the framework is meant to be both an analytical and a practical tool, and therefore it guides the study of SP systems through the operational dimensions most relevant for ASP. Social protection helps facilitate equity, build resilience, and promote opportunity through benefits and services that include non-contributory social assistance or social safety nets (SSNs); active labor market programs; social care services; and contributory social insurance (World Bank, 2012). SP is intrinsically related to risk management and is not only concerned with reducing the poverty impact of shocks but also with supporting long-term transformations towards more adaptive and resilient households and societies (Hallegatte et al., 2016). Adaptive Social Protection is concerned with how social protection programs and systems can contribute to addressing covariate shocks through preventive, preparedness, and response actions. ASP approaches build on the recognition that SP systems have the capacity to buffer the impacts of disasters and shocks on households’ livelihoods, income, food security, and assets, while also being a vehicle of long- term change by enhancing households’ adaptive capacity (World Bank, 20120a) . This paper uses the following definition of ASP, from (Bowen et al, 2020): “ASP helps to build the resilience of households that are vulnerable to shocks through direct investments that support their capacity to prepare for, cope with, and adapt to shocks: protecting their wellbeing and ensuring that they do not fall into poverty or become trapped in poverty as a result of the impacts.” This paper relies on the framework developed by the World Bank’s Social Protection and Jobs Group8 for assessing SP systems across three key system dimensions – Institutions, Delivery, and Financing – and along the different 8 Lindert, K. George, T. et al. Forthcoming. Sourcebook on the Foundations of Social Protection Delivery Systems (World Bank) and Williams, A. and Berger Gonzalez, S. 2020. Towards Adaptive Social Protection Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Synthesis Note on using Social Protection to Mitigate and Respond to Disasters and Climate-Related Risks. (World Bank) 10 maturity levels of SP systems. Regarding the system dimensions, the ‘Institutions’ dimension recognizes the paramount importance of governments leading the ASP agenda in the Caribbean region, and includes aspects such as the policies and legislation governing SP, disaster risk management (DRM), and other related sectors, institutional capacity and the institutional arrangements, which are vital for effective horizontal and vertical coordination across and between government agencies, and with non-government and external actors. The ‘Delivery’ dimension includes the building blocks related to benefit and service delivery (including program design and delivery systems) and information systems. This dimension relates to the ability to ensure that SP programs, services, and information systems are adaptive and capable of responding to the nuanced needs in different shock contexts. Finally, the ‘Financing’ dimension includes metrics related to the predictability and sustainability of SP financing and ensuring specific disaster risk financing (DRF) arrangements to ensure that SP financing needs emerging from these contexts can be met. Figure 3: Typology for assessing social protection system maturity Source: World Bank (2020a) 11 The conceptual framework defines three maturity levels for SP systems: nascent, emerging, and established. According to this typology, which is presented in the figure below, countries range from those with nascent systems, demonstrating low institutional capacity, limited program offerings and coverage, rudimentary systems, and ad-hoc financing arrangements, to those that demonstrate more established institutions, instruments, and performance along these metrics (World Bank, 2020a). Other countries operate at an emerging level of maturity, having moved away from nascent systems, but not yet achieving the maturity and performance of established systems. Moreover, a country may be nascent on one dimension and established on another (e.g. it may have established SP legislation and good institutional arrangements, while program coverage remains low and information systems are still rudimentary). 12 4 Traffic light system for improving ASP readiness As noted in the previous section of this report, ensuring that social protection systems are adaptive and contribute to improved resilience requires sound institutions, delivery and finance. These three dimensions are also reliant on a range of supporting variables to ensure effective implementation. In this complex implementation environment, it may become challenging for countries to identify specific priority areas for strengthening SP and ASP system performance. To help navigate these complexities, this section proposes a traffic light system for enhancing ASP readiness in Caribbean countries. The proposed system suggests a series of characteristics inherent in the different maturity levels – nascent, emerging, and established – along the three key dimensions of institutions, delivery, and finance. The traffic light system is formulated to help countries pinpoint ‘problem areas’ that need prioritization to improve system performance. The system also helps countries acknowledge where their SP systems are performing relatively well, and thus require minimal investments for improvement. This section describes the main tenets of the traffic light system, following which it is applied in sections 0 and 6 of this report to assess SP system performance the Caribbean. It is important to mention that the traffic light system is a generic guide for Caribbean countries: it does not intend to establish a unique and one-size-fits-all approach to developing ASP systems. It is also important to note that a country can demonstrate nascency on one dimension, while demonstrating maturity on another. This guide should be adapted and tailored to each country context and can help countries prioritize those dimensions which are still operating at nascent levels and therefore require more investment. The development of the traffic light system relied not only on the assessment of ASP in the Caribbean, but also on research conducted elsewhere. For ASP to contribute to addressing covariate shocks through preventive, preparedness, and response actions, some key processes, mechanisms and systems need to be already in place. These ‘foundational’ aspects of SP are essential for both routine service delivery as well as for ASP. It is important to note that countries also vary in the maturity of their foundational SP systems, which often impacts the extent to which they are able to adapt. Given these nuances, the traffic light assessment is therefore divided to distinguish between the foundational investments in SP and investments related exclusively to ASP. 4.1 Traffic light system: foundational investments The foundational elements of social protection are critical to ensuring that programs and services effectively respond to the poverty and life cycle risks faced by individuals and 13 households. Foundational SP therefore relates to what is often characterized as ‘regular’ delivery of SP. This section proposes a summarized traffic light system to help countries rapidly self-assess foundational SP performance metrics that are also important to effective ASP. It is important to note that the traffic light system for foundational investments is not intended to replace established tools for assessing foundational SP performance. Notably, the Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment (ISPA) Core Diagnostic Instrument (CODI)9 provides a framework for a more detailed assessment of SP system performance against national SP objectives and helps track progress against a standardized set of performance criteria over time. Additionally, the Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE) helps countries analyse the scope and performance of SP programs and facilitates cross-country comparisons.10 ASPIRE can also help countries compare foundational SP performance on some metrics identified in this traffic light system, notably on coverage, targeting, benefit adequacy, and spending. The traffic light system for foundational investments is oriented around the following dimensions: ● Institutions: SP policies and frameworks are current and operational. Institutional and coordination arrangements for foundational SP are well-defined. Moreover, SP’s human resource capacity is adequate to deliver all programs and functions nationwide. ● Delivery: (i) information systems to support program intake and beneficiary management, optimally integrated and interoperable; with effective strategies for collecting, updating, and sharing data, and security protocols; and (ii) delivery mechanisms that guarantee the effective delivery of regular SP benefits, and that rely, to the extent possible, on objective and transparent procedures. ● Financing: Financing for foundational SP is domestically funded; consistent and sustainable and compares favourably with global trends. Table3: A traffic light system for foundational investments in SP in the Caribbean Dimension Nascent Emerging Established SP Policy and • There is no national SP • A national SP law, • SP national law, policy INSTITUTIONS strategy and law, policy nor strategy policy or strategy is in strategy is up-to-date, framework place, but it is either has legal foundations outdated or partially and is fully operational operational. SP Coordination • SP is delivered in silos, • There is some • SP delivery is well- with no/limited coordination among SP coordinated with 9 https://ispatools.org/core-diagnostic-instrument/ 10 https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/aspire 14 Dimension Nascent Emerging Established coordination among agencies, with quasi- limited overlap and agencies and no formal legal structures for effective information structures to monitor institutional sharing, and governed institutional arrangements such as by formal legal arrangements memoranda of structures. understanding (MOUs) SP Human • Very limited human • HR capacity for major • HR capacity for all roles Resource (HR) resource capacity of SP roles and programs in in regular SP delivery is Capacity leading agency regular SP delivery is adequate. adequate. Social Registry • Paper-based data • Social registry in place, • Social registries are in collection but supports a single place, current, dynamic, • No registry, or if in program, is static, or and cover a large share place, it is excel-based has very small coverage of the population and • Data is old and/or not of the population or those most at risk updated regularly those most at risk • Integrated and • There is no data sharing • Data collection is digital interoperable registries or integrated use of • Data may be updated – for SP and beyond social registry data more routinely, but • Data are frequently isn’t always current. updated, with on- demand approaches (although not exclusively) Beneficiary • No registry, or if in • Main programs have • Beneficiary registries Registry place, it is excel-based digital beneficiary are integrated and registries, but these are interoperable with independent single other systems program registries with DELIVERY limited integration SP Program Mix • A small offering of SP • At least two of the • SP programs effectively programs with large primary SP objectives of support all primary SP gaps in two or more of equity/protection; objectives of the primary SP opportunity/promotion; equity/protection; objectives of and resilience/ opportunity/promotion; equity/protection; prevention are and resilience/ opportunity/promotion; supported by an prevention are and adequate offering of supported by an resilience/prevention. programs adequate offering of programs; without excessive duplication and overlap Targeting of Main • Targeting methods rely • Targeting is based on • Targeting is based on SSN on subjective objective and objective and assessments and/or on transparent methods, transparent methods undocumented but there may be with few inclusion and processes challenges with exclusion errors. Data inclusion or exclusion to inform targeting errors or outdated data updates is current. to inform targeting 15 Dimension Nascent Emerging Established Coverage of Main • Coverage of the main • There is reasonable • There is broad coverage SSN poverty reduction SP coverage of the main of the main poverty programs among the poverty reduction SP reduction SP program poor is low program among the among the poor poorest Identification (ID) • No unique ID in place • No unique ID in place, • Unique ID in place to Systems and coverage of other but there is at least one facilitate effective data IDs is too limited to other ID type with sharing and support data sharing broad coverage of the interoperability of • Average ISPA population to support household data across assessment score for ID some data sharing databases below 2 functions. Or if a unique • Average ISPA ID is in place, coverage assessment score for ID is low. between 3-4 • Average ISPA assessment score for ID between 2-3 Benefit Adequacy • Benefits for regular SP • Benefits for regular SP • Benefits for regular SP are not adequate and are fairly adequate (the are adequate, facilitate do no facilitate benefit of the main CT is consumption effective consumption between 21-50% of the smoothing and smoothing (the benefit average income (or improved nutrition and of the main CT is below consumption) in the resilience (where the LAC CCT average of poorest quintile) applicable) (the benefit 21% of the average of the main CT is income in the poorest between over 50% of quintile or consumption the average income (or if income data is not consumption) in the available) poorest quintile) Payment Delivery • Most cash transfers are • Most cash transfers are • All cash transfers are delivered through delivered electronically, delivered electronically manual mechanisms but limited to a single and there are options and limited to a single delivery mechanism for benefit delivery to delivery mechanism • Average ISPA provide beneficiary • Average ISPA assessment score choice assessment score below between 2-3 • Average ISPA 2 assessment score between 3-4 SP Information • Incipient data privacy • Data privacy and • Effective data privacy Systems and security legislation security legislation and and security legislation and protocols protocols exist but are and protocols • Systems are largely not effective • Broad interoperability absent, so there is no • There is some of SP information data sharing nor interoperability among systems to facilitate interoperability SP information systems effective verification but limited to flagship and beneficiary programs monitoring Operational • Delivery processes for • Delivery processes are • Delivery processes are processes regular programs are documented, but documented, and not documented operations manuals operations manuals may be out-of-date are regularly updated 16 Dimension Nascent Emerging Established to reflect new procedures Complementary • Lack of family • Family accompaniment • Accompaniment and measures for SP accompaniment, and and case management case management beneficiaries case management for measures are provided, measures are well- beneficiaries of but on a limited scale established for most foundational SP and not evaluated for beneficiaries and programs impact impact is routinely assessed SP spending • SP spending is lower • SP spending is similar • SP spending compares than other comparable to other comparable favourably with regions and countries regions and countries comparable regions and FINANCE • SP relies heavily on • SP is funded with a countries external financing and mixed of external and • SP is domestically is unpredictable domestic resources and funded, consistent, is generally reliable, but reliable and sustainable sustainability is not guaranteed Source: Authors, based on World Bank (2020a, b, c, d and e). 4.2 Traffic light system: ASP investments While a strong foundational SP system is useful for ASP, there are specific adaptations, adjustments, and investments needed to ensure that SP systems are effective in responding to shocks among traditional beneficiaries and other affected households, while facilitating broader resilience among the those vulnerable and at risk. Regarding the ASP investments, the traffic light system proposes that the transition towards established systems would entail achieving the following: ● Institutions: DRM and SP policies and frameworks are current and include provisions for ASP, and clear roles and responsibilities, which are then reflected in the mandates and strategies of SP agencies. Moreover, cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms promote effective coordination internally across different levels of implementation and externally across sectors. Finally, there is adequate human resource capacity to support ASP actions. ● Delivery: (i) Integrated and interoperable information systems are, overall, risk- informed and inform DRM actions; and (ii) there are contingency plans that guarantee business continuity during crises, and with protocols and mechanisms that are capable of flexing and scaling up when needed and ensuring efficient and appropriate SP shock response. Additionally, delivery supports strengthened household resilience and risk reduction strategies to specifically address identified risks. 