INTERNATIONALBANK FOR WORLD BANK R E T C N O E N STRUCTION PM AND DEVELO November 2005 No. 57 A regular series of notes highlighting recent lessons emerging from the operational and analytical program of the World Bank`s Latin America and Caribbean Region NICARAGUA: RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF FARMERS USING AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND INNOVATION SYSTEMS Norman Bentley Piccioni and Fabio Maria Santucci Background · Shallow penetration of information ­ The country lacked an effective, integrated and useful system to meet The Nicaraguan agricultural and livestock sector experienced the information needs of farmers, extension agents, wide policy shifts over the last two decades. State intervention researchers and government agencies; during the Sandinista period (1979--1990) was reversed by subsequent governments that drastically reduced credit, · Disconnect between public and private sector ­ Scien- curtailed government technical assistance services, and tists conducting agricultural research, or providing ex- liberalized foreign and domestic input and output markets. tension and training services in Universities, INTA, the However, government withdrawal was not accompanied by National Tecnologiucal Institute (INATEC) and NGOs promotion of institutions to worked in isolation, without effective linkages; facilitate competition in input and output markets, and/or · Low technical education ­ High provision of credit and technical levels of illiteracy among poor farm assistance. households (32 percent in agricul- tural areas and 40 percent amongst In 1993, with World Bank the poorest in 1993), and limited assistance, the Government schooling (62 percent of 15-39 articulated a comprehensive year-olds only attended 3 years) strategy that included the were a leading causes of slow Agricultural Technology and implementation of product and pro- Land Management Project. The cess innovations, and perpetuated Nicaraguan Institute of agricultural/urban divides. Agricultural Technology (INTA) was created to provide advisory services to farmers, and · Peasant holdings becoming experimented with cost sharing smaller ­ the number of farm strategies (Keynan, Olin and families almost doubled since the Dinar 2001). However, by 2000, 1963 census, cultivated land in- a number of challenges creased by only 63 percent remained: (World Bank 2000): (Arguello et al. 2002). Expansion of agricultural land is reducing forest coverage, causing dramatic · Low coverage of extension services ­ Less then 15 environmental problems. percent of farm households used advisory services, only half the services were provided by the government; Key policy and institutional reforms · Incoherent research agenda ­ government and donors In response, in 2001, the Government launched a phased, were funding many different activities without a shared long-term investment program in agricultural technology, strategic vision; to implement policy and institutional reforms. The Bank- 1 funded Agricultural Technology Project supports the fol- services, business opportunities and best practices to: (i) lowing components: agricultural researchers, technical staff, subject matter spe- cialists and trainers at all levels, to improve the quality of heir Institutional capacity development - The main public professional services; (ii) farmers, directly or through devel- institutions related to agricultural technology are being opment agents, to enhance their decision-making ability; and strengthened. A Directorate of Agricultural Technology (iii) policy decision-makers and program design and monitor- (DTA) has been created within MAG-FOR, and is design- ing units. ing and implementing agricultural technology and train- ing policies and coordinating and monitoring publicly The Impact of the Reform funded research, technical assistance and agricultural technical education and training activities. The Fundacion Nicaraguense de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (FUNICA), a FUNICA began in 2000. It funded 5 of 55 research proposals private body accountable to a Board of Directors bringing under the first call, than developed a fast--track procedure for together public and private stakeholders, serves as a financing research projects within six months. Another permanent forum for discussing and agreeing on technol- scheme provides quick mini-grants (approved within 30 ogy. FUNICA manages a competitive fund facility with days) for validating existing technologies. A third initiative two windows. One window (FAITAN) finances agricul- would provide mini-grants to less favored areas of the tural research projects presented by research organiza- country, where a pilot finances technical assistance to groups tions and institutions, domestic and foreign. Another of farmers, provided by freelance agronomists or by NGOs. window (FAT) stimulates competitive, private agricultural advisory services. INTA is showing signs of renewed vitality, with many validated innovations, and more staff training and publica- Nicaraguan Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA) - tions. It still needs to become more flexible, less costly, and the main institution responsible for innovations genera- more demand-oriented. In 2002, INTA provided co-financed tion and diffusion is being helped to increase its capacity, technical support to 11,343 families, cost free