56294 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Indicators and Analysis of the Commercial Banking Sector Kiatchai Sophastienphong Anoma Kulathunga 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° SOUTH ASIA REGION AFGHANISTAN 30° 100° 60° PAKISTAN 30° BHUTAN NEPAL BANGLADESH INDIA 20° 20° Arabian Sea Bay of Bengal 10° 10° SRI This map was produced by the LANKA INDIAN OCEAN Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment MALDIVES 0 200 400 600 Kilometers on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of 0 100 200 300 400 Miles such boundaries. 70° 80° 90° IBRD 36448 AUGUST 2008 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Indicators and Analysis of the Commercial Banking Sector Kiatchai Sophastienphong Anoma Kulathunga © 2010 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org E-mail: feedback@worldbank.org All rights reserved 1 2 3 4 13 12 11 10 This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- ment / The World Bank. 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Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii 1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Development Dimensions and Micro Indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Interpretation of Ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The Role of Microfinance in South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 PART I: ANALYSIS 2. PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS FOR BANKS IN SOUTH ASIA . . . . . . . . 15 Capital Adequacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Implementation of the Basel II Capital Adequacy Framework. . . . . . . . . . . 17 Asset Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Income Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Write-Off Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Exposure Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Directed Lending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Liquidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Debt Restructuring Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3. THE GETTING FINANCE INDICATORS: COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE . . . 25 Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 v vi Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Bhutan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Maldives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Contents vii Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4. COUNTRY RANKINGS ON THE GETTING FINANCE INDICATORS . . 101 Composite Ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Annual Rankings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Five-Year Average Rankings on Micro Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 5. AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Benchmark Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Capital Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Savings Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Benchmark Comparison with Individual Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 6. FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Capital Market Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 viii Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Savings Mobilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Impact of the Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 PART II: INDICATORS 7. COMPILATION GUIDE FOR THE GETTING FINANCE INDICATORS FOR SOUTH ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Access to Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Performance and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Capital Market Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Market Concentration and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Payment Systems Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Savings Mobilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 Corporate Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 8. METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Data Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Choice of Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Method for Country Rankings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Financial Indicator Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Corporate Governance Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Financial Soundness Ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Presentation of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 9. MAJOR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA, 2007­08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Legislation Enacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Legislation Enacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 Bhutan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Legislation Enacted or Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Legislation Enacted or Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Maldives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Legislation Enacted or Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Contents ix Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 Legislation Enacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Legislation Enacted or Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Prudential Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Other Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Legislation Enacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 SPECIAL FEATURE MANAGING THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 The Crisis and South Asian Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Economic Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Policy Responses and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 The Crisis and South Asian Banking Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Impact on Banking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Policy Responses and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 APPENDIXES Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 Appendix 3B. Data Sources and Notes for Benchmark Economies . . . . . . . 296 Appendix 4A. Corporate Governance Matrix: Questionnaire Responses for South Asian Countries, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Appendix 4B. Status of Corporate Governance of Banks in South Asian Countries, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 Appendix 5. Payment Systems in Place in South Asian Countries . . . . . . 309 Appendix 6. Annual Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2004­08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Foreword The financial sector is crucial to any economy--it affects the business climate, investment climate, and economic growth. Well-functioning financial systems are not only critical for sustaining high economic growth paths--mobilizing sav- ings from the public and allocating them to productive investments--but can also play a pivotal role in making growth more inclusive, allowing more people to contribute to growth and share in the benefits, and providing access to finance for all, which in turn is associated with more rapid growth, job creation, better income distribution, and poverty reduction. Furthermore, the financial sector can operate as a shock absorber or as an amplifier of external or internal shocks, as the recent global financial crisis has best illustrated. It is therefore critical to understand the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the financial sector, and thereby to monitor and compare the financial sectors across economies and over time. However, the available data and analytic work based on these data often lack the robustness needed to objectively assess countries' financial sector development. Information is scattered, disparate, often limited to measuring only the size of the financial system, not allowing other dimensions of the financial sector to be compared over time or across countries. These data availability and comparability issues have prompted the Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development Department of the South Asia Region of the World Bank to embark on a regional initiative to develop standardized indicators to measure the depth and breadth of the financial sector. The Getting Finance Indicators that have been updated and enhanced over the past five years now encompass various dimensions of finan- cial sector development including access to finance, performance and efficiency, corporate governance, and financial stability. This is the fifth of a series of regional studies on Getting Finance Indicators for the South Asia Region. All Getting Finance Indicators covered in the fourth edition have been updated and two new development dimensions--namely, payment systems development and savings mobilization--have been added to the study. As under previous editions, each of these dimensions is represented by six microfinancial indicators. The coverage of the South Asian countries has been expanded to include Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives, while retain- ing the five South Asian countries with relatively more developed financial sec- tors (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), thus bringing all the eight South Asian countries under study for the first time. Similarly, the coverage of the benchmark countries has been broadened to cover Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Italy, France, Germany, raising the total number of benchmark countries to 15. xi xii Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Using the Getting Finance Indicators for the period 2001­08, the book pro- vides an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the commercial banking sector of the eight South Asian countries. The analysis reveals that countries in the region have made significant development efforts under several different areas and have generally been expanding access to finance and improving per- formance and efficiency, market concentration and competitiveness, corporate governance, and savings mobilization. They are tightening prudential norms in line with international standards, and they are developing their capital markets and their payment systems, although much more needs to be done. This initiative has over the years served to strengthen the financial risk assess- ment framework in the region. These indicators would be useful to supervisory authorities to monitor financial vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and also to draw comparative analyses with regional counterparts. The special feature on the impact of the global financial crisis on the financial sector adds a wealth of knowledge on how South Asian countries were affected by this financial melt- down and how they responded to it. Ernesto May Sector Director, Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development South Asia Region Acknowledgments The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable contributions of many individuals. We gratefully acknowledge the encouragement by Ivan Rossignol (Sector Man- ager, SASFP), comments and guidance received from Simon C. Bell (Sector Manager MNSED), and John F. Speakman (Lead Private Sector Specialist, SASFP). Several members of the World Bank country teams facilitated the research and operational visits and commented on the study, including Md. Reazul Islam and Richard Nash for Afghanistan; Shah Nur Quayyum, Sadruddin Muhammad Salman, and A. K. M. Abdullah for Bangladesh, K. R. Ramamoorthy for India; Shamsuddin Ahmad Suran Kc Shrestha and Sabin Raj Shrestha for Nepal; Imtiaz Ahmad Sheikh and Kiran Afzal for Pakistan; and Sriyani Hulugalle and Lohitha Karunasekera for Sri Lanka. We offer them special thanks. We thank the representatives of central banks and other supervisory authori- ties who participated in this study and provided advice and insights based on their experience, including the following: Mohammad Zarhir and Farzana Rashid Rahimi (Da Afghanistan Bank); Md. Nazrul Huda, S. M. Rabiul Hassan, and Ashok K. Karmaker (Bangladesh Bank); Eden Dema (Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan) and Dorji Phuntsho (Royal Stock Exchange of Bhutan); Ahmed Munawar (Maldives Monetary Authority); Pralhad Thapa and Rishikesh Bhatta (Nepal Rastra Bank); Surbir Paudyal (the Securities Board of Nepal); Jiva Nath Nepal (Bank of Kathmandu Ltd.); Yaseen Anwar, Saeed Ahmed, Lubna Farooq Malik, Muhammad Javaid Ismail, and Abdul Samad (the State Bank of Pakistan); and Ananda Silva, Janakie Mampitiya, Yvette Fernando, A. A. M. Thassim, Dhammika Nanayakkara, and Arjuna W. Mohottala (the Central Bank of Sri Lanka). We benefited from the thoughtful and helpful comments received during the peer review process. We are indebted to Anjali Kumar (Lead Economist, IEGCG), Ranee Jayamaha (former Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Sri Lanka), Varsha Marathe (Senior Financial Sector Specialist, SASFP), Eliana Cardoso (Chief Econo- mist, SAR), Ulrich Bartsch (Senior Economist­India, SASEP), Deepak Bhattasali (Lead Economist, SASEP), Hisanobu Shishido (Senior Economist­Nepal, SASEP), Sanjay Kathuria (Lead Country Economist­Bangladesh, SASEP), T. G. Srinivasan (Lead Country Economist­Afghanistan, SASEP), Luchia Chritsova (Consultant, CAIFI), Massimo Cirasino (Lead Financial Sector Specialist, CAIFI), Youssef Saadani (Consultant, MNSED), Thyra Railey (Lead Financial Sector Specialist, SASFP), and Kyoo-Won Oh (Consultant, SASFP) for providing invaluable inputs, advice, and insight. To disseminate the main findings and recommendations of the fifth edition, the World Bank, jointly with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), organized a xiii xiv Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 conference on "South Asia Getting Finance Indicators 2010" in Manila, Philip- pines in February 2010. This conference was designed to provide regulators from central banks, securities exchange commissions, and ministry of finance repre- sentatives in South Asia with insight into the key issues for the development of financial sectors in the region, an opportunity to share intraregional experiences, hear about ADB's experience in East Asia, and discuss other international best practices in bank management. More important, this forum provided a platform for the exchange of knowledge and expertise in financial sector development. In addition to World Bank and Asian Development Bank staff, those participating in the conference included the following: Muhebullah Safi (First Deputy Governor, Da Afghanistan Bank), Kapil Mani Sharma (Chief Program Officer, Public Enter- prise Division, Ministry of Finance, Bhutan), Dorji Phuntsho (C.E.O. Royal Stock Exchange of Bhutan), Sangay Dorji (Head, NBFI, Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan), Md. Nazrul Huda (Deputy Governor, Bangladesh Bank), Shitangshu Kumar Sur Chowdhury (General Manager, Offsite Supervision, Bangladesh Bank), Md. Yasin Ali (Member, Securities and Exchange Commission, Bangla- desh), Amalendu Mukherjee (Joint Secretary for Banking Policy, Finance Divi- sion, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh), Mr. Prashant Saran (Wholetime Member, Securities and Exchange Board of India), Aishath Asna Hamdi (Assistant Man- ager, Maldives Monetary Authority), Hawwa Latheef (Assistant Manager, Mal- dives Monetary Authority), Bahadur Min Shrestha (Chief Manager, Nepal Rastra Bank), Bimal Wagle (Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Nepal), Mr. Mukti Nath Shrestha (Securities Board of Nepal), Mr. Yaseen Anwar (Deputy Governor, State Bank of Pakistan), Mr. Ananda Silva (Assistant Governor, Central Bank of Sri Lanka), and Mr. Namal Kamalgoda (Director of Research and Policy, Securities Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka). We express our deep appreciation to Alison Strong for her excellent editorial support; Chie Ingvoldstad and Mariko Katsura for their research support; and Maria Marjorie Espiritu for her technical support and for organizing and manag- ing the dissemination process. About the Authors Kiatchai Sophastienphong is senior financial sector specialist, Poverty Reduc- tion, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development at the World Bank, South Asia Region. Recently Mr. Sophastienphong has led the Financial Sector Assessment Program update mission to Sri Lanka; helped to design and implement restructuring and bank privatization programs in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan; and guided the dialogue on financial sector issues in several client countries at both policy and technical levels. He has designed the overall financial sector strategies for these countries and developed a program to imple- ment them. Before joining the Bank, he held senior executive positions at the Bank of Thailand (the central bank) and two private commercial banks in Thailand. He also worked at the Asian Development Bank as senior financial economist in the Regional and Sustainable Development Department. In addition to the Get- ting Finance series, he recently coauthored the book South Asian Bond Markets: Developing Long-Term Finance for Growth (published by the World Bank). His research interests include bank restructuring and privatization, corporate debt restructuring, and bond market development. He received a BA and an MA in economics from the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Anoma Kulathunga is a PhD candidate at the George Washington University Business School in Washington, DC, and a consultant at the World Bank. Before undertaking her doctoral studies, Ms. Kulathunga had worked for the Central Bank of Sri Lanka for 15 years. She received an MA in finance from the George Washington University and an MBA from the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, Sri Lanka. She is an associate member of the Chartered Institute of Manage- ment Accountants, U.K. In addition to the Getting Finance series, she recently coauthored a chapter in Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge (published by John Wiley & Sons). Her research interests include financial sector development, Islamic banking, worker remittances, and international banking. xv Acronyms and Abbreviations AA articles of association a/c account ADB Asian Development Bank Af Afghanis AGM annual general meeting AR annual report ATM automated teller machine BB Bangladesh Bank BIS Bank for International Settlements BOD board of directors CAR capital adequacy ratio CBSL Central Bank of Sri Lanka CD certificate of deposit CEO chief executive officer CFO chief financial officer CITS check imaging and truncation system CMDA Capital Market Development Authority (Maldives) CR concentration ratio CRIB credit information bureau CRR cash reserve requirement CSE Colombo Stock Exchange DAB Da Afghanistan Bank DFI development finance institution ECAI external credit assessment institution ECS electronic clearing service FSV forced sale value G-8 Group of Eight G-10 Group of Ten G-20 Group of Twenty GAAP generally accepted accounting principles GDP gross domestic product GNI gross national income HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index IAS International Accounting Standards IASC International Accounting Standards Committee ICAB Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh IFC International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group) IFRS International Financial Reporting Standard IMF International Monetary Fund IPO initial public offering xvii xviii Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 km kilometer km2 square kilometers KSE Karachi Stock Exchange MICR magnetic ink character recognition MMA Maldives Monetary Authority MOF Ministry of Finance NECS National Electronic Clearing Service NEFT national electronic fund transfer NEPSE Nepal Stock Exchange NIFT National Institutional Facilitation Technologies (network) NPL nonperforming loan NRB Nepal Rastra Bank NRs Nepalese rupees Nu Bhutanese ngultrum OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OFI other financial institution PICG Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance PRISM Pakistan Real Time Interbank Settlement Mechanism PRs Pakistan rupees PSD Payment Systems Department RBI Reserve Bank of India Rf Maldivian rufiyaa RMA Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan ROSC Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes Rs Indian rupees RTGS real-time gross settlement SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SBP State Bank of Pakistan SEANZA South East Asia, New Zealand, and Australia SEBON Securities Board of Nepal SEC Securities and Exchange Commission SECP Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan SLIPS Sri Lanka Interbank Payment System SL Rs Sri Lanka rupees SME small and medium-size enterprise SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications Tk Bangladesh taka TOR terms of reference Exchange rates for South Asian currencies Country US$1 equivalent Afghanistan 50.00 Afghanis (Af) Bangladesh 68.80 taka (Tk) Bhutan 48.03 Indian rupees (Rs) 48.03 ngultrum (Nu) India 48.03 Indian rupees (Rs) Maldives 12.80 rufiyaa (Rf) Nepal 77.00 Nepalese rupees (NRs) Pakistan 82.90 Pakistan rupees (PRs) Sri Lanka 114.80 Sri Lanka rupees (SL Rs) European Union countries 0.68 euro () Source: XE, http://www.xe.com/ (accessed September 19, 2009). 1 Introduction The recent global financial meltdown was a revelation in one sense. Before the crisis there had been a belief that banks could never fail, a belief that encour- aged overleveraging and excessive risk taking. The complexity of financial instruments, opaqueness of transactions, and sophistication of modeling tech- niques used by developed country financial institutions all combined to con- ceal the hollowness of their success. Many financial institutions largely ignored regulatory requirements or preempted them through the use of complex instruments and methods, while risk taking caused profits to rocket to unimag- inable levels. Regulatory arbitrage became rampant in this environment. While financial institutions were in a mode of overexpansion, regulators visibly failed to enforce regulations--and the financial institutions took advantage of the regulatory anarchy. All this was an eye-opener for regulators in South Asia, as regulatory lapses and lack of enforcement can lead to potential instability in financial systems. The ensuing crisis prompted an immediate reassessment of the regulatory framework and policies governing financial systems. A consensus emerged that greater market discipline and proactive supervisory regimes were essential to restore stability and confidence in financial systems and minimize systemic risks to national economies and the global economy. For financial systems in developing economies, even those not directly affected by the crisis, the operating environment has changed significantly. As developed countries overhaul their regulatory and supervisory systems, they are changing international standards and practices. In response to the global changes taking place, developing countries too are redesigning regulatory frameworks and revamping policies. Thus, even the least affected financial systems are undertak- ing systemic changes to realign with the global market. Financial regulators in the developing world have expanded their resources and sharpened their tools. They are evaluating their supervisory systems, tightening their guidelines, monitor- ing the stability of the financial system, and taking prompt corrective measures where necessary. Against this backdrop, the fifth edition of Getting Finance in South Asia provides a wealth of information for policy makers engaged in managing the financial crisis and formulating appropriate responses. This series stems from a regional initiative of the World Bank to develop standardized indicators for 1 2 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 measuring the performance and soundness of financial sectors in South Asia. The previous editions included micro indicators to assess the development of the commercial banking sector through six dimensions--access to finance, performance and efficiency, financial stability, market concentration and competitiveness, capital market development, and corporate governance. The earlier editions also provided a time-series analysis, rankings by indicators of financial soundness, and a tool for benchmarking against selected high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member and nonmember economies and a comparator group of Asian economies (see World Bank 2004, 2005b, 2006d; Sophastienphong and Kulathunga 2008). This fifth edition, in addition to updating the existing Getting Finance Indi- cators, provides a better assessment of financial stability and development in the region by introducing two additional dimensions--payment systems devel- opment and savings mobilization. More important, it includes data for three additional countries--Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives--and thus for the first time encompasses the entire South Asian region. The report evaluates key prudential guidelines issued by the regulatory authority of each country to assess the comparability of data as well as to shed light on the country's level of regula- tory development. It also expands the group of benchmark economies to allow comparison with diverse economies in Asia as well as the Western hemisphere. And it includes a special write-up on how South Asian countries and commer- cial banking sectors are managing the impact of the global financial crisis and economic slowdown. Development Dimensions and Micro Indicators The study analyzes indicators under eight development dimensions--access to finance, performance and efficiency, financial stability, capital market develop- ment, market concentration and competitiveness, payment systems develop- ment, savings mobilization, and corporate governance. For the first seven dimensions, aggregate financial ratios are collected over eight years, 2001­08, from the commercial banking sector of each country. Each of these dimensions is represented by six micro indicators. For the eighth dimension, corporate gov- ernance, a questionnaire was developed to evaluate such issues as ownership structure and influence of external stakeholders, investor rights and relations, transparency and disclosure, and board structure and effectiveness. Comparability of the data is ensured to some extent by a compilation guide setting out definitions and concepts for compilers as well as for readers (see chapter 7). The definitions and rationale for the indicators used in previous edi- tions remain the same. Access to Finance Access to financial services is important in raising the standard of living of poor people and underserved segments of society. In almost every part of the world, limited access to finance is considered a key constraint to private sector growth (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2005). This is especially true in developing countries, where poor people have little influence over policy reforms and financial sector development thus often disproportionately benefits the rich. Introduction 3 In countries seeking to develop financial markets, it is important to measure and monitor the level of access to finance. The resulting knowledge provides a more balanced picture of financial outreach and, thus, helps policy makers and regulatory authorities better target their development efforts. Initially, the study is analyzing access to finance using data relating to provid- ers of finance (supply-side data). Building a more complete set of data would require collecting demand-side data as well, but this has been ruled out by time and resource constraints. Access to finance is measured using the following six micro indicators:1 · Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) · Demographic ATM penetration (automated teller machines [ATMs] per 100,000 people) · Deposit accounts per 1,000 people · Loan accounts per 1,000 people · Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 square kilometers) · Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers) Demographic penetration indicates the availability of financial services to a given number of people. Geographic penetration indicates physical access to financial services in a given geographic area. And deposit and loan ratios show the use of such services. Performance and Efficiency The efficiency of banks is important for the robustness and resilience of the financial sector. The study uses traditional measures of bank efficiency to assess returns efficiency and cost efficiency. Two of the most popular measures of efficiency are used to assess the scope for banks' earnings to offset losses relative to capital or assets, the sustainability of their capital position, and their efficiency in using capital or assets: · Return on equity · Return on assets Two ratios measure banks' efficiency in terms of staff and operating expenses: · Staff cost ratio (personnel expenses as a percentage of operating expenses) · Operating cost ratio (operating expenses as a percentage of net interest earnings) In addition, two ratios measure the earning strength and overall operating efficiency of the banking sector: · Net interest margin (net interest earnings as a percentage of the average value of total assets) · Recurring earning power (preprovision profits as a percentage of the average value of total assets) Financial Stability Maintaining stability in a financial system is key to achieving price stability and sustainable economic growth. In a stable financial system, markets function 4 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 without disruptions, financial institutions can operate efficiently, and asset prices are realistic. To measure the stability of financial systems, the study uses ratios on capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity. The two capital adequacy ratios measure the capacity of financial institutions to absorb losses and thus indicate their financial strength: · Capital adequacy ratio (regulatory capital funds as a percentage of risk- weighted assets) · Leverage ratio (total equity as a percentage of total on­balance sheet assets) Two ratios measure banks' asset quality in terms of credit risk: · Gross nonperforming loans (NPLs) ratio (gross NPLs as a percentage of total advances) · Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (loan loss provisions as a percentage of gross NPLs) Finally, two ratios measure banks' vulnerability to loss of funds and liquidity mismatch in terms of liquidity risk: · Liquid assets ratio (liquid assets as a percentage of total assets) · Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (liquid assets as a percentage of liquid liabilities) The study does not attempt to measure market risk, a third source of vulnera- bility, because of the lack of data across countries and over a reasonable period-- a problem encountered in compiling data for previous editions. Capital Market Development The development of capital markets is a powerful indicator of the depth of the finan- cial sector. By allocating funds for viable investment projects, healthy capital markets diversify the channels of financial intermediation, providing a counterweight to the banking business. Bond markets provide an alternative source of long-term finance for borrowers and allow lenders to convert illiquid assets into tradable securities. An active bond market allows credit risk to be spread over a wide range of investors and provides up-to-date information about a market player's creditworthiness. An active stock market suggests strong economic and institutional fundamentals. To measure the level of capital market development in terms of depth, effi- ciency, and liquidity, the study uses the following ratios: · Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization ratio · Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP ratio · Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (trading value of top 10 stocks as a per- centage of total value of shares traded) · Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio · Stock trading value to GDP ratio · Stock market turnover ratio (total value of shares traded as a percentage of average stock market capitalization) Market Concentration and Competitiveness The study examines the market structure of the banking sector to evaluate the banking system's proneness to instability and crisis. Greater concentration in the Introduction 5 banking industry, by reducing competition and increasing cost, leads to lower efficiency and thus higher obstacles to receiving bank financing. Yet a highly competitive banking sector might be more prone to crisis--because of increased fragility resulting from intense competition--than a more concentrated one. Thus striking the right balance matters for the optimal functioning and stability of the financial sector. To measure market concentration and competitiveness, the study uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and three concentration ratios. As part of guidelines for horizontal mergers, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1997) issued HHI standards that are used as a measure of market concentration by the United States and many other countries as well as the European Union.2 The study uses three variations of the K-bank concentration ratio, which, for reasons of simplicity and limited data requirements, is among the most frequently used measures of concentration in the empirical literature (see Al-Muharrami, Matthews, and Khabari 2006). Finally, the study uses two ratios measuring the relative activity and importance of the commercial banking sector. The six micro indicators used to measure market concentration and competi- tiveness are as follows: · Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) · K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), based on assets · K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), based on deposits · K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), based on loans · Private credit extended by banks to GDP ratio · Commercial banking assets to GDP ratio Payment Systems Development Safe and efficient payment systems are critical to the effective functioning of the financial system. Payment systems are the means by which funds are transferred between banks. The most significant ones, referred to by this study as systemi- cally important payment systems, are a major channel for the transmission of shocks across domestic and international financial systems and markets--if the systems are not properly designed, managed, and regulated. Well-designed pay- ment systems, by contrast, can contain the transmission of shocks and limit the adverse consequences of vulnerabilities in some participating banks or other sys- tems.3 Robust payment systems are therefore a key to maintaining and promot- ing financial stability. In the past few years a broad international consensus has developed on the need to strengthen payment systems by promoting interna- tionally accepted standards and practices for their design and operation (CPSS 2001). The six indicators selected to measure the development of payment sys- tems are standard ones used by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Sys- tems of the Bank for International Settlements (CPSS various years). The first two ratios measure the importance of cash and basic monetary instruments as a means of settlement used by nonbanks relative to the size of the economy: · Notes and coins in circulation to GDP ratio · Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP ratio 6 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 The next two ratios measure the importance of the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system and retail payment system as interbank fund transfer systems relative to the size of the economy: · Value of RTGS transactions to GDP ratio · Value of retail transactions to GDP ratio Two other ratios measure the participation of users in the RTGS system and retail payment system, with a high concentration indicating less participation: · RTGS concentration ratio (of the five largest participants) · Retail payments concentration ratio (of the five largest participants) Savings Mobilization Financial systems that are more effective at pooling the savings of individuals can profoundly affect economic development. Besides having a direct effect on capi- tal accumulation, better savings mobilization can improve resource allocation and boost technological innovation (Levine 1999). The growth of output of any economy depends on capital accumulation, which in turn requires investment and an equivalent amount of savings to match it. Two of the most important issues in development economics, and for developing countries, are how to stim- ulate investment and how to bring about a higher level of saving to fund the increased investment (Thirlwall 2002). The study uses six indicators to assess savings mobilization: · Broad money supply (M2) to GDP ratio (an indicator of financial deepening) · Real deposit interest rate (nominal deposit rate adjusted for inflation) · Gross domestic savings to GDP ratio · Reserve money to total deposits ratio (an indicator of financial intermediaries' efficiency) · Loan to deposit ratio · Worker remittances to GDP ratio For all except the efficiency measure (reserve money to total deposits ratio) and the loan to deposit ratio, an increase in value would be expected to have a positive impact on savings. Corporate Governance Sound corporate governance creates an environment that promotes banking effi- ciency, mitigates financial risks, and increases the stability and therefore the cred- ibility of financial institutions. Developing countries have much to gain by improving their corporate governance standards, still mostly in the development stage. The basic principles of sound corporate governance are the same every- where: fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility. These are the minimum standards that provide legitimacy to banks, reduce vulnerability to financial crisis, and broaden and deepen access to capital. Corporate governance scoring is challenging and must be approached with care. Unlike other forms of financial analysis, where quantitative measures can provide "hard" benchmarks, assessment of corporate governance is a largely qualitative exercise (see Standard & Poor's 2004). To assess corporate governance, Introduction 7 the study developed a questionnaire on ownership structure and influence of external stakeholders, investor rights, transparency and disclosure, and board structure and effectiveness. The questionnaire is based on the good governance practices outlined by the OECD (see table 7.1 in chapter 7). Also underlying the questionnaire is a guidance paper issued in February 2006 by the Basel Commit- tee on Banking Supervision, articulating eight principles to enhance corporate governance in banking and to guide the actions of the directors, managers, and supervisors of a diverse range of banks (see table 7.2 in chapter 7).4 Because the assessment of corporate governance is based on a series of straight- forward questions, no definitions or guidelines are provided in the compilation guide for the questions or the resulting indicators. And because the collection of data for the analysis is confined to the simple questionnaire, the observations on corporate governance in this report should be viewed as preliminary at best. The Methodology This edition of Getting Finance in South Asia, like the previous ones, compiles annual aggregate data on the commercial banking sector of each country cov- ered--this time for eight years, 2001­08. It assesses the development and sound- ness of financial sectors in South Asia through time-series analysis for each country, benchmark comparisons, and country rankings on financial soundness. The impetus for the series came from the World Bank's identification of stable and efficient banking systems as essential for achieving the objectives of Country Assistance Strategies in South Asia. Standardized indicators to measure the vulnerabilities of the region's financial systems had not been fully developed. Thus, in 2002 the Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Pri- vate Sector Development Department of the World Bank's South Asia Region launched a regional initiative to develop such indicators. The first two editions used the indicators developed to analyze the financial performance and soundness of commercial banks, development banks, and non- bank financial institutions in five South Asian countries--Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. These editions provided time-series financial data, international best practices, and in-depth analysis of prudential norms-- information useful to regulatory authorities in undertaking regional comparisons as well as comparisons with international norms (see World Bank 2004, 2005b). The third edition provided more focused analysis of the commercial banking sec- tor. In addition, it used the financial and corporate governance indicators, now called the Getting Finance Indicators, to rank the South Asian countries on the basis of their financial soundness (see World Bank 2006d). The fourth edition added two more development dimensions and provided an international per- spective through benchmark indicators for selected high-income OECD member and nonmember economies and a comparator group of Asian economies (see Sophastienphong and Kulathunga 2008). This fifth edition, undertaken in the wake of the global financial crisis, has fur- ther broadened the assessment. Besides adding the three remaining South Asian countries and two more development dimensions, this edition expands the group of benchmark economies (box 1.1) and provides a comparison of key prudential norms and developments in such policy areas as corporate governance, payment systems, and implementation of the Basel II capital framework. It also provides 8 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Box 1.1 Developing Benchmarks Benchmarking is a useful diagnostic tool. By This edition expands the group of comparing data across countries, bench- benchmark economies by adding China, marking makes it possible to identify gaps in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic performance as well as in guidelines. It also of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. France, fosters healthy competition. The results of a Germany, and Italy are included to provide benchmarking exercise can help channel comparisons with members of the resources efficiently to focused remedial European Union, while China, Japan, the action that improves systems and their Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand performance. are added to strengthen the representation To provide benchmarks for the South of high-growth Asian comparator Asian countries, the previous edition used economies. selected high-income OECD member and nonmember economies: Australia; Canada; a. SEANZA was formed to promote cooperation Hong Kong, China; New Zealand; Singapore; among central banks by providing intensive, the United Kingdom; and the United States. systematic training courses for their staff. The The choice of economies was based on two original members were the central banks of considerations: to include standard-setting Australia, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Sri countries (in the case of the OECD member Lanka. Joining later were those of Bangladesh; countries) and to include members of the China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; the Islamic Republic of Iran; Japan; the Republic SEANZA (South East Asia, New Zealand, and of Korea; Malaysia; Macao, China; Mongolia; Australia) group (in the case of the Nepal; Papua New Guinea; the Philippines; nonmember economies).a The choice was Singapore; and Thailand. also influenced by the availability of data. composite five-year average country rankings and yearly country rankings on the financial soundness index for 2004­08 (see chapter 8 for details on the method- ology). And, like the previous edition, the book includes a CD-ROM containing financial data from the eight South Asian countries for 2001­08 for use in analysis. The rankings and analysis presented in this report are based mainly on data gathered from each country. The findings, interpretations, and conclu- sions therefore depend on the accuracy of these data as well as on the indica- tors selected. Also important to note is that countries are ranked using a simple averaging method, giving equal weight to each of the indicators included in the financial soundness ranking. Although weighting the indicators on the basis of objective criteria would have enhanced the value of the rankings, this was ruled out by time and resource constraints and by the need to review simple ranking results over a reasonable period to determine their usefulness. While future editions will attempt to apply more complex ranking methods using weights, at this stage the rankings should be viewed as the results of a purely data-driven exercise. Even so, the results of the analysis point to the importance, in promoting and maintaining a stable financial system--a sound prudential supervisory framework; excellent corporate governance practices; broad access to finance; efficient payment systems; strong savings mobilization; and stable, efficient, and well-performing banks. Interpretation of Ranks Countries in South Asia began financial sector reforms as early as the 1980s. Early reform programs included initiatives to privatize and restructure public sector Introduction 9 banks and develop capital markets. These were followed by reforms to liberalize the financial sector, strengthen prudential norms, revamp laws, build regulatory capacity, improve corporate governance, and develop market infrastructure and payment systems. While countries have undertaken varying degrees of reform, in most cases the reform programs have strengthened their financial systems and especially their banking sectors. Banks have become dominant players in the region's financial sectors and strong contributors to economic growth. Many issues remain. But countries in South Asia continue to make financial sector reform a policy priority and are moving in the right direction. They also continue to adapt the reform process to emerging circumstances--as they did after the Asian financial crisis. In the wake of that crisis, South Asian countries accelerated their reform programs. They remained mindful of the fact that finan- cial crises can occur at any time--and responded quickly to the current global financial crisis. As the region's countries continue to respond to ongoing developments, they will need all the information they can get to evaluate the performance and sound- ness of their banking systems. Rankings can help countries gauge their position relative to others in the region and identify their strengths as well as areas need- ing improvement. This report ranks South Asian countries on each develop- ment dimension over the five-year period 2004­08 and overall (see chapter 4 for details). In the overall ranking, India retains first place, reflecting its strong leadership in the growth and development of the region's financial sectors. Sri Lanka follows in second place, and Pakistan in third. Bangladesh and Maldives share fourth place, followed by Bhutan, Nepal, and Afghanistan. In the rankings on dimen- sions, low ranks are sometimes due to data being unavailable. This is especially so for Afghanistan, for which no data are available for one dimension--capital market development--and only partial data for the others. Maldives ranks first in access to finance with a composite percentage score of 94 percent. It displaces Sri Lanka, which ranked first in the previous edition with a score of 93 percent. As explained in this report, however, the results for Maldives on the availability of bank branches and ATMs are skewed because the indicators fail to take into account the geographic dispersion of its population among atolls. Recognizing that access to finance remains a concern for its popu- lation, Maldives is initiating a mobile banking project. Sri Lanka ranks second overall in access to finance and leads in the use of financial services. Following in the ranking are India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Pakistan (tied for fifth), and Nepal. Access is lowest in Afghanistan. Maldives also ranks at the top in performance and efficiency (with a score of 93 percent), thanks to high values for returns, the net interest margin, and recur- ring earning power. These ratios have been mostly on the decline since 2006, however, a matter for concern. Ranking second is Pakistan (which secured first place in the previous evaluation with 80 percent), followed by Sri Lanka, Bhu- tan, Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. Nepal saw a significant shift in 2008 as its banking sector finally emerged from a situation of negative equity. Banks in South Asia continue to enjoy high returns because of wide interest rate spreads, but with the economic slowdown and rising levels of nonperforming loans, these returns can be expected to decline. If nonperforming loans were to increase in the coming years, another concern for some countries would be the management of already high operating costs. 10 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 India once again leads the region in financial stability, with a score of 82 per- cent (down from 89 percent in the previous evaluation). The country's strengths are capital adequacy and better credit quality, resulting in lower levels of non- performing loans compared with the rest of the region. Bhutan and Pakistan share second place, followed by Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Nepal. Bhutan recorded gains in its liquidity and capital ratios to secure the second-place ranking shared with Pakistan. Provisions for nonperforming loans are a concern for Maldives. They are also a concern for Nepal, where provi- sions fall far short of what is needed to cover the existing nonperforming loans. Afghanistan reported lower nonperforming ratios and high provisions. Liquidity has also been a concern for most countries in recent years, though it has been managed to some extent by their regulatory authorities. India leads in capital market development with a score of 97 percent (up from the previous evaluation's score of 91 percent). Pakistan ranks second, followed by Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. Capital markets remain strongly in need of development. India has the region's most developed capital market. Both bond and equity markets are developed and provide long- term funding for companies. But in most of the region's countries banks still serve as the main funding source, even for long-term projects. Afghanistan lacks both a bond market and an equity market, and the central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank) operates a capital notes market for the government's funding needs. The country relies heavily on external funds for all its development efforts. Bhutan and Maldives have very small stock markets, and the Maldivian bond market has had just three issues by one company. Pakistan weathered a stock market crisis. The region's bond markets are dominated by government bonds or treasury bills, with corporate bond markets still at a nascent stage. Only India has been able to list government securi- ties on its stock exchanges and benchmark on the yield curves. India again ranks first in market concentration and competitiveness, with a score of 91 percent (up slightly from its previous score of 89 percent). Bangladesh ranks second, followed by Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Afghani- stan. In India, the top three banks hold less than 31 percent of assets, deposits, and loans, while in Sri Lanka these shares are around 50­55 percent. In Bhutan, with only two banks, market concentration is extremely high. Afghanistan ranks last because of lack of data. Nepal secures third place because of the influx of new banks. But while the new entrants have reduced concentration, they have not improved access or stability. Moreover, Nepal is faced with a situation in which too many banks are competing for deposits and loans, and heavy lending in the real estate sector has created a price bubble. To curb new entry, the central bank has temporarily stopped issuing banking licenses (six new licenses were issued in 2009, however). Another concern for countries is the increase in private credit extended by banks, which could pose credit risks. The previous edition of this report cautioned that rapid expansion of bank credit, if not coupled with systems for managing credit risk, would make banks vulnerable if economic activity were to slow. Today's economic slowdown was not on the horizon at that time. Now that it is a reality, banks should review their credit policies and existing loan port- folios carefully to ensure that credit risk is minimized. This situation is a concern for both Bhutan and Nepal, where credit bubbles could be in the making. In most countries banks have tightened their credit policies and, rather than profit seek- ing, have taken steps to consolidate their asset portfolios. Introduction 11 In payment systems development, Sri Lanka ranks at the top with a score of 94 percent. India comes second, followed by Pakistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Maldives. For Bangladesh, Nepal, and Maldives, a lack of most of the data required affected their places in the ranking. While all countries in the region have retail payment systems for checks and other payment instru- ments, only Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan have advanced payment systems. All three have real-time gross settlement systems for large-value, time-critical pay- ments. Payment systems development, important in ensuring financial stability, is evaluated for the first time in this edition. In savings mobilization, another dimension included for the first time, India leads with a score of 80 percent. Bangladesh ranks second, followed by Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan, Maldives, and Afghanistan. Domestic savings can help sustain growth at times that external funding opportunities become uncertain. An important source in South Asia is worker remittances, which have continued unabated even in the economic downturn. Nepal has the highest remittances relative to GDP, while Maldives has negligible inflows. Afghanistan and Bhutan provided no data on remittances. As a result of persistent inflation, real deposit interest rates remain negative in all countries except India, which disrupts the savings market. All countries in the region have the potential to increase their savings rates. In corporate governance, Pakistan ranks at the top with a score of 87 percent (up slightly from its previous score of 84 percent). India and Sri Lanka share sec- ond place, followed in the ranking by Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives. Pakistan has issued comprehensive guidelines. Maldives did not supply some of the required data, which may have affected its place in the ranking. The questionnaire is based mostly on the availability of policy regulations, guidelines, and statutes. It does not show compliance and enforcement. Thus, it could be stated that these are the main areas on which the authorities should focus while also ensuring that the gaps in regulations and guidelines identified in the country analyses are corrected. Government influence in banking operations is another point of concern, since state-controlled public sector banks hold a significant share of banking assets in most countries. Other areas of concern are stakeholder rights, disclosure of beneficial ownership, minority shareholder rights, and adherence to international accounting and auditing standards. The Role of Microfinance in South Asia As in the previous edition, the analysis in this report is limited in coverage to commercial banks and ignores a range of other deposit-taking financial institu- tions, such as cooperative banks, microfinance institutions, and post office sav- ings schemes. The findings on access to finance are therefore restricted to the commercial banking sector. Yet the microfinance movement is a significant force in financial inclusion in South Asia, providing access to financial services for a large number of people (table 1.1). Recognizing this, most South Asian countries have regulations or guidelines in place for microfinance, and some have laws in the draft stage. Pakistan was the first country in South Asia to introduce a specialized law for microfinance, the Microfinance Ordinance of 2001, which paved the way for the creation of a microbanking industry and allowed commercialization of microfinance. The 12 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table 1.1 Selected Indicators on Microfinance in South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Microfinance Institutions 10 274 288 47 28 23 Borrowers (thousands) 228 24,757 10,886 707 926 1,422 Borrowers as % of population 1 17 1 3 1 7 Borrowers as % of poor population -- 35 3 8 2 29 Credit unions Penetration (%)a 0.03 0.2 2.8 1.0 -- 6.1 Members 4,766 157,047 20,000,000 172,830 -- 860,611 Savings (US$ millions) 0.29 23.50 25,940 30.0 -- 34.99 Loans (US$ millions) 0.81 19.93 15,770 27.0 -- 23.25 Assets (US$ millions) 0.85 28.58 31,480 34.0 -- -- MSMEs (per 10,000 people)b -- 1 -- -- 19 6 Source: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), "Country Maps," http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.2301/ (accessed September 15, 2009). Note: No data available for Bhutan and Maldives. a. Number of credit union members divided by a country's economically active population. b. MSMEs = micro, small, and medium-size enterprises. -- = not available. State Bank of Pakistan was the first South Asian central bank to issue regula- tions on branchless banking, aimed at extending the outreach of microfinance to underserved regions through cost-efficient, agent-based banking. India has introduced a draft microfinance law, while Sri Lanka has drafted one. Bangladesh passed the Microcredit Regulatory Authority Act in 2006. Endnotes 1. In measuring access to finance, the analysis is confined largely to bank branches and ATMs. Throughout the period 2004­08 new financial services were provided in South Asia through mobile banking and agency banking and, more recently, by telecommunica- tions and card service providers, some of which may have been routed through bank branches. It is important to note these new services and instruments even though their impact is not measured through these ratios. 2. HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each bank and summing the squares. According to the guidelines, a banking industry is considered to be unconcen- trated if HHI is less than 1,000, somewhat concentrated if HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, and highly concentrated if HHI is more than 1,800. 3. For example, during the recent financial crisis almost all payment and settlement systems in the Group of Ten (G-10) countries showed great resilience and performed well even in the face of liquidity shortages in the market and extreme transaction volumes. 4. These guidelines focus on the fiduciary responsibilities of boards of directors and were updated in 2008/09 to strengthen the governance principles. 2 Prudential Regulations for Banks in South Asia Assessing the health of a financial system on the basis of financial indicators is fraught with technical and practical difficulties. The rules on loan classification and loan loss provisions vary from country to country, as do the capital adequacy guidelines--and this variation leads to differences in results. The data used for comparison are not always based on the same periods. The definitions and con- cepts underlying the data may differ from country to country--and while the com- pilation guide prepared for this study addresses this constraint, it is hard to ensure that the central banks submitting data strictly follow the guide. In addition, accounting principles and practices vary across countries. All South Asian coun- tries have taken steps in recent years to bring their local accounting standards and practices into line with the International Accounting Standards, but the extent to which they actually follow these standards varies. For all these reasons, it is important to compare key prudential guidelines in place in South Asian countries, to better understand the environment in which their commercial banks operate. This chapter reviews the main prudential guide- lines implemented by the regulator of commercial banks in each country, which in all cases remains the central bank (table 2.1). The review shows that South Asian authorities have made progress in align- ing their prudential norms with international best practices. And as could be expected, countries with more sophisticated economic and banking environments have moved ahead. But the process is an evolving one. Capital adequacy norms need to be reexamined in light of the high-risk environment in which banks oper- ate today. Credit risk management needs to be tightened through more stringent rules for nonperforming loans and provisioning. Risk management policies also need to be strengthened in such areas as market risk and interest rate risk. Most South Asian countries have been lagging in reporting and working to mitigate operational risks. Besides natural disasters, potential operational risks that could bring instability include fraud, human error, hardware and software problems, breakdown of processes and procedures, and lack of infrastructure for payments and settlements. The core banking operations of banks usually entail such market and operational risks, and it is to accommodate these risks that the Basel II Capi- tal Accord requires that additional capital be maintained. In addition, liquidity 15 16 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table 2.1 Commercial Bank Regulator in South Asian Countries Country Regulator (central bank) Afghanistan Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) Bangladesh Bangladesh Bank (BB) Bhutan Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan (RMA) India Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Maldives Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) Nepal Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) Pakistan State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) Sri Lanka Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Source: Authors. management needs to be improved, especially in foreign currency operations--an area that will be covered in a future edition of this report. South Asian authorities are aware of the need to further strengthen prudential regulations and are revising them in stages (see chapter 9 for a summary of developments in prudential regula- tions in each country in recent years). Regulation and supervision are of primary importance in ensuring the stabil- ity of a country's financial system. Economic conditions have a heavy impact on banking sector operations, and an economic downturn can lead to a banking crisis, as occurred with the recent financial crisis. Efficient supervision techniques can help identify unstable situations through close monitoring and ensure that early preventive measures are taken. Benchmarking prudential norms against international standards can help bring greater stability and market discipline to financial institutions. At the same time, however, authorities need to be mindful that these standards are not designed to be a panacea. Capital Adequacy Regulators in South Asia have introduced prudential norms based on the Basel guidelines on capital adequacy, and they have been tightening these norms to bring them into line with international best practices. In accordance with the Basel guidelines, commercial banks in South Asia are required to maintain minimum capital ranging from 9 percent of risk-weighted assets in India (on a nonconsoli- dated basis) to 12 percent in Afghanistan and Maldives (see appendix table A1.1).1 All South Asian countries use a minimum capital adequacy requirement that is higher than the international best practice of 8 percent. To calculate capital adequacy, in most cases capital funds are divided into Tier 1 (core) capital and Tier 2 (supplementary) capital. In India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka capital funds are further divided into Tier 3 capital, which consists of short-term subordinated debt that may be used for the sole purpose of meeting a proportion of the capital requirements for market risk. Tier 1 capital is required to be maintained at a minimum of 50 percent of total capital in all countries. In Afghanistan, India, Maldives, and Nepal the minimum for Tier 1 capital is set at 6 percent of total risk-weighted assets, while in Pakistan no limit is specified other than the requirement that Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital combined cannot exceed Tier 1 capital.2 In Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka the Tier 1 capital adequacy requirement is 5 percent of risk-weighted assets. Prudential Regulations for Banks in South Asia 17 South Asian regulators have also prescribed minimum paid-up capital for commercial banks. These amounts range from about US$6.25 million for Bhu- tanese banks to US$72.5 million for Pakistan banks. Bangladesh has differ- ent requirements for mainstream commercial banks (US$29.5 million) and Islamic commercial banks (US$14.5 million). Mainstream commercial banks in Bangladesh also have to maintain a total capital balance of not less than US$59 million.3 In all South Asian countries, Tier 1 capital includes paid-up common equity shares, share premium, retained earnings, statutory reserves, and general reserves (see appendix table A1.2). Such capital is considered freely and immediately avail- able to meet claims against the bank. But there are also variations among countries in the composition of core capital that are worth noting. Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka allow minority interests in subsidiaries to be counted. Bangladesh and Nepal allow dividend equalization funds to be part of core capital. India per- mits capital reserves representing surplus from the sale of assets to be eligible as Tier 1 capital. Both India and Sri Lanka allow specified perpetual debt instruments to be included, with India limiting this allowance to 15 percent of the previous year's Tier 1 capital. Nepal and Pakistan permit bonus share reserves. Nepal also includes capital redemption reserves, while Sri Lanka allows after-tax surplus from the sale of fixed and long-term investments. Common deductions from Tier 1 capital include goodwill, intangible assets, and equity investments in subsidiaries. Tier 2, or supplementary, capital commonly consists of undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan loss provisions, and hybrid instruments (such as unsecured subordinated debt and preference shares) that combine the char- acteristics of debt and equity and are available to meet losses. As with core capi- tal, however, the definition differs across countries. Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives include profits for the current year as part of Tier 2 capital. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Pakistan allow the exchange equalization or adjustment reserves to be counted as Tier 2 capital, while Bhutan allows research and devel- opment funds. India permits excess provisions toward depreciation on investment, and Bhutan, India, and Nepal allow investment fluctuation reserves. Sri Lanka allows minority interests arising from preference shares issued by subsidiaries. Bhutan, Maldives, and Pakistan do not allow preference shares to count as sup- plementary capital. In all South Asian countries, Tier 2 capital cannot exceed 100 percent of Tier 1 capital, while in Pakistan and Sri Lanka Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital combined can- not exceed 100 percent of Tier 1 capital. All except Afghanistan and Bangladesh limit subordinated debt to 50 percent of Tier 1 capital. In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, up to 50 percent of the revaluation reserve arising from revalua- tion of bank assets is taken as Tier 2 capital, while in Nepal the asset revaluation reserve is allowed only up to 2 percent of total Tier 2 capital inclusive of this reserve. India allows 45 percent. All countries except Bangladesh limit general provisions to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets. Implementation of the Basel II Capital Adequacy Framework When the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (of the Bank for Interna- tional Settlements) published International Convergence of Capital Measurement 18 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (commonly known as the Basel II Capital Accord) in June 2004, countries not part of the Group of Ten (G-10) were not expected to make adoption of the new framework a priority. The Basel II framework is aimed at building on a solid foundation of prudent capital regula- tion, supervision, and market discipline and further enhancing risk management and financial stability. Thus, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004a) encourages each national supervisor to carefully consider the benefits of the new framework in the context of its own domestic banking system and in developing a timetable and approach for implementation. Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives have not yet implemented Basel II, but they are compliant with Basel I. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have embraced Basel II and are at various stages of implementation.4 The differences in the pace at which South Asian countries are moving ahead with the adoption of Basel II standards, along with differences in the capital guidelines adopted by each country (see appendix table A1.3), lead to differences in the capital adequacy ratio. Countries that have adopted Basel II have had lower capi- tal adequacy ratios, primarily as a result of greater capital charges for operational and market risk. Differences in the methods used to calculate the capital charges add to the disparities. These differences should be kept in mind when comparing the capital adequacy ratios of the countries. In Afghanistan, Basel I is the current capital adequacy norm. The regulatory capital ratio for all banking institutions is above the minimum regulatory threshold (12 percent of risk-weighted assets). In planning for the transition to Basel II, Da Afghanistan Bank and the banking community will need to work together to address challenges, both tactical and operational. These include harmonizing goals; identifying and developing risk parameters, risk measurements, and rat- ings; improving lending processes; and addressing legal and regulatory precondi- tions and issues relating to accounting, disclosure, data management, supervisory resources, and training. Bangladesh is materially compliant with Basel I, and in January 2009, Bangladesh Bank issued revised capital guidelines in line with Basel II. Under these guidelines, credit ratings for the purpose of the capital adequacy ratio are to be determined on the basis of risk profile assessments by external credit assessment institutions. While banks could use both the Basel I and Basel II frameworks to calculate their capital adequacy for 2009, beginning in January 2010 they will have to apply the Basel II framework alone. Under the initial implementation of Basel II, banks are to follow the Standardized Approach to calculate capital requirements for credit risk, the Standardized (Rule-Based) Approach to calculate those for mar- ket risk, and the Basic Indicator Approach to calculate those for operational risk. To ensure a successful migration to the new framework, however, both the regulatory authorities and the banking sector will need to address such issues as lack of capacity in credit rating agencies, gaps in the regulations for such agen- cies, lack of information, and the need to strengthen risk management tools and capabilities. Bhutan uses Basel I as its capital adequacy norm. The country has not yet made any headway toward implementation of Basel II, given the size and func- tions of its banks and lack of expertise. But the Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan is encouraging banks to develop their own internal credit rating sys- tems and risk management techniques. Some financial institutions are already Prudential Regulations for Banks in South Asia 19 strengthening their internal controls and systems. One bank has formed a department to assess and manage risk. India has issued comprehensive guidelines for implementation of Basel II. Foreign banks operating in India and Indian banks with operations outside the country have migrated to the Basel II framework since March 2008. All other commercial banks (except local area banks and regional rural banks) migrated to the new framework by March 2009. All commercial banks in India (excluding local area banks and regional rural banks) are required to adopt the Standardized Approach for credit risk and the Basic Indicator Approach for operational risk. Banks are to continue to apply the Standardized Duration Approach for computing capital requirements for market risk. They need approval from the Reserve Bank of India to migrate to the Internal Ratings­Based Approach for credit risk and the Standardized Approach or Advanced Measurement Approach for operational risk. India recognizes that some challenges must be met before moving toward advanced techniques--relating mostly to issues in such areas as risk management, rat- ing, capacity building, and corporate governance (Leeladhar 2007). The Reserve Bank of India is working toward addressing these issues. Maldives is materially in compliance with Basel I, while Basel II remains a work in progress. The Maldives Monetary Authority issued new capital guidelines in 2009 allowing banks to apply the Basel II methods for computing capital require- ments. Initially banks must use the Standardized Approach and Basic Indicator Approach to establish capital requirements (Pillar I) but must not have a leverage capital ratio less than 5.0 percent. The adequacy of a bank's capital remains subject to supervisory review (Pillar II) and market discipline (Pillar III), and higher capi- tal levels may be required depending on the bank's risk profile and activities.5 Nepal issued a simplified version of the Basel II framework effective from 2008. On a trial basis and in anticipation of the transition to Basel II in 2009, banks were allowed to use Basel I in parallel with the new accord to report capital requirements. The new guidelines prescribe the use of a simplified standardized approach for credit risk, a basic indicator approach for operational risk, and an indigenous net open exchange model for market risk. This approach by Nepal Rastra Bank seems to be a practical one given the structure of banking operations in Nepal and the challenges faced by its banks, including lack of risk management tools and expertise; absence of credit rating agencies and internal ratings; and gaps in data, information, and disclosure practices. While the lack of external risk assessments means that the credit risk measurement is somewhat similar to the Basel I method, the expanded risk weights and recognition of risk mitiga- tion techniques are welcome additions. The capital charge for operational risk is measured as a percentage of the previous three years' average income. Market risk is limited to foreign exchange risk measured by a net open position model. Although Nepal needs to address its challenges before moving toward more advanced approaches, its simplified, practical approach is a major step forward. In Pakistan, all banks were required to adopt the Standardized Approach for credit and market risk and the Basic Indicator or Standardized Approach for oper- ational risk beginning January 1, 2008. Banks were advised to adopt a parallel run of two years for the Internal Ratings­Based Approach on that date and to report their capital adequacy under Basel II while continuing to submit calculations based on Basel I until the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) issues instructions to stop 20 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 doing so. Banks in Pakistan have already made major advances in implementing the new framework, although many still face challenges in such areas as integrated risk management policy and collateral management. Banks have been hampered by the limited availability of external credit ratings of counterparts in Pakistan. The SBP is working with banks to meet these challenges and provide guidance. Under the SBP's instructions, adoption of the Foundation or Advanced Inter- nal Ratings­Based Approach for credit risk and the Internal Models Approach for market risk is optional and can be done only with prior written approval of the SBP. No bank has asked for permission to begin implementing the advanced approaches, although some of the larger banks can be expected to opt for these approaches in the next few years (SBP 2009b). Meanwhile, the SBP has required all banks to carry out internal risk ratings to force them to review their risk manage- ment systems and capabilities. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) adopted the Basel II capital adequacy standards for all licensed banks effective January 2008. Accordingly, all banks are required to follow the Standardized Approach for credit risk, the Standardized Measurement Approach for market risk, and the Basic Indicator Approach for operational risk. Market risk has been incorporated into the capital adequacy ratio since 2006. By the end of June 2008 all commercial banks operating in Sri Lanka had switched to the Basel II framework. The capital adequacy ratios of the banking sector remain well above the minimum regulatory standards. The CBSL will permit banks to shift to more advanced approaches once it ensures that they have the appropriate models and risk management systems. But issues relating to external rating agencies, risk management capacities in the banking sector, and gaps in data and information will need to be addressed first. The CBSL is addressing these issues through several efforts: implementing an integrated risk management framework for banks, issuing guidelines on maturity gap analysis, introducing regulatory limits on negative mismatches in asset and liability maturity profiles, and initiating draft guidelines on Pillar II of Basel II (CBSL, Annual Report, 2008). Basel II requires that banks rate their corporate customers, and South Asian countries, especially those using advanced methods, should introduce this requirement. India has already started the process, but others have yet to follow. Basel II also requires that banks present losses due to operational risks on the basis of International Accounting Standards in their financial reporting. Banks using the Standardized Approach and those wishing to move to the Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II should begin building up databases on operational losses and submit such data to the regulatory authorities. While Basel II requires that loss data be reported on an International Account- ing Standards basis, financial reporting standards tend to differ among South Asian countries. The central banks of Pakistan and Sri Lanka and some commer- cial banks in India and Maldives use International Accounting Standards. Banks in Afghanistan, which lacks a local accounting body, are required to follow Inter- national Accounting Standards. In some countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka), commercial banks adopt the accounting standards issued by their local accounting institution or body, which may or may not be on a par with international standards. Bhutan follows Indian accounting standards because it lacks a national accounting body. Prudential Regulations for Banks in South Asia 21 Asset Quality Using quantitative, time-based criteria, banks need to recognize nonperforming assets, then treat them appropriately with respect to the accrual of interest, clas- sify them according to their ultimate collectibility, and make adequate provisions to cover potential losses on the basis of these classifications. The recognition of nonperforming assets stimulates collection efforts and helps reduce the possibil- ity of loss. International best practice is to classify a loan as nonperforming if the principal or interest (or both) is three months or more in arrears or if the loan continuously exceeds its approved limits (set by the lending bank, such as for value thresholds) for three months or more. Debt is classified as doubtful if past due for 3 months, substandard if past due for 6 months, and bad if past due for 12. Qualitative evalu- ations such as risk assessment, collateral, and repayment capacity may also cause a loan to be classified in any of these categories. Commercial banks in South Asia classify advances that are in arrears for three months or more as nonperforming except in Afghanistan, where banks classify loans past due for two months as nonperforming. Banks across South Asia con- tinue to classify nonperforming loans into different categories based on different time frames (see appendix table A1.4). Loans are classified in the substandard category if they are past due for a period ranging from 2­3 months in Afghani- stan to 6­12 months in Sri Lanka. Loans are classified in the doubtful category if they are past due for a period ranging from 3­6 months in Afghanistan to 12­24 months in Bhutan. And loans are classified in the loss category if they are past due for a period ranging from 6 months or more in Afghanistan to 24 months or more in Bhutan. In most countries, a longer period applies under each category for long-term loans such as agricultural loans or long-term fixed loans. Regula- tions in all South Asian countries also require the use of qualitative criteria in the classification process. Commercial banks in South Asia are required to classify nonperforming assets into different categories based on how long they have remained nonperforming and whether the amounts due are collectible and then to make provisions for them. All countries in the region except Afghanistan also require banks to provide for standard (or performing) loans, as part of general provisions. The rates range from 0.25 percent for standard priority sector loans in India to 5 percent for stan- dard consumer loans in Bangladesh and unsecured consumer loans in Pakistan (see appendix table A1.5). In Afghanistan general provisions are encouraged for standard loans to nonfinancial institutions and other clients, while specific provi- sions of 5 percent are required for loans in the watch category (those past due for 31­60 days). For substandard loans, provisions range from 20 percent to 25 percent. Excep- tions are 5 percent for agricultural loans in Bangladesh, 6.25 percent for priority sector loans that are insured in Nepal, 10 percent for all substandard loans in India (and an additional 10 percent if unsecured), and 30 percent for high-exposure loans in Bhutan. For doubtful assets, all countries in the region except India have a 50 percent provisioning requirement. In India, provisions for doubtful assets are 100 percent of the extent to which the advance is not covered by the realizable value of the security as well as a percentage of the secured portion that depends 22 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 on the period for which the advance has remained doubtful: 20 percent for up to one year, 30 percent for one to three years, and 100 percent for more than three years. Other exceptions are 5 percent for agricultural loans in Bangladesh, 12.5 percent for priority sector loans that are insured in Nepal, and 60 percent for high-exposure loans in Bhutan. For a loan in the loss category, all countries require 100 percent provisioning except Afghanistan, where the loan has to be written off in full. In India the loan has to be either written off or provided for at 100 percent. In all countries, provisioning is made after deducting the value of eligible security. The value that can be set off differs among countries. In asset classification and provisioning South Asian banks therefore follow loan classification schedules that both differ among countries in the region and differ from international best practices. Further complicating the situation is that, contrary to international practice, classification schedules vary depending on the type of credit facility. This leniency in classification leads to lower provisioning requirements, resulting in a greater possibility of incurring losses on loans even when these requirements are met. Income Recognition South Asian countries have similar write-off policies. In all countries except Nepal, income on performing assets is recognized on an accrual basis, while income on nonperforming assets is realized only on a cash basis (see appendix table A1.6). In all countries, once a loan is classified as nonperforming, the inter- est accrued on it thereafter will be credited to an interest-in-suspense account and not credited as income; instead, the interest is recognized only on a cash basis. Further, all accrued but unpaid interest is to be reversed to an interest-in- suspense account. In Bangladesh, however, regulations do not specify whether this reversal should take place. Write-Off Policy The prudential regulations of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka include no specific write-off provisions for nonperforming assets of commercial banks (see appen- dix table A1.7). Afghanistan requires assets in the loss category to be immediately charged off, while Maldives allows them to be written off at the end of the current calendar quarter but no later than 90 days after first being identified as a loss. Prudential regulations in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan allow commercial banks to write off nonperforming loans at their discretion. Exposure Limits Banks face credit concentration risk when their credit exposures to an individual or group exceed a certain percentage of their regulatory capital. Prudential regu- lations set exposure limits with the aim of controlling this risk. Lower limits min- imize the adverse effects of exposure and increase diversification benefits. All South Asian countries have set detailed exposure limits in their prudential regulations, ranging from 15 percent of capital funds in Afghanistan, India, and Maldives to 50 percent of capital in Pakistan (see appendix table A1.8). In most countries the regulations also specify exceptions to the limits. Prudential Regulations for Banks in South Asia 23 Directed Lending Prudential regulations in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka clearly direct commercial banks to channel a certain portion of their credit port- folio to priority sectors (see appendix table A1.9). By contrast, the regulatory bodies in Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives have issued no such guidelines. Most directed lending in developing countries is for priority sectors such as agri- culture and for minority groups. Where such lending goes to low-return projects, it often results in low profitability and poor asset quality. Liquidity Prudential regulations in South Asia direct commercial banks to maintain cer- tain statutory liquidity and cash reserve ratios (see appendix table A1.10). Statu- tory liquidity requirements range from 8 percent of total deposits in Nepal to 25 percent of average rufiyaa and foreign currency demand and time liabilities (excluding interbank liabilities and letter of credit margin deposits) in Maldives. Nepal reintroduced its statutory liquidity requirement to contain inflation. Afghanistan has two different ratios: the quick liquidity ratio and the broad liquidity ratio. Bangladesh has a statutory liquidity requirement of 18 percent for mainstream commercial banks and 10 percent for Islamic commercial banks. Cash reserve requirements range from 5 percent in Bangladesh, India, and Paki- stan to 17 percent in Bhutan. In Sri Lanka, the previously high statutory reserve requirement has been gradually reduced to 7 percent. Statutory liquidity and cash reserve requirements can have a favorable impact on banks' liquidity. But because they tie up funds, they can also have an adverse impact on banks' profitability by raising the cost of funds. In most cases, banks pass on such costs to customers. The high transaction costs that customers face as a result are among the critical obstacles to getting finance and enhancing access to finance. Statutory liquidity and cash reserve requirements are con- sidered blunt monetary policy instruments, but with cascading effects on the transaction chain. No single ratio for statutory liquidity or cash reserves would meet the needs in all countries given the diversity in economic environments and growth capabilities. But the authorities need to be mindful of the effects of such requirements on transaction costs and access to finance and initiate action over time to reduce the ratios. Debt Restructuring Policy Prudential regulations for debt restructuring and rescheduling differ among the South Asian countries (see appendix table A1.11). In Afghanistan, which has issued no guidelines, banks are to follow International Accounting Stan- dards and International Financial Reporting Standards. Bangladesh has issued guidelines on cash installments that need to be paid before restructuring is con- sidered and has introduced a scheme for restructuring large loans. In Bhutan, restructuring is permitted only for loans that have been regularly serviced and are affected by genuine unforeseen financial constraints. India, which has issued detailed guidelines, allows restructured loans not to be classified under certain circumstances. 24 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 In Maldives, restructured loans include any new loan to repay or replace loans that are overdue, rescheduled, rolled over, or otherwise modified because of deterioration in the borrower's financial condition or an inability to repay the loan under the original terms. But all overdue interest is to be paid in cash at the time of restructuring. Nepal allows nonperforming loans to be reclassified as standard loans subject to a provision of 12.5 percent (or, for priority sector loans, 3.125 percent) and compliance with the terms of the restructured loan for two years. In Pakistan, restructured loans are to remain classified as nonperforming until the terms and conditions of the rescheduling or restructuring have been fully met for at least one year and at least 10 percent of the outstanding amount has been recovered in cash. Sri Lanka allows rescheduled loans to be reclassified as performing only if the borrower continues to comply with the terms of the rescheduling for six months. Endnotes 1. The 12 percent capital adequacy requirement in Maldives is effective from 2009; the earlier requirement was 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. Similarly, in Pakistan the capital adequacy requirement was 8 percent of risk-weighted assets until December 2008. It was raised to 9 percent in 2009 and will be raised again, to 10 percent, in 2010. 2. In Nepal, the 6 percent Tier 1 capital adequacy requirement is effective from the 2009/10 financial year (which runs from mid-July to mid-July); previously it was 5.5 percent. 3. Minimum capital is prescribed in local currencies. The U.S. dollar equivalents are based on the conversion rates of September 19, 2009 (see the currency conversion table in the beginning of the report). 4. South Asian countries regularly exchange information on implementation of Basel II and on risk management through the SAARCFINANCE network, which operates under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985. All eight South Asian countries are members. Their central bank governors and finance secre- taries decided to establish the SAARCFINANCE network in 1998. 5. Maldives Monetary Authority, Prudential Regulation No. 01-2009 (Capital Adequacy). 3 The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective In the countries of South Asia, as in most developing countries, banks dominate the financial sector. Banking assets averaged more than 68 percent of GDP in 2008, ranging from around 14.3 percent of GDP in Afghanistan to 143.14 percent in Maldives. The region's capital markets are relatively undeveloped. The stock market is about a third of the size of the banking sector in all South Asian coun- tries except India (where stock market capitalization is 116 percent of banking assets) and Pakistan (70 percent). In the region's bond markets, government bonds dominate while corporate bonds remain minimal. The government bond market is also around a third of the size of the banking sector, except in Pakistan (where domestic public bonds outstanding are 65 percent of banking assets) and Sri Lanka (54 percent). In some South Asian countries, public sector banks control more than half the commercial banking assets. But in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, pri- vate sector banks have taken the lead. And in Maldives, foreign banks dominate. South Asian banks are relatively stable. Capital adequacy ratios exceed the statutory requirements in all countries except Nepal. Bank performance is sat- isfactory, with high interest margins and cost efficiencies. Gross nonperforming loans, while rising, have not reached alarming levels, and most countries have posted satisfactory levels of provisions. While the economic slowdown is likely to have an impact on asset quality, the region's banking systems are expected to continue to operate without significant disruptions. All countries in South Asia have undertaken financial sector reform. They have made considerable improvements in prudential regulations, and the region is moving toward the adoption of higher capital standards. Similarly, the coun- tries have taken steps in recent years to bring their local accounting standards and practices into line with International Accounting Standards, introduce corporate governance guidelines, strengthen supervisory capabilities, improve technological infrastructure, and modernize payment systems. These improvements continue to bear fruit, leading to an increasingly robust financial system. Issues remain in these areas, however, including improving compliance with and enforcement of prudential guidelines, corporate governance guidelines, and International Accounting Standards and managing credit, market, and operational risks. 25 26 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 The country analysis in this chapter provides a multidimensional perspective on the development of the region's financial sector over eight years, 2001­08. A benchmark comparison using data for 15 economies--high-income OECD member countries as well as nonmember Asian economies-- enhances the value of the analysis (see appendixes 2­4 for the underlying data and chapter 5 for the benchmark comparison). Because the financial indicators give only a partial view of the dimensions considered, financial sector performance is examined, to the extent possible, in the context of the prudential guidelines issued, the compli- ance level, and other important developments (see chapter 2 for a comparison of regulatory frameworks in South Asian countries and chapter 9 for an update on major policy developments in 2007­08). Afghanistan Afghanistan ranks third among South Asian countries in area (652,100 square kilometers), fourth in population (28.14 million), and sixth in GDP (US$11.7 billion), according to 2008 data (table 3.1). With a gross national income (GNI) per capita of just US$370 in 2007, Afghanistan is classified as a low-income coun- try. It is also classified as a heavily indebted poor country. Afghanistan's security situation, with conflict ongoing for more than three decades, has had an adverse impact on its fragile macroeconomic gains. Still, the macroeconomic framework is stable, though the country is heavily dependent on foreign aid. High food and fuel prices led to steadily rising inflation, with a sharp increase from 12.9 percent in 2007 to 26.8 percent in 2008. This situation reversed in 2009, however, with inflation falling to an estimated -9.8 percent. The strict no- overdraft fiscal rule adopted by the Afghan government has restricted maneuver- ability in its monetary policy, already constrained by its limited policy tools. But the central bank has managed to keep the money supply within the target range by making judicious use of foreign exchange interventions. GDP growth slowed from 12.1 percent in 2007 to 3.4 percent in 2008 because of drought, then rebounded to an estimated 15.7 percent in 2009 thanks mainly to good harvests. GDP growth is expected to be around 8.5 percent in 2010, in line with agricultural growth for a normal year. Agriculture accounts for about 36 percent of GDP. But illicit opium production, despite a recent declining trend, remains the main economic activity, accounting for around 30 percent of GDP.1 A current account surplus of 0.9 percent of GDP in 2007 deteriorated to a deficit of 3 percent of GDP in 2008, mainly as a result of high-priced imports. The current account improved slightly to an estimated 2.7 percent in 2009 and, thanks to rising export growth, is expected to improve further in 2010, though slowly. Afghanistan has 16 commercial banks: 2 state-owned banks (generally referred to in this report as public sector banks), 9 privately owned banks (generally referred to as private sector banks), and 5 foreign banks. The private sector banks (mainly 2 of them) dominate the banking industry in terms of assets, deposits, and lending. Most of their deposits and loans are in U.S. dollars. The financial sector also includes 2 insurance companies and 15 microfinance institu- tions. In addition, there are more than 332 foreign exchange brokers and about ´ 100 licensed money service providers (Pavlovic and Charap 2009). The informal money transfer system hawala remains strong and active. Table 3.1 Key Economic Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2008 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka South Asia World Income groupa Low Low Lower middle Lower middle Lower middle Low Lower middle Lower middle n.a. n.a. Population (millions) 28.14 161.75 0.66 1,186.30 0.35 27.64 160.97 20.09 1,585.90 6,692.00 Surface area (km2 thousands) 652.10 144.00 38.39 3,287.30 0.30 147.20 796.10 65.60 5,139.50 134,095.40 b GNI per capita (US$, Atlas method) 370 520 1,900 1,070 3,630 400 980 1,780 986 8,613 GDP (US$ billions) 11.70 84.20 1.39 1,206.69 1.26 12.28 164.56 39.60 1,521.68 60,917.00 Average annual GDP growth (%) 3.40 6.20 13.82 6.70 5.75 5.35 5.95 5.95 6.87 2.00 Annual inflation (%) 26.80 7.70 8.40 8.35 11.89 7.70 12.00 22.56 9.60 5.98 Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) ­1.18 20.10 34.80 37.70 -- 11.50 13.25 14.13 28.42 24.19 Equity market capitalization (% of GDP) -- 19.26 13.14 106.05 20.60 28.12 36.05 11.08 45.10 59.36 Domestic public bonds outstanding (% of GDP) -- 18.42 3.14 36.24 4.51 13.55 33.13 29.07 -- -- The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 27 Commercial banking assets (% of GDP) 14.30 57.04 63.74 91.80 143.14 69.05 51.38 53.39 -- -- Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) -- 36.30 38.82 48.78 100.84 26.44 27.56 28.94 61.50b 162.50b b b Deposit interest rate (%) 7.50 9.70 4.50 -- 6.50 2.30 11.40 10.90 -- -- Lending interest rate (%) 14.90 16.40 14.00b 13.30 13.00 8.00b 14.60 19.00 -- -- Real interest rate (deposit, %) ­4.17 ­1.58 ­3.60 1.05 ­0.65 ­3.50 ­12.63 ­10.97 -- -- Commercial banks 16 43 2 77 6 28 36 22 -- -- Specialized banks 0 5 1 7 0 58 4 14 -- -- Nonbank financial institutions 0 29 0 364c 2 78 -- 56d -- -- Exchange rate/US$ (year-end) 52.14 68.92 48.46 48.46 12.80 77.65 77.65 113.14 n.a. n.a. Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators database; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; Asian Development Bank, statistical database, 2009a; Bhutan, National Statistical Bureau, 2009; South Asian regulatory authorities. a. World Bank classification based on GNI per capita (Atlas method) in 2008: low income, US$975 or less; lower middle income, US$976­3,855 (see http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0). b. Data are for 2007. c. Nonbank financial institutions permitted to accept deposits from the public. d. Registered finance companies and specialized leasing companies. -- = not available, km2 = square kilometer, n.a. = not applicable. 28 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2002, banks were hardly in a posi- tion to act as intermediaries because of the lack of infrastructure and legal and regulatory frameworks. Since then, major rebuilding efforts have put into place legal and regulatory frameworks and other essential elements. In 2003, the Law of Da Afghanistan Bank and the Law of Banking in Afghanistan were enacted, reinstating Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) as the central bank with the authority to conduct monetary policy and regulate banks and financial institutions. Ongoing development efforts are leading to observable improvements in bank operations and competitiveness. In addition, DAB is taking steps to improve the collection of data (available for most financial indicators only for the past few years) and policy coordination efforts. Despite the volatile security situation, Afghanistan has shown progress in some areas of banking sector development. But challenges remain to be addressed. Access to financial services continues to be among the main constraints to devel- opment. Because of the limited banking network, credit penetration is low. While performance indicators for banks are favorable, high interest margins and low recurring earning power indicate vulnerability of earnings to interest rate shocks. For dilution of such risks, the earnings base should be diversified. Adequate capi- tal and low nonperforming loans ratios are positive signs. But once the market matures and infrastructure and technology are in place, DAB would do well to move toward higher capital requirements. In addition, the liquidity situation warrants careful management. Over the long term, capital market development should be considered as a vehicle for sustainable growth and efficient allocation of capital. Low domestic savings and underdeveloped capital markets force a reliance on external funding. Incentives should be provided to encourage savings. For avoidance of systemic risks, bank concentration should be reduced and healthy competition welcomed. Also important is to develop payment systems so as to improve efficiency and minimize settlement risks. Finally, corporate governance guidelines need to be augmented, and compliance and enforcement capabilities improved through training and development of the supervisory staff. Access to Finance Access to finance remains weak in Afghanistan. The country has less than one bank branch or automated teller machine (ATM) available for every 100,000 people or 1,000 square kilometers of land. This situation, while it continues to slowly improve, is far from satisfactory. In 2008 there were only 27 deposit accounts and 1 loan account per 1,000 people. The large share of private sector bank loans and deposits in U.S. dollars provides further evidence of the limited financial outreach to the public. In the absence of significant outreach by the banking sector, the hawala system continues to provide intermediary functions. Microfinance institutions also provide financial access to the public. At the end of 2008, microfinance institutions were operating in at least 24 of the 34 provinces and had a client base of around 448,000, about 1.7 percent of the population. The Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan--a private, nonshareholding company established by the government in 2003 and owned by the Ministry of Finance--provides funding and assistance to these institutions. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 29 Performance and Efficiency The overall performance of the banking system has improved since 2006 (figure 3.1). In 2007, both return on assets and return on equity were negative as a result of increased operating costs, provisions for loan losses, and taxes. The operating cost ratio jumped from 97.13 percent in 2006 to 101.79 percent in 2007. By 2008, the banking system's position had improved, with return on equity at 8.93 percent, return on assets at 1.77 percent, and the operating cost ratio falling to 83.87 percent. Interest income remains the major source of income for Afghan banks. Afghanistan posted the highest net interest margin in the region for 2008 at 7.12 percent. Recurring earning power remains low at about 0.51 percent, denoting vulner- ability in earnings strength and in the efficiency of the banking system. Moving toward a diversified earnings base that reduces interest rate risk will be necessary to ensure the long-term growth and stability of the banking sector. Financial Stability Banks are adequately capitalized and have low levels of gross nonperforming loans and high levels of provisions. In 2008 Afghanistan posted the region's best capital adequacy ratio, gross nonperforming loans ratio, and provisions to nonperforming loans ratio. The capital adequacy ratio is difficult to compare, however, since the region's more developed economies are following the more stringent Basel II guidelines. Afghanistan, with a banking system still in its infancy, has not implemented Basel II but instead follows the Basel I accord. Banks are required to maintain a minimum regulatory (total) capital to risk-weighted asset ratio of not less than Figure 3.1 Afghan Banks Improve Performance and Capital Levels 10.00 45.00 38.35 40.00 8.00 35.00 31.77 6.00 30.00 returns (percent) CAR (percent) 4.00 25.00 2.00 20.00 15.00 0.00 10.00 ­2.00 5.00 ­4.00 0.00 2006 2007 2008 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) return on equity return on assets net interest margin recurring earning power Source: Appendix table A2.9. Note: CAR data are not available for 2006. 30 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 12 percent and a core (Tier 1) capital to risk-weighted asset ratio of 6 percent. The regulatory capital ratio of all banking institutions is above the minimum regulatory threshold (12 percent of risk-weighted assets). The aggregate ratio fell slightly between 2007 and 2008 to 31.77 percent. The leverage ratio continues to be low. The gross nonperforming loans ratio remains low, dropping from 3 percent in 2007 to 0.90 percent in 2008. Provisions for nonperforming loans doubled, in part because of this drop. One reason for the low nonperforming loans ratio is the highly collateralized lending practices of Afghan banks. In addition, banks almost always prefer short-term lending. Liquidity also remains low. The liquid assets ratio dropped marginally from 31.43 percent in 2007 to 23.80 in 2008. This suggests a need for banks to monitor the liquidity situation carefully to avoid liquidity risk. Capital Market Development The capital market in Afghanistan is extremely underdeveloped, with no stock exchange or bond market. The central bank, to meet the country's funding needs, established a capital notes market in 2005. Licensed commercial banks, money service providers, and foreign exchange dealers are eligible to participate in the primary auctions of these central bank securities. The primary and secondary markets for the capital notes have been established but are not automated. Developing the country's capital market is critical to its future growth. Afghanistan will need to work toward establishing and strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for capital market institutions. In the meantime banks remain the only source of financing. Market Concentration and Competitiveness The commercial banking assets to GDP ratio has steadily increased, almost tri- pling in 2004­08. In 2008, the ratio was 14.30 percent. Data to assess market concentration are not available, but information suggests that private sector banks dominate the market. Two private sector banks account for more than 45 percent of assets and 66 percent of loans. These figures indicate that market concentration is high in Afghanistan. This leads to higher costs and lower competition, affecting efficiency. Moreover, if one of the two main private sector banks were to experi- ence difficulties, this would have significant adverse consequences for the entire banking system. Payment Systems Development The Afghan payment system is still under development. While some banks offer their customers online banking, ATMs, and mobile banking services, most finan- cial transactions are still paper based. Cash remains the dominant payment medium for the public. Since the banks are concentrated in Kabul, informal financial systems such as hawala operate in other areas. In addition, one telecom- munications operator has provided mobile payment services since 2008. Afghanistan has one payment system, a partially automated gross settlement system, for both large- and small-value transactions. There is no real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system in the country. Cross-border fund transfers through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 31 have been available through DAB since 2003. The Afghanistan Fund Transfer System was implemented in 2004, and the Afghanistan Clearing and Settlement System in 2005. DAB, which operates the systems, offers their services to com- mercial banks and the banks' customers. Notes and coins in circulation are low, kept at around 11 percent of GDP. DAB continually monitors the currency in circulation in an effort to contain inflation. The narrow money supply to GDP ratio rose slightly from 18.67 percent in 2004 to 21.38 percent in 2008. The value of retail transactions to GDP ratio dropped from 7.95 percent in 2007 to 4.91 percent in 2008. This ratio indicates the low level of noncash transactions in the country. Savings Mobilization Savings mobilization is weak, and Afghanistan continues to rely on external capi- tal for its investment needs. The gross domestic savings to GDP ratio is still nega- tive, though it rose from -35.77 percent in 2003 to -1.18 percent in 2008. The broad money supply averaged about 21 percent of GDP in 2004­08, indicating a lower level of financial deepening than in the rest of the region. The real interest rate in 2008 was -4.17 percent, pointing to a lack of incentives to shift income to savings. The reserve money to total deposits ratio remains very high, though it has shown a declining trend. A lower ratio would indicate higher efficiency in finan- cial intermediation and better incentives to save. The loan to deposit ratio is on the rise, indicating greater use of borrowing to fund activities. Given the scarcity of capital in Afghanistan, one would expect the savings rate to be high, but this is not the case. The overall propensity to save is low. One main reason for the low savings rate is the lack of bankable projects. Another is the low interest rates, which banks keep low to avoid bringing in excess cash. Encourag- ing small and medium-size entrepreneurs would expand the demand for money, thereby raising interest rates and leading to higher savings. Corporate Governance Corporate governance is an area needing further development. The Law of Banking (2003), the legal foundation for banking regulations, subjects all com- mercial banks in Afghanistan to certain requirements, restrictions, and guide- lines. Articles 22­26 of this law prescribe the corporate governance structure for banks. In addition, corporate governance guidelines issued by DAB in 2005 cover the following areas: · Responsibilities common to both the board of supervisors and the manage- ment board · Recommended makeup of the management board and qualifications for its members · Responsibilities of the board of supervisors and its appropriate place in the governance of a bank in ensuring competent management · Typical structure for a management board · Selection of the board of supervisors · Duties of the board of supervisors, including ensuring competent manage- ment, ensuring that appropriate plans and policies are in place, monitoring 32 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 operations, ensuring adequate internal controls and compliance with laws and decisions, overseeing the bank's financial performance, and preventing conflicts of interest · Establishment of committees, including the audit committee; loan commit- tee; investment, asset liability, and risk management committee; compensa- tion committee; and nominations committee · Conditions relating to banks that are subsidiaries of other companies These guidelines are generally in keeping with Principles 3, 14, and 17 of the Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision of the Basel Committee. DAB will monitor adherence to the guidelines through on-site supervision. While the banking law prescribes ownership rights and structure, disclosure of investor rights, and board structure and effectiveness, the guidelines cover only corporate governance issues relating to the management of banks. They will need to be expanded to be comprehensive. The answers to the survey questionnaire on corporate governance reveal several areas needing further attention: disclosure requirements relating to ownership, government ownership, and special privi- leges; influence of external stakeholders such as labor unions and authorities; preemption rights of minority shareholders; disclosure requirements relating to ultimate beneficial ownership; and minority rights to appoint directors (see appendix 4A). Setting up a local accounting body should be among the priorities, since a local standard-setting body could help ensure compliance and uniformity in accounting practices. While banks are required to adhere to international stan- dards, some standards may not be applicable depending on a country's level of development, and some may need to be adapted to address country-specific issues. Another priority is to ensure effective monitoring of and compliance with the corporate governance guidelines through adequate training of both the examiners and the users. According to the questionnaire answers, DAB approval is needed to acquire a qualifying holding of 20 percent or more in a bank. Banks are not required to disclose government ownership along with its special privileges. Whether exter- nal stakeholders such as labor unions and banking and securities regulators can influence the operations of banks is unclear. And there is no evidence that the preemption rights of minority shareholders are firmly protected. Notwithstanding the requirement for DAB approval for acquisitions of qual- ifying holdings, it is unclear whether specific rules govern ultimate beneficial ownership or whether the ultimate owners need to disclose their holdings. The central registry kept by DAB for inspection by the public includes disclo- sures about the bank, but whether it includes disclosures about shareholders is unclear. Moreover, while the questionnaire answers indicate that sharehold- ings are generally disclosed in the audited accounts, no threshold limits for disclosure are given. Procedures for shareholder meetings are defined. Voting procedures allow shareholders to vote by proxy, though the counting of votes need not be veri- fied by a third party. Banks are not required to disclose special voting rights and caps on voting rights. Appointments and dismissals of members of the board of supervisors are subject to shareholder vote; however, government control is always present. There is no clear dividend policy prescribed by DAB; instead, this The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 33 policy is at the discretion of individual banks. In the event of a legitimate takeover bid, DAB approval would be needed to change shareholdings. No guidelines are available to ensure minority shareholders' right to appoint directors; this again depends on a bank's rules. Adherence to international accounting and auditing standards has been iden- tified in recent studies as an area needing special attention. In the absence of a recognized local accounting body, the banking law is the source of most of the accounting and financial reporting requirements for banks. The banking law mandates adherence to International Accounting Standards and requires banks to make their annual audited financial statements available to DAB, their share- holders, and the public within three months after the end of the financial year, which must coincide with the calendar year. Because there is no standard-setting body for accounting or auditing, there are no enforced accounting or auditing standards for the private sector. The Finan- cial Supervision Department of the central bank is responsible for monitoring compliance with accounting, financial reporting, and statutory audit require- ments in the financial sector (both banking and nonbanking). The department focuses on monitoring compliance with prudential norms, however, with little attention to general-purpose financial reporting. All banks are required to set up audit committees, but the frequency of meet- ings, selection of auditors, and procedures can vary from bank to bank. Banks are also required to appoint an independent external auditor with qualifications and experience acceptable to DAB. These external auditors are allowed to perform nonaudit functions for banks. While DAB has issued guidelines on the appoint- ment of internal auditors, internal auditing procedures, frequency of reporting, and similar operational issues can vary from bank to bank. A bank's board of supervisors is required to have an uneven number of mem- bers, at least three and up to nine. The majority must be independent. The quali- fications, roles, and responsibilities of board members are defined. There are no policies on setting remuneration for board members. At annual general meetings, however, shareholders can appoint and dismiss members of the bank's board of supervisors, management board, and audit committee and also determine their remuneration. But shareholders may not tie such remunera- tion to the bank's financial condition or financial results. The compensation of the board of directors is disclosed on an aggregate basis in the audited financial statements. Bangladesh Among South Asian countries Bangladesh ranks second in population (161.75 million), third in GDP (US$84.2 billion), and fifth in area (144,000 square kilo- meters), according to 2008 data. In population density, Bangladesh ranks 11th in the world. With a GNI per capita of around US$520 in 2008, Bangladesh is clas- sified as a low-income country. Poverty, political instability, and natural disasters such as floods and cyclones are among the main challenges Bangladesh is seeking to overcome through its development efforts. Bangladesh has not been significantly affected by the ongoing financial crisis, as it has no direct links to toxic assets or failed institutions. But the country will nevertheless feel the economic impact because of its heavy reliance on exports to 34 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 developed countries and on remittance receipts. Economic growth declined from 6.4 percent in 2007 to 6.2 percent in 2008, mainly because of the high cost of imports. The 2009 growth rate was marginally lower, at an estimated 5.9 percent. Lower prices for such imports as food and oil, a good harvest season, and strong remittances have helped sustain the growth rate. Projected growth for 2010 is 5.2 percent. Concerns about export vulnerability will remain, however, as the United States and the European Union, the main markets for ready-made gar- ments, are still struggling with recession. Overall, the economic situation appears to be favorable, but there are some concerns. Inflation has been creeping up, reaching 7.7 percent in 2008, mainly as a result of high-priced imports such as food and fuel. But the drop in food and fuel prices internationally led to a decline to an estimated 6.7 percent in 2009, and inflation is projected to be 6.5 percent in 2010. Current account balances remained positive in 2004­08, thanks mainly to growth in remittance inflows. Exchange rates were stable in nominal terms, and the country's international reserve position continues to grow. The fiscal deficit was kept below 4 percent of GDP over the five-year period. But the deficit was expected to increase in 2009 as a result of the stimulus package offered by the government to counter the eco- nomic slowdown. The fiscal situation needs to be managed carefully to prevent inflation from shooting up once again. In Bangladesh, as in other developing countries, commercial banks dominate the financial sector. In 2008, commercial banking assets amounted to more than 57 percent of GDP. The country's financial sector includes 43 commercial banks, 5 development banks, and 29 nonbank financial institutions. The commercial banks consist of 4 state-owned banks (generally referred to in the report as public sector banks), 30 privately owned banks (generally referred to as private sector banks), and 9 foreign banks. The private sector banks have overtaken their public sector counterparts, securing a market share of about 52 percent of assets. But the four public sector banks continue to have a major impact because of their extensive branch network and 33 percent market share. With the aim of making the public sector banks more competitive and profitable, the Bangladesh govern- ment has undertaken management changes, turned them into limited liability companies, and divested shares. These restructuring efforts have yet to bear fruit, however. Although the global financial crisis is not expected to have a significant effect on the banking system, Bangladesh needs to address the system's structural weaknesses to realize its full potential. While managing the reforms of the sys- temically important public sector banks, Bangladesh will also need to improve the profitability and efficiency, capital position, asset quality, and provisioning of all banks to strengthen the stability of the financial sector. Banks need to work on expanding their financial services to reach the public cost-effectively. To ben- efit from high net interest margins, banks should pursue cost efficiencies and improve performance. Modernizing the banking infrastructure and payment systems would reduce systemic risks and increase efficiency. Recapitalizing public sector banks and some private sector ones would bring greater stability to the system. Improving mar- ket discipline requires strong enforcement of prudential regulations, and that will require clearly defining and standardizing key guidelines on capital require- ments, disclosure requirements, accounting and auditing standards, and corporate The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 35 governance. For expansion of funding options for economic growth, priority should be given to capital market development and domestic savings mobilization. Bangladesh has low concentration ratios in its banking sector, and it should continue to maintain the competitiveness of the sector as financial sector reforms proceed (figure 3.2). The country has a deposit insurance scheme, one of only two in the region, under which deposits are insured up to Tk 100,000 (around US$1,450). And Bangladesh has a credit information bureau that is moderniz- ing the credit information systems. Moreover, it has begun implementation of Basel II. Progress in these areas is paramount for continued financial stability and robustness. Access to Finance Indicators of access to financial services showed little change between 2001 and 2008. Branch penetration remained around 5 branches per 100,000 people and 47 branches per 1,000 square kilometers, while ATM penetration improved slightly to around 1 ATM per 100,000 people and 6 ATMs per 1,000 square kilo- meters in 2008. Lack of physical and technological infrastructure impedes finan- cial outreach as well as growth potential in banking. The use of financial services offered by banks, as measured by loan accounts and deposit accounts per 1,000 people, increased marginally over the eight years. Low levels of use are common in developing countries, indicating both the inability of banks to reach the poor in a cost-effective manner and the lack of demand for such services because of poverty. In South Asia, where poverty is the main challenge, the use of financial services is low in all but a few countries. Figure 3.2 Bangladesh Maintains Low Market Concentration in Banking 70 1,000 900 60 800 50 700 600 HHI value 40 percent 500 30 400 20 300 200 10 100 0 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) trading value of top 10 stocks ratio K-bank concentration ratio (K = 3), assets K-bank concentration ratio (K = 3), deposits K-bank concentration ratio (K = 3), loans Source: Appendix table A2.10. 36 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 In Bangladesh, which has one of the biggest microfinance movements in the world, microfinance institutions play a notable role in providing financial ser- vices to the poor. It is estimated that these institutions have served more than 17 percent of the population (and about 35 percent of the poor population, based on national poverty estimates).2 By mid-2008, outstanding microfinance loans amounted to about US$1.8 billion, nearly 3 percent of GDP. Microfinance insti- tutions in Bangladesh are supervised by the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority under the Micro-Credit Regulatory Act, 2006. Performance and Efficiency Return on equity and return on assets in the banking sector have shown some improvement in recent years. In 2004, because of the charging of an accumulated shortfall of provisioning at one nationalized bank, both indicators turned nega- tive for the entire industry. This position was later reversed, and by the end of 2008 the return on equity was 48.35 percent and the return on assets 2.63 percent. For public sector banks, however, these ratios are still negative. The staff cost ratio held constant over the period studied, while the operat- ing cost ratio showed a welcome declining trend. That ratio dropped by almost 62 percent between 2001 and 2008, to 88.9 percent. Because of overstaffing and efficiency issues, both staff and operating costs are much higher in the public sector banks than in the private sector or foreign banks. For the banking industry as a whole, even with healthy growth in the net inter- est margin and in recurring earning power, returns remain lackluster, mainly because of the poor performance and high cost of the public sector banks. The present economic conditions will increase the number of delinquent loans and the provisioning needs, adding to the stress on returns. So it is important that banks aggressively pursue cost-efficiency improvements to benefit from the higher interest spreads. The restructuring of the public sector banks is expected to improve the earning capacity of the entire sector. Financial Stability The negative capital position of the public sector banks has affected the Bangladesh banking sector for a number of years. The capital adequacy ratio was below the statutory requirement of 10 percent in most years during the period. In 2008, the ratio exceeded the minimum for the first time, improving to 10.06 percent. In 2007, the public sector banks' cumulative losses had been transferred to a valu- ation adjustment account to be amortized over a 10-year period, improving their balance sheets in a narrow sense. With the better capital situation, the leverage ratio also improved to 6.21; this is still low by international standards, however. The gross nonperforming loans ratio dropped from 31.49 percent in 2001 to 10.79 percent in 2008, while the provisions to nonperforming loans ratio rose over the period to around 56.15 percent in 2008. Such improvements are a result of the reforms of the public sector banks, where regulatory changes have led to more streamlined loan recovery. Although the capital position of the public sector banks improved after the valuation adjustments, bringing in additional capital is important to improve their viability. Thus, capitalization of public sector banks as well as some pri- vate sector banks should be actively pursued. To support this, Bangladesh Bank The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 37 (BB) doubled the minimum capital requirement for banks to Tk 4 billion and increased the capital adequacy requirement to 10 percent of total risk-weighted assets and the Tier 1 ratio to 5 percent. These regulatory reforms are a step in the right direction. Liquidity ratios show that Bangladesh banks do not have prob- lems with liquidity issues. As discussed in chapter 2, Bangladesh has decided to adopt the Basel II frame- work from 2010. This will mean additional capital charges for market and oper- ational risk, putting greater pressure on banks already struggling to meet the existing compliance burden. Capital Market Development Development of capital markets is still at an early stage in Bangladesh. The coun- try has two exchanges, Dhaka Stock Exchange and Chittagong Stock Exchange, both of which deal in equities, mutual funds, and debentures. Equity market capitalization increased sevenfold from 2001 to 2008, to 19.26 percent of GDP. Market liquidity improved, with the stock trading value at about 6 percent of GDP in 2008. The market turnover ratio was around 0.33. Ten or fewer stocks account for about 40 percent of the market capitalization. Public bonds out- standing typically average about 17 percent of GDP. And the bond market is about three times the size of the stock market on average. But the bond market is not developed and remains dominated by government bonds. The corporate bond market is virtually nonexistent. In the absence of a developed capital market, banks become the only fund- ing source for investment and economic growth. Thus, focusing on capital market development needs to be a priority for Bangladesh. Developing bench- mark bonds, expanding the investor base, improving the market infrastructure, streamlining the regulatory framework and guidelines, and managing the market distortions created by government savings schemes are among the efforts needed to accelerate capital market development. Market Concentration and Competitiveness Market concentration is an area where Bangladesh has performed well. The top three banks account for less than 40 percent of assets, deposits, and loans. More- over, Bangladesh had the region's best Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in all three years from 2006 to 2008. For 2008, the index was 500.56--well within the range for an unconcentrated banking industry (according to the norms, values less than 1,000). Low concentration can foster healthy competition. Credit growth may be an area of concern, however. Private credit extended by banks increased by about 50 percent over the eight years to 36.30 percent of GDP in 2008. The commercial banking assets to GDP ratio in 2008 was 57.04 percent. If growth in deposits does not match the growth in private credit, banks will have to secure external funding to finance the credit growth. Bangladesh has a relatively high savings rate. But because government savings schemes offer bet- ter terms than banks, deposit mobilization by banks, while steady, has not shown dynamic growth. In the absence of a developed capital market, banks need to focus on securing deposits to finance their credit portfolio. At the same time, because of the private sector's heavy reliance on bank funding, credit growth will have to be monitored carefully to limit exposures to interest rate risk. 38 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Payment Systems Development BB has highlighted payment systems as a key area for development. Bangladesh has a manual clearing system, which is an end-of-day net settlement system. Four clearinghouses operate in the country: BB's clearinghouse in Dhaka and its branches in seven other cities; Sonali Bank's clearinghouses in 31 cities where there are no BB branches; the BB large-value check settlement system; and the BB foreign currency clearing system in Dhaka, which clears and settles foreign cur- rency checks and payment orders. The settlement times are typically T+2, T+3, and even longer for regional checks. Bangladesh does not have an RTGS system. BB is working toward a strategy for modernizing the payment systems and implementing an RTGS system in the future. In a move toward achieving this, the National Payment Systems Council was formed in 2007. Installation of the Bangladesh Automated Clearing House, with an automated check pro- cessing system and electronic fund transfer network, has already started. The automated check processing system and electronic fund transfer network are not yet operational. The implementation of payment reforms has been a slow process. Bangladesh has reported few payment systems indicators, but those that are available suggest that the country, like most others in South Asia, has a large share of funds tied up in currency in circulation. The notes and coins in circulation to GDP ratio and the narrow money supply to GDP ratio both showed increasing trends over the period, hovering around 7 percent and 11 percent. The average ratio of currency in circulation to narrow money supply (about 60 percent) or even to broad money supply (15 percent) was high. Keeping funds tied up in currency in circulation limits lending activities and expansion of the economy. A modern payment system will improve the ability to use funds efficiently as well as keep the banking system liquid. Savings Mobilization Savings mobilization is an important concept for Bangladesh and for the other South Asian countries, the more so since their capital markets are not fully devel- oped and external income is limited. Savings play an important part in capital formation and, in the long run, in economic growth and poverty reduction. Bangladesh compares well with the other South Asian countries in this respect. A measure of financial deepening, the broad money supply to GDP ratio has shown an increasing trend, reaching 49 percent in 2008. But as a result of high inflation, the real deposit interest rate turned negative in 2003 and continued the negative trend to peak at -3.16 percent in 2007. In 2008, the rate improved to -1.58 percent. Gross domestic savings average around 20 percent of GDP. A measure of intermediary efficiency, the reserve money to deposits ratio held constant throughout the eight-year period at around 24 percent, while the loan to deposit ratio remained at around 81 percent. Declining trends in both would denote higher efficiency by the banking sector in mobilizing savings and allocat- ing funds. In a favorable trend for savings, worker remittances have averaged around 7 percent of GDP. But concerns about a possible downturn in remit- tances remain, since more than 60 percent of the country's remittances originate from Gulf countries that have recently been suffering the effects of the global financial crisis. Overall, Bangladesh has good potential for savings mobilization The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 39 given its good savings habits and constant stream of remittances. But to bridge the savings-investments gap, the banking sector should take steps to ensure con- tinuity and improve efficiency, and thereby enhance financial deepening. Corporate Governance BB is continually working to improve corporate governance guidelines. Several key guidelines cover the following areas: · Qualifications of bank directors and chief executive officers (CEOs) (fit-and- proper tests, selection procedures, and the like) · Appointment of CEOs and advisers (moral integrity, experience and suitabil- ity, transparency and financial integrity) · Authorities and responsibilities of the chairman, board of directors, CEO, and advisers (work planning and strategic management, lending and risk manage- ment, internal control management, human resources management and development, financial management, formation of supporting committees, appointment of CEO) · Limits on the size of the board · Responsibilities of the board · Establishment of audit committees (financial reporting, internal and external audits, other responsibilities, organization, member qualifications, and meetings) · Restrictions on lending to directors of private sector banks · Dividend payments No significant changes have been made since the guidelines were issued in 2003, and the responses to the survey questionnaire, first forwarded to the authorities in 2005, therefore remain largely unchanged (see appendix 4A). Examination of the questionnaire responses suggests a need to augment the guidelines with legal provisions governing beneficial ownership, minority shareholder rights, remuneration of directors, and roles and responsibilities of external and inter- nal auditors. More attention is also needed in other areas. Full conformity with international accounting and auditing standards should be actively pursued. And while the regulatory authorities have started moving ahead with the process of infusing the banking system with a corporate governance culture and educating shareholders about their rights and responsibilities, much more needs to be done in these areas. The corporate governance analysis based on the answers to the questionnaire also led to the following observations. The ownership structure is transparent. No individual or family can hold more than 10 percent of the shares of a banking company, and under the Bank Com- panies Act banks must disclose their shareholding structure in their articles of association. No legal provision seems to identify a threshold of share ownership to be disclosed to the general public. The government controls the nomination of directors for government-controlled banks, while the central bank regulates the remuneration of directors. The Companies Act protects the preemption rights of minority shareholders. There are no provisions to establish stakeholders' rights. Nor are there legal provisions governing the disclosure of beneficial ownership by shareholders other than the requirement that shareholders disclose their 40 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 portfolios in their tax returns. But banks are required to submit reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission for shareholdings above 10 percent. Investor rights appear to be in place when it comes to voting procedures and shareholder meetings. Shareholders receive adequate information in a timely fashion before shareholder meetings, and they are able to vote in absentia. No rules govern third-party verification of voting. Shareholders may vote on a range of issues, including related-party transactions. Special voting rights of individual shareholders other than the government are capped at 5 percent of the total votes. In contrast, basic ownership rights need improvement. Shareholders can vote on appointments and dismissals of directors, and in the public sector banks it is evident that the government exercises control over such outcomes. As the regula- tor, BB has issued guidelines controlling the percentage of shares in a bank that any one shareholder may own. A clear dividend policy is in place, and structural defenses that can prevent takeover bids are not established. Minority sharehold- ers cannot easily nominate a director, pointing to a need for legal provisions to safeguard their interests in the appointment of directors. Finally, no evidence shows that shareholders exercise any of these basic ownership rights. Questionnaire responses on transparency and disclosure requirements indi- cate that financial statements are prepared annually and in accordance with local generally accepted accounting standards, which are in material conformity with International Accounting Standards. Yet other studies have revealed gaps remaining between the two sets of standards (see World Bank 2003; eStandards- Forum 2009b). The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) is working toward improving harmonization with international standards. In December 2008, according to its 2009 action plan, the ICAB converged local standards with the new and updated Handbook of International Standards on Auditing, Assurance and Ethics Pronouncements (volume 1) issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. In addition, in November 2008 the ICAB adopted its own clarity project, slated for completion by December 2009, to redraft national standards in line with the clarified International Accounting Standards (eStan- dardsForum 2009b). Preparation of accounting and auditing standards in line with international standards should be a priority. Moreover, audit functions need to be defined in detail. Banks are required to appoint audit committees, but it is unclear whether the committees' mandate includes determining the process for selecting auditors. Contrary to internation- ally accepted standards, external auditors can perform other, nonaudit services for banks. While auditing standards are said to conform with international stan- dards, here again other reports point to areas needing improvement (see World Bank 2003; eStandardsForum 2009b). And there are no provisions governing the roles and responsibilities of internal auditors. Responses on the structure and effectiveness of boards of directors show that Bangladesh banks follow a unitary structure, with around 13 directors on aver- age. A BB circular limiting the number of directors on a bank board to no more than 13 reduced the average, which in the recent past was around 20. The terms of bank directors are limited to six years, and their minimum qualifications are governed by the guidelines issued by BB. The roles and responsibilities of boards of directors are clearly defined. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 41 Compensation policies need to be reviewed, however. Contrary to accepted stan- dards, shareholders have no say on the remuneration of directors, and the board sets the remuneration of the bank's CEO with approval from BB. In addition, banks are not required to disclose the compensation of directors. There are no provisions for including performance-based compensation in directors' remuneration packages. Performance-based compensation has been widely accepted as a positive incentive in today's competitive world. But in light of recent events in the international finan- cial world, where companies struggling with financial difficulties nevertheless paid large executive bonuses, guidelines on performance-based compensation packages should be reviewed carefully--and performance levels monitored. Bhutan Bhutan is one of South Asia's smallest countries, with an area of just 38,394 square kilometers and a population of only 0.7 million. Its GDP in 2008 was around US$1.4 billion. With a GNI per capita of US$1,900 in 2008, Bhutan is classified as a lower-middle-income country. After being governed by a monar- chy for centuries, Bhutan held its first democratic elections and created its first democratically elected government in 2008. Bhutan's economy is closely tied to that of India, its main trading partner as well as its largest donor. The value of its currency (the ngultrum) is pegged to the Indian rupee, and the Indian rupee (in denominations up to Rs 100) is accepted legal tender in Bhutan.3 Inflation in India therefore has a direct impact in Bhutan. In 2008, when India's inflation rate jumped to 8.35 percent as a result of high oil prices, Bhutan's rose to 8.4 percent. In 2009, Bhutan's inflation rate was expected to go up to 9 percent, and in 2010, with economic recovery in India, Bhutan's rate is expected to match India's at around 4 percent. Fluctuations in Bhutan's current account are caused by its fluctuating trade deficit with India, the sole recipient of hydropower exports from Bhutan and the source of most of its imports. India also funds power projects in Bhutan. Bhutan maintains a positive current account balance. It was 3.9 percent of GDP in 2008 and projected to increase to 5.5 percent in 2009 and 9 percent in 2010. GDP growth was around 13.82 percent in 2008, driven by strong demand for hydropower from India and an increase in power generation capacity. The growth rate dropped to an estimated 6 percent in 2009 as a result of the eco- nomic slowdown in India, but it is expected to rise to about 6.5 percent in 2010. Bhutan had a fiscal surplus of 0.56 percent of GDP in 2007, and the newly elected government set an annual fiscal deficit target of about 5 percent of GDP. Interna- tional reserves are healthy: in 2004­08, Bhutan had reserves equivalent to about 16 months of imports on average, the best record in the region. Overall, the econ- omy seems to be on the way to recovery. Bhutan's financial sector is small and underdeveloped. Its banking sector is very narrow, with just two commercial banks. One is a state-owned bank, and the other has a government stake. A development bank, an insurance company, and a pension fund make up the rest of the country's financial sector. The sector dominates the small stock exchange in Bhutan. Bhutan has initiated reforms aimed at expanding and stabilizing its financial sector to help meet the needs of its small but rapidly growing economy. The Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan (RMA), the regulatory authority for the sector, is 42 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 encouraging new entrants to the market, which would reduce the dominance of government-owned financial institutions both in the financial sector and in the small capital market. Greater competition would also improve efficiency. Bhutan's banking sector has been insulated from the global financial melt- down by its limited exposure. The main challenge for banks is to expand access to financial services and credit so as to support economic development. To reduce the cost and increase the timeliness of the provision of services, banks need to improve both cost and technological efficiency. Regulatory improvements would support better asset quality. Bhutan's high liquidity position has made liquid- ity management challenging (figure 3.3). Although the level of private credit is far from satisfactory for economic development, it grew rapidly in 2001­08, a situation that warrants careful monitoring by the authorities to prevent a credit bubble. The RMA, mindful of the high liquidity and the rapid increase in credit, raised the cash reserve requirement for banks in 2008 to slow the pace of private credit growth. This requires a very fine balance, however. Promoting capital market development and domestic savings mobilization could provide effective funding options for investment, while modernization of the payment system would further reduce systemic risk. And two key areas that the RMA needs to focus on in its financial sector development efforts are devel- oping a code of corporate governance for banks and streamlining accounting and auditing procedures. Access to Finance Lack of access to bank services is a serious impediment to development in the country. Over the period studied, Bhutan had on average six branches and one Figure 3.3 Bhutan's Banking Sector Has High Liquidity 200.00 180.00 160.00 140.00 120.00 percent 100.00 80.00 60.00 40.00 20.00 0.00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 private credit extended by banks to GDP liquid assets ratio liquid assets to liabilities ratio commercial banking assets to GDP loan to deposit ratio Source: Appendix table A2.11. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 43 ATM per 100,000 people--and one branch and less than one ATM per 1,000 square kilometers. The low demographic and geographic penetration is mirrored in low rates of use of bank facilities. While use grew marginally over the period, in 2008 there were only 325 deposit accounts and 43 loan accounts per 1,000 people. The RMA has recognized the problem of poor access to bank and credit facilities and is trying to take remedial action to expand the banking sector. It has approved in principle three more licenses to start commercial banks. The new banks are now in the process of meeting the minimum requirements to obtain a formal banking license. While the development bank provides loans to the rural sector and small and medium-size enterprises, the microfinance movement has not yet developed in Bhutan. In formulating a strategy to implement a microfinance system, Bhutan could look to other countries in the region, which provide success stories of the microfinance movement aiding economic development of the poor. Performance and Efficiency Return on equity and return on assets in Bhutan's banking sector have remained somewhat constant, dropping to 17.08 percent and 1.50 percent in 2008 despite the increasing trend in the net interest margin, which rose to 3.46 percent in 2008. One reason for the lackluster performance may be the rising staff costs, which amounted to 60.73 percent of total operating costs in 2008. The operating cost to income ratio declined, however--a favorable sign. Recurring earning power has also remained constant, averaging around 2 percent. For banks to benefit from higher margins, they need to improve cost-efficiency and reduce staff costs. To help further increase efficiency, Bhutan also needs to improve its technological infrastructure. Financial Stability Overall, the Bhutanese banking system is moderately stable. Bhutan is compli- ant with Basel I guidelines, and banks maintain capital adequacy ratios well above the statutory requirement of 10 percent. Because of growth in loan activi- ties, the overall capital adequacy ratio dropped from 16.17 percent in 2007 to 13.93 percent in 2008. Bhutan has not yet made progress in implementing Basel II, given the simple structure of its banking system and lack of expertise. But the RMA is encouraging banks to develop their own internal credit rating systems. Leverage is low in Bhutan, reflecting the relative inactivity in the banking sec- tor. The leverage ratio in 2008 was just 0.08. Gross nonperforming loans averaged around 7 percent over the period, while provisions averaged around 47 percent. Although nonperforming loans are comparatively low, Bhutan's classification policies are rather lax. So the low nonperforming loans ratio does not provide a true picture of asset quality. For further improvement of asset quality, regulatory guidelines on asset classification and provisioning should be tightened. Liquidity remains high. From time to time, the RMA uses monetary policy tools to sterilize liquidity. But given the shallow credit market, managing liquid- ity is a challenge for Bhutan. Capital Market Development Bhutan's capital market remains small and underdeveloped. At the end of 2008, the Royal Securities Exchange of Bhutan listed 19 companies and was operating 44 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 with a market capitalization equivalent to 13 percent of GDP. The market is dominated by the four state-owned financial institutions. Besides equities, the exchange deals in treasury bills, government bonds, and RMA bills. But the mar- ket is very narrow and the instruments extremely limited. The domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP ratio was 3.14 percent at the end of 2008. No corpo- rate bonds had been issued in Bhutan by 2008 (in 2009, however, the Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan Limited began issuing a corporate bond). Developing the capital market is important as a way to provide additional fund- ing for investment and growth. Market Concentration and Competitiveness Since Bhutan has only two commercial banks, market concentration is extremely high. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Bhutan averaged around 5,500 over the period, well above the 1,800 considered to denote a highly concentrated mar- ket. Commercial banking assets amounted to around 63.74 percent of GDP in 2008, having increased marginally over the period. However, private credit extended by banks increased by almost 267 percent between 2001 and 2008, from 10.61 percent of GDP to almost 38.82 percent. Bhutan should monitor this situ- ation carefully to prevent a credit bubble. High credit growth in boom times exposes banks to credit risks if credit policies are not prudent and can have adverse consequences during an economic slowdown like that being experienced now by South Asian countries. The limited access to financial services is a major impediment to growth and needs to be addressed in multiple ways. The RMA's steps to encourage new play- ers to enter the banking system are an important move. Highly concentrated markets lack efficiency and are more fragile during times of crisis. Payment Systems Development Along with other aspects of the banking sector, Bhutan needs to develop payment systems. Today Bhutan has one system, an end-of-day net settlement system, for both large- and small-value payments. The clearing system is automated. The RMA operates the Bhutan Electronic Clearing House, which launched a check truncation system based on magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) in January 2007. Proposed bylaws for the clearinghouse are being developed. With financial assistance from the World Bank, the RMA is undertaking a project aimed at developing an electronic fund transfer and clearing system for Bhutan. In Bhutan, unlike in most other developing economies, currency circulation is low. In 2008, notes and coins in circulation amounted to only 6.46 percent of GDP, and the narrow money supply to around 25.54 percent. While low cur- rency in circulation often means that financial services, especially payment sys- tems, are well developed, in this case it does not. Instead, it denotes limited use of currency in ordinary transactions, which curtails credit growth. Savings Mobilization Bhutan's average domestic savings rate is high relative to rates in the rest of the region. Gross domestic savings averaged around 44 percent of GDP in 2001­07 and reached 60.07 percent in 2007 (no data are available for 2008). Yet other indicators on savings mobilization are less positive. The broad money supply to The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 45 GDP ratio averaged around 48 percent of GDP in 2001­08, which could improve further. Since 2004, as a result of inflationary pressures, the real interest rate has turned negative. The reserve money to total deposits ratio was 61.42 percent at the end of 2008. The loan to deposit ratio remains low because of the limited lending activity. No information is available on worker remittances. In the absence of a developed capital market, domestic savings would help Bhutan move away from a dependence on external funds and take charge of its development activities. Thus, to benefit from investment opportunities and foster development, Bhutan needs to focus on savings mobilization. Measures that would help create and maintain a constant stream of savings include improv- ing access to financial services and managing inflation so that positive real inter- est rates can act as an incentive to save. Corporate Governance Corporate governance of banks is another area needing further development in Bhutan. The Financial Institutions Act, 1992 and the Companies Act, 2000 provide the legal foundation for banking regulations. In 2002, under the Financial Institu- tions Act, the RMA's division for financial institutions supervision issued pruden- tial regulations relating to corporate governance that cover the following areas: · Directors and chief executives (including duties, appointment, prohibitions, structure and duties of audit committee, and internal audit requirements) · Code of ethics for directors and employees · Submission of annual accounts · Dividends and reserves · Share capital ownership of banks and nonbank financial institutions · Reporting requirements · Guidelines for compliance officers Yet there is no code of corporate governance or specific corporate governance guidelines for banks. Instead, bank directors are to comply with sections of the Companies Act relating to directors' responsibilities, appointment, eligibility, registration, term of office, resignation, conduct of meetings, vacancies, minutes of meetings, remuneration, and validity of proceedings.4 Analysis of the answers to the corporate governance questionnaire sug- gests that, overall, the practice and awareness of corporate governance are low in Bhutan (see appendix 4A). Since all financial institutions have a significant government stake, the government can influence management as both owner and regulator, a situation that should be remedied through privatization of these institutions. Basic shareholder rights are in place, as are the preemption rights of minority shareholders. Banks would benefit from improvements in such areas as provisions governing beneficial ownership, proxy voting rights, special vot- ing rights, remuneration of directors, and disclosure requirements. Also key are building awareness on corporate governance and shareholder and investor rights, developing a code of corporate governance for banks, and streamlining accounting and auditing procedures. Basic guidelines are in place on disclosing ownership structure and influ- ence of stakeholders, but indirect or beneficial ownership is not clearly defined. Under the Financial Institutions Act, acquisitions of issued share capital above 46 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 20 percent in banks must be approved by the RMA, while acquisitions of 10 percent and above must be reported to the RMA. There are no apparent legal provi- sions identifying thresholds of share ownership that must be disclosed to the public. The government controls the nomination and remuneration of direc- tors for government-controlled banks and financial institutions. Because of the significant government ownership stake in all financial institutions, this would mean that the government has substantial control over shareholder rights even as it acts as the regulator. The Companies Act protects the preemption rights of minority shareholders. There are no provisions to establish stakeholders' rights. Nor are there legal provisions governing the disclosure of beneficial ownership by shareholders except when filing taxes, and no thresholds are prescribed. There is no evidence that this reporting has been monitored or that action has been taken against violations. Investor rights relating to voting procedures and shareholder meetings are met to a certain extent. Adequate information is disclosed to shareholders in a timely fashion before shareholder meetings. Shareholders are not able to vote in absentia. No rules govern third-party verification of voting. Shareholders may vote on a range of issues, though not on major or related-party transactions. But the RMA has provided regulatory guidelines on the conduct of related-party transactions. Special voting rights of individual shareholders need not be dis- closed, nor are they capped. In contrast, basic ownership rights are in place. Shareholders can vote on appointments and dismissals of directors, with the government exercising con- trol over such outcomes in the government-controlled banks. A clear dividend policy is in place, and structural defenses that can prevent takeover bids are not established, though the government or the RMA reserves the right to approve such transactions. The ability of minority shareholders to nominate a director is not clearly defined. No evidence shows that shareholders exercise any of these basic ownership rights. Bhutan does not have national accounting or auditing standards or a profes- sional standard-setting body. Bank financial statements are prepared monthly, quarterly, and annually and in accordance with Indian generally accepted accounting principles, which are in material conformity with International Accounting Standards. But other studies on financial reporting and standards have revealed that reporting is confined to forms and schedules prescribed in the Companies Act, with limited nonfinancial disclosures (see World Bank 2006c). Until Bhutan has its own standard-setting institutions, it is important that the RMA issue detailed guidelines on disclosure requirements. Banks are required to appoint audit committees to review internal and exter- nal audit functions as well as ensure compliance with laws and regulations. A panel of external auditors eligible to audit public companies in Bhutan is specified by the Royal Audit Authority, and the audit committees of the banks select their external auditors from this panel and get the RMA's consent. External auditors cannot perform other, nonaudit services for banks. Provisions govern- ing the roles and responsibilities of the internal auditor are established. While auditing standards are said to conform with international standards, here again other reports point to areas needing improvement, such as a general lack of local standards and capacities that will need to be addressed in due course (see World Bank 2006c). The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 47 Responses on the structure and effectiveness of boards of directors show that Bhutanese banks follow a unitary structure, with around five directors on aver- age. Board appointments are governed by eligibility criteria set out by the RMA in accordance with the Financial Institutions Act. The roles and responsibilities of boards of directors are clearly defined. Directors and employees are required to follow the code of ethics set out by the RMA in management and operations. For minimization of conflicts of interest, interlocking directorships in the financial industry are prohibited. No defined process is in place for director induction, training, and continuing education. Compensation policies need to be reviewed. Contrary to accepted standards, shareholders have no say on the remuneration of directors, and the board sets the remuneration of the bank's CEO. The government determines the remunera- tion of the board. Moreover, disclosure of the compensation of directors is not required. Performance-based compensation systems are not in use. While such compensation systems are widely accepted as providing positive incentives, they should be implemented only after careful consideration. India India has had impressive economic growth over the past decade. Its GDP of US$1.2 trillion in 2008 makes India the 12th largest economy in the world. Its population of 1.18 billion makes it the second most populous country, after China. In South Asia, India ranks first in GDP (with 79 percent of the region's total GDP), area (3,287,300 square kilometers), and population. With a GNI per capita of US$1,070 in 2008, India is classified as a lower-middle-income country. Spurred by expansion in industry and agriculture, annual GDP growth just before the global financial crisis averaged more than 9 percent. But rising oil prices and the onset of the financial crisis slowed the growth rate to 6.7 percent in 2008. This trend continued in 2009, when growth was expected to be around 6 percent. Recovery is expected in 2010, with growth projected to be 7 percent. The current account deficit rose from 1 percent of GDP in 2006 to 2.6 percent in 2008, driven in part by the export slowdown and higher world prices for oil. In 2009 the current account deficit improved slightly to an estimated 1.5 percent of GDP, and in 2010 it is projected to be 2 percent. On a positive note, India con- tinued to attract remittances in 2004­08 at a level averaging around 3.17 percent of GDP. In addition, net annual portfolio flows returned to a positive US$8.5 billion in 2009, from a net annual outflow of US$9.3 billion in 2008. On the fiscal side, inflation was creeping up as a result of international price increases, peaking at around 8.35 percent in 2008. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) responded to this situation through the use of monetary policy tools. In 2009 inflation was expected to be around 2.5 percent. For 2010, when economic activity is expected to pick up, it is projected at 4 percent. The fiscal deficit jumped from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2007 to around 6.0 percent in 2008. This widening of the fiscal deficit stems from payment of wage arrears for the pub- lic sector under the Sixth Pay Commission proposals and the fiscal stimulus designed to counter the economic slowdown, and the trend was expected to continue in 2009. The Indian rupee depreciated in 2008 as a result of the global financial crisis and the deleveraging activities that dried up capital inflows, slowing investment 48 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 activity. Although both portfolio and foreign direct investment picked up mod- estly in 2009, India needs this pace to accelerate to meet its growing investment requirements. India enjoys one of the highest domestic savings rates in the region, averaging around 34 percent of GDP in 2004­08. Reserves are stable, with India maintaining import cover of 12 months on average in the past few years. Overall, India seems to have countered the economic slowdown, though it needs strong inflows of external capital, along with a continuation of its historically high sav- ings rate, to accelerate investment. India has a well-regulated and relatively stable banking sector and, unlike most countries in the region, a well-developed capital market. In 2008, the banking sector included 77 commercial banks: 27 public sector banks (8 state banks and 19 nationalized banks), 23 private sector banks (15 old private banks and 8 new ones), and 27 foreign banks. The RBI is the banking regulator and supervisor. In 2008 commercial banking assets amounted to around 91.8 percent of GDP. India is one of the two countries in South Asia that offer an explicit deposit insurance scheme and was the second country in the world to establish such a scheme, in 1962 (the United States was the first, in 1933). Today, each deposi- tor in a bank is insured up to a maximum of Rs 100,000 (US$2,084) for both principal and interest. A second important element for success in the banking sector is the Credit Information Bureau (India) Limited, incorporated in 2000 to provide credit information to member banks on both commercial and consumer borrowers. The Indian commercial banking sector is relatively stable (figure 3.4), and it has weathered the second-round effects of the financial crisis thanks to a pru- dent regulatory framework and sound macroeconomic fundamentals. But some Figure 3.4 Indian Banks Are Stable and Well Capitalized 100.00 100.00 returns (percent; log scale) 10.00 percent (log scale) 12.00 12.70 12.90 12.80 12.40 12.28 13.01 11.40 10.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 capital adequacy ratio gross nonperforming loans ratio provisions to nonperforming loans ratio return on equity return on assets Source: Appendix table A2.12. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 49 fundamental issues remain to be addressed. To promote financial inclusion, key to both human and economic development, banks should seek ways to increase access to the financial services and instruments they offer. In addition, banks should work to further improve their efficiency, achieving stable returns that enable them to further strengthen their provisions and capital cover. Concentra- tion within banking segments should be monitored carefully. In corporate gover- nance, addressing government ownership of banks, harmonization of standards and codes, and revision of statutes and guidelines would improve transparency and consistency. In addition, since India has performance-based compensation mechanisms in place, such mechanisms should be reviewed carefully given recent events in the international arena. Monitoring of performance levels also needs to be discussed. The Indian capital market is far more developed than its regional counter- parts. Yet there are several challenges to address. One is to develop the corporate bond market. With the massive infrastructure financing needs spurred by eco- nomic growth, there is huge untapped potential in the corporate bond market. Developing this market would also enable commercial banks to shift away from such long-term projects and better manage their risk portfolios. In developing the capital market, measures are needed to fill legal and regulatory gaps while at the same time not inhibiting market participants. Developing the corporate bond and equity markets while maintaining domestic savings and remittance levels would provide an enormous boost to economic growth. Access to Finance Access to financial services offered by the commercial banking sector continues to increase, though there is still room for improvement. Demographic penetra- tion rose marginally in 2001­08, averaging around six bank branches and three ATMs per 100,000 people, though it is still low by developed-country standards. Geographic penetration has improved faster, averaging around 23 branches and 9 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers in 2001­08 and growing to 26 branches and 13 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers in 2008. Usage ratios are low, averaging 436 deposit accounts and 68 loan accounts per 1,000 people over the period, indicat- ing a need to further improve access to bank branches and ATMs to match the pace of economic growth. Recognizing the need to increase financial inclusion, the RBI has taken policy measures to do so and has directed banks to make basic, "no frills" accounts available to certain parts of the population. Significant progress has been made in providing these basic accounts. Besides commercial banks, 91 regional rural banks (predominantly in rural areas) and a large number of cooperative banks (98,343 rural and 1,770 urban) provide access to financial services to low-income and other disadvantaged groups. The regional rural banks are supervised by the National Bank for Agri- culture and Rural Development, while most of the cooperative banks operate under the purview of state governments. The RBI regulates 53 scheduled urban cooperative banks, part of the group of 1,770 urban cooperative banks. The microfinance movement in India has made great strides in providing financial access to the poor since its inception in the early 1990s. The main actors are self-help groups, with total loans outstanding of Rs 123.66 billion (US$2.6 billion) at the end of 2007, and microfinance institutions, with Rs 15.84 billion (US$330 million). For the self-help groups, commercial bank loans account for 50 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Rs 87.60 billion (US$1.82 billion) of the loans outstanding. By March 31, 2007, there were 4.2 million self-help groups maintaining savings accounts with banks, with total savings of Rs 35.13 billion (US$731 million). These groups cover around 58 million poor households. Commercial banks hold the largest share of the self-help groups' savings (53.9 percent), followed by regional rural banks (32.9 percent) and cooperative banks (13.2 percent). (Note that this study does not include cooperative banks, regional rural banks, and microfinance institu- tions in its indicators on access to finance.) Performance and Efficiency Returns in the banking sector remained stable over the period, thanks to the rela- tive stability of the net interest margin. The return on equity increased signifi- cantly between 2003 and 2004, mainly because of large profits realized on the trading of securities. The rate grew slightly in 2007 to end at 17.34 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, the return on assets showed an increasing trend. The net inter- est margin remained stable over the period at around 3 percent. Recurring earn- ing power also appeared stable, with the ratio at 2.15 percent in 2008. The operating cost ratio fell in 2007 to 71.05 percent but crept back up in 2008 to 76.03 percent. The staff cost ratio declined by almost 25 percent between 2001 and 2008, to 51.55 percent, as a result of automation and staff retirements. Many countries in the region have reported better returns, interest mar- gins, and earning power than India, but Indian banks are expected to be able to maintain stable performance levels even with the economic slowdown. While nonperforming loans are expected to increase as a result of adverse economic conditions, the restructuring of loans in the second part of 2008 and early 2009 should have eased bad loans, keeping returns stable. Even so, banks will have to keep nonperforming loan levels low and improve cost and return efficiency to maintain stability in returns. Financial Stability India's commercial banks are adequately capitalized. In 2008, all but two banks recorded capital adequacy ratios of more than 10 percent, above the 9 percent minimum capital requirement in India. All 27 public sector banks, along with 22 private sector banks and 26 foreign banks, showed capital adequacy ratios above 10 percent, while one local private bank and one foreign bank recorded ratios between 8 percent and 10 percent. In 2008, the aggregate capital adequacy ratio reported by the Indian banking sector was 13.01 percent. This capital ade- quacy reporting is under the Basel I framework. Foreign banks in India have followed the Basel II guidelines since March 2008, and all other banks were expected to follow suit by March 2009. In 2008, of the 77 banks in India, 41 had migrated to Basel II, and all 41 had capital adequacy ratios, reported under Basel II guidelines, exceeding the regulatory requirement of 9 percent. The leverage ratio has continued to decline, reaching 10.63 in 2008. While leverage ratios in India are higher than those in most other South Asian coun- tries, its banks may need to further augment their capital base. Since the onset of the financial crisis, the government has infused close to US$400 million in capital in some public sector banks to strengthen their capital position and is ready to do more in the coming year. As it is, banks are able to withstand the shocks to the system that may be caused by an increase in nonperforming loans. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 51 The gross nonperforming loans ratio fell from 11.40 percent in 2001 to 2.25 percent in 2008. The provisions to nonperforming loans ratio stood at 56.18 per- cent in 2008. Provisions fell in 2007 and 2008. Because nonperforming loans may rise in the near future as a result of the economic slowdown, increasing the provision cover would be prudent. In the second part of 2008 and early 2009, the RBI allowed a large-scale loan restructuring process, covering around 4.5 percent of the loan portfolio, to counter the effects of the global financial crisis. Loan terms were restructured, and in some cases, loans that under normal cir- cumstances would have been classified as nonperforming on time-based criteria (for example, because of late payments of interest) were classified as performing, depending on their recoverability. Since Indian banks are not directly exposed to the global financial crisis, no large-scale increase in nonperforming loans is expected. Liquidity seems to have tightened over the period. The liquid assets ratio dropped slightly to 34.12 percent in 2008, though it remained significantly higher than in other countries in the region, while the liquid assets to liabilities ratio improved slightly to 146.23 percent. A rising loan to deposit ratio indicated increasing liquidity stress in the banking system and thus growing liquidity risk. The RBI countered this tight liquidity situation by easing the cash reserve requirement and other policy rates. Overall, the outlook for the Indian banking system is for financial stability. With their current capital cushion, banks will be able to withstand the rising lev- els of nonperforming loans, and no dramatic increase in these levels is expected. But banks will be in a better position if provision levels are increased further and liquidity is prudently managed. Capital Market Development India's dynamic economic growth has paved the way for rapid development of its capital market over the past decade. Today India has a developed capital market for equities, bonds, and derivatives. Corporate governance has progressed, and the market infrastructure and regulatory framework have been improved. The stock market has developed rapidly, with market capitalization increasing from 29.40 percent of GDP in 2001 to 106.05 percent in 2008. Between 2007 and 2008, market capitalization increased by about 26.6 percent. In 2008, however, the global deleveraging directly affected the Bombay Stock Exchange's Sensex index. As foreign investors liquidated their portfolios, the index fell by more than 52 percent at the end of 2007 to 9,788 at the end of October 2008. This negative trend did not last long, however. The index had recovered to 16,283 by October 2009 and is projected to rise further. Market depth has improved as well, with the trading value of the top 10 stocks declining from 72.90 percent of the total value of shares traded in 2001 to 26.78 percent in 2008. Market liquidity initially fell, then improved over the period: the stock trading value rose to 108.86 percent of GDP in 2008. The stock market turnover ratio improved steadily. In 2007 it increased slightly, but remained at an efficient level in 2008, at 1.13. Government bonds dominate the bond market, with outstanding public bonds amounting to 36.24 percent of GDP in 2008. The corporate bond market is negligible at around 3.2 percent of GDP. The dominance of government bonds, accounting for more than 91 percent of the total bond market, is comparable to 52 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 that in other South Asian countries. This dominance is likely to increase given the government's need to finance fiscal stimulus activities and the pay increase under the Sixth Pay Commission. India is the only country in South Asia to list govern- ment securities on the stock exchange and benchmark on the yield curve--an important step in bond market development. The Securities and Exchange Board of India regulates the capital market. Trades take place mostly through electronic trading platforms, with same-day settlement for government debt securities and T+1 settlement for equity. Dema- terialization is almost complete, and securities are traded only in demateralized form. The dematerialization reforms have increased efficiency and transparency and reduced settlement costs for the investors. While the equity market is devel- oped and stable, the corporate bond market is still at a comparatively nascent stage of development. Legal and regulatory gaps need to be filled to attract inves- tors to this market. Market Concentration and Competitiveness India continues to lead the region in lowering market concentration in the bank- ing sector. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index declined steadily over the period to 535.63 in 2008. But when the banking sector is broken down by segment, it becomes clear that while the index shows a trend of declining market concentra- tion among public sector banks, it shows an increasing trend among private sector banks and foreign banks. The data suggest that a few key players dominate these two segments, a situation that needs to be monitored carefully. The market shares of the top three banks in assets, loans, and deposits have remained steady at around 32 percent. Again, however, analyzing the banking segments separately shows higher concentration among private sector and foreign banks. Still, con- centration is relatively low overall, indicating room for new entrants and healthy competition in the growing economy. Private credit extended by banks increased rapidly, growing by almost 127 percent between 2001 and 2008 to 48.78 percent of GDP. Commercial banking assets also increased steadily, from 61.90 percent of GDP in 2001 to 91.80 percent in 2008. Commercial banks still hold the prime position in the formal financial structure. As the markets mature and corporate bond and equity markets grow, however, this can be expected to change. The Indian banking sector is competitive and can expect efficiencies that will further lower intermediary costs. But the higher concentration in the private sector and foreign bank segments should be monitored. Private credit growth seems to have decelerated by 2009, possibly because of the economic slowdown. But because of the accelerated credit growth in previous years, credit risk will remain a concern. Prudential regulations and risk management systems should help manage this risk, however. Payment Systems Development India has a developed payment system that includes both retail- and large-value payment systems. The retail-value payment systems are automated or manual clearing systems with end-of-day net settlement. The retail payment system includes automated (MICR and non-MICR) check clearing, retail electronic fund transfer, and card payments. Today there are 71 MICR check processing centers functioning in the country. Where setting up MICR check processing was The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 53 not found to be viable (the case in 1,064 clearinghouses), the settlement opera- tions have been computerized so that settlement is done electronically even though the instruments are still sorted manually. High-value clearing is available at 24 major locations in the country. The threshold for high-value clearing is to be raised from Rs 100,000 to Rs 1 million (US$20,834) per transaction. Another clearing arrangement, "speed clearing," has been introduced at 53 locations, where outstation checks (those outside the main city or region) are now cleared on a T+1 or T+2 basis. To enhance the efficiency of the paper-based clearing systems, a check truncation system was implemented in February 2008 as a pilot project with the 10 banks in the National Capital Region (RBI, Annual Report, 2008­09). Electronic fund transfer systems include the electronic clearing service (ECS), electronic fund transfer (EFT), and national electronic fund transfer (NEFT). ECS is available in 75 centers and operates on a T+1 settlement cycle. To enhance its efficiency, a new system, the National Electronic Clearing Service (NECS), which has centralized processing capabilities, was introduced in September 2008. By the end of March 2009, 114 banks with 26,275 branches were participating in the new system. NEFT is a nationwide electronic fund transfer system in which 89 banks with 55,225 branches participate. The transactions processed through the systems in 2008/09 totaled Rs 164,463 crore (US$34.3 billion) for the ECS (debits and credits) and NECS and Rs 251,956 crore (US$52.5 billion) for the EFT and NEFT (RBI, Annual Report, 2008­09). The total value of retail transactions relative to GDP has shown a declining trend, indicating increasing use of the RTGS system. In 2008 retail transactions amounted to 306.1 percent of GDP. The RTGS system has been in operation since March 2004. This system is primarily for large-value transactions, with a minimum threshold of Rs 1 lakh (Rs 100,000). There were 55,006 RTGS-enabled bank branches by March 2009, with 11,494 branches added to the RTGS network in 2008/09. In that year the RTGS system processed 13.37 million transactions with a total value of Rs 323 trillion (US$6.73 trillion) (RBI, Annual Report, 2008­09). RTGS transactions have been increasing rapidly, reaching 1,024.69 percent of GDP in 2008. The RBI assessment of the RTGS system reports that it is fully compliant with six core principles of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and broadly compliant with core prin- ciples 3, 7, and 8 relating to management of credit and liquidity risk, operational reliability, and efficiency. To strengthen the regulation and supervision of the payment systems, a new law and two regulations came into effect on August 12, 2008: the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 (PSS Act 51 of 2007); Board for Regulation and Supervision of Payment and Settlement Systems Regulations, 2008; and Payment and Settlement Systems Regulations, 2008. India is presently making arrangements to implement RTGS second-generation modifications to its payment system from 2010 onward. This would further reduce the potential risks in the payment and settlement systems. Besides the interbank and high-value check clearing systems and the RTGS system, two other systemically important payment systems are the Negotiated Dealing System and the Foreign Exchange Clearing System. Both the notes and coins in circulation to GDP ratio and the narrow money supply to GDP ratio increased over the period to 11.17 percent and 21.06 percent, 54 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 respectively, in 2008. Currency in circulation accounts for more than 53 percent of the narrow money supply. Heavy use of currency indicates a need for financial services or payment instruments--and while India has developed its payment systems, there is still room for expansion given the size of its population and geo- graphic area. Conversely, the broad money supply indicator shows a higher level of financial intermediation (see the section on savings mobilization). To promote more inclusive growth in the payment systems, India is expand- ing into such areas as mobile banking and prepaid smart cards. The RBI issued operating guidelines for mobile banking in October 2008 and policy guidelines for prepayment instruments in April 2009. Savings Mobilization Domestic savings are among the more important and more stable resources a country has at its disposal. India has enjoyed a consistently high domestic savings rate. In 2008, domestic savings amounted to 37.7 percent of GDP. The broad money supply is also high, at 76.45 percent of GDP in 2008, indicating efficient financial intermediation. The real deposit rate, which is adjusted for inflation, turned negative in 2003 but then turned positive again, and in 2008 it was around 1.05 percent. The reserve money to total deposits ratio has declined slightly and averages around 26 percent. The loan to deposit ratio rose steadily from 53.13 percent in 2001 to 73.88 percent in 2008, an increase of around 39 percent. Worker remittances have also been stable and were around 3.64 percent of GDP in 2008. Overall, the savings situation in India is promising, with a sound savings cul- ture, reliable remittance patterns, and incentives in the form of positive interest rates. Strong growth in domestic savings could be the solution for sustaining the dynamic economic growth observed in the past decade, especially in light of the capital outflows following the onset of the financial crisis. Indeed, India has been able to finance a significant portion of its investment needs through domestic savings (which amount to more than a third of GDP), an impressive feat for such a fast-growing economy. It is important that it take the steps necessary to maintain this advantage. Corporate Governance The Securities and Exchange Board of India regulates the corporate gover- nance of listed companies across all sectors through Clause 49 of the Listing Agreements. Clause 49 provides guidelines on composition of the board of direc- tors, composition and operations of the audit committee, remuneration of direc- tors, board procedures, management, shareholders, and reporting requirements and compliance. In addition, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, remains the foundation of the corporate governance framework for banks in India. Public sector banks are also governed by the statutes under which they are incorporated. These include the State Bank of India Act, 1955; the State Bank of India (Subsid- iary Banks) Act, 1959, for the associate banks of the State Bank of India; and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970/80, for nationalized banks. Recognizing the importance of corporate governance to the efficiency of banks' operations, the RBI set up at least three committees to study differ- ent aspects of corporate governance.5 On the basis of their recommendations, The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 55 guidelines that can be implemented within the existing legislative structure are being issued while legislative amendments are being discussed. India has made good progress in these matters, though challenges remain in the implementation and enforcement of such regulations. While the framework governing ownership, board composition and opera- tions, and fit-and-proper criteria for the public sector banks is entrenched in the legal statutes that govern them, the RBI introduced a comprehensive policy framework for ownership and governance in private sector banks in February 2005. The broad principles underlying this framework are to ensure that ulti- mate ownership and control of commercial banks is well diversified, that key shareholders and directors and CEOs meet the fit-and-proper criteria, and that the board observes sound corporate governance principles. The RBI has also expanded the transparency and disclosure standards. Detailed assessment of the responses to the corporate governance survey shows that existing provisions largely cover issues relating to ownership struc- ture and influence of external stakeholders (see appendix 4A). There appear to be differences between the rules that apply to public sector banks and those applying to private sector banks, however. The questionnaire responses also show that regulatory guidelines of both the RBI and the Securities and Exchange Board require disclosure of the sharehold- ings of promoters as well as the top 10 shareholders in the annual report, to which both shareholders and the market have access. The RBI disclosure threshold is 5 percent. For private sector banks, the threshold for disclosure is 1 percent. The government discloses its shareholdings only in public sector banks. In addition, the government appoints the chairman and managing director and the executive directors and nominates nonexecutive directors. The RBI, the regulator, is also represented on the board. But its earlier practice of nominating directors to the boards of all private sector banks has been changed, and the RBI now nominates directors only for selected private sector banks. Nominee directors include repre- sentatives of labor unions. Nonexecutive directors representing the government and the RBI do sometimes exercise influence over board decisions. The prompt correction action regime does not discriminate on the basis of ownership. The regulator can initiate corrective actions proposed under the regime. Minority shareholders have preemption rights under the Companies Act. Legal provisions govern the disclosure of beneficial ownership of sharehold- ers, but no thresholds are prescribed. Shareholders are required to disclose such ownership to the company. The questionnaire responses indicate comprehensive coverage of investor rights relating to voting and shareholder meetings. Proxy voting is allowed, though electronic voting is not. Shareholders can demand a vote only if they hold a tenth of the total votes. Two independent parties are appointed by the chairman to assist in the polling process. The Banking Regulation Act caps individual voting rights at 10 percent for the private sector and 1 percent for the public sector. Shareholders can vote on a range of issues, including related-party transactions. Government control over basic ownership rights once again warrants review. The government controls the appointment or dismissal of directors in public sec- tor banks, while shareholders vote on such issues in private sector banks. There are no special provisions covering minority shareholder rights in electing board members. The RBI has given clear guidelines to commercial banks on broad 56 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 parameters for declaring dividends. If these guidelines are not met, banks need to obtain prior approval from the RBI before recommending dividends to share- holders for approval. No structural defenses have been established to prevent takeover bids, but any transfer of shares exceeding 5 percent of total paid-up capi- tal is subject to registration and regulatory scrutiny and to approval by the RBI. Responses on transparency and disclosure suggest that policy improvements are needed on disclosure requirements, audit fees, and the internal audit func- tion. Financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted local accounting principles, which are in material conformity with Interna- tional Accounting Standards. Considerable efforts have been made to align Indian accounting standards with the International Financial Reporting Stan- dards. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India uses the International Financial Reporting Standards in developing the national standards, departing from the international standards where justified. In recent years, the institute has issued and revised several accounting standards, significantly reducing the gap between the national and international standards. Differences remain, how- ever (eStandardsForum 2007). A similar process is under way for local auditing standards. Financial reporting is done quarterly, semiannually, and annually. No provisions have been established requiring the disclosure of audit fees paid to external auditors. The RBI has issued clear guidelines on the appointment of audit committees and has clearly delineated their roles and responsibilities. In private sector banks, these committees control the process of selecting external auditors; for public sector banks the central bank appoints auditors from a preapproved list. External auditors do not perform other, nonaudit services for the banks they audit. The RBI has issued clear guidelines on the roles and responsibilities of internal audi- tors. The internal audit function is performed by bank staff with the required professional qualifications and work experience. But internal auditors face no requirement to report to the board of directors rather than to management, rais- ing questions about their independence. Indian banks follow a unitary structure for their boards with around 8­12 members on average. The Banking Regulation Act governs requirements on the qualifications and experience of board members. The roles and responsibilities of the board are clearly defined, but tasks and objectives are not assigned to indi- vidual board members. Moreover, no provisions exist on formal and systematic training for directors, an issue that warrants attention. Detailed guidelines are needed to harmonize the practices of local private and public sector banks for setting and disclosing the remuneration of directors as well as setting performance-based compensation policies. Compensation poli- cies for public sector banks were reviewed by the RBI in March 2006. Executive directors of public sector banks will receive performance-based compensation for achieving targets, similar to their counterparts at private sector banks. In pri- vate sector banks, shareholders can vote on the remuneration of directors, while in public sector banks the government has the right to set remuneration. In addi- tion, while private sector banks disclose directors' compensation in detail, public sector banks disclose only aggregate compensation. The global financial crisis has prompted much debate in the international arena about executive compensation, stock options, and bonus practices. This would be a good opportunity for the RBI to review performance-based compensation The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 57 policies in consultation with banks. The monitoring of performance also needs to be discussed. Overall, India has made good progress in strengthening the corporate gover- nance of banks. Some areas need further attention, however. One main issue is government ownership of banks and such underlying concerns as transparency, objectivity, and a level playing field. To address these concerns, differences in rules, regulations, and treatment between public and private sector banks should be minimized. To improve transparency and disclosure, accounting and auditing standards should be reviewed for consistency with international standards. The RBI, in consultation with banks, should also review compensation policies and the monitoring of executive performance. And banks should take an active part in incorporating corporate governance into their operations. To bring in some of the changes suggested by the consultative committees, the RBI could take steps to make necessary amendments to the legal statutes. Also important is to ensure proper enforcement of the guidelines. An efficient corporate governance system would provide both regulators and banks with the tools to improve robustness, reliability, and consistency--and thereby strengthen the credibility of the banking sector. Maldives Maldives has the smallest area (300 square kilometers), population (350,000), and GDP (US$1.26 billion in 2008) in South Asia. Yet it has the highest GNI per capita in the region at US$3,630 in 2008 and is classified as a lower-middle- income country. This was made possible by the remarkable economic growth achieved by Maldives in the past two decades. The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, coupled with a decline in tourism rev- enue due to greater global uncertainties as well as high food and fuel prices, has taken its toll, however. Asset losses due to the tsunami amounted to around 62 percent of GDP. In 2006 reconstruction projects boosted GDP away from a negative trend, to 18 percent. But since then, despite a pickup in tourism and fishing, growth has lagged. In 2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the growth rate turned negative, dropping to an estimated -3.5 percent. The pro- jection for 2010 is a conservative 3.5 percent, though it is hoped that the global economic slowdown will have waned by then. As a result of expansionary policies, inflation crept up from 3.5 percent in 2006 to 11.89 percent in 2008 before declining to an estimated 4.5 percent in 2009. The soaring government expenditure pushed the fiscal deficit up to 13.57 percent of GDP by the end of 2008, and the deficit was expected to rise even higher by the end of 2009. The current account deficit dropped from 51.7 percent of GDP to an estimated 30 percent, but remains a matter for concern. Reserves have fallen to two months of import cover. Overall, the fiscal situation is still critical, but Maldives is taking steps to address the situation. One priority was to stop monetizing the deficit, which was done in 2009. Maldives is also working to cut recurrent government expenditure to a sustainable level and obtain external financing. Because the country lacks domestic resources, its economic prospects will depend largely on an upturn in the world economy, at least in the near future. The banking sector in Maldives consists of six commercial banks--one local bank in which the government is the majority owner and five foreign banks. 58 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 As in other countries in the region, banks dominate the financial sector; com- mercial banking assets in 2008 amounted to 143.14 percent of GDP. The finan- cial sector also includes a leasing company, a housing finance institution, several insurance companies, money service businesses, and securities market interme- diaries. The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) is the regulatory authority for banks as well as nonbank financial institutions, while the Capital Market Devel- opment Authority (CMDA) regulates the securities market. The Maldivian banking sector is small but has the potential to grow. The authorities are working to expand the banking sector and capital market while improving financial outreach. These efforts, along with measures to address mac- roeconomic imbalances, should help ensure stability in the banking system, a key to stable and sustainable economic growth. Although commercial banking assets tripled in 2001­08, and private credit provided by banks quadrupled over the same period, limited access to financial services remains one of the main impediments to financial inclusion and private sector development. The authorities are tackling this issue--which is caused by the geographic dispersion of the population--through a mobile phone bank- ing project intended to provide branchless banking. Evaluation of the banking sector's performance reveals high but declining returns and rising operating costs, a trend that is a matter for concern. Maldivian banks have maintained stable capital adequacy ratios well above the minimum requirement (figure 3.5). Even so, increasing levels of nonperforming loans and declining provisions are another cause for concern. Asset quality should be improved through diversified lending and better credit information. A new credit information bureau should Figure 3.5 Maldivian Banks Maintain Stable Capital Ratios 100.00 10.00 percent (log scale) 1.00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 0.10 capital adequacy ratio leverage ratio (times) gross nonperforming loans ratio provisions to nonperforming loans ratio Source: Appendix table A2.13. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 59 help by improving credit information and reducing costs. Another issue needing review is the high liquidity in the banking sector, which stems from high statu- tory reserve requirements. The capital market remains undeveloped, making it difficult for banks to secure long-term funding--though development efforts are under way. The banking sector is narrow and concentrated. And the public sector seems to crowd out private sector credit, because of both macroeconomic imbalances and nar- row capital markets. These areas need attention to expand capital markets and ensure a stable, competitive banking industry. Maldives has a small but functional payment system, and efforts are under way to expand and modernize it, an important step toward improving the soundness of the financial sector. Although the domestic savings rate is high, the intermedia- tion between savers and investors is inefficient. Steps are needed to create savings and investment opportunities and to improve interest rates by curbing inflation. Developing a stable domestic savings base to aid investment is important when the external economic and financial environment becomes uncertain. Maldives has issued a corporate governance code as well as corporate gover- nance regulations for banks, an important step. These guidelines are too new to assess their effectiveness. But issues that need to be addressed include the heavy government ownership in listed companies, transparency and disclosure prin- ciples with an emphasis on accounting and auditing standards, and compliance with guidelines and standards. Developing governance practices and compliance would improve transparency and accountability. Access to Finance Maldives leads South Asia in access to finance, mainly because of higher indica- tors of demographic and geographic penetration. Demographic penetration increased over the period studied--from 6 branches and 3 ATMs per 100,000 people in 2001 to 10 branches and 13 ATMs in 2008. Geographic penetration showed similar increases, growing from 57 branches and 27 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers in 2001 to 103 branches and 130 ATMs in 2008.6 Usage ratios also rose, reaching 965 deposit accounts and 142 loan accounts per 1,000 people in 2008. But the story does not end there, because these penetration ratios do not take into account the geographic dispersion of Maldivians among the atolls of the country. This geographic dispersion poses a big challenge. According to a World Bank report (2008c, 3­4), "The Maldives may be one of the most difficult coun- tries in the world in which to deliver financial services through traditional branch networks. . . . Its 300,000 people live on 198 scattered islands in 26 atolls, and 60 percent of the inhabited islands have less than 1,000 residents. . . . only 40 percent have bank accounts and this varies sharply between the outer atolls (35 percent) and Male (65 percent)." According to this report, the 2006 Investment Climate Assessment in Maldives identified access to finance as the biggest constraint to private sector development, followed by cost of financing--while in most South Asian countries finance typically ranks third or fourth. Opening bank branches on all the islands clearly would not be cost-effective. Even microfinance, which has played a large part in the region in bringing access to financial services to mostly rural areas, would not be a feasible solution because of the high setup costs that would be involved. But mobile phone banking has 60 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 good potential for delivering services across the country. Mobile phone penetra- tion exceeds 100 percent, and the network provides full coverage of Maldives. With the assistance of the World Bank, the MMA has therefore initiated a mobile phone banking project that is expected to benefit the residents of the outer atolls especially. Even people in Male will benefit from the ability to conduct virtual transactions. Performance and Efficiency Although the Maldivian banking sector ranks high on performance indicators in South Asia, negative trends in 2007­08 are a matter for concern. Returns increased over much of the period studied, with the return on equity rising to 53.51 percent in 2006, and the return on assets to 6.36 percent. The two ratios then fell to 30.36 percent and 4.53 percent in 2008. The net interest margin and recurring earning power showed a similar declining trend. Meanwhile, operating costs rose from 30.60 percent of net interest earnings in 2006 to 36.30 percent in 2008. Staff costs amounted to almost half the operating costs in 2007, then dropped to around 33.6 percent in 2008. Even with these declining trends, the performance ratios are some of the highest in the region. But high banking costs and lower returns will adversely affect the performance and efficiency of the banking sector in the future. One reason for the declining returns is the high concentration of lending in the economy's two main sectors--and thus the vulnerability to fluctuations in those sectors. The mainstays of the Maldivian economy are tourism, accounting for around 31 percent of GDP on average for the past decade or so, and fisher- ies, accounting for 7 percent. These two sectors accounted for 61.3 percent and 7 percent, respectively, of commercial bank lending in 2008. Housing construc- tion loans represented another 8.7 percent of the total. Commercial bank returns are falling because of declining growth in these activities. Growth in tourism arrivals dropped from 52.3 percent in 2006 to 12.3 percent in 2007 and just 1.1 percent in 2008. Growth was expected to fall to -11 percent in 2009, then pick up marginally to a projected 1 percent in 2010 and 2.5 percent in 2011. In the fisheries sector, total fish landings dropped by about 20 percent between 2006 and 2007 and did not increase in 2008 (Maldives, Ministry of Finance and Treasury 2009). Global uncertainties, the effects of the tsunami, the global financial and economic crisis, and high fuel prices are among the reasons for the slowing growth in these sectors. The concern is that neither industry is expected to see a robust turnaround in the near future. Financial Stability Maldives maintained a stable risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio of around 20 percent on average throughout the period studied (see figure 3.5). Even when performance ratios dropped in 2007, the capital adequacy ratio was around 15.58 percent--well above the then minimum requirement of 8 percent of risk- weighted assets. The minimum requirement was raised to 12 percent effective in 2009, a level that the average capital adequacy ratio also always exceeded during the period. In 2008, the capital position increased to 21.01 percent. Because Maldives adheres to Basel I guidelines, however, the capital cushion does not include charges against market risk or operational risk. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 61 The gross nonperforming loans ratio fell from a high of 10.10 percent in 2003 to 1.56 percent in 2007, then jumped to 8.90 percent in 2008. At the same time, provisions for nonperforming loans dropped by nearly 50 percentage points-- from 63.94 percent in 2007 to 14.02 percent in 2008. Although capitalization is high, growing levels of nonperforming loans and weak provisioning are a matter for concern. In today's uncertain economic environment, banks need to ensure that their capital base is not further eroded by a weak asset position. The banking sector's leverage position has been continually low, with equity just 16 percent of total assets in 2008, indicating the vulnerability of the capital position if more assets should go bad. Moreover, the liquidity position is high, though it declined considerably over the period. In 2008 the liquid assets ratio was around 22.60 percent.7 The minimum reserve requirement is high, at 25 percent, and bank funds are tied up. This can have an adverse effect on the cost of funds, and the MMA should therefore take steps to reduce reserve requirements to facilitate credit expansion. Overall, the capital position of Maldivian banks is stable, though the already rising levels of nonperforming loans and declining provisions could undermine this position. Maldives is grappling with outdated mortgage and property laws and lack of special debt recovery provisions, all of which play a major part in debt recovery and could have supported the management of nonperforming loans. Banks need to manage their liquidity positions well. Also important is to improve asset quality so as to minimize nonperforming loans. Maldivian authorities have taken an important step by initiating the creation of a credit information bureau with the assistance of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. The exchange of credit information should help improve credit quality as well as reduce processing costs. Capital Market Development The capital market in Maldives is still very much at a nascent stage. The stock market has just four stocks listed. The corporate bond market has had only three corporate bond issues, by one company in 2006. The MMA has issued treasury bills to finance the budget deficit. Those outstanding in 2008 amounted to 4.51 percent of GDP. The stock market capitalization was around 20.60 percent of GDP in 2008. Market liquidity was around 3.19 percent of GDP. And turnover was about 0.014 times the average market capitalization, reflecting the low efficiency. With the shallow capital market, banks lack access to long-term funding, which hampers their growth. While foreign banks can secure funding through overseas markets, the lack of local long-term funding will discourage domestic private sector banks from entering the market. Maldives is working toward developing its capital market. The Maldives Secu- rity Depository, established in 2004, facilitates scripless trade sharing for the stock market. It operates a net clearing and settlement system with a payment-versus- delivery mechanism to minimize risk and to dematerialize the trades. Market Concentration and Competitiveness The Maldivian banking sector is narrow, leading to a heavily concentrated mar- ket. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index showed an increasing trend over the 62 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 period and averaged around 3,400. According to accepted norms, an index above 1,800 denotes a heavily concentrated market. The top three banks account for more than 90 percent of assets, deposits, and loans. There is little room for com- petition and, thus, little opportunity to reap intermediary cost efficiencies. Commercial bank credit jumped from 23.57 percent of GDP in 2001 to 100.84 percent in 2008. But public sector credit seems to crowd out private credit as a result of macroeconomic imbalances as well as narrow capital markets. Com- mercial banking assets almost tripled as a percentage of GDP, growing from 50.92 percent in 2001 to 143.14 percent in 2008. But while banks' asset posi- tion increased, the narrowness of their lending activities, reflected in the heavy concentration in two sectors, needs to be addressed, perhaps in the medium to long term. Payment Systems Development The ratio of notes and coins in circulation to GDP increased gradually over the period, to 9.37 percent in 2008. The narrow money supply increased much faster, from 21.23 percent of GDP in 2001 to 37.75 percent in 2008. Currency in circula- tion is not very high as a share of narrow money. There is no evidence that funds are tied up in currency in circulation; instead, they are tied up in reserves because of the high liquidity requirements for banks. Even so, a modern payment system would improve efficiency in the use of funds and, more important in this case, provide access to financial services. Maldives has a small but functional payment system for both large- and small- value transactions, an end-of-day net settlement system. The MMA operates a manual clearinghouse for the commercial banks. Maldivian authorities are mod- ernizing the payment system through the mobile phone banking project. The project will develop an RTGS system allowing real-time settlement of large-value payments and minimizing settlement risk; an automated clearinghouse system, which is an image-enabled, faster clearing system; a mobile payment system using mobile phones to facilitate branchless banking; and an electronic fund transfer point-of-sale/ATM switch system, a continuously available, real-time, secure system enabling reciprocity and interoperability. This modernization project is expected to make the systems compliant with BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems core principles and assist in efficient utilization of resources. It should also improve financial inclusion by overcoming the challenges of geo- graphic dispersion in Maldives. Savings Mobilization Maldives has not aggressively pursued savings mobilization. The country has a high savings rate but lacks a strong savings culture. A measure of financial deepen- ing is high--the ratio of broad money to GDP increased from 43.04 percent in 2001 to 76.51 percent in 2008--and is reflected in the high per capita income. The real deposit interest rate declined over the period as a result of inflationary pres- sures, from 3.24 percent in 2001 to -0.65 percent in 2008. The available data on gross domestic savings show that they averaged around 47 percent of GDP in 2001­04. The reserve money to total deposits ratio declined over the period to 44.67 percent in 2008, which is still too high. The loan to deposit ratio increased over the period by about 72 percentage points to 133.41 percent in 2008. Unlike The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 63 most countries in the region, Maldives does not have significant remittance income; it averaged less than 0.5 percent of GDP throughout the period. Instead, Maldives has net remittance outflows because of the many expatriates in its labor force. These indicators show that domestic savings are underused. While the finan- cial deepening ratio is high, this can have a negative impact on economic growth when coupled with high liquidity and low credit. The high ratio of reserve money to total deposits indicates low efficiency in financial intermediation between sav- ers and investors. And although bank credit is growing, the lack of real invest- ments or diversified credit opportunities means that the credit is not supporting sustainable growth. Moreover, even though domestic savings rates are high, negative real interest rates and lack of investment opportunities can drive the savings abroad (because Maldives has no exchange restrictions, both residents and nonresidents can freely import and export capital). Other countries in the region offer attractive rates, instruments, and opportunities to encourage foreign investment. The compara- tively low gross capital formation in Maldives is evidence that domestic savings are underutilized. Although foreign income and capital are important, domestic savings should be aggressively pursued. During times of crisis, when foreign income declines and global deleveraging induces capital outflows, domestic savings can sustain economic development. Maldives would therefore benefit from taking steps to create savings and investment opportunities and to improve real interest rates by curbing inflation. Corporate Governance The key legislation governing the financial sector is the Maldives Monetary Authority Act, 1981 (amended in 2007). Regulations for Banks and Financial Institutions, issued under the Maldives Monetary Authority Act of July 1988 (amended January 1, 1998), set out the framework within which all banks and financial institutions in Maldives must operate. Based on the provisions of the Companies Act, 1996 (amended in 1998), and the Maldives Securities Act 2/2006, the CMDA issued a corporate governance code for all listed companies--first for voluntary adoption beginning January 1, 2007, then for mandatory adoption (unless a company is expressly exempted) beginning January 1, 2008. The CMDA code covers the following areas: · Board of directors--effectiveness; composition; nomination and reelection of members; separation of chairman and CEO; role of the board, chairman, and CEO; duties; training; board committees (nominating, remuneration, and audit) · Remuneration--policy, evaluation of board performance, disclosure · Management--constitution, roles and responsibilities, access to information · Internal audit, external auditor, and internal control · Company secretary · Shareholder rights--communications, meetings, voting rights · Disclosure--financial and nonfinancial statements · Voluntary provisions--system to raise concerns, investor and media relation- ships, and disclosure of remuneration for individual board members 64 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 To complement this code, the MMA issued a corporate governance regulation setting additional standards for banks, effective May 2009. This regulation covers the following areas: · Requirements--policies and committees, competent management, conflicts of interest, records, board meetings, board of directors, resident manager, branch visits · Corrective measures--remedial measures and sanctions Because the guidelines were issued very recently, assessing their effectiveness is difficult. But the answers to the survey questionnaire reveal several areas need- ing further attention: government control, voting procedures, minority share- holder rights, and transparency and disclosure principles with an emphasis on accounting and auditing standards (see appendix 4A). The main issue is the gov- ernment control over most outcomes, stemming from state ownership in almost all listed companies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that companies are amending their articles to circumvent this control. The recently created local accounting body needs to be strengthened and compliance with international standards pursued. However, some standards may not be applicable in Maldives given its level of development, and some may need revisions to address country-specific issues. Streamlining accounting and auditing standards is very important. Also important is to ensure compliance with guidelines and standards. Thus training should be provided for the examiners as well as the users. The survey responses show that ownership structure is clearly defined. Public companies are required to keep a registry of shareholders who directly or indi- rectly control more than 5 percent of shares (substantial shareholders), but there is no special requirement to disclose government ownership and its special privi- leges. The government controls the remuneration and nomination of the board. It is unclear whether external stakeholders such as labor unions and banking and securities regulators can influence the nomination and remuneration process for the board of directors. And there is no evidence that the preemption rights of minority shareholders are firmly protected. The Maldives Securities Act obligates any person acquiring more than 5 percent of the shares in a public company to send notice of that fact within 14 days to the company, the CMDA, and the stock exchange. A registry of such holdings is to be maintained. This registry is accessible to shareholders, and because the information is disclosed to the stock exchange, it is accessible to the market. Breach of these disclosure requirements can lead to fines or imprisonment, although how strictly these penalties are enforced is not known. There are established procedures for shareholder meetings, though vot- ing procedures need to be clearly defined. It is unclear whether banks provide detailed agendas and explanatory circulars along with notice of meetings. Vot- ing procedures--such as ability to vote by proxy, third-party verification, and shareholder voting rights--are determined by banks' articles. Moreover, it is unclear whether banks are required to disclose special voting rights and caps on voting rights. Since all listed companies are state-owned enterprises, the gov- ernment exerts considerable control over appointment and dismissal of board members. While some companies have defined dividend rules, a provision has been included in the listing rules to circumvent problems arising because of a company's lack of written dividend policies. There are no structural takeover The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 65 defenses that would prevent a legitimate takeover bid. Nor are there guidelines to ensure minority shareholders' right to appoint directors; this depends on individual banks' rules. Transparency and disclosure is an area needing special attention and develop- ment. While the CMDA requires companies to follow internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards, there is no evidence that this is happening. The frequency of reporting and the availability of financial statements to the pub- lic are unclear, although the CMDA is trying to ensure quarterly reporting. No information is available to discern whether external auditors are allowed to per- form nonaudit functions. The CMDA code and MMA regulation include guide- lines on audit committees and external and internal auditors, but it is unclear whether banks follow any of these rules. A local accounting body, the Certified Practicing Accountants of Maldives, or CPA Maldives, was formed in 2007 to develop a system of regulation governing the accountancy practice in Maldives.8 It is hoped that this step will help lead to greater transparency and disclosure and ensure compliance. Boards have a unitary structure with 7­10 members, depending on the size of the company. Qualifications, roles, and responsibilities for board members are defined. The CMDA code requires that training be made available to directors. Under the CMDA code, board remuneration is to be determined on the basis of a remuneration policy disclosed in the annual report. What role shareholders can play in determining board remuneration is not specified. Board remunera- tion can be tied to performance if the bank's remuneration policy allows this. If performance-based compensation mechanisms are in place, they should be monitored carefully. Whether directors' compensation is disclosed on an aggre- gate basis in the audited financial statements is unclear. No information is avail- able to determine whether banks follow any of these rules on determining board remuneration. Nepal Nepal has the fourth largest area (147,200 square kilometers) in South Asia and the fifth largest population (27.6 million) and GDP (US$12.3 billion), according to 2008 data. With a GNI per capita of US$400 in 2008, the lowest reported in the region for that year, Nepal is classified as a low-income country. Nepal has been relatively insulated from the global economic slowdown. And the peace accord signed between the Maoists and the other political parties in 2007, after a decade-long civil insurgency, has raised hopes that higher economic growth would be possible. The 5.35 percent GDP growth recorded in 2008 was the highest in the eight-year period studied--almost 2.6 percentage points higher than in 2007--thanks to a good crop season aided by a better monsoon as well as to higher tourism arrivals and stronger remittance income. In 2009, with industrial growth slowing as a result of uncertainties and labor unrest, GDP growth fell to an estimated 3.8 percent, and the projection for 2010 is a moderate 4 percent. Strong remittance inflows helped maintain the high consumption demand and thus growth momentum over the period. Inflation in Nepal, influenced by price levels in India because of the currency peg, rose from 6.4 percent in 2007 to around 7.7 percent in 2008. In 2009, the rate rose further, to an estimated 12.8 percent, as a result of higher food and fuel 66 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 prices, price hikes in India, and a wage hike in the public sector. The central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), has expressed an intention to follow a tight monetary policy; but because of the accommodative stance taken, money growth reached nearly 30 percent in 2008 and 2009. NRB reintroduced the statutory liquidity ratio to curb inflation and also uses the cash reserve ratio to manage the money supply for bank lending, but these turned out to be ineffective in the absence of a tighter monetary policy. In 2007, higher remittances increased import demand and led to a trade account deficit but kept the overall current account in balance or in surplus. Helped by the growth in remittances, the current account had a surplus of 2.9 percent of GDP in 2008 and an estimated 3 percent in 2009. Prudent fiscal management has kept the fiscal gap at a sustainable level over the years. The budget deficit was 1.61 percent of GDP in 2008, rose to an esti- mated 1.8 percent in 2009, and is projected to be around 2 percent in 2010. The NRB statute limits lending to the government through ways and means accounts or temporary overdraft accounts. There is a penalty on government borrowings above the limit. This may be a useful macroprudential indicator for fiscal disci- pline for other countries in the region. The high volume of remittances has raised the standard of living of recipients. But the growing dependence on remittances increases economic vulnerability to a prolonged global slowdown. Remittances have also raised the demand for real estate and helped create a real estate bubble. NRB is rightfully concerned about a possible bursting of this bubble, which could create a severe liquidity crisis, and has cautioned banks about the adverse consequences of funding the real estate bubble. Further regulatory action and a tighter monetary policy stance are prob- ably needed to manage the situation toward a soft landing (NRB has recently directed banks to gradually reduce their real estate exposure; see the section on financial stability). Nepal's banking sector in 2008 consisted of 28 commercial banks: 3 public sec- tor banks, 21 private sector banks, and 4 joint venture banks (generally referred to in this report as foreign banks). As in other countries in the region, banks domi- nate the financial sector; commercial banking assets amounted to 69.05 percent of GDP in 2008. The financial sector in 2008 also included 58 development banks, 78 finance companies, 12 microcredit development companies, 16 savings and credit cooperatives, 46 nongovernmental organizations, 117 government postal savings banks, and 16 insurance companies. In addition, there are 7,240 coopera- tives licensed by the Nepalese government to conduct business as financial insti- tutions. The capital market remains at an early stage of development in Nepal. NRB regulates and supervises all financial institutions except government postal banks, cooperatives, and insurance companies. The government regulates the postal banks and cooperatives, the Insurance Regulatory Authority of Nepal (Bheema Samithi) regulates the insurance companies, and the Securities Board of Nepal (SEBON) regulates the capital market. Nepal established a credit information bureau in 1989 under the Nepal Bank- ers Association, an important step toward ensuring credit quality. Efforts to improve the bureau's performance are ongoing with the assistance of the IFC. The country does not have a deposit insurance program, which is a concern given the large number of financial institutions and the importance of the banking sector in development activities. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 67 Nepal's banking sector, with little exposure to foreign banks, is expected to emerge unscathed from the global financial crisis. Both the banking sector and the financial sector are expanding rapidly. But this expansion has not brought greater financial access to rural areas and some regions. Restructuring of ailing public sector banks has made these banks profitable for the first time in recent years. More remains to be done, however, with enormous negative net worth raising questions about sustainability and the public sector banks continuing to affect the performance of the entire sector because of their size. NRB is expected to decide on a future course of action. The banking sector's performance levels were nevertheless high (figure 3.6), though higher interest spreads denote greater risk taking. Rapid entry of new banks has increased competition and led to aggressive deposit solicitation and risky lending practices. Fueled by remittance income, banks continue to funnel money into real estate ventures, creating a real estate bubble. Excessive exposure to real estate and rising asset prices are a major concern, especially since most banks lack a substantial capital cushion. In the absence of a developed capital market, a stable banking sector is critical to sustainable economic growth. The payment system needs to be further developed. Automation and legal and regulatory improvements would bring both stability and efficiency to the system. Nepal lacks a strong savings culture, probably because of a lack of financial facilities. While the steady stream of remittance income has helped bridge the savings-investment gap, better savings habits would help overcome an overreliance on external funds for development. The corporate governance Figure 3.6 Nepalese Banks Improve Performance with Lower Operating Costs 20 350 300 15 250 costs (percent) 10 200 percent 150 5 100 0 50 ­5 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 staff cost ratio operating cost ratio worker remittances to GDP return on assets net interest margin Source: Appendix table A2.14. 68 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 of banks deserves immediate attention, especially given the intense competition and greater risk taking being observed in the market. There is a need to improve governance standards, ensure compliance through effective enforcement, and encourage banks to undertake more meaningful implementation of the corpo- rate governance regulations. NRB has made efforts to address many of the issues highlighted here and to advise the banking sector over the years. The restructuring of public sector banks, an ongoing effort that has helped ease the pressure on the entire banking sec- tor, is among its successful interventions. Other ongoing efforts include moving toward the adoption of Basel II, introducing a comprehensive corporate gover- nance code for banks, and developing the payment system. But NRB has a serious capacity issue, especially given the many new entrants to the banking and finan- cial sector. It needs both human resources and expertise to improve supervision and address new issues that arise with globalization and financial innovation. Building up its capacity would help NRB address banking sector challenges as well as ensure sustainable economic growth. Access to Finance Access indicators show no significant improvement in the provision of bank facilities over the period studied. The number of bank branches averaged around two per 100,000 people and barely three per 1,000 square kilometers over the eight years, while the number of ATMs in both cases averaged less than one. Thus, only about 0.002 percent of the population has access to a bank branch and only 0.001 percent to an ATM. Usage ratios were also low: deposit accounts aver- aged 111 per 1,000 people over the period, while loan accounts averaged 17 per 1,000. In 2008 deposit accounts were lower, at 107 per 1,000 people, while loan accounts increased to 25 per 1,000. According to these measures, use of commer- cial bank facilities is limited to less than 11 percent of the population for deposits and only around 2.5 percent for loans. This situation warrants immediate attention. The number of commercial banks grew over the period--from 13 at the beginning of 2001 to 28 by the end of 2008--while commercial banking assets more than doubled, from US$3.3 bil- lion to US$7.4 billion, or nearly 70 percent of GDP. But this financial deepening and widening has not happened in an equitable way. Banks have favored the developed central region and cities over the less developed regions in setting up their operations. More than 47 percent of the 555 commercial bank branches in operation in 2008 were located in the central region--and nearly 22 percent (120 branches) in the city of Kathmandu (NRB, Annual Bank Supervision Report, 2008). While countless studies have shown a positive correlation between finan- cial depth and economic development, access to finance is also an important concept in social inclusion. Beyond commercial banks, other financial institutions (not included in this study) also provide financial access in Nepal--including savings and credit coop- eratives, nongovernmental organizations, rural development banks, and micro- credit development banks. Collectively, these financial institutions held around 2.8 percent of the total assets in the entire financial system, about US$256.8 million, in 2008. Their loans granted amounted to around 2.5 percent of total loans (US$127.1 million), and their deposits to around 0.9 percent of total deposits (US$59.5 million). These institutions serve only a fraction of the market The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 69 compared with commercial banks, which hold around 80.2 percent of total assets, 78.3 percent of total loans, and 83.7 percent of total deposits. Thus, commercial banks should lead the way in designing strategies to ensure financial inclusion. Performance and Efficiency Nepal's banking sector still suffers from the poor performance of two of the pub- lic sector banks as well as massive nonperforming loan losses by the private sector banks that eroded the capital base. The two public sector banks were incurring huge losses that affected the entire industry. After a massive restructuring, these banks have managed to stay profitable since 2004. The consolidated return on equity turned positive in 2008 for the first time in eight years, shooting up to an unrealistic 503.55 percent. The reason for this unusually large ratio is that the negative equity position turned positive during 2008, making the average equity for the year much smaller. In 2007, the return on equity had been -78.70 percent. The return on assets turned positive in 2004 and rose steadily, reaching 2.77 percent in 2008. A rising net interest margin and falling operating costs have contributed to the profitability of Nepalese banks. The net interest margin almost doubled over the period, to 3.13 percent in 2008. Interest income accounted for around 69 percent of revenue earned in 2008. Recurring earning power dropped to -0.01 percent in 2003, then recovered steadily to 2.34 percent in 2008. The interest rate spreads of the public sector banks--which were high in 2004 and 2005, denoting higher risk taking--have since declined. The sector's operating costs declined steadily over the eight-year period, while staff costs dropped until 2006, then increased slightly. Staff costs increased substantially in 2009 as a result of a doubling of pub- lic sector wages. In 2008, operating costs amounted to 21.56 percent of income, while staff costs amounted to 172.89 percent of operating costs. Nepal had the best operating cost ratio in the region in 2004­08. While the restructuring of the two public sector banks has produced positive results, the work is not yet done. The hard-earned gains need to be maintained if the banking industry is to stabilize in the future. The third public sector bank also suffers from huge cost inefficiencies and is also undergoing restructuring. Once this restructuring process is complete, the next course of action for the three banks should be undertaken without undue delay. Financial Stability The banking sector's consolidated capital adequacy ratio remained below the regu- latory capital requirement of 10 percent throughout the eight-year period studied.9 The continued losses and huge negative net worth of the public sector banks and the erosion of reserves due to the heavy nonperforming loans in the private sector banks continued to affect capital. But thanks to restructuring of public sector banks and growth in the capital base of private sector banks, the capital adequacy ratio turned positive in 2008, at 4.04 percent, for the first time since 2001. The capital base of the public sector banks remains negative because of their huge negative net worth. But the situation is improving. To rid the public sec- tor banks of their toxic reserves, the next step after restructuring will need to be determined soon--whether to recapitalize the banks through privatization or to liquidate the banks to get rid of the negative capital base and restructure them. Either alternative would need the approval of NRB as the regulator. 70 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 In 2008, two public sector banks and one private sector bank posted nega- tive capital adequacy ratios due to negative capital funds, while one private bank posted a ratio below the regulatory requirement. All 4 foreign banks, the other 2 public banks, and the other 18 private banks had capital adequacy ratios above the minimum requirement--but 10 of these banks had ratios very close to the minimum requirement. In addition, while banks were scheduled to adopt the local model of the "Basel II minus" approach, developed in line with the more complex Basel II approach, by the 2008/09 financial year, banks were reporting capital adequacy ratios under Basel I guidelines for 2008 and no capital charges were therefore made for market and operational risk. The volatility of capital positions combined with the absence of additional capital charges could undermine the stability of these banks because of the procyclical behavior of the banking system.10 So it is important to examine the viability of these institutions in adverse economic situations through sensitivity analysis and stress testing. In addition, the possibility of mergers and consolidations to improve stability should be considered. Because of the negative capital, the leverage ratio turned negative in 2004, returning to a positive level in 2008 at 0.02. The gross nonperforming loans ratio fell by about 79 percent between 2001 and 2008 to 6.08 percent. Aggres- sive recovery and write-down procedures that developed with the restructur- ing process, more efficient supervision, and regulatory changes were among the reasons for this. Greater credit expansion, soaring values of land used as col- lateral, and loan restructuring also played a major part. But recovery of loans continues to be an issue in Nepal because of archaic mortgage and property laws and lack of special debt recovery provisions and commercial courts. While a reduction in nonperforming loans is a positive sign, the decreasing provision for such loans is a concern. Provision cover dropped from 30.59 percent in 2001 to 8.16 percent in 2008, in part because of higher collateral values. Liquidity ratios dropped over the period, though they have been on the rise since 2007 because of large remittance flows. The liquid assets ratio dropped by nearly half between 2001 and 2008, to 11.80 percent. The liquid assets to liabilities ratio followed a similar pattern. The main concerns for the stability of the banking sector are the unresolved capital volatility, the excessive exposure to real estate lending, and rising asset prices. Fueled by the steady stream of remittances and the resulting liquidity, the real estate market has soared. Given the higher interest rate spreads, banks have competed aggressively for real estate lending. This is believed to have created a bubble situation. If remittance inflows slow, real estate prices could plummet, and the ensuing liquidity crisis combined with banks' overexposure to the bubble could throw the system into disarray. Recognizing this, NRB has cautioned banks about overexposure to the real estate bubble and also has taken monetary policy measures to contain the liquidity in the market. More recently, NRB directed banks to reduce their real estate exposure to 40 percent by July 2010, 30 percent by July 2011, and 25 percent by July 2012. Implementing risk-based supervi- sion is also part of the solution, but NRB is hampered by constraints in human resources as well as expertise. NRB has temporarily contained the surge of new entrants by not issuing new banking licenses. More comprehensive measures may be needed to take control of the situation. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 71 Capital Market Development Nepal's capital market is still at an early stage of development. The country has one stock exchange, the Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE). The exchange has 23 member brokers who operate on the trading floor in accordance with the Securities Exchange Act, 2006, as well as rules and bylaws of the exchange. In addition, there are 17 merchant banks that work as issue managers, portfolio managers, underwriters, and share registrars. The NEPSE trading system (the NEPSE Automated Trading System, or NATS) is a fully automated, screen-based trading system with T+3 settlement, introduced in August 2007. Settlements are done on a paper-versus-payment basis, as there is no central depository system. Shares (equity and preference), debentures, government bonds, and mutual funds are traded through the stock exchange.11 The financial institutions domi- nate the stock market with limited involvement by the real sector. There are only a few institutional investors and few participants. The bond market in Nepal consists of a government securities market and a corporate securities market. To meet financing needs, the government issues short-term treasury bills and national savings certificates. The lack of a bench- mark yield curve in the government bond market hampers risk management efforts by investors and thus may discourage new entrants. But the treasury bill market operates relatively efficiently. The corporate bond market is limited to a few private placements. There is no active secondary market or benchmark yield curves and, thus, no market pricing of corporate bonds. The Nepalese institutional investor base is too narrow to support an active bond market. But the secondary market is not yet open to nonresident Nep- alese or foreign institutional investors. Attracting foreign investors will require such actions as undertaking legal and regulatory reforms, developing market infrastructure (a central depository system, scripless systems, credit and research information, securities rating), developing accounting and auditing standards and uniform reporting standards, and enhancing corporate governance. Also important is to strengthen SEBON so that foreign investors have confidence in the regulator overseeing the capital market. As part of the strengthening process, SEBON would benefit from greater operational autonomy to conduct its affairs and attract professionals to its workforce, improving efficiency. A review of capital market development indicators over the eight-year period reveals that the equity market is developing faster than the bond market. While the domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP ratio declined slightly, stock mar- ket capitalization more than doubled to 28.12 percent of GDP in 2008. But the stock market remains narrow and inefficient. The top 10 stocks accounted for nearly 92.5 percent of the total trading value in 2008. The stock market turnover ratio averaged only around 0.05 over the period, indicating relative inefficiency. Market liquidity improved over the period, with the stock trading value increasing from 0.59 percent of GDP in 2001 to 1.68 percent in 2008. The large remittance inflows have driven the demand for stocks and thus the stock market activity. But the high level of liquidity in the market, focused on a limited set of securities, may warrant painful readjustments in the future if not monitored carefully. It is important that capital market development be actively pursued. Because of the lack of a developed capital market to meet long-term funding needs, banks continue to dominate the financial market, and maturity mismatches will 72 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 therefore continue. Developing a stable capital market would improve efficiency in the banking sector by increasing competition, thus contributing to the bank- ing system's stability in the long run. Market Concentration and Competitiveness Nepal's banking sector is not concentrated. With the influx of new entrants, all concentration ratios declined rapidly over the eight-year period. The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index dropped to 712.01 in 2008 (according to accepted international norms, index values less than 1,000 indicate an unconcentrated industry). All of the three-bank concentration ratios also declined, and in 2008 the top three banks held no more than 35.26 percent of assets, 30.98 percent of deposits, and 26.22 percent of loans. Private credit extended by banks remained stable over the period at around 28 percent of GDP (26.44 percent in 2008). Commercial bank- ing assets also remained stable, averaging around 68 percent of GDP over the eight years. Nepal's financial sector had a significant number of new market entrants in the eight-year period. The number of commercial banks rose from 13 in 2001 to 28 in 2008, while the total number of financial sector institutions increased from 98 to 238.12 Commercial banks hold more than 80 percent of total finan- cial assets. And while total banking assets grew by nearly 28 percent in 2008, the assets of private commercial banks increased by almost 41 percent. The big increase in the number of players in the market raises concerns. Most new banks compete aggressively for deposits and engage in high-risk lending activities, as evidenced by the rapid expansion in the real estate sector. While the loan to deposit ratio in the banking sector as a whole was around 82.6 percent in 2008, the ratio for the seven new banks that started operations in 2007­08 was around 88.8 percent. Even though the banks compete aggressively, their low capital levels may cause problems. Overreliance on short-term deposits, which are likely to depend on remittances, could pose problems for the stability of the banking system. NRB is trying to control this situation, including through the stopgap measure of temporarily halting the issuance of new banking licenses. Over the medium to long term, other actions will need to be taken, including revising regulations, enhancing supervision capacity, introducing risk-based cap- ital requirements, and improving credit rating and credit information systems. Payment Systems Development Cash is the dominant payment instrument in Nepal. Notes and coins in circula- tion averaged around 12.5 percent of GDP throughout the period. The narrow money supply increased from 15.99 percent of GDP in 2001 to 18.80 percent in 2008. As would be expected, currency in circulation as a share of narrow money was high, averaging around 65 percent. Nepal has one retail payment system for both large- and small-value transac- tions, an end-of-day net settlement manual clearing system. In addition, Nepal has more than 10 check clearinghouses managed by NRB, located at regional and district levels. These clearinghouses clear and settle transactions relating to paper-based instruments such as checks, drafts, and payment orders. Manual settlement times are usually T+3, but regional clearing done on a collection basis can take 7­15 days. Moreover, since NRB is not electronically connected, each The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 73 regional clearinghouse needs additional time to clear checks. In addition, banks have to maintain different regional accounts in each center, creating possible unwinding risk as well as inefficiencies. Automated clearing facilities are not available in Nepal. Nor is there an RTGS system. But NRB is discussing the possibility of formulating a payment system master plan that will include an RTGS system. Payment systems development also involves such aspects as payment instruments, securities settlement, infra- structure, legal and regulatory issues, and awareness building. Savings Mobilization The broad money supply to GDP ratio was high throughout the period and around 60.35 percent in 2008, indicating adequate liquidity in the market. The real deposit rate turned negative in 2003 as a result of inflation and continued on a negative trend, registering -3.50 percent in 2008. The reserve money to total deposits ratio was fairly high at around 34.30 in 2008, denoting relative ineffi- ciency in financial intermediation. Nepal's loan to deposit ratio was also high, averaging around 81 percent of GDP over the eight-year period. Nepal's domestic savings rate has been the second lowest in South Asia after Afghanistan's. In 2008, gross domestic savings were around 11.5 percent of GDP. The high intermediary ratios and negative interest rates do not provide incentives for the public to save.13 While low domestic savings can hamper growth, high remittances have helped overcome the savings-investment gap in Nepal. Worker remittances amounted to 17.38 percent of GDP in 2008 and were expected to be higher in 2009. Because of the large remittance inflows, the banking sector remained liquid throughout the period. Recognizing the importance of this, the RBI and NRB established the India-Nepal Remittance Corridor in 2008 to speed remittance inflows to Nepal. As long as remittance income keeps grow- ing, savings will not be an issue for Nepal. Even so, it is important to develop a domestic savings base to avoid overreliance on foreign capital or income. When remittance-originating countries suffer prolonged economic slowdowns, as per- haps in the present situation, there is no guarantee that remittance inflows will continue unabated. Corporate Governance Financial institutions in Nepal are governed by a legislative framework provided by the Nepal Rastra Bank Act 2058 (2002), Bank and Financial Institution Act 2063 (2006), Company Act 2063 (2006), and Supervision Bylaws 2059 (2002). Directives are issued under the legislative framework to ensure compliance. The Securities Act 2063 (2007) also provides necessary guidelines for companies. Recognizing the importance of corporate governance, NRB issued guidelines, effective from June 2005, as part of the unified directives relating to banks and financial institutions. Important areas covered include the following: · Code of ethics for directors · Duties and responsibilities of board of directors · Appointment of the chief executive · Code of ethics for employees · Audit committee 74 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · Prohibition on extending credit to directors, shareholders, or employees or to firms related to directors, promoters, or shareholders · Prohibition on extending credit against assets of directors or family members as collateral NRB assesses the corporate governance systems of banks as part of its on-site supervision. This supervision in past years identified serious lapses in corpo- rate governance that contributed to the deterioration of public sector banks and some private sector ones. Weak corporate governance in some private sector banks is a growing concern because of the intense competition and high-risk activity observed. Moreover, NRB's resource constraints along with the large number of financial institutions hamper its efforts to ensure compliance. Thus, corporate governance in Nepal's banking sector appears to need imme- diate attention. Governance standards need to be improved and a comprehensive governance code developed for banks, with compliance ensured through effective enforcement. Banks need to be encouraged to undertake meaningful implemen- tation of the code, making corporate governance part of their culture. Adop- tion of the Basel II accord would be an important step toward a better corporate governance framework. To ensure the soundness of the banking industry, NRB and the banks should continue to work toward achieving a transparent, effective corporate governance system. Important areas needing greater attention include broadening investor rights, increasing disclosure, improving adherence to inter- national accounting and auditing standards, and strengthening the effectiveness of boards. Responses to the corporate governance survey remain unchanged since 2005 (see appendix 4A). Analysis of the responses suggests a need for greater transpar- ency and disclosure of share ownership and beneficial ownership and for legal provisions establishing the rights of external stakeholders and minority share- holders. The regulatory guidelines contain no provisions on the disclosure of ownership. Although the central bank requires disclosure of shareholdings above 0.5 percent, this requirement is seldom enforced. Thus, in practice the public has no access to such information. There are no provisions establishing the rights of external stakeholders, such as whistleblower rules. Nor are there rules or regula- tions protecting the preemption rights of minority shareholders or legal provi- sions governing the disclosure of beneficial ownership. Clear provisions and guidelines establishing shareholders' rights, including their right to attend and vote at shareholder meetings, need to be formalized. Also important is to examine the practices of shareholders to see whether they in fact exercise their rights. Information is disclosed to shareholders in a timely fashion before shareholder meetings; shareholders can vote in absentia, by proxy or by post; and third-party verification of voting is permitted. But sharehold- ers are unable to vote on a range of issues, including related-party transactions. Banks are required to disclose special voting rights and caps on voting rights in their memorandum of association and articles of association. Shareholders can vote on appointments to the board of directors, though the board itself appoints some members. For the government-controlled banks, the government can appoint directors. No clear dividend policy is in place; instead, the policy is set by the board and approved at the annual general meeting. There are no specific structural defenses that can prevent a takeover bid other than the The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 75 legal requirement for regulatory approval of any transfer of promoters' shares. Nor is there any specific provision to ensure that minority shareholders can elect directors. Banks' financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted local accounting principles. Other studies have found that accounting and audit- ing standards are still being issued and do not yet fully conform to International Accounting Standards (see World Bank 2005a). Still, to the extent that NRB has issued guidelines, it is safe to conclude that banks are meeting the reporting stan- dards to a certain extent. Financial reporting is done quarterly, and banks are required to disclose audit fees paid to external auditors. Nepal's auditing standards appear to be at the development stage, according to other reports (see World Bank 2005a). It is advisable that NRB issue detailed guidelines on the appointment of both external and internal auditors. The cen- tral bank has issued guidelines on the appointment of audit committees as well as on their primary roles and responsibilities. But it is unclear whether the audit committees have control over the selection process for external auditors. More- over, the guidelines do not cover the frequency of their meetings and other per- tinent details. They do, however, prohibit external auditors from performing other, nonaudit services for the banks they audit. External auditors are appointed with the approval of the annual general meeting. Central bank guidelines require that the internal auditor be appointed by management and report to the audit committee. NRB has issued detailed guidelines on the structure of boards and on the directors' roles and responsibilities. These guidelines appear to be adequate as long as they are strictly enforced. Banks in Nepal follow a hybrid structure, with boards having five to nine members on average. The guidelines do not specify detailed requirements for directors' qualifications and experience, though they do outline such requirements for the CEO. Directors are not required to attend any special training on their fiduciary duties and responsibilities, pointing to a need for developing a systematic training program. Shareholders can vote on the remuneration of directors. Compensation of directors can be linked to perfor- mance and must be disclosed in detail. Where performance-based mechanisms are in place, NRB should review them carefully. NRB has continued to review and improve the legal and regulatory frame- work for the financial sector. Recent additions include the Bank and Financial Institution Act (2006); Insolvency Act (2006); Secured Transaction Act (2006); Company Act (2006); Asset (Money) Laundering Prevention Act, 2008; and Bank and Financial Institutions' Prompt Corrective Action Bylaws, 2008. Deposit and credit guarantee acts are to follow. As regulators, NRB and SEBON need to coor- dinate to ensure the compliance that is key to good corporate governance. Boards of directors should ensure that their bank adopts a corporate governance culture in its day-to-day operations. And boards should have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance so that they can ensure that their bank's poli- cies and practices are consistent with the corporate governance culture. Pakistan Pakistan's macroeconomic environment is affected by a volatile security situa- tion as well as external balance uncertainties resulting from the global economic 76 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 slowdown. The deteriorating security and political situation has affected every economic sector. Despite massive external aid, the real sector failed to pick up in 2008/09. The global economic slowdown has added to the uncertainties by cast- ing doubts on the continuation of remittance flows, exports, and foreign invest- ment. While the overall economic situation remains volatile, stabilization efforts have shown positive results. Pakistan has the third largest population (161 million) and the second larg- est area (796,100 square kilometers) and GDP (US$164.6 billion) in South Asia, according to 2008 data. With a GNI per capita of US$980 in 2008, Pakistan is classified as a lower-middle-income country along with Bhutan, India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. The country's economic slowdown began in 2008, when GDP growth declined to 5.95 percent, down from 6.8 percent in 2007. In 2009, the rate dropped to an estimated 2 percent. Sectors such as exports and manufactur- ing contracted, resulting in an overall slowdown. Moderate gains are expected in 2010, with growth projected at 3 percent, thanks largely to fiscal stimulus spend- ing in the form of a planned public expenditure program, favorable agricultural output, and modest growth in industry and services. The surge in world prices of food and oil pushed inflation to double dig- its--to 12.0 percent in 2008 and an estimated 20.8 percent in 2009. Even when oil prices and demand dropped, food price inflation appears to have kept the consumer price index at a high level. In 2010, inflation is projected at around 10 percent, but Pakistan will be vulnerable to reemerging upward pressure on oil and commodity prices. The current account remained in deficit throughout the period, increasing to 8.4 percent in 2008. Although exports contracted in 2009, a sharp reduction in imports and a steady stream of remittances helped limit the current account deficit to an estimated 5.3 percent. This trend is expected to continue in 2010, with the deficit projected at 4.8 percent. As a result of the global and domestic uncertainties, foreign investment rapidly declined. Interna- tional reserves fell, and by the end of 2008 Pakistan's import cover had dropped to three months. This position reversed in 2009 with disbursements from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).14 The fiscal deficit increased over the period, with lower-than-projected tax col- lections leading to a drop in revenue. The deficit rose from 4.35 percent of GDP in 2007 to 7.56 percent in 2008. Concerns about revenue collection prompted the authorities to cut fiscal spending to reduce the budget deficit. But the global economic slowdown and the resulting expansion in the fiscal spending program will initially push the deficit higher. Pakistan's banking system consisted of 36 commercial banks in 2008: 4 public sector banks, 25 local private banks (generally referred to in the report as private sector banks), and 7 foreign banks. In addition, four specialized banks and two microfinance banks also operate. The private sector banks dominate the banking sector--and banks dominate the financial sector. In 2008, commercial banking assets amounted to around 72.1 percent of total financial assets, or around 51.38 percent of GDP. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is the banking regulator. Pakistan's commercial banks have managed to weather the global financial crisis without much impact. But the economic slowdown that followed the onset of the crisis has affected bank performance (figure 3.7). Analysis shows that while the overall performance of banks is stable, several areas need attention. Rural areas remain underserved by banks, although nonbank institutions have The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 77 Figure 3.7 Pakistan's Banks See Volatility Return 5.0 100 4.5 90 4.0 80 3.5 70 returns (percent) costs (percent) 3.0 60 2.5 50 2.0 40 1.5 30 1.0 20 0.5 10 0 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 operating cost ratio staff cost ratio net interest margin recurring earning power return on assets return on equity Source: Appendix table A2.15. undertaken schemes to address this. A related issue is the lack of focus on savings mobilization. Even with steady remittance flows, Pakistan has not tapped the full potential of domestic savings as a means to finance investment. While bank performance levels have been high, this could change if the economic downturn continues, as seen in the volatility of returns in 2007­08. Nonperforming loans will rise as the economic slowdown affects the corporate sector as well as small and medium-size enterprises. High nonperforming loans and greater provision- ing and write-offs would erode banks' capital cushion. Capital adequacy levels are strong thanks to the proactive regulatory guidelines and better-than-average returns, and implementation of Basel II could further improve financial stability. But the liquidity situation needs to be monitored. Development of the capital market slowed after the stock market crash in 2008. The stock market is showing signs of recovery. But capital market development should nevertheless be a priority because limited options for long-term financing will affect economic development. Another area needing renewed focus is corpo- rate governance. The guidelines for corporate governance of banks appear to be comprehensive. But compliance and enforcement need further review. The SBP has developed a 10-year strategic plan for financial sector develop- ment. The plan addresses such issues as savings mobilization and poor access to banking facilities in underserved areas. It also addresses the need to establish a deposit protection scheme. According to the strategy paper, although the govern- ment protects all bank deposits under the Banks (Nationalization) Act of 1974, it cannot continue to do so because private sector banks now dominate the bank- ing sector (SBP 2009b). The SBP has submitted a draft act to establish a deposit protection scheme to the Cabinet for consideration and is ready to launch the scheme subject to necessary legislation. 78 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Pakistan established a credit information bureau in 1992, an important step in managing credit risk. In 2003, the bureau began offering credit information online, the first in the region to do so. Further development of the credit infor- mation bureau is planned under the SBP's 10-year strategy. Access to Finance Access to financial services through commercial banks remains low in Pakistan. Demographic branch penetration changed little over the eight-year period and was still around five branches per 100,000 people in 2008. The performance on geographic branch penetration was similar, with 11 branches per 1,000 square kilometers in 2008. For ATMs, however, both demographic and geographic pen- etration increased, to two ATMs per 100,000 people and four ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers. The use of services as measured by deposit accounts actually dropped, from 196 accounts per 1,000 people in 2001 to around 155 in 2008, though loan accounts increased from 16 per 1,000 people to 31. Overall, both access and usage indicators remain far from satisfactory. More- over, the distribution of branches between urban and rural areas is dispropor- tionate. Urban areas have around two-thirds of the branches, though rural areas have two-thirds of the population. To promote the opening of branches in rural areas, the SBP introduced the Annual Branch Licensing Policy, which requires commercial banks with 100 or more branches to open at least 20 percent of their branches in rural underserved areas. Nonbank institutions (not covered by this study) also provide financial facilities to the public. Pakistan Post provides savings and remittance services through its network of 13,419 branches, managing more than 3.6 million savings accounts and selling savings certificates. Because of its extensive branch network, some microfinance institutions have collaborated with Pakistan Post to provide financial services to the underserved. In addition, financial institutions have been permitted to collaborate with telecommunications companies in providing financial services as a way to improve access. Pakistan's microfinance movement is growing. In 2001, Pakistan passed the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance to outline a regulatory framework for microfinance through commercial banks and established microfinance banks under the purview of the SBP. Pakistan was the first country in South Asia to introduce a special law for microfinance. In addition, the SBP has issued separate prudential regulations for microfinance banks. The National Microfinance Growth Strategy aims to increase the number of active microfinance borrowers to 3 million by 2010 and to 10 million by 2015. By December 2008, the number of borrowers had grown to 1.7 million (Pakistan Microfinance Network 2009). Islamic banking is growing fast in Pakistan and plays an important part in financial inclusion. By December 2008, there were 6 Islamic banks operating 384 branches and 12 conventional banks (with 130 branches) offering Islamic bank- ing (table 3.2). Performance and Efficiency Pakistan's banks saw an upward trend in performance indicators until 2006. In 2007 and 2008, however, return ratios declined and cost ratios rose (see figure 3.7). The return on assets dropped from 3.20 percent in 2006 to 2.05 percent in 2008, while the return on equity dropped from 34.90 percent to 19.30 percent. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 79 Table 3.2 Selected Indicators on Islamic Banking in Pakistan, December 2008 Indicator Value Total assets In PRs billions 276 In US$ billions 3.3 As % of total for banking industry 4.9 Total deposits In PRs billions 202 In US$ billions 2.4 As % of total for banking industry 4.8 Financing and investment In PRs billions 187 In US$ billions 2.3 As % of total for banking industry 4.4 Institutions Islamic banks 6 Conventional banks with Islamic banking divisions 12 Branches 514 Performance and stability indicators Return on (average) equity (%) 5.31 Return on (average) assets (%) 0.69 Nonperforming financing to total financing (%) 2.3 Provisions to nonperforming financing (%) 67.6 Source: SBP 2009a. Note: Data are provisional. A similar pattern occurred for the net interest margin (3.26 percent at the end of 2008) and recurring earning power (2.49 percent). While all return ratios declined, the operating cost ratio rose from 55.66 percent in 2006 to 66.82 per- cent in 2008. These trends were expected to continue in 2009. While the trends are negative, the performance indicators remain strong. Because of the low cost of funds, the net interest margin is still high. As noted, private sector banks dominate Pakistan's banking sector, and the large banks have performed better than the industry average. If the economic downturn con- tinues, however, the banking sector could be affected. In addition, some banks, with regulatory consent, deferred until 2009 writing off part of the equity losses suffered when the stock market crashed in 2008. These losses further reduced returns in 2009. Even so, the high interest margins have enabled banks to weather the fluctuations. Banks should monitor their rising operating costs and take appropriate corrective action to mitigate the impact. With the volatile economic situation, it is important for banks to keep costs low and improve their margins. Financial Stability Even with performance indicators declining, Pakistan's banking sector managed to keep the capital adequacy ratio above the 8 percent statutory minimum capital requirement. The capital adequacy ratio was 13.80 percent in 2007, the highest in 80 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 the period, then fell to 12.20 percent in 2008. One reason for banks' strong capital position is that the SBP issued prudential guidelines increasing both the minimum regulatory requirement and the minimum paid-up capital require- ment. Accordingly, banks had to increase their minimum paid-up capital from PRs 5 billion (US$60.42 million) in 2007 to PRs 6 billion (US$72.5 million) by the end of 2009--and will have to increase it further to PRs 10 billion (US$120.83 mil- lion) by 2013. The minimum regulatory requirement was raised from 8 percent of risk-weighted assets in 2008 to 9 percent in 2009 and will be raised to 10 percent in 2010. These regulatory changes, by compelling banks to increase their capital base, have helped them weather the adverse financial situation. Adopting Basel II capital guidelines has also helped. All banks and develop- ment finance institutions in Pakistan are using the Standardized Approach for calculating credit and market risk. Two foreign banks have opted for the Stan- dardized Approach for calculating operational risk, while the rest are using the Basic Indicator Approach (SBP 2008). Even though adopting Basel II reduces capital adequacy ratios because of additional charges for operational and market risk, 21 banks reported capital adequacy ratios over 15 percent in 2008 (when 8 percent was the minimum regulatory requirement), while 13 banks had ratios between 10 percent and 15 percent. Two banks reported ratios between 8 percent and 10 percent (see SBP 2008). The leverage ratio increased to 9.35 in 2007, then fell slightly to 9.23 in 2008. The gross nonperforming loans ratio fell progressively from 19.6 percent in 2001 to 5.7 percent in 2006. The ratio then climbed to 6.3 percent in 2007 and 7.6 per- cent in 2008. Nonperforming loans to the small and medium-size enterprise sec- tor seem to be on the rise, while the corporate sector accounts for the bulk of the nonperforming loans. Nonperforming loans in agriculture actually fell in 2008, probably because of the good crop season. The provisions to nonperforming loans ratio rose over the period until 2007, when it was 88.20 percent, then fell to 81.10 percent in 2008. Although provisions increased in absolute terms in 2008, the rise in nonperforming loans outmatched the rise in provisions. In addition, because of the high level of nonperforming loans in 2008, the SBP reinstated the practice of allowing up to 30 percent of the forced sales value of mortgaged property (commercial as well as residential), liquid assets, and stocks in the cal- culation of the loan values on which the provisions are made. This helped further reduce loan loss provisions. Both liquidity ratios declined over the period until 2007, when they rose, then continued to fall in 2008. The liquid assets to total assets ratio fell from 33.82 percent in 2007 to 28.74 percent in 2008, while the liquid assets to liabilities ratio dropped from 57.07 percent in 2007 to 50.79 percent in 2008. Economic uncertainties resulted in a severe liquidity shortage in 2008. The SBP reduced the cash reserve requirement from 9 percent to 5 percent, freeing up liquidity for the banking sector. While the accelerated economic growth rates have abated, the larger capital base, the higher returns resulting from high interest margins, and the timely revisions of regulatory guidelines have helped Pakistan's banks manage the eco- nomic slowdown and maintain stability. If the slowdown continues, however, nonperforming loans will grow as adverse market conditions affect the corporate sector as well as small and medium-size enterprises. High levels of nonperform- ing loans and increased provisioning and write-offs would erode banks' capital The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 81 cushion and affect their stability. Banks as well as the authorities should therefore monitor the situation carefully and take early corrective action. Capital Market Development Pakistan's stock market had a remarkable growth spurt before the market melt- down experienced by the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) in May 2008. Business- Week dubbed it "the best-performing stock market in the world" in 2002.15 The stock market capitalization grew by a staggering 473 percent between 2001 and 2007, from 8.06 percent of GDP to 46.2 percent. On December 26, 2007, the market closed high: the KSE-100 index was at 14,814.85, and the market capital- ization close to PRs 4.56 trillion (around US$76 billion). On April 18, 2008, the KSE-100 index reached 15,676.34, the highest level recorded. But as a result of political and economic uncertainties, the market fell sharply starting in May 2008. By December 31, 2008, the index had dropped to 5,865.01 and the market capitalization to PRs 1.86 trillion (US$23.50 billion). The authori- ties took measures to counter the market crash, including introducing floor prices and even closing the stock exchange temporarily in 2008. The market turned around, however, and by October 15, 2009, the KSE-100 index had climbed to 9,845.73 and the market capitalization to PRs 2.86 trillion (US$34 billion). Pakistan has two other stock exchanges, in Lahore and Islamabad. The exchange in Lahore recorded a market capitalization of PRs 2.71 trillion (US$33 billion) on October 15, 2009, and the one in Islamabad a market capitalization of PRs 1.59 trillion (US$19 billion). Overall, the market has shown little gain. The trading value of the top 10 stocks fell from 20.02 percent of the total value of shares traded in 2006 to 6.81 percent by the end of 2008. Market liquidity is tight, with the stock trading value at around 0.14 percent of GDP in 2008. And market efficiency is very low, as shown by the stock market turnover ratio of just 0.004. The bond market is also still developing, with the corporate bond market not yet a major factor. The domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP ratio averaged around 33 percent over the eight-year period. Pakistan has vast potential for capital market development. It has raised money in international capital markets through eurobonds, global depository receipts, and exchangeable bonds. Once the economy stabilizes, it is hoped that the development of its capital market will pick up. Market Concentration and Competitiveness Pakistan managed to reduce the concentration ratios in its banking sector over the eight-year period. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index declined to 741 in 2008 (values less than 1,000 indicate an unconcentrated industry, according to inter- nationally accepted norms). The three-bank concentration ratios also declined over the period, and in 2008 the top three banks held 38 percent of assets, depos- its, and loans on average. Low concentration promotes competition. Also favor- ing healthy competition is the dominance of private sector banks in Pakistan's banking sector. In addition, the higher paid-up capital requirements imposed by the SBP have helped weed out unsuitable market entrants (though this also means a need for more comprehensive programs to improve financial outreach, especially in rural areas). 82 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Yet Pakistan also shows the same trends of increasing levels of commercial banking assets and bank credit to the private sector that have been observed throughout South Asia. Where a developed capital market is lacking (or, as in Pakistan, has gone through a market meltdown) and external financing flows out, commercial banks become the main providers of capital--and in some cases even the sole providers. In Pakistan private credit extended by banks increased over the period until 2007, then fell slightly to 27.56 percent of GDP in 2008. Commercial banking assets increased sharply until 2007 before decreasing in 2008 to 51.38 percent of GDP. This situation needs to be monitored carefully, especially since Pakistan's banking sector still operates with relatively high interest margins. If interest rates were to rise, banks would face maturity mismatch issues. And since banks con- stantly roll over short-term funding, private sector firms are highly vulnerable to interest rate fluctuations and other restrictions imposed by banks. Once the economy recovers and the capital market again starts to develop, it is hoped that the private sector will have a greater range of funding opportunities available for development activities. Payment Systems Development Pakistan's payment system has both retail and large-value components. The small-value retail payment system is a semiautomated, end-of-day net settlement system, provided by the National Institutional Facilitation Technologies (NIFT) network. Pakistan has an RTGS system to handle large-value payments. Set up by a consortium of banks and a private company, the NIFT network serves more than 4,500 branches of 40 banks (including the SBP) in 100 major cities of Pakistan. It offers four major clearing services: intercity clearing, over- night clearing, same-day high-value clearing, and local U.S. dollar clearing. In 2008, the network cleared 60.27 million checks with a value of PRs 21 trillion through its clearinghouses. The system processed PRs 137,369 billion of paper- based transactions and PRs 13,893 billion of e-banking transactions. Clearly, paper-based transactions still dominate, though e-banking is growing fast. The SBP is developing a strategic plan to reform the retail payment system, with an agenda that includes promoting e-banking as well as mobile banking. Notes and coins in circulation were maintained at around 11 percent of GDP over the eight-year period. In 2008, currency in circulation amounted to around 28 percent of the narrow money supply and around 25 percent of the broad money supply. The narrow money supply was 39.73 percent of GDP. Cash is clearly the preferred mode of payment. The value of retail transactions grew to 1,444 percent of GDP in 2008. The retail payment system is concentrated. According to the retail payments concentration ratio for 2008, the system's five largest participants accounted for 79 percent of the retail payment transactions. In July 2008, the SBP launched the RTGS system, the Pakistan Real Time Inter- bank Settlement Mechanism (PRISM), which operates under the Payment Sys- tems and Electronic Funds Transfer Act enacted in 2007. The system is designed to handle all large-value payments in Pakistan, including interbank money and securities market transactions, the domestic leg of foreign exchange transactions, and net settlement positions from retail (NIFT) and bank card clearings (ATM switch operators). The high-value transactions are cleared through PRISM using SWIFT financial messaging. In 2008, the value of RTGS transactions amounted to The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 83 around 389.75 percent of GDP, indicating the importance of having a real-time payment system for high-value transactions. The RTGS concentration ratio in 2008 was 32.39 percent, showing that RTGS transactions are not concentrated among a few participants. Recognizing the importance to financial system stability of minimizing settle- ment risk, the SBP is drafting detailed settlement rules for PRISM participants. Creation of a national payment council is also being discussed. Savings Mobilization The broad money supply to GDP ratio hovered around 46 percent over the eight- year period, indicating that financial deepening could be further improved to increase the liquidity in the market. High inflation drove the real deposit interest rate down sharply, to a huge -12.63 percent in 2008. The domestic savings rate is low, dropping to 13.25 percent in 2008, indicating a weak savings culture in Pakistan. The reserve money to total deposits ratio is high, pointing to inefficien- cies in financial intermediation. The loan to deposit ratio is very high, showing that banks continue to rely on borrowings rather than savings. Remittances improved only marginally over the period, but they remain a stable source of income. Analysis of these indicators reveals that present conditions do not provide incentives for domestic savings. Indeed, domestic savings remained low over the period even with increased external capital, robust bank performance, and strong remittance receipts. A big part of the explanation may be the low access to financial services. As noted, the distribution of formal financial services leaves rural areas relatively underserved, and the use of financial services as measured by deposit accounts per 1,000 people dropped over the period. One reason for this may be the growing dominance of private sector over public sector banks. The more profit-oriented private sector banks may find that providing financial services in rural areas is not feasible because of its greater cost. The SBP's 10-year strategy for financial sector development reflects its under- standing of the potential of the banking industry to support economic growth and development by promoting domestic and foreign savings and investment. Under this strategy, the SBP plans to implement a financial inclusion program that will, among other things, encourage banks to meet the needs of underserved sectors, including through outreach programs for agriculture, housing, micro- finance, and small and medium-size enterprises (SBP 2009b). The strategy is expected to improve savings mobilization, allowing it to be an important element in financial market and economic development. Corporate Governance The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), established by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, as the regulator of capital markets and the controller of corporate entities, issued the country's first code of corporate governance in March 2002. The SECP code was later incorpo- rated into the listing regulations of the three stock exchanges and thus applies to all listed companies. Its main objectives are to stimulate company performance while limiting the abuse of power, promote corporate accountability and protec- tion of investor interests, safeguard minority interests, promote transparency in operations and decision making, and encourage directors to discharge their fidu- ciary responsibilities diligently and transparently. 84 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Several other corporate governance initiatives followed. In 2004, the SECP initiated the establishment of the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) to provide training and build awareness on corporate governance issues. In 2006 the International Finance Corporation launched a project aimed at improving corporate governance practices in Pakistan. And in 2007 the Associa- tion of Chartered Certified Accountants Pakistan, in association with the IFC, the SECP, and the PICG, conducted a survey of corporate governance practices in Pakistan. The survey targeted locally listed companies, large companies not locally listed, and financial institutions. The SBP, as the banking sector regulator, issued prudential regulations (G1­G4) requiring all commercial banks and development finance institutions to comply with the SECP code of corporate governance. It also issued a handbook of corporate governance to promote compliance and good corporate governance practices in the banking sector. Among the key areas covered by the regulations and handbook are the following: · Board of directors--qualification and eligibility, election, appointment of directors by the SBP, board independence, board responsibilities and powers, board meetings, loans and remuneration, and dealings · Management--appointment, qualifications, requirement to attend board meetings, and fit-and-proper test · Financial disclosure--frequency of reporting, responsibility for financial reports and corporate compliance, disclosure of interest by directors holding company shares, corporate ownership structure, and divestiture of shares by sponsors and controlling interests · Auditor--guidelines, qualification and disqualification, tenure, reading and inspection of auditor's report, signature on audit report, and prohibition on auditors' holding shares · Audit committee--composition, meetings, terms of reference, reporting pro- cedure, and internal audit Through guidelines G1­G3, the SBP amended two parts of the corporate governance code issued to banks--the fit-and-proper test and the responsibili- ties of boards of directors, management, and compliance officers--and added guidelines (G3) on contributions and donations for charitable, social, and public welfare purposes. In addition, guideline G4 makes it mandatory for all banks and development finance institutions to have themselves rated by a credit rating agency that is on the approved panel of the SBP. The key amendments in G1 and G2 cover the following: · Broadening the scope of the fit-and-proper test to include sponsors and stra- tegic investors in addition to directors, CEOs, and key executives of banks and development finance institutions · Requiring prior clearance in writing from the SBP for the entry of sponsors and strategic investors and the appointment of directors and the CEO · Requiring prior approval in writing from the SBP for acquisitions of 5 percent or more of the shares of a bank or development finance institution · Further clarifying the scope of responsibilities of the board of directors and management The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 85 · Increasing the mandatory requirement for independent directors and restric- tions on family and executive directors in banks · Emphasizing that the board is to remain independent of management by focusing on policy making and providing general direction to the bank or development finance institution rather than getting involved in day-to-day operations, including credit decisions Some of these amendments would improve self-governance; others, such as the requirement to obtain SBP approval for acquisitions of 5 percent or more of the shares in an institution, need to be reviewed. Other areas to focus on include greater transparency and disclosure, greater accountability, further disclosures on beneficial ownership, safeguards on stakeholder rights, greater clarification of board responsibilities, and greater emphasis on self-governance for institutions. Analysis of the answers to the corporate governance questionnaire finds that Pakistan has legal provisions covering most aspects of banks' ownership struc- ture and the influence of stakeholders (see appendix 4A). The provisions relating to beneficial ownership could be further strengthened through greater disclosure requirements, however. The SBP regulatory guidelines--along with the Banking Companies Ordinance of 1962 and the Companies Ordinance of 1984--require disclosure of share ownership, with the threshold set at 10 percent, through means available to both the market and the public. In addition, banks must dis- close shareholdings of 3 percent or more to the SBP. As noted, share acquisitions of 5 percent or more require the SBP's prior approval. Government ownership is also publicly disclosed. Only the board and the company can appoint bank directors, though the government can nominate directors of government-controlled banks. There are provisions establishing the rights of stakeholders such as labor unions, though no details were available for an assessment. The State Bank Act limits the issuance to banks of any directive by the government or a quasi-governmental body that is inconsistent with the policies, regulations, and directives issued by the SBP. The preemption rights of minority shareholders are protected under the guidelines, but it is unclear whether this is monitored. The SBP requires disclosure of beneficial ownership of shareholders--includ- ing information on the sponsor shareholders, with the threshold set at 3 percent. But this information is not available to the public. In addition, the SECP code requires disclosure of shareholdings of directors, the CEO, and their spouse and minor children; associated companies, undertakings, and related parties; pub- lic sector companies and corporations; and shareholders holding 10 percent or more of the voting interest in the company. Banks are to disclose this informa- tion in their annual accounts. Investor rights relating to voting and shareholder meetings appear to be in place. Adequate information is disclosed to shareholders in a timely fashion before shareholder meetings. Shareholders can vote in absentia, though postal and elec- tronic voting is not used, and voting is verified by a third party. Shareholders can vote on a normal range of issues, including related-party transactions. Banks are required to disclose special voting rights and caps on voting rights. While basic ownership rights exist, regulatory control over share transactions and management changes needs to be reviewed. Appointments and dismissals of directors are subject to vote by shareholders, although the SBP has the power 86 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 to remove directors and managers. The government can appoint directors to government-controlled banks only by virtue of its shareholdings. A clear divi- dend policy is in place. There are specific structural defenses that can prevent a takeover bid, including the requirement for prior approval by the SBP for share acquisitions of 5 percent or more of total paid-up capital. In addition, the cen- tral bank must approve any change in bank management. For a privatization, it assesses prospective investors to determine whether they meet its fit-and-proper test for owners and managers. All companies are encouraged to protect the inter- ests of minority shareholders. In addition, under the fit-and-proper test, 25 per- cent of board members must be independent. The questionnaire responses show that provisions for transparency and dis- closure meet the main criteria, though the internal audit function has room for improvement. Banks' financial statements are prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IAS). All these standards apply in Pakistan except IAS 39 and IAS 40, which are deferred for the time being for financial institutions. Financial reporting is done quarterly, semiannually, and annually. Audit fees paid to external auditors must be disclosed. The SBP has issued guidelines on the appointment of audit committees that clearly outline their roles and responsibilities, which include controlling the selection of auditors. External auditors are not permitted to perform other, non- audit services for the banks they audit. No bank can retain the same auditors for more than five years. The SBP has also issued guidelines relating to internal auditors. Under these guidelines, the fit-and-proper test devised for key execu- tives applies to the head of internal audit. Internal auditors are independent and report to the audit committee, though the frequency of such reporting is not defined. Banks in Pakistan follow a unitary board structure with a minimum of seven directors. Board members' qualifications and experience are governed by the fit-and-proper test outlined in the prudential guidelines. The board's roles and responsibilities are clearly defined; however, its tasks and objectives are not indi- vidually assigned, and this matter is instead left to the board. The SECP code recommends orientation courses for directors. In addition, the SBP's prudential guidelines urge that all board members attend at least one to two weeks' training at an institution such as PICG within the first year of joining the board. No infor- mation on formal or systematic training was available for assessment, however. Developing a systematic training program for directors is important. The remuneration of directors is subject to a shareholder vote at annual gen- eral meetings, and banks are required to disclose the compensation of directors in detail. The remuneration paid to board members is linked to the meetings they attend, and no periodic, fixed remuneration is paid. There are no provisions for performance-based compensation. For assurance that banks can attract and retain qualified and competent directors, a review of compensation policies is needed. In addition, the recent financial meltdown and the underlying issue of executive compensation packages have highlighted the need for the authorities to discuss compensation policies with commercial banks and to set clear guidelines if the banks decide to link compensation to performance levels. In addition, per- formance levels will need to be monitored. Pakistan has issued comprehensive guidelines in most areas of corporate governance. But the success of governance procedures depends largely on the The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 87 commitment of banks. Their approach to corporate governance needs to go beyond simple compliance with legal requirements. Two other key issues are disclosure and accountability, emphasizing the importance of regulatory surveil- lance and enforcement. Sri Lanka Sri Lanka's economy has remained resilient over the past few decades in the face of a 30-year war, a devastating tsunami, escalating prices, and weak reserves. Challenges on many fronts led to particular volatility in 2008. Escalating oil and food prices caused the already high inflation to soar and the current account defi- cit to widen further. Foreign reserves plummeted in the second part of the year. The second-round effects of the global financial crisis appeared to compound these effects. While Sri Lanka had no direct exposure to toxic assets, the impact on the real economy through weak growth in export markets, along with a slowdown in domestic demand and external capital outflows resulting from the deleveraging activities of foreign investors, decelerated economic growth. But the end of the armed conflict in May 2009 brought renewed hope of sustainable peace and eco- nomic development. Based on 2008 data, Sri Lanka ranks sixth in the region in population (20 mil- lion) and area (65,600 square kilometers) and fourth in GDP (US$39.6 bil- lion). With a GNI per capita of US$1,780 in 2008, Sri Lanka is classified as a lower-middle-income country. Its economy has felt the effects of global trends. Between January 2003 and May 2008 South Asia suffered a huge loss of income from a severe terms-of-trade shock as a result of the surge in global commodity prices. Sri Lanka had a GDP loss of around 10.2 percent--around 7.7 percent on energy and 2.3 percent on food (World Bank 2008b). The current account defi- cit increased from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2007 to 9.3 percent in 2008. Inflation soared from 10 percent in 2006 to 15.8 percent in 2007 and 22.56 percent in 2008. Worker remittances, averaging around 7.6 percent of GDP, prevented a further slide in the current account balance. Meanwhile, the fiscal deficit hovered around 7 percent of GDP (because the government adjusted food and energy prices to world market prices, the deficit did not widen further). The overall impact was a slowdown in GDP growth from 7.7 percent in 2006 to 5.95 percent in 2008. In 2008, the global financial crisis added to the decelerating effects on the economy. Global deleveraging resulted in a rapid outflow of external funds, exacerbated by the intervention of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) in the foreign exchange market in a bid to sustain the rupee's peg to the U.S. dollar. Foreign reserves dropped from US$3.5 billion in 2007 to US$1.8 billion at the end of 2008, and import cover fell to two months. The government countered the deteriorating situation by curbing expenditure, mainly by reducing the public sector wage increase, limiting imports, and easing monetary policy. These actions paid dividends. The import limits and the easing of world food and energy prices improved the terms of trade, and inflation eased. Foreign reserves were improved by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement, a sovereign bond issue, and the return of investors.16 Remittances continued to support reserves as well as the current account. In 2009, the current account deficit was expected to be around 3 percent of GDP, and inflation around 5 percent. Postwar recon- struction is also expected to boost the economy. The real sector is expected to 88 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 rebound in 2010, and if fiscal consolidation takes place as planned, GDP growth is expected to be around 4 percent in 2009 and 6 percent in 2010. Sri Lanka's banking system in 2008 consisted of 22 licensed commercial banks: 2 state banks (generally referred to in the report as public sector banks), 8 domestic private banks (generally referred to as private sector banks), and 12 foreign banks. The financial system also included 14 licensed specialized banks (8 national and 6 regional development banks) and 56 nonbank financial institu- tions and specialized leasing companies. The CBSL is the regulatory authority for the banking sector as well as nonbank financial institutions. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Sri Lanka regulates the securities market. The stability of the banking sector depends on six systemically important banks, two public sector banks and four private sector banks. These six banks held around 78 percent of commercial banking assets in 2007. The two public sector banks dominate, accounting for more than 42 percent of the total com- mercial banking assets. But the private sector banks are beginning to compete for dominance. In 2008, banks accounted for around 47.5 percent of total financial assets, an amount equivalent to around 53.39 percent of GDP. In Sri Lanka, as in most other South Asian countries, the banking sector has been hit by the second-round effects of the global financial crisis through the impact on real sector activities. Timely regulatory actions and focused responses by the banking community appear to have helped the country's banks navigate the economic uncertainties. Analysis of the indicators for the eight-year period 2001­08 supports this premise. The analysis also identifies the banking system's strengths and weaknesses. Access to financial services is among the highest in the region and already improving in the war-affected areas of the North and East. The profitability of banks improved over the period, though the economic slowdown is expected to lead to rising levels of nonperforming loans and thus falling returns. This sug- gests a need for banks to focus on reducing operating costs. Banks are relatively stable. The capital adequacy ratio is maintained above the minimum regulatory requirements, and all banks had switched to the Basel II framework by June 2008. Banks would benefit from further capital enhancements, however. The capital market continues to develop, though the private bond market remains limited. In the banking sector, market concentration is high. Development of the pay- ment system has been laudable (figure 3.8). But savings mobilization remains below the potential for the country, pointing to a need to identify and counter barriers to saving. Sri Lanka has taken important steps to improve corporate governance in the banking sector by issuing mandatory guidelines. More work is needed, however, to make the guidelines more comprehensive and effective. Important needs are to expand disclosure requirements and strengthen compliance and enforcement. Equally important is for the banking sector to incorporate the best practices of corporate governance. In other moves that will also support better corporate governance, Sri Lanka has made credit rating mandatory for all banks and imple- mented Basel II guidelines. Sri Lanka has a credit information bureau (CRIB). In 2008, CRIB launched the Credit Information Management Systems, allowing more comprehensive credit reports. CRIB has the authority to issue credit reports to individuals as well as to financial institutions.17 In addition, Sri Lanka has voluntary deposit insurance The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 89 Figure 3.8 Sri Lanka Moves toward a Cashless Society 50 300 45 40 250 value of transactions (percent) 35 200 30 percent 25 150 20 100 15 10 50 5 0 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 value of RTGS transactions to GDP value of retail transactions to GDP notes and coins in circulation to GDP narrow money supply (M1) to GDP broad money supply (M2) to GDP Source: Appendix table A2.16. Note: There are no RTGS values for 2001 and 2002; the RTGS system started in 2003. coverage, established in 1987, though it has seldom been used. The CBSL is work- ing toward implementation of a comprehensive deposit insurance scheme, which should further strengthen the stability of the financial system. Access to Finance Sri Lanka arguably has the highest access to banking services in the region. Mal- dives has higher demographic and geographic penetration ratios. But as observed in the analysis of that country, the calculation of these ratios is skewed because it does not take into account the dispersion of the population among atolls (which are not supported by banking services). A recent World Bank study (2008a) reported that around 59 percent of households in Sri Lanka have access to finan- cial services, the highest share in the region.18 Geographic and demographic penetration of bank branches and ATMs rose over the period. Demographic penetration increased to about 9 branches and about 6 ATMs per 100,000 people in 2008. Geographic penetration similarly increased, reaching 18 branches and 15 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers in 2008. Moreover, the distribution of the branch network across the country is fairly equitable. Among the 25 districts in Sri Lanka, 7 districts accounting for 54 percent of the population have 64 percent of the branches, while the other 18 districts, with 46 percent of the population, have 36 percent of the branches. The 5 districts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, where the war was mainly waged, account for an estimated 13 percent of the population and 9 percent of the branches. Some of these areas came under full government control only after May 2009. But reconstruction efforts are already under way to provide better banking facilities to these areas, and penetration ratios were expected to rise in 2009. 90 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 The usage indicators confirm the increase in financial access over the period. Deposit accounts per 1,000 people grew by around 44 percent from 2001 to 2007, then dropped slightly in 2008 to 1,304.31. Loan accounts per 1,000 people grew by around 6 percent over the same period, though the ratio dropped by 11 per- cent in 2008 to 240.37. The economic slowdown in 2008 appears to have slowed the growth in the use of banking facilities. But new branch openings by all major banks as part of the development in the north and east should rectify this in 2009 and beyond. Besides the main branches of commercial banks, there were 3,332 other bank- ing outlets in 2008, such as extension offices, pawn centers, student savings units, and pay offices. These outlets provide limited though valuable banking func- tions. In addition, the 15 licensed specialized banks had a network of 423 main branches and 221 other banking outlets in 2008. The microfinance industry provides another important means of access to finance in rural areas. In Sri Lanka, microfinance is channeled mainly through cooperative institutions, Sanasa and thrift and credit cooperative societies, and Samurdhi banking societies.19 A survey conducted in 2006/07 by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation revealed that there are around 10,000 active microfinance providers in Sri Lanka: 1,038 Samurdhi societies; 1,687 coopera- tive rural banks and women's development cooperatives; 3,794 active Sanasa and thrift and credit cooperative societies; and 2,500 other microfinance institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the like. Almost 90 percent of these operate in rural areas. According to the survey, in 2007 Sri Lanka's microfinance industry accounted for around SL Rs 42 billion (US$400 million) in deposit accounts and SL Rs 68.8 billion (US$655 million) in loan accounts. To establish a regulatory and supervisory framework for the industry, the CBSL has drafted the Micro- Finance Institutions Act, which is now under revision. (For more information on microfinance in Sri Lanka, see GTZ ProMis 2009.) Performance and Efficiency Bank returns improved over the eight-year period, with the return on assets growing faster than the return on equity. The return on assets increased by around 140 percent to 2.01 percent in 2008. The return on equity remained rela- tively stable over the period and was around 27.64 percent in 2008. Both the net interest margin and recurring earning power showed robust growth in 2001­08. The net interest margin grew by 35.75 percent to 4.48 percent in 2008, while recurring earning power grew by 46.66 percent to 2.40 percent. The operating and staff cost ratios declined over the period, helping to improve profitability. The operating cost ratio fell by 41.84 percentage points to around 76.82 percent in 2008. The regional average, however, was 60.25 percent. One reason for the higher operating costs in Sri Lanka is the high tax on financial services.20 Staff costs fell from 46.21 percent of operating costs in 2001 to 42.74 percent in 2008. The two public sector banks have higher operating costs on average than the private sector banks, in part because of their extensive branch networks. The return ratios were expected to decline in 2009 as the economic slowdown led to increases in nonperforming loans and reductions in banks' fee-based activ- ities. All return ratios are strong, however, and banks should be able to withstand moderate reductions. If nonperforming loans were to increase significantly or The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 91 interest margins to fall, however, banks' profitability will be affected. Because of their high operating costs, banks have been unable to increase their capital cushions even with high interest margins. To counter the effects of the eco- nomic slowdown on profitability, banks are expected to work to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Financial Stability Maintaining financial stability in the wake of the global financial meltdown is of prime importance to commercial banks as well as regulatory authorities. Lack of exposure to toxic assets and failing financial institutions in the developed world minimized the direct effects of the financial meltdown on Sri Lanka's banks. A bigger concern is the resulting economic slowdown, which could affect the qual- ity of their asset portfolios and the growth of their business. Thus far, timely regulations and prudent management have played a big part in maintaining the stability of the financial system. The capital adequacy ratio improved over the period, ending at 12.62 percent in 2008. By the end of June 2008, all commercial banks had switched to the Basel II capital computation method. Because of the additional capital charges on operational risk under Basel II, the capital adequacy ratio fell from 2007 levels by about 96 basis points. But the ratio remained above the minimum regulatory requirement throughout the period. The leverage ratio increased over the period, and in 2008 equity was around 13.15 times total assets. The increase in the leverage ratio matched the trend in the capital adequacy ratio. But this also points to the need for banks to increase their capitalization levels. The gross nonperforming loans ratio fell by about 66 percent from 2001 to 2007. With the economic slowdown, this ratio is creep- ing back up. From 2007 to 2008, the nonperforming loans ratio increased by 1.30 percentage points, to 7.92 percent. The provisions to nonperforming loans ratio increased over much of the period, then fell slightly to 61.41 percent in 2008. In 2009 nonperforming loans were expected to be higher.21 Banks should be able to withstand moderate shocks. In the present economic situation, however, banks need to expand their capital base to absorb possible losses that might occur with an increase in nonperforming loans. A threat to the stability of the financial system arose at the end of 2008, when unauthorized finance business conducted by a subsidiary of one of the systemi- cally important banks caused a run on deposits and liquidity stress for the parent bank. The CBSL stepped in immediately and successfully managed the situation by changing the board of directors, appointing one of the large public sector banks as the managing agent, and providing collateralized borrowings, mainly from the central bank. These measures restored public confidence and averted the bank's collapse. This incident justifies the call for banks to enhance their capi- tal base. The stringent monetary measures introduced in 2007 and the absorption of rupee liquidity through foreign currency sales led to tight liquidity in the market. In the second half of 2008, the CBSL relaxed its monetary policy and provided adequate liquidity to the market by lowering its statutory reserve ratios and repo and reverse repo rates numerous times. Overall, liquidity in the banking system has been fairly stable. At the end of 2008, liquid assets amounted to around 20.11 percent of total assets and to 23.46 percent of liquid liabilities, slightly higher 92 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 than the regulatory requirement of 20 percent. Liquidity has been managed well except in the one bank that faced liquidity stress. Overall, the outlook for financial stability is favorable, though the need to increase the capitalization of banks should be examined in the light of the eco- nomic situation. Nonperforming loans need to be monitored diligently, and credit quality needs to be maintained while pursuing stable credit growth. Capital Market Development Sri Lanka has one stock exchange, the Colombo Stock Exchange. The exchange is fully automated, with a central depository system, an electronic clearing and settlement system for share transactions, and an automated trading system. A debt securities trading system implemented in 2003 supports secondary trading of government securities. The exchange calculates two main price indexes, the All Share Price Index and the Milanka Price Index, as well as the Total Return Index. Price indexes are calculated for each of 20 business sectors. Equity and debt secu- rities can be listed on either the main board (for larger companies) or a secondary board, Diri Savi, with much more relaxed listing requirements (for small to medium-size companies and start-up companies). At the end of December 2008, the exchange had 236 companies listed and a market capitalization of SL Rs 488.81 billion (around US$4.3 billion).22 The stock market capitalization improved until 2006, then declined from 2007 onward. In 2008, the market capitalization was 11.08 percent of GDP, having lost around 60 percent of its 2006 value. Moreover, the market became increas- ingly concentrated, especially after 2005; the trading value of the top 10 stocks accounted for 67.3 percent of the total in 2008. Market liquidity fluctuated over the period. A market liquidity measure, the stock trading value to GDP ratio, fell between 2005 and 2008 to around 2.5 percent. Market efficiency as measured by the stock market turnover ratio also fluctuated, rising in 2007 and 2008 to end the period at 0.17. Low turnover ratios denote relatively low efficiency. Many factors drove the market decline in 2008. They include the impact of the global financial crisis, the deleveraging activities of foreign investors, and the country's economic slowdown. Domestic reasons for the market decline include court reversals of privatization deals for some blue chip companies, the high interest rates, and declines in company performance. But the equity market appears to have weathered these conditions. Today, investors are trying to reap peace dividends from the end of the war. And a sharp decline in interest rates has diverted funds back to the equity market.23 Government bonds dominate the bond market in Sri Lanka. In 2008, the domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP ratio was 29.07 percent. While the opening of treasury bill and bond auctions to foreign investors (allowed to pur- chase up to 10 percent) brought in funds in 2007 and early 2008, there has been a net outflow from treasury securities since then because of the financial crisis. The corporate bond market remains very small. The largest issue in 2008 was by a public sector bank. The capital market in Sri Lanka is still very small compared with other mar- kets around the world. But with the end of war, the stock and bond markets should grow, providing a stable source of long-term funding for the economy and an alternative to bank funding. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 93 Market Concentration and Competitiveness Market concentration is very high in Sri Lanka's banking system. While all con- centration ratios have been declining, the three largest banks still held around 50 percent of banking assets, deposits, and loans in 2008. Moreover, as noted, the six systemically important banks hold more than 75 percent of commercial banking assets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in 2008 was 1,198.75 (denoting a mod- erately concentrated industry, according to international norms). The private credit extended by banks to GDP ratio increased over much of the period, a concern because of possible credit risks. With the economic slowdown, however, banks have tightened credit, and the ratio dropped by nearly 18 percent between 2006 and 2008, to 28.94 percent. The commercial banking assets to GDP ratio also increased over the period until 2006, then started to decline. In 2008, commercial banking assets amounted to 53.39 percent of GDP. High commercial banking assets and private credit along with high concentration ratios are a con- cern if interest margins start to drop, and this combination needs to be moni- tored carefully. Better risk management practices would help lessen the impact. Some have argued that for a small country like Sri Lanka, having 22 banks is not operationally efficient and that banks should therefore pursue mergers and consolidations. But having fewer banks that are too big to fail also can have adverse consequences, especially in an economic downturn like the one countries are experiencing today. Having fewer banks does not guarantee lower operating costs. For example, India's commercial banking sector serves a population and geographic area 50 times the size of those served by Sri Lanka's--and has 3.5 times as many commercial banks and 13 times as many branches. Yet it has an operat- ing cost ratio quite similar to that of Sri Lanka's banking sector. So it can be argued that reducing the number of banks will not necessar- ily reduce operating costs. What is more important is to identify what contrib- utes to higher operating costs, such as higher-than-average taxes, and work to reduce those costs. Conversely, increasing the number of banks to serve a policy objective--such as expanding access to financial services or increasing social inclusion--may also fail to achieve the desired results, as evidenced by Nepal. Thus, the right number of banks for a country is a policy decision that warrants careful consideration. Payment Systems Development Sri Lanka has three systemically important payment systems--a check-based retail payment system, a high-value and time-critical RTGS payment and settle- ment system, and the automated trading system operated by the stock exchange, which settles private equities. A strong institutional, legal, and regulatory frame- work has been developed to back these payment systems. Sri Lanka has gone further in payment system reforms than most countries in the region. These reforms have increased efficiency while minimizing risk and have improved financial access--all important concepts for economic development.24 The retail payment system consists of a check imaging and truncation system (CITS); the Sri Lanka Interbank Payment System (SLIPS), operated by Lanka- Clear Pvt. Ltd.; and a retail check clearinghouse, jointly owned by the CBSL and the banks and also operated by LankaClear. LankaClear has a main operating cen- ter in the capital city of Colombo and 11 regional centers. The CITS, an interbank 94 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 check clearing system, ensures T+1 settlement for checks deposited from almost anywhere in the country. By using check imaging, this system provides faster and more efficient settlement and minimizes risk. LankaClear also clears interbank payments. SLIPS is an end-of-day net settlement system. LankaClear sends the end-of-day net balances of SLIPS through the RTGS system for settlement. In 2008, LankaClear cleared around SL Rs 19.5 billion (US$170 million) of checks daily through the CITS, while the daily average for SLIPS clearing was SL Rs 979 million (US$8.5 million). Retail payment system transactions totaled SL Rs 5,221 billion (US$45.4 billion) in 2008. Another clearing system handles U.S. dollar checks drawn within the country. This clearing is done by a commercial bank where other banks hold settlement accounts. This settlement system is not systemically important, handling only SL Rs 26 billion (US$226 million) in transactions in 2008. In 2008, the CBSL initiated the establishment of a common payment switch, owned and operated by LankaClear, to clear all account-based electronic trans- actions between banks from their own accounts and on behalf of their custom- ers. Many cash and check transactions and SLIPS transactions are expected to be shifted to the common payment switch, which will go live in mid-2010. Lanka- Clear received the certification authority for the financial sector in 2009 and can 25 therefore certify digital signatures for other countries in the region as well. This is a commendable achievement. It will enhance the efficiency of the retail-value payment system and reduce the cost of transactions for banks and their custom- ers through automation. In September 2003, the CBSL established the RTGS system, which it operates, to process large-value and time-critical fund transfers. The CBSL provides col- lateralized intraday liquidity at no charge to all banks and primary dealers for RTGS settlements to be returned at the end of the day. In 2008, transactions with a total value of SL Rs 25.13 trillion (US$218.5 billion) were settled through the RTGS system. The RTGS system is part of an integrated system, known as LankaSettle, that includes the securities settlement system LankaSecure, also operated by the CBSL. LankaSecure consists of a scripless securities settlement system and scrip- less securities depository system. LankaSecure maintains central records of own- ership and transfers securities between security holders' accounts. The system handles government securities in scripless form. Settlement of securities takes T+3 to T+4. The total value of scripless securities holdings at the end of 2008 was SL Rs 1,713 billion (US$15 billion). The payment and securities messages are transmitted through the system using SWIFTnet, an internationally accepted online messaging system provided by SWIFT. In 2005, LankaSecure introduced an Internet-based information service, LankaSecureNet, that enables account holders to obtain detailed information on their accounts using the Internet. Sri Lanka was the 16th country in the world to receive Red Book status for modernized payment systems from the BIS Committee on Payment and Settle- ment Systems.26 Among the countries of South Asia, Sri Lanka as well as India and Pakistan have engaged in major payment reforms, and Sri Lanka was the first in the region to operate an RTGS and scripless securities settlement system with a SWIFT link (Jayamaha n.d.). In 2006, the CBSL established the National Pay- ments Council, the highest decision-making body for payment and settlement systems, with representation of all stakeholders. Following a recommendation The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 95 by the council, a local SWIFT service bureau, Lanka Financial Services Bureau Ltd., was established in 2008 to manage the SWIFT service facilities. The service bureau saves substantial foreign exchange while providing an efficient service to institutions participating in the RTGS and scripless securities settlement system. Moreover, according to the CBSL, the RTGS system was expected to conform to 9 of 10 BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems core principles for systemically important payment and settlement systems by the end of 2009. Payment system indicators for Sri Lanka show increasing use of the new secure systems. Both the notes and coins in circulation to GDP ratio and the narrow money supply to GDP ratio are lower in Sri Lanka than in the rest of the region's countries, and fell marginally over the period, denoting lower use of currency. In 2008, these two ratios were 4.22 percent and 6.29 percent, respectively. Currency in circulation accounted for more than 67 percent of the narrow money supply and around 14.5 percent of the broad money supply. The value of retail trans- actions to GDP ratio dropped by nearly 60 percent over the period, while the value of RTGS transactions to GDP ratio increased, indicating a shift toward the RTGS system. In 2008 the value of RTGS transactions amounted to around 67.11 percent of GDP. Similarly, the retail payments concentration ratio fell over the period, while the RTGS concentration ratio declined slightly in 2008. Since the RTGS system is quite new, the effects will be observable in the long run. Savings Mobilization Savings mobilization is important in any developing country, especially if its capital market is not fully developed. High savings allow a country to move away from overreliance on external funding. In Sri Lanka, however, savings remain below their potential. The broad money supply averaged around 32 percent of GDP over the period, and declined to 29.07 percent in 2008, indicating a potential for greater finan- cial deepening. As a result of inflation, however, the real deposit interest rate remained negative throughout the period. In 2008, the unprecedented inflation rate of 22.6 percent drove the real interest rate to a new low of -10.97 percent. High inflation inhibits domestic savings. This situation was expected to change beginning in 2009, however, with inflation back to normal levels. The reserve money to total deposits ratio averaged around 21 percent, drop- ping to 19.03 percent in 2008. Lower levels of reserve money indicate greater effi- ciency in financial intermediation, which aids savings mobilization. The loan to deposit ratio rose by around 12 percent over the period, to 88.78 percent in 2008. The increase in this ratio shows that banks are relying on borrowings rather than deposits for their funding needs. Remittances remained steady throughout the period, averaging around 7.6 percent of GDP and providing an important stable flow of funds to the country. Several steps have been taken to ensure a steady flow of remittances. The CBSL has dedicated a bond to attracting diaspora savings and facilitated the opening of bank branches and exchange houses in countries that are important sources of remittances. In addition, the government offers tax holidays on the income of those who send remittances. Sri Lanka has almost all the preconditions to promote savings--stable finan- cial institutions, a strong regulatory framework, relatively high financial access through the banking network, and prudent savings habits. But for macroeco- nomic reasons, actual savings fall short of the potential. While the end of the 96 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 war should provide an impetus for saving, investment policy is also important. Today domestic savings are used mainly to fund the government deficit, which puts upward pressure on inflation and further inhibits saving. A better alterna- tive would be to channel domestic savings toward capital investments. Corporate Governance Under Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949, the CBSL has a mandate to secure financial system stability in Sri Lanka, while its Monetary Board is authorized to make rules and regulations as deemed necessary. And under Banking Act No. 30 of 1988 (last amended by No. 46 of 2006), the Monetary Board is empowered to issue directions to licensed commercial banks on the way in which any aspect of their business is to be conducted.27 Under these legal provisions, the CBSL issued Banking Act Direction No. 11 of 2007, Corporate Governance for Licensed Com- mercial Banks in Sri Lanka, in December 2007, to be implemented from January 2008. A revision in April 2008 amended the provisions on executive directors and transitional provisions for founding directors, incumbent chairmen, and execu- tive directors. The direction covers the following key areas: · Responsibilities of the board · Composition of the board · Fit-and-proper criteria for directors · Management functions delegated by the board · Separation of the duties of the chairman and the CEO · Board-appointed committees · Related-party transactions · Disclosures · Transitional and other general provisions Banks have a responsibility to adopt the guidelines set out by the CBSL not just as guidelines but also as part of their banking culture. Following is a detailed analysis of the corporate governance standards in Sri Lanka based on the responses to the survey questionnaire (see appendix 4A). Under the guidelines and regulations issued by the Colombo Stock Exchange, publicly listed companies must disclose the share ownership of their top 20 shareholders in their annual reports, available to both the market and the gen- eral public. In addition, banks must disclose holdings of 5 percent and above to the CBSL monthly. Government ownership is disclosed in the same manner. Only the board of directors and the company can appoint directors and decide on their remuneration at annual general meetings. For government-controlled banks, however, the government can nominate directors. To be appointed as a director, a person must satisfy the fit-and-proper criteria. Even though rules protect the preemption rights of minority shareholders, no provisions establish stakeholder rights. Among these guidelines, one of the most significant is the requirement, aimed at achieving broad-based ownership of banks, that large shareholdings of single shareholders, beneficial owners, or groups be reduced to 15 percent within a period determined by the Monetary Board of the CBSL. Because of its restric- tiveness, this cap may create a strong incentive for shareholders to disguise their The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 97 interests through nominees or associated parties, despite the legal provisions outlawing such agreements. The definition of significant ownership should be broadened and clearly defined, with legal provisions to ensure proper disclosure and to encompass exertion of control regardless of the size of the shareholding, and a suitability test should be introduced. The Monetary Board of CBSL should be explicitly empowered to prevent the exercise of voting rights by a party that fails the suitability test. These material ownership rules do not apply to govern- ment, public corporations, or statutory bodies. Investor rights relating to voting procedures and shareholder meetings need further strengthening. Adequate information is disclosed to shareholders in a timely fashion before shareholder meetings, and shareholders can vote in absen- tia, but electronic voting is not available. No provisions exist for third-party veri- fication of voting. Although major transactions of a bank should be approved by the shareholders by a special resolution unless otherwise specified in the articles of association, there is no evidence that shareholders must vote on related-party transactions. Disclosure of special voting rights and caps on voting rights is not required. Basic ownership rights also need improvement, particularly with respect to shareholders' right to vote on the operations of banks, rights of minority share- holders, and regulatory and government control of share transactions. Board appointments and dismissals are not subject to a shareholder vote and are con- trolled by the government in public sector banks. The ability of minority share- holders to appoint directors depends on banks' internal rules. A clear dividend policy is in place. There are structural defenses against takeover bids, including a requirement for prior approval by the CBSL and the Ministry of Finance for the acquisition of a material interest in a bank (10 percent or more of its shares). In addition, the SEC requires any investor acquiring more than 30 percent of a listed company to make an offer to all other shareholders. Banks' financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted local accounting principles, which are in material conformity with International Accounting Standards.28 Financial reporting is done monthly, quarterly, and annually, and audit fees paid to external auditors must be disclosed. The CBSL has issued clear guidelines on the appointment of audit committees and defined their roles and responsibilities. The audit committee makes recommendations on the selection of external as well as internal auditors. External auditors are not permitted to perform other, nonaudit services for the banks they audit. Guidelines on internal auditors have been issued, but improvements could be made. Internal auditors are independent, reporting to the audit committee, but the frequency of such reporting is not clearly defined. Banks in Sri Lanka follow a hybrid board structure with around 5­11 mem- bers on average. Board members' qualifications and experience are governed by the fit-and-proper test criteria set by the prudential guidelines. Board commit- tee requirements are presented in the SEC governance rules as well as the CBSL guidelines. The CBSL rules require boards to have audit, selection, remuneration, and risk management committees and to specify that the committees must be chaired by a nonexecutive director and include at least one independent director. The CBSL should enhance the guidance on the significance and responsibilities of the committees and the key role they play in the governance structure of a financial institution. 