17 ● Financing: An optimized mix of contingency financing options in line with the risk profile and the estimated financing needs of the country, with pre-established funding mechanisms for ASP. Table 4: A traffic light system for ASP in the Caribbean Dimension Nascent Emerging Established Defined policy • DRM and SP policies are • DRM legislation and • DRM national structures for either inexistent or national strategy is strategies establish ASP in DRM outdated and ASP fairly up-to-date, but roles for SP and SP Policies considerations are not adequate roles for SP • SP national strategy mainstreamed in the are not clearly includes resilience mandates and established strengthening as a regulations of DRM and • SP national strategy key objective SP ministries / agencies does not include • Detailed ASP concrete strategies for considerations are resilience mainstreamed in strengthening DRM and SP • Some ASP regulations and considerations mandates integrated in DRM and SP mandates and regulations, but limited ASP • Weak coordination • Coordination • Effective coordination INSTITUTIONS Coordination mechanisms between SP mechanisms between mechanisms between Arrangements and DRM agencies; SP and DRM agencies; SP and DRM agencies; between Government between Government between Government and non-Government and non-Government and non-Government actors; and vertically at actors; and vertically actors; and vertically different levels of at different levels of at different levels of Government Government exist and Government are active, although not effective ASP Human • Very limited capacity of • Limited capacity of • Adequate capacity of Resource (HR) DRM and SP leading DRM leading agencies DRM leading agencies Capacity agencies (inadequate (inadequate human (adequate human and human and financial and financial financial resources) resources) resources) • HR capacity for all • HR capacity for major roles in regular SP roles in regular SP delivery is adequate, delivery is adequate, and contingency but no measures in measures are in place place to ensure to ensure adequate contingency HR HR capacity for post- capacity for post- disaster SP disaster SP operations. operations. Post Disaster • PDHAs are developed ad- • PDHA data collection is • PDHA data collection VERY DELI Household hoc for each disaster mainly electronic, but is mainly electronic, includes offline but includes offline 18 Dimension Nascent Emerging Established Assessment • Paper-based data functionality or paper functionality or paper (PDHA) collection format as back-up format as back-up • There is no dedicated • The PDHA may not be • The PDHA is information system to supported by a supported by an store PDHA data dedicated information information system • There is no coordination system and is not that links to the social or data sharing among linked to the social registry agencies carrying out registry • The PDHA processes PDHAs • The PDHA processes are established in may not be established manuals and staff are in manuals and not all trained in processes staff are trained in ex-ante these processes • The PDHA data is • The PDHA informs used by most SP Government SP actors to inform post- response but is not disaster SP response used by external agencies Post-Shock • Benefit delivery • There is some • Multiple and Benefit Delivery mechanisms in post- flexibility in benefit accessible benefit Mechanisms shock context limited to a delivery in the post- delivery mechanisms single method, with no shock context help facilitate adaptability to the post- adaptations to the shock environment post-shock environment as well as beneficiary choice SP and DRM • Systems are largely • There is some data • SP registries are risk- Information absent, so there is no sharing between SP informed and Systems Secure data sharing nor and DRM but very interoperable with and interoperability between limited other risk information Interoperable SP and DRM interoperability systems, including those for PDHAs • DRM actions are informed by SP data (e.g. risk maps use SP data about vulnerability) ASP operational • Lack of contingency • Operations manuals • Manuals of processes protocols for ASP do not cover delivery operation include adjustments processes shock- protocols for shock response responsive SP • Contingency protocols • There are effective for ASP adjustments contingency exist, but do not protocols for ASP include alternative adjustments that delivery mechanisms include alternative delivery mechanisms Complementary • SP programs – CTs, Public • Risk is integrated on a • Risk is integrated into measures to Works etc. – are not risk limited scale in one or most programs or 19 Dimension Nascent Emerging Established support informed and have no two flagship programs comprehensively for resilience interventions to address – e.g. beneficiary flagship programs beneficiary risk education to CT through risk • No productive and beneficiaries; Public information and risk economic inclusion Works to address reduction efforts. interventions for SP climate risk • Productive and beneficiaries • Productive and economic inclusion • Lack of social care and economic inclusion interventions case management for interventions for SP available for most SP post-disaster support beneficiaries beneficiaries and are • Benefit delivery does not implemented on a well-coordinated with facilitate financial pilot or small scale and other sectors inclusion not broadly • Effective social care coordinated with and case other sectors management for • Social care and case post-disaster support management for post- systematically disaster supporting deployed for affected place, but not well- households established and • Benefit delivery implemented on an facilitates financial ad-hoc basis inclusion, including • Benefit delivery savings. facilitates some links to financial inclusion by improving financial access, but does not facilitate savings Post-shock SP • No mechanisms in place • Limited or pilot • Established ASP needs to quantify post-shock SP mechanisms in place funding mechanisms quantified ex- financing needs ex-ante to quantify post-shock informed by ex-ante FINANCE ante SP financing needs ex- quantification of post- ante, but not shock SP financing systematically used by needs and methods in government place for its systematic use to inform ASP financing. 20 Dimension Nascent Emerging Established DRF • ASP to be taken into • ASP financing arm • Established ASP Mechanism in consideration when integrated into a wider financing strategy, place for ASP devising a national DRF DRF agenda included in the wider strategy • Different DRF national DRF strategy • Inadequate ex-ante instruments are in in place financial protection place, but are not fully • Different DRF strategies (often over- aligned and optimized instruments relying on budget for financing ASP combined and reallocations and needs optimized with humanitarian aid) • No sectorial / respect to probable • No established financing programmatic ASP financing needs coordinating vehicle for disaggregation of • Sectorial and streamlining funding financing resources programmatic mechanisms for ASP, that and mechanisms for financing for ASP can include capitalized ASP considered and in reserves, risk transfer • At least one ASP place (e.g. micro-/meso-/macro- related DRF complementary instruments instrument is available financing strategies • No direct ASP related DRF for agriculture, tool available fisheries, small businesses, infant nutrition, etc.) • Multiple tools available Source: Authors, based on World Bank (2020a, b, c, d and e). 21 5 Overview of social protection in the Caribbean This section presents the main characteristics of Caribbean social protection systems, with a focus on spending, coverage, and adequacy of benefits. Where feasible, these characteristics are benchmarked against SP systems in other regions of the world. The overview, which focuses on SSNs and on flagship cash transfer programs, finds that most Caribbean countries are transitioning from ‘nascent’ to ‘emerging’ on most dimensions in the traffic light systems presented in section 4. A more detailed analysis in relation to the readiness of SP systems in the Caribbean, including both foundational SP and ASP parameters, is presented in section 6. Caribbean countries have made significant progress in developing SP systems that enhance resilience from different angles. Most countries have in place a mix of programs that aim to support the main SP objectives of equity/protection; opportunity/promotion; and resilience/ prevention. These include cash transfer programs and social pensions for consumption smoothing; school feeding programs for improving food security, nutrition outcomes and school attendance; active labor market programs (skills training and employment services) for improving employability and increasing earnings; and social insurance for protection against certain risks (e.g. disability, old age). The table below shows the wide range of SP programs implemented in the Caribbean. In relation to SSNs, cash transfer programs, either conditional or unconditional, and school feeding programs are implemented in almost every country. Social pensions, relief grants11 and public works are also fairly popular. Regarding active labor market policies, virtually all the countries in the region have a skills training program in place, while some also have employment services. Finally, in terms of social insurance, almost all the countries in the Caribbean have a contributory old-age pension scheme and other social insurance benefits to cover work related risks, like for example workplace injuries; however, unemployment insurance is almost non-existent in the region. 11 In the Caribbean context, relief grants refer to social assistance transfers (cash or in-kind) for emergency needs. These transfers are often one-off or temporary emergency cash transfers. Most Caribbean countries have at least one relief grant among its social assistance program offerings and financed by recurrent expenditures. 22 Table 3: Overview of social protection programs by SP objective in the Caribbean Country Social Safety Nets Labor Markets Social Insurance Equity/Protection Opportunity/ Resilience/Preven Promotion tion UCT CCT Social ECT/ SFP Public US Skills ES Pensions UI OSI Pension RG Works Training Antigua and ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Barbuda Belize ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Dominica ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Dominican ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Republic Grenada ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Guyana ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Haiti ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Jamaica ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ St Kitts and ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Nevis St Maarten ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ St Lucia ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ St Vincent ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ and the Grenadines Trinidad ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ and Tobago Sources: SP Assessments, (World Bank, UNICEF, UNDP, and ILO - 2009-2020). Administrative Data for Trinidad and Tobago. Notes: UCT: Unconditional Cash Transfer (poverty-targeted to households); CCT: Conditional Cash Transfer (poverty-targeted to households); ECT/RG: Emergency Cash Transfer or Relief Grant (one-off or temporary cash or in-kind transfers for emergencies that are an established part of the SP system); SFP: School Feeding Program; US: Utility subsidies or waivers; Skills Training refers to publicly funded skills training programs; ES: Employment Services; UI: Unemployment Insurance; OSI: Other Social Insurance (short- and long-term benefits, including maternity, workplace injury, etc.). The progress in the development of SP systems is driven by substantial public spending on SSNs. Finance is in fact the dimension with strongest achievements, according to the traffic light system for foundational SP provisions. Many Caribbean countries have reached an emerging maturity level and are starting to transition towards an established level. Social spending in the Caribbean is, on average, similar to that in Latin American countries. It is also similar to the world’s average spending on SSNs (as a percentage of GDP), and is higher than in regions like East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2018a). Foundational SP programs in the Caribbean, are for the most part, financed annually by recurrent budget expenditures and maintain beneficiary quotas without disruptions. Haiti is an exception: while levels of 23 expenditures on social protection in 2013 were comparable to the averages presented in the figure below, two-thirds of the budget was financed through the PetroCaribe fund and special taxes which have now dwindled. Social expenditures through the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor have continuously decreased since 2014 and represented 0.13 percent of GDP in 2020. The vast majority of financing for cash transfer programs thus stems from external donors and are implemented through humanitarian agencies. The figure below shows the spending as a percentage of GDP for selected countries. Figure 4: Public spending on SSNs (% of GDP) 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% Sources: World Bank SP Assessment Reports for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St Lucia. Social Safety Net Assessments (UNICEF, UN Women, and World Bank) for St Kitts and Nevis, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. World Bank Public Expenditure Reviews of SP for the Dominican Republic and Jamaica12. Atlas of SP Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE) for Latin America and the Caribbean, Lower and Upper Middle- Income Countries, and World. Social Sector Investment Program, 2018. Trinidad and Tobago. Despite this progress and the wide range of programs implemented in most countries, significant gaps remain in terms of coverage and adequacy, and with implementing strategies to promote resilience. For example, in Jamaica, one of the Caribbean countries 12 For Jamaica, the scope of programs and services included in this expenditure review does not cover all the components considered as SP in Jamaica’s SP Strategy and the SP Floor, which general education and general health expenditures, spending on infrastructure, sanitary waste disposal, and potable water. However, the expenditure does include education and health related spending on transfers to individuals and households. 24 with the highest levels of SP coverage13, almost 20% of the population does not have access to any SP, while in Saint Lucia more than half of the population is excluded (53%). Figure 5: Share of the population receiving social protection benefits by quintile (%) Source: Authors, based on data from Saint Lucia’s Survey of Living Conditions and Household Budgets (2016) and Jamaica’s Survey of Living Conditions (2017) Notes: i) Social Protection (SP) includes Social Assistance (SA) and Social Insurance (SI); ii) In Jamaica, SA includes the following programs: PATH, Poor Relief and School Feeding, and SI includes beneficiaries of the National Insurance Scheme and of government pensions; iii) In Saint Lucia, SA includes the following programs: Koudmen Ste_ Lisi, PAP, Housing assistance, Education Assistance, School Feeding Program, and the School Transportation Program, and SI includes beneficiaries from the National Insurance Corporation. Coverage here refers to both direct and indirect beneficiaries (i.e. household members in a household with a direct beneficiary, but for whom no specific benefit is assigned.) Social insurance coverage in the region remains low and pro-rich due to the predominantly high levels of informality. Coverage of the poor is particularly low: while in Jamaica approximately 60% of those in the poorest quintile do not have access to social insurance, this proportion goes up to more than 80% in the case of Saint Lucia (Figure 5) Social assistance (SSNs) is pro-poor, but with substantial room for improvement in terms of reaching the poorest. For example, in Jamaica 36% of those in the poorest quintile are excluded from social assistance, while in Saint Lucia this proportion is 47%. Flagship cash transfer programs in most Caribbean countries still have low coverage. The figure below presents the coverage of the main cash transfer programs in region as a percentage of the poor. As the chart illustrates, coverage of flagship poverty-targeted cash transfers is generally low in Caribbean countries compared to global averages. This is for 13 Similarly to the expenditure analysis for Jamaica, the coverage mentioned here for Jamaica is for SP benefits including non-contributory social assistance, social insurance, and select labor market programs, and does not include all the components considered as SP in Jamaica’s SP Strategy and the country’s SP Floor. Coverage here however does include education and health related SSN transfers to individuals and households. 25 both Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs) and CCTs. Only the Dominican Republic’s CCT coverage slightly exceeds the global average. The data illustrates that while these programs are often intended to be the main SP intervention to address household poverty, close to 80% of the poorest quintile in several countries do not receive any benefits from these programs. Furthermore, coverage for countries without recent household survey data (e.g. Belize, Dominica, Grenada, and St Vincent and the Grenadines), assumes perfect targeting, so actual coverage is likely to be lower. Figure 6: Cash transfer coverage among the poor (%) 45.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Belize (CCT) St Lucia St Vincent & Grenada Jamaica Dominica Domnican Global Gobal 2019 (UCT - 2016) Grenadines (CCT-2018) (CCT-2017) (UCT - 2016) Republic Average Average (UCT - 2017) (CCT-2016) UCTs CCTs Sources: Belize, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada and Dominica: administrative data; Saint Lucia: SLC (2016); Jamaica: SLC (2017); Dominican Republic: ASPIRE. Notes: i) Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT), ii) Accounts for coverage of direct beneficiaries14 iii) For the Dominican Republic, St Lucia and Jamaica, coverage is estimated as a share of the poorest quintile. iv) For Belize, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada and Dominica, coverage is estimated as a share of households below the poverty line, with the most recent poverty rate applied to the current population, iv) Program coverage for countries without household survey data assumes perfect targeting, so in fact actual coverage is lower, v) global UCTs cover 23.4% of the poorest quintile (APSIRE), and v) CCTs cover 40.3% of the poorest quintile (ASPIRE). In relation to other SSNs, although many countries in the region have a social pension program in place, coverage is generally low. While social pensions are universal in Guyana, they are means-tested or categorically tested in most countries (Antigua and 14 For Jamaica, when including indirect beneficiaries (i.e. household members in beneficiary households who do not have a direct benefit assigned to them, PATH coverage increases to 69.9 percent of the poorest quintile. 26 Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago). These social pensions do help increase overall pension coverage by complementing social insurance coverage. For instance, in Dominica, 44.6% of elderly were covered by the Dominica Social Security (DSS) pension, while 14.5% were covered by the social pension, resulting close to 60% of elderly covered by a pension. Despite this, some 40% did not receive a pension. Trinidad and Tobago’s social pension results in near universal coverage by providing a pension to anyone not in receipt of a pension and to persons receiving a contributory pension below an established minimum pension, with benefit amounts scaled depending on the amount received from the contributory scheme. Regarding school feeding programs, although they exist in virtually all the countries in the region, there is a lot of variation in terms of their targeting approach . Some programs are offered in selected public schools only (e.g. Dominica, Haiti, and Guyana), while others are means-tested – i.e. only children in need are entitled to the meals (e.g. Trinidad and Tobago) – and others are offered universally – in the schools selected - (e.g. Grenada and Guyana) (Barca et al., 2019). School feeding programs are sometimes the main SSN in terms of coverage: this is the case of Saint Lucia, for example. A rapid estimation of benefit adequacy for select countries indicatively suggests that cash transfer benefits in some Caribbean countries are generally more adequate than in other LAC countries, but very low in others. Benefit adequacy is an important performance indicator to help assess the potential impact of SP benefits on consumption smoothing and ultimately, poverty reduction. This measure is also particularly important, given the assumption that the poor uses most of their income on consumption. For most Caribbean countries, assessing benefit adequacy is difficult, given the absence of recent household surveys for some countries; while in those countries with recent household surveys, the relevant variables are not structured to effectively assess benefit adequacy of specific non-contributory transfers. The table below illustrates benefit adequacy assessed for select Caribbean countries to estimate the transfer size as a share of consumption among the poorest. Indicatively, cash transfer programs in Belize, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines are more adequate than in LAC and globally, while the Dominican Republic and Jamaica’s CCT benefits are lower than those in LAC and globally. It is important to note that for both the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, the CCT transfers are complemented by other benefits. For the Dominican Republic, the Comer es Primero is a base benefit that can be complemented with other benefits. For Jamaica, the PATH CCT also complemented by the School Feeding Program and an annual Back-to-School grant for households with children in eligible grades. Additionally, the data shows that while the Dominican Republic and Jamaica demonstrate lower adequacy, both demonstrate higher coverage than countries with more adequate benefits. While indicative, the data does demonstrate the trade-offs countries face between expanding coverage and increasing benefits. For instance, for Belize, the low spending on social assistance is likely mostly attributable to the BOOST program’s low 27 coverage than the benefit size. It would be useful to assess benefit adequacy of these programs through subsequent household surveys in Belize, Jamaica, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Table 4: Benefit adequacy of select cash transfer programs in the Caribbean Country Program and Type Adequacy