information to gradually withdraw from its traditional role as direct through mass media and mass contacts to 16,577 families and field provider of advisory services and become instead the contracted private suppliers and NGOs to provide co-fi- main provider of: (i) strategic and adaptive research; (ii) nanced technical support to 13,412 more families2. technical assistance which generates positive externali- ties; (iii) agricultural technology and knowledge captured INATEC developed new curricula, involving NGOs and from foreign sources; (iv) basic and registered seed; and (v) Farmers Unions of all political affiliations as sources of second-tier services to other agricultural service providers. information, and decision--making and advisory board mem- bers. Private Input Suppliers, Output Traders and Food Developing an agricultural technical education and training Processors are being contacted to strengthen the existing system - The program supports: (i) in-service training to network and attract private resources into the system. technical assistance and education staff provided by private sector (universities, NGOs, agro-industrial companies) and SIA created a portal and website, with a wealth of information public sector specialists; (ii) education and training of future about partners and links to other websites, such as MAG- agricultural trainers; (iii) pilot initiatives to improve literacy FOR and INTA. 3 and assist agricultural youth and unemployed adults to work An articulated, detailed project monitoring and evaluation as farmers or skilled/semi-skilled farm workers, and (iv) in- system was devised, with 136 indicators (DSE/MAGFOR service training for agricultural public sector management, 2002). Opinions of producers, technicians and the public are administrative and technical staff. monitored through periodic polls (agrobarometro), providing invaluable feedback. Developing an agricultural technology information system (SIA) that brings together several independent sources of Early, encouraging signs of strong commitment came from information available nationally and internationally. The sys- several donors providing financial and human resources tem should provide relevant and timely information on mar- through the Project; and many Nicaraguans in the relevant ket trends and opportunities, agro-meteorology, agricultural institutions who showed willingness to change and personal 2 engagement with this long term, complex, promising ap- tackle/mitigate them. proach. Tackling this implementation challenge required leadership Sustainability Risks groups at all levels of society and all relevant sectors. They conceived strategies for making change happen, and to organize, mobilize, and energize people at all levels to take The reforms' sustainability is affected by three risks. collective action that yields intended results. The "leadership groups" had to work differently with their constituencies, (i) Financial sustainability is a major issue for agricultural behave in new ways and leverage new skills. The World Bank technology systems throughout the world. The program team needed to play a critical, catalytic and facilitating role: depends heavily on donors. In the longer term, as more as advisors, coaches, and partners to counterparts in these private operators enter the market and diffuse validated "leadership groups," as they worked with their own constitu- information, the public role can shift away from deliver- encies to translate collective intent into action and results. ing private goods (from seeds to information) and focus on information that is a public good, and supporting The first cycle of initiatives developed ownership and ac- marginalized farmers. More private investments are countability for results at local levels, and a positive sense of needed in input supply and processing. "challenge" at all levels. Achieving results lays the ground- work for longer-term reforms. (ii) Institutional sustainability is a moderate risk due to the participation of many institutions and the need for them Many important lessons were learned in the first two years: to relate in new ways, i.e., public-private part- · Reforms must be devised nerships for research as a whole and approached and technical assis- together, linking institutions tance. that rarely act together. Ex- ternal agents can help break (iii) E n v i r o n m e n t a l the status quo. sustainability presents a minor risk, even though · The elite head and staff of program activities are existing institutions like expected to improve INTA and MAGFOR, resist knowledge and diffu- change. External individu- sion of environmentally als/teams can accelerate the friendly technologies. innovation process. Stakeholder groups cannot continue to ex- · Institutional modification ploit Nicaragua's natu- and/or capacity building take ral resources in the tra- time, and dedicated effort. This justifies longer-term ditional way; innovations are needed to improve agricul- programs, but should not be an excuse to neglect tech- ture overall performance. nical, social and political needs for achieving quick re- sults; Lessons Learned · Formal education qualifications often exceed real The first two years of program implementation had encourag- knowledge and skills. Staffing should be based on ing results. Stakeholders agree that performance exceeded practical criteria and the capacity to achieve