98 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 The roles and responsibilities of boards are clearly defined, and their tasks and objectives are defined and individually assigned. In addition, the corporate governance code details the need for systematic training for directors. Banks are permitted to disclose merely the aggregate compensation of their directors in their annual reports. No information is available on whether banks offer perfor- mance-based compensation to their directors or whether shareholders can vote on directors' remuneration--practices that should be incorporated into policy. If banks decide to link compensation to performance, however, the authorities need to discuss their compensation policies with them and set clear guidelines in light of the recent global financial meltdown and the issues related to executive compensation packages. The CBSL has taken important steps to strengthen corporate governance in the banking sector. These include implementing Basel II, introducing mandatory corporate governance standards, and requiring credit ratings for better disclo- sure. But the corporate governance guidelines issued to banks could be further improved. Disclosure requirements and detailed guidelines are still needed on many issues, such as stakeholder rights, special voting rights, rights of sharehold- ers to vote on bank operations, and minority shareholder rights. Other important issues include regulatory and government control of share transactions and the absence of beneficial ownership restrictions on government, public corporations, and statutory bodies. These issues should be reviewed, and necessary changes incorporated into regulatory guidelines and legal statutes to ensure compliance as well as enforceability. Endnotes 1. According to World Bank estimates, Afghanistan produces and trades more than 90 percent of the world's illicit opium. 2. CGAP, "Country Maps," http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.2301/ (accessed in November 2009). 3. Denominations above Rs 100 (that is, Rs 500 and Rs 1,000) are not legal tender in Bhutan. 4. Financial Institutions Act, 1992, Part III, Article 11, Organization and Administration. 5. The three committees are the Patil Committee (chaired by R. H. Patil) to assess Indian standards relative to international standards and codes; the Verma Committee (chaired by M. S. Verma) to advise on banking supervision; and the Ganguly Committee (chaired by A. S. Ganguly) to study board effectiveness. 6. The actual numbers of branches and ATMs are lower. Because the geographic pen- etration ratios are calculated for 1,000 square kilometers and the area of Maldives is only 300 square kilometers, the actual numbers of branches and ATMs are multiplied by 1,000/300 to arrive at comparable ratios. 7. In September 2009, the MMA started open-market operations to mop up excess liquidity in the banking system. The treasury instruments to carry out these transactions were generated by securitizing outstanding balances in the government overdraft account at the MMA (known as the ways and means account), converting them to medium- to long-term government bonds with maturities of 2­10 years. This process was completed by January 2010, and under the medium-term macrofiscal plan the government will not resort to overdraft financing of the deficit. The next two key steps are establishing a proper auction system to sell government securities (rather than the current practice of offering instruments with amount and price predetermined) and obtaining a sovereign debt rating. The Getting Finance Indicators: Country Perspective 99 Establishing a proper auction system would also give rise to a reference yield curve, which would support the development of the corporate debt market. 8. Certified Practicing Accountants of Maldives official Web site, http://cpamaldives .org/page.php?display=about. 9. The minimum regulatory capital requirement was reduced to 10 percent of risk- weighted assets effective for the 2009/10 financial year, with the Tier 1 core capital require- ment at 6 percent of risk-weighted assets. Previously (until the 2008/09 financial year) the minimum capital requirement had been 11 percent, and the Tier 1 requirement 5.5 percent. The financial year for banks in Nepal is from mid-July to mid-July. 10. Procyclicality is defined as the property of exaggerating or exacerbating the cyclical tendencies of aggregate economic activity (see SEMP 2009). 11. See Nepal Stock Exchange official Web site, http://www.nepalstock.com/about/ index.php (accessed in November 2009). 12. In 2001, Nepal's financial sector consisted of 13 commercial banks, 7 development banks, 45 finance companies, 7 microcredit development banks, 19 savings and credit cooperatives, and 7 nongovernmental organizations. In 2008, as noted, there were 28 com- mercial banks, 58 development banks, 78 finance companies, 12 microcredit development banks, 16 savings and credit cooperatives, and 46 nongovernmental organizations (NRB 2008). 13. Policies such as interest rate ceilings, liquidity requirements, and reserve require- ments can cause financial repression and may prevent intermediaries from functioning at their full capacity. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that a repressed financial sector discourages both savings and investment because rates of return fall. Because reserves carry no interest, when reserve requirements are high, the interest spread widens and the cost of capital increases. 14. In fall 2008, the IMF supported the stabilization program embarked on by Pakistan through a Stand-By Arrangement of US$7.6 billion, deemed necessary given the sizable external imbalances and risk of large capital outflows. In August 2009, the IMF raised the support to US$11.3 billion to address increased risks and financing needs. The program is aimed at restoring financial stability through a tightening of fiscal and monetary policies, to reduce inflation and strengthen foreign currency reserves, among other things (see http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/notes/pakistan.htm). 15. "Guess Who Has the Hottest Stock Market," Up Front, BusinessWeek, September 23, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_38/c3800022.htm#B3800024 (accessed November 19, 2009). 16. Sri Lanka's debut sovereign bond, floated in October 2007, was three times over- subscribed. The entry into the international capital market was made at the peak of the subprime crisis, when investor confidence had fallen significantly, but the investment community accepted Sri Lanka's credit story. A second sovereign bond, floated in October 2009, was 13 times oversubscribed. These two bond issues greatly improved the country's foreign reserves situation. 17. The CRIB Act was amended in 2008, enabling significant changes in the ownership of shares of CRIB. The CBSL reduced its 51 percent shareholding to 19.9 percent, paving the way for other public sector credit institutions to jointly hold 51 percent. CRIB also went live with its new data transmission facility, which allows online data submission and continuous evaluation of customer credit profiles. Sri Lanka's CRIB, ranked among the best in South Asia, can now provide not only negative but also positive information on borrowers as well as protect customers by permitting them to obtain credit reports directly from CRIB. 18. The World Bank study (2008a) reports that in Bangladesh 32 percent of house- holds have access to financial services; in Bhutan, 16 percent; in India, 48 percent; in Nepal, 20 percent; and in Pakistan, 12 percent. No data are available for Afghanistan and Maldives. 100 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 19. Sanasa is the Sinhala acronym for the movement of thrift and credit cooperative societies, a microfinance cooperative network covering all provinces of Sri Lanka. Samurdhi is a donor-funded poverty alleviation program introduced by the Sri Lanka government in 1996. Samurdhi banking societies, the microfinance arm, have enhanced access to credit for poor families while promoting the savings and investment habit. 20. Banks in Sri Lanka are taxed at a rate close to 60 percent in addition to a debit tax on withdrawals. 21. Even with special debt recovery laws, commercial courts, and parate execution powers for banks, recovering loans backed by real estate will be difficult in Sri Lanka. 22. Information from Colombo Stock Exchange official Web site, http://www.cse.lk/ (accessed November 20, 2009). 23. Sri Lanka's stock market recorded unprecedented growth during the last quarter of 2009, with the All Share Price Index reaching 3,344.89 and the Milanka Price Index ris- ing to 3,809. Market turnover and capitalization have been high, in part because of foreign investment in Sri Lankan shares. 24. The information in this section was drawn mostly from CBSL (Annual Report, 2008). 25. To promote public confidence in the authenticity, integrity, and reliability of data messages, electronic documents, electronic records, and other communications, the CBSL requested LankaClear to be the certificate service provider for the financial sector. Under the guidance of the CBSL, LankaClear therefore launched Sri Lanka's first certificate authority under the brand name LANKASIGN, in accordance with Electronic Transaction Act No. 19 of 2006 and Computer Crimes Act No. 24 of 2007, which affords legal protec- tion against liability arising from electronic fraud. 26. A Red Book is a BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems publication documenting all payment systems in a particular country in a structured format. 27. Banking Act Direction No. 11 of 2007, Corporate Governance for Licensed Com- mercial Banks in Sri Lanka, issued by the CBSL on December 26, 2007. 28. IAS 32, IAS 34, and International Financial Reporting Standards are yet to be introduced, however. 4 Country Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators Comparisons with other countries in the region can help in assessing the finan- cial soundness of banking sectors in South Asia. For this purpose, the countries are ranked on the Getting Finance Indicators using a simple-average ranking method. The rankings should help in identifying where performance is strong and where improvements are most needed--and where each country is in the development process. While useful, the rankings are purely data driven and do not fully capture the strengths and weaknesses of banking systems. The underlying data provide com- parability, are easily available, and cover a range of years--and are therefore an integral part of any regional comparative study. But assessing the health of finan- cial systems on the basis of a limited number of micro indicators imposes many technical and practical limitations (caveats reflected in the interpretation of the results). Assessment of financial sector development has many aspects and needs to take into account such important factors as market conditions, monetary pol- icy, the state of the economy, the regulatory and supervisory framework, and the structure and capacity of the financial system. But while the rankings developed in this chapter cannot provide a full picture of the financial soundness of a bank- ing system, they can serve as one tool in a full-scale financial sector assessment. Two types of rankings are presented: a composite ranking based on the average scores for the five years 2004­08 and annual rankings for each of those years. The rankings are based on six micro indicators for each of seven financial dimensions--access to finance, performance and efficiency, financial stability, capital market development, market concentration and competitive- ness, payment systems development, and savings mobilization--and responses to the questionnaire used to assess the eighth dimension, corporate gover- nance. In the composite ranking, the countries are ranked on each of the eight dimensions across the five-year period to arrive at a composite score for each dimension. These composite scores are then averaged to produce an overall composite score. In the annual rankings, the countries are similarly ranked on financial indicators, and the scores within each dimension are added to arrive at the aggregate score for that dimension. (See chapter 8 for a description of the ranking methodology.) 101 102 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Composite Ranking In the five-year average composite ranking, India retains the top position with an overall composite score of 0.75--or a composite percentage score of 75 percent (table 4.1). The Indian commercial banking sector scores high on all dimensions except performance and efficiency. India's composite percentage score dropped from 80 percent in the previous edition of the report. Sri Lanka secures second place with a composite percentage score of 70 per- cent (up from 65 percent in the previous edition), displacing Pakistan thanks to better scores on access to finance, payment systems development, and savings mobilization. Pakistan drops to third place with a composite percentage score of 62 percent (down from 67 percent in the previous edition). Yet it still scores high on corporate governance policy, performance and efficiency, financial stability, and capital market development. Bangladesh and Maldives tie for fourth place with composite percentage scores of 57 percent. For Bangladesh, this rank is the same as in the previous edition, while Maldives is included for the first time in this edition. Bangladesh's strengths are market concentration and savings mobilization, while Maldives scores high on access to finance and performance and efficiency.1 Bhutan, also included for the first time, secures sixth place with a composite percentage score of 48 percent. Bhutan's financial stability ratios indicate moder- ate overall stability.2 With the inclusion of three new countries, Nepal drops to seventh place with a composite percentage score of 47 percent (up from 42 percent in the previous edition). Nepal scores well on market concentration thanks to less concentrated markets--and fairly high on savings mobilization.3 Afghanistan is in eighth place with a composite percentage score of 28 percent. Data understandably are unavailable for many of the indicators, a situation that Da Afghanistan Bank is working to remedy by issuing guidelines and strengthen- ing its structure and systems. A radar graph shows each country's relative strengths and weaknesses based on the rankings (figure 4.1). India leads the countries with scores ranging from 0.97 on capital market development to 0.48 on performance and efficiency. Afghani- stan ranks lowest, with scores ranging from 0.63 on corporate governance to 0.13 on market concentration and competitiveness (a dimension in which Afghani- stan lacks data for most indicators). A second radar graph highlights the relative performance on different dimen- sions by the countries as a group (figure 4.2). All countries had relatively high scores on corporate governance--ranging from 0.87 in Pakistan to 0.54 in Maldives-- and on performance and efficiency--ranging from 0.93 in Maldives to 0.26 in Afghanistan.4 By contrast, most countries had relatively low scores on capital mar- ket development--ranging from 0.97 in India to 0.13 in Afghanistan--and on pay- ment systems development--ranging from 0.94 for Sri Lanka to 0.23 in Maldives. The two radar graphs show that development levels differ among countries as well as among dimensions. How far each country has progressed in develop- ing its financial sector depends on many aspects. While the region's countries have some similarities, they also form a diverse group with different strengths and weaknesses. The varied results presented in the radar graphs underscore the impossibility of introducing uniform financial sector development policies or reform programs in all the countries. Table 4.1 Composite Ranking on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2008 (five-year average composite ranking) Dimension Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Access to finance Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.13 0.58 0.48 0.70 0.94 0.31 0.48 0.89 Dimension rank 8 4 5 3 1 7 5 2 Performance and efficiency Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.26 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.93 0.50 0.73 0.64 Dimension rank 8 7 4 6 1 5 2 3 Financial stability Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.41 0.48 0.70 0.82 0.56 0.22 0.70 0.58 Dimension rank 7 6 2 1 5 8 2 4 Capital market development Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.13 0.61 0.36 0.97 0.38 0.58 0.74 0.70 Dimension rank 8 4 7 1 6 5 2 3 Market concentration and competitiveness Country Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 103 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.13 0.78 0.32 0.91 0.58 0.69 0.56 0.52 Dimension rank 8 2 7 1 5 3 4 6 Payment systems development Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.25 0.36 0.38 0.53 0.23 0.24 0.39 0.94 Dimension rank 6 5 4 2 8 7 3 1 Savings mobilization Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.29 0.57 0.48 0.80 0.43 0.52 0.49 0.53 Dimension rank 8 2 6 1 7 4 5 3 Corporate governance Composite score (aggregate score/40) 0.63 0.71 0.60 0.78 0.54 0.68 0.87 0.78 Dimension rank 6 4 7 2 8 5 1 2 Total score 2.23 4.52 3.82 5.99 4.57 3.73 4.96 5.58 Overall composite score (total score/8) 0.28 0.57 0.48 0.75 0.57 0.47 0.62 0.70 Composite percentage score 28 57 48 75 57 47 62 70 Overall rank 8 4 6 1 4 7 3 2 Source: Table 8.1. 104 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 4.1 South Asian Countries Have Varying Strengths and Weaknesses in Their Commercial Banking Sectors (five-year average composite score, 2008) Afghanistan Sri Lanka 0.94 Bangladesh 0.63 0.78 Pakistan Bhutan 0.87 0.70 0.69 Nepal 0.97 India 0.94 Maldives access to finance performance and efficiency financial stability capital market development market concentration and competitiveness payment systems development savings mobilization corporate governance Source: Table 8.1. Annual Rankings Annual rankings for each of the five years from 2004 to 2008 make it possible to observe year-to-year changes in rankings. In the overall ranking, there was no change over the five years in the first two positions, with India remaining in first place and Sri Lanka in second (table 4.2). Maldives occupied third place in 2004, but Pakistan moved up to third place in 2005 and remained there through 2008. Maldives dropped to fourth place in 2005, then to fifth place in 2008, when Bangladesh moved up from fifth place to fourth. Nepal and Bhutan also switched places, with Nepal moving up to sixth place while Bhutan dropped to seventh. Afghanistan occupied eighth place throughout the period. A comparison of the 2008 annual ranking with the 2008 composite ranking (covering 2004­08) shows no difference in the first three places--held by India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Bangladesh holds fourth place in the 2008 annual ranking but shares that place with Maldives in the composite ranking. For Maldives, strong performance in the first four years (2004­07) offset weaker performance in 2008 Country Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 105 Table 4.2 Annual and Composite Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2004­08 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Annual rankings 2004 rank 8 5 6 1 3 7 4 2 2005 rank 8 5 6 1 4 7 3 2 2006 rank 8 5 6 1 4 7 3 2 2007 rank 8 5 6 1 4 7 3 2 2008 rank 8 4 7 1 5 6 3 2 Composite rankings 2008 rank (2004­08) 8 4 6 1 4 7 3 2 2006 rank (2001­06) a 4 a 1 a 5 2 3 Sources: Appendix 6; table 8.1; Sophastienphong and Kulathunga 2008. a = Not included in the data set. Figure 4.2 South Asian Countries Have Focused Most on Corporate Governance and on Performance and Efficiency (five-year average composite score, 2008) access to finance Maldives, 0.94 corporate performance and governance efficiency Pakistan, 0.87 Maldives, 0.93 savings financial mobilization stability India, 0.80 India, 0.82 payment systems capital market development development Sri Lanka, 0.94 India, 0.97 market concentration and competitiveness India, 0.91 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Source: Table 8.1. 106 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 to push it up to the shared fourth place. Similarly, Bhutan's performance in the first four years pushed that country up to sixth place in the composite ranking and pushed Nepal down to seventh. Also interesting is to compare the 2008 composite ranking with the previ- ous edition's 2006 composite ranking (covering 2001­06). In the 2006 composite ranking, India again held first place, while Pakistan was in second place (with a composite score of 0.67) and Sri Lanka in third (0.65). There was no difference in ranking for Bangladesh, while Nepal was in fifth place in the 2006 ranking, which did not include Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives. Differences between the two rankings reflect not only changes in performance levels but also the different time periods covered and the inclusion in this edition of two new dimensions-- payment systems development and savings mobilization. Five-Year Average Rankings on Micro Indicators Much more important than each country's place in the rankings are the factors underlying those rankings. Discovering what explains the rankings can help countries identify the areas needing further attention. Based on the five-year average composite ranking exercise, the following analysis provides a more com- plete picture of how each country performed on the micro indicators within each development dimension and therefore the key areas on which to focus. Access to Finance Maldives and Sri Lanka both have high scores on indicators of access to finance (figure 4.3). Yet in Maldives access to finance is an issue because of the disper- sion of its population among atolls. India scores well on all access indicators, while the scores for Pakistan suggest a need to focus on the use of financial services--the provision of loans and mobilization of deposits. Bangladesh scores low on demographic penetration for both branches and automated teller machines (ATMs), while Bhutan scores low on geographic penetration. Nepal's scores suggest a need to work on all aspects of access to finance, though increas- ing the number of players in the market has not provided the desired effect. Afghanistan scores lowest on all indicators. Performance and Efficiency Maldives ranks first in performance and efficiency, with the best scores on all indicators except the operating cost ratio (figure 4.4). Pakistan and Sri Lanka also have high scores on performance indicators, though they too need to monitor operating costs. Nepal has the best operating cost ratio in the region but high staff costs. Bhutan's performance ratios are fair, while India has relatively low ratios but with less volatility expected. Bangladesh's ratios are improving, with operating costs falling over the years. Afghanistan has also shown improvement over the short period since it started to collect all data. Financial Stability India leads the region in financial stability (figure 4.5). Pakistan follows with good provisions, though nonperforming loans need to be managed carefully. Country Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 107 Figure 4.3 Maldives and Sri Lanka Score Highest on Access to Finance 45 40 35 30 total score, 2004­08 25 20 15 10 5 0 tra c n eo ts pl s n ch n M tio TM ne hi tio eo unt 0 p oun e tio an tio AT pe rap pl e tra c A 0 p co tra br ,00 cc tra ic n ch og ,00 ac ne hi ne ic ne ph r1 a m pe rap pe raph pe oan r 1 it pe gra de pe pos og l o og an de m ge ge de br Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Source: Table 8.1. Bhutan shows high ratios but has lax capital and provisioning policies. While Maldives ranks a close second on the nonperforming loans ratio, it nevertheless needs to focus on this aspect. Sri Lanka needs to manage liquidity as well as focus on nonperforming loans. Bangladesh needs to further improve capital. Afghani- stan reports high provisions and low levels of nonperforming loans. Nepal urgently needs to improve capital as well as focus on provisions. Capital Market Development India has a developed capital market with higher market capitalization (figure 4.6). Pakistan and Sri Lanka need to focus on developing their bond markets, while all other countries need to focus on developing capital markets more broadly. Market Concentration and Competitiveness India has the lowest bank concentration ratios, indicating healthy competition, followed closely by Bangladesh (figure 4.7). Most South Asian countries need to 108 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 4.4 Maldives Ranks First in Performance and Efficiency 45 40 35 30 total score, 2004­08 25 20 15 10 5 0 g ng n ty ts io ra g er gi st tin ui se at w in rri tio ar eq tr co era po as rn cu tm os on on ea re op es fc rn rn er af tu tu nt st re re ti ne Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Source: Table 8.1. focus on private credit extended by banks because of the credit risks that rising levels could pose--even as they need to expand financial services. Bhutan (with only two banks) and Sri Lanka have high concentration ratios. Afghanistan lacked the data to calculate concentration ratios. Payment Systems Development Payment systems development is an area on which most countries in the region need to focus. Most lack payment and settlement systems for high-value transac- tions. Only India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems (figure 4.8). But some retail payment systems in the region are auto- mated net settlement systems. Savings Mobilization India leads in savings mobilization with relatively high financial deepening ratios, positive real interest rates, and high domestic savings rates (figure 4.9). Bangladesh Country Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 109 Figure 4.5 India Leads in Financial Stability 45 40 35 30 total score, 2004­08 25 20 15 10 5 0 s r rm to tio g at o tio tio cy l io in sr st ua ita at ing an fo s ra ra ra at rm io lo er on ie et eq cap ge lit ss ts s r rfo np isi io se ra bi a no rov an pe lia uid as ve lo on p le ad d liq sn ui liq os gr Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Source: Table 8.1. follows with high worker remittances and good savings rates but needs to address the negative real deposit interest rate. Other countries have also had persistently negative interest rates. But most countries enjoy steady worker remittances, a boon during these troubled economic times. Corporate Governance The assessment of corporate governance mainly shows how well defined the rel- evant guidelines are in a country. Pakistan has the most comprehensive guide- lines (figure 4.10). While all countries in the region have issued guidelines, more work is needed on many issues, such as those relating to government ownership, shareholder rights, indirect or beneficial share ownership, auditors and audit committees, accounting standards, and disclosure requirements. And although rankings may not reflect these aspects, even more important is that banks achieve more comprehensive compliance with the guidelines that have been issued and that authorities strengthen their monitoring and enforcement. total score, 2004­08 total score, 2004­08 He r d 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 fin d m ma ome ar rk s In ahl ke e tic de -H t c t to b x irs (H c ap e on HI hm ita qu d Source: Table 8.1. ) Source: Table 8.1. an liz ity at io n do K- b m ra ank ou es ts tic Afghanistan Afghanistan tio c ta p (k on nd ub = ce in lic 3) nt g , a ra to bo ss tio GD nd et n s P s K- Bangladesh Bangladesh ra ban tio k (k con to trad p in = ce 10 g 110 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 3) n st va , d tr oc lu ep ati ks e o os on Bhutan Bhutan its ra f tio K- b ra ank India ca India tio c pi stoc (k onc ta k = en liz m 3) tr at ar , l at io ke oa io n ns n to t GD P Maldives Maldives pr iv a by te c ba red nk it st s t ex va ock Nepal o te Nepal lu tr Figure 4.6 India Has the Region's Most Developed Capital Market GD nd e ad P ed to in Figure 4.7 India and Bangladesh Have Lower Market Concentration GD g P co m m Pakistan Pakistan as er se cia s ts l b tu tock to an rn GD ki ov ma P ng er rk ra et tio Sri Lanka Sri Lanka total score, 2004­08 total score, 2004­08 br n 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 oa d ci otes rc a (M mo ul nd 2) ne at to y s io co GD up n in to s Source: Table 8.1. Source: Table 8.1. P ply GD in P na rro Afghanistan w Afghanistan (M m re 1) one in al d to y te e GD su re po P ppl st s ra it y te Bangladesh Bangladesh gr tra va sa oss ns lue vi d ac o ng om tio f R st e ns TG Bhutan o sti to S Bhutan GD c GD P P India India r tra va to ese ns lue to rve ac o ta tio f r l d mo ns eta ep ne to il os y GD its Figure 4.9 India Performs Best in Savings Mobilization P Maldives lo an Maldives co to nc de en RT Nepal po tra GS Nepal sit tio ra n tio ra tio w Pakistan Pakistan or ke co reta r nc il to rem en pa GD itt tra ym P anc tio en n ts Figure 4.8 Sri Lanka Shows Laudable Progress in Payment Systems Development es ra tio Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Country Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 111 112 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 4.10 Pakistan Leads in Corporate Governance 6 5 4 total score, 2004­08 3 2 1 0 identification indirect and shareholder basic ownership adherence to independent role and compensation of substantial beneficial meetings and rights internationally internal and effectiveness majority holders ownership voting procedures accepted external auditors accounting and audit standards committee ownership structure and influence investor rights transparency and disclosure board structure and effectiveness of external stakeholders Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Source: Table 8.1. Country Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 113 Endnotes 1. As discussed in chapter 3, while Maldives scores high on access to finance, the indi- cators do not take into account the geographic dispersion of its population, and actual access to finance is far worse than the indicators suggest. This underscores the importance, emphasized in the introduction to this chapter, of using multiple tools to assess financial sector development. 2. While Bhutan scores high on financial stability, the ratios do not reflect its simpli- fied capital adequacy standards and lax provisioning rules. 3. Not reflected in Nepal's market concentration ratios is that it has too many new entrants to the banking sector, which has contributed to a real estate price bubble. To curb entry, Nepal Rastra Bank has temporarily suspended the licensing of new banks. 4. Attention is drawn once again to the fact that assessment of corporate governance in this exercise is confined to reviewing whether the necessary guidelines are in place or whether the law provides for such guidelines. No attempt is made to assess compliance and enforcement, both very important aspects. 5 An International Perspective To develop a modern, well-functioning financial system that will speed eco- nomic growth, countries need to understand international best practices, assess their own performance, and continually adapt the development effort to meet emerging challenges. Benchmarking is a useful tool in this process, making it possible to identify gaps and shortfalls in performance through comparison with other countries. To provide benchmarks for South Asian countries, the previous edition of this report used selected high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member and nonmember economies: Australia; Canada; Hong Kong, China; New Zealand; Singapore; the United Kingdom; and the United States. Depending on the availability of data, that edition focused on standard- setting OECD countries and members of the SEANZA (South East Asia, New Zealand, and Australia) group. This edition expands the benchmark group. It adds France, Germany, and Italy to provide comparisons with members of the European Union. And it adds China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand to strengthen the representation of high-growth Asian comparator economies. This chapter compares the performance of South Asian countries with the benchmark ranges--from low to high--for indicators in each of the seven financial dimensions (corporate governance is not benchmarked). Because of data availabil- ity issues for the benchmark economies for 2008, the comparison uses 2007 data. (See appendix 3A for the underlying benchmark data and appendix 3B for data sources; see appendix tables A2.1­A2.8 for data for the South Asian countries and the benchmark ranges for each year in 2001­08.) The chapter also compares the performance of South Asian countries with that of individual benchmark economies, again using 2007 data. Benchmark Comparison Relative to the benchmark economies, South Asia performs better in some finan- cial dimensions than in others. The region compares well on performance and efficiency, capital adequacy (under financial stability), market concentration and competitiveness, and savings mobilization. In other areas, the benchmark com- parison suggests a need for further improvements--such as access to finance, 115 116 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 nonperforming loans and provisioning (under financial stability), capital market development, and payment systems development. And while some South Asian countries come out well in the benchmark comparison, others are still at an ear- lier stage of development. While more work needs to be done, it must be empha- sized that South Asia has made laudable progress in key areas such as financial stability and performance and efficiency. Access to Finance A comparison of geographic branch penetration shows that some South Asian countries had high penetration ratios in 2007--especially Maldives, with 96.70 branches per 1,000 square kilometers, and Bangladesh, with 45.52 (figure 5.1). (As explained in chapter 3 and elsewhere, however, access indicators for Maldives are skewed by the geographic dispersion of its population.) The benchmark range was from a low of 1 branch per 1,000 square kilometers to a high of 110. All South Asian countries except Afghanistan had higher geographic branch penetration than the benchmark low. In benchmark economies, the use of tech- nology for banking activities, allowing "branchless banking," is one reason for the relatively low penetration levels. For automated teller machines (ATMs), the benchmark range for geographic penetration was from 3 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers to 146. Among South Asian countries, Maldives had the highest penetration ratio, with 130 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers, followed by Sri Lanka, with 13. Thus, to compare well with the international group, South Asia needs to further improve geo- graphic ATM penetration. Figure 5.1 Geographic Penetration Significant for Branches, Weak for ATMs in South Asia in 2007 150 130.00 146.00 96.70 110.00 100 45.52 24.13 branches or ATMs per 1,000 km2 (log scale) 17.69 13.45 10 9.11 9.82 5 4.39 3.00 3.20 3.29 1.00 1.12 1 0.67 0.26 0.23 0.03 0 bench/low Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka bench/high geographic branch penetration geographic ATM penetration Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. An International Perspective 117 Performance and Efficiency South Asia compared well with the benchmark economies on performance and efficiency ratios. The benchmark range for return on assets in 2007 was from a low of 0.2 percent to a high of 1.9 percent, and all South Asian countries except Afghanistan (because of negative returns) recorded ratios that were either very close to or above the benchmark high (figure 5.2). And Maldives reported a return on assets significantly higher than the benchmark high, 6.33 percent. Net interest margins in some South Asian countries were significantly higher than those in the benchmark economies. The benchmark range was from 0.4 percent to 3.61 percent. All South Asian ratios were higher than the bench- mark low. Significantly higher ratios were reported by Afghanistan (7.45 percent), Maldives (5.41 percent), and Sri Lanka (4.54 percent). South Asia outperformed the benchmark economies in cost management. The benchmark range for the operating cost ratio was from a low of 55.82 percent to a high of 313.18 percent. Three South Asian countries had operating cost ratios below the benchmark low: Nepal (22.62 percent), Maldives (26.83 percent), and Bhutan (49.97 percent). And the highest ratio in South Asia was just a third of the benchmark high--Afghanistan's, at 101.79 percent. Financial Stability South Asia showed mixed performance in financial stability. The region com- pared favorably on capital adequacy ratios (figure 5.3). The benchmark range Figure 5.2 South Asia's Performance Ratios a Good Match for the Benchmark Group's in 2007 8 350 7.45 313.18 7 300 6.33 6 250 5 operating cost ratio (percent) 200 4 3.61 percent 3 150 2.11 2 1.90 101.79 1.43 100 1 55.82 0.40 0.20 50 0 ­0.26 22.62 ­1 0 bench/low Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka bench/high return on assets net interest margin operating cost ratio Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. 118 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 5.3 South Asia's Capital Adequacy Favorable in 2007, but Room to Improve Credit Quality 1,000 40 38.35 35 188.90 30 100 88.20 25 capital adequacy ratio (percent) 28.80 percent (log scale) 13.23 12.44 20 10 8.60 14.60 15 1.56 10 7.15 1 5 0 Basel guideline, 8% 0.2 ­1.71 0.1 ­5 bench/low Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka bench/high gross nonperforming loans ratio provisions to nonperforming loans ratio capital adequacy ratio Basel guideline Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. was from 7.15 percent (below the Basel II capital adequacy limit of 8 percent) to 14.60 percent. All South Asian countries reported capital adequacy ratios above the Basel II limit except Nepal (-1.71 percent) and Bangladesh (7.52 percent). Afghanistan had a capital adequacy ratio of 38.35 percent, significantly higher than the benchmark high. Comparing South Asian countries on the financial stability dimension is difficult because not all of them have adopted Basel II. Over time, South Asian countries will need to ensure that all banks are complying with additional capital requirements for liquidity, market, and operational risks under new guidelines proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009). But the benchmark comparison suggests that South Asian countries need to pay more attention to reducing nonperforming loans to bring the gross nonper- forming loans ratio much closer to the benchmark low. The benchmark low for the ratio was 0.2 percent, and the benchmark high was 8.6 percent. Two South Asian countries recorded a gross nonperforming loans ratio above the bench- mark high: Nepal (10.56 percent) and Bangladesh (13.23 percent). Maldives recorded the lowest ratio, at around 1.56 percent. Results also suggest a need for South Asian countries to further increase provi- sions for nonperforming loans. In the benchmark economies provisions for non- performing loans ranged from 28.8 percent to 188.9 percent. Among South Asian countries, Pakistan had the highest provisions ratio, at 88.20 percent. But even An International Perspective 119 this did not compare well with the benchmark high, and all other ratios in the region were closer to the benchmark low. Nepal's ratio was below the benchmark low at 12.44 percent. That being said, it should be noted that having higher provisions alone does not denote good banking practice. High provisioning could also mean that the loans are not recoverable. Capital Market Development The benchmark comparison shows that capital markets are relatively undevel- oped in South Asia and should be made a focus of development efforts. Only India recorded capital market development ratios somewhat comparable to those of the benchmark economies. For the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, the benchmark range was from 36.70 percent to 1,284.15 percent, while India's ratio was 83.77 percent (figure 5.4). For the stock trading value to GDP ratio, the benchmark range was from 18.68 percent to 1,033.79 percent, while India recorded a ratio of 70.33 percent, significantly higher than the benchmark low. And for the stock market turnover ratio the benchmark range was from 0.52 to 2.70, while India's ratio was 0.67. Market Concentration and Competitiveness Several South Asian countries had concentration ratios that were fairly competitive with those of the benchmark economies, indicating overall lower concentration in Figure 5.4 South Asia Lagged in Capital Market Development in 2007 10,000 3 2.70 1,284.15 1,033.79 2.5 100 83.77 70.33 2 36.7 market turnover (times) percent (log scale) 18.68 9.76 1.5 1 1 0.67 0.52 0.5 0.05 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 bench/low Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka bench/high stock market capitalization to GDP stock trading value to GDP stock market turnover ratio Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. Note: Afghanistan has no stock market, hence no data are available. 120 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 their banking markets (figure 5.5). With small banking sectors, however, Bhutan and Maldives have highly concentrated markets. Sri Lanka also has high concentra- tion. No data were available for Afghanistan. For the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index the range for benchmark economies was from 280.88 (classified as unconcentrated) to 2,080.86 (highly concentrated). Other than Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka, South Asian countries have markets that are unconcentrated on the basis of this measure. Bhutan has only two banks and therefore very high concentration. Sri Lanka's market is moderately concen- trated, with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index value of 1,217.18 in 2007. Results for the three-bank concentration ratios were similar. For private credit extended by banks, most South Asian countries had lower ratios than the benchmark economies. The benchmark range was from 62.44 percent to 189.58 percent. Only Maldives had a ratio above the benchmark low, at 91.28 percent. Payment Systems Development The benchmark comparison on payment systems development shows mixed results in South Asia, and the overall assessment is that this is an area needing attention in most of the region's countries. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka reported figures comparable to those of the benchmark economies. But other South Asian countries fared poorly in the benchmark comparison because of a low level of payment systems development or lack of data. Figure 5.5 Varied Results on Market Concentration in South Asia in 2007 200 6,000 189.58 5,414.57 180 5,000 160 140 4,000 3,676.00 120 HHI value percent 100.00 100 95.12 3,000 91.28 80 2,080.86 62.44 highly concentrated 64.23 2,000 60 moderately concentrated 40 28.97 1,000 24.19 18.41 20 484.32 unconcentrated 280.88 0 0 bench/low Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka bench/high K-bank concentration ratios (k = 3), loans private credit extended by banks to GDP Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. Note: No data available for Afghanistan. An International Perspective 121 For the value of real-time gross settlement transactions to GDP ratio, the bench- mark range was from 2,147 percent to 17,557 percent (figure 5.6). The high- est ratio recorded for South Asia was India's 596.72 percent. For the value of retail transactions to GDP ratio, the benchmark range was from 0.57 percent to 5,067.78 percent. All reported ratios for South Asia compared well with the benchmark low, while the highest ratio for South Asia, Pakistan's 1,423 percent, was closer to the benchmark high. For the ratio of notes and coins in circula- tion to GDP, the benchmark range was from 1.94 percent to 31.03 percent. Most South Asian countries recorded significantly higher ratios than the benchmark low. The exception was Sri Lanka, which recorded a ratio of 4.89 percent. The rel- atively high ratios for South Asia reflect the higher use of currency in the region. Savings Mobilization South Asia compared well with the benchmark economies on savings mobiliza- tion in 2007 (figure 5.7). For the ratio of worker remittances to GDP, the benchmark range was from 0.02 percent to 1.02 percent. All reported ratios for South Asia were significantly higher than this range, indicating the importance of worker remittances in the region. Nepal had the region's highest ratio, at 13.77 percent, followed by Bangladesh with 10 percent. Figure 5.6 Payment Systems Development in 2007: More Work to Be Done in Most of South Asia 1,00,000 35 31.03 17,557.00 30 10,000 2,147.00 notes and coins in circulation to GDP (percent) 1,423.00 25 1,000 596.72 percent ( log scale) 20 100 65.03 5,067.78 15 12.48 10 7.95 10 0.57 1 4.89 5 1.94 0.1 0 bench/low Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka bench/high value of RTGS transactions to GDP value of retail transactions to GDP notes and coins in circulation to GDP Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. Note: RTGS = real-time gross settlement. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal have no RTGS systems, hence no data are available. Pakistan has an RTGS system, but no data are available. Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal have no data available on the value of retail transactions to GDP. 122 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 5.7 Savings Mobilization Favorable in South Asia in 2007, with Room to Improve 70 1,000 60.07 412.65 60 52.89 broad money supply (M2) to GDP (percent; log scale) 50 100 71.71 72.61 40 35.70 42.03 percent 30 23.76 20.40 20 17.78 17.60 15.19 10 13.77 10.00 9.70 10 7.74 4.17 2.96 0.02 0.28 1.02 0 ­8.72 ­10 1 bench/low Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka bench/high worker remittances to GDP gross domestic savings to GDP broad money supply (M2) to GDP Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. Note: Afghanistan and Bhutan: no data on worker remittances to GDP are available. Maldives: no data on gross domestic savings to GDP are available. Results for the gross domestic savings to GDP ratio were similar. The bench- mark range was from 15.19 percent to 52.89 percent. While Afghanistan had a negative savings rate (-8.72 percent), all other rates reported for South Asian countries were highly favorable. Bhutan recorded the highest at 60.07 percent. Results for the broad money supply to GDP ratio, which indicates the extent of financial deepening in a country, show a need to improve financial deepen- ing and intermediation in South Asian countries. The benchmark range was from 42.03 percent to 412.65 percent. Maldives recorded the highest ratio in South Asia, at around 72.61 percent, followed by India with 71.71 percent. Benchmark Comparison with Individual Economies While the previous section compares the performance of South Asian countries on financial indicators against benchmark ranges, this section compares their performance on selected indicators against that of individual economies in the two benchmark groups: OECD countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and a peer group in Asia (China; Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; Singapore; and Thailand). The comparison is done graphically. Some of the comparative data are given in table 5.1. For the graphic presenta- tion (in figures 5.8­5.14), the underlying data are available in appendix tables Table 5.1 Financial Ratios for South Asian Countries and OECD and Asian Economies (Selected), 2007 (percent, except where otherwise specified) Performance and Capital market Market concentration Payment systems Access to finance efficiency Financial stability development and competitiveness development Savings mobilization Domestic Stock K-bank Private Notes and Value of Gross Branches ATMs Capital Gross public market concentration credit coins in RTGS domestic Worker per 1,000 per 1,000 Return on Return on adequacy nonperforming bonds to capitalization ratio (k = 3), extended by circulation transactions savings remittances Economy km2 km2 equity assets ratio loans ratio GDP to GDP assets banks to GDP to GDP to GDP to GDP to GDP Afghanistan 0.26 0.03 ­1.07 ­0.26 38.35 3.00 -- -- -- -- 12.07 -- ­8.72 -- Bangladesh 45.52 4.39 50.94 1.95 7.52 13.23 18.78 10.07 31.58 33.11 7.50 -- 20.40 10.00 South Asian countries Bhutan 1.12 0.23 18.31 1.54 16.17 4.91 3.53 9.76 100.00 24.19 6.27 -- 60.07 -- India 24.13 9.11 17.31 1.43 12.28 2.50 34.71 83.77 31.12 44.30 11.13 596.72 35.70 2.96 Maldives 96.70 130.00 49.99 6.33 15.58 1.56 4.02 26.65 92.55 91.28 8.46 -- -- 0.28 Nepal 3.20 0.67 ­78.70 1.87 ­1.71 10.56 13.66 25.62 35.83 31.94 12.50 -- 9.70 13.77 Pakistan 9.82 3.29 21.90 2.30 13.80 6.30 32.94 46.20 38.62 28.43 11.55 -- 17.78 4.17 Sri Lanka 17.69 13.45 25.37 1.93 13.59 6.62 29.99 23.00 51.79 33.26 4.85 65.03 17.60 7.74 China 5.52 5.96 19.90 1.00 7.70 6.60 34.65 136.55 35.01 115.83 31.03 -- 52.89 1.02 Asian peer group Hong Kong, China 1,234.00 2,420.00 20.05 1.90 13.40 0.90 8.95 1,284.15 56.87 139.58 10.91 15,069.65 32.18 0.17 Malaysia -- -- 16.14 1.40 13.20 6.60 38.57 180.00 32.37 105.13 8.36 5,923.89 42.20 0.97 Singapore 487.00 1,658.00 13.40 1.40 14.00 1.80 42.21 334.17 64.11 95.72 7.14 6,546.88 51.41 -- Thailand 6.84 -- 7.30 0.30 14.60 8.60 38.52 80.19 31.99 84.10 10.34 2,147.19 34.49 0.67 Australia 0.68 3.32 28.10 1.60 10.30 0.20 14.46 158.00 35.60 122.81 16.58 17,557.12 26.23 0.47 Canada -- -- 12.50 0.60 12.10 0.40 55.24 164.85 57.13 127.26 3.30 3,186.06 -- -- An International Perspective 123 France -- -- 9.88 0.31 -- 2.80 54.84 164.80 57.17 -- 7.18 8,658.22 20.20 0.53 OECD countries Germany -- -- 14.04 0.44 -- -- 42.25 63.85 64.30 -- 7.18 9,621.95 25.32 0.26 Italy 110.40 145.65 11.40 0.76 10.90 -- 84.10 50.89 66.89 -- 7.18 2,749.44 21.18 0.15 Japan -- -- 3.20 0.20 12.90 1.50 163.25 106.56 25.21 96.92 16.66 6,815.76 -- 0.04 Korea, Rep. -- -- 14.98 1.00 12.70 0.80 48.05 115.76 29.01 107.81 3.67 -- 30.20 0.12 New Zealand 4.28 8.93 16.24 1.06 7.15 -- -- 36.70 55.25 149.49 1.94 5,658.53 -- 0.48 United Kingdom -- -- 8.25 0.51 -- -- 33.10 141.20 39.51 189.58 3.51 9,159.75 15.19 0.30 United States 6.96 -- 10.50 1.10 12.80 1.10 47.72 144.25 40.47 62.44 5.74 8,382.42 -- 0.02 Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. -- = not available. 124 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 5.8 South Asia Showed Improving Access in 2007 Thailand Asian peer Singapore group Malaysia Hong Kong, China China United States United Kingdom New Zealand OECD countries Korea, Rep. Japan Italy Germany France Canada Australia Sri Lanka South Asian countries Pakistan Nepal Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Afghanistan 0.01 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1,000.00 10,000.00 ATMs or branches per 1,000 km2 (log scale) geographic ATM penetration geographic branch penetration Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. Figure 5.9 South Asia Outperformed Comparator Group in Return on Equity in 2007 Thailand Asian peer Singapore group Malaysia Hong Kong, China China United States United Kingdom Korea, Rep. OECD countries New Zealand Japan Italy Germany France Canada Australia Sri Lanka South Asian countries Pakistan Nepal Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Afghanistan ­100.00 ­80.00 ­60.00 ­40.00 ­20.00 0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 return on equity (percent) Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. An International Perspective 125 Figure 5.10 South Asian Capital Adequacy Ratios Compared Well in 2007 Asian peer Thailand group Singapore Malaysia Hong Kong, China China United States United Kingdom Korea, Rep. OECD countries New Zealand Japan Italy Germany France Basel guideline, 8% Canada Australia Sri Lanka South Asian countries Pakistan Nepal Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Afghanistan ­5.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 35.00 40.00 45.00 capital adequacy ratio (percent) Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. Figure 5.11 Outstanding Public Bonds Slightly Lower in South Asia Than in Comparator Group in 2007 Thailand Asian peer Singapore group Malaysia Hong Kong, China China United States United Kingdom Korea, Rep. OECD countries New Zealand Japan Italy Germany France Canada Australia Sri Lanka South Asian countries Pakistan Nepal Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Afghanistan 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (percent) Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. 126 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 5.12 South Asia Matched Comparator Group in Concentration of Banking Assets in 2007 Thailand Asian peer Singapore group Malaysia Hong Kong, China China United States United Kingdom Korea, Rep. OECD countries New Zealand Japan Italy Germany France Canada Australia Sri Lanka South Asian countries Pakistan Nepal Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Afghanistan 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (percent Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. Figure 5.13 South Asia's Narrow Money Supply to GDP Ratio High and Comparable to That in Most Benchmark Economies in 2007 Thailand Asian peer Singapore group Malaysia Hong Kong, China China United States United Kingdom Korea, Rep. OECD countries New Zealand Japan Italy Germany France Canada Australia Sri Lanka South Asian countries Pakistan Nepal Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Afghanistan 0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00 140.00 160.00 180.00 narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (percent) Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. An International Perspective 127 Figure 5.14 South Asia Strong on Worker Remittances in 2007 Thailand Asian peer group Singapore Malaysia Hong Kong, China China United States United Kingdom Korea, Rep. OECD countries New Zealand Japan Italy Germany France Canada Australia Sri Lanka South Asian countries Pakistan Nepal Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Afghanistan 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 worker remittances to GDP (percent; log scale) Source: Appendix tables A2.7 and A3.7. A2.7 and A3.7). Because the data in the table and figures are analyzed in aggregate form in the previous section, there is no further discussion of the comparative performance in this section. The comparison uses data for 2007 because more recent data were not avail- able for the benchmark economies. Interestingly, beyond 2007 the financial performance ratios of the most advanced economies would have deteriorated. Thus, the applicability of benchmarks and best practices may be reviewed in future editions. 6 Findings and Observations The eight economies of South Asia, from the smallest one (Afghanistan) to the largest and most dynamic (India), face both common challenges and unique ones. As they pursue lasting economic growth, top priority should be accorded to finan- cial reforms that build stable financial systems--systems resilient to economic shocks. Financial sector development is multifaceted, encompassing such aspects as lower intermediation costs, dynamic savings mobilization, market-oriented regulatory systems, diversity of market players, expanded access to finance, better allocation of resources, greater efficiency through improved technology, and availability of innovative financial instruments. Progress should be continually monitored by the authorities and remedial action taken to ensure the desired out- comes. The analysis and findings in this report should help in this process. In pursuing reform, South Asian countries have introduced structural changes and policy reforms, adopted new technologies, undertaken legal and regulatory reforms, developed capital adequacy frameworks, strengthened bank supervision, promoted capital market development, and developed market infrastructure and payment systems. They have also introduced corporate governance guidelines to improve transparency and accountability. The region's countries should be com- mended for undertaking these reforms in the face of daunting economic challenges. These reforms, still ongoing, have helped improve financial system soundness. Analysis of the Getting Finance Indicators confirms that the region's com- mercial banking sectors have made progress. It also shows that much work remains--and that progress has been uneven across countries. Most countries have made improvements in such dimensions as performance and efficiency, market concentration and competitiveness, savings mobilization, and corporate governance. Greater efforts are needed in access to finance, financial stability, capital market development, and payment systems development. In interpreting the findings in this report, readers should bear in mind the tech- nical and practical limitations of the analysis and underlying data noted elsewhere in the report. The indicator analysis for different development dimensions should not be considered in isolation. Indicator analysis can only provide clues to the financial soundness of a banking system and thus should be considered together with qualitative analysis of other important information--such as a country's prudential regulations (and the compliance with those regulations) and the state of its economy. Still, the country analysis based on the indicators, together with the 129 130 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 comparative analysis of prudential norms and the country rankings, can provide valuable information on both the strengths and the deficiencies of South Asian banking systems, helping the authorities focus their development efforts. Access to Finance To provide financial services to the poor, South Asian countries will need to improve access to commercial banking facilities. In most countries, such facilities are largely confined to urban areas. While microfinance is common in South Asia, bank finance plays a vital role, sometimes as the sole source of long-term funding in the absence of developed capital markets. Among South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has high access as well as use ratios and these are expected to improve further with the North-East rehabilitation pro- gram started in 2009. Maldives has the highest penetration ratios, but these do not reflect the true picture because they do not account for the geographic disper- sion of the population among atolls. Indeed, access to finance is a serious issue in Maldives, one that the country is addressing through a mobile banking project. In Afghanistan, credit penetration is low because of the lack of an extensive banking network. Bhutan needs to improve access to finance to speed economic growth. Nepal finds itself in a unique situation: even with rapid growth in the number of banks, financial access in rural areas remains limited. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan also need to improve financial access in underserved rural areas. In the benchmark group, greater use of technology has made branchless banking possible, resulting in low branch penetration levels. South Asia is also moving in this direction. Performance and Efficiency Performance and efficiency are one area in which South Asian banks appear to have done well. Supported by high net interest margins, both the return on assets and the return on equity steadily improved over the years. But higher spreads could mean higher risk taking, and banks could be vulnerable to interest rate risk as well as credit risk. Overall, South Asian banks had higher performance indica- tors and lower operating costs than those in the benchmark economies--and their profitability has steadily increased. Even so, the region's banks should focus on reducing operating costs. Afghan banks operate with high interest spreads but low recurring earning power. Bangladesh banks need to further lower operating costs. Those in Bhutan need to work toward achieving cost as well as technological efficiency. In Maldives, return ratios are falling while operating costs are rising, a trend that needs to be managed. Driving this trend is the high concentration of bank lending in tourism and fisheries, industries affected by recent economic events. Financial Stability Some South Asian countries have adopted the Basel II capital adequacy frame- work, while others are moving toward this important milestone. And South Asian banks have generally done well in maintaining capital adequacy ratios. But rising levels of nonperforming loans and declining provisions are a matter for Findings and Observations 131 concern. The nonperforming loan situation will need to be monitored carefully given the economic downturn that came in the wake of the global financial crisis. This situation is expected to worsen, and if banks are unable to provide for the bad loans and manage their asset portfolios, this could threaten the stability of the region's financial systems. Compared with the benchmark economies, South Asia does well on capital adequacy ratios but appears to lag in nonperforming loans and provisioning. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have already adopted Basel II capital guidelines. Nepal and Bangladesh have been conducting parallel runs in anticipation of the adoption of Basel II. Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives are using the Basel I framework, with Maldives issuing guidelines in 2009 on the use of the new capi- tal framework. Most South Asian countries lag behind in reporting operational risks and in initiating efforts to mitigate such risks. Among the countries that have moved to Basel II, only India has started to require its banks to rate their corporate customers. In addition, countries differ in their financial reporting and accounting standards, and the region as a whole is not yet fully compliant with the International Accounting Standards. Afghanistan reports high capital ratios and low nonperforming loans. But liquidity needs to be carefully monitored. Bangladesh is in the midst of restruc- turing systemically important public sector banks. The overall capital adequacy ratio remained below the regulatory requirement until 2008, and nonperforming loans and provisions need to be better managed. Recapitalization of banks would improve the stability of the banking system. In Bhutan, the growth of lending activity has reduced the capital adequacy ratio, but it is still very high. For avoid- ance of a credit bubble, however, the growth in loans should be monitored care- fully. And lax regulatory guidelines on loan classification and provisioning should be tightened. The Indian banking system has maintained steady capital ratios. But improv- ing performance should enable banks to further augment the capital base. In Maldives, the capital adequacy ratio is stable, but rising levels of nonperforming loans and declining provisions are a major cause for concern. Asset quality should be improved through efforts to diversify lending and enhance credit information. In Nepal, the restructuring of ailing public sector banks has made these banks profitable for the first time. But the banks continue to have large negative returns, suggesting a need to continue the process. Another concern for Nepal is the rapid entry of new banks. Aggressive competition has led to risky lending practices, and excessive exposure to real estate has created a real estate price bubble. This rep- resents a major risk to financial stability, since most banks lack substantial capital cushions. In most South Asian countries, the recoverability of nonperforming loans is an issue, especially for those backed by real estate. And this raises a ques- tion about whether such collateral has realizable value. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have speedily passed debt recovery laws, a move that other South Asian countries would do well to follow. In Pakistan, better regulatory guidelines and higher performance levels have ensured higher capital levels. But rising levels of nonperforming loans and declin- ing provisions are major concerns given the economic downturn. In Sri Lanka, the capital adequacy ratio is steady and above regulatory requirements, but the banking system would benefit from capital infusions. In addition, nonperform- ing loans are rising with the economic slowdown and need to be watched. 132 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 South Asian regulators also need to be mindful of high statutory reserve requirements and cash reserve requirements, because these raise the cost of funds and thus have a cascading effect on the transaction chain. To support the expan- sion of credit, central banks should reduce such requirements over time. Capital Market Development Capital market development needs attention in all South Asian countries. Only India has a developed capital market. The region's stock markets tend to be small and concentrated among a few players, and its bond markets are dominated by government bonds. Pakistan and Sri Lanka have fairly developed stock markets but, like other countries in the region, lack developed corporate bond markets. Along with India, both countries experienced capital outflows after the onset of the financial crisis as investors deleveraged their portfolios. And in Pakistan, the stock market crash of 2008 slowed the development of the market, though it is showing signs of recovery. Among the region's countries, only India lists govern- ment securities on the stock exchange and benchmarks on the yield curve. Other South Asian countries would benefit from doing the same at some point, to sup- port the development of their corporate bond markets. Lack of a developed capital market hampers domestic investment because of the greater difficulty in obtaining long-term funding--and requires banks to include long-term lending in their portfolios. Such practices could expose banks to credit risks because of maturity mismatch issues. Thus, capital market devel- opment should be considered as a vehicle for long-term growth. All South Asian countries except India need to greatly improve their measures of capital market development to match the benchmark economies. Market Concentration and Competitiveness Lower concentration in banking is widely believed to foster healthy competition and thus reduce intermediary costs. Market concentration is low in all major economies of South Asia except Sri Lanka, where the top three banks account for more than 50 percent of commercial banking assets. Bangladesh and India have low market concentration in terms of assets as well as loans and deposits. But in India, as in most countries, concentration within banking segments (public sec- tor, private sector, and foreign banks) needs to be monitored carefully. Pakistan managed to reduce concentration ratios over the eight-year period studied. In the region's three smaller economies, concentration is high. In Afghanistan, two banks account for more than 45 percent of assets, and in Maldives three account for more than 90 percent. Bhutan has only two banks. By contrast, Nepal has a market dilution problem: too many banks competing for too few assets, resulting in an asset price bubble. Thus, too much competition can also foster unhealthy situations. Driven by high interest margins, private credit has increased rapidly in all coun- tries in the region. In 2008, however, the pace of growth appeared to slow some- what as the economic slowdown began and banks started to scale back on lending operations in favor of consolidation. A rapid increase in private credit coupled with high interest margins is a cause for concern: if economic activity slows and interest rates drop, as is happening in the region today, this situation could give Findings and Observations 133 rise to both interest rate risk and credit risk. This issue requires immediate atten- tion to maintain system stability. And Bhutan and Nepal need to take care to avoid asset bubbles, which would undermine the health of their financial systems. In India's case, the rapid credit growth was backed by dynamic economic growth. The benchmark economies have higher ratios of private credit to GDP than their South Asian counterparts but, like India, also have far higher levels of economic development and growth. Payment Systems Development Payment systems development is another area needing greater attention in all South Asian countries. The payment system forms an integral part of the finan- cial infrastructure, enabling timely execution of the financial transactions arising from economic activity. In addition to retail payment systems, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have implemented real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems to handle large-value, time-critical payments. The region's other countries have retail payment systems and end-of-day net settlement systems for large-value payments. Sri Lanka has also developed a strong institutional, legal, and regula- tory framework to back its systemically important payment systems and estab- lished the National Payments Council as the decision-making body. Payment reforms in other countries have been focused mostly on automating the systems to increase efficiency. The benchmark economies are far ahead in payment sys- tems development, showing that South Asia still has much work to do. Thanks to efforts by the Payments Council of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), all SAARC countries--including Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal--have now established an appropriate forum to discuss pay- ment systems development, such as a national payments council or committee. The needs in developing payment systems differ among countries in the region. Coun- tries such as India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka need to strengthen their existing RTGS systems, while other countries need to introduce systems with RTGS capabilities for large-value and time-critical payments. The solutions also differ. In some coun- tries, the most economically viable solution is to implement one integrated system (and to automate the system). All countries need to develop their retail payment infrastructure. While the limited selection of indicators may not clearly reflect the weaknesses in this area, all countries have low levels of use of electronic payment instruments such as payment cards and credit and debit transfers. The availability of such payment instruments and services is low in South Asia compared with the benchmark economies. Savings Mobilization Savings mobilization was already important in South Asia because its capital markets are not fully developed, and it became even more so with the impact of the global financial crisis on external capital flows into the region's countries. Higher domestic savings could sustain capital investments and help countries move away from overreliance on external capital. All South Asian countries except Maldives enjoy steady inflows of worker remittances, a stream that has continued to flow despite the global financial crisis. In Maldives, the outflows of remittances are far greater than the inflows. Savings 134 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 rates in South Asia are generally high, though persistent inflation has driven real deposit interest rates into negative territory, affecting overall savings. One area that needs greater focus is financial deepening. Most countries have fairly high broad money supply (M2) to GDP ratios, but these could be improved. Compared with the benchmark economies, South Asian countries have fared better on worker remittances as well as domestic savings relative to GDP. But they fall short in financial deepening and real deposit interest rates. Overall, domestic savings are much more important in South Asian countries because of their lower levels of capital market development. In Afghanistan, the low savings rate and lack of a capital market have forced the country to rely heavily on external funding. Bangladesh has high worker remittances but needs to address its negative interest rates. Bhutan has a high savings rate but needs to curb inflation so as to maintain positive interest rates. India enjoys a high savings rate, positive real interest rates, and a high level of financial deepening. Even so, India's economic growth rate and its increasing requirements for domestic investment suggest a need to further encourage domestic savings. Maldives has not pursued a policy of savings mobilization but nevertheless has a high savings rate. Nepal has the second lowest domestic savings rate in South Asia after Afghanistan, but the highest remittance inflows relative to GDP. Pakistan has a low domestic savings rate, indicating a weak savings culture, and it is also battling high negative real interest rates resulting from persistent high inflation. In Sri Lanka, unprecedented inflation drove the real deposit interest rate to a new low. Sri Lanka also has a low savings rate, but its remittance inflows are stable. The country could further improve financial deepening. Corporate Governance All South Asian countries have attempted to incorporate guidelines on corporate governance into their prudential norms for banks. Some have issued comprehen- sive guidelines, including Pakistan, India, and, more recently, Sri Lanka. Others have issued guidelines covering different areas. But all countries need to focus more on compliance and enforcement. Government control over public sector banks is another common issue. In addition, different countries need to strengthen different areas of their regulatory guidelines. Afghanistan recently issued fairly detailed corporate governance guidelines, but it is still too soon to comment on their effectiveness. Some issues need further attention, including minority shareholder rights, influence of external stakehold- ers, and disclosure requirements relating to beneficial ownership. In addition, setting up a local accounting body should be among the priorities in working toward compliance with international accounting standards. Bangladesh has issued several guidelines covering key areas. But this process of developing comprehensive guidelines needs to be fast-tracked. There is a need to clearly define legal provisions governing beneficial ownership, minority share- holder rights, remuneration of directors, and roles and responsibilities of exter- nal and internal auditors. Full conformity with international accounting and auditing standards should be actively pursued. Bhutan's banking regulations include requirements relating to corporate governance, but there is no corporate governance code for banks. The country's Findings and Observations 135 banks would benefit from improvements in provisions governing such areas as beneficial ownership, proxy voting rights, special voting rights, remuneration of directors, and disclosure requirements. Other key efforts would include building awareness on corporate governance and shareholder and investor rights, devel- oping a code of corporate governance for banks, and streamlining accounting and auditing procedures. India has issued comprehensive guidelines. But additional efforts are needed besides strengthening compliance and enforcement and addressing government control over public sector banks. These include harmonizing standards and codes, revising statutes and guidelines to improve transparency and consistency, and reviewing performance-based compensation mechanisms and monitoring performance levels given recent events in the international arena. Maldives has issued a set of guidelines, though too recently to assess their effectiveness. Still, there is a need to clearly define voting procedures, minority shareholder rights, and transparency and disclosure principles, with an emphasis on accounting and auditing standards. In addition, the recently established local accounting body needs to be further strengthened and compliance with interna- tional standards pursued. While Nepal has issued guidelines for banks, weak corporate governance in some private sector banks is a growing concern because of the intense competition and high risk taking observed in the market. Also important is to focus on broad- ening investor rights, increasing disclosure, strengthening board effectiveness, and improving adherence to international accounting and auditing standards. Pakistan has issued comprehensive guidelines and developed a code of cor- porate governance. In addition, it has set up the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance to provide training and build awareness on corporate governance issues. Corporate governance of banks could be strengthened through greater transparency and disclosure, greater accountability, more disclosure on benefi- cial ownership, safeguards on stakeholder rights, greater clarification of board responsibilities, and greater emphasis on self-governance for institutions. Sri Lanka has taken important steps to improve corporate governance in banking by issuing mandatory guidelines. But further work is needed to make the guidelines more comprehensive and effective. Among the areas needing review are disclosure requirements, stakeholder rights, the rights of minority shareholders, and basic ownership rights to reflect shareholders' right to vote on bank operations. Because of lack of data as well as resource constraints, this study has not done a comparative assessment of corporate governance in the benchmark economies. Impact of the Financial Crisis While the global financial crisis has had little or no direct effect on South Asian countries, it has had an indirect effect in two ways. The ensuing recession in developed countries led to a slowdown in export activity and growth in South Asian economies. And the deleveraging activities of international investors led to an outflow of funds from portfolio investments and, to a lesser extent, from direct investments. For banks, these effects meant a slowing of the growth momentum and rising levels of nonperforming loans. Banks pulled back funding and became more concerned with preserving their asset portfolios than with pur- suing aggressive lending, resulting in a credit crunch. While South Asia will feel 136 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 the impact of the economic slowdown for the next few years, the region's banks can be expected to weather the slowdown well, thanks in part to conservative prudential guidelines established by regulatory authorities. South Asian countries share some common features in macroeconomic indi- cators and financial systems, and almost all have gone through similar phases of development at different times. In that light, it is hoped that this edition provides an opportunity for the region's policy makers and regulators to assess the status of their financial systems and replicate reforms and advances where suitable. 