Year Building Opportunities for Our Social Belize 60.1% 2019 Transformation (BOOST) - CCT Dominican Republic PROSOLI - CCT 2.8% 2016 Program of Advancement Through Health Jamaica 15.3% 2017 and Education (PATH) - CCT St Lucia Public Assistance Program (PAP) - UCT 45.6% 2016 St Vincent and the National Assistance Fund – (UCT) 33.6% 2019 Grenadines LAC Average (CCTs) 21% 2019 Global Average (CCTs) 15.6% 2018 Global Average (UCTs) 18.6% 2018 Sources: For Belize, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: Program administrative data (last available year);Country Poverty Assessments; Consumer Price Index data; and SLC data for St Lucia); World Bank Public Expenditure Review report for Jamaica (2019);ASPIRE for the Dominican Republic and the LAC Average; and the World Bank’s State of Social Safety Net Report (2018) for global averages. The global averages measure the cash transfer value captured in household surveys, as a share of beneficiaries’ post-transfer welfare among the poorest quintile. Notes: i) For Belize, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), adequacy is estimated by using the last available average annual benefit as a share of the Food Poverty Line (FPL). Where the FPL is outdated, it is adjusted to current prices using official Consumer Price Index data. ii) for the Dominican Republic, adequacy here refers to adequacy of CCT benefits in the first quintile. The role of public works and skills training programs in promoting climate adaptation and enhancing resilience is overall very limited. Countries like Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago have public works programs in place (also referred to as cash for work or temporary employment programs). Public works programs provide immediate cash support to poor households in return for labor. They are typically designed to have an impact through three channels: cash, works, and training. They can be particularly useful when used to support climate adaptation investments: for example, programs may include activities related to shock-proofing public infrastructure, like roads, schools, or clinics, or adaptation measures, like tree planting. These programs can also be used after a shock to restore, recover, and rebuild public infrastructure damaged by the disaster. However, recent ASP assessments in several Caribbean countries15found that these programs do not systematically engage participants in activities related to climate adaptation or post-disaster recovery. Moreover, the training programs in 15 World Bank (2017 a, b, c and 2018 b) 28 the region tend to have low coverage and offer training in areas not related to resilience building.16 There are, overall, few SP systems with complementary measures to support beneficiary households. For foundational programs, the most common of these measures are family accompaniment and case management by social workers to beneficiary families.17 These services often require sufficient capacity of social workers or staff performing these functions as well as effective referral mechanisms and coordination arrangements with agencies providing complementary services. Most programs in the region tend to focus on delivering their core benefits and services, without complementing them with additional support to enhance resilience. However, there are two experiences worth highlight, in Jamaica and Belize, where the flagship cash transfer programs have attached complementary measures. Box 1: Resilience-enhancing complementary measures: Jamaica’s Steps-to-Work program and Belize’s Job Readiness component ● Jamaica’s Steps-to-Work The Steps-to-Work program engages working-age members of the flagship cash transfer program PATH, on a voluntary basis, in a set of initiatives to build human capital and strengthen resilience. These initiatives include job readiness, skills training, competencies building, job matching, and business development. The programme has four components (i) second chance education programmes (for persons ages 17-25); (ii) skills development training and certification (ages 18-64); (iii) job readiness training (ages 17-25); and (iv) business development / entrepreneurship training (ages 18-64). The second chance education and skills development interventions are implemented in partnership with the National Training Agency (Human Employment and Resource Training). The job readiness component is delivered in partnership with the job matching facility Electronic Labour Exchange. The entrepreneurship component provides business training and grants. In 2018, 78% of PATH households that had received business development grants were still in business after 6 months, and 28% of persons in PATH households that completed a 16 More on skills and resilience is detailed in the Education chapter that accompanies this piece. 17 Family Accompaniment is a type of counselling aimed at setting goals and modifying behavior to improve the safety and well-being of people, and is based on the established ties between the social worker and the family or individual/client. Case Management involves the joint assessment of client needs and the amount and type of benefits or services required to achieve the goals set during a client’s participati on in a SP program or service, and monitoring and evaluating that participation. (World Bank, 2020e) 29 Steps-to-Work service were employed within 12 months. Additionally, 452 working-age members of PATH households had completed skills training. ● Belize’s Job Readiness Component The Job Readiness Component aims to improve the skills and capacity of the participants and therefore, increasing their employability and income-generating capacity. The program does not offer any specific in-house training itself; it provides advice and mentoring, referrals to relevant training programs, and links beneficiaries with job- matching agencies to become aware of employment opportunities, and financial support. A social worker and a placement officer are assigned to each beneficiary to develop a job readiness plan that outlines the client’s career aspirations and goals. After an initial assessment process, beneficiaries are directed to the specific “economic empowerment route” that matches her interest and capacity. The three routes are: i) life skills (reading, writing, numeracy); 2) job preparedness (resume writing, interview skills, work ethics); and iii) vocational skills. In 2018, a total of between 180 and 200 beneficiaries obtained support from the program, comprising of about 140-150 beneficiaries that were part of the BOOST cash transfer program. Sources: World Bank: 2019a and b, and 2018f 30 6 ASP experiences and assessment of service delivery readiness This section assesses how ready SP systems in the Caribbean are to facilitate resilience to shocks. The section starts with a description of how Caribbean systems have been used to respond to recent shocks, with a focus on natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic. These experiences are fundamental for understanding the adaptive capacity of SP systems to respond to shocks and support resilience building. The section continues with an assessment of the readiness of the ASP in the region. 6.1 ASP experiences in the Caribbean Below various experiences in the use of SP programs to respond to shocks are presented, including responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these innovative experiences, the trend in the Caribbean has been one of using SP on an ad-hoc basis, without systematic prepositioning before shocks strike. 6.1.1 Natural disasters a) Cash transfers Some countries in the region have developed cash transfer programs to support people affected by various shocks. These ‘relief grants’ are typically programs implemented by the same ministry that implements the flagship cash transfer program, but they target people affected by idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, including localised natural disasters. Some examples of relief grants include: ● Trinidad and Tobago: General Assistance Grants and the Disaster Relief Grants – 1,466 and 10,366 beneficiaries in 2019, respectively. ● Jamaica: Emergency Grant of the Rehabilitation Program – 2,029 beneficiaries in 2017/18. ● Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: Disaster relief grants – 43 beneficiaries in 2017. ● Grenada: Disaster Relief Grants – data on beneficiaries not available. Although they are ASP interventions by design, the scale of these programs, compared to the flagship cash transfer programs, is very limited, as is their capacity to scale up when faced with large-scale shocks. In addition, in some cases, beneficiaries of relief grants are selected through the subjective assessments made by social workers or other program staff. In other cases, these emergency grants are categorically targeted (e.g. scale of damage; vulnerable members in the household etc.), at times based on post-disaster 31 needs assessments, which vary in the appropriateness and efficiency of their design. In summary, the targeting mechanism and scope of these emergency transfers differ from those of flagship cash transfer programs. In addition to their primary poverty reduction objectives, flagship cash transfer programs in the Caribbean have been deployed to respond to shocks, mostly in the context of economic crises. There are still very few experiences in the use of this kind of programs to respond to large-scale natural disasters; however, based on the experiences in LAC and elsewhere (Bowen et al.,2020; World Bank, 2020a; Beazley et al, 2018), it is likely that future responses will rely increasingly on the capacity of flagship cash transfer programs. The use of these programs for large-scale shocks has most recently been used in response to COVID-19 (examples detailed later in this chapter). A notable experience in the region of a flagship cash transfer program used to respond to a large-scale natural disaster took place in Jamaica: the conditional cash transfer program PATH provided one-off cash grants in response to Hurricane Dean in 2007. More than 90,000 households registered in PATH received roughly US$28; with payments transferred via cheques. In addition, cash grants were provided to non-beneficiaries screened through a damage assessment process using PATH’s payment mechanism (Williams et al., 2016). The box below describes the experience of a humanitarian response to a natural disaster led by WFP and UNICEF relying on the administrative infrastructure of the flagship cash transfer program in Dominica. Box 2: Humanitarian responses piggybacking on the capacity of cash transfer programs: the case of Dominica’s response to Hurricane Maria (2017) After the devastating effects of Hurricane Maria in Dominica in 2017, WFP and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) piggybacked on the capacity of the Public Assistance Program (PAP) to provide temporary cash transfers through the Joint Emergency Cash Transfer program (JECT). The JECT reached almost 25,000 people, including existing PAP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The response was informed by a Vulnerability Needs Assessment (VNA) carried out after the hurricane. The transfer value was of three payments of US$90 per household per month, with a top-up of US$50 per child up to three children, in addition to PAP benefits for those in the program. Although the payments were meant to be transferred within three months, due to delivery challenges some beneficiaries received one or two payments instead, of the same total value. JECT grants were distributed to the beneficiaries using the existing PAP delivery mechanisms, largely based on manual payments made through the Village Councils. Source: Beazley (2018) 32 b) In-kind transfers Dominican Republic’s Economic Kitchens (Comedores Económicos) sell cooked meals at subsidized prices. They operate on demand, without any targeting mechanisms. The program’s staff numbers exceed 1,600, and the program’s infrastructure includes 36 kitchens established across the country and more than 40 mobile kitchens (‘mobile canteens’) that are deployed in response to emergencies. In such cases, the mobile kitchens also deliver raw food and relief packages. The mobile kitchens were used in the 2016 floods and were also deployed to Haiti in response to Hurricane Matthew in 2007. Over 10 million meals were provided in 2017 (Comedores Económicos, 2018; Beazley, 2017). Jamaica’s Central Foods Warehouse facilitates pre-positioning of emergency relief by storing goods such as non-perishable food items, relief supplies, and toiletries, primarily for distribution to needy victims in times of disaster, and also for welfare relief on an as- needed basis. The Central Foods Warehouse is operated and managed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in its role as the ministry responsible for coordinating relief to victims of disaster. Disaster victims in need are identified by responders attached to the Humanitarian Assistance Committee, social workers and through household assessments, and are provided with food packages, relief supplies, and toiletries (World Bank, 2017c). School feeding programs are one of the SP instruments that are used to transfer in-kind benefits in the region; however, these programs have rarely been used to provide additional meals or take-home rations to children in schools and to other community members in the aftermath of natural disasters. This type of response was implemented in Trinidad and Tobago, where the School Nutrition Program provided food and meals to people affected by floods in 2013, beyond the children attending those schools (Beazley and Ciardi, 2020b). Despite this, the unique nature of the COVID-19 pandemic has seen an increased use of this program type to respond to the crisis in the region (examples detailed later in this chapter). c) Social insurance Jamaica’s response to Hurricane Dean in 2007 included not only the provision of cash assistance to PATH, as already described above, but also to National Insurance Scheme pensioners and elderly. The support consisted of a one-off transfer of about US $72 to approximately 80,000 people (Williams et al., 2016). d) Labor market policies Sint Maarten’s Emergency Income Support and Training Program was created in response to the effects of Hurricane Irma (2017). The program initially provided hospitality training to hotel workers whose places of employment were destroyed by the hurricane. The program aimed to improve skills during the recovery period and until normal hotel operations 33 resumed. Since then, the program has expanded both in terms of coverage (reaching almost 2,000 beneficiaries by 2020) and training courses (including, for example, training on construction, which is key for the preparedness of the country to future disasters). Dominica’s National Employment Program offers three types of support: internships, community employment, and education mentorship. In the community employment component, people work three days a week in the beautification of communities and as caregivers in the program Yes We Care, while others work in tourism or in road maintenance. Dominica’s response to Hurricane Maria in 2017 included the expansion and refocus of the National Employment Program: the program expanded its coverage, absorbing a substantial proportion of unemployed people, and some of the activities conducted under the beautification component, like cleaning roads, helped communities to recover from the shock (Beazley, 2018). 6.1.2 COVID-19 pandemic The economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have led to an unprecedented use of SP systems to respond to covariate shocks. Some of these experiences are described below, based on the mapping conducted by Gentilini et al. (2020). It is important to mention that at the time of writing this report, the responses are still being implemented and evolving, and therefore only partial information is available at this time. a) Cash transfers Some countries have provided support to existing beneficiaries of cash transfer programs, with temporary increases in the benefit value. Top-ups of this kind (also referred as a program’s vertical expansion) have been implemented in countries like Barbados (Welfare Department), Belize (BOOST), Cayman Islands (Permanent Financial Assistance), Dominican Republic (PROSOLI), Jamaica (PATH), and Trinidad and Tobago (Food Card, Public Assistance, and Disability Assistance). The expansion of existing cash transfer programs to new caseloads has been less frequently implemented. However, in Saint Kitts and Nevis, additional funding has been allocated to the Poverty Alleviation Program for households that may fall into poverty and become eligible. In Sint Maarten the Income Support Program has been extended to provide support to people affected by the COVID-19 crisis. In Saint Lucia, the coverage of the Public Assistance Programme is being expanded to reach at least 3,600 households (from a baseline of approximately 2,400 prior to COVID-19). Many governments have also launched new cash transfer programs in response to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of these new programs target sectors badly hit by the crisis, like tourism; or targeted to poor and vulnerable households excluded from the 34 safety net. Although these programs sometimes intend to reach informal workers, the eligibility requirements are often onerous and may lead to the exclusion of these workers. Some of the eligibility requirements include taxpayer’s registration numbers, business license, proof of association membership, or business receipts, among others. This type of unemployment assistance is in fact a hybrid between SSN and social insurance: it is an income replacement measure, but it is not funded by direct contributions to social security. Some examples of cash transfers to different target groups affected by COVID-19 include the following: ● The Bahamas has launched the Unemployment Assistance scheme, which provides weekly payments for up to eight weeks to self-employed workers, with a focus on the tourism sector. The delivery of the transfer is managed by the National Insurance Board, although the program is not funded by the Board. ● Belize created an Unemployment Relief Program to provide support to employed and self-employed workers who lost their jobs directly as a result of theCOVID-19 crisis. Benefits were paid every two weeks for 12 weeks. The country is also introducing a temporary 6-month cash transfer Belize COVID-19 Cash Transfer (BCCAT) to poor households with household members in the eligible categories for the BOOST CCT and who are not in receipt of other safety net cash transfers nor contributory pensions. ● Dominica introduced a program to provide Livelihood and Income Support to Employees and Self-Employed Persons. The program provided employees and self- employed individuals with minor dependents under the age of 18 US$222, while other eligible employees and self-employed individuals with no minor dependents under the age of 18 received US$148. The transfer was provided monthly for a maximum of three months. ● The Dominican Republic created a ‘Stay at Home’ program (Quédate en Casa) with different elements, including US$92 to 690,000 nonpoor and vulnerable non- beneficiary families in the SIUBEN social registry. The benefit was initially planned to be for two months, but has been extended for up to nine months.18 The program also provided a special transfer totalling US$129 to over 350,000 households where the household head is vulnerable to COVID19. ● Haiti announced a one-off cash transfer to 1.5 million vulnerable families as well as food distributions for 1 million vulnerable families and wage subsidies for 60,000 textile industry workers as well as compensations for teachers. ● Jamaica introduced a number of temporary grants under the COVID Allocation of Resources for Employees (CARE) Program, including (i) a Supporting Employees with Transfer of Cash (SET Cash) which provided temporary cash transfer to individuals 18 As of writing this report, the program has been extended until December, 2020. 