concrete expectations. This may be due to the innovative mechanism results. used to initiate and guide change, and maintain its momen- tum. · External expertise is required to provide inputs and sug- gestions from countries with successful experiences, While the program focuses on gradual (medium to long term) and opinions that are less likely to be interpreted as po- change, it became clear that quick concrete results were litical rather then technical; needed to maintain enthusiasm and political support. Since many measures would take a long time to show their strengths · Continuous feedback is needed, to changes procedures and weaknesses, a preemptive mechanism was needed to spot that prove ineffective or uselessly fatiguing; potential implementation risks early. The government, as- sisted by a specialized firm, undertook a series of short-term · Developing a proper communication strategy needs results-producing initiatives. These rapid-results initiatives serious attention from the program's inception. Besides helped explore implementation risks and issues, and ways to the standard technical communications typical of exten- 3 sion activities, a more sophisticated strategic com- ence producers' decisions, an integrated market and price munication approach should be considered when information system could have a large payoff. promoting reforms. Besides farmers, communica- tions activities should target policy makers, opinion *************** leaders, donors, and even urban dwellers. References · Technology generation and transfer in combination are necessary but not sufficient to increase produc- Agrodiversos (2000) Análisis del impacto de la comunicación tivity; increasing productivity alone will not guaran- en la adopción de tecnologías agropecuarias en Nicaragua, tee increased net income and well-being. In a com- mimeo, FUNICA, Managua. petitive, open environment, emphasis must also be given to other important factors, particularly devel- Arguello M. et al. (2002) Nicaragua : Tecnología agro- opment of infrastructure, marketing and farmer orga- pecuaria ­ su rol en una política del sector rural productivo, nizations. mimeo, Banco Mundial, Managua. Moving forward DSE/MAGFOR - NITAPLAN - UCA (2002) Sistema de evaluación de impactos del programa nacional de tecnología Within a broad agricultural growth strategy, the Nicara- y formación técnica agropecuaria, mimeo, Managua. guan government is financing and promoting a new effi- cient, demand-driven, agricultural technology, knowledge Keynan G., Olin M., Dinar A., (2001) Cofinanced public and innovation system that responds to farmers' needs. extension in Nicaragua, The World Bank Research Observer 12 (2), 225-247. The institutional reforms include: The World Bank (2000) Agricultural Technology Project, Repositioning INTA: In a free market environment where Report no. 20168-NI, Washington. various actors can offer advisory services, the public sector should concentrate on creating a policy and regula- Notes tory environment and improving the quality of services that only government can offer. INTA's new role should 1Based on a paper written for "The Role of Extension In- include: (i) research on public goods and strategic pro- vestment in Rural Development" workshop, World Bank, grams of national interest, (ii) serving as the agricultural USAID/IFPRI, Washington, DC, November 2002. technology issue "think-tank", (iii) becoming the agricul- tural sector technology bank and diffusing technologies to 2The total, 41,332 is 20% of families counted in the 2001 service providers, (iv) involving local stakeholders in Agricultural Census, but Arguello et al (2002) note that the setting research agendas, and (v) maintaining strong link- Census reported only 12% of families as receiving advisory ages with international institutions and networks associ- services (including from other providers). This discrepancy ated with the Consultative Group on International Agri- needs investigating. cultural Research and adapting new genetic materials to local conditions. 3Since most agricultural information is transmitted orally (Agrodiversos 2000), from advisors to farmers and farmer- Supporting FUNICA to be a forum for consensus building to-farmer, this jump into the Information Age might is being among public and private actors. FUNICA could fund questioned. research through competitive proposal calls, establish partnerships with well-reputed overseas universities, and develop a competitive fund for extension and eventually About the Authors other activities (technical education, marketing, pre-in- vestments, etc.). Norman Piccioni is a senior agricultural economist for the Latin American Region for the World Bank. Mr. Santucci is Developing a competitive market for agricultural train- a rural communication specialist for the World Bank and ing: Successful technology transfer and adoption requires Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Policy, regular training for technical assistance providers and University of Perugia, Italy receivers. Reforms should open agricultural technical education to private service providers. INATEC will need to develop capacity to manage this process. Key technical About "en breve" staff of MAGFOR, INTA, INATEC, IDR and INAFOR need regular training. Subscribe to "en breve" by sending an email to en_breve@worldbank.org Increasing information flows: As markets increasingly influ- 4