7 Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia As part of the World Bank's regional initiative to develop standardized indicators to measure the performance and soundness of the financial sector, this study uses indicators under eight categories: access to finance, performance and efficiency, financial stability, capital market development, market concentration and com- petitiveness, payment systems development, savings mobilization, and corporate governance.1 Initially, these indicators are being computed only for commercial banks. Interpretation and analysis of these indicators are likely to vary unless banking supervisors adopt a common methodology for computing them. Because most of the indicators take the form of ratios, understanding the underlying data is imperative. This guide provides common definitions, data sources, and concepts for both compilers and users of the indicators. For indicators appearing in previ- ous editions of Getting Finance in South Asia, the definitions are the same as those given in the compilation guide issued for those editions. Access to Finance In countries seeking to develop financial markets, it is important to monitor and measure the level of access to financial services. This knowledge provides a more balanced picture of financial sector development. It also enables policy makers and regulatory authorities to better target the development efforts. Initially, access to finance is being analyzed using data relating to providers of finance (supply- side data). Both demographic and geographic market penetration is analyzed. 1. Demographic branch penetration Bank branches per 100,000 people = Number of bank branches 100,000 Total population Number of bank branches: Number of commercial bank branches in the country at year-end. Total population: Total population at year-end. 139 140 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 This indicator measures the demographic penetration of the banking sector in terms of access to banks' physical outlets. Higher penetration means more branches and thus easier access. 2. Demographic ATM penetration ATMs per 100,000 people = Number of ATMs 100,000 Total population Number of ATMs: Number of automated teller machines (ATMs) of commercial banks in the country at year-end. Total population: As defined in eq. (1) above. This indicator also measures the demographic penetration of the banking sector in terms of access to physical outlets. Higher penetration means more ATMs and thus easier access. 3. Deposit accounts per 1,000 people Deposit accounts per 1,000 people = Number of deposit accounts 1,000 Total population Number of deposit accounts: Number of deposit accounts in commercial banks in the country at year-end. Total population: As defined in eq. (1) above. This indicator measures the use of banking services. Higher values mean greater use of services. 4. Loan accounts per 1,000 people Loan accounts per 1,000 people = Number of loan accounts 1,000 Total population Number of loan accounts: Number of loan accounts granted by commercial banks in the country at year-end. Total population: As defined in eq. (1) above. This indicator also measures the use of banking services, with higher values indi- cating greater use. 5. Geographic branch penetration Bank branches per 1,000 km2 = Number of bank branches 1,000 Total surface area (km2) Number of bank branches: As defined in eq. (1) above. Total surface area (km2): Total surface area of the country measured in square kilometers. Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia 141 This indicator measures the geographic penetration of the banking sector in terms of access to physical outlets. Higher values mean easier geographic access to branches. 6. Geographic ATM penetration ATMs per 1,000 km2 = Number of ATMs 1,000 Total surface area (km2) Number of ATMs: As defined in eq. (2) above. Total surface area (km2): As defined in eq. (5) above. This indicator also measures the geographic penetration of the banking sector in terms of access to physical outlets, with higher values indicating easier geographic access to ATMs. Performance and Efficiency Bank efficiency has become critical in an environment of increasingly competi- tive international markets. Thus comparative data on the efficiency of banks are important both to regulators and to banks, which can use the data to adjust their operating policies. For this study two types of efficiency are analyzed: returns efficiency and cost efficiency. 7. Return on equity (profits to period-average equity) Net income Return on equity = Average value of total equity Net income: Net profit before tax and other extraordinary adjustments. Average value of total equity: Can be calculated by taking the beginning- and end-period values for total capital (total equity) and finding the average. Total capital (total equity): Also called regulatory capital funds or own funds. Defined as Tier 1 (core) capital plus Tier 2 (supplementary) capital. Tier 1 capital: Equity capital and disclosed reserves that are freely available to meet claims against the bank. Tier 1 capital comprises paid-up shares, share premiums, retained earnings, statutory reserves, and general reserves. Good- will should be deducted because its value may fall during crises. According to international best practice, Tier 1 capital should be at least 50 percent of total capital funds. Tier 2 capital: Undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan loss provi- sions, and hybrid instruments that combine the characteristics of debt and equity and are available to meet losses and unsecured subordinated debt. According to international best practice, Tier 2 capital should be less than or equal to Tier 1 capital, subordinated debt should not exceed 50 percent of Tier 1 capital, and loan loss provisions should not exceed 1.25 percent of total risk- weighted assets. This ratio measures the efficiency with which a bank uses capital and, over time, the sustainability of the bank's capital position. 142 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 8. Return on assets (profits to period-average assets) Net income Return on assets = Average value of total assets Net income: As defined in eq. (7) above. Average value of total assets: Can be calculated by taking the beginning- and end- period values for total assets and finding the average. This ratio measures the efficiency with which a bank uses assets. 9. Staff cost ratio Staff cost ratio = Personnel expenses Operating expenses Personnel expenses: Total remuneration payable to employees. Operating expenses: All expenses other than interest expenses and provisions. This ratio measures personnel cost as a share of total operating expenses and reflects cost efficiency. 10. Operating cost ratio Operating cost ratio = Operating expenses Net interest earnings Operating expenses: As defined in eq. (9) above. Net interest earnings (net interest income): Interest earned less interest expenses. This ratio measures efficiency in controlling operating expenses in relation to net interest income. 11. Net interest margin Net interest earnings Net interest margin = Average value of total assets Net interest earnings (net interest income): As defined in eq. (10) above. Average value of total assets: As defined in eq. (8) above. This ratio measures the overall operating efficiency of the banking sector. 12. Recurring earning power Preprovision profits Recurring earning power = Average value of total assets Preprovision profits: Profits before tax and loan loss provisions. Average value of total assets: As defined in eq. (8) above. Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia 143 This ratio measures the recurring earning strength and efficiency of the banking sector. Financial Stability Financial stability means avoiding significant disruptions to the financial system and its functions. It is key to achieving both low inflation and sustainable eco- nomic growth. While different indicators measure different aspects of financial sector stability, this study uses capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity ratios. The two capital adequacy ratios measure the capacity of an institution to absorb losses and thus indicate its financial strength. The asset quality and liquidity ratios measure major vulnerabilities relating to credit risk and liquidity risk. 13. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Capital adequacy ratio = Regulatory capital funds Risk-weighted assets Regulatory capital funds: Also called own funds or total capital funds, as defined in eq. (7) above. Risk-weighted assets: Each class of assets and off­balance sheet exposures is weighted using weights related to the credit risk associated with each type of assets. The standard risk weights used as international best practice (Basel I) are as follows: · Cash, gold, and government or treasury securities, 0 percent · Loans to government agencies, 20 percent · Mortgage loans, 50 percent · Others, 100 percent The CAR assesses how well capital cushions fluctuations in earnings and sup- ports asset growth. The ratio should be calculated on a consolidated basis. In international best practice 8 percent of total risk-weighted assets on a consoli- dated basis is considered adequate capital. 14. Leverage ratio Leverage ratio = Total equity Total assets Total equity: Total capital funds as defined in eq. (7) above. Total assets: Total assets on the balance sheet at the end of the period without risk weighting. This ratio measures the extent to which assets are financed by funds other than own funds and thus is an indicator of capital adequacy. 15. Gross nonperforming loans ratio Gross nonperforming loans ratio = Gross nonperforming loans Total advances 144 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Gross nonperforming loans (NPLs): Amount of NPLs before specific loan loss provisions are deducted. In accordance with prudential norms, loans are clas- sified as nonperforming when payments of principal and interest are past due by three months. Total advances: Gross loans and advances, including NPLs before deducting spe- cific loan loss provisions. This ratio is a measure of asset quality and indicates the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio. 16. Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio Loan loss provisions Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio = Gross nonperforming loans Loan loss provisions: Specific loan loss provisions outstanding at the end of the period. Gross NPLs: As defined in eq. (15) above. This ratio is a measure of asset quality and identifies the adequacy or shortfall of the specific provisions made for NPLs. 17. Liquid assets ratio Liquid assets ratio = Liquid assets Total assets Liquid assets: Cash, demand deposits, and other financial assets that are available on demand or within three months or less. Total assets: As defined in eq. (14) above. This ratio measures stability. It indicates the liquidity available to meet expected and unexpected short-term demands for cash--and thus the vulnerability of the banking sector to loss of funding sources. 18. Liquid assets to liabilities ratio Liquid assets to liabilities ratio = Liquid assets Liquid liabilities Liquid assets: As defined in eq. (17) above. Liquid liabilities: Short-term debt liabilities and the net market value of financial derivatives positions (short term). This ratio also measures stability. It captures the liquidity mismatch between short-term assets and liabilities and indicates the extent to which a bank can meet its short-term obligations without incurring liquidity problems. Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia 145 Capital Market Development The development of capital markets is a powerful indicator of the depth of the financial sector. By allocating funds for viable investment projects, healthy capi- tal markets diversify the channels of financial intermediation. This study uses ratios to measure the size and structure of the stock and bond markets. 19. Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization ratio Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization ratio = Domestic bonds outstanding Equity market capitalization Domestic bonds outstanding: Total value of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by private entities as well as public entities, at the end of the period. Equity (stock) market capitalization: Market value of all outstanding shares cal- culated as share price times the number of shares outstanding at the end of the period. This ratio gives an indication of the size and structure of the capital markets. It also reflects financial depth and diversity. 20. Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP ratio Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP ratio = Domestic public bonds outstanding GDP Domestic public bonds outstanding: Total value of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by public entities. Gross domestic product (GDP): An aggregate measure of production in the economy equal to the total value added of all residential units engaged in pro- duction, for the given period. This is the nominal GDP. This ratio is a measure of the size of the bond market. It reflects the extent to which the public sector preempts resources that would otherwise be available to the private sector. 21. Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio = Trading value of top 10 stocks Total value of shares traded Trading value of top 10 stocks: Total value of the top 10 actively traded stocks in the stock exchange for the period under consideration, such as the financial year or calendar year. Total value of shares traded: Total value of shares traded in the stock exchange for the period under consideration, such as the financial year or calendar year. 146 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 This ratio measures the degree of concentration of the top 10 firms in the stock market and reflects the depth of the market. 22. Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio = Stock market capitalization GDP Stock market capitalization: As defined in eq. (19) above. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the importance of the stock market relative to the size of the economy. 23. Stock trading value to GDP ratio Stock trading value to GDP ratio = Total value of shares traded GDP Total value of shares traded: As defined in eq. (21) above. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the activity or liquidity in the stock market and reflects the ease of trading. 24. Stock market turnover ratio Stock market turnover ratio = Total value of shares traded Average market capitalization Total value of shares traded: As defined in eq. (21) above. Average market capitalization: Average of the end-period market capitalization values for the current period and the previous period. This ratio is a measure of efficiency in the stock market. Market Concentration and Competitiveness The study examines the market structure of the banking sector to evaluate the banking system's proneness to instability and crisis. A high level of concentration in the banking industry, by reducing competition and increasing cost, has an adverse impact on efficiency. At the same time, a highly competitive banking sec- tor might be more prone to crisis (because of greater fragility resulting from intense competition) than a more concentrated one. 25. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) n Herfindahl-Hirschman Index = (MS ) i =1 i ^2 Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia 147 HHI is calculated by squaring the market share (for assets) of each bank in the geographic banking market and summing the squares. This ratio measures market concentration in the commercial banking sector. A high value indicates a highly concentrated sector, which may lead to a lack of competitive pressure. 26. K-bank concentration ratio, assets K-bank concentration ratio (CRk), assets = Three largest banks' total assets Total assets of commercial banks (CRk), where k = three largest banks. Three largest banks' total assets: Calculated as the total assets of the three largest banks. Total assets of commercial banks: Total assets of the commercial banking sector. This ratio measures banking concentration in terms of assets. 27. K-bank concentration ratio, deposits K-bank concentration ratio (CRk), deposits = Three largest banks' total deposits Total deposits of commercial banks (CRk), where k = three largest banks. Three largest banks' total deposits: Calculated as the total deposits of the three largest banks. Total deposits of commercial banks: Total deposits of the commercial banking sector. This ratio measures banking concentration in terms of deposits. 28. K-bank concentration ratio, loans K-bank concentration Three largest banks' total loans ratio (CRk), loans = Total loans of commercial banks (CRk), where k = three largest banks. Three largest banks' total loans: Calculated as the total loans of the three largest banks. Total loans of commercial banks: Total loans of the commercial banking sector. This ratio measures banking concentration in terms of loans. 148 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 29. Private credit extended by banks to GDP ratio Private credit extended by banks to GDP ratio = Total value of private credit by commercial banks GDP Total value of private credit by commercial banks: Claims on the private sector by commercial banks. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the activity of banks as financial intermediaries in channeling savings to investors, relative to the size of the economy. 30. Commercial banking assets to GDP ratio Commercial banking assets to GDP ratio = Total commercial banking assets GDP Total commercial banking assets: As defined in eq. (26) above. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the importance of the commercial banking sector relative to the size of the economy. Payment Systems Development Safe and efficient payment systems are critical to the effective functioning of the financial system. Payment systems are the means by which funds are transferred between banks, and the most significant ones, referred to in this report as sys- temically important payment systems, are a major channel for the transmission of shocks across domestic and international financial systems and markets. Robust payment systems are therefore a key to maintaining and promoting financial stability. In the past few years a broad international consensus has devel- oped on the need to strengthen payment systems by promoting internationally accepted standards and practices for their design and operation (CPSS 2001). The six indicators selected to measure the development of payment systems are standard ones used by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Bank for International Settlements (CPSS various years). 31. Notes and coins in circulation to GDP ratio Notes and coins in circulation to GDP ratio = Value of notes and coins in circulation GDP Notes and coins in circulation: Notes and coins (or currency) in circulation out- side banks. This is the narrowest measure of money supply and is identified as Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia 149 a settlement medium used by nonbanks. Notes and coins represent the value of cash in circulation in the economy at the end of the year. This excludes the value of banknotes and coins kept in vaults at central banks or at banks but includes the value held by nonresidents. It also excludes commemorative coins not used for payments. When such coins are included, this should be mentioned in a footnote. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the importance of cash as a means of settlement used by nonbanks relative to the size of the economy. A higher ratio means greater use of basic instruments in settlement as against more advanced methods. 32. Narrow money supply to GDP ratio Narrow money supply to GDP ratio = Narrow money supply (M1) GDP Narrow money supply (M1): Cash in circulation and transferable deposits held by nonbanks, including nonresidents. This is also classified as a settlement medium used by nonbanks. When national definitions of narrow money sup- ply or M1 differ from the definition here, this should be noted in a footnote. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the dominance of narrow money as a means of settlement used by nonbanks relative to the size of the economy. 33. Value of RTGS transactions to GDP ratio Value of RTGS transactions to GDP ratio = Total annual value of RTGS transactions GDP Total annual value of RTGS transactions: Total value of transactions processed through the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system in the year. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the importance of the RTGS system as an interbank fund transfer system relative to the size of the economy. 34. Value of retail transactions to GDP ratio Value of retail transactions to GDP ratio = Total annual value of retail transactions GDP Total annual value of retail transactions: Total value of transactions (such as checks and credit clearing) processed through the retail payment system in the year. GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. 150 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 This ratio measures the importance of the retail payment system as an interbank fund transfer system relative to the size of the economy. 35. RTGS concentration ratio Total annual value of RTGS transactions of five largest participants Retail payments concentration ratio = Total annual value of RTGS transactions Total annual value of RTGS transactions of five largest participants: Market share of the five largest participants in the RTGS system, based on the total volume of transactions. Total annual value of RTGS transactions: As defined in eq. (33) above. This ratio measures the participation of users in the RTGS system as a fund trans- fer system, with high concentration denoting less participation. 36. Retail payments concentration ratio Total annual value of retail transactions of five largest participants Retail payments concentration ratio = Total annual value of retail transactions Total annual value of retail transactions of five largest participants: Market share of the five largest participants in the retail payment system, based on the total volume of transactions. Total annual value of retail transactions: As defined in eq. (34) above. This ratio measures the participation of users in the retail payment system as a fund transfer system, with high concentration denoting less participation. Savings Mobilization Financial systems that are more effective at pooling the savings of individuals can profoundly affect economic development. Besides having a direct effect on capi- tal accumulation, better savings mobilization can improve resource allocation and boost technological innovation (Levine 1999). The growth of output of any economy depends on capital accumulation, which in turn requires investment and an equivalent amount of savings to match it. Two of the most important issues in development economics, and for developing countries, are how to stim- ulate investment and how to bring about a higher level of saving to fund the increased investment (Thirlwall 2002). 37. Broad money supply to GDP ratio Broad money supply to GDP ratio = Broad money (M2) GDP Broad money (M2): M1 (currency and demand deposits held by the public) plus time and savings deposits held by the public with commercial banks. Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia 151 GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the impact of broad money on savings, which is the financial depth, or volume of intermediation. Financial deepening would be expected to have a positive effect on savings in the long run (Baliamoune and Chowdhury 2003). 38. Real deposit interest rate Real deposit interest rate = Nominal (average) deposit interest rate adjusted for inflation Real deposit interest rate: Nominal (average) deposit interest rate adjusted for inflation (or price changes). The deposit interest rate is the (average) rate paid by commercial or similar banks on demand, time, or savings deposits. This indicator measures the effect of the real interest rate on savings mobiliza- tion. Higher real interest rates imply higher rates of return on savings, which would lead to a shift of funds to savings. 39. Gross domestic savings to GDP ratio Gross domestic savings to GDP ratio = Gross domestic savings GDP Gross domestic savings: Calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption). GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures the level of domestic savings relative to the size of the economy. Higher savings would be expected to increase the funds available for investment. 40. Reserve money to total deposits ratio Reserve money to total deposits ratio = Reserve money Total deposits Reserve money: Currency held by the public and commercial banks, plus com- mercial bank and other government agency deposits held at the central bank. Total deposits: Total deposit liabilities held by financial institutions. This ratio is an indicator of the efficiency of financial intermediaries. A lower ratio means higher efficiency in financial intermediation, which would be expected to lead to better instruments and incentives for saving. 41. Loan to deposit ratio Loan to deposit ratio = Gross value of bank loans Total deposit liability Gross value of bank loans: Total gross value of bank loans outstanding at the end of the period. 152 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Total deposit liability: Total deposit liability of the banking sector at the end of the period. This ratio indicates a bank's use of savings. The higher the ratio, the more the bank is relying on borrowed funds, which are generally costlier than most types of deposits. 42. Worker remittances to GDP ratio Worker remittances to GDP ratio = Worker remittances and compensation of employees GDP Worker remittances: Current private transfers from migrant workers who are residents of the host country to recipients in their country of origin. Worker remittances include only transfers made by workers who have been living in the host country for more than a year, regardless of their immigration status. Compensation of employees: Income of migrants who have lived in the host coun- try for less than a year. Migrants' transfers are defined as the net worth of migrants who are expected to remain in the host country for more than one year and that is transferred from one country to another at the time of migration.2 GDP: As defined in eq. (20) above. This ratio measures worker remittances relative to the size of the economy. Worker remittances provide an important external source of funding for most developing countries and would be expected to have a positive impact on savings. Corporate Governance Sound corporate governance creates an environment that promotes banking effi- ciency, mitigates financial risks, and increases the stability and therefore the cred- ibility of financial institutions. Developing countries have much to gain by improving their corporate governance standards. The basic principles are the same everywhere: fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility. These are the minimum standards that give banks legitimacy, reduce vulnerabil- ity to financial crisis, and broaden and deepen access to capital. Scoring performance on corporate governance is hugely challenging and must be done with care. Unlike other types of financial analysis, where quantitative measures can provide "hard" benchmarks to guide the more qualitative aspects of analysis, assessing corporate governance is a largely qualitative exercise. Because corporate governance is assessed in this study through a series of straightforward questions, no definitions or guidelines are provided here. The questionnaire developed to assess corporate governance is based on the good governance practices outlined by the Organisation for Economic Co-oper- ation and Development (OECD) (table 7.1). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD 2004) provides the framework for the work of the World Bank Group in this area and identifies the key practical issues: the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and other financial stakeholders, the role of nonfinancial stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the board of directors (World Bank 2003). Compilation Guide for the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia 153 Table 7.1 OECD Principles Applied in the Corporate Governance Questionnaire Principle Explanation 1. The rights of shareholders A corporate governance framework should protect shareholders' rights. 2. The equitable treatment of All shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders, shareholders should be treated equally. 3. The role of stakeholders in corporate Good corporate governance recognizes that it is in the governance long-term interest of the corporation to respect the rights and interests of stakeholders. 4. Disclosure and transparency There is a need to ensure timely and accurate disclosure of all material matters relating to the corporation, including financial aspects, performance, ownership, and governance. 5. The responsibilities of the board The board is key to the strategic guidance of the company and the effective monitoring of the management. It should be fully able to undertake its tasks and responsibilities and be fully accountable to shareholders. Source: Enterprise Development Impact Assessment Information Service 2003. Table 7.2 Basel Committee Principles for Sound Corporate Governance Principle 1 Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance, and be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank. Principle 2 The board of directors should approve and oversee the bank's strategic objectives and corporate values that are communicated throughout the organization. Principle 3 The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organization. Principle 4 The board should ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management consistent with board policy. Principle 5 The board and senior management should effectively utilize the work conducted by the internal audit function, external auditors, and internal control functions. Principle 6 The board should ensure that compensation policies and practices are consistent with the bank's corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategy, and control environment. Principle 7 The bank should be governed in a transparent manner. Principle 8 The board and senior management should understand the bank's operational structure, including where the bank operates in jurisdictions, or through structures, that impede transparency (the "know your structure" principle). Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006. Also underlying the corporate governance questionnaire is a guidance paper issued in February 2006 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The guidance paper articulates eight principles to enhance corporate governance for banking organizations and to guide the actions of the directors, managers, and supervisors of a diverse range of banks (table 7.2). Endnotes 1. This guide does not include definitions for the corporate governance indicators, for which a separate questionnaire is used to collect the information (for more details, see the section in this chapter on corporate governance). 2. World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 8 Methodology This report, presenting findings on the financial soundness of the commercial banking sectors of South Asian countries, is based on a unique data set. In this edition, for the first time, the data set includes all eight South Asian countries. This chapter describes the compilation of the data, the choice of indicators, and the ranking methodology. Data Compilation Annual data on the commercial banking sector in each of the eight countries were compiled for the eight years from 2001 to 2008. The financial data were col- lected using a data collection template (see appendix 2 for the results). The cor- porate governance data were collected using a questionnaire in which the responders were asked to provide responses to each question as well as legal ref- erences to justify those responses (see appendix 4A for the responses). The data set is unique for two reasons. First, the data for each country were collected directly from its regulatory authorities or their published reports. Sec- ond, data comparability across the region was ensured by providing the data collectors with a compilation guide setting out definitions of the indicators and underlying concepts (see chapter 7). Data for benchmark economies were compiled from published reports of national authorities, reputable databases of international organizations, and, where ratios were unavailable, calculations by the authors. Definitions from the compilation guide could not always be strictly followed for benchmark econo- mies. But because the preparation of the compilation guide took into account international best practices and standards, the variations are minor. Moreover, even if definitions vary somewhat, these benchmarks provide the best available proxy for comparisons with the data collected for South Asian countries. Choice of Indicators To provide a holistic perspective on getting finance in South Asia and to improve the understanding of the region's financial systems, indicators were selected under eight dimensions (or categories): access to finance, performance and effi- ciency, financial stability, capital market development, market concentration and 155 156 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 competitiveness, payment systems development, savings mobilization, and cor- porate governance. The financial indicators are based on internationally accepted measures and reflect the structure of financial systems in South Asia, just as in the previous edi- tions of the report. The corporate governance indicators are based primarily on the guidelines issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which in turn rely on the principles of corporate governance published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see chapter 7). While market-based indicators such as credit ratings and market volatility would better serve macroprudential analysis, such indicators were not selected for this study. The effectiveness of these indicators depends on the quality and depth of financial markets. In most South Asian countries, these characteristics are directly affected by the ownership structure of the commercial banking sec- tor (with government-owned or government-controlled banks accounting for a large share of banking sector assets) and by the lack of stringent public disclosure requirements (for a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of macroprudential analysis, see World Bank and IMF 2005). It was therefore con- cluded that microprudential indicators would be better measures of the sound- ness of financial sectors in South Asia. Method for Country Rankings The ranking of countries on the financial and corporate governance indicators is based on a simple-average ranking method. Because of the limited size of the sam- ple, using a ranking method based on percentile averages is not warranted. Simple- average ranking also appears to be appropriate because of the lack of sufficiently detailed data to assess the impact of each indicator on financial soundness and, thus, to assign different weights to the indicators (see Djankov and others 2005). The report presents two types of rankings--a composite ranking based on the average scores for the five years 2004­08 and annual rankings for each of those years. Financial Indicator Scores For each financial indicator for each year, each country is ranked relative to the others, and scores are assigned based on the ranking, with 1 assigned for the low- est ranking and 8 for the highest. The lowest score of 1 is also given for any year for which no data are available (indicated in the data tables in appendix 2 by a dash). Each country receives a different score except in instances in which no data are available for more than one country or more than one country reports the same ratio. For the composite ranking, these scores are aggregated across the years to arrive at the score for the five-year period for each indicator--and the scores for the indicators within a dimension are added to arrive at the aggregate score for that dimension (access to finance, performance and efficiency, financial stability, capital market development, market concentration and competitiveness, pay- ment systems development, or savings mobilization). This aggregate score is then divided by the maximum "possible" total score for the dimension. That maxi- mum score is 240, derived by multiplying the number of indicators in the dimen- sion (6) by the highest possible score (8), then multiplying that by the number Methodology 157 of years (5). Dividing the aggregate score by the maximum possible total score of 240 gives the composite score for each dimension. The composite scores range from 0 to 1. (See table 8.1 for the composite scores received by each country for each dimension and table 4.1 for the ranking of countries in each dimension.) For the annual rankings for each year, the countries are similarly ranked on the financial indicators, scores are assigned on the basis of that ranking, and the scores for the indicators within each dimension are added to arrive at the aggre- gate score for that dimension (see appendix 6 for annual rankings for each of the five years 2004­08). Corporate Governance Scores For corporate governance, each country is individually scored on the two major sections of each of the four topics on a scale from 1 (not observed) to 5 (largely observed), based on the responses to the questionnaire (see appendix 4A), the country's corporate governance guidelines, and various reports. Here again, a score of 1 is given if no data are available. Since the scores are not based on coun- try rankings, more than one country can receive the same score for a section. With four topics and two major sections in each, and with the highest pos- sible score for a section being 5, the maximum "possible" score on corporate governance is 40. Because data are not available for all five years in the period (information on corporate governance was collected in 2005 and revised in 2008, with no significant changes observed), the scores cannot be aggregated over the period. Instead, the total score for 2008 is simply divided by the maximum pos- sible score to arrive at the composite score for corporate governance (see table 8.1 for the composite scores and table 4.1 for the ranking of countries on corporate governance). For the same reason, the corporate governance score is calculated only for 2008 in the annual rankings (see appendix 6). Financial Soundness Ranking The composite scores for the eight categories of indicators are averaged for each country. These simple averages are then arranged from highest to lowest to iden- tify the overall financial soundness ranking for each country, with 1 being the highest ranking and 8 the lowest (see table 4.1 for the overall ranking and appen- dix 6 for annual overall rankings). Presentation of Data For enhancement of the points made in the analysis, graphs and tables are used throughout the report. Some of the graphs are semilogarithmic, with the y axis having a logarithmic scale and the x axis a normal linear scale. The objective in using a semilogarithmic graph is to make it easier to visualize small values as well as the large values on the y axis. The regional data include numbers that range over many orders of magnitude. The range is so great that visualization of the data is almost impossible if only linear scales are used. Table 8.1 Five-Year Average Composite Scores on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2008 158 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Access to finance Demographic branch penetration 5 16 29 26 40 10 19 35 Demographic ATM penetration 6 14 22 25 37 13 25 38 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 5 21 24 30 35 10 15 40 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 5 26 19 31 33 10 16 40 Geographic branch penetration 5 35 10 30 40 15 20 25 Geographic ATM penetration 6 26 11 25 40 16 21 35 Aggregate score 32 138 115 167 225 74 116 213 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.13 0.58 0.48 0.70 0.94 0.31 0.48 0.89 Performance and efficiency Return on equity 6 29 17 18 37 12 29 27 Return on assets 8 20 14 14 40 28 33 23 Staff cost ratio 11 15 23 21 36 9 29 36 Operating cost ratio 7 8 33 21 32 40 24 15 Net interest margin 25 8 20 20 38 12 27 30 Recurring earning power 5 27 15 21 40 18 32 22 Aggregate score 62 107 122 115 223 119 174 153 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.26 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.93 0.50 0.73 0.64 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio 19 13 37 23 34 5 23 23 Leverage ratio 19 25 12 37 14 5 32 36 Gross nonperforming loans ratio 23 10 29 34 32 13 22 17 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio 14 15 20 27 25 8 38 33 Liquid assets ratio 13 17 37 37 25 8 29 14 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio 11 34 32 39 5 14 25 17 Aggregate score 99 114 167 197 135 53 169 140 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.41 0.48 0.70 0.82 0.56 0.22 0.70 0.58 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market 5 15 17 40 5 32 33 24 capitalization Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP 5 24 13 39 10 21 33 33 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio 5 29 10 34 15 20 40 27 Stock market capitalization to GDP 5 13 17 40 24 22 35 24 Stock trading value to GDP 5 32 13 40 22 23 13 32 Stock market turnover ratio 5 34 17 40 14 22 23 29 Aggregate score 30 147 87 233 90 140 177 169 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.13 0.61 0.36 0.97 0.38 0.58 0.74 0.70 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 5 38 10 37 15 26 29 20 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets 5 36 10 39 15 27 28 20 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits 5 35 10 40 15 29 26 20 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans 5 36 10 36 15 33 25 20 Private credit extended by banks to GDP 5 26 14 31 40 18 16 25 Commercial banking assets to GDP 5 17 22 35 38 32 11 20 Aggregate score 30 188 76 218 138 165 135 125 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.13 0.78 0.32 0.91 0.58 0.69 0.56 0.52 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP 10 31 34 18 25 7 15 40 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP 22 35 14 23 11 30 6 40 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP 5 5 5 39 5 5 11 35 Value of retail transactions to GDP 14 5 27 37 5 5 26 32 RTGS concentration ratio 5 5 5 5 5 5 11 40 Methodology 159 Retail payments concentration ratio 5 5 5 5 5 5 25 38 Aggregate score 61 86 90 127 56 57 94 225 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.25 0.36 0.38 0.53 0.23 0.24 0.39 0.94 (Table continues on next page) 160 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table 8.1 Five-Year Average Composite Scores on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2008 (continued) Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP 5 18 22 37 38 29 20 11 Real deposit interest rate 11 5 10 40 23 5 5 5 Gross domestic savings to GDP 5 30 32 35 12 15 23 22 Reserve money to total deposits 5 35 10 31 15 25 20 39 Loan to deposit ratio 38 16 37 29 9 10 25 16 Worker remittances to GDP 5 32 5 20 5 40 25 33 Aggregate score 69 136 116 192 102 124 118 126 Composite score (aggregate score/240) 0.29 0.57 0.48 0.80 0.43 0.52 0.49 0.53 Corporate governance Ownership structure and influence of external stakeholders Identification of substantial majority holders 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 5 Indirect and beneficial ownership 3 2 2 4 5 1 4 4 Investor rights Shareholder meetings and voting procedures 3 4 3 5 2 4 5 4 Basic ownership rights 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 Transparency and disclosure Adherence to internationally accepted accounting 4 4 4 4 2 4 5 5 standards Independent internal and external auditors and 3 4 4 5 1 4 5 4 audit committee Board structure and effectiveness Role and effectiveness 5 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 Compensation 3 2 2 4 2 5 4 3 Aggregate score 25 28 24 31 21 27 35 31 Composite score (aggregate score/40) 0.63 0.71 0.60 0.78 0.54 0.68 0.87 0.78 Source: Authors' calculations based on data from appendixes 2 and 4. Note: See appendix 6 for annual rankings and underlying scores by dimension. 9 Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 In recent years stewardship of the global financial system was crippled by banks' excessive risk taking and profit seeking; by failures in their corporate governance, due diligence, and risk management; and by gaps in regulatory and supervisory regimes (eStandards Forum 2009a). The global financial crisis to which all this led underscored the importance of prudential regulations in the stability of finan- cial systems. Supervisory authorities in South Asia have been updating their legal and regulatory frameworks for the banking sector over the past years. These efforts have led to improvements, though progress is still needed in many areas. This chapter summarizes major policy developments in prudential regu- lations in 2007 and 2008 (and, where information was available, in 2009) for each country in the region along with other policy developments and legislative actions relevant to the banking sector. Since Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives are included for the first time in this edition, the chapter also includes some information for earlier years for these three countries. The information was col- lected from the regulatory authorities of the eight countries, their official Web sites, and other sources.1 Afghanistan Prudential Regulations Prudential regulations issued by Da Afghanistan Bank in recent years include the following. 2004 · July: Regulation on credit extended to related persons. 2005 · February: Regulation on open positions in foreign currencies. · February: Regulation on enforcement. · February: Regulation on corporate governance. 161 162 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · February: Regulation on acquiring a participation that yields a qualifying holding or that increases a qualifying holding above certain threshold limits. 2006 · March: Regulation on capital adequacy. · March: Regulation on liquidity measurement and management. · June: Regulation on the responsibilities of financial institutions in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. · September: Responsibilities of Financial Institutions under the Laws on Com- bating of Financing of Terrorism and Anti-Money-Laundering and Proceeds of Crime. · October: Regulation on asset classifications and provisioning. · October: Procurement regulation. 2008 · February: Regulation on prohibited and authorized activities. · February: Regulation on asset risk diversification and limitations on large exposures of banking organizations (latest amendment). · February: Regulation for licensing and permitting of commercial banks. · July: Human Resources Regulation. Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in Afghanistan in recent years include issuance of the following regulations. 2005 · January: Regulation on defining operating rules for the clearing and settle- ment of interbank payments in Afghanistan. · December: Reserve requirement for monetary policy purposes: revised regulation. 2006 · March: Standing Facilities Regulation: Administrative Instructions. · June: Regulation for the Protection of the Payment System. · July: Regulation on the licensing, regulation, and supervision of depository microfinance institutions. 2007 · February: Capital Note Issuance and Auction Regulations. 2008 · March: Regulation to establish a basic framework for secondary market trans- actions in capital notes issued by Da Afghanistan Bank. · July: Regulation on the licensing, regulation, and supervision of money service providers. · July: Regulation on the licensing, regulation, and supervision of foreign exchange dealers. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 163 2009 · August: Amendments to the Money Service Providers Regulation to Extend Regulatory Oversight to E-Money Institutions. Legislation Enacted Legislation relevant to the banking sector enacted in Afghanistan in recent years includes the following laws. 2003 · July: The Afghanistan Bank Law­Law of Da Afghanistan Bank. · July: Law of Banking in Afghanistan. 2004 · September: The Law of Anti-Money-Laundering and Proceeds of Crime. 2005 · April: Insurance Law of 1989 (amended by Presidential Decree). 2007 · February: Law for Mortgage on Immovable Property in Banking Transac- tions (Amendment). · February: Leasing Law. · February: Negotiable Instruments Law. 2008 · March: Law for Secured Transaction on Movable Property in Banking Trans- actions (Amendment). · June: Insurance Law (Amendment). · September: Afghanistan Law on Combating the Financing of Terrorism. Bangladesh Prudential Regulations Bangladesh Bank (BB) issued a range of prudential guidelines in 2007­09, including the following. 2007 · February: Risk weights applicable under balance sheet items: a risk weight of 20 percent for claims on AAA-rated multilateral development banks is included under "Advances (other financial institutions)." · February: As per clause 5(I) of the Bank Deposit Insurance Act, 2000, risk- based premium rates (as per the guideline issued) will be applicable for all scheduled banks in the country. This instruction is effective from the half year January­June 2007. · March: Guidelines were issued for compliance of financial institutions in writing off loans and leases. · March: Uniform guidelines were issued for compliance of banks and financial institutions with a view to structuring and disciplining the process of mergers and amalgamations of banking companies and financial institutions. 164 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · March: Guidelines were issued for financial institutions with a view to bring- ing discipline in loan and lease rescheduling. · May: With a view to strengthening the capital base of banks and making them prepare for the implementation of the Basel II accord, banks are required to maintain a capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of 10 percent at a minimum, with core capital not less than 5 percent. This requirement was to be achieved by December 31, 2007. · September: Guidelines were issued for banks' compliance regarding the appointment of consultants. · September: Guidelines were issued regarding the responsibility and account- ability of the board of directors, chairman of the board, and chief executive or managing director of financial institutions. · September: Instructions were issued for opening and maintaining the accounts of Politically Exposed Persons by the power conferred under the Money Laun- dering Prevention Act, 2002 (Act No. 7 of 2002), in compliance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption and recommendation no. 6 of the Financial Action Task Force for all scheduled banks and financial institutions to follow properly. · November: The paid-up capital and statutory capital of all bank companies was raised to a minimum of Tk 2 billion. 2008 · January: Any bank company can invest a maximum of 10 percent of its total capital in bonds or debentures of any company that are approved by the Secu- rities and Exchange Commission. · February: Credit norms for the Agricultural and Rural Credit Program were relaxed because of an uptrend in the price of agricultural inputs. · February: A guideline was issued, to be followed by all resident individuals and organizations, requiring the permission of BB under section 18A of For- eign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, before commencing business or receiving any proposal to act as an agent (as satellite channel distributor) of foreign principals. · March: Policy on Capital Adequacy of Banks: Revaluation reserves against held-to-maturity securities (up to 50 percent of the revaluation reserves) were added to the components of supplementary capital. In addition, "hedg- ing the price risk of commodity transactions" was included in short-term, self-liquidating trade-related contingencies. · March: With a view to reducing the recent upward trend in the market price of powdered milk and ensuring sufficient supply of powdered milk in the market, the interest rate on import finance of powdered milk was temporarily fixed at 12 percent. · April: Guidelines were issued for the compliance of financial institutions at the time of appointment of consultants. · April: Banks were advised to repay loans taken under the Export Development Fund with interest by the time due or, if necessary, to submit an application before the time due for extending the time. If a bank fails to repay amounts overdue on loans by the time they are due or is unable to inform the Forex Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 165 Reserve and Treasury Management Department of BB earlier regarding its inability to do so, the principal amount with interest will be recovered by deb- iting the foreign currency clearing account with BB on the next working day of overdue. This instruction is in effect from May 4, 2008. · May: Banking Regulation and Policy Department circular no. 10 dated November 25, 2002, was revised and some amendments were made to cover "hedging the price risk of commodity transactions." · June: BB issued a circular on mainstreaming corporate social responsibility with a strategic guideline for banks and financial institutions in Bangladesh. · June: A uniform account opening and "know your customer" profile form for all banks was introduced. All banks were asked to implement the form by December 31, 2008. · July: A notification was issued by BB to the effect that it would follow the following guidelines at the time of appointment of directors to the board of a bank company from the depositors under subclause 15(5) of the Bank Company Act, 1991: Fit and Proper The person concerned will be a depositor of the bank company. During the time of holding the post of director, he or she must continue to maintain a deposit account with the bank. He or she must have at least a bachelor's degree from a recognized university. Depositors who have higher educational qualifications in economics, trade, business administration, and the like, or who have professional experience in industrial business, will be given priority at the time of appointment as director. He or she cannot be a director, officer, staff member, or adviser of any bank company, financial institution, insurance company, or stock exchange. He or she or his or her family members cannot hold more than 1 percent of deposits or paid-up capital in aggregate of the concerned bank company. He or she cannot keep any business or profit-motive relationship with the bank company except for maintaining a deposit account or holding not more than 1 percent of paid-up capital. He or she cannot be involved in any activity of a political party. He or she cannot be a loan, tax, or bill defaulter. Fit-and-proper test criteria issued by BB from time to time will be appli- cable for directors appointed from depositors. Selection Procedure The board of directors of the concerned bank company will send a pro- posal to BB to appoint two directors from the depositors on the basis of the fit-and-proper test criteria above. The term of directors selected from the depositors will be three years. Any director selected from the depositors cannot hold the post for more than two terms or six years at a time. 166 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Others Directors appointed from the depositors will be in addition to the 13 direc- tors mentioned in subclause 15(6) of the Bank Company Act, 1991. · August: BB directives were issued for banks, financial institutions, insur- ance companies, and all money changers for compliance with the provisions contained in the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance, 2008, and Anti- Terrorism Ordinance, 2008. · September: Guidelines on recognition of eligible external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) were issued by BB. Now, under the Standardized Approach of the Risk-Based Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel II), a credit rating is to be determined on the basis of a risk profile assessed by the ECAIs duly recognized by BB. All scheduled banks are required to nominate a recognized ECAI for their own as well as their counterparty credit rating. BB completes the recognition process when applications are obtained from interested credit rating agencies. · October: As a result of an amendment to Import Policy Order 2006-2009, it was decided to make changes in Regulation 21 of Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing, which now stands as follows: "The banks desirous of financing the purchase of used cars shall prepare uniform guidelines for deter- mining the value of the used vehicles. However, in no case shall the bank finance cars older than 6 (six) years." 2009 · January: In pursuance of the objectives of monetary policy, all scheduled banks of BB have been required to maintain the cash reserve requirement at 5 percent of their total demand and time liabilities effective from October 1, 2005. Banks are also required to maintain the cash reserve requirement at the rate of 5 percent daily on a biweekly average basis, subject to the condition that the rate should not be less than 4 percent on any day. After review of the present situation of the monetary policy, it was decided that the cash reserve requirement would remain unchanged at the rate of 5 percent, with the con- dition that the rate should not be less than 4.5 percent on any day. This instruction is in effect from March 1, 2009. · January: A draft regulation was issued to accommodate new products and instruments of payment being used in modern payment systems. · January: Some instructions were given regarding revaluation on the basis of marking to market of treasury bills and bonds held by banking companies. · February: A guideline was issued by BB to banks about the requirement they must meet to participate in and interface with the Automated Cheque Pro- cessing System (BACPS), as part of the Bangladesh Automated Clearing House implementation. · March: A circular was issued unifying all earlier directives issued by BB regard- ing the imposition of a penalty interest rate for a shortfall by banks in main- taining the cash reserve requirement. · April: Considering the existing inflation rate and global economic situation, the maximum rate of interest on agricultural loans, term loans and working capital for large and medium-scale industry, housing sector loans, and trade financing was fixed at 13 percent. Directives were issued to all scheduled banks. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 167 · April: Guidelines were issued regarding the mapping of external credit assess- ment institutions and the rating with BB Rating Grade. Credit Rating Infor- mation and Services Ltd. and Credit Rating Agency of Bangladesh Ltd. have been recognized as eligible external credit assessment institutions. · May: Instructions were issued referring to the previously issued circular about restrictions in respect of responsibilities and accountabilities of the board of directors and the chief executive officers of private banks. · June: BB set a maximum interest rate of 13 percent for bank financing to non- bank financial institutions. · July: BB released its Monetary Policy Statement on July 19 for July­December 2009. It forecast that the economy would grow at 6 percent in fiscal 2009/10 despite the global downturn that weighed on exports.2 · July: BB announced its Annual Agriculture and Rural Credit Policy FY2009/10 with the highest target ever. The loan disbursement target was set at Tk 115.13 billion, marking 22.74 percent growth over that of the previous fiscal year. · July: A separate guideline was issued on "Risk Factors Relating to Islamic Mode of Investment" within the purview of guidelines on "Risk-Based Capital Adequacy (RBCA) for Banks" issued on December 31, 2008. Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in Bangladesh in 2007­ 08 include the following. 2007 · January: As per the appeal of BB, the government declared a moratorium on the activities of The Oriental Bank Limited for six months effective from January 25, 2007, except for certain important activities. · February: With a view to ensuring balanced and organized industrial develop- ment in the country, a decision was made to allocate a minimum 10 percent of the total funds for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) provided by BB for women entrepreneurs of SMEs to provide more institutional credit facili- ties on easy terms and conditions. · July: BB undertook the Refinance Scheme for Housing to provide a refinanc- ing facility to banks and financial institutions against loans provided to buy or build new apartments for own residential purposes. · August: A decision was made to the effect that, if flood-affected farmers were loan defaulters, credit facilities would be provided to them through loan rescheduling. · October: The credit facility given under the Export Development Fund was raised from US$100 million to US$150 million to facilitate the ongoing trend of expansion and development of export-oriented industry in the country. · October: Policy guidelines for establishing drawing arrangements by banks in Bangladesh with exchange houses abroad were put in place from October 9, 2007. · December: On the basis of a quantitative impact study conducted by BB to assess the readiness of banks for implementing the Basel II Capital Accord 168 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 (scheduled to be implemented from early 2009), an action plan/road map was finalized and approved by the competent authority and sent to banks for gear- ing up efforts for implementing Basel II. 2008 · April: To resume the banking business of The Oriental Bank Ltd. (presently ICB­Islamic Bank Limited), the moratorium order issued by the government was rescinded with effect from May 5, 2008, at the request of BB for the imple- mentation of The Oriental Bank Ltd. (Reconstruction) Scheme, 2007. · May: With a view to encouraging transactions in government securities after issuance and to establishing a more effective secondary market, it was decided to make some amendments in the guidelines regarding revaluation of treasury bills and bonds on the basis of marking to market. For this purpose, detailed revised guidelines were issued through a Department of Off-Site Supervision circular letter no. 05, dated May 26, 2008. The revised guidelines are in effect from July 1, 2008. · May: BB made a decision in principle to grant permission to open SME Ser- vice Centers. Scheduled banks operating in Bangladesh were advised to apply to the Banking Regulation and Policy Department of BB to open a limited number of SME Service Centers only in areas of Bangladesh where no branches of the same bank exist at present. · June: With a view to making secondary trading of government securities competitive, some amendments were made in the guidelines issued earlier regarding provision of liquidity facility to primary dealers. · June: For the necessity of strengthening, encouraging, and expanding the SME sector, the funding for the Refinance Scheme for the Small Enterprise Sector was raised from Tk 3 billion to Tk 5 billion with effect from June 12, 2008. · July: Credit norms for different crops were formulated by the Agricultural Credit and Special Programs Department of BB for fiscal 2008/09. Banks may increase or decrease the loan amount up to a maximum 10 percent on the basis of actual credit demand. · August: With a view to encouraging export trade, it was decided to provide export subsidy and cash incentives for some export goods in fiscal 2008/09 as in preceding years. However, no subsidy or cash incentives were to be pro- vided against export of tobacco. According to this decision, export subsidy and cash incentives were to be provided at a rate of up to 5­20 percent for different export commodities. · September: In order to ensure food security by enhancing agricultural pro- duction through increasing disbursement of agricultural loans and advances, the following decisions were made: All scheduled banks (including private and foreign banks) working in Bangladesh would have to participate in agricultural credit activities. Every bank would fix a portion of its total loan portfolio for agricultural credit. At the beginning of the fiscal year banks would fix a realistic target and inform BB. Banks would ensure proper monitoring to achieve their annual target for agricultural lending. Banks that did not fix an agricultural credit disbursement target for the fis- cal year 2008/09 were to fix it immediately and subsequently inform BB. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 169 If BB considered the target fixed by a bank to be not realistic, BB would give direction to the bank concerned for refixing the target. Agricultural credit should be disbursed following an "area approach" by giving importance to the cultivation of crops based on region and type of crops, that is, which region is suitable for cultivation of a particular crop. Banks that do not have branches in rural areas or do not have an adequate number of branches would disburse agricultural credit through links with nongovernmental organizations. · September: For effective agricultural credit operation--that is, to make agri- cultural credit easier and hassle free for the farmers and to ensure a continu- ous flow of agricultural credit at the farmer level--BB introduced the Revolving Crop Credit Limit System of three years' tenure. Under this system, the fol- lowing guidelines are to be followed: Farmers engaged in continuous crop production will be allowed a Revolv- ing Crop Credit Limit System facility. After realization of a previous loan (principal and interest accrued thereon), the farmer will get a further loan or renewal without redocumentation. All paperwork will be simplified as much as possible. Loan sanctioning power should be delegated to the branch manager. Once the disbursement is made, any changes in production planning and demand for credit would require further approval from the bank. The details of the new scheme, including credit limits, mortgage, and inter- est rate, will be determined by the bank itself. Farmers will be encouraged to receive loans under this system. Banks will closely monitor to ensure that the farmers are getting the facilities. · September: With a view to making the foreign exchange transaction sys- tem up to date and to clarify some existing instructions, several amend- ments were made in the Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Transactions 1996 (vol. 1). · September: With a view to liberalizing the payment system through interna- tional cards, it was decided that international cards (debit, credit, or prepaid, as the case may be) may also be issued against foreign exchange entitlements fixed by the Ministry of Finance or competent authority for official or semi- official visits abroad by officials of the government, autonomous or semiauto- nomous institutions, and the like; per diem foreign exchange entitlements for private sector participants attending seminars, conferences, or workshops abroad arranged by recognized international bodies; balances held in private foreign currency accounts; personal entitlements fixed by the government of Bangladesh in each year for pilgrims intending to perform Hajj; and payment of mobile phone roaming bills. · October: With a view to ensuring food security and simplifying the agricul- tural credit disbursement system in favor of sharecroppers, and in consider- ation of their important contribution to agricultural development and to the national economy, guidelines were issued that include the following: Sharecroppers who are directly involved in agricultural production will be eligible for obtaining agricultural credit under these guidelines. 170 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Sharecroppers shall be permanent residents of the jurisdiction under the bank branch disbursing agricultural credit. Sharecroppers shall hold a national identification card or farmers' identifi- cation card. The bank branch disbursing agricultural credit is responsible for identify- ing genuine sharecroppers. · October: It was decided by the board of directors of the Asian Clearing Union that with effect from January 1, 2009, transactions among the union's mem- ber countries may also be settled in euros. Some instructions were given in this regard to be followed by authorized dealers. · November: With a view to bringing dynamism to economic activities and generating employment opportunities by expanding the broadband and information technology sectors, banks were advised to finance entrepreneurs in these sectors from the SME sector. · December: To comply with international best practices, make bank capital more risk sensitive, and build a banking industry that is more shock absorbent and stable, a revised regulatory capital framework, Risk-Based Capital Ade- quacy for Banks, in line with Basel II, was devised and sent to banks for imple- mentation from January 2009. Along with the existing capital adequacy rules and reporting to BB, banks will start quarterly reporting as per the reporting format enclosed in the guidelines. Legislation Enacted Legislation relevant to the banking sector enacted in Bangladesh in 2007­08 includes the following. 2007 · July: Money Laundering Prevention (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007, was promulgated through the Bangladesh Gazette on July 30, 2007, making a par- tial amendment of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 (Act No. 7 of 2002). 2008 · April: Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance, 2008 (Ordinance No. 12 of 2008), was promulgated on April 15, 2008, repealing the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 (Act No. 7 of 2002). · June: Anti-Terrorism Ordinance, 2008 (Ordinance No. 28 of 2008), was promulgated on June 11, 2008, to prevent certain terrorist acts and to for- mulate regulations regarding effective punishment and related matters. Bhutan Prudential Regulations Actions relating to prudential regulations in Bhutan in recent years include the following. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 171 2002 · The Financial Institutions Supervision Division of the Royal Monetary Authority (RMA) issued a number of prudential regulations in 2002: Regulations on Directors and Chief Executives of Financial Institutions (RMA/PR-1/2002). Regulations on Related-Party Transactions (RMA/PR-2/2002). Regulations on the Code of Ethics for Directors and Employees of Finan- cial Institutions (RMA/PR-3/2002). Regulations on Shares Trading (RMA/PR-4/2002). Regulations on Human Resources Development Fund (RMA/PR-5/2002). Regulations on Submission of Annual Accounts (RMA/PR-6/2002). Regulations on Capital Requirements (RMA/PR-7/2002). Regulations on Liquidity Requirements (RMA/PR-8/2002). Regulations on Credit Concentration to Borrowers (RMA/PR-9/2002). Regulations on Asset Classifications (RMA/PR-10/2002). Regulations on Borrower Information (RMA/PR-11/2002). Regulations on Revaluation and Appropriation of Reserves (RMA/ PR-12/2002). Regulations on Dividends and Reserves (RMA/PR-13/2002). Regulations on Collateral and Others (RMA/PR-14/2002). Regulations on Share Capital Ownership of Banks and Nonbank Financial Institutions (RMA/PR-15/2002). Regulations on Investment in Equity (RMA/PR-16/2002). Regulations on Establishment of Branches, Agencies, and Other Such Offices of Financial Institutions (RMA/PR-17/2002). Regulations on Money Laundering (RMA/PR-18/2002). Regulations on On-Site Examinations of Financial Institutions (RMA/ PR-19/2002). Reporting Requirements (RMA/PR-20/2002). Guidelines for Compliance Officer (RMA/PR-21/2002). Regulations on Penalty for Noncompliance (RMA/PR-22/2002). · The RMA also issued regulations on the establishment of commercial banks in Bhutan. 2007 · Revisions to minimum capital requirements were issued. · Revisions to provisioning rates were issued. · September: Special Schemes forms were amended. 2008 · January: The limit on commercial bank holdings of convertible currency was set at US$10 million. · February: Rupee management. · March: An amendment to Section 7.2 and Section 9.4 of Prudential Regula- tions 2002 was issued. 172 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · August: A notification was issued on the cash reserve ratio. · December: Information on check-clearing operation in line with banks' year- end closing. · The RMA gave an "in-principle approval" to two new financial service pro- viders and one existing development finance corporation to carry out banking activities. Pending · Implementation of clearing hours. · Closing of Samdruqionskhar Regional Clearing House. · Final notice on discontinuation of non-MICR (magnetic ink character recog- nition) checks. · Reassignment of bank branches under Samdrupjongkhar Regional Clearing House to different regional clearing houses. · September 2009: The Credit Information Bureau was launched. Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in Bhutan include the following. · The RMA issued licensing regulations for the establishment of an insurance business in Bhutan. 2007 · March: The National Pension and Provident Fund formally came under the purview of the RMA. · March: The RMA was appointed the implementing agency for the activity "Strengthening the Financial Sector through Information Technology Invest- ments" under the World Bank Private Sector Development Project. · In line with the objective of promoting the development of the financial sector in the country, the RMA granted approval to Bhutan National Bank Limited to open branches in Wangdue and Bumthang. 2008 · The RMA issued Note Refund Rule 2008. 2009 · August: The RMA licensed Bhutan Insurance Limited to engage in the general insurance business. · The RMA granted approval to Bhutan Development Finance Corporation to open branches in Dorokha and Nganglam. · The RMA granted approval to Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan to open an extension office at Lobeysa, Punakha. · Drafting of rules and regulations for the Credit Information Bureau. Legislation Enacted or Pending Legislation relevant to the banking sector enacted or pending in Bhutan includes the following. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 173 Enacted · The Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan Act, 1982. · Financial Institutions Act of Bhutan, 1992. · Foreign Exchange Regulations of Bhutan, 1997. · Bankruptcy Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 1999. · Movable and Immovable Property Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 1999: An act relating to loans, mortgages, and other security interests in movable and immovable property. · Royal Monetary Authority Bylaws, 2000. · The Negotiable Instruments Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2000. · The Evidence Act of Bhutan, 2005. Pending · Financial Services Act, in draft form to be passed by the National Assembly. · Proposed Bylaws for the Bhutan Electronic Clearing House, under development. India Prudential Regulations The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued many circulars in 2007­09. The following are actions relating to some of the most important ones. 2007 · February: The RBI advised banks to formulate an appropriate plan of action on corporate social responsibility with the aim of raising the level of aware- ness and focusing the attention of banks on the issue; and to start nonfinancial reporting along with their annual accounts, which will be used to audit their initiatives toward corporate social responsibility. Such reporting will cover the work done by banks toward the social, economic, and environmental bet- terment of society. · March: The RBI issued detailed guidelines stipulating, among other things, that floating provisions can be used only for contingencies under extraordi- nary circumstances for making specific provisions in impaired accounts. Such extraordinary circumstances were illustrated in the guidelines. · April: Comprehensive guidelines on derivatives were issued to all scheduled commercial banks. · April: The definition of micro, small, and medium-size enterprises engaged in manufacturing or production and providing or rendering of services was modified, and the new definition was required to be implemented by banks along with other policy measures, with immediate effect. · April: The cash reserve ratio was increased by 50 basis points of net demand and time liabilities in two stages to 6.25 percent and 6.50 percent, respectively, effective from the fortnights beginning April 14, 2007, and April 28, 2007. However, the effective cash reserve ratio maintained by scheduled commercial banks on total demand and time liabilities was not to be less than 3.0 percent, 174 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 as stipulated under the RBI Act, 1934. With effect from the fortnight begin- ning April 14, 2007, scheduled commercial banks were to be paid interest at the rate of 0.50 percent per annum on eligible cash balances maintained with the RBI under the cash reserve ratio requirement. · April: The RBI, after due consultation with market players and on the basis of feedback received on its second draft, issued guidelines for implementation of the new capital adequacy framework. · April: Guidelines were issued to streamline the accounting for amortization of the premium for banks' "held to maturity" securities. · May: A modification was made to risk weights for housing loans against the mortgage of residential housing properties and banks' investments in mort- gage-backed securities that were backed by housing loans. · May: Guidelines on the purchase and sale of nonperforming assets were issued. · June: Draft guidelines on restructuring or rescheduling of dues were issued to all scheduled commercial banks (excluding regional rural banks and local area banks). · June: Guidelines on stress testing were issued. · July: A master circular was issued on prudential norms for classification, valu- ation, and operation of investment portfolios by banks. · August: Final guidelines on prudential norms for off­balance sheet exposures of banks were issued to all scheduled commercial banks. · August: Directives were issued covering the framework for the trading of cur- rency futures in recognized exchanges. · October: Commercial banks were allowed a wider choice of instruments for raising Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 capital by issuing preference shares such as perpetual noncumulative, perpetual cumulative, redeemable noncumulative, and redeemable cumulative preference shares, subject to guidelines. · October: Operating guidelines for banks relating to mobile banking transac- tions were issued to all scheduled commercial banks. · October: Following a review of the liquidity situation, the cash reserve ratio of scheduled commercial banks was increased by 50 basis points to 7.5 percent of their net demand and time liabilities with effect from the fortnight begin- ning November 10, 2007. · October: Guidelines on the asset and liability management system were amended. · October: Guidelines on the purchase and sale of nonperforming assets were issued. · November: The RBI laid out specific "fit and proper" criteria to be fulfilled by the persons elected as directors on the boards of nationalized banks under the provisions of Section 9(3)(i) of Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970/80. · November: To contain the equity funding risk that banks face (in instances where promoters bring in equity funds proportionate to the debt financing by banks), banks were advised to have a clear policy on the debt-equity ratio. Banks were also advised to ensure that the infusion of equity funds by pro- moters was such that the stipulated level of debt-equity ratio was maintained Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 175 at all times. Further, they were advised to adopt funding sequences so that the possibility of equity funding by banks was obviated. · December: To encourage banks to increase the flow of credit to the infra- structure sector, the RBI permitted banks to invest in unrated bonds of com- panies engaged in infrastructure activities; such investments should be within the ceiling of 10 percent for unlisted nonstatutory liquidity ratio securities. · December: The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, was notified. 2008 · January: All education loans were classified as nonconsumer credit for the purpose of capital adequacy norms. Accordingly, the risk weight applicable to education loans would be 100 percent and 75 percent under the Basel I and Basel II frameworks, respectively. · February: The RBI issued revised Know Your Customer, Anti-Money- Laundering, and Combating Financing of Terrorism guidelines to banks. · March: With effect from April 1, 2008, all payment transactions of Rs 1 crore (Rs 10 million) and above between RBI-regulated entities such as banks, pri- mary dealers, and nonbanking financial companies were required to be routed through electronic payment mechanisms. Furthermore, all payments of Rs 1 crore and above in RBI-regulated markets, such as the money market, govern- ment securities market, and foreign exchange market, would also be routed through electronic payment mechanisms with effect from April 1, 2008. · March: Effective March 31, 2008, amendments to the capital adequacy frame- work were announced with respect to innovative perpetual debt instruments, banks' aggregate investment in all types of instruments, and changes in risk weights on direct loan, credit, and overdraft exposure to state governments, investment in state government securities, and claims guaranteed by state governments. · March: Banks were mandated to provide cost-free access to automated teller machines (ATMs) installed anywhere in the country to noncustomers effec- tive April 1, 2009. · March: With the objective of ensuring that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in their business as well as encouraging them to develop and use better risk management techniques for monitoring and managing their risks, the RBI issued guidelines providing only broad principles to be followed by banks in developing their internal capital adequacy assessment process. The banks are advised to develop and put in place, with the approval of their board, an internal capital adequacy assessment process commensu- rate with their size, level of complexity, risk profile, and scope of operations. · April: The cash reserve ratio was increased in two stages of 25 basis points each, to 7.75 percent with effect from the fortnight beginning April 26, 2008, and to 8.00 percent with effect from the fortnight beginning May 10, 2008. · April: The cash reserve ratio was increased by 25 basis points to 8.25 percent with effect from the fortnight beginning May 24, 2008. · May: The RBI issued guidelines on the treatment of banks' investments in subsidiaries or associates and of the subsidiaries' or associates' investments in parent banks in the context of the Basel I and Basel II frameworks. 