35 where was verified that they lost their employment since March 10, (the date of the first COVID19 case in Jamaica). Beneficiaries received US$63 per fortnight, paid monthly for a maximum of four or nine months depending on the date of job loss;19 (ii) a COVID General Grant which provided one-time grants to different categories of small businesses and self-employed persons; (iii) Compassionate Grant of US$70to anyone in need (e.g. tertiary students, unemployed, informally employed, elderly, pensioners, etc.) who is not formally employed, did not receive any other cash benefit under the CARE program, excluding PATH beneficiaries. ● St Lucia introduced 3-month cash transfer to informal sector workers unemployed or displaced due to COVID19, preconditioned on their enrolment in the National insurance Corporation NIC. ● Trinidad and Tobago provided cash transfers for three months to households with a family member that is laid off or whose income is reduced due to de COVID-19 crisis. Rental assistance is also available to this target group. ● Saint Vincent and the Grenadines launched a stimulus package which includes cash transfers to those not on public assistance nor in receipt of a pension, with a focus on displaced workers in the hotel and tourism sector. b) In-kind transfers School closures have led to the need to adapt school feeding programs. New approaches include the provision of take-home rations (like, for example, in Belize and Dominican Republic), food vouchers (like in Cayman Islands), or assistance through other programs (like in Jamaica, where children in the cash transfer program PATH received food packages and top-ups for meals, or in Trinidad and Tobago, where children enrolled in the national School Feeding Program received temporary cash support through the Food Support Card program. Many countries have delivered food packages to vulnerable households in response to the economic downturn caused by the pandemic. This is the case in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cayman Islands, Grenada, Haiti, Saint Lucia, Sint Maarten, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and in Dominican Republic and Jamaica, through the Economic Kitchens and the Central Foods Warehouse, respectively (see Section 6.1.1). c) Other SSNs 19 Applicants who were employed as of March 2020 were eligible for a maximum of nine months of benefits, while later applicants who were employed up to August 2020, were eligible for a maximum of four months of benefits. 36 The main type of SSN response not covered above have entailed relaxing the payment of utilities and other financial obligations. Payments are typically temporarily suspended or postponed. This is the case in, for example, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Guyana, Saint Lucia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. d) Social insurance A quick social insurance response implemented by some countries in the region has consisted of advancing payments. The delivery of pensions in Jamaica, the Bahamas, Guyana, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has been advanced. In the few countries where they are offered, unemployment insurance or severance benefits were paid out. For instance, in Dominica, the Redundancy Fund of Dominica Social Security was activated. However, pay-outs from the Fund requires a minimum of 3 years continuous employment, which left many workers (particularly in the tourism sector) ineligible given the destruction following Hurricane Maria in late 2017, which businesses were just recovering from. Additionally, varied benefits (to those registered in the social security agency) have been created, increased, or adapted in response to the crisis. This is the case in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. In Barbados, for example, application requirements have been relaxed. e) Labor market policies Various measures have been implemented by Caribbean countries to support firms in the formal sector. Most of them consist of wage subsidies – implemented in Belize, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Sint Maarten, for example. Other measures include, for instance, waiving or subsidizing social security contributions (e.g. Barbados where employers who retained three quarters of their workforce, were allowed to defer their employer’s contributions to the National Insurance Scheme for three months, in the first instance, with the preparation to extend it for another three months if the crisis continues beyond that period).As part of the CARE program, Jamaica also provided a one-time COVID Small Business Grant of US$697 to all small businesses with average annual sales of approximately US$34,000 between 2017-2019; who filed taxes in the 2019/20 financial year; and filed payroll returns indicating that they have employees. In Belize, the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Support Program includes grants of US1,250; wage subsidies, and soft loans to help facilitate continued operations and employee retention during the crisis. There are not many examples of direct job creation in response to the crisis, however one measure was recently announced by Barbados, which hasapproved COVID Relief Program to address the interruption in earnings and livelihoods among affected working-aged individuals. The Program will provide 12-month employment contracts to unemployed persons to carry out 37 a range of jobs that are linked to COVID19 and social responses, and to support development priorities in sectors such as infrastructure and the environment. f) Service Delivery Several countries also adjusted benefit and service delivery to facilitate social distancing and to minimize contagion risks. These included changing payment delivery processes in Grenada to provide direct payment delivery to beneficiaries aged 60 and over at their homes in March; and introducing additional payment points for all beneficiaries in each Parish (district) in April; and in Jamaica, where PATH beneficiaries received payments in smaller groups on different days, organized in alphabetical order, and increased transitioning of PATH and NIS beneficiaries from check payment to electronic payments. 6.2 Readiness of social protection delivery systems This section assesses the readiness of SP delivery systems for ASP, following the three system dimensions of the conceptual framework: institutions, delivery, and financing, and covering both foundational SP and ASP parameters. a) Institutions The institutional arrangements required for effective ASP is still quite nascent in the region, with some exceptions (i.e. the Dominican Republic and Jamaica). The main challenges that systems face are associated with capacity constraints and limited linkages between SP and DRM. Nevertheless, there is an increasing effort in the region to develop or update national SP strategies and frameworks. For example, St Lucia’s SP policy from 2015 is planned to be updated/revised in 2020-2021. Having a national SP strategy operational is one of the foundations of ‘emerging’ systems, as per the traffic light assessment, and therefore most Caribbean countries can be assessed as either ‘emerging’ or transitioning from ‘nascent’ to ‘emergent’ in this institutional aspect. There is clear and strong government leadership in the SP and DRM sectors in most Caribbean countries. Most countries in the region have institutionalized ministries and other public agencies with specific responsibilities for SP delivery and oversight, and the same for DRM (World Bank, 2020a). DRM legal and policy frameworks in the region have different levels of maturity (Barca et al., 2019). While some countries have laws covering the full spectrum of DRM, others lack national-level legislation, or the existing legislation is very outdated and does not reflect DRM actions on the ground (Beazley et al, forthcoming). For example, in the following countries, 38 the most recent laws or plans governing DRM are outdated: Trinidad and Tobago’s Disasters Measures Act is from the year 1978 (Beazley and Ciardi, 2020b), Dominica’s National Disaster Plan is from 2001 (World Bank, 2017b),and Saint Vin cent and the Grenadines’ National Disaster Plan from 2005 (World Bank, 2018b). In others, the relevant laws have been revised more recently: Grenada’s Disaster Management bill was revised in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a) and Jamaica’s DRM act was revised in 2015 (Beazley and Ciardi, 2020). DRM policies typically include few provisions for ministries and agencies responsible for SP, and mostly focused on the provision of relief. This is a consequence of DRM policies being outdated or underdeveloped in various countries, but also due to the fact that ASP is a fairly new policy area, and that the interaction between the two sectors has traditionally been limited. The role of SP in DRM policies, when established, usually consists of providing shelter and relief to the affected population and supporting or conducting post- disaster needs assessments. For example: ● In Dominica, although the National Disaster Plan does not explicitly mention the role of the Ministry of Social Services, it assigns the role of linking SP and DRM to the Social Welfare Task Force, comprised of the Chief Welfare Officer, the Assistant Local Government Commissioner, the Police Chief, the Chief Development Officer, the Red Cross representative, among other private and civil society organizations. This task force is mandated with responsibilities before, during and after a disaster strikes (World Bank, 2017b). ● In Grenada, the Ministry of Social Development chairs the Welfare and Voluntary Services Subcommittee, which is responsible for the management and coordination of relief support. According to the National Disaster Plan, the main roles of the Ministry are: i) to design, update, test and evaluate continuity of operations and emergency response plans and procedures; ii) the distribution of welfare supplies (other than food); and iii) the maintenance of adequate stocks of blankets, beds, feeding utensils, lanterns, torch lights, etc. during hurricane season (Government of Grenada, 2005). ● In Jamaica, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security chairs the national Humanitarian Assistance Committee, which oversees and ensures coordination of all shelter, relief and distribution activities, as well as leading the National Humanitarian Policy and Strategy, which articulates welfare and relief issues within the context of DRM in Jamaica. The ministry is the primary agency responsible for coordination of welfare activities to support people affected by disasters (World Bank, 2017c and Beazley and Ciardi (2020a). ● In Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Ministry of National Mobilisation, Social Development, Family, Gender Affairs, Persons with Disabilities and Youth is a member of the National Emergency Council (Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2006). 39 Given the multi-sectoral nature of SP and DRM, effective delivery requires institutional leadership that ensures coordination at different levels, and that articulates different interventions. However, the capacity of SP and DRM leading agencies to coordinate and articulate the actions within their sectors is, overall, limited. Several DRM leading agencies in the region have limited capacity for effective horizontal and vertical coordination, due to inadequate regulatory frameworks and resourcing. For example: ● In Dominica, the Office for Disaster Management, which is mandated with DRM coordination and preparedness actions, is heavily under-resourced: back in 2017, it had only two officers and one consultant back (Beazley, 2018). ● In Grenada, the National Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, from 2013, highlighted that, although there has been some progress in this respect, human and financial resources together with technical capacities were lacking (National Disaster Management Agency, 2013 in World Bank, 2017a). The World Bank assessment from 2017 indicates that this challenge remains and that there are no financial resources allocated to mainstreaming DRM in the different ministries and agencies, a situation that hinders planning, prevention and response capacity (World Bank, 2017a). ● In Saint Lucia the mandate of the National Emergency Management Office has increased in scope over time: while until 2016 the agency was mainly tasked with emergency response, today it is responsible for many activities along the DRM cycle and to promote resilience. Although its role has expanded, resources allocated to the agency are limited. The recurrent allocation covers the operating expenses with a small allocation for training. The agency is mainly financed through projects and grants to which they have to apply themselves (World Bank, 2018e and Marzi and Ciardi, 2019). ● In Trinidad and Tobago, there are currently no sectoral committees that meet regularly for prevention, mitigation, and preparedness actions. Interactions between the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management and line ministries, regional corporations and the Disaster Management Units are limited to few ad hoc trainings and consultations (Beazley and Ciardi, 2020b). Coordination arrangements for effective collaboration between SP and DRM sectors are often weak in the region. There are, however, some exceptions, for example in Jamaica, due to the role of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security as chair of the national Humanitarian Assistance Committee, or in Belize, where the Ministry of Human 40 Development is responsible for DRM and multiple SP programmes, and therefore there are mechanisms in place to ensure coordination between the two sectors (Bailey and Ciardi, 2019a). There is also a lack of contingency human resource (HR) and institutional arrangements for ASP to support DRM actions. As a result, most of the ASP experiences described in Section 5.1were implemented without supporting contingency plans and resourcing. Dominican Republic is a notable exception to the overall limited institutional set-up for ASP in the region. Dominican Republic has developed a comprehensive protocol establishing the role of SP, and other sectors, in response to climatic shocks. The protocol establishes the roles and responsibilities of DRM, SP, and other actors in three stages after an alert is declared: emergency, early recovery, and medium- to long-term recovery. The use of SP data is envisioned in the protocol for identifying those affected by the climatic shock (see Box 3 about the use of the social registry for DRM actions), as well as the scale-up of SSNs and the provision of social accompaniment. However, the protocol does not establish a clear funding mechanism. It explicitly mentions that such a mechanism will be developed. b) Delivery The delivery dimension includes the business processes and systems required to implement a program. This typically includes four phases (Lindert et al., 2020): i) assessing the potential demand for the program, which includes outreach activities and assessing needs; ii) enrolling beneficiaries, which entails determining the eligibility of applications, the benefit package and onboarding beneficiaries; iii) providing benefits and services; and iv) managing and monitoring the program. While the first two phases are typically implemented at the beginning of each implementation cycle, the last two phases are continuous. Figure 7: SSN’s delivery systems and processes 41 Source: World Bank (2020c), adapted from Lindert et al. World Bank, 2020. Information systems and payment mechanisms constitute the backbone of program delivery. Information systems include the processes and systems to collect, store, and share data. They inform decision making regarding the assessment of needs and of eligibility and they provide the information for monitoring and routine operations. Payment mechanisms are the processes and systems that enable delivering cash and/or in-kind benefits. The analysis of the delivery dimension is divided into two sections: information systems and delivery mechanisms. The section on information systems is further divided into subsections on SP and disaster risk information systems. Information Systems o Social Protection Information Systems (SPIS) SP programs are optimally supported by SPISs to support delivery processes. There are two principal types of SPISs. Beneficiary registries, on the one hand, support the management of specific programs: that is, the processes of enrolment and onboarding; provision of benefits and services; grievance redress; and other monitoring and management functions related to the program(s) they are used by. These registries only contain information on those enrolled in specific programs (Barca, 2017 and Leite et al., 2017). Social registries, on the other hand, support the delivery processes related to 42 outreach, in-take, registration, and the determination of potential eligibility for one or more social programs. They contain detailed socio-economic and demographic data of households and, since they are used for assessing eligibility, they contain information about both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (Barca, 2017; and Leite et al., 2017). This is a promising feature of social registries for ASP, since they could inform responses to reach non- beneficiaries (e.g. horizontal expansions of SP programs, new programs relying on these data) (Barca and Beazley, 2019). Sometimes social and beneficiary registries do not operate in isolation, but tend to be components of a broader integrated information system. Integrated systems facilitate multiple information management functions for a single or range of programs and services. These integrated systems often include social registries, beneficiary registries, payment systems, case management and grievance redress systems, and protocols and frameworks for interoperability and data exchange (World Bank, 2020b). World Bank (20120c) proposes the typology described in Figure 8 for assessing the maturity of SP information systems. According to this typology, nascent systems are typically characterized by being largely paper based, suffering from data quality issues (e.g. data are outdated and not regularly collected), with few security protocols and controls, with no interoperability, and without a social registry in place. At the other extreme of the spectrum, established information systems have digitalized and electronic registries, high confidence among the users and the public regarding the data quality, and strong security mechanisms, and have social registries that serve multiple programs and integrated or interoperable beneficiary registries with bidirectional data sharing.20 Figure 8: Typology for assessing the maturity of social protection information systems 20 Having social registries in place is not a precondition for a mature social protection information system (‘established’, as per the typology). Although social registries are popular in Latin America and the Caribbean, countries may decide to strengthen other registries and their interoperability, rather than developing a social registry. The best approach will depend on the context and the policy priorities. For example, social registries are typically associated with poverty-targeted programs and therefore countries with universal or categorical programs may prefer or need other types of registries. 43 Source: World Bank (2020b) Note: The development of information systems is not as linear as is illustrated in the figure. Countries can advance development on one spectrum yet demonstrate less maturity on another. Countries can also leapfrog to more integrated and interoperable systems. In relation to the foundational aspects of information systems, most Caribbean countries can be categorized as either nascent or emerging or between these two stages. Although the flagship cash transfer programs in Dominica and Saint Lucia still rely on paper- or Excel-based registries, most countries in the region have electronic registries (World Bank, 2020b; Beazley et al, forthcoming). However, there are very few countries with social registries (i.e. in Grenada and Jamaica the social registries serve one program only, while in Belize and Dominican Republic serve multiple programs). Moreover, there is, overall, limited interoperability and data sharing across programs and registries in the region, and many registries suffer from data quality issues, in particular regarding updating data regularly (World Bank, 2020b; Beazley et al, forthcoming). Table 5: Use of Social Protection Information Systems in Select Caribbean Countries Country Social Registry Beneficiary Registry Integrated SP 44 Single-Program Multiple-Program Single Program Multiple Program Information System Belize* ✔ ✔ Dominica ✔ ✔ Dominican Republic* ✔ ✔ Grenada ✔ ✔ Haiti* ✔ ✔ Jamaica* ✔ ✔ St Lucia* ✔ ✔ St Vincent and the ✔ Grenadines Sources: From program administrative data; World Bank staff. For the Dominican Republic, SIUBEN collects partial information on the individuals that receive some sort of benefit (but not on the benefits themselves); For Haiti, beneficiary registries are donor-managed program registries; Belize, Jamaica, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines are all currently planning reforms to move towards more integrated and multi-program registries. Belize, Jamaica and St Lucia also plan to develop integrated SP information systems. o Disaster Risk Information Systems According to World Bank (2020b), there are three critical DRM-related information systems relevant to ASP, as follows: ● Geographic Information Systems (GIS), which use computer database technology to merge geo-referenced and cartographic information to create digital maps and databases. GIS tools enable the production of hazard and risk maps, which are key for DRM actions. ● Early warning systems (EWS) are ‘the set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss’ (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2009). ● Registries of Disaster Affected Households based on post-disaster household assessments (PDHAs) collect data to assess household needs and impacts at the time of the shock or shortly thereafter. The resulting registries of affected households often provide a static picture of needs and impacts. The sector in charge of collecting and managing this type of information varies across countries, although often it is the responsibility of the DRM agency, and sometimes social workers from the leading SP agency are involved in conducting the assessments. In the Caribbean, while these instruments are routinely deployed to assess households after disasters, there are 45 no documented cases of countries with established registries which store the data from these assessments. Following hurricane Maria in Dominica, various household assessments were carried out, including the VNA and a Building Damage Assessment. The information from these instruments were stored in simple databases, but the data was not interoperable and could not be cross-referenced with other systems due to the absence of a unique identifier and other challenges with cross-referencing data. Although its previous household damage assessment instrument was paper- based, Jamaica is planning to establish a dedicated information system for its new Jamaica Household Damage, Impact and Needs Assessment (JHDINA) instrument, which has both online and offline functionality. The Dominican Republic, with support from the World Bank and WFP, is also developing a PDHA instrument, which is expected to have interoperability with the SIUBEN social registry. The interoperability between SP and DRM information systems is promising for ASP. SP information systems, and in particular social registries, have a lot of potential for informing the measurement of vulnerability at the household/individual level – something that is usually a challenge for DRM agencies. For example, social registries can feed into the design of hazard maps. From the perspective of the SP sector, disaster risk information can make registries and programs more risk-informed, by, for example, covering more risk- prone regions of the country with the social registry, or collecting data about exposure to hazards (Barca and Beazley, 2019). World Bank (2020b) describes the roles that SP information systems could play to help improve decisions and actions for risk identification, preparedness, risk reduction, response and financial protection (Figure 9). In addition, the report emphasises that interoperability between SP and DRM information systems can allow improving resilience, coping and adaptation among poor and vulnerable households. Figure 9: Using social protection information systems for DRM 46 Source: World Bank (2020b) Note: SP = Social Protection; SPISs = Social Protection Information Systems Despite how promising the interoperability between SP and DRM information systems is, there are almost no experiences of this in the region (World Bank, 2020c). This is probably the result not only of the frequent lack of coordination between the two sectors, but also the fact that the information systems of both sectors still face challenges in terms of data quality, data sharing protocols, coverage, etc., compounded by the absence of established unique identifiers in most Caribbean countries. The social registry of Dominican Republic is the only one in the region that has systematically been used for shock response and that has also utilized the data in its system to improve risk information and understanding of risk. Sistema Unico de Beneficiarios (SIUBEN) collects information for identifying households exposed to climate hazards, which is used by the DRM sector for hazard mappings and other actions. The box below describes SIUBEN. Box 3: Using social protection data to inform DRM actions: the case of Dominican Republic The social registry SIUBEN contains socio-economic data of more than 80% of the country’s population and is used by various social safety net programs to identify beneficiaries. The most recent round of data collection took place between 2017 and 2018. 47 The Index of Vulnerability to Climate Shocks (Índice de Vulnerabilidad ante Choques Climáticos – IVACC) uses SIUBEN data to estimate the probability of a household being affected by hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding. IVACC uses data on housing characteristics (walls and ceiling), earned income, and dwelling proximity to a hazardous natural element (river, stream, or ravine), and estimates how vulnerable each household in the registry is, scoring households from 0 (least vulnerable) to 1 (most vulnerable). IVACC helps to map out the areas most at risk from natural disasters, thus making it possible to focusing preparedness actions and responses towards the most vulnerable. The index has been also been used for disaster preparedness, through identifying highly vulnerable households before the onset of storms and hurricanes and to inform housing support to vulnerable households. Beyond natural disasters, SIUBEN data have been used to inform the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. SP programs have expanded their coverage using SIUBEN’s well-being ranking. Sources: Beazley (2017); SIUBEN (2019) Information systems for effective ASP are still at a nascent stage in the region, with the exception of Dominican Republic. The region can be broadly characterised by a lack of interoperability and data sharing between DRM and SP; and by PDHAs relying on paper- based data collection; and limited information systems to store and analyse its data. Delivery mechanisms The maturity level of the foundational aspects of service delivery in the Caribbean is, overall, hybrid. There are, on the one hand, substantial shortages in relation to the design and documentation of key processes (‘nascent’ systems), while on the other hand payment delivery mechanisms are fairly effective (‘emerging’ systems). Despite the long history of SP program provision in the Caribbean, delivery mechanisms are overall rudimentary, with a few exceptions. Delivery mechanisms include all the processes required for service delivery: that is, from outreach, in-take, and registration, to enrolment, onboarding, payments, monitoring, and grievances redressal mechanisms. While countries like the Dominican Republic and Jamaica demonstrate comparatively more established delivery mechanisms, delivery in several other countries is nascent. Many flagship SSNs in the region lack adequate manuals of operation and documentation regarding their processes, including eligibility criteria and targeting procedures. This is also often the case in school feeding programs and smaller-scale cash transfers (World Bank, 2020b). The programs most likely to have established manuals are 48 usually flagship poverty targeted cash transfers. While some countries such as Jamaica routinely update their program operations manual; manuals in other countries are not updated regularly to reflect recent adjustments in delivery mechanisms or changes to program rules. Some flagship cash transfer programs in the region still rely on subjective eligibility assessments, based on processes and criteria that are not well defined. While the programs of countries like Belize, Dominica Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago have developed objective and data-driven methods for poverty targeting (i.e. means-test or proxy-means test), others rely on the subjective assessment of social workers and other actors (e.g. Dominica and Guyana) (UNICEF, 2019c; UNICEF 2009a, and c; UNICEF, 2010; UNICEF, 2011). Furthermore, some countries are in the process of updating their targeting systems or have plans to do so in the near future (Belize, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines to name a few). The payment mechanisms of cash transfer programs in the region vary. For instance, flagship cash transfer programs in Belize, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago pay their benefits through bank or credit union transfers, while in Jamaica and Guyana most payments are delivered using cheques. Moreover, Dominican Republic relies on pre-paid cards, as well as Trinidad and Tobago for its Food Support program. Dominica, Grenada, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines pay most benefits in cash. Where rudimentary, countries have been making efforts to switch to electronic payment delivery. For instance, in Grenada, a small share of SEED beneficiaries receives their payments through bank accounts, due to recent efforts to encourage electronic payment delivery. A small share of Jamaica’s PATH beneficiaries also receives payments through Banks and remittance agents, though this is mostly in urban areas. Given the country’s recent experience with the COVID-19 crisis, Jamaica has rolled out more deliberate measures to incentivize transition from check payments to electronic payments among PATH beneficiaries and NIS pensioners. Saint Vincent is also taking the first steps towards improving its payment mechanism: electronic cards are expected to be piloted in 2021. Regardless of the payment method, transfers are, overall, regular and predictable. Several assessments conducted in different countries of the region have concluded that payments are rarely delayed (Barca et al., 2019). This is a commendable achievement as timeliness of payment delivery is a challenge experienced by cash transfer programs in several other countries. Figure 10: Main payment mechanisms: selected cash transfer programs 49 Source: Authors, based on various reports Notes: 1. Cash transfer programs considered: Building Opportunities for Our Social Transformation - BOOST (Belize), PAP (Dominica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Saint Lucia), PROSOLI (Dominican Republic), Poor Relief (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), PATH (Jamaica), SEED (Grenada), and Food Support Program (Trinidad and Tobago). 2. Some programs have more than one payment mechanism; the one used for delivering the majority of benefits was considered. Most countries in the region have delivery systems that can be categorised as ‘nascent’ in relation to their capacity to deliver support that enhances resilience and shock responsiveness. For example, although varied payment delivery options are critical to providing flexibility in post-shock environments, reviews of payment systems for SSN programs in Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines carried out between 2016-2018 flagged opportunities for electronic delivery which were not being leveraged (Pulver:2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2018). Most notably is the fact that countries were not leveraging high levels of bank and credit union account penetration. For instance, Dominica and St Vincent and the Grenadines which rely on cash payment demonstrate high levels of credit union penetration, with Dominica having the second highest rate of credit union penetration globally. In Jamaica, there were seven commercial banks, two building societies, 32 credit unions and eight remittance services providers, with 33.1% of Jamaicans receiving remittances, compared with 11.3% of adults in Latin America and the Caribbean and 17.8% of adults in upper middle-income countries. Some countries also demonstrate high levels of accessibility to electronic payment options. For Jamaica, although penetration of access points was lower than some other countries in the region, only 3% of unbanked adults reported distance as a barrier.21 Another area not leveraged is mobile money. Caribbean countries, like much of the globe demonstrate high levels of mobile phone ownership and coverage, but this has not translated to leveraging mobile technology for delivering SP 21 National Financial Inclusion Council of Jamaica, 2016, p. 42 50 benefits. For instance, in Jamaica there were 112 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people, while this was 106.29 subscriptions per 100 people in Dominica, and 103.65 subscriptions per 100 people in St Vincent and the Grenadines.22 Despite this, mobile payments are not common in the region. In 2017, mobile money was available in 92 countries,23 and while there were 30 live mobile money services across LAC at the end of 2016, mobile money was only available on a limited scale in Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (with two deployments in each of these markets launched between 2010-2015). No Caribbean countries currently use mobile money to deliver regular SP payments. However, this may be changing. The COVID-19 crisis further highlighted the problems with cash delivery, particularly in contexts where social distancing and crowd control is essential for minimizing the risks of community spread. Given this, Belize is piloting an e-wallet mobile payment option for its BCCAT emergency transfer. Table 6: Credit Union Penetration in Eastern Caribbean countries Table 7: Density of financial access points in select Caribbean countries Jamaica Bahamas Belize Grenada Dominican Trinidad & Republic Tobago Access points per 42 141 80 83 45 53 100,000 adults Access points per 76 41 7 188 66 110 1,000km2 Source: Pulver, 2017 – based on IMF Financial Access Survey 2013. 22 The indicator comes from the Word Development Indicators database and is defined as: “Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that provide access to the PSTN using cellular technology. The indicator includes (and is split into) the number of post-paid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e. that have been used during the last three months). The indicator applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice communications. It excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to public mobile data services, private trunked mobile radio, telepoint, radio paging and telemetry services.” 23 (GSMA, 2017) 51 Caribbean countries are also not fully leveraging payment delivery for resilience. Financial inclusion is a critical component of household resilience. In SP, financial inclusion can help connect poor households to the financial sector, improve financial literacy, and encourage savings and prudent financial management practices. In the Caribbean, financial inclusion does not appear to have high-level priority at the policy level, nor at the sectoral level. Only four Caribbean countries are members of the International Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI)24–Bahamas, Haiti, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, does not have a financial inclusion strategy in place. However, it is important to note that the ECCB’s latest strategic plan 2017-2021, mentioned financial inclusion for the first time (Pulver - 2017b, 2017c, 2018). Savings and financial inclusion also appear to be lower than regional and income averages. Where SP benefits are delivered in cash, they do not facilitate financial inclusion, as is the case for several countries in the region. This is also the case for pre-paid card payments that are return unused benefits by a cut-off date, as is the case for the Dominican Republic’s ADESS card. One notable exception is Belize, where 95% of BOOST beneficiaries are paid through credit unions. The BOOST program also has a policy of encouraging financial inclusion through provision of benefits through nine credit unions across the country. This facilitates improved access to financial services among beneficiaries and options to save for periodic expenses the household may incur. Table 8: Financial Inclusion in the Caribbean, percentage of population over the age of 15 years Accounts Dominican Jamaica Latin Upper Republic America & Middle Caribbean Income All adults 54.1 78.5 51.4 70.5 Women 56.0 77.8 48.6 67.3 Adults belonging to the poorest 40% 41.8 69.5 41.2 62.7 Young adults (% of population ages 15-24) 38.0 73.4 37.4 58.1 Adults living in rural areas 46.5 76.2 46.0 68.8 24 AFI is a membership organization comprised of central banks and other financial regulatory institutions from more than 80 developing countries, where the majority of the world's unbanked reside. AFI’s members are actively engaged in advancing financial inclusion policy at national, regional and international levels through partnerships and cooperative arrangements with other regulators, as well as with international organizations and private sector leaders.https://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/inline- files/AFI%20Official%20Members_Upload%20on%20Website.pdf 52 Accounts Savings in the Past Year (% of population over the age of 15) Saved at a financial institution 26.5 29.7 13.5 32.2 Saved at a financial institution, 2011 16.0 30.4 9.6 25.1 Saved using a savings club or person outside the family 14.2 27.2 7.9 4.9 Saved any money 57.3 74.3 40.6 62.7 Saved for old age 11.3 32.2 10.6 3.6 Saved for a farm business 16.2 25.1 10.6 17.6 Saved for education of school fees 25.3 37.9 17.2 25.4 Source: Pulver, 2017 based on World Bank Global Findex 2014. Delivery mechanisms are not designed to flex and respond to shocks. For example, most flagship cash transfer programs are either means-tested or proxy means-tested, with rigid mechanisms for beneficiary identification, typically associated with assessing structural or chronic needs. There is, overall, a lack of programs with protocols in place for reaching people affected by shocks. In addition, payment mechanisms – regardless of whether they are rudimentary or more advanced – do not have contingency protocols and strategies in place to guarantee service delivery during crises. Payment systems are typically limited to a single delivery mechanism, and where alternative mechanisms exist, they do not have sufficient coverage and capacity to scale up rapidly (World Bank, 2020b). Most SSNs in the Caribbean are supported by a cadre of social workers or other staff who perform social work functions by providing an interface between the programs and beneficiaries and their communities (World Bank, 2020c). Social workers not only play key roles in terms of service delivery, but also in the provision of counselling, family accompaniment, referrals to public and social benefits and services, and case management. Social workers or the staff that perform these roles can play key roles to enhance household resilience by promoting strategies for risk identification, preparedness, risk reduction, response and financial protection. However, in practice, only in few countries in the region the social workers of SSNs support DRM actions and when they do, they focus on response and recovery (e.g. Belize, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica) (World Bank,2020c). A notable exception is the case of Jamaica, where social workers support a variety of emergency preparedness and response functions through their responsibilities for shelter management; leading multi-sector teams that apply the JHDINA assessment to affected households; and delivering emergency relief items to affected households. There is a unique opportunity to leverage the application of social work interventions in SP programs in the region to strengthen household resilience. This includes more strategic use of social work interventions such as case management and family 53 accompaniment to promote resilience building and risk mitigation activities and strategies among beneficiaries and clients (World Bank, 2020c). In the case of Jamaica, the case management mechanism implemented by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security has the following main components: i) it provides assessment tools for psychosocial support, identifying households at risk, etc.; ii) a resilience matrix, which is an assessment tool used to triage families to determine the interventions necessary; and iii) a task-centred practice model, which is a methodology that is used to strengthen the relationship between the social workers and families, which consists of the following phases: assessment, treatment / referral, and termination (World Bank, 2020c;Beazley and Ciardi, 2020a). There are, overall, few SP programs with complementary interventions to enhance resilience in the region. Beyond the cases of Steps-to-Work, the Job Readiness programs, and complementary measures in Jamaica, Belize and the Dominican Republic, described in Boxes1 and 5, the trend in the region is that programs focus on delivering their core services, i.e. delivering cash to reduce food insecurity or to smooth consumption. However, these programs are rarely complemented with strategies that could include sensitization meetings, enabling access to micro-insurance and other financial services, the provision of livelihood and agricultural trainings and inputs, among others. Even public works, which are suitable for enhancing resilience through the works and the training, are typically not designed to promote climate adaptation or to perform post-disaster recovery and reconstructions activities. Beyond complementary measures, there is a notable case of a program addressing barriers to resilience building in an integral manner: Dominican Republic’s PROSOLI includes different components, from cash transfers to housing improvements, and support to productive activities. The box below describes this experience. Box 5: An integral approach to resilience building through social protection: the case of Dominican Republic Dominican Republic’s PROSOLI provides holistic support to resilience building in the following areas: ● Component 1: Cash transfers The conditional cash transfer component includes a food sub-component (Comer es Primero - Food is First) and the education transfers: Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar– (Incentive for School Attendance) and Bono Escolar Estudiando Progreso (Progress by 54 Studying). This component increases resilience not only through the cash transfers but also through the increase in the use of health and education services. ● Component 2: Housing improvements This support is complementary to the cash transfers and aims to address basic housing deficiencies. Emphasis is placed on the replacement of dirt floors by reinforced cement floors and painting of walls. This component is implemented by private entrepreneurs in selected areas and NGOs in others. ● Component 3: Productive inclusion This component mainly aims at increasing the employability of young women and men (ages 18-29 years) in extremely poor and moderately poor PROSOLI households through two main series of activities: (i) the carrying out of technical, vocational and life skills training courses and provision of apprenticeships; and (ii) the carrying out of periodic diagnostics of employers’ training needs and training for the Eligible Training Providers. In addition, PROSOLI also enables the access of its beneficiaries to the subsidised health insurance (SENASA). Source: World Bank (2015) c) Financing Caribbean SP financing can be classified as falling between ‘emerging’ and ‘established’ levels. This is because SP is largely financed by recurring government expenditures, with the exception of Haiti. The development and expansion of SP programs over the years, and of SSNs in particular, has been driven by the leadership, ownership and accountability of governments, reflected in increasing spending and investments in SP. In addition, SP spending in the region compares favourably with global trends (Figure 4). It is, on average, similar to that in Latin American countries and higher than that in regions like East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa (as a percentage of GDP) (World Bank, 2018a). However, regarding ASP financing, most Caribbean countries have ‘emerging’ financing strategies: they combine different financing instruments, although they are not optimized and are not linked to SP. There are no countries in the region with ASP financing mechanisms that could be categorized as ‘established’. Table 9: Disaster Risk Financing (DRF) instruments in the Caribbean When Function Instrument Examples 55 Contingency funds: Jamaica, Budgetary instruments: Trinidad and Tobago, Saint reserve funds, contingency Lucia, Grenada, Turks and budgets, and budget Caicos, British Virgin Islands, allocations and Barbados Retention Ex ante Grenada: World Bank’s Deferred Drawdown Option for Catastrophe Risks (Cat Contingent credit DDO)25 Market-based risk transfer Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Transfer instruments: insurance, Insurance Facility Segregated reinsurance Portfolio (CCRIF SPC) World Bank’s Contingent Budget reallocation Retention Emergency Response International loans Component (CERC) Ex post Haiti – repeatedly since 2010 Transfer Various countries in response Humanitarian aid to Hurricanes Irma and Maria (2017) Source: Authors, based on Beazley et al (forthcoming) and World Bank (2020f) Caribbean countries have developed risk financing arrangements, with some innovative approaches. The table below presents some examples of financing instruments implemented in the region. Instruments can be categorized as ex-ante or ex-post (depending on whether financial decisions are made before or after the shock occurs), risk retention (which involves absorbing the risk), or risk transfers (which entails passing the risk on to a third party).Governments can optimize their financial coverage by combining different instruments to protect against events of differing frequency and severity, either before or after a disaster strikes (World Bank 2020a). Recent reviews in various Caribbean countries show that DRF26 instruments are not optimized to address the risk profile of the region (World Bank, 2018c, d, and e). While most countries have disaster financing legislation and frameworks in place, in practice 25 www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/01/21/world-bank-approves-us20-million-for-grenada-to-reduce-disaster- risks-and-build-resilience 26 DRF provides different finance instruments that can allow governments to channel financial support through social protection programs to respond to disasters. DRF also provides public officials with the risk information and tools necessary to make informed financial decisions on managing disaster and climate-related risks. Developing a DRF strategy allows governments to have more predictability and ownership of their risk, in order to manage their losses (World Bank, 2019c). 56 different types of instruments are not combined in the best way possible, and they are not based on in-depth assessment and quantification of risks. Regarding ex-ante strategies, many countries have contingency funds in place. However, these funds are typically under-resourced and hence are unable to adequately finance response when disaster strikes (Barca et al., 2019; and Collymore, 2011). The other ex-ante strategy that is popular in the region is CCRIF SPC, which is an innovative regional risk-pooling fund. CCRIF SPC offers parametric insurance to member countries for earthquake, tropical cyclone, and excess rainfall risk. There are currently 22 country members of CCRIF SPC, most of them from the Caribbean. While financing for regular benefits is generally predictable, financing for ASP has often been reactive (World Bank, 2020a). Financing for post-disaster SP needs has often been based on ex-post instruments, in the form of budgetary reallocation, loans, and humanitarian aid. Even when budgetary adjustments are made, often they are discretionary and not based on established emergency budget procedures (World Bank, 2020a). Regarding loans, the World Bank’s CERC allows countries to quickly access undisbursed funds from existing Investment Project Financing for emergency response. This type of instrument was used in Dominica to finance direct cash transfers to farmers and fishermen affected by Hurricane Maria (World Bank, 2020f), and has been used for COVID- 19 SP response in Belize, Dominica and Haiti. The existence of risk financing arrangements does not guarantee their use for ASP. In virtually all the countries of the region there are no established mechanisms for financing ASP, and in particular for financing the scale-up of programs in response to shocks (World Bank, 2020f). The experiences of ASP so far have been ad-hoc, with funding decided and allocated during the emergency. 6.3 Traffic Light Assessment of Select Countries The section applies the traffic light system for enhancing ASP readiness in select Caribbean countries. The countries selected for these assessments are those where there is active World Bank engagement on SP; where more comprehensive assessments of the SP system were carried out; and/or where there is available data to inform a rating for each of the dimensions. The assessments provide an illustrative view of the areas that policy makers and implementers may want to prioritize to strengthen the ASP in their countries and to improve the contribution of SP benefits and services to resilience. Given the importance of foundational SP to ensuring a solid basis for ASP delivery, that traffic light system is also applied here. 57 There are important caveats to these assessments. Firstly, many of the variables in the traffic light system are qualitative in nature, and therefore the ratings proposed are not based on defined quantitative metrics (with a few exceptions). Secondly, several dimensions include multiple variables to inform the rating. This adds a bit more complexity to the traffic light system, but helps ensure that countries can adequately identify the main contributing factors to improving performance on a particular dimension. Thirdly, the assessment of foundational SP is a rapid assessment and not intended to replace the established tools for comprehensive SP system assessments such as ASPIRE and CODI. Finally, the ratings proposed here are from the perspective of World Bank staff and the authors and are still pending discussion with client countries.27 Despite these caveats, the exercise helps illustrate more concretely, how Caribbean countries can use the traffic light tool, to assess their performance on different ASP dimensions. Countries could then opt to prioritize the areas that are operating on a more nascent level. a) Belize: Table 11: Summary of Belize Traffic Light Assessment Dimension Foundational SP Adaptive SP SP Policy and Strategy ASP Policy Structures Institutions SP Coordination* ASP Coordination HR Capacity ASP HR Capacity Social Registry Beneficiary Registry Program Mix Targeting of Main SSN Coverage of Main SSN Delivery ID Systems Benefit Adequacy Post Disaster Household Assessment Payment Delivery Post-Disaster Benefit Delivery SP Information Systems SP and DRM Information Systems Interoperability Operational Processes ASP Operational Processes Complementary Measures Complementary Measures for Resilience SP Spending Quantification of Post-Shock SP Needs Ex-Ante Finance Disaster Risk Finance Mechanism for ASP Belize has several strengths in terms of improving its foundational SP system and ensuring effective SP for resilience. However, some key bottlenecks need to be addressed to improve both SP roles. On the institutional dimension, Belize lacks an established SP policy or strategy to guide the sector, and consequently, there is no ASP strategy in place either. Despite this, there is routine coordination for foundational SP, particularly through implementation of the flagship BOOST CCT and data sharing, particularly between the Ministries of Education and Human Development. However, there 27 Client discussions to agree on country ratings will be held before the report is published. 58 are coordination weaknesses, related to monitoring co-responsibilities of the CCT and no strong frameworks in place to guide foundational SP coordination. There is also routine coordination between Government and non-government actors. For ASP, there is a clear role for the Ministry of Human Development in the national emergency management structure to manage and distribute relief and provide psychosocial services. The national emergency management system also includes clear sectoral coordination arrangements through national committees which are replicated at the district and village levels to ensure effective vertical coordination. On delivery, Belize has an established proxy means test (PMT) for targeting beneficiaries and an associated a social registry. The targeting instrument however is based on the last poverty data in 2009 and most households in the social registry have not had their data updated since their enrollment. Efforts were underway at the time of writing this report to update data on BOOST households. Coverage of the main cash transfer program, BOOST, is low based on beneficiary numbers and poverty data (less than 4% of the poor). Indicative data shows that the benefit level accounts for over 60% of the adjusted food poverty line, illustrating relatively better adequacy than other programs in the region. This will need to be validated with updated household survey data once available. Payment delivery for BOOST is made to credit union accounts for 95% of BOOST beneficiaries. The payment delivery system appears to have some flexibility in post-shock contexts, as Government piloted new payment mechanisms for emergency cash transfers following COVID-19. These were however done on a pilot basis, and it would be useful to assess if such flexibility will be embedded in the country’s SP system for future shocks. The country does have a beneficiary registry (FAMCARE) which is used by several SP programs for beneficiary management. On post-disaster household assessments, there is an established instrument used by Government, but there is still some fragmentation, as the Red Cross manages its own assessment instrument separately. Furthermore, there is no dedicated information system for managing PDHA data, nor interoperability nor data sharing with existing SP information systems. This interoperability is hindered by the lack of a unique ID system, although other forms of ID (notably the social security ID) have reasonable coverage. Finally, program manuals for main SP programs such as BOOST have not been updated in several years, and while there are clear coordination arrangements in place under the national emergency management structure, there is need to ensure ASP processes are updated and documented. While the Ministry of Human Development has piloted various initiatives to improve resilience such as the Job Readiness Component, these have been done on a small scale. The financial inclusion facilitated by credit union payments have been a comparatively stronger feature of Belize’s SP system. On finance, Belize’s low program coverage means that it spends less than other countries on the region on SP, particularly SSNs. Despite this, SP program budgets are primarily domestically financed and are a component of Government’s recurrent expenditures yearly, 59 providing predictable and reliable support to beneficiary households. There have been fiscal constraints with scaling-up support. For instance, the BOOST CCT has, for the most part, maintained relatively the same number of beneficiaries since its inception. External financing through credits28 and bi-lateral assistance has helped facilitate recent scaled-up emergency transfers. On ASP, Belize participates in the CCRIF SPC, but DRF remains limited in terms of instruments. However, the country has made substantial progress regarding tracking of expenditures in the budget, development of data collection infrastructure, and institutional coordination. Recent technical assistance has also been provided to the country to assess the liquidity needs for ASP for hydrometeorological events ex-ante. Despite this, there is no direct ASP related DRF tool available. Based on the assessment, the following actions are suggested as priorities for Belize: • Develop SP and ASP policies and/or strategies to clearly outline a vision for improving resilience through SP in Belize, with clear roles for DRM. This should build on the existing national emergency management structure. • Improve coverage of the BOOST CCT: The exclusion of most poor households from the social safety net means that these households are not receiving critical support to improve their resilience and address their consumption and basic needs. Furthermore, vertical expansion will be of limited utility as a standalone response if CCT coverage remains low. • Improve information management gaps where needed: This includes updating social registry data and ensuring inclusion of the poor and most vulnerable households in the social registry; developing a dedicated information system for PDHA data; and improving interoperability between DRM and SP information systems. • Improve contingency arrangements and document operational processes for ASP: To ensure better preparedness of the SP system for disaster response, regular SP operational processes should be updated and include processes for ASP actions, including contingency delivery arrangements and HR repositioning. • Introduce a national unique ID to facilitate more effective identify verification and data sharing. • Scale-up resilience building interventions to poor households, including to improve earnings, facilitate sustainable livelihoods, address resilience to climate change, and support disaster risk reduction among the poor. 28 Including from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank 60 b) Jamaica: Table 12: Summary of Jamaica Traffic Light Assessment Dimension Foundational SP Adaptive SP SP Policy and Strategy ASP Policy Structures Institutions SP Coordination ASP Coordination HR Capacity ASP HR Capacity Social Registry Beneficiary Registry Program Mix Targeting of Main SSN Coverage of Main SSN Delivery ID Systems Benefit Adequacy Post Disaster Household Assessment Payment Delivery Post-Disaster Benefit Delivery SP Information Systems SP and DRM Information Systems Interoperability Operational Processes ASP Operational Processes Complementary Measures Complementary Measures for Resilience SP Spending Quantification of Post-Shock SP Needs Ex-Ante Finance Disaster Risk Finance Mechanism for ASP Jamaica has one of the more established SP systems in the Caribbean and advanced ASP systems compared to other countries in the region. Despite this, several critical gaps remain in the delivery and finance dimensions, which, if addressed, will ensure a more advanced foundational SP system and effectiveness in resilience building. On the institutions dimension, Jamaica has an established SP Strategy (2012), including goals and objectives for disaster response and resilience building and establishes a SP floor to ensure provision of basic SP benefits and services critical for helping households address their risks. The SP Strategy also established a National Social Protection Committee (NSPC) which is the lead coordinating framework for the sector. The country’s DRM Act of 2015 is comparatively more recent than others in the region, having been updated in 2015. Despite this, there is need to ensure a more focused ASP strategy. This is a recent priority of the country’s Humanitarian Assistance Committee (HAC),29 but has not yet been completed. Jamaica has a clear institutional framework for emergency management as outlined earlier in this report, including a clear and direct role for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security as chair of the HAC under the country’s National DRM Council. Additionally, coordination arrangements are replicated at the Parish level. The HAC also includes non-government actors, to ensure coordination both within and externally to Government in disaster response. PDHA arrangements are also carried out by multi-sector teams led by social workers and including staff from other ministries and non-government actors. HR capacity for regular SP is relatively established, though there is need for more social workers to support the broad SP 29 The HAC has been working on updating a Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Strategy. 61 interventions being implemented and to ensure contingency arrangements for post-disaster conte. In terms of delivery, Jamaica implements one of the first CCT programs introduced globally, PATH, which has an established beneficiary registry and associated social registry with data on PATH applicants. When including indirect beneficiaries, PATH’s coverage (close to 70% of the poorest quintile) may seem very high, but it is lower than the global CCT average when accounting for direct beneficiaries only. Despite this, PATH’s targeting is generally progressive, with most beneficiary incidence higher for poorer quintiles. PATH benefits are also much lower than the LAC average for CCTs and therefore do not facilitate sufficient consumption smoothing. Although efforts have been made to diversify payment delivery, most payments are delivered through checks, not leveraging the country’s mobile and bank penetration for benefit delivery. Despite this, PATH payments are timely and reliable each month. There is no unique ID system, hindering the ability to verify identify and to facilitate data sharing. A National ID System (NIDS) is planned, but its introduction has been delayed due to legal challenges. Although the SP system has an established beneficiary registry, there is no national social registry with data on most poor and vulnerable households in the country. There is also no interoperability across DRM and SP information systems. One of Jamaica’s strengths in ASP, is the introduction of the JHDINA instrument to be used by all agencies to assess households affected by disasters and to inform SP responses. Despite this, there is no dedicated information system for the JHDINA, although this is also planned to be introduced. Jamaica is a regional leader in introducing complementary measures to support resilience of safety net beneficiaries and the poor, including established case management and a resilience index applied to PATH beneficiaries; a Steps-to-Work program that provides training and capacity building to beneficiaries. Social workers are often deployed to support disaster response, but capacity is often strained in post-shock contexts. These efforts could be strengthened through more deliberate productive inclusion measures to help vulnerable households address climate risk. Given the payment delivery mechanisms, there is also room to improve financial inclusion of the poor. On finance, Jamaica has increased its SP spending consistently in recent years and SSN spending is edging closer to the LAC and world averages. Spending is reliable and PATH transfers, in particular, have seen a shift from externally financed capital expenditures to recurrent budgetary expenditures. Jamaica is party to varied DRF mechanisms, including the CCRIF SPC and a National Disaster Fund, which in the DRM Act of 2015 provides for consultation with the Minister responsible for SP to determine the criteria for determining financial assistance to support relief and recovery for affected persons. Nevertheless, measures for ex-ante quantification of SP needs are not established and there is no established ASP financing strategy. Suggested priorities for Jamaica include: 62 • Complete the Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Strategy to articulate ASP objectives; to mainstream inter-sector DRM and SP arrangements; and to outline operational processes for ASP delivery. • Make SP information systems more risk informed and interoperable to ensure there is a ready repository of data on the poorest and most vulnerable to disasters for ex-ante resilience building and more effective shock response. • Increase PATH coverage to cover more poor households currently excluded from the social safety net. • Increase PATH benefits to improve adequacy and effective consumption smoothing of the poor. • Continue to diversify SP payment delivery, to improve electronic payment delivery and to provide multiple options for post-disaster benefit delivery. • Complete introduction of the NIDS to facilitate more effective identify verification and data sharing. • Improve information systems for ASP objectives, including introducing a dedicated information system for the JHDINA with links to other SP information systems; improve security and back-up arrangements for SP information systems; improve interoperability and data sharing among SP and DRM information systems. • Improve links between the SP system and resilience, by introducing more targeted interventions to address disaster risk and climate vulnerability of poor households and to facilitate financial inclusion of the poor. • Quantify post-disaster SP needs ex-ante, including to anticipate financing needs to provide support to poor and other affected households. • Strengthen ASP financing arrangements, including more specific rules for financing scaled-up provision of post-disaster benefits. c) St Lucia: Table 13: Summary of St Lucia Traffic Light Assessment Dimension Foundational SP Adaptive SP SP Policy and Strategy ASP Policy Structures Institutions SP Coordination ASP Coordination HR Capacity ASP HR Capacity Social Registry Beneficiary Registry Delivery Program Mix Targeting of Main SSN 63 Coverage of Main SSN ID Systems Benefit Adequacy Post Disaster Household Assessment Payment Delivery Post-Disaster Benefit Delivery SP Information Systems SP and DRM Information Systems Interoperability Operational Processes ASP Operational Processes Complementary Measures Complementary Measures for Resilience SP Spending Quantification of Post-Shock SP Needs Ex-Ante Finance Disaster Risk Finance Mechanism for ASP Note: *Some ratings pending confirmation. Saint Lucia has made considerable advancements with improving its SP system over the years, and additional reforms are planned to further strengthen the SP system. Some critical gaps to effective foundational and adaptive SP remain, and are summarized here. On the institutional dimension, St Lucia has been working on a reform to the SP legal framework (e.g. SP Bill), but this has not been sent to Parliament for approval, operating with an outdated legal and institutional framework. St Lucia has an approved SP Policy of 2015 outlining key policy goals for the sector, which is planned to be updated/revised in 2020-2021, in line with other potential updates to the legal framework, using the most updated data and based on the current context. The current SP policy includes a phased intervention strategy which aims to, inter-alia, develop household and community-level minimum standards based on vulnerability, poverty risk factors, and level of resilience to shocks. The policy also includes objectives to develop, reform and strengthen emergency and housing interventions for the poor and vulnerable. Despite this, the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) is not specifically included in the institutional framework of the SP Policy. The country’s 2006 DRM Act was revised in 2019. The country’s National Emergency Management Plan defines roles and responsibilities of an advisory committee (NEMAC), 13 national disaster committees and 18 district disaster committees for vertical and horizontal coordination. The Ministry of Equity, Social Justice, Local Government and Empowerment (MoEQ, SP responsible ministry) has a peripheral, but supporting role in the national emergency management framework. Although there are disaster committees for wellbeing and stress management, these are not chaired by the MoEQ. However, the Ministry is a member of the National Emergency Management Advisory Committee (NEMAC) and MoEQ’s Social Transformation Officers serve as field officers to NEMOs in times of disaster. While there are some groups for SP coordination involving multiple stakeholders from different ministries and agencies, these groups do not meet on a regular basis, limiting their effectiveness. For delivery, St Lucia has a PMT that was recently updated: the Saint Lucia National Eligibility Test 3.0 (SL-NET 3.0), based on the latest household survey data (2016 SLC and Household Budget Survey), was approved by Cabinet in 2019. Implementation of the new targeting tool is starting this year in the Public Assistance Program (PAP). The updated targeting mechanisms SL-NET 3.0 was approved for the Educational Assistance Program 64 (implemented by MoEQ-SSDF) in 2020 and is expected that most beneficiaries will be selected with this tool starting on 2021. PAP’s targeting seems to be progressive, with most beneficiary incidence higher for poorer quintiles. As noted earlier in the report, coverage of the Public Assistance Program (PAP) is very low, accounting for roughly only 16% of the poor and, while it is important to acknowledge Government efforts to expand the program in 1,000 households in the second half of 2020 (i.e. about 50% in PAP coverage increase), the coverage would still have limitations. In terms of systems, in 2020 the intake process of the information of potential eligible population for PAP changed from paper-based to computer assisted. The country has a simple database which is used as a single-program social and beneficiary registry for PAP. A social information system is planned under the World Bank Human Capital Resilience Project (HCRP) approved in 2020. Processes to conduct household- level post-disaster assessments are in place, coordinated through district disaster committees and NEMO, with support from Social Transformation officers. There is fragmentation in the process as other agencies also conduct their own assessments (e.g. Red Cross). St Lucia does not yet have a national foundational and reliable ID system in place, but other functional ID documents, including National Insurance ID numbers are used to verify identity. The lack of a unique and trusted national ID makes difficult to have interoperable systems. PAP payments have transitioned from mostly cash to mostly electronic through bank accounts in recent years (~81% receive payments through Bank accounts – Beazley et al, 2020). There are issues with timeliness of payments. On resilience, PAP does not have an established graduation strategy, although one is planned as part of the HCRP, and links to resilience building for beneficiaries are weak. There is need to develop clear operational processes for ASP actions. In terms of gaps in the SP system, St Lucia does not have an unemployment insurance intervention, which limits the protection offered in case of job loss. On financing, the last available assessment of SP spending for St Lucia showed very low spending at 0.48% of GDP, compared to the LAC average of 1.6%. Nevertheless, Government continues to finance SP programs and benefits each year. St Lucia has several DRF mechanisms in place, though there are limitations with operationalization, adequacy and links to SP. These include an Emergency Disaster Fund defined in the 2009 DRM Policy Framework which is not operational, and a contingency fund managed by the Ministry of Finance, which has insufficient reserves for meaningful response. Furthermore, it was not being used for disaster response, nor was it being replenished. St Lucia is party to the CCRIF SPC, but there are no specific rules on the use of CCRIF SPC payouts for SP response. Life and non-life insurance penetration (percent premium to GDP) was 5.7%, slightly below the rate of 5.8% for the Caribbean region. The country also participated in a pilot Livelihood Protection Policy to provide risk coverage to poor and vulnerable individuals, but coverage is negligible. World Bank (2018) identifies multiple recommendations to strengthen disaster risk financing, including that the country needs to enhance the management of contingent liabilities to SP. 65 Based on the assessment, the following actions are suggested as priorities for St Lucia: • Update the SP legislation and policies to clearly establish the foundations of the SP system: (i) vision to articulate social insurance, social assistance and DRM; (ii) definitions with system-wide implications (e.g. legal definition of poverty, SP programs, social information system); (iii) roles and responsibilities for the different functions; among others. • Develop a graduation strategy to link the poor and vulnerable with interventions that will enable them to find their way out of poverty, providing an enabling environment and increasing economic opportunities to generate or increase income. • Improve coverage of the PAP program to cover more poor households currently excluded from the social safety net. • Modernize SP program operational procedures to align with the updated high- level regulations, policies and strategies, to include procedures currently not considered (e.g. undefined or subjective, including emergency response protocol) and to improve procedures that are outdated or inefficient. Implement the updated targeting mechanism SL-NET 3.0 in other social programs, in addition to PAP and the Educational Assistance Program. • Introduce an inclusive and reliable foundational ID system to allow effective identify verification and interoperability, facilitating inclusion and more efficient delivery of benefits and services. • Develop an integrated social information system, along with the institutional capacity to exploit its potential. The Social Information System will contribute to an ASP system by enhancing program efficiency and effectiveness; improve preparedness and response to disasters by identifying households (including current and potential beneficiaries) who are more exposed and more vulnerable to certain type of shocks; facilitate inter-institutional coordination before, during and after emergencies; among others. • Enhance disaster risk financing mechanisms to allow for an effective SP response in case of shocks, providing adequate coverage and benefit levels in a fiscally sustainable manner. d) Haiti Table 14: Summary of Haiti Traffic Light Assessment Dimension Foundational SP Adaptive SP SP Policy and Strategy ASP Policy Structures Institutions SP Coordination ASP Coordination 66 HR Capacity ASP HR Capacity Social Registry Beneficiary Registry Program Mix Targeting of Main SSN Coverage of Main SSN Delivery ID Systems Benefit Adequacy Post Disaster Household Assessment Payment Delivery Post-Disaster Benefit Delivery SP Information Systems SP and DRM Information Systems Interoperability Operational Processes ASP Operational Processes Complementary Measures Complementary Measures for Resilience SP Spending Quantification of Post-Shock SP Needs Ex-Ante Finance Disaster Risk Finance Mechanism for ASP While still nascent, the social protection system in Haiti reached an important milestone with the adoption of the SP Policy, and additional reforms are planned to build the foundations of an adaptive social protection system. Some critical gaps to effective ASP remain and are summarized here. On the institutional dimension, a significant milestone was reached with the adoption of the National Social Protection and Promotion Policy (NSPPP) in 2020. The NSPPP recognizes ASP as one of the fundamental pillars of the system in Haiti and recognized the role of coordination with DRM in responding to shocks. The NSPPP needs however to be translated into a national and local action plans and programs to ensure its operationalization. Emergency response protocols will also need to be developed to ensure the coordination across stakeholders, including the Civil Protection Committees and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, primarily through the national and local emergency response operational centers. There is currently a lack of field staff in the MAST that could be mobilized to respond to emergencies in most departments. For delivery, Haiti has a social registry, the SIMAST, which now covers 23% of the population, with information entered electronically through census sweep surveys of vulnerable areas. The registry includes information used to compute the PMT (the Haitian Deprivation and Vulnerability Index, or HDVI), which was developed based on the 2012 household survey data. While there are currently no government-led flagship programs that could rely on this targeting mechanism, it has become a foundation for several humanitarian and donor- funded programs and will be the basis for identifying beneficiary households under the new safety net under preparation. While a new biometric ID system was recently launched, a large share of the population does not yet have access to it. The payment system is also in its infancy, with a majority of current payments operated via cash distribution and some via e- money, but the Government is planning to develop a payment platform as part of the development of an integrated MIS for the MAST. On resilience, there is no established graduation strategy, but complementary measures to increase resilience will be included in 67 the new safety net program. There is need to develop clear operational processes for ASP actions. On financing, Haiti is currently in the process of developing a DRF strategy. Haiti is party to the CCRIF SPC, but there are no specific rules on the use of CCRIF SPC payouts for SP response. There is an Emergency Disaster Fund, which has not been used for ASP response. Finally, but importantly, most of the financing for cash transfer programs in Haiti is from external donors and implemented through humanitarian agencies. This results in uncertain sustainability for these critical SP programs. Based on the assessment, the following actions are suggested as priorities for Haiti: • Develop operational plans for the NSPPP and Standard Operating Procedures to clearly establish the coordination across stakeholders in response to emergencies; including roles and responsibilities for the different functions; among others. • Develop a flagship social safety net that can be scaled-up in response to shocks, to support the poor and vulnerable with interventions that will enable them to prepare for, cope with, and adapt to shocks. • Develop an integrated social information system including a payment platform, along with the institutional capacity to exploit its potential. The Social Information System will contribute to an ASP system by enhancing program efficiency and effectiveness; improve preparedness and response to disasters and facilitate inter-institutional coordination before, during and after emergencies. • Enhance disaster risk financing mechanisms to allow for an effective social protection response in case of shocks, providing adequate coverage and benefit levels in a fiscally sustainable manner. 68 7 Conclusions and priority actions Foundational SP systems in the Caribbean (particularly for SSNs), have evolved and improved in recent years, but lingering gaps hinder program effectiveness and adaptability to address resilience. With the exception of Haiti, most SP systems have characteristics associated with nascent and emerging maturity levels; and some countries have been able to demonstrate established maturity on a few key metrics. One area of strong performance across most countries is that of spending, with budgets for flagship safety net programs consistently financed through recurrent expenditures annually for most countries, improving reliability and sustainability to these expenditures. Caribbean countries also have a strong program offering, with multiple programs available to address objectives of equity, opportunity and prevention. However, gaps remain which prevent established maturity at the system level. Principal among these is limited coverage of SSNs, and the coverage of the poor in particular. Estimations from household surveys and administrative data reveal that for several countries, less than 25 percent of the poorest quintile are direct beneficiaries of the main poverty-targeted cash transfer program. Benefit values in some countries are also low. In addition, delivery mechanisms and operational processes are still underdeveloped in most cases, despite the reform efforts in recent years. A similar picture emerges for adaptive SP in the Caribbean, with countries demonstrating ability to respond quickly to households affected by varied shocks, but often through ad-hoc and reactionary approaches. The countries assessed for this paper also demonstrate functioning at the nascent or emerging level, but there are some notable country cases where performance at the established level for some metrics only require some last mile investments. Key gaps for most countries on ASP maturity are weak institutional arrangements to guide ASP delivery; rudimentary delivery systems to facilitate adaptability; a lack of complementary strategies focused on enhancing resilience to shocks; and a lack of systematic links between existing DRF arrangements and ASP. Despite these weaknesses, recent responses to natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic have shown how promising ASP is for Caribbean countries. Adequate investments to improve ASP institutions, delivery and finance can lead to more effective post-shock responses; and more importantly, tangible improvements in people’s resilience, which is of paramount importance in a region as exposed to shocks as the Caribbean. The traffic light system presented in this report outlines the characteristics of foundational and adaptive SP systems according to their maturity level, and therefore provides a roadmap for countries to invest in the development of such capacity.30 The following are considered 30 The conclusions presented here are explored in further detail in a compendium of ASP guidance notes: 1) Towards Adaptive Social Protection Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Synthesis Note on using Social Protection to Mitigate and Respond to Disasters and Climate-Related Risks; 2)Post-Disaster Household Assessments and 69 the most fundamental and priority actions for Caribbean countries based on this report’s review and traffic light assessments for selected countries. It is important to flag that the priorities outlined here, do not negate, country specific improvements that are needed on different SP dimensions. Rather, the priorities outlined here identify the most common gaps across countries. Priority: Expand coverage, particularly of the poor, and improve benefit adequacy. Foundational SP – Delivery Dimension A social protection system with high coverage, that addresses risks comprehensively, and provides adequate benefits / services is best positioned to build human capital and strengthen resilience, particularly of the poor. Furthermore, vertical expansion of existing benefits is often the fastest available response to poor households in post-shock contexts. Therefore, limited coverage of foundational SP programs, particularly the flagship cash transfer program, has implications for a country’s ability to scale-up quickly and effectively to the poor. High coverage could be achieved by combining different programs that address different risks across a life cycle approach. For example, cash transfer programs and social pensions for consumption smoothing of households and elderly; school feeding programs for improving food security, nutrition outcomes and school attendance; active labor market programs for improving employability and increasing earnings among working aged; social insurance for protecting against certain risks (e.g. unemployment, disability, and old age). Coverage expansion also includes the complementary development and growth of private micro-insurance, accessible for small businesses and households to reduce the potential burden on the safety net in post-shock environments. While Caribbean countries offer a range of these benefits, program coverage is often too limited to translate into broad coverage. Countries could therefore benefit from a more thorough assessment of how the program mix could facilitate improved coverage, while helping to address various risks across the life cycle. Central to effective coverage expansion is improving targeting systems for foundational SP programs, particularly to ensure that those most in need can be identified and enrolled. These targeting systems should be optimally informed by updated household survey data, which is lacking for several countries. Given this, Caribbean countries face constraints in effectively identifying the poor are and tailoring SP provision to address current poverty constraints. Eligibility Determination for Post-Disaster Social Protection Benefits; 3) Making Social Protection Information Systems Adaptive; 4) Tailoring Adaptive Social Safety Nets to Latin America and the Caribbean; 5) Using Social Work Interventions to Address Climate and Disaster Risks in Latin America and the Caribbean; and 6) Disaster Risk Finance for Adaptive Social Protection. 70 An important complement to this, is ensuring that benefits provided are adequate to help programs meet their objectives, and by extension, foster meaningful resilience. Primary among this is to ensure that benefits for the flagship poverty-targeted safety net is adequate enough to facilitate consumption smoothing among beneficiary households. It is also important to recognize that countries face difficult trade-offs between expanding coverage broadly versus increasing benefits. Programs that have small coverage, but also provide adequate benefits and include deliberate measures to facilitate economic inclusion and poverty reduction, could help pave the way for new rounds of beneficiaries through graduation. Priority: Develop integrated and interoperable social protection information systems, with strategies for ensuring good-quality data. Foundational and Adaptive SP – Delivery Dimension Reliable, comprehensive, and accessible data can enable the improvement of the design and implementation of foundational and adaptive SP. Moreover, risk-informed SP information systems (including beneficiary and social registries) can provide key data for shock preparedness and responses (e.g. household characteristics and location). The more integrated and interoperable SP information systems are with data from disaster risk information systems and other sectors; the better the quality of data and the more informed and data-driven policy decisions can be. Broad coverage of SP information systems that are dynamic, updated regularly, and supported by unique ID systems and other mechanisms to ensure the reliability to interoperability and data sharing are also important. Caribbean countries have been making efforts to improve the information systems to support their foundational SP programs and to use such systems to support ASP delivery. Despite this, many countries are utilizing simple, single program, databases to support program delivery, often with no or limited interoperability. A promising development are plans to improve the design and functionality of SP information systems in various countries, including in Belize, St Lucia and St Vincent, among others. SP information systems maturity can be achieved in different ways, with different types of registries and integration strategies, based on the country needs, and is a long-term effort. Given that many countries in the region still rely on rudimentary registries (Excel or paper based - see section 0), the first steps towards interoperability and integration would entail having both nationwide unique IDs and digital registries in place. The second priority is related to developing protocols and mechanisms for data sharing and data protection within and between the SP and DRM sectors, to make program designs and operations more risk- informed and to enhance coordination. Finally, mechanisms for frequent data updates should be put in place, in order to ensure that the data is current, relevant and of good quality. There is currently no country in the region with such a mechanism. Priority: Improve institutional policy, coordination and capacity for ASP. 71 Foundational and Adaptive SP – Institutional Dimension Strengthening institutional policy, coordination and capacity to deliver ASP nationwide is proposed as a main priority area, because most Caribbean countries still have substantial shortages in this regard (section 0). Of utmost importance, is capacity strengthening through adequate human, material and financial resources and skills both for routine service delivery and for shock responses. Anecdotal evidence and feedback from countries indicate that capacity is often strained for delivering foundational programs. Capacity needs for program scale-up are even more pronounced in post-shock contexts, where existing program staff are required to implement to significantly larger cohorts of beneficiaries, with no or few contingency staffing arrangements. It is therefore important to ensure adequate beneficiary to staff ratio for foundational programs; mechanisms to strengthen technical and implementation capacity of program staff; and provision of effective supporting tools to aid staff in their daily duties. For adaptive SP, staffing contingency arrangements, either through re-assignment from other agencies, temporary contracting, or coordination with humanitarian agencies should also be established ex-ante. Another priority is to establish effective coordination mechanisms at all government levels and across sectors and organisations. Effective coordination mechanisms are key to promote better integration of the DRM and SP in the relevant areas. Both sectors are multi- sectoral by nature and, in the case of most Caribbean countries, their programs and systems are very fragmented (i.e. implemented by different ministries / agencies and government levels). This coordination also extends to non-government and humanitarian actors, who are not primary implementers of SP programs in the region,31 but are often among first responders in post-shock contexts. Many Caribbean countries have DRM frameworks in place to guide responses across sectors. However, the role of SP agencies in these arrangements and the extent to which they are followed in practice is uneven. It would therefore be timely and prudent for Caribbean countries to re-examine the role of SP in these coordination arrangements and to identify where there are gaps to effective coordination within Government and across sectors. Finally, it will be important to develop adequate policy frameworks for ASP, as part of wider SP and DRM legislations and strategies. This is still lacking in most Caribbean countries (section 0). The legislation should give actors in the DRM and SP sectors appropriate mandates, while national strategies should clearly establish the role of SP in the different stages of the DRM cycle – mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery – as well as its role in promoting climate adaptation and resilience. Priority: Improve operational processes and adaptability of delivery mechanisms Foundational and Adaptive SP – Delivery Dimension 31 With the exception of Haiti 72 Some key operational processes and delivery mechanisms for foundational SP are still rudimentary in many Caribbean SP systems, further limiting their ability to adapt to post- shock contexts and needs. Given this, it would be important for countries to document and update key operational processes where outdated or absent (e.g. updating operations manuals etc.), and developing objective and transparent methods for program outreach, eligibility determination, beneficiary selection, electronic payment delivery etc. This will help to ensure coherent and consistent implementation of programs during routine operations, which by extension, increase their reliability for post-shock adaptations. Although Caribbean countries have demonstrated their ability to react quickly to shocks with emergency SP responses, these have often been ad-hoc, reactionary and designed during the emergency, with the resulting delays and inefficiencies. Key actions include improved information sharing between SP and DRM agencies to ensure risk-informed and risk- responsive SP programs and services. Investments in ASP should include establishing, ex- ante, how programs’ operational processes will be adjusted to respond to different risk scenarios. The development of such processes should be complemented by ensuring contingency capacity to perform the activities envisioned (i.e. contingency staffing arrangements and absorbing additional caseloads discussed previously). Depending on the risk scenarios and the existing delivery mechanisms, contingency planning may include developing back-up delivery mechanisms, and stand-by agreements with services providers. Developing accompanying systems is also of importance, for instance ensuring established PDHA arrangements for assessing post-disaster household needs and data sharing across sectors to inform different sector responses. Furthermore, countries should continue the ongoing transition to electronic payments, and should develop multiple options to facilitate choice depending on post-shock contexts. Priority: Expand the provision of complementary measures and links to resilience. Foundational and Adaptive SP – Delivery Dimension The provision of complementary measures to support beneficiary households of foundational SP programs in the Caribbean is limited, and even more so for deliberate links to building resilience. Social protection programs can have significant positive impacts on household resilience, not only through the delivery of cash or in-kind transfers, but also through effective family accompaniment and case management strategies to help facilitate changes in coping strategies used by households, and complementary measures to link households to resilience strengthening interventions. These efforts have been uneven in the region, with the Dominican Republic leading through multi-pronged approaches to address economic inclusion, housing vulnerability and employability. Jamaica’s experiences with its case management provision and Steps-to-Work offers a positive example for foundational SP implementers. Other efforts, such as Belize’s BOOST Plus and Job Readiness Component have been at a small-scale, but still offer useful lessons to inform scale-up. Conversely, deliberate links to address climate resilience have been weak. For instance, public works 73 programs are absent from the SP landscape in many countries or do not operate with DRM nor SP objectives fully integrated. Caribbean countries should scale-up the provision of family accompaniment and case management to beneficiaries of existing SP programs. These services are either not supported or offered only on a small scale (largely due to capacity constraints). These services provide programs the opportunity to better support beneficiaries during program participation, respond more effectively to familial crises; help families identify and meet their goals; and better assess if programs are their meeting objectives. Finally, it would be important to develop complementary interventions to enhance resilience among SP beneficiaries, as such measures are largely absent in SP systems in several Caribbean countries (section 0). These measures include ensuring that SP programs are risk- informed and risk-responsive. For example, hazard vulnerability could be integrated into program responses for poor households. Cash transfer programs can include beneficiary education on risk reduction strategies for households; referrals to complementary programs and benefits; and support more deliberate financial inclusion strategies for beneficiaries. In the case of public works, projects could promote climate adaptation or contribute to post- disaster recovery, reconstruction, and restoring livelihoods. Skills training programs could promote livelihood diversification and other adaptation strategies. Supporting these interventions requires effective referral mechanisms, coordination arrangements, trained staff, and sound monitoring mechanisms to evaluate outcomes and adjust measures as needed. Often, these programs require cross-sector coordination and joint implementation, (e.g. with DRM, Agriculture, Banking, etc.). Priority: Ensure effective and appropriate financing arrangements for ASP. Adaptive SP – Financing Dimension The absence of predefined funding mechanisms is one of the main causes of delays in the delivery of SP responses after a shock. Adequate financing mechanisms, developed according to the country risk profile and estimating SP financing needs ex-ante, are fundamental for effective and sustainable ASP. In addition, and based on the legislation and strategies described above, it is also key to establish a mechanism for financing ASP actions. While most Caribbean countries are party to risk financing arrangements, notably through the CCRIF SPC, they lack ASP strategies to systematically link these mechanisms to ASP financing. Additionally, ex-ante quantification of SP needs is largely absent in most countries. The first step towards effective ASP financing mechanisms in the Caribbean is to develop and implement methods for quantifying ASP future needs based on the risk profile of each country. This should then be complemented with developing appropriate ASP financing strategies, which includes mechanisms tailored to different risk scenarios and the associated 74 financing needs and sources. Finally, it will be important to integrate ASP financing as part of wider DRF strategies. Social protection’s contribution to improved resilience of Caribbean individuals and households could meaningfully strengthened if the aforementioned priorities are addressed in a holistic way. The following table provides a summary roadmap of these ASP priorities, which should be adapted and tailored to the needs of each country. Table 14: Priority actions for Caribbean countries to achieve an ‘emerging’ ASP maturity level Priority Institutions Delivery Financing Information systems Delivery mechanisms 1 Improve Ensure that ASP Expand coverage of Quantify post- administrative delivery is supported foundational SP shock ASP needs capacity for ASP by sound information programs and improve based on risk delivery at the systems benefit adequacy, profiles ex-ante national level informed by updated (staffing, skills, Expand coverage of and current poverty financial resources, unique ID systems and vulnerability data and contingency across the population staffing to facilitate fast Ensure that ASP arrangements for identification, delivery processes and scaled-up services in verification, and data contingency post-shock contexts) exchange to support arrangements clearly ASP delivery. documented and current Introduce clear and transparent mechanisms for eligibility determination and beneficiary identification in post- shock contexts. Develop sound PDHA processes to inform responses from Government and other sectors. Expand electronic payment delivery and increase payment delivery options to ensure choice and 75 contingency strategies for benefit delivery depending on post- shock contexts 2 Strengthen ASP Improve Scale-up the provision Develop an ASP coordination interoperability and of family financing strategy mechanisms data exchange accompaniment and with sound legal (across sectors functionality of case management supporting within government information systems measures to enhance structures and with non- (SP, DRM, civil resilience of existing government actors) registries etc) to beneficiaries support SP, including introducing data Introduce sharing and data interventions to protection protocols facilitate financial inclusion of SP beneficiaries 3 Introduce and/or Ensure frequent data Strengthen the Integrate ASP update legislation, updates of provision of financing in wider policies and information systems complementary DRF mechanisms strategies to govern interventions to and policies ASP delivery enhance resilience across the various SP program types 76 Bibliography Bailey, S. and Ciardi, F. 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