176 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · May: The risk weight for claims secured by residential property was changed. · June: The cash reserve ratio was increased by 50 basis points in two stages, to 8.5 percent and 8.75 percent, with effect from the fortnights beginning July 5, 2008, and July 19, 2008, respectively. · June: The repurchase (repo) rate was increased by 25 basis points to 8.0 percent with effect from June 12, 2008. · June: The repo rate was increased by 50 basis points to 8.5 percent with effect from June 25, 2008. · June: The threshold for mandatory routing through electronic payment systems of all payment transactions between RBI-regulated entities in RBI-regulated markets was reduced to Rs 10 lakh (Rs 1 million) with effect from August 1, 2008. · July: The cash reserve ratio was increased by 25 basis points to 9.0 percent with effect from the fortnight beginning August 30, 2008. · July: The repo rate was increased by 50 basis points to 9.0 percent effective from July 30, 2008. · August: Prudential guidelines on restructuring of advances by banks were issued. · August: The RBI issued guidelines on accounting for off­balance sheet credit exposures arising on account of interest rate and foreign exchange derivative transactions and gold, using the "current exposure method." · August: The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 came into effect. · September: Guidelines were issued on the asset classification status of over- due payments in respect of derivative transactions and restructuring of deriv- ative contracts. · September: The cash reserve ratio was reduced by 150 basis points to 7.5 percent with effect from the fortnight beginning October 11, 2008. · September: The cash reserve ratio was further reduced by 100 basis points to 6.50 percent with effect from the fortnight beginning October 11, 2008. · September: The repo rate was cut by 100 basis points to 8.0 percent with effect from October 20, 2008. · October: The RBI issued guidelines permitting the applicability of the prin- ciple of borrower-wise asset classification to be confined to only the overdues arising from forward contracts and plain-vanilla swaps and options. The clas- sification of all other assets of such clients will, however, continue to be gov- erned by the extant income recognition and asset classification norms. · November: Prudential norms (provisioning norms and risk weights) were amended as a countercyclical measure. · November: Prudential guidelines on restructuring of advances by banks were issued. · November: The statutory liquidity ratio was reduced by 100 basis points to 24.0 percent of net demand and time liabilities, with effect from the fortnight beginning November 8, 2008. · November: The cash reserve ratio was reduced by 100 basis points, by 50 basis points to 6.0 percent and a further 50 basis points to 5.5 percent, with effect from the fortnights beginning October 25, 2008, and November 8, 2008, respectively. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 177 · November: The repo rate was cut by 50 basis points to 7.5 percent with effect from November 3, 2008. · December: The repo rate was cut by 100 basis points to 6.5 percent, and the reverse repo rate by 100 basis points to 5.0 percent, with effect from December 8, 2008. 2009 · January: The repo rate was cut by 100 basis points to 5.5 percent, and the reverse repo rate by 100 basis points to 4.0 percent, with effect from January 2, 2009. · January: The cash reserve ratio was further reduced by 50 basis points to 5.0 percent with effect from the fortnight beginning January 17, 2009. · February: Prudential guidelines on restructuring advances by banks were issued. · March: The repo rate was cut by 50 basis points to 5.0 percent, and the reverse repo rate by 50 basis points to 3.5 percent, with effect from March 24, 2009. · April: The repo rate was cut by 25 basis points to 4.75 percent, and the reverse repo rate by 25 basis points to 3.25 percent, with effect from April 21, 2009. · May: Revised guidelines were issued to banks to address credit risk exposures to the central counterparties on account of derivatives trading and securities financing transactions. · May: To avoid significant systemic implications and impeding the develop- ment of a genuine corporate debt market, banks were advised not to provide guarantees or equivalent commitments for issuance of bonds or debt instru- ments on behalf of corporate entities with respect to nonconvertible deben- tures or any debt instrument issued by such entities. · June: The RBI issued guidelines on additional provisions for nonperforming assets at higher than prescribed rates; excess provisions on the sale of nonper- forming assets; and provisions for diminution of the fair value of restructured advances, with respect to both standard assets and nonperforming assets. · July: The RBI reiterated the need for all participants to have necessary backup sites for their critical payment systems that interact with the systems at its data centers and to participate in the disaster recovery drills as and when requested by the RBI. · August: RBI guidelines permit banks to continue to have the choice between deducting their existing floating provisions from gross nonperforming assets to arrive at net nonperforming assets or using such floating provisions as part of Tier 2 capital subject to the overall ceiling of 1.25 percent of total risk- weighted assets. · September: Guidelines were issued on the classification of exposures as com- mercial real estate exposures. Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in India in 2007­09 include the following. 2007 · June: With a view to providing greater flexibility to residents with overseas direct investments (in equity and loans), banks are permitted to allow the 178 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 cancellation of forward contracts entered into by residents for overseas direct investments (in equity and loans) for hedging the exchange risk. Further, 50 percent of the canceled contracts may be allowed to be rebooked. · October: As part of anti-money-laundering guidelines, limits for payments in cash by foreign visitors and nonresident Indians were raised from US$2,000 to US$3,000. Further, to establish a relationship with a business entity, the PAN (permanent account number) card issued by income tax authorities is permitted to be accepted as a suitable identification document. 2008 · February: The check truncation system was implemented as a pilot project with the 10 banks in the National Capital Region. · June: The government of India issued a set of clarifications relating to the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme, 2008, in response to oper- ational queries received from lending institutions. · July: Operating guidelines for banks relating to mobile banking transactions in India were issued. · July: All the member banks of the New Delhi Bankers' Clearing House were required to participate in the check truncation system in the National Capital Region. · September: On the basis of recommendations made by a working group and feedback received, the criteria for participation in the national payment systems--real-time gross settlement (RTGS) and national electronic fund transfer (NEFT) systems--were finalized. The financial strength of an institution would be the guiding parameter for participation in national payment systems. The RTGS and NEFT systems would continue to be regulated by membership regulations, business guidelines, or procedural guidelines, which are binding on the participating members. The norms for access criteria prescribe only the stan- dards for entry to and exit from national payment systems. · October: Operating guidelines for banks relating to mobile banking transac- tions in India were modified. · December: Draft regulatory guidelines for securitization and reconstruction companies were issued. · November: Draft guidelines were issued on uniform accounting for repo and reverse repo transactions. · December: Draft revised reporting procedures for foreign direct investments were issued. 2009 · January: Draft guidelines were issued for the issuance and operation of pre- paid payment instruments in India. · February: A model scheme for financial literacy and credit counseling centers supported or proposed to be supported by banks should be formulated. Banks can either individually or with pooled resources create such centers to provide credit and technological counseling to farmers to make them aware of their rights and responsibilities. · February: A draft schedule was issued for the introduction of advanced approaches under the Basel II framework in India. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 179 · April: The RBI mandated that member banks set up a maker-checker facility for RTGS during data entry. Further, all transactions through the RTGS sys- tem are to be digitally signed and encrypted, and banks were advised to use adequate checks and balances to maintain the two-tier security system inher- ent in the architecture of RTGS. · April: The RBI advised banks to provide a customer receiving RTGS credit with the name of the remitter in his or her account statements or passbook. Similarly, the bank customer sending an RTGS remittance shall be provided with the name of the beneficiary in his or her account statements or passbook. · May: Draft guidelines on stripping and reconstitution of government securi- ties were issued for public comment. · June: The RBI reiterated that banks and financial institutions are to ensure strict compliance with the provisions of the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005, which provides access to own credit reports. · July: The RBI permitted cash withdrawals at point-of-sale terminals. To start with, this facility will be available for all debit cards issued in India, up to Rs 1,000 per day. · August: The government of India extended the last date for payment of 75 percent of the overdue portion by the "other farmer" under the Agricul- tural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme, 2008, by six months, that is, up to December 31, 2009. · August: In a relaxation of the mandatory instructions issued in March 2008, banks were permitted to levy service charges on noncustomers for cash with- drawals of Rs 10,000 or above on any day or if the number of transactions exceed five in a month, effective October 15, 2009. · August: The RBI issued updated and consolidated instructions and directives to banks with respect to providing credit facilities to minority communities. · August: Directions relating to the framework for trading of interest rate futures in recognized exchanges were issued in consultation with the Securi- ties and Exchange Board of India, to take effect from August 28, 2009. · September: The RBI permitted banks to issue subordinated debt as Tier 2 capital with call and step-up options subject to certain terms and conditions. Legislation Enacted or Pending Legislation relevant to the banking sector enacted or pending in India in 2007­09 includes the following. 2007 · January: The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2007. · April: Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999 Current Account Transaction Rules--Amendment. · May: The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2007. · June: The State Bank of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007 (effected amendments to State Bank of India Act, 1955). · July: The State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks Laws) Amendment Act, 2007. · December: Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007. 180 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 2008 · December: The Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, dealing with interception of messages from mobile phones, computers, and other communication devices; blocking of Web sites in the interest of national secu- rity; measures to tackle cybercrime (fraud, phishing, terrorism, pornography); and the setting up of a cyber appellate tribunal. 2009 · January: Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Act, 2008 (formation and regulation). · February: The Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009, to bring certain financial institutions, such as full-fledged money changers, money transfer service providers like Western Union, and international pay- ment gateways including Visa and MasterCard, within the reporting regime of the act. The act incorporates provisions to combat financing of terrorism and introduces a new category of offenses that have cross-border implications. Pending · The Micro Financial Sector (Development and Regulations) Bill, 2007 (pre- sented to Lok Sabha). Maldives Prudential Regulations The following are among the prudential regulations issued by the Maldives Mon- etary Authority (MMA) since 1995. 1995 · June: Banks are free to set interest rates on loans and deposits denominated in U.S. dollars. · June: Banks are free to set interest rates on loans and advances denominated in rufiyaa provided that the rate does not exceed 20 percent per annum. 1996 · December: Banks must obtain prior approval from the MMA for all payments and profit repatriation to their head offices overseas. 1998 · January: The MMA issued Regulations for Banks and Financial Institutions (Amended). 1999 · September: Guidelines were issued on consumer protection in electronic fund transfers. 2001 · August: Banks are free to set interest rates on rufiyaa deposits. 2006 · March: Banks are required to formulate and adopt written policies and pro- cedures to prevent money laundering and financing of terrorism; provide Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 181 adequate staff training for effective prevention, detection, and control of pos- sible money laundering or terrorism financing activities; accurately identify all customers and unusual and suspicious transactions; maintain customer information; appoint a compliance officer; and report all transactions that indicate possible money laundering or attempts to conceal the true identity of customers or ownership of assets to the MMA. · June: The minimum reserve requirement for commercial banks was reduced to 25 percent (from 30 percent) based on the average demand and time liabili- ties in both rufiyaa and foreign currency. The first 15 percent of minimum reserve deposits earn no interest. Reserve requirements must be satisfied in the same currency as the underlying deposit liabilities. · June: Rufiyaa balances in excess of 15 percent earn interest at 2.5 percent per annum. · September: The MMA is the issuing and paying agent for treasury bills issued by the government. Banks and public enterprises may purchase such treasury bills. Treasury bills are issued at maturities of 28 days and 91 days, and interest rates (as of July 2009) are 6.0 percent for 28 days and 6.25 percent for 91 days. Treasury bills are denominated in rufiyaa, sold at a discount to par, and carry no coupon. · November: A repurchase facility was introduced to replace the "Lombard Facility" as a mechanism for providing short-term rufiyaa liquidity to com- mercial banks. Terms are one to seven days, and the repo rate is set at a margin above the one-month treasury bill rate. 2009 · Issued in May 2009 were the following prudential regulations: No. 01­2009: Capital Adequacy. No. 02­2009: Single-Borrower and Large Exposure Limits. No. 03­2009: Limits on Loans to Related Persons. No. 04­2009: Transactions with Related Persons. No. 05­2009: Asset Classification and Provisioning. No. 06­2009: Interbank Exposures. No. 07­2009: External Audits. No. 08­2009: Publication and Disclosure. No. 09­2009: Fit-and-Proper Requirements. No. 10­2009: Corporate Governance. Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in Maldives include the issuance of the following regulations. · March 1987: Monetary regulations. · March 1987: Regulations outlining arrangements for money changers. · September 1995: Regulation for the replacement of damaged banknotes (amendment). · May 2002: Regulations for finance leasing companies and finance leasing transactions. · September 2004: Insurance industry regulations. 182 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Legislation Enacted or Pending Legislation relevant to the banking sector enacted or pending in Maldives includes the following. Enacted · May 1981: Maldives Monetary Authority Act, Law 6/81 (amended by Law No. 3/2007). · June 1985: Law 9/85, under which banks operating in Maldives are required to pay a profit tax of 25 percent of net profits. · December 1993: Mortgage Act 9/93. · December 1995: Negotiable Instruments Act 16/95. · January 2006: Maldives Securities Act 2/2006. Pending · Bill amending the Evidence Act (work in progress). · Bill amending the Negotiable Instruments Act (proposal stage). · Bill amending the Mortgage Act (proposal stage). · Banking Bill (drafted). · Bankruptcy Bill (proposal stage). · Central Security Depository Bill (drafted). · Trust Bill (drafted). Nepal Prudential Regulations Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) issued the following circulars in 2007­08. 2007 · January: Circular 19: Reopening Branches and Counters. · February: Circular 20: Loans against Guarantee and Counterguarantee. · February: Circular 21: Preoperational Expenditure Restriction on Deposit and Credit. · February: Circular 22: Action against Willful Defaulters. · March: Circular 23: Lending for Initial Public Offering (IPO) Application. · March: Circular 24: Compulsory Lending to Deprived Sector. · April: Circular 25: Minimum Paid-Up Capital. · April: Circular 26: Prize-Based Deposit Scheme. · May: Circular 27: Credit Purchase, Repurchase, and Takeover. · June: Circular 28: Business, Capital Plan. · June: Circular 29: Core Capital Ratio. · June: Circular 30: Forms of Credit Information and Blacklisting. · July: Circular 01: Priority Sector Lending Phased Out, Deprived Sector Lending Continued. · July: Circular 02: Microcredit, Credit Purchase, Prize Deposit. · July: Circular 03: Export Refinancing Rate, 11 Percent Capital Adequacy Ratio. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 183 · July: Circular 04: Punishing Defaulters. · August: Circular 05: Seizure of Passport. · August: Circular 06: Withdrawal Legal Actions Deposit-Lockers. · August: Circular 07: Parallel Implementation of Capital Adequacy. · August: Circular 08: Recordings of Interest and Principal. · August: Circular 09: Account of Royal Family Members Frozen. · September: Circular 10: Recognizing Interest Incomes. · September: Circular 11: Preparation of Long-Form Audit Report. · September: Circular 12: Audit Report by External Auditor. · October: Circular 13: Margin Lending up to 50 Percent of the Average Value of the Closing Price of the Shares for the Last 90 Days. · October: Circular 14: Promoters' Shares Cross-Holding. · October: Circular 15: Single Obligator Limit to Hydropower. · October: Circular 16: Cash Reserve Requirement. · November: Circular 17: Promoters' Shares Tradable on Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE). · November: Circular 18: Promoters' Shares Tradable on NEPSE. · December: Circular 19: Business, Capital Plan. · December: Circular 20: Prohibition of TRO. · December: Circular 21: Lending against Guarantee of Microfinance Institu- tions 0 Risk Weight. · December: Circular 22: Suspension of Margin Lending. 2008 · January: Circular 23: Margin Lending, 50 Percent, 180 Days, 25 Percent. · January: Circular 24: Divest Promoters' Shareholding to 51 Percent. · January: Circular 25: G & S Loan, Insurance Agent, Software. · January: Circular 26: Interest Rate for Trust Receipt Loans and Loans against Fixed Deposit Receipts. · February: Circular 27: No Deprived Sector Lending via Agricultural Develop- ment Bank Nepal. · February: Circular 28: Writing Off of Bad Debts. · February: Circular 29: Board of Directors Chairman Only on Board; Loans against Fixed Deposit Receipts. · March: Circular 30: Deprived Sector Loans, up to 25 Percent in Real Estate, No IPO Loan. · March: Circular 31: Statutory Liquidity Facility to Commercial Banks Extended to 75 Percent. · April: Circular 32: Cash Reserve Requirement for Constituent Assembly Election. · April: Circular 33: Ownership Transfer of 1 Percent or Less of Promoters' Share without Prior Permission of NRB. · April: Circular 34: Mandatory Forms for Branch Expansion. · April: Circular 35: Capital Adequacy Ratio Every Time, Penalty for Exc Borrow. 184 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · April: Circular 36: Capital Adequacy Ratio at Every Time from 2065 Kartik 1 (October­November 2008). · May: Circular 37: "D," Invest in Promoters' Shares but Others Not. · June: Circular 38: Delay in Repayment of Interest and Principal due to CA. · June: Circular 39: Cash Reserve Requirement due to Republic Declaration. · July: Circular 01: Clarification of Promoter Group Shares. · August: Circular 02: Statistics: "D" Class. · August: Circular 03: Option-Linked Scheme, Capital Structure. · August: Circular 04: Lending against Coupon Securities. · August: Circular 05: IPO within Two Years. · August: Circular 06: New Account Opening. · July: Circular 07: Updated Capital Adequacy Framework. · September: Circular 08: Domestic SWIFT Transactions. · September: Circular 09: Electronic Payment. · September: Circular 10: Application for Merger and Upgrade. · September: Circular 11: Clarification on Power Purchase Agreement in Circular no. 15-064 65. · September: Circular 12: Amendment in SWIFT Timing. · September: Circular 13: Excess Shareholding, Bank Guarantee, Low-Cost Housing, Microcredit. · October: Circular 14: Monetary Policy Provision. · October: Circular 15: Cash Reserve Requirement. · October: Circular 16: Cross-Holding. · October: Circular 17: Deprived Sector--Hospitals. · November: Circular 18: Upgrading, Merger Policy--New. · November: Circular 19: Amendment in Trust Receipt Loans. · November: Circular 20: Right Share and Banking Documentation. · December: Circular 21: Amendment in Right Share (Circ.14). · December: Circular 22: Amendment in Circ. 35-64-65 and Interbank. · December: Circular 23: Margin Lending, Amortization, Loans against Fixed Deposit Receipts, Borrowing. · December: Circular 24: Productwise Credit Information. Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in Nepal include issuance of the following by NRB. 2007 · NRB Document Destruction Bylaws, 2007. 2008 · Notice of expression of interest for the management team of Rastriya Banijya Bank Ltd., issued in February 2008. · NRB Auction Directives, 2008. · NRB Expenditure Management Bylaws, 2008. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 185 Forthcoming in 2009 · NRB Note Printing and Coin Minting Directives, 2009. · NRB Authority Delegation Bylaws, 2009. Legislation Enacted Legislation relevant to the banking sector enacted in Nepal in 2007­08 includes the following. 2007 · Banking Offense and Punishment Act, 2064 (2007). 2008 · Asset (Money) Laundering Prevention Act, 2008. · Bank and Financial Institutions' Prompt Corrective Action Bylaws, 2008. Pakistan Prudential Regulations The following circulars and circular letters were issued by the State Bank of Pakistan's (SBP) Banking Inspection (On-Site) Department, Banking Policy and Regulations Department, Banking Surveillance Department, Islamic Banking Department, Offsite Supervision and Enforcement Department, and Payment Systems Department (PSD): 2007 · January: Maintenance of Cash Reserve Requirement and Statutory Liquidity Requirement. · January: Refund of Charges on Failed Transactions (PSD circular letter). · February: Minimum Capital Requirements for Banks and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) (circular letter). · March: Revised Prudential Regulations for Microfinance Banks. · March: Prudential Regulations for Corporate and SME Financing Amend- ment in the Definition of "Subordinated Loan" (circular letter). · March: Prudential Regulation M-1: Opening of Accounts (circular letter). · March: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II. · March: Salient Features of Products and Services (Islamic banking circular letter). · March: Fit-and-Proper Criteria for Shari'ah Advisors (Islamic banking circu- lar letter). · March: Data Based on Annual Audited Accounts (Islamic banking circular letter). · April: Deduction of Withholding Tax on Cash Withdrawal. · April: Amendments in Regulation G-1 of Prudential Regulations. · April: Fit-and-Proper Test. · April: Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing: Withdrawal of 10 Percent Limit for Housing Finance, Regulation R-17 (circular letter). · April: Policy Framework in Banks and DFIs. 186 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · April: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (2) (circular letter). · May: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordi- nance, 1962 (circular letter). · May: Submission of Returns to Islamic Banking Department (Islamic banking circular letter). · June: Master Circular on Security Standards for Enhancement of Security of the Lockers. · June: Writing Off of Irrecoverable Loans and Advances. · June: Amendment in Prudential Regulations for Corporate and Commercial Banking (circular letter). · June: Prudential Regulation R-5 (circular letter). · July: Establishment of Financial Monitoring Unit. · July: Combating Counterfeiting of Currency. · July: Guidelines on Outsourcing Arrangements. · July: Guidelines for Issuance of Depositary Receipts. · July: Financing Facilities by State Bank: Enhancement in Repo Rate from 9.5 Percent to 10.0 Percent. · July: Prudential Regulation M-1: Obtaining Computerized National Identity Card from All Bank and DFI Customers and Clients (circular letter). · July: Statutory Liquidity and Cash Reserve Requirement (circular letter). · July: Islamic Financial Accounting Standard-1 Murabaha (Islamic banking circular letter). · July: Implementation of Countrywide Netting of Clearing Results (RTGS circular). · August: Pricing of Lending Products and Loan Documentation. · August: Branch Licensing Policy, Amendment. · August: Amendment in Prudential Regulations for Corporate and Commer- cial Banking (circular letter). · August: Maintenance of Cash Reserve Requirement. · August: Statutory Liquidity and Cash Reserve Requirements. · August: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (circular letter). · August: Maintenance of Cash Reserve Requirement (circular letter). · August: Minimum Capital Requirements for Banks and DFIs: Revised Regu- latory Capital Framework under Basel II (circular letter). · August: Directive under Section 41 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (Islamic banking circular letter). · August: Fit-and-Proper Criteria for Shari'ah Advisors (Islamic banking circu- lar letter). · August: Settlement of Intra- and Inter-Switch ATM Transactions by Karachi Office of SBP-BSC (Banking Services Corporation) (PSD circular). · September: Surrendering of Unclaimed Foreign Currency Deposits and Funds of Unclaimed Foreign Currency Instruments by Banks to the SBP under Section 31 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 187 · September: National Disaster Management Programme (circular letter). · September: Prudential Regulation M-1: Opening of Accounts (circular letter). · September: Amendment in Prudential Regulations (circular letter). · September: Clarification in Prudential Regulations for Corporate and Commercial Banking (circular letter). · September: Revaluation Surplus/Deficit. · September: Guidelines for Islamic Microfinance Business (Islamic banking circular letter). · September: Operational Guidelines on ATMs (PSD circular). · October: Revised Branch Licensing Policy. · October: Amendments in Prudential Regulations: Provisioning for Loans and Advances. · October: Guidelines on Internal Credit Risk Rating Systems in Banks and DFIs. · October: Submission of Returns to Islamic Banking Department (Islamic banking circular letter). · November: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II (circular letter). · November: Information about Islamic Banking Windows (Islamic banking circular letter). · November: Declaration of Weightages and Profit Sharing Ratios (Islamic banking circular letter). · December: Prudential Regulation M-1: Obtaining Copies of Computerized National Identity Card from All Bank and DFI Customers and Clients (circu- lar letter). · December: Cash Reserve Requirement for Deposits Raised under FE Circular 25 of 1998. · December: Compliance of Prudential Regulations on Classification and Pro- visioning (circular letter). · December: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (circular letter). 2008 · January: Financing Facilities by State Bank: Enhancement in Repo Rate from 10.0 Percent to 10.5 Percent. · January: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II. · January: Statutory Liquidity and Cash Reserve Requirements. · January: Maintenance of Cash Reserve Requirements. · January: Risk Management Guidelines for Islamic Banking Institutions (Islamic banking circular letter). · January: Guidelines for Retained/Disabled Cards on ATMs (PSD circular). · February: Statutory Liquidity and Cash Reserve Requirements. · February: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II. · February: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (circular letter). · February: Submission of Information regarding Sukuk Issued in Pakistan (Islamic banking circular letter). 188 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · March: Withdrawal of Instructions for Reporting of Classified Advances and Written-Off Loans. · March: Branchless Banking Regulations for Financial Institutions. · March: Guidelines on Internal Controls. · March: Prudential Regulation No. 4: Minimum Capital Requirements. · March: Instructions and Guidelines for Shari'ah Compliance in Islamic Banking Institutions (Islamic banking circular letter). · April: Regulations for Continuous Funding System (CFS MK II) Financing. · April: Prudential Regulation M-1: Obtaining Computerized National Iden- tity Card from All Bank and DFI Customers and Clients (circular letter). · April: Prudential Regulation M-5: Suspicious Transactions (circular letter). · April: Section 86 of the Insurance Ordinance 2000 (circular letter). · April: Cash Reserve Requirements against FE-25 Deposits Maintained by Islamic Banks and Islamic Banking Branches. · April: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II (circular letter). · May: Deposit of Sponsor Shares in Blocked Account with Central Depository Company of Pakistan. · May: Financing Facilities by State Bank: Enhancement in Repo Rate from 10.50 Percent to 12 Percent. · May: Minimum Margin Restriction on Import Letters of Credit. · May: Minimum Rate of Return on Savings/PLS (Profit-Loss Sharing) Saving Deposit. · May: Regulations for Continuous Funding System (CFS MK II) Financing (circular letter). · May: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II. · May: Cash Reserve and Statutory Liquidity Requirements (2). · May: Upward Revision in Penalties for Misreporting and Late Submission of Returns. · June: On-Line Banking (circular letter). · June: Prudential Regulation R-5 (circular letter). · June: Minimum Margin Restriction on Import Letters of Credit (circular letter). · June: Pledge of Third-Party Share against Financing to Brokers (circular letter). · June: Minimum Margin Restriction on Import Letters of Credit (circular letter). · June: Prudential Regulation M-1: Obtaining Computerized National Identity Card from All Bank and DFI Customers and Clients (circular letter). · June: Statutory Liquidity Requirement (2). · June: Cash Reserve Requirements for Deposits Raised under FE Circular 25 of 1998 (2). · June: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II. · June: Internal Credit Rating System: Obligor and Facility Ratings (circular letter). Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 189 · July: Financing Facilities by the SBP: Enhancement in Repo Rate from 12 Percent to 13 Percent. · July: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of Banking Companies Ordi- nance, 1962 (circular letter). · August: Amendment in Regulation G-1 of Prudential Regulations. · August: Amendment in Revised Prudential Regulation for Microfinance Banks. · August: Imposition of 100 Percent Letter of Credit Margin on Nonessential and Luxury Items. · August: Discriminating Consumer Finance Practices (circular letter). · August: Guidelines on Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process. · August: Statutory Liquidity Requirements. · September: Amendment in Regulation R-8, Para. 4 of Prudential Regulations for SME Financing (circular letter). · September: Minimum Margin Restriction on Import Letters of Credit (circu- lar letter). · September: Minimum Capital Requirements for Banks and DFIs. · September: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (circular letter). · September: Fit-and-Proper Criteria for Shari'ah Advisors (Islamic banking circular letter). · October: Imposition of Minimum Balance Requirements for the Account Holders in Earthquake-Affected Areas (circular letter). · October: Amendment in Regulation O-3 of Prudential Regulations for Corporate and Commercial Banking (circular letter). · October: Exposure against Shares (circular letter). · October: Customer Facilitation Centers to Reduce Concerns and Grievances of Depositors and Borrowers (circular letter). · October: Cash Reserve and Statutory Liquidity Requirements (4). · October: Government of Pakistan Ijara Sukuk. · October: Held-to-Maturity Securities. · October: Statutory Liquidity Requirements. · October: Liquidity Management. · October: Liquidity Management-Advances to Deposit Ratio. · November: Fair Debt Collection Guidelines. · November: Financing Facilities by the SBP: Enhancement in Repo Rate from 13 Percent to 15 Percent. · November: Minimum Margin Restriction on Import Letters of Credit (circu- lar letter). · November: Pricing of Lending Products and Loan Documentation (circular letter). · November: Minimum Margin Restriction on Import Letters of Credit (circu- lar letter). · November: Cash Reserve Requirements. 190 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · November: Minimum Capital Requirements for Banks and DFIs. · November: Minimum Capital Requirements: Implementation of Basel II (circular letter). · November: Instructions and Guidelines for Shari'ah Compliance in Islamic Banking Institutions (Islamic banking circular letter). · December: Financing Facilities by Banks and DFIs to Microfinance Banks and Microfinance Institutions. · December: Prudential Regulation M-1: Obtaining Computerized National Identity Card from All Bank and DFI Customers and Clients (circular letter). · December: Statutory Liquidity Requirements. · December: Revaluation Surplus/Deficit (circular letter). · December: Questionnaires for Self-Assessment--Institutional Risk Assess- ment Framework. 2009 · January: Amendment in Prudential Regulations for Corporate and Commer- cial Banking. · January: Minimum Capital Requirement: Implementation of Basel II. · January: Amendments in Prudential Regulations: Provisioning for Loans and Advances. · January: Internal Credit Rating System: Obligor and Facility Ratings (circular letter). · January: Revaluation Surplus/Deficit (circular letter). · January: Implementation of Islamic Financial Accounting Standard for Ijarah (IFAS 2) (Islamic banking circular letter). · January: Discontinuation of Hard-Copy Submission of Quarterly Report of Condition (circular letter). · January: Operational Guidelines for Credit Card Business in Pakistan (PSD circular). · February: Margin Restrictions for Financing against the Security of Sugar Stock (Both Raw and Refined). · February: Amendment in Prudential Regulation for Corporate and Commer- cial Banking (R-3). · February: Amendments in Prudential Regulations for Consumer Financing. · February: Statutory Liquidity Requirements. · February: Revaluation Surplus/Deficit. · February: Guidelines on Internal Controls. · March: Policy for Opening of Overseas Offices and Establishment of a Subsid- iary Banking Company Outside Pakistan. · March: Regulation R-5: Prudential Regulations for Corporate and Commercial Banking. · March: Prudential Regulations for Corporate and Commercial Banking, M-1 and M-2 (circular letter). · April: Financing Facilities by the SBP: Reduction in Repo Rate from 15 Percent to 14 Percent. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 191 · April: Amendment in Prudential Regulation G-1 (circular letter). · April: Amendment of Para. 5(vi) of Guidelines on Commercial Paper (circu- lar letter). · April: Minimum Capital Requirements for Banks and DFIs. · April: Submission of Returns to Islamic Banking Department: Revision of Monthly Statement of Position (Islamic banking circular letter). · May: Banking Facilities for Internally Displaced Persons. · May: Deposit of Sponsor Shares in Blocked Account with Central Depository Company of Pakistan. · May: Amendments in Microfinance Credit Guarantee Facility. · May: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (circular letter). · June: Pension Disbursement through Banks. · June: Minimum Margin Restriction on Import Letters of Credit. · June: Internal Credit Rating System: Obligator and Facility Ratings (circular letter). · June: Revision of Capital Adequacy Requirement for Islamic Banking Branches (Islamic banking circular letter). · July: Margin Restrictions for Financing against the Security of Sugar Stock (Both Raw and Refined). · July: Prudential Regulation M-1: Obtaining Computerized National Identity Card from All Bank and DFI Customers and Clients (circular letter). · July: Amendments in Microfinance Credit Guarantee Facility (circular letter). · July: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (circular letter). · August: Remuneration of Directors and Chairman: Prudential Regulations G-1. · August: Revaluation Surplus/Deficit. · August: Panel of Auditors, under Section 35(1) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (circular letter). · August: Payment and Settlement of Home Remittance Transactions under Pakistan Remittance Initiative (PSD circular). Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in Pakistan in 2007­08 include the following. 2007 · The SBP launched its first comprehensive financial stability review. · The SBP rolled out its microfinance outreach strategy, providing a compre- hensive road map for the development of microfinance in Pakistan. · February: A detailed survey to assess the level of preparedness for Basel II was conducted. 2008 · February: A separate Financial Stability Department was established in the Monetary Policy and Research Cluster of the SBP. 192 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · June: A SAARCFINANCE seminar on Basel II was held in Islamabad. · July: The real-time gross settlement system--Pakistan Real Time Interbank Settlement Mechanism (PRISM), which has real-time interface with Globus-- started live operations. · August: The definition of time and demand liabilities was revised to exclude deposits with tenor of less than one year from time liabilities and to include the same in demand liabilities. · The SBP initiated a reform process in the exchange companies sector with a view to bringing better market discipline. Legislation Enacted or Pending Several legislative actions relevant to the banking sector were taken in Pakistan in 2007, and several others are under way. 2007 · Finance Bill 2007. · Anti-Money-Laundering Ordinance, 2007. · Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007. Pending · Banking Act 2009 (an act to repeal and, with certain modifications, to consoli- date and reenact the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962), draft stage. · Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 2008 (to amend the Banking Compa- nies Ordinance, 1962), draft stage. · Deposit Protection Fund Act, 2008, draft stage. Sri Lanka Prudential Regulations Among the prudential guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) in 2007­08 are the following. 2007 · January: Banking Act Direction No. 1 of 2007: Ownership of Issued Capital Carrying Voting Rights. · January: Customer Due Diligence: "Know Your Customer" Procedures. · January: Investment in Rupee-Denominated Treasury Bonds by Foreign Investors. · January: Foreign Currency Fixed Deposit Accounts for Dual Citizenship Applicants: Operating Instructions. · January: Amendment to LankaSettle System Rules, August 2003. · January: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Wide Area Network (CBSLNet)­Based Application to Record Overnight Customer Repo Repositioning Transactions Involving Government Securities. · March: Resident Guest Scheme, Special Accounts: Operating Instructions. · March: Krushi Navodaya Loan Scheme. · April: Light a Million Candles Campaign. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 193 · April: Poverty Alleviation Microfinance Project (Revolving Fund) Loan Scheme. · May: Compliance with the Reporting Requirements under the Financial Transactions Reporting Act, No. 6 of 2006. · May: Financial Transactions Reporting Act, No. 6 of 2006 (FTRA): Know Your Customer and Customer Due Diligence Rules Prescribed in Terms of Section 2(3) of the FTRA. · June: Mandatory Reporting Requirement: Electronic Fund Transfers. · June: Issuance of Foreign Currency Notes to Sri Lankans Traveling Abroad. · June: Permission for Third-Party Foreign Exchange Deposits in Nonresident Foreign Currency Accounts. · July: Matale Regional Economic Advancement Project Revolving Fund. · August: Compliance with Know Your Customer and Customer Due Diligence Rules for New Customers and Existing Customers: State of Readiness. · September: Amendments to LankaSettle System Rules Issued in August 2003 (2). · September: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Wide Area Network (CBSLNet)­Based Application to Record Customer Repositioning Transactions Involving Gov- ernment Securities. · October: Construction Sector Development Project to Assist the Construc- tion and Public Works Relating to Post-Tsunami Reconstruction. · November: General Direction on the Participating Institutions' Service Norms and Standard Times for Accepting Check Deposits from Customers and Crediting Check Proceeds to Customers' Accounts under the Check Imaging and Truncation System. · November: Banking Act Direction No. 7 of 2007: Maximum Amount of Accommodation. · December: Banking Act Direction No. 11 of 2007: Corporate Governance for Licensed Commercial Banks in Sri Lanka. · December: Investment in Rupee-Denominated Treasury Bonds by Foreign Investors (Increase of the Holding Limits of Foreign Investors in Rupee- Denominated Treasury Bonds from 5 Percent to 10 Percent). · December: Construction Sector Development Project to Assist the Con- struction and Public Works Relating to Post-Tsunami Reconstruction (Amendment). 2008 · January: Enhancement of Minimum Capital Requirement of Banks. · February: Reverse Repurchase Facility. · March: Operating Instructions on Issuing Central Bank Securities in Scripless Form under Open-Market Operations of the CBSL. · April: Agro Livestock Development Loan Scheme. · May: Enhancing Lending to Agriculture Sector. · May: Banking Act Direction No. 3 of 2008: Classification of Loans and Advances, Income Recognition, and Provisioning. · May: Establishment of Bank Branches. 194 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · May: Operating Instructions on Long-Term Repo Transactions under the Auction System. · May: Investment in Treasury Bills by Foreign Investors. · May: Compliance with the Rules on Customer Due Diligence for Financial Institutions. · June: Foreign Investment Deposit Accounts. · June: Compliance with the Reporting Requirements under the Financial Transactions Reporting Act, No. 6 of 2006. · July: Nonresident Blocked Accounts. · July: Sale of Foreign Exchange to Emigrants. · August: Banking Act Direction No. 5 of 2008: Amendments to Directions on Corporate Governance for Licensed Commercial Banks in Sri Lanka. · August: Permitting Licensed Commercial Banks to Trade in the International Sovereign Bonds Issued in 2007 by the Government of Sri Lanka. · August: Definition of Liquid Assets under Section 86 of Banking Act No. 30 of 1988 as Amended by Banking (Amendment) Act No. 33 of 1995. · August: Amendment to the LankaSettle System Rules Issued in August 2003: Introduction of Personal Computer­Based Payment and Securities Settle- ment System (PC-Based System). · September: Banking Act, Order No. 1 of 2008: Banking (Off-Shore Banking Business Scheme) Order Designated Foreign Currencies (Addition of New Zealand Dollar as a Designated Currency for Foreign Exchange Transactions). · September: Recommendation of Interest Subsidy under New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme, 2008/09 Maha. · September: Banking Act Determination No. 1 of 2008: Annual License Fees of Licensed Commercial Banks. · October: Banking Act Direction No. 7 of 2008: Amendments to Directions on Corporate Governance for Licensed Commercial Banks in Sri Lanka. · October: Use of Banking System by Institutions and Persons Not Authorized to Accept Deposits. · October: Reserve Requirements. · October: Reverse Repurchase Facility (2). · October: Forward Sales and Purchases of Foreign Exchange. · October: Imports on Documents Against Acceptance Terms. · October: Margin Requirements against Letters of Credit. · October: Prepayment of Import Bills. · November: Regulations Made under the Public Security Ordinance Proscrip- tion of Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation. · November: Misleading and Unethical Advertisements. · November: Imports on Documents against Acceptance Terms. · November: Imports of Motor Vehicles on Documents Against Acceptance Terms. · November: Reserve Requirements. · November: Margin Requirements against Letters of Credit (2). · November: Margin Requirements for Imports Made on Advance Payment Terms (2). Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 195 · December: Margin Requirements against Letters of Credit. · December: Imports on Documents against Acceptance Terms. · December: Imports of Motor Vehicles on Documents against Acceptance Terms. · December: Margin Requirements for Imports Made on Advance Payment Terms. · December: Banking Act Direction No. 9 of 2008: Amendments to Directions on Classification of Loans and Advances, Income Recognition, and Provision- ing for Licensed Commercial Banks in Sri Lanka. Other Policy Developments Other policy developments relevant to the banking sector in Sri Lanka in the past three years include the following. 2007 · January: Road Map: Monetary and Financial Sector Policies for 2007 and Beyond was released by the CBSL. · January: The Foreign Currency Fixed Deposit Accounts scheme was intro- duced for ex­Sri Lankans and Sri Lankans living abroad, who would apply for dual citizenship status, in domestic banking units. · February: The Inter-Regulatory Institutions Council was established to pro- mote coordination among regulators in the financial sector. · February: The CBSL's wide area network (CBSLNet)­based application to record small-value customer overnight repo repositioning transactions was implemented. · March: Two foreign currency account schemes, the Resident Guest Foreign Currency Account and the Resident Guest Rupee Current Account, were introduced for foreigners who obtain visas under the Resident Guest Scheme. · June: A consultative paper on the implementation of the new capital adequacy framework, Basel II, was issued to banks for their comments, before the issu- ing of directions to banks. · August: Assets and liabilities of Pramuka Savings and Development Bank were vested in a new state bank called Sri Lanka Savings Bank Ltd. · October: The first international sovereign bond of Sri Lanka, amounting to US$500 million, was issued. 2008 · January: Road Map: Monetary and Financial Sector Policies for 2008 and Beyond was released by the CBSL. · January: Commercial banks were required to apply the Standardized Approach for credit risk, Standardized Measurement Method for market risk, and the Basic Indicator Approach for operational risk under Basel II. · March: Sri Lanka Savings Bank Ltd. commenced its operations. · May: The road map for full implementation of International Accounting Standards by January 1, 2011, was issued, requiring banks to comply fully with the standards from 2011, with a parallel run commencing June 2008. 196 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · May: Foreign investment in treasury bills was permitted to nonresident Sri Lankans, citizens of foreign states, corporate bodies incorporated outside Sri Lanka, and foreign institutional investors not exceeding 10 percent of the out- standing treasury bill stock. · June: A scheme, the Special Foreign Investment Deposit Account, both in foreign currency and in rupees, was introduced to mobilize funds from citi- zens of foreign states, investors and corporate bodies incorporated outside Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan citizens residing outside Sri Lanka, and foreign institu- tional investors. · August: The system rules of LankaSettle were amended to introduce a per- sonal computer­based payment and securities settlement system as an alter- native settlement system to be used in the event of a prolonged, unrecoverable LankaSettle application event. · October: Draft guidelines on integrated risk management were issued to the banking industry for its comments and suggestions. · October: Draft guidelines on outsourcing activities of banks were issued in consultation with the banking industry to improve the risk management pro- cesses of banks. · October: A circular was issued to all institutions participating in the check imaging and truncation system, stipulating deadlines (March 31, 2009, for Western Province and June 30, 2009, for all other provinces) for migrating to the system in which the check images captured at the collecting bank are to be submitted on a compact disc, as an interim arrangement before moving toward direct connectivity allowing the check images and information to be transmitted online to LankaClear. · October: The CBSL reduced the statutory reserve ratio by 75 basis points from 10.00 percent to 9.25 percent. · October: The shutdown time for the RTGS system was advanced by 15 min- utes as a result of system upgrades and improvements. Accordingly, effective from November 3, 2008, the shutdown time for the RTGS system is 5:00 p.m. · November: The CBSL reduced the statutory reserve ratio by 150 basis points from 9.25 percent to 7.75 percent. · December: The Asian Clearing Union Agreement and Procedure Rules were amended, permitting member countries to process transactions either in U.S. dollars or in euros within the Asian Clearing Union mechanism with effect from January 1, 2009. · December: Bank of Ceylon was appointed by the CBSL to carry on the busi- ness of Seylan Bank under a new board of directors appointed by Bank of Ceylon. · December: Finance Companies (Corporate Governance, Amendment) Direc- tion No. 4 of 2008 was issued. 2009 · Implementation of an integrated risk management framework for banks: Issuing guidelines on compilation of maturity gap analysis and introduc- ing regulatory limits on negative mismatches in the asset and liability maturity profiles. Major Policy Developments in the Prudential Regulations of South Asia, 2007­08 197 Initiating draft guidelines on Pillar II of Basel II. Fully implementing Part IX (Sections 72 to 76) of the Banking Act on Abandoned Property. Formulating a framework for consolidated supervision. Introducing a model to rate banks to identify risks and provide early warn- ing signals. Continuing the work on preparing the banking industry to adopt the new accounting standards on financial instruments (SLAS 44 and 45). · The master repo agreement, which can be commonly used by primary dealers and licensed commercial banks, was implemented in January 2009. · The rupee-denominated treasury bill and treasury bond market was opened up to the Sri Lankan diaspora and migrant workforce in January 2009. · Implementing the first stage of the primary dealer diversification program. Directions issued in November 2009 and effective from December 2009 allow primary dealers to diversify their activities. Legislation Enacted Legislation relevant to the banking sector enacted in Sri Lanka in 2007­08 includes the following. 2007 · April: Debits Tax (Amendment) Act, No. 12 of 2007: An act to amend the Debits Tax Act, No. 16 of 2002. · April: Finance (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2007: An act to amend the Finance Act, No. 11 of 2006; Finance Act, No. 5 of 2005; and Finance Act, No. 11 of 2002. · July: Computer Crime Act, No. 24 of 2007: An act to provide for the identifi- cation of computer crime and to provide the procedure for the investigation and prevention of such crimes; and to provide for matters connected there- with and incidental thereto. · July: Regulation of Insurance Industry (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 2007: An act to amend the Regulation of Insurance Industry Act, No. 43 of 2000. · July: National Insurance Trust Fund (Amendment) Act, No. 28 of 2007: An act to amend the National Insurance Trust Fund Act, No. 28 of 2006. · August: Finance Leasing (Amendment) Act, No. 33 of 2007: An act to amend the Finance Leasing Act, No. 56 of 2000 (to enable specialized leasing compa- nies to mobilize funds from the public by issuing debt securities, thus broad- ening their funding sources). 2008 · February: Finance (Amendment) Act, No. 7 of 2008: An act to amend the Finance Act, No. 5 of 2005. The Finance Act, No. 11 of 2004 is amended in Part II (Imposition of Cellular Mobile Telephone Subscribers' Levy). · February: Stamp Duty (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Act, No. 10 of 2008: An act to amend the Stamp Duty (Special Provisions) Act, No. 12 of 2006. 198 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 · February: Economic Service Charge (Amendment) Act, No. 11 of 2008: An act to amend the Economic Service Charge Act, No. 13 of 2006. · February: Regional Infrastructure Development Levy (Amendment) Act, No. 12 of 2008: An act to amend the Regional Infrastructure Development Levy Act, No. 51 of 2006. · February: Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2008: An act to amend the Value Added Tax Act, No. 14 of 2002. · December: Pradeshiya Sanwardana Bank Act, No. 41 of 2008: An act to pro- vide for the establishment of the Pradeshiya Sanwardana Bank and for the absorption of the assets, liabilities, contracts, employees, etc., of the develop- ment banks established under the Regional Development Banks Act, No. 6 of 1997 and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. · December: Credit Information Bureau of Sri Lanka (Amendment) Act, No. 42 of 2008: An act to amend the Credit Information Bureau of Sri Lanka Act, No. 18 of 1990. Endnotes 1. Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years). 2. The fiscal year for the Bangladesh government is from July 1 to June 30. Special Feature Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown Navigating the global financial storm appears daunting from whatever view- point one chooses to look at it. The World Bank, in a February 2009 press release (2009), outlined some of the devastating effects that the financial crisis could have on the poor and most vulnerable. According to World Bank estimates for 2009, lower economic growth rates will trap an extra 53 million in poverty (liv- ing on less than $2 a day). The sharp slowdown in growth also threatens achieve- ment of the Millennium Development Goals, including reducing infant mortality. If the crisis persists, preliminary estimates for 2009­15 show, an average 200,000­400,000 more children a year may die. South Asian countries, home to more than half the world's poorest people, already face the challenging dual task of developing their economies while eradi- cating poverty. According to the World Bank's income group classification in 2008, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are lower-middle-income countries, while Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal are low-income countries.1 With 1.59 billion people, South Asia accounts for around 24 percent of world pop- ulation but a mere 2.50 percent of world GDP. Worker remittances are the largest source of external funding for the region, which accounted for 14 percent of global inflows of remittances in 2007. These remittances amounted to 3.85 percent of regional GDP, ahead of official development assistance (0.72 percent) and foreign direct investment (2.07 percent).2 A recent World Bank study (Cord and others 2009) confirms the poten- tial vulnerability of South Asian countries. According to its estimates, almost 40 percent of developing countries are highly exposed to the poverty effects of the crisis (facing both decelerating growth rates and high poverty levels), while another 56 percent are moderately exposed (facing either decelerating growth or high poverty levels). Among the South Asian economies, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Pakistan are categorized as having high exposure, Sri Lanka as facing decelerating growth, and Nepal as facing high poverty levels. (Maldives is excluded from the categorization, either because of lack of data or because it has a population of less than 0.5 million.) These background facts underscore the importance of examining the impact of the financial crisis and the ensuing economic slowdown in South Asia as well as the region's response. The following discussion is aimed at both providing 199 200 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 insight into how South Asian countries are coping with the crisis and shedding light on remedial actions they could take to mitigate its impact. An Overview By mid-2008, the global financial crisis had triggered a slump in demand from the United States and the Euro Area. That in turn caused a sharp fall in terms of trade (export prices relative to import prices) for emerging markets. Private capital flows to emerging markets came to a sudden stop as a result of a massive retreat by investors after the collapse in September 2008 of Lehman Brothers, a major U.S. investment banking firm. External financing dried up even for developing countries with solid economies. The global community took swift action to try to prevent the adverse effects of the financial crisis from spreading worldwide (box 1). The International Mon- etary Fund and other multilateral institutions have made new commitments to countries affected by the crisis. Besides financial support, every international financial institution also provides important research and analytical support, technical and policy advice, and other assistance. For private capital flows, the Group of Twenty meeting in April 2009 marked a turning point, with even for- eign direct investment now resuming. The belief was that South Asia would not be seriously affected by the ongoing global financial crisis. The region's banking systems had little exposure to complex financial instruments and had not resorted to the excessively risky practices of the more sophisticated banking systems of developed countries. But because of finan- cial and economic integration with the rest of the world, South Asia did not escape unscathed and has felt the impact of the second-round effects of the crisis. The global financial crisis hit at a time that South Asia was already reeling from the effects of severe terms-of-trade shock. The substantial terms-of-trade losses have been reflected in a slowdown of growth, a worsening of macroeconomic balances, and huge inflationary pressures. Countries have responded by partially adjusting domestic fuel prices, cutting development spending, and tightening monetary policy. But the global financial crisis is likely to worsen those trends, particularly on the growth and balance of payments front. The second-round effects of the crisis have had an adverse impact on South Asian exports and hurt income from remittances. Smaller inflows of foreign capital and harder terms have reduced domestic investment. These effects will undermine growth pros- pects in the region. South Asia's financial sectors are broadly resilient thanks to past financial sec- tor reforms, capital controls that help insulate these economies from the risk of a financial crisis transmitted from abroad, and only partial integration with the rest of the world. But the risks for individual countries vary substantially because of considerable differences in macroeconomic performance, financial sector health, and exposure to foreign capital markets. The Crisis and South Asian Economies The degree of economic impact from the financial crisis varies from country to country in South Asia. Maldives, with capital and current accounts fully open, has been affected more severely than India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, where there Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown 201 Box 1 Crisis Response by Multilateral Institutions and Major Bilateral Donors In response to the global financial crisis, the The European Bank for Reconstruction Group of Twenty leaders, at their April 2009 and Development increased its planned summit meeting, decided to add US$1.1 investment in 2009 to 8 billion (around trillion in resources for the international US$12 billion) and is setting up a financial institutions--US$750 billion for corporate support facility (250 million, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), US$367 million) and recapitalizing sound US$250 billion to boost global trade, and banks. It is also collaborating with the World US$100 billion for multilateral development Bank to commit up to 24.5 billion banks. The United States increased its quota (US$36 billion) to the banking sector.b in the IMF by 4.5 billion special drawing In February 2009, the finance ministers of rights (US$7.69 billion) and provided loans the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the IMF of up to an additional 75 billion plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea special drawing rights (US$116.01 billion) agreed to expand the Multilateralised Chiang (Nanto 2009). Mai Initiative from the initially agreed The IMF aims to triple its total resources level of US$80 billion to US$120 billion. allocated to combating the crisis to (The initiative, a currency swap arrangement, US$750 billion. In addition to ongoing was created to manage regional short-term development programs, the World Bank liquidity problems and facilitate the work of is prepared to commit up to US$100 billion other international financial arrangements in 2009­10, including by tripling investment and organizations.) The Asian Development in safety nets and social protection to Bank (ADB) expects to increase its crisis- US$12 billion and by setting up a US$55 related lending by more than US$10 billion billion infrastructure platform. in 2009­10. In addition, the ADB established The African Development Bank Group, the US$3 billion Countercyclical Support facing an unprecedented increase in Facility to provide short-term, fast-disbursing requests from its members, has responded loans. And to help ease the severe resource accordingly. Its financing in 2009 was constraints faced by low-income countries, expected to total US$15 billion, more than the ADB approved additional liquidity of three times the projections under its US$400 million for those eligible to borrow medium-term strategy.a The Inter-American on concessional terms from the Asian Development Bank plans to accelerate loans Development Fund.c to finance projects and enhance social programs and expected to approve up to a. African Development Bank Group, "Financial US$12 billion in 2009, a record level and up Crisis," http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-sectors/ from about US$10 billion in 2008. The bank is topics/financial-crisis/. also setting up a quick-disbursing US$6 b. European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- billion liquidity facility--the Liquidity opment,"EBRD Responds to the Global Financial Program for Growth Sustainability--to help Crisis," http://www.ebrd.com/new/fin_crisis.htm. Latin American and Caribbean economies c. ADB, "The Global Economic Crisis," http://www .adb.org/Economic-Crisis/default.asp. sustain growth (ADB 2009b). are some restrictions in place. But these economies, because of the openness of their real sector, remain very vulnerable to global economic slowdown--through lower export earnings due to weakening consumer demand in developed econo- mies and tight external financing due to global deleveraging activities. Economic Impact The terms-of-trade shocks already affecting South Asia before the onset of the financial crisis stemmed from high oil and commodity prices. In 2003­08 they led to losses ranging from 8 percent of GDP for Bangladesh to 34 percent for Maldives (World Bank 2008b). The regional average current account balance dropped from -1.7 percent of GDP in 2007 to -3.1 percent in 2008, indicating 202 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 export income losses (figure 1, panels a and b). The current account balance remained negative in 2009, at an estimated -1.7 percent, and is projected at -2.2 percent in 2010. Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Nepal managed to maintain surplus balances--Bhutan thanks to stable hydropower exports to India, and Bangladesh and Nepal thanks to large inflows of remittances. In the absence of trade surpluses and with no certainty of achieving higher growth in remittances, however, these countries may be unable to maintain their current account surpluses in the future. International reserves deteriorated, with the ratio of reserves to imports declining sharply for all major economies in the region (figure 1, panel c). Recent inflows of external capital have improved the reserve situation for some coun- tries, such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka, while India has benefited from valuation gains. Bhutan has the strongest import cover among the South Asian countries, followed by India. Fiscal deficits increased further between 2007 and 2008 (figure 1, panel d). India, Maldives, and Pakistan registered the sharpest increases, though the main reasons for the deterioration varied. In India, the main cause was tax reductions and domestic spending increases to stimulate growth. In Maldives, it was a loss of revenue from tourism. And in Pakistan it was a rise in domestic debt servic- ing costs. In light of the need for higher domestic spending to counter economic slowdown, managing the fiscal deficits will be a major challenge for South Asian countries. As a result of these adverse conditions, growth decelerated during the period. The regional growth rate fell from 8.6 percent in 2007 to 6.9 percent in 2008 and an estimated 5.6 percent in 2009. In 2010, however, GDP growth is projected to recover to around 6.4 percent, mainly because of the resilience of the Indian econ- omy (figure 1, panel e). India, the third largest economy in Asia, had annual growth averaging 9 percent in 2005­07. But its growth rate slipped to 6.7 percent in 2008 and an estimated 6 percent in 2009, though it is projected to rise to 7 percent in 2010. While uncertainties in external demand and international market conditions mean that it remains too early to predict the sustainability of such growth, the pro- jected turnaround is still an important sign of an anticipated recovery. Other indicators also provide signals about whether South Asia is on track toward a sustainable recovery. One such indicator is the inflation rate. South Asian countries have been battling rising inflation, with significant increases in 2008. Four economies recorded double-digit inflation--Afghanistan 26.8 percent, Maldives 11.9 percent, Pakistan 12 percent, and Sri Lanka 22.6 percent--mainly as a result of high food and fuel prices. India posted inflation of 8.4 percent in 2008. But except for Nepal and Pakistan, the region's countries managed to cur- tail inflation in 2009 (figure 2, panel a). A drop in fuel prices was a major factor in this. For South Asia as a whole, inflation averaged around 9.6 percent in 2008 and an estimated 4.7 percent in 2009 and is projected at 4.9 percent in 2010. Since policy effects may take longer to manifest as a result of the economic downturn, maintaining a good balance between inflation and policy measures is imperative. If high inflation were to continue, fiscal stimulus packages, tax cuts, and other expansionary policy measures needed to boost production and move toward economic recovery may not provide the desired effects. While price indexes are not necessarily comparable across South Asian countries, the changes clearly indicate the inflationary trends in the countries--and the trends are positive.3 Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown 203 Figure 1 Twin Deficits Have Led to a Deceleration of Growth a. Current account deficits continue 20 current account balance (% of GDP) 10 0 ­10 ­20 ­30 ­40 ­50 ­60 2006 2007 2008 2009a 2010b South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka b. Export growth may be slowing 100 export value (US$ billions; log scale) 10 1 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka c. International reserves have deteriorated 100.0000 (months of import coverage; log scale) 10.0000 international reserves 1.0000 0.1000 0.0100 0.0010 0.0001 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (Figure continues on next page) 204 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 1 Twin Deficits Have Led to a Deceleration of Growth (continued) d. Narrow fiscal space, limited maneuverability 4 2 0 fiscal balance (% of GDP) ­2 ­4 ­6 ­8 ­10 ­12 ­14 ­16 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka e. Decelerating GDP growth, but turnaround imminent? 20 15 annual GDP growth (%) 10 5 0 ­5 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 2010 b South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Source: ADB 2009a. Note: a = estimated; b = projected. Another favorable factor is the relative constancy of worker remittances, which are among the main stable sources of funding for most South Asian countries. Remittance flows showed a steady trend through 2008 (figure 2, panel b), though they were estimated to drop in 2009 and are projected to drop again in 2010. But South Asian governments and central banks have taken measures to ensure that there is no significant reduction in remittance flows. In Sri Lanka, for example, the government offers tax holidays for those who remit their earnings into the country, while the banks offer higher interest rates on foreign currency depos- its, provide remittance-related products such as housing finance and education Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown 205 Figure 2 Recovery Is Expected a. Inflation coming down 30 24 18 annual inflation (%) 12 6 0 ­6 ­12 South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2006 2007 2008 2009a 2010b b. Worker remittances continue 20 18 16 worker remittances to GDP (%) 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Bangladesh India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 c. Domestic savings still strong 80 gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 60 40 20 0 ­20 ­40 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Sources: ADB 2009a (for inflation data); appendix 2 (for worker remittances and domestic savings). Note: a = estimated; b = projected. Data on domestic savings to GDP not available for Maldives, 2005­08. 206 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 loans, market dedicated bonds to attract savings from the diaspora, and open branches and exchange houses in countries that are large sources of remittances. Developed countries are also making important efforts to facilitate remittance flows to developing countries. For example, the G-8 (Group of Eight) remittance group has been working on the "5 x 5 initiative," an effort aimed at reducing the cost of remittance transfers by 5 percent over five years with a view to mitigating the impact of a potential 10­15 percent decline in remittances in 2008­10 due to the world financial crisis. The significant positive savings rates in almost all countries in the region would also facilitate the recovery process (figure 2, panel c). South Asia's strong savings culture and reliable remittance patterns could help bridge the savings- investments gap to sustain economic growth. This is especially important as a precursor to moving away from overreliance on external funding. Policy Responses and Challenges To counter the economic slowdown, South Asian countries have adopted both monetary and fiscal policy measures. Despite large fiscal deficits and considerable public debt that limit the fiscal space to maneuver, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka have introduced fiscal stimulus packages (table 1). These stimulus mea- sures are aimed at boosting production and exports, strengthening agriculture and other critical sectors, developing infrastructure and social safety nets, and promoting domestic demand. Other measures taken by the region's countries include easing policy rates, reducing cash reserve requirements, introducing tar- geted lending, and relaxing loan restructuring and provisioning requirements. While the indicators appear to support the expectation of a modest economic recovery in 2010, significant challenges clearly lie ahead for these diverse econo- mies trying to navigate toward sustainable growth. Common challenges include keeping inflationary pressures low, maintaining a flexible fiscal policy (at least in the short term) while managing already large fiscal deficits, attracting much- needed external financing, and boosting export income. Beyond these common challenges are country-specific ones. In several coun- tries, the financial crisis has had minimal impact--Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. For Afghanistan, the challenges at this stage are primar- ily security related. Bangladesh and Nepal both need to focus on controlling inflation and improving export growth. Bhutan needs to diversify its export avenues. The rest of the countries in the region--India, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka--have been affected by the crisis to some extent. India's economy shows sign of recovery, though managing inflation, maintaining fiscal balance, and attracting external capital are issues that still need attention. Maldives needs to battle the twin deficits--fiscal and current account--as well as improve its reserve position. Pakistan needs to focus on such issues as inflation, diversified export growth, and adherence to its stabilization program. And Sri Lanka needs to focus on attracting external capital while maintaining fiscal balance. The Crisis and South Asian Banking Sectors South Asian banking systems, with limited exposure to complex financial instru- ments and failed financial institutions, had little to do with the subprime mort- gage crisis. But because of both economic and financial integration with the rest Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown 207 Table 1 Salient Features of Fiscal Stimulus Packages Introduced by South Asian Countries Stimulus package Features Bangladesh Fiscal spending of Tk 34.24 billion ­ Expenditure on cash subsidies to exporters (Tk 4.5 billion) (US$500 million, 0.6% of GDP) ­ Expenditure on agriculture (Tk 15 billion) announced in April 2009, to be expanded to 0.8% of GDP in the 2010 ­ Expenditure on power sector (Tk 6 billion) budget ­ Expenditure on agricultural loans (Tk 5 billion) ­ Expenditure on social security (Tk 3.74 billion) India Three stimulus packages ­ Support extended to exports, textile sector, infrastructure, announced, in December 2008, housing, and small and medium-size enterprises January 2009, and February 2009, ­ Spending increased on public projects to create employment with total fiscal spending of Rs and public assets 186,000 crore (US$39 billion, 3.5% of GDP) ­ Prices cut for gasoline (by Rs 5 per liter) and diesel (Rs 3) ­ Interest rates on loans for infrastructure and exports lowered ­ Excise duties on all manufactured goods (except petroleum products) cut by 4% ­ India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited permitted to raise funds to provide refinancing to public sector banks in the infrastructure sector ­ External commercial borrowings policy liberalized to increase lending to borrowers in the infrastructure sector ­ Countervailing duty and special countervailing duty reimposed on cement imports ­ Service tax cut across the board from 12% to 10% ­ Excise duty reduced by 2% for items currently attracting 10% Sri Lanka Package to support export sectors ­ Incentives for the agricultural and industrial export sectors through spending of SL Rs 16 (tea, textiles, tourism, leather, rubber), including fertilizer billion (US$141 million, 0.4% GDP) subsidy and 5% export incentive announced in December 2008, and ­ Reduction in fuel prices another of SL Rs 8 billion (US$70 million, 0.2% of GDP) in May 2009 ­ Waiver on 15% electricity surcharge Pakistan No new fiscal spending introduced ­ Benazir Income Support Program launched with a budget because of huge fiscal deficit, of PRs 34 billion (0.3% of GDP), to help poor families through but efforts made to reprioritize monthly cash benefits expenditures in 2008/09, so as to ­ Increase in Private Sector Development Program spending increase spending on social safety (up to 62% of previous year's program budget) introduced in nets 2010 budget Sources: ESCAP 2009; official sources. of the world, all regional banking systems suffered to varying degrees from the adverse effects of the global deleveraging and contraction in the real sector. Liquidity and credit markets tightened as inflows of external capital declined and outflows of capital (such as portfolio investment) increased. And the level of nonperforming loans rose as a result of the real sector slowdown. But regulatory 208 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 measures taken by banking supervisory authorities and the financial sector reforms already under way in most of the region's countries appear to have helped the banking systems remain resilient. The dominance of local banks in all major banking systems in the region also helped limit the effects of the crisis. Getting Finance Indicators on banking soundness and performance over the five-year period 2004­08 can help in understanding the environment of the South Asian commercial banking sector and regional trends in banking practices. (For detailed time-series analysis and financial soundness rankings for each country, see part I.) Impact on Banking Private credit extended by banks showed a generally increasing trend over the 2004­08 period (figure 3, panel a). In 2008, however, the ratio dropped slightly in Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, largely because banks adopted overly cautious lend- ing policies toward import- and export-related businesses in response to the decline in demand for exports. The rising levels of nonperforming loans were also a factor for banks. Credit extended by banks averaged around 36 percent of GDP over the period in most South Asian countries. The exception was Maldives, where the five- year average was 71 percent and the 2008 ratio a high 100.84 percent, pointing to a disproportionate reliance on bank credit that should be viewed with caution. Private credit growth appeared to slow in 2009 as the economic slowdown led to lower demand. In Maldives and Pakistan, however, heavy government bor- rowing appears to have crowded out private credit, also a cause for concern. This development is due in part to banks choosing the easy option of investing in relatively risk-free assets such as treasury bonds and treasury bills. Liquidity appeared to tighten during 2004­08. While the liquid assets ratio for the region's countries averaged 29 percent over the five-year period, it dropped to 24 percent in 2008 (figure 3, panel b). Liquidity was tight in Nepal, where liq- uid assets averaged 11 percent of total assets, and in Sri Lanka, where the average was 20 percent. Tightening liquidity was also evident from the steadily increas- ing loan to deposit ratios (figure 3, panel c). Rising loan to deposit ratios mean increasing liquidity stress for the banking system and thus increasing liquidity risk. The loan to deposit ratio for the region averaged around 72 percent over the five-year period. Maldives had the highest ratio, averaging 101.71 percent over the five years and reaching 133.41 percent in 2008. These ratios suggest that banks could face liquidity constraints in the near future and possible credit risks as the economic slowdown affects the real sector. In 2009, loan to deposit ratios generally fell, although in Nepal the ratio rose as a result of growth in real estate lending. Most countries appear to have managed liquidity tightness through the easing of policy rates, the cash reserve ratio, and the statutory liquidity ratio. In this environment of slowing credit growth and tight liquidity, it is important to look at the performance and stability of the commercial banking sector. On the performance side, the return on assets generally improved across the region over the five-year period (figure 4, panel a). In Maldives and Pakistan, the return on assets dropped in 2008, but these two countries still posted higher average returns over the period than the rest of the region. While the regional average over the five-year period was around 2.25 percent, Maldives posted an average of 5.43 percent, the region's highest. In 2008, the return on assets in Maldives fell to 4.53 percent. Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown 209 Figure 3 Challenges to Manage a. Private credit extended by banks at high levels 120 private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka b. Liquidity tightening 80 70 60 liquid assets ratio (%) 50 40 30 20 10 0 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka c. Growing liquidity stress in the banking system 160 140 120 loan to deposit ratio (%) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: Appendix 2. Note: Liquid assets ratio data are not available for Afghanistan, 2004­06. 210 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Banks in South Asia continue to enjoy high interest rate spreads. The net inter- est margin averaged nearly 4 percent over the period, with Afghanistan posting the highest in 2008 at 7.12 percent (figure 4, panel b). Even with central banks cutting policy rates in 2009, banks are unlikely to reduce interest rates signifi- cantly and, thus, will continue to earn high margins. Given these recent trends in returns and interest rate spreads, it appears unlikely that the performance levels of South Asian banking systems will be severely affected. On the stability side, all South Asian countries except Nepal maintained capi- tal adequacy levels well above the statutory requirements (figure 4, panel c). After years of being saddled with negative equity, the Nepalese banking sector man- aged to post a positive capital adequacy ratio in 2008; at 4.04 percent, however, the 2008 ratio was well below the statutory requirement. Afghanistan posted the highest ratio in 2008, at 31.77 percent, followed by Maldives (21.01 percent) and Bhutan (13.93 percent). These three countries still follow the Basel I Capital Accord, however, with the result that risk weights are not adjusted for market and operational risks. Sri Lanka moved to Basel II by 2008, and India (all local banks) by 2009. These two countries therefore have lower capital ratios, because of the additional capital charge for market risk, but they also have more stable performance on capital adequacy. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan planned to do a parallel run of both accords until 2010. Conditions were conducive to a further decline in capital adequacy in 2009. For most countries with dominant state banks, this may be a concern--because the lack of fiscal space during these times could hamper government recapital- ization efforts. Even for nonstate banks recapitalization will be a problem during economic slowdown. The region's average gross nonperforming loans ratio fell over the five years (figure 4, panel d). The average for the period was around 6.29 percent. While Afghanistan had the lowest nonperforming loans ratio in 2008, at 0.9 percent, India steadily reduced its ratio over the period to 2.25 percent. By contrast, the ratio in Maldives jumped from 1.56 percent in 2007 to 8.90 percent in 2008. The ratio also rose in several other countries in the region. The provisions to nonperforming loans ratio was high in all countries except Nepal (figure 4, panel e). In Nepal, the five-year average for the ratio was 10.30 percent, and the 2008 ratio was 8.16 percent. The regional average over the five years was 52.62 percent. In Maldives, provisions dropped from 63.94 percent of gross nonperforming loans in 2007 to 14.02 percent in 2008. All other countries except Afghanistan and Bangladesh also registered a decline in provisions from the previous year. The levels of nonperforming loans and provisions need to be watched care- fully. In 2009 the level of nonperforming loans rose in all countries except Afghanistan, where the financial crisis has had no impact, and Nepal, where real estate lending, because of the availability of collateral, has led to a reduc- tion in the nonperforming loans ratio. The situation in Nepal is a concern, however, since fluctuations in real estate prices could lead to higher exposures for banks. The recovery of loans and advances backed by real estate collateral has been a critical problem in Nepal and Maldives as a result of archaic mort- gage and property laws and the lack of special debt recovery provisions and commercial courts. Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown 211 Figure 4 Returns and Capital Levels Fair, But Nonperforming Loans Need Watching a. Returns are stable 7 6 5 return on assets (%) 4 3 2 1 0 ­1 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka b. Net interest margins are high 8 7 6 net interest margin (%) 5 4 3 2 1 0 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka c. Capital adequacy above statutory requirements 50 40 capital adequacy ratio (%) 30 20 10 0 ­10 ­20 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (Figure continues on next page) 212 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Figure 4 Returns and Capital Levels Fair, But Nonperforming Loans Need Watching (continued) d. Nonperforming loans possibly climbing 25 gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 20 15 10 5 0 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka e. Provisions coming down 100 provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: Appendix 2. Note: For Afghanistan, return on assets data for 2004­05 and capital adequacy ratio data for 2004­06 are unavailable. If the economic recovery is weak, nonperforming loans may increase further. It may therefore be prudent to assume that the nonperforming loan position will not improve significantly in the near term. Policy Responses and Challenges Just as the impact of the crisis on the banking sector has varied among countries in the region, so have the policy responses. On the monetary policy side, most countries have resorted to rate cuts and reductions in the statutory liquidity and Managing the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and Economic Slowdown 213 cash reserve ratios to manage liquidity. India has introduced special refinance facilities. Bangladesh has imposed a lending rate ceiling and has also introduced targeted lending by commercial banks. While capital infusions are difficult for most countries at this stage, India has recapitalized some of the state banks. The World Bank has extended a US$2 billion loan to India for this purpose, to help ensure that banks can maintain credit growth, support social banking and employment growth, and help strengthen the economic recovery ahead. The loan is part of a US$4.3 billion loan program to support India's economic stimu- lus and infrastructure investments. Most countries have engaged in regulatory forbearance, such as relaxing risk weights and loan restructuring and provision- ing requirements, with the aim of boosting banks' returns and capital positions. India has restructured part of the loan portfolio. In addition to responses such as these, the regulatory reforms and capacity-building programs taking place in most countries may also have helped. Regulatory authorities appear to have responded swiftly and aggressively to contain the crisis and avert an erosion of public confidence in the bank- ing system. As the impact of the financial crisis and the ensuing economic slowdown continues to evolve, regulators need to identify gaps in the regula- tory and supervisory systems and take remedial actions as well as to continue adjusting actions taken so far to restore financial stability and improve crisis preparedness. This points to a need to pursue development programs, such as implementing the Basel II Capital Accord, improving prudential regulation and supervision systems, strengthening corporate governance, and restructur- ing and recapitalizing banks. While the banking systems in South Asia have so far weathered the second- round effects of the global financial and economic meltdown better than those in some other regions, each of the region's countries will have to overcome chal- lenges in the continuing recovery process. For most countries, the real sector slowdown and global deleveraging will pose challenges in credit quality and funding. Other issues needing careful attention by all countries include ensuring adequate capitalization, managing the risk environment, and minimizing delin- quent loans. In addition to these common challenges, Afghanistan and Bhutan need to address many development issues in their banking systems (see the dis- cussions in chapter 3). Maldives and Pakistan need to be concerned about heavy government borrowing through the commercial banks, which is crowding out private sector credit. Nepal needs to monitor real estate lending, which could lead to further deterioration in the nonperforming loans position. Bangladesh needs to improve banks' capital position to maintain stability while remaining mindful of the additional capital charges needed for market and operational risk when it adopts Basel II. And India and Sri Lanka need to further manage the transition to Basel II by strengthening banks' capital cushions. Beyond such operational issues, South Asian countries also need to focus on deposit insurance. Today, only Bangladesh and India have explicit deposit insur- ance schemes in place. While no country in the region experienced a loss of con- fidence in the banking system as a result of the global financial crisis, having a deposit insurance scheme is nevertheless important to help maintain confidence in the system. Such schemes will not address the root cause of an erosion in con- fidence. But they may help stall bank runs and restore confidence, as shown by 214 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 events in the United States during the financial crisis. Having a deposit insurance scheme can also lead to moral hazard. But during a crisis, restoring public confi- dence is of prime importance to the stability of the banking system. Another critical focus is credit for the real sector. Economic deceleration would affect all industries and could further reduce output. This impact on the real economy could be exacerbated by the financial squeeze that might ensue with a reduction in remittance receipts and in foreign direct investment and other financing options as a result of deleveraging activities by developed country investors. Thus, in addition to the other reforms discussed, South Asian coun- tries need to take all necessary steps to ensure the availability of credit and liquid- ity to the real sector so that economic activity can continue unabated. Even more important is that South Asian economies and banking sectors strive not only for strong and stable growth but also for a more inclusive growth that minimizes inequalities. Endnotes 1. The World Bank classifies economies based on their per capita gross national income (GNI), calculated using the Atlas method. For the 2008 classification a GNI of US$975 or less is low income, and a GNI of US$976­3,855, lower middle income (for more details and the entire classification, see http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0). 2. World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 3. Inflation figures may vary as a result of differences in methods and in the goods and services included in the basket of commodities used for measuring inflation. For example, India uses wholesale price indexes for measuring inflation, while Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and others use retail price indexes. In addition, some countries have removed price increases due to the unprecedentedly high oil prices in 2007/08 from their price indexes and publish data on core inflation rather than point-to-point or average inflation. Appendixes 215 216 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 Table A1.1 Capital Adequacy Requirements for Banks Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Capital adequacy requirement (as % of risk-weighted assets) 12 10 10 9 12 (from 2009; 10 10 10 8 earlier) Tier 1 capital (as % of risk-weighted assets) 6 5 5 6 (by March 6 (from 2009; 6 5 (since the sum 5 2010) 4 earlier) of Tier 2 and 3 capital cannot exceed Tier 1 capital) Minimum paid-up capital requirement Af 500 million (US$10 For mainstream Nu 300 million Rs 300 crore Rf 150 million NRs 2 billion PRs 6 billion SL Rs 2.5 billion million) commercial banks: (US$6.25 million) (Rs 3 billion or (US$11.7 million) (US$26 million) (US$72.5 million) (US$21.8 million) (Incumbent banks minimum capital US$62.5 million) A minimum leverage by the end of are given 5 years to requirement of ratio of 5% is added December 2009 comply.) Tk 400 crore to provide a basic (up from PRs (Tk 4 billion or US$59 "tangible net worth" 5 billion in 2008) million), of which threshold of safety. minimum paid-up capital must be Tk 200 crore (Tk 2 billion or US$29.5 million), with any capital shortfall to be met by August 2011 For Islamic banks: minimum paid-up capital requirement of Tk 100 crore (Tk 1 billion or US$14.5 million) Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. Table A1.2 Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 Capital Composition Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tier 1 capital composition Paid-in capital - Paid-up capital - Paid-up capital - Paid-up capital - Permanent - Paid-up capital - Paid-up capital or - Paid-up ordinary shares or such as: shareholders' capital deposited assigned capital - Nonrepayable - General reserves - Statutory reserves - Share premium equity (issued with the State Bank - Common equity share premium (statutory reserves) - Noncumulative or nonre- - Other disclosed free and fully paid-up - Nonredeemable of Pakistan (SBP) shares and their deemable preference - Statutory reserves - Share premium reserves ordinary shares preference shares (for foreign banks) related surplus shares Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 217 account and noncumula- - General reserves - Capital reserves - Proposed bonus equity - Share premium - Noncumulative, tive perpetual - Share premium - Retained earnings representing any shares account perpetual pre- - Retained earnings preference (free reserve) surplus arising from shares) - Statutory reserve fund ferred shares - Statutory general - Reserve for bonus - Minority interest in sale proceeds of Deductions reserves shares - Retained profits or losses - Such other subsidiaries assets - Disclosed instruments - Loss for the current reserves (addi- - Retained earnings - General reserves - General and other reserves - Noncumulative - Specified innovative tional paid-in as may be year irredeemable pref- perpetual debt share premium - Unaudited current year's - Unappropriated or - Gains or losses after tax approved by erence shares instruments (limited plus undistrib- cumulative profit, after unremitted profits from sale of fixed and long- Da Afghanistan to 15% of previous uted profits) provisions (including (net of losses, if any) term investments Bank (DAB) - Dividend equaliza- year's Tier 1 capital) staff bonuses and taxes) tion account - Minority inter- Deductions - Unpublished current year's - Retained profit - Specified perpetual ests in equity - Capital redemption profits or losses or loss for previ- - Goodwill noncumulative of consolidated reserves created in lieu of ous years - Minority interests preference shares subsidiaries redeemable instruments - Intangible assets - Legal reserves - Perpetual debt capital - Any other type of Deductions - Capital adjustment - Shortfall in provi- - Other reserves instruments as instruments reserves sions required set aside for specified by the - Goodwill and against classified Deductions after-tax profit Reserve Bank of other intangible - Dividend equalization assets India (RBI) assets reserves - Goodwill - Losses of cur- - Deficit on account rent year (if any) Deductions - Loan loss - Any other type of - Net deferred tax of revaluation of provisions (both reserves as notified by investments held in - Other intangible assets Deductions - Equity investments general and Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) "available for sale" in subsidiaries specific) - Employee advances to - Goodwill Deductions category - Intangible assets share ownership plans - Intangible assets - Goodwill and current or - Dues to or from head office - Future tax brought-forward - Miscellaneous and branches (foreign benefits losses expenditure as specified banks) - Equity invest- - Deferred tax assets - Investments in equity - 50% of investments in ments, to be licensed by NRB unconsolidated banking deducted from a and financial subsidiary bank's regulatory companies (total) capital (Table continues on next page) 218 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.2 Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 Capital Composition (continued) Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka - All other asset - All investments in equity - 50% of investments in revaluation of institutions with finan- capital of other banks and reserves cial interest financial institutions - Future income - Investments in equity in tax benefits excess of prescribed limits - Losses carried - Investments arising from forward underwriting agreements - Encumbered - Reciprocal cross-holding assets of bank capital designed to inflate capital, not disposed of within 1 year of commitment - Any other as stipulated by NRB Tier 2 capital composition - Ordinary pre- - General provisions - Capital reserve - Undisclosed - Year-to-date - Cumulative or redeem- - General provisions - Approved revaluation ferred shares (1% of unclassified reserves earnings (or able preference shares or reserves for loan reserves (50%) - Fixed assets revalu- loans)a losses) with maturity of more losses (subject to a - Term preferred ation reserve - Cumulative per- - General provisions (subject than 5 years maximum of 1.25% shares - Asset revaluation petual preference - Undisclosed to a maximum of 1.25% of - Exchange fluctua- of total risk- reserves shares (fully paid up reserves - General loan loss total risk-weighted assets) - Term debt tion reserve weighted assets) and no redemption provisions (subject to a instruments fully - All other prefer- - Asset revalu- - Hybrid capital instruments - Investment fluctua- rights) maximum of 1.25% of total - Exchange translation subordinated ence shares ation reserves tion reserve risk-weighted assets) reserves - Approved subordinated to the rights of - Revaluation (if allowed by - Perpetual subordi- term debt (50%) depositors - Research and reserves on prem- the Maldives - Exchange equalization - 50% of revaluation nated debt development fund ises and marketable Monetary reserve reserves on fixed - Minority interests arising - Hybrid - Exchange equal- securities (dis- Authority [MMA] assets only from preference shares debt-equity - General provisions - Investments adjustment ization account counted by 55%) and consistent issued by subsidiaries instruments (not exceeding reserve - Undisclosed reserves with applicable (unsecured and - Revaluation 1.25% of total risk- - Excess provisions Deductions accounting - Assets revaluation - Subordinated debt fully paid up) reserves of weighted assets) toward depreciation standards) reserve (only up to 2% of (up to 50% of Tier 1 - 50% of investments in held-to-maturity on investments - Debt instruments - Subordinated term total Tier 2 capital, inclu- capital) unconsolidated banking securities (up to - General loan mandated to be debts with a mini- - General provisions sive of this reserve) and financial subsidiary 50% of revaluation loss provisions For capital adequacy convertible into mum original matu- and loss reserves companies reserves) (limited to 1.25% - Hybrid capital purposes, supplemen- common shares, rity of at least 5 years (up to a maximum of risk-weighted instruments tary capital is limited - 50% of investments in which are (must be fully paid or of 1.25% of risk- assets) to 50% of core capital. capital of other banks and unsecured and repayment must not weighted assets) fully paid in financial institutions be guaranteed) - General - Profit for current - Hybrid capital - Subordinated - Subordinated term debt Total Tier 2 capital is limited reserves for year instruments term debt (limited fully paid up with maturity to 100% of Tier 1 capital. loan losses up to 50% of Tier 1 of more than 5 years In the calculation of - Subordinated debt to a maximum capital) (limited to 50% of Tier 1 regulatory capital, (up to 50% of Tier 1 of 1.25% of risk- capital) Tier 2 capital is capital) - Hybrid debt- weighted assets limited to 100% of equity capital - Other reserves as speci- at any one time - Investment fluctua- core capital. And instruments fied by NRB tion reserves - Revaluation subordinated debt (unsecured, sub- Total Tier 2 capital is Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 219 reserves of shall not exceed 50% - Innovative perpet- ordinated, and limited to 100% of Tier 1 fixed assets, of Tier 1 capital. ual debt instruments fully paid up) capital. available-for- (in excess of 15% of Total Tier 2 capital sale invest- Tier 1 capital) is limited to 100% ments, and cash - Any other type of of Tier 1 capital. flow hedges and other assets instruments speci- fied by the RBI - Profits of cur- rent year (if any) Total Tier 2 capital is limited to 100% of Tier In the calcula- 1 capital. tion of regulatory capital, supple- mentary capital is limited to 100% of core capital. Tier 3 capital composition Capital issued solely Short-term subordi- Short-term subordinated to meet the market nated debt; will be debt; may be used for the risk capital charge in used solely for the sole purpose of meeting a accordance with the purpose of meeting proportion of the capital criteria laid down (for a proportion of the requirements for market risk primary dealers) capital requirements for market risks Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. a. Except for housing and small and medium-size enterprise loans (2%) and consumer credit and special mention loans (5%). 220 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.3 Basel I Risk Weights in Use and Basel II Status Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Indiaa Maldives Nepala Pakistana Sri Lankaa Basel I risk weights in use for computing capital charges 0% weight 0% weight 0% weight 0% weight 0% weight 0% weight 0% weight 0% weight - Cash - Cash in hand - Cash in hand - Cash at bank and - Cash at bank and in - Cash at bank - Cash at bank - Cash at bank and (local banks, branches abroad transit branches abroad - Bank balances - Precious metals - Balances with NRB - Gold and bullion Bangladesh Bank and claims in - Gold and bullion - Claims and balances - Gold and bullion [BB], public OFIs - Balances with the - Treasury bills and - Balances with the SBP category A with the MMA [other financial Royal Monetary - Balances with the bonds - Balances with the Cen- countries - Treasury bills and bonds institutions]) Authority (RMA) RBI - Claims on, or guaran- tral Bank of Sri Lanka - Central bank - Precious metal (current deposits teed or fully secured - Central bank securities (CBSL) - Money at call - Treasury bills and securities in vault and cash reserve by, securities issued (local banks, bonds - Other government - Treasury bills and bonds requirements) by the government of - Other government - Current public OFIs) securities and securi- - Central bank Maldives securities or secu- - Central bank securities accounts and - Bills issued by the ties guaranteed by the - Foreign currency securities rities guaranteed obligations in RMA - Claims on central gov- government - Other government in hand, in banks by the government DAB - Loans and ernments and central securities and securi- abroad, in BB, and - Bills and bonds - Loans and advances advances against banks denominated - Loans and ties guaranteed by the - Loans with cash in wage earners' issued or guaranteed against cash, deposits, cash, deposits, and in national currency advances against government collateral accounts by the government and gold gold and funded in that cash, deposits, and - Import and inland - Reserves repur- currency - Loans and advances 20% weight gold - Loans and advances bills (Ministry of - Loans and against cash, deposits, chased by the RMA against government guar- - Loans and direct Food, government) advances against - Other claims on OECD - Loans and and gold central governments antees or securities claims - Loans and over- government advances against - Advances and central banks - Loans and advances drafts secured by guarantees or government - Loans and advances - Claims with (Ministry of Food, against government cash deposits with securities guarantees or guaranteed by the central maturity of - Claims collateralized guarantees or securities President and banks in Bhutan securities bank more than 1 - Loans and by securities of, or Prime Minister's - Loans and advances year supported guaranteed by, OECD - Loans and Office, parliament, - Claims and guaran- advances guaran- - Staff loans secured by guaranteed by the by collateral tees with remaining teed by the central central governments advances guaran- provident fund balances autonomous and central bank or securities semiautonomous maturity of less bank teed by the central - Claims fully secured - Claims guaranteed by issued, offered bodies) than 1 year issued bank - Staff loans secured by 2.5% weight by cash or pledged OECD central govern- by Category A by governments or provident fund balances deposits in same bank - Staff loans secured ments or central banks countries - Investments (trea- central banks of - Other govern- sury bills, govern- by provident fund - Gold and gold jewelry Zone A countries ment securities 20% weight - Claims guaranteed by - Loans supported ment savings balances against advances and securities non-OECD central govern- by collateral of certificates and 20% weight - Claims on multilateral guaranteed by the 20% weight ments or central banks 10% weight multilateral lend- other securities, development banks - Claims on financial government ing institutions prize and income and claims guaran- - Claims guaranteed 20% weight - Claims guaranteed by institutions in Bhutan tax bonds) 20% weight teed or collateralized by OECD central OECD central govern- - Cash in process - Claims guaranteed by - Claims on financial by securities issued by governments or ments or central banks of collection - Head office and - Staff loans secured such banks commercial banks (matu- institutions incor- central banks interbranch by provident fund rity up to 1 year) porated in Zone A adjustments balances countries 3­50% weight - Other assets as - Claims and guaran- - Claims guaranteed - Claims and loans - Claims guaranteed - Claims and loans guaran- - Balances with foreign specified tees with maturity by OECD central guaranteed by banks by non-OECD cen- teed by banks incorpo- currency banking units - Loans with of more than 1 year governments or incorporated in OECD tral governments or rated in OECD countries residential - Off­balance sheet 20% weight issued by govern- central banks countries central banks mortgages as commitments with - Balances with branches ments or central - Claims guaranteed collateral, not residual maturity - Claims guaranteed - Claims and loans - Claims guaranteed abroad banks of Zone A by non-OECD central past due for 30 of less than 1 by non-OECD cen- guaranteed by domes- by commercial countries - Balances with banks governments or central days year that can be tral governments or tic banks incorporated banks (maturity up abroad banks revoked at any - Claims and guaran- central banks in non-OECD countries to 1 year) - Loans to build- time tees with maturity with residual maturity - Balances with local banks - Claims guaranteed ers to finance - Claims guaranteed - Claims and loans of less than 1 year of less than 1 year by commercial banks Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 221 real estate con- 20% weight by commercial guaranteed by - Balances with foreign cur- issued by govern- (maturity up to 1 year) struction where banks (maturity up - Claims and loans banks incorporated rency banking units - Balances and ments or central property is pre- to 1 year) guaranteed by in OECD countries - Claims and loans money at call with banks of Zone B 0­50% weight sold or leased non-domestic OECD guaranteed by banks private OFIs countries - Claims and loans - Balances with with finances public sector entities, - Loans and advances on incorporated in OECD guaranteed by branches abroad assigned to the - Foreign invest- 50% weight excluding the central enterprises owned and countries banks incorporated bank ments in OECD government (with prior - Balances with controlled by the govern- - Claims and guaran- in OECD countries - Balances with banks countries approval of the MMA) banks abroad ment - Other approved tees with maturity abroad - Balances with assets - Import and inland of more than 1 year - Cash items in process - Balances with local 50% weight banks abroad - Balances with local bills (autonomous issued by govern- of collection (domestic banks 100% weight - Loans fully secured by banks and semiauto- ments or central - Balances with local and foreign) banks of Zone B - Balances with primary mortgages on - All loans to nomous bodies, banks - Cash in process of col- 50% weight foreign currency residential property private debtors OFIs, banks, local countries lection - Balances with banking units authorities) - Loans fully secured 100% weight - Premises, plant - Claims with maturity foreign currency 50% weight by first-priority mort- - Cash in process of and equip- - Advances of less than 1 year on banking units - Other loans and advances gages on residential collection - Claims guaranteed by ment, other (government financial institutions property fixed assets, autonomous and incorporated in Zone 50% weight 100% weight - Other investments Sri Lanka Export Credit and other real semiautonomous B countries, includ- - Loans fully - Claims and loans Insurance Corporation - Loans fully - Fixed assets (SLECIC) estate owned bodies; public ing deposits in India secured by primary guaranteed by local as a result of OFIs; AAA-rated government authori- secured by primary - Other assets 100% weight mortgages on resi- - Loans granted for foreclosures or multilateral devel- ties of Maldives mortgages on resi- dential property housing purposes and defaults opment banks, - Equity investments dential property - Claims on pub- fully secured by primary banks, and local (net of specific 75% weight - Real estate held lic enterprises if - Other loans and mortgages on residential authorities) provisions) - Balances with advances property for investment approved by the MMA - Investments - Investments in real other financial - Any other assets 100% weight - Fixed assets 100% weight (autonomous and estate (net of spe- institutions semiautonomous cific provisions) - Claims on the private - Other assets - Other loans and 100% weight bodies, OFIs, sector advances - Term loans and - Other investments banks, local - Other loans and overdrafts (net of - Other investments authorities, nego- advances specific and gen- - Fixed assets tiable CDs) - Fixed assets eral provisions) (Table continues on next page) 222 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.3 Basel I Risk Weights in Use and Basel II Status (continued) Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Indiaa Maldives Nepala Pakistana Sri Lankaa - Other assets - Claims with maturity - Other assets - Claims and loans - Other assets (letters of credit of more than 1 year guaranteed by 102.5% weight - Fixed deposits with of government, on financial institu- domestic commercial finance companies contingent assets tions incorporated - Other investments banks and other for other banks, in Zone B countries banks incorporated - Loans against fixed claims guaranteed (including India) 125% weight outside the OECD with deposits with finance by AAA-rated - Gold and gold jew- residual maturity of companies - Fixed assets multilateral devel- elry less than 10% of more than 1 year opment banks) - Other assets total advances - Claims on central gov- - Off­balance sheet - Off­balance sheet ernments outside the self-liquidating items (net of margin OECD (unless denomi- trade-related money) nated or funded in contingencies national currency) 50% weight - Claims on public sec- tor entities not listed - Foreign currencies above held for bilateral trade credits - Claims on commercial companies owned by - Export and other public sector entities foreign bills - Premises, plant and - Foreign invest- equipment, and other ments in non- fixed assets OECD countries - Real estate owned - Import and inland and other investments bills (nonfinancial (including noncon- public enter- solidated investment prises) participations in other - Advances (OFIs, companies) nonfinancial pub- - Capital instruments lic enterprises) issued by other banks - Investments (OFIs, (unless deducted from nonfinancial pub- capital) lic enterprises) - All other assets, excluding those deducted from capital - Other assets - Other off­balance sheet items - Fixed assets and valuation adjustments - Off­balance Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 223 sheet transaction- related contingent items - All note issuance facilities and revolving under- writing facilities with maturity of more than 1 year 100% weight - Import and inland bills (private sector) - Advances (private sector) - Investments (private sector) - Other assets not specified in any other category - Off­balance sheet direct credit substitutes, sale and repurchase agreements, forward assets purchased, and placements of forward deposits (Table continues on next page) 224 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.3 Basel I Risk Weights in Use and Basel II Status (continued) Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Indiaa Maldives Nepala Pakistana Sri Lankaa Status of Basel II implementation Not yet Moving toward Not yet implemented Foreign banks Not yet implemented Banks were to con- All banks were required The CBSL adopted the implemented implementation operating in India duct parallel runs to adopt the Standardized Basel II capital adequacy New guidelines issued since 2009. Both and Indian banks of Basel I and II in Approach for credit and standards for all licensed in 2009 allow banks to Basel I and II with operations the 2007/08 financial market risk and the Basic banks effective from apply the new methods are allowed for outside India have year, with the new Indicator or Standardized January 2008. Accord- for computing Basel II capital adequacy migrated to the capital adequacy Approach for operational ingly, all banks are capital requirements in purposes. Banks Basel II framework framework made risk beginning January 1, required, in computing a manner prescribed are to use Basel II since March 2008. compulsory from 2008. capital charges for capital by the MMA. Initially, from 2010. All other commercial 2008/09.b adequacy purposes, to banks are to use the Banks were advised to banks (except local follow the Standardized Initially, banks are Standardized Approach New guidelines adopt a parallel run of area banks and Approach for credit to use the Stan- and the Basic Indicator called for using: two years for the Internal regional rural banks) risk, the Standardized dardized Approach Approach to establish Ratings­Based Approach migrated to the new - A simplified stan- Measurement Approach to calculate capital capital requirements starting January 1, 2008. framework by March dardized approach for market risk, and the requirements for (Pillar I), but in no event 2009. for credit risk Adoption of the Founda- Basic Indicator Approach credit risk, the will a bank be allowed tion or Advanced Internal for operational risk. Standardized (Rule Parallel runs are to have a leverage - A basic indica- Ratings­Based Approach Based) Approach reviewed on a capital ratio less than tor approach for for credit risk and the to calculate those quarterly basis. 5.0%. The adequacy operational risk Internal Models Approach for market risk, and of a bank's capital All commercial - An indigenous net for market risk is subject to the Basic Indica- will remain subject to banks in India open exchange the prior written approval of tor Approach to supervisory review (excluding local area model for market the SBP. calculate those for (Pillar II) and market banks and regional risk operational risk. discipline (Pillar III), While the requirement rural banks) are and higher capital to use the Standardized Guidelines for required to adopt levels may be required, Approach for reporting recognition of the Standardized depending on the capital adequacy took eligible external Approach for credit bank's risk profile and effect on January 1, 2008, credit assessment risk and the Basic activities. banks were also required to institutions have Indicator Approach continue to submit been issued. for operational risk. Banks are to their calculations based continue to apply the on Basel I until the SBP Standardized Dura- issues instructions to stop tion Approach for doing so. computing capital requirements for market risk. Banks need RBI Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 225 approval to migrate to the Internal Ratings­Based Approach for credit risk and the Stan- dardized Approach or Advanced Mea- surement Approach for operational risk. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. a. Risk weights shown for India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were or are being phased out with the switch to Basel II. b. The financial year for banks in Nepal is from mid-July to mid-July. 226 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.4 Asset Quality: Loan Classification Criteria Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka - Standard: a performing - Standard: all unclas- - Standard: a Loans are nonper- Loans are past due if Loans and advances Loans are classified Loans are nonperforming asset, being repaid in sified loans other performing asset, forming if past due unpaid for 30 days or are classified as by the period for if past due for 90 days or accordance with the than special mention being repaid in for 90 days or more. more. Classifications nonperforming if which mark-up/inter- more. Classifications are contract accounts accordance with Classifications are are as follows. unpaid for 30 days or est or principal is as follows. the contract as follows. more. Classifications overdue: - Watch: 31­60 days - Special mention - Pass/standard: Special mention are as follows. past due (most favor- accounts: continu- - Watch: 31­90 days - Standard: principal 0­60 days past due - Substandard if by - Overdrafts: 90­180 days able classification; ous credit, demand overdue amount not past - Pass: not past due 90 days or more - Special mention: could be lower based loans, or term loans due for up to 3 or past due for up - Installment credit: 3­6 - Substandard: 61­90 days past due - Doubtful if by 180 on subjective criteria) remaining overdue for months to 3 months installments unpaid 91­360 days past days or more 90 days or more - Substandard: - Substandard: 61­90 due - Substandard: past - Substandard: past - Credit cards: 90­120 days 91­180 days past - Loss if by 1 year days past due (most Continuous loans due for up to 12 due for 3­6 months - Doubtful: 360­720 due or more (or, for - Other credit: 90­180 days favorable classifica- months - Past due/overdue days past due - Doubtful: past due trade bills, such as tion; could be lower - Doubtful: 181­360 Substandard if not repaid or - Doubtful: remained for 6­12 months import/export or based on subjective - Loss: 720 days or days past due renewed by the fixed in substandard inland bills, if not - Overdrafts: 180­360 days criteria) more past due - Loss: past due for expiration date category for 12 - Loss: 360 or more paid or adjusted for more than 1 year - Installment credit: 6­12 - Doubtful: 91­180 days Provisions on credit months days past due 180 days or more) - Substandard if past installments unpaid past due (most favor- extensions (such as due/overdue for 6­9 - Loss: identified as Classification Besides the time- able classification; overdrafts, working - Credit cards: 120­180 months a loss by the audi- criteria go beyond based criteria, sub- could be lower based capital advances, days tors, regulators, simply the number jective evaluation on subjective criteria) - Doubtful if past due/ and credit cards) or bank and not of days past due of the performing - Other credit: 180­360 overdue for 9­12 that do not have pre- - Loss: 181 days or more written off fully and now take into and nonperforming days months established repay- past due account qualitative credit portfolio shall ment schedules Classification of Doubtful - Bad debt if past due/ factors such as be made for risk A loan secured by col- shall be allocated as assets to be done overdue for more repayment capacity, assessment. And lateral is classified as follows: taking into account - Overdrafts: 360­540 days than 12 months adverse financial where considered follows: the degree of - Credit facilities on trends, deteriorating necessary, any - Installment credit: 12­18 Demand loans well-defined credit a. The portion of the out- which no repay- financial conditions, account, includ- installments unpaid weaknesses and the standing balance that - Past due/overdue ments have been and the like. ing the performing extent of depen- - Credit cards: 180­240 is equal to or greater if not repaid or received for 91­360 account, will be dence on collateral days than the market value rescheduled by the days shall be classified, and the security for realiza- of the collateral (as fixed expiration date - Other credit: 360­540 tion of amounts due. determined days in accordance - Substandard if unpaid classified substan- category of clas- Loss with International for 6­9 months dard, requiring 20% sification determined - Overdrafts: more than Valuation Standards provisioning. on time-based cri- - Doubtful if unpaid for 540 days and International teria shall be further 9­12 months - Credit facilities with Accounting Stan- downgraded. - Installment credit: more no repayments for dards) is classified in - Bad debt/loss if than 18 installments more than 360 days, the category that is unpaid for 12 months unpaid or whose term has one category higher or more expired, shall be - Credit cards: more than than the combina- Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 227 tion of objective and Fixed-term loans repay- classified as a loss 240 days able within 5 years and require 100% subjective criteria - Other credit: more than provisioning. would imply. - Substandard if install- 540 days Loans could also be b. The remaining portion ments in default for Classification is based more than 6 months classified under the of the outstanding on potential risks as well above categories balance, if any, is - Doubtful if for more as period risks: banks (even if the speci- classified in the cat- than 12 months shall classify performing fied period has not egory consistent with loans as nonperforming the combination of - Loss if for more than elapsed) subject to other conditions where full recoverability objective and subjec- 18 months specified in the in accordance with the tive criteria used for Fixed-term loans agreed terms is in doubt regulations. that category. repayable in more than because of circumstances c. If all or a portion of 5 years affecting repayment the outstanding bal- capacity. - Substandard if install- ance is fully secured ments in default for by readily marketable more than 12 months collateral, that portion may be classified as - Doubtful if for more standard, and the than 18 months remaining portion - Loss if for more than is classified in the 24 months category consistent with the combination Short-term agricultural of objective and sub- and micro credits jective criteria used - Irregular if not repaid for that category. by the due date as stipulated in the loan agreement - Substandard if loan remains irregular beyond 12 months (Table continues on next page) 228 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.4 Asset Quality: Loan Classification Criteria (continued) Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka - Doubtful if loan remains irregular beyond 36 months - Bad debt if loan remains irregular beyond 60 months If any uncertainty or doubt arises with respect to recovery of any continuous, demand, or fixed-term loan, the loan will have to be classified on the basis of a qualitative judgment on whether or not it is classifiable on the basis of objec- tive criteria. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. Table A1.5 Asset Quality: Provisioning Requirements for Different Loan Classifications Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka - Standard: 0% Standard - Standard: 1.5% Standard - Pass/standard: 1% - Standard: 1% (for - Standard: 0% General provisions general provisions general provisions priority sector, except for con- - Watch: 5% - Loans other than - Agricultural and - Performing assets: 0.25% if insured) sumer loans (5% if consumer finance - Watch: 1.5% general small and medium- - Special mention: 5% 1% - Substandard: 25% unsecured; 1.5% if loans and special provisions size enterprise loans: general provisions - Substandard: 25% secured) - Special mention - Doubtful: 50% mention accounts: 0.25% general (for priority sector, - Substandard: 20% - Substandard: 25% accounts (net of Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 229 1% general provisions 6.25% if insured) - Substandard: 25% - Loss: immediate (30% for sectors with specific provisions interest in suspense): provisions charge-off against the highest exposures) - All other loans and - Doubtful: 50% (for - Doubtful: 50% 1% - Doubtful: 50% reserve for losses - Housing finance and advances: 0.40% priority sector, - Doubtful: 50% (60% specific provisions - Loss: 100% General provisions loans to profession- general provisions 12.5%) For the standard for sectors with are not necessary als under consumer - Loss: 100% specific Provisioning is made category, general loss highest exposures) Substandard - Loss: 100% (for for loans secured by finance: 2% general provisions on gross loans net of reserves are encour- priority sector, 25% cash, gold, or govern- provisions - Loss: 100% 10% general provi- liquid assets realiz- aged on loans to nonfi- Netting of collateral if insured) ment securities. sions (unsecured able and 30% of the nancial institutions and - Other unclassified Provisions against is allowed only for exposures attract An additional 20% forced sale value of Specific provisions other clients. For other consumer finance credit exposures the doubtful and loss additional 10%) provision is required pledged security. categories, specific loans as well as secured by risk-free classifications. - Substandard: 25% for unsecured loans loan loss reserves are special mention collateral shall be Doubtful For the loss cat- for credit card debt; Group pooling of with only personal required in the indicated accounts after maintained in an egory, the benefit 20% for others a. 100% to the extent provisions is allowed or corporate guar- percentages, as a netting of interest amount being the net of forced sale value not covered by for small loans. antees. Provision- - Doubtful: 50% minimum. in suspense: 5% difference between (FSV) against security's realizable ing is done on the general provisions the principal amount nonperforming loans - Loss: 100% value; and outstanding amount. and the value of the shall not be avail- Continuous, demand, Specific provision- risk-free collateral. b. An additional able after 3 years and fixed-term loans ing is made on gross For this purpose amount for the from the date of - Substandard: 20% precious metals, cash classification of the loans net of realizable period for which deposits in banks, loan or advance. security value and the loan remains - Doubtful: 50% interest suspended. and securities issued doubtful: 20% (of by the RMA or by the Classified loans and A haircuta is applied to - Bad/loss: 100% security value) if up advances guaran- the value of collateral government of Bhutan to 1 year, 30% if 1­3 Short-term teed by the govern- depending on the shall be deemed to be years, 100% if more agricultural and ment do not require period remaining in risk-free collateral. than 3 years. microcredit loans provisioning. the loss category. (Table continues on next page) 230 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.5 Asset Quality: Provisioning Requirements for Different Loan Classifications (continued) Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka - All except bad/loss Loss The SBP withdrew (standard, substan- the FSV benefit for - To be written off dard, doubtful): 5% determining pro- - If not written off, visioning require- - Bad/loss: 100% 100% ments to create a Off­balance sheet cushion in the bal- Except for doubtful ance sheet of banks. assets (general assets, provisioning is In 2009 the SBP provisions) done as a percent- partially allowed - Effective December age of the gross loan the FSV benefit (up 31, 2007, 0.5% amount. to 30%) for pledged - Effective December The RBI has compre- stock as well as 31, 2008, 1% hensive provisioning residential and com- rules for leased assets mercial properties. Provisioning made Furthermore, at the and all other types of after deducting the end of 2007 the SBP advances as well. interest in suspense no longer allowed and the value of banks to reduce eligible securities provisions for loans (at 50% of the market collateralized by value of the illiquid assets. But securities). banks continued to be able to reduce provisions on loans collateralized by liq- uid assets, including listed securities. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. a. Haircut = The percentage by which an asset's market value is reduced for the purpose of calculating capital requirement, margin, and collateral levels. Table A1.6 Income Recognition Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Income on loans and Income on loans and Income on loans and Income on loans and Income on loans and Interest accruals on Following the All interest advances is recognized advances is recog- advances is recog- advances is recog- advances is recog- loans and advances new rules of the accrued from the Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 231 on an accrual basis. nized on an accrual nized on an accrual nized on an accrual nized on an accrual shall be recognized Securities and date an advance basis. basis. basis. basis. on a cash basis. Exchange Commis- is classified as Banks must suspend the sion (SEC) permit- nonperforming accrual of interest on all For nonperforming Interest accrued on For nonperforming A loan or advance will Interest accrued but ting companies to shall forthwith be interest-earning assets loans, based on the a credit exposure loans, based on the be placed on nonac- not received must be delay recognition suspended and for which principal record of recovery, that is classified as record of recovery, crual status: debited to the of any losses on credited to an or interest payments income is recognized nonperforming shall income is not recog- accrued interest - If it is maintained securities (avail- interest-in- have been past due for on a cash basis. not be recognized as nized on an accrual account on the asset on a cash basis able for sale) in suspense account. periods exceeding 90 income, but shall be basis but is booked side of the balance Income on substan- because of deteri- their income state- days. The loan is then suspended and only on actual sheet and credited Interest on non- dard and doubtful oration in the ments until end- placed on nonaccrual booked in a valuation realization. to the interest-in- performing loans loans can be charged borrower's financial December 2009, the status, and interest reserve designated suspense account is recognized as to the loan account. Banks, using their condition or ability SBP has allowed income is recognized as an interest-in- on the liability side. income only on a The interest charged own discretion, can to pay banks the option to only upon payment in suspense account. cash basis. cannot be transferred debit interest to a follow instructions cash. The only exception Thereafter, any - If full payment of to the income nonperforming asset issued by the SEC At the time of to this rule is when payments received principal and account, however, account, crediting on recognition of classifying credit such an asset is both against the credit interest is not but must be main- the interest to an impairment on their facilities as well secured and in the exposure must be expected tained in an interest- interest-in-suspense capital position, nonperforming, a process of collection. first applied toward in-suspense account account, or maintain - Or if it is nonper- but encouraged bank shall reverse interest arrears, and When an asset is placed (also referred to as only a record of such forming, unless it is early recognition the accrued the remaining on nonaccrual status, an interest suspense interest in pro forma both well secured in income interest and credit balance, if any, all accrued but unpaid account). accounts. and in the process statements. it to an interest- toward the principal. interest must be of collection in-suspense Income on loans and advances is (Table continues on next page) 232 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.6 Income Recognition (continued) Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka reversed through a As soon as any loan If any advance All interest that is recognized on an account. The debit to interest income is classified as bad becomes nonper- accrued but not accrual basis. For reversal of and a credit to accrued debt, the charging of forming, the interest collected and still nonperforming unearned income interest. interest on that loan accrued and credited carried on the books loans, unrealized identified after the will cease. to the income shall be written off mark-up/interest close of a financial account in the by the end of the is to be put in a year could be Regulations do not previous year should calendar quarter in suspense account accounted for specify whether be reversed or which the loan is, or and not to be cred- in the financial the interest income provided for, if the should have been, ited to the income year in which the accrued but not interest is not placed on nonaccrual account except advances were received on loans that realized. This applies status, but in no when realized in identified as have subsequently to government- event later than 90 cash. Unrealized nonperforming. become nonperform- guaranteed accounts days after being mark-up/interest ing has to be reversed as well. transferred to already credited or clawed back or nonaccrual status. to the income provided for. account is to be reversed and kept in the suspense (memorandum) account. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. Table A1.7 Write-Off Policy Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Assets classified At any time banks No guidelines have Banks should either Any asset past NRB has issued Bad or irrecoverable The CBSL has as a loss are to be may write off without been issued. make full provision in due for 360 days no specific loans may be written issued no spe- immediately charged delay loans classified accordance with the or more shall be prudential off by banks with the cific prudential off against the reserve as bad/loss for the guidelines or write off classified as a guidelines on express approval of guidelines on for losses. An asset previous 5 years and nonperforming assets loss and written the write-off of their board of directors the write-off of classified as a loss for which 100% and claim tax benefits off at the end nonperforming or their nominated or nonperforming Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 233 is considered not provision has already as applicable, in of the current loans. But it designated authority or loans. Banks collectible and of such been made. consultation with their calendar quarter has instructed committee. can write off little value that its auditors or tax but not later than banks to have loss advances Banks may write off Before allowance of a continuance as a consultants. 90 days after first their write-off at their own loans by debiting loan write-off, all liquid bankable asset is being identified policy approved discretion. their current year's Banks may write off assets held under lien not warranted. A loss as a loss. The by NRB through income account advances at the head and pledged goods classification does not write-off may be their board. where 100% office level even should be realized and mean that the asset deferred, but provision is not found though they are appropriated toward has absolutely no only if the loan adequate for writing outstanding in the reduction of the recovery or salvage is well secured, off such loans. the branch books. But outstanding amount and value, but that legal action has provisions need to be should be legally cleared deferring the commenced, and made in accordance by the bank's legal write-off of this the time to realize with the classification counsel. basically worthless the collateral is assigned to the asset is not practical less than 1 year. accounts. or desirable even Guarantees though partial must be honored recovery may be within 90 days of effected in the future. being called to preclude a loss classification. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. 234 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.8 Exposure Limits Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka No bank is permitted Effective April No financial institu- The exposure limit is The basic single- A bank may grant The single-borrower For a single to grant credit to 9, 2005, a bank tion shall extend 15% of capital funds borrower limit is a single borrower limit is 30% of the company, public a single obligor or cannot lend to credit (funded and for a single borrower 15% of capital, but or group of related bank's capital, subject corporation, firm, group of related an individual or nonfunded) to a and 40% for a group. exceptions allow borrowers fund- to a cap of 20% for association of per- obligors if, as a result organization or to single borrower Individual exposure loans of up to 30% based advances cash credit. (For sons, or individual, of that action, the a group in excess exceeding 30% of its may exceed the to one borrower up to 25% of its foreign banks, it is 30% the lending limit for exposure to that obli- of 35% of its total capital funds (single norm by 5%, and under specific core capital and of the bank's assigned banks is 30% of cap- gor or group exceeds capital (previously, borrower includes group exposure by "low-risk" circum- non-fund-based capital, subject to a ital funds. The limit 15% of regulatory 50% of capital), and individuals; spouse an additional 10%, stances. Groups off­balance sheet cap of 20% of capital is 33% in aggregate capital or increases the funded portion and dependents; if the excess is for of closely related facilities up to for cash credit or PRs for an individual, his the amount by which of the approved entities with common infrastructure proj- borrowers are 50% of its core 12 million, whichever close relations, and the exposure already loan should not financial or business ects such as power, limited to 40% of capital fund. is higher.) a company or firm exceeds 15% of be more than 15% interests, such as telecoms, roads, or capital. in which he has a From the 2010/11 The group limit is 50% regulatory capital. of the bank's total partnerships, enter- ports. In exceptional substantial interest, An aggregate financial year, the of the bank's capital, capital. prises, companies, circumstances or for a company The corresponding limit of 500% is total limit (funded subject to a cap of 35% and subsidiaries; and these limits can be and one or more limit for an Afghan For large loans established for and nonfunded) is for cash credit. a group of companies increased by another of its subsidiaries, branch of a foreign (more than 10% of large exposures to be within 25%.a with common owner- 5%. Unsecured loans are associates, or one bank is 4% of the capital), the ceiling (defined as 10% or ship). Exposures limited to PRs 500,000 that has a substan- total assets of the depends on the This limit includes more of capital). secured by cash, per person. (For small tial interest in it. branch. bank's nonperform- An exposure may both funded and non- The basic limit for national savings and medium-size ing loans ratio. If exceed the limit by funded credit limits, The aggregate of In calculating compli- loans to "insiders" bonds, and first- enterprises, the limit is the ratio is less another 10% if the underwriting, and all loans exceed- ance with this limit, is 15% of capital class international PRs 3 million.) than 5%, large additional credit similar commitments. ing 15% of capital exposures to each (the same as for bank guarantees loans can go up to exposure is for infra- The maximum funds shall not obligor in a group With effect from non-insiders), but are exempt from 56% of the bank's structure. exposure to a single exceed 55% of the of related obligors May 29, 2008, the insider loans must single-obligator capital funds. If the small or medium-size total advances of are aggregated and Exclusions include exposure limit for a be fully secured. limits. ratio is 5­10%, the enterprise is PRs 75 the bank, except in considered as an the following: single borrower has The requirement ceiling is 52%. For For hydropower, million. the case of loans exposure to a single been raised to 25% of for security is 10­15%, it is 48%. - Interbank expo- a total of 50% of granted to obligor. When the capital funds for oil waived if the total For 15­20%, it is sures of less than core capital is aggregation is companies that have loans to an insider 44%. And for more 1 year allowed. been issued oil bonds than 20%, it is 40%. performed, each Loans against - Exposures fully (which do not have are less than 2% The maximum certain state- individual credit is shares are limited covered by cash statutory liquidity of capital. The unsecured credit card owned entities, counted. to 5% of total collateral ratio status) by the aggregate of all loan per person is PRs entities engaged liabilities. For listed government of India.b loans to all insid- 500,000. to undertake large - Exposures covered shares, up to 40% In addition, banks ers is capped at infrastructure proj- by government The maximum per- of the market value may in exceptional 50% of capital. ects, and the like. guarantees party limit for housing can be granted as circumstances con- finance is PRs 10 loans, or Tk 10 mil- - Exposures to sider enhancement of million. lion per borrower. governments and the exposure to such Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 235 central banks oil companies up to Advances against a another 5% of capital bank's own shares, Aggregate borrowing funds. toward floating of of a bank's 10 largest shares, against non- borrowers should These limits are not listed shares, and the not exceed 30% of its applicable to existing like are prohibited. total loan portfolio. or additional credit facilities (including Exposure against The total of the bank's funding of interest shares of a listed large advances shall and irregularities) company shall be not exceed 8 times granted to weak or restricted to 30% of its capital funds. sick industrial units their current market For such purposes, under rehabilitation value. amounts are specified packages. for each sector. In addition to the above, there are exposure limits for other types of facilities. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. a. The financial year for banks in Nepal is from mid-July to mid-July. b. A statutory liquidity ratio status makes a bond more attractive, since under statutory liquidity requirements the RBI requires banks to invest 24% of the deposits in government-approved securities. 236 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.9 Directed Lending Guidelines Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka No guidelines have Locally incorpo- No guidelines have All domestic banks No guidelines have The minimum The SBP has issued All banks were been issued rated banks are been issued. must make 40% of been issued percentage of comprehensive required to ensure required to allocate their net loans to total credit to be guidelines on prior- that at least 10% of credit through the priority sector invested in the ity sector lending, their lending was directed lending (of which 18% is to priority sector such as prudential directed to agricul- programs to certain go to agriculture was phased out regulations for ture by the end of economic sectors and 10% to the according to a agricultural financ- 2009. For this purpose, (such as agricul- "weaker sections"), timetable, from 7% ing and the like. agriculture is defined ture) as directed and 1% of the for fiscal 2002/03 The agricultural as the cultivation, by the government previous year's total to 6% for 2003/04, lending target for processing, and pur- or BB. But specific advances are given 4% for 2004/05, fiscal 2007/08 was chasing of tea, rubber, targets or amounts under the Differen- and 2% for 2005/06 PRs 200 billion.c coconut, paddy, and have not been tial Rate of Interest and 2006/07.b From The SBP is phasing minor export crops; made public (for scheme. fiscal 2007/08 this out these directed livestock and dairy fiscal 2009/10 the program of priority lending programs, farming; fisheries; Foreign banks must disbursement target sector lending is not however. minor food crops; make 32% of their for agriculture is Tk compulsory. horticulture; forestry; loans to the sector, To help improve 115 billion).a beekeeping; and the of which loans to From fiscal 2007/08 credit to rural proj- like; as well as the In view of the global small enterprises the portfolio of ects, and to improve processing of prod- economic situation, should not be less deprived sector access to finance ucts for value addition effective April 2009 than 10% and lending of licensed in rural areas, the for export purposes. BB has capped at export credit not A- and B-class SBP has mandated 13% the interest less than 12% of net banks and financial that banks establish rate on loans to bank credit (there institutions must be 20% of their new various sectors, is no target for at least 3% and 1%, branches in rural including produc- agriculture). respectively, of their areas. tive sectors such as total outstanding The priority sector agriculture; housing loans and advances broadly covers agri- sector loans; and (loans outstanding culture, small-scale bank loans to for the previous 6 industry, and other nonbank financial months, including activities such institutions. bills purchase as small business, and discount). For retail trade, small this purpose, the transport operators, deprived class has professional and been defined as self-employed people having low persons, housing, incomes, mainly education loans, socially backward microcredit, and women, scheduled the like. castes, dalits, Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 237 marginal and small The RBI has also farmers, artisans, issued directives to laborers, landless banks on providing families, and people credit facilities who are blind, deaf, to minority or handicapped. communities. The loans that were provided, up to the limit set by NRB, to microenterprises that generate self- employment and were established to improve the economic and social conditions of deprived people are also accounted as deprived sector lending. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. a. The fiscal year for the Bangladesh government is from July 1 to June 30. b. The fiscal year for the Nepalese government is from mid-July to mid-July. c. The fiscal year for the Pakistan government is from July 1 to June 30. 238 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.10 Liquidity Requirements Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Statutory liquidity requirements Quick liquidity ratio: 18% of demand and 20% of total liabilities, 24% of net demand With effect from In 2009, after a 15% of time and 20% of all liabilities high-liquid assets time liabilities for excluding capital and time liabilities June 1, 2006, the decade and a half demand liabilities (excluding contingent must be at least 20% mainstream com- fund and liabilities to minimum reserve NRB reintroduced liabilities), less liabili- of volatile liabilities. mercial banks, 10% the RMA (from July requirement for com- a statutory liquidity ties to shareholders (Volatile liabilities for Islamic banks 2009) mercial banks was requirement to con- and the CBSL, for the include demand reduced from 30% to tain inflation and fuel domestic banking unit deposits of banks, 25% of the average growth. The require- in Sri Lanka rupees deposits of other rufiyaa and foreign ment rose from 6% of and for the offshore financial institutions, currency demand total deposits in the banking unit in U.S. borrowings under and time liabilities, second quarter to dollars, for each securities repur- excluding interbank 8% by the end of the month chase agreements, liabilities and letter fourth quarter. short-term borrowings of credit margin from banks, and other deposits. short-term Balances of the mini- borrowings.) mum reserve local Broad liquidity ratio: currency deposits in liquid assets must be excess of 15% bear at least 15% of the an interest rate of sum of attracted funds 2.5% a year. With and designated off­ effect from December balance sheet items. 30, 2008, foreign cur- rency deposits in excess of 15% of the minimum reserve bear an interest rate of 0.25% a year. The reserve requirement for rufiyaa must be met in the form of rufiyaa deposits, while for foreign Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 239 currency, U.S. dollar deposits are required. Cash reserve requirements At least 8% of cus- 5% of total demand 17% of total liabilities 5% (from 2009; 8.25% No cash reserve 5.5% of total deposit 5% of time and Statutory reserve ratio tomer deposits, held and time liabilities on (from September in August 2008) requirements estab- liabilities (based on demand liabilities on of 7% of deposits with in a special, blocked a biweekly average 2008) lished the average of the a weekly average the CBSL (from current account at the basis, on the condi- deposits of 2 weeks basis, subject to a February 2009) central bank tion that the cash back), to be held with daily minimum of 4% reserve ratio should NRB not be less than 4.5% on any day. (This is counted toward the statutory liquidity requirement.) Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. 240 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A1.11 Debt Restructuring Policy Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka No specific policy Borrowers can A restructuring facil- Banks can restructure A restructured loan Banks may resched- The rescheduling or For rescheduled on troubled debt be rescheduled ity may be granted assets classified as includes any new ule or restructure restructuring of non- credit facilities, when restructuring; banks as performing, only for credit standard, substandard, loan to repay or nonperforming performing assets shall rescheduling occurs are to follow Inter- according to BB exposures that have or doubtful. replace any loan assets upon receipt not change the asset before an account national Account- rules, if they pay been regular and are that is overdue, of a written action classification unless the is classified as No account can be ing Standards a set fee (10% of affected by genuine rescheduled, rolled plan from the bor- terms and conditions nonperforming, the restructured unless and International the outstanding unforeseen financial over, or otherwise rower with payment of the rescheduling or rescheduled account financial viability and Financial Reporting debt for the first constraints. modified because of at least 25% of the restructuring have been shall be classified as certainty of repayment Standards. rescheduling). of deterioration total accrued inter- fully met for at least 1 nonperforming when, Before the loan can are established. The fee is treated in the borrower's est up to the date year (excluding the grace in the aggregate, the be rescheduled, as income for the Upon restructuring: financial condition of rescheduling or period, if any) from the period of time the financial institutions bank, and any or an inability to restructuring. date of the rescheduling account is in arrears must reassess the - A standard asset specific provisions repay the loan or restructuring and at before rescheduling borrower's financial should be reclassified Loan rescheduling that it has made according to the least 10% of the outstand- (if any) and after position and make a as substandard. or restructuring that are reversed. original terms. ing amount has been rescheduling is 3 full credit evaluation results in an improve- - Nonperforming assets recovered in cash. months or more (for Restructuring is of the borrower's A bank shall docu- ment in classification would continue to loans repayable in considered after financial condition ment the basis for to the least-risk Further, the unreal- have the same clas- monthly installments, defined cash pay- and prospects for restructuring a category (pass) is not ized mark-up on such sification. when 3 installments ments: repayment, to avoid loan. prohibited. But such loans (declassified have not been paid; "evergreening" - Such nonperforming a rescheduled loan after rescheduling or - For the first time, If all overdue and for loans payable of the loan. In this assets are eligible for shall require provi- restructuring) shall not 15% of overdue interest is paid by quarterly or semian- regard, financial upgrading to standard sioning of at least be taken (credited) to the installments or the borrower in nually, loans with institutions are per- after satisfactory 12.5%. If the loan is income account unless at 10% of the total cash at the time of bullet payments, and mitted to reschedule performance for a priority sector credit, least 50% of the amount outstanding, restructuring, the credit cards, when a loan only once in period specified by the provisioning is has been realized in cash. whichever is less restructured loan amounts due are not 2 years and not more the bank. 3.125% (one-fourth of But this will not affect shall be classified paid for 90 days from - For the second than 3 times during the 12.5%). the declassification of substandard. After the due date). time, 30% and the term of the loan. this account if all other payments have Rescheduled or 20% criteria are met. Banks shall reclas- been made restructured loans sify nonperforming - After 2 times, 50% according to cannot be reclassi- loans as performing if and 30% fied in the pass For rescheduling the restructured category until the interest and principal of demand or loan terms for a terms of the restruc- in arrears are paid continuous loans, period of at least tured loan have by the borrower in a down payment 6 months, the loan been observed for relation to classified is required, with may be reclassified 2 years; that is, loss nonperforming loans. the rate based using the criteria provisions cannot A nonperforming on the amount specified. be written back and advance that has outstanding: distributed. If a loan is been rescheduled Appendix 1. Prudential Regulations in South Asian Countries, End of 2008 241 - Up to Tk 1 crore restructured but all would be eligible to (Tk 10 million), 15% overdue interest be upgraded to the is not paid by the performing category - Tk 1­5 crore (Tk borrower in cash at only after satisfac- 10­50 million), the time of restruc- tory performance for 10% (not less than turing, the loan a period the length Tk 15 lakh [Tk 15 shall be classified of which depends on million]) according to the the category of the - Tk 5 crore (Tk criteria specified. nonperforming loan: 50 million) and - For special mention, above, 5% (not a period of 90 days less than Tk 50 after the date on million) which the first pay- Borrowers with ment of interest or rescheduled loans principal falls due, will get any new whichever is earlier, facilities subject to under the resched- conditions speci- uled terms fied by BB. - For substandard, a For restructuring period of 180 days of large loans, a - For loss, a period of separate scheme 360 days exists. Source: National prudential regulations for commercial banks. 242 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 Table A2.1 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2001 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) -- 4.83 3.58 6.42 6.29 2.09 4.88 6.03 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) -- 0.10 -- -- 2.96 0.05 -- 2.55 43­115 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- 231.97 -- 416.77 397.13 111.59 195.84 939.32 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- 56.56 18.75 50.99 -- 19.07 16.04 256.88 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) -- 42.50 0.54 22.18 56.70 3.29 8.77 11.68 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) -- 0.91 -- -- 26.70 0.08 -- 4.93 1­378 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) -- 17.12 19.03 13.80 43.72 ­93.62 12.20 20.57 4.42­32.80 Return on assets (%) -- 0.74 1.23 0.90 5.59 ­3.04 0.60 0.84 0.20­1.47 Staff cost ratio (%) -- 44.75 55.04 68.10 33.96 194.25 52.58 46.21 14.87­46.31 Operating cost ratio (%) -- 236.78 40.14 92.33 40.99 35.87 90.91 118.66 49.86­294.02 Net interest margin (%) -- 1.66 1.63 2.98 5.06 1.76 3.24 3.30 0.64­3.55 Recurring earning power (%) -- 1.70 1.76 1.60 5.90 0.86 1.17 1.64 0.10­2.29 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) -- 7.02 14.83 11.40 24.00 4.00 11.30 8.59 10.40­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) -- 4.17 0.07 19.12 0.14 3.27 4.58 3.90 4.11­15.01 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 31.49 8.80 11.40 9.89 29.31 19.60 19.57 0.60­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 25.36 38.72 49.70 24.95 30.59 53.20 44.43 25.40­128.80 Liquid assets ratio (%) -- 30.03 47.46 48.20 47.90 22.10 39.90 22.80 7.42­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- 122.90 136.39 260.00 -- 47.88 56.25 26.30 2.83­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- 663.50 16.98 117.85 -- 129.55 537.75 659.05 8.90­256.86 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 16.17 2.18 26.80 -- 14.50 38.90 16.28 8.83­95.34 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 59.16 100.00 72.90 -- 83.13 22.52 54.37 6.04­61.90 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 2.57 12.86 29.40 -- 11.76 8.06 8.81 35.58­350.02 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 1.28 0.34 112.00 -- 0.59 0.02 0.99 16.21­290.00 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.50 0.03 2.13 -- 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.34­2.21 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 243 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 944.90 5,774.98 784.67 3,347.00 1563.48 1,091.80 1,650.62 427.10­1,658.53b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- 47.38 100.00 33.80 91.69 58.02 50.30 63.09 27.04­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 50.55 100.00 33.98 91.95 51.73 53.23 62.02 23.53­60.18 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 45.76 100.00 33.04 94.12 52.06 50.86 65.16 22.28­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 24.33 10.61 21.50 23.57 26.95 17.82 28.19 42.00­157.85 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) -- 50.35 58.67 61.90 50.92 63.83 43.61 56.80 44.90­174.28 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) -- 5.47 7.03 9.90 7.40 11.90 10.20 5.44 1.98­28.97 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) -- 9.53 21.55 17.07 21.23 15.99 20.32 8.68 11.29­110.57 Value of real-time gross settlement transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,381.00­14,835.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- -- 514.34 -- -- -- 289.85 0.62­1,432.30 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 38.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- -- 85.70 22.50­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) -- 36.10 47.18 58.58 43.04 48.57 39.20 32.03 48.81­286.09 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- 3.95 4.10 3.35 3.24 2.40 1.38 ­3.42 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) -- 18.16 33.95 23.70 44.93 11.70 16.28 15.80 15.11­41.84 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- 26.43 58.84 29.37 62.90 38.90 48.67 21.69 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- 84.17 26.18 53.13 61.92 74.80 63.54 79.01 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 5.26 -- 3.09 0.32 10.69 2.14 7.34 0.03­1.98 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; Asian Development Bank (ADB), statistical database; CPSS 2004; Ratha and Xu 2008. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. ATM = automated teller machine, -- = not available, n.a. = not applicable. Table A2.2 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2002 244 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) -- 4.74 3.49 6.33 6.66 1.85 4.73 6.70 5­65 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) -- 0.14 -- -- 3.70 0.06 -- 3.27 37­128 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- 234.75 -- 420.84 456.03 123.21 194.87 989.94 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- 57.14 21.24 53.93 -- 14.92 14.93 257.66 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) -- 42.26 0.54 22.26 60.00 2.96 8.72 13.17 1­149 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) -- 1.22 -- -- 33.30 0.10 -- 6.43 2­371 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) -- 12.40 17.03 17.30 25.77 ­96.16 27.50 25.71 2.90­25.51 Return on assets (%) -- 0.54 1.19 1.10 3.42 ­3.37 1.50 1.11 0.10­1.50 Staff cost ratio (%) -- 66.53 56.88 64.70 35.46 185.00 50.75 47.62 16.39­47.27 Operating cost ratio (%) -- 187.63 46.11 85.38 51.83 59.78 85.81 99.80 53.39­238.96 Net interest margin (%) -- 1.04 2.02 2.66 3.69 0.92 3.10 3.78 0.84­3.55 Recurring earning power (%) -- 1.50 1.70 2.00 4.27 0.21 2.00 2.07 0.17­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) -- 7.60 13.94 12.00 23.13 ­7.25 12.60 10.35 9.60­16.90a Leverage ratio (times) -- 4.34 0.06 15.69 0.12 3.71 4.11 4.71 1.21­14.64 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 28.10 7.23 10.40 10.01 30.41 17.70 19.09 0.70­26.00 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 25.3 43.62 53.40 27.59 29.98 58.20 50.38 24.50­123.70 Liquid assets ratio (%) -- 25.84 40.52 47.40 50.29 18.16 48.10 18.80 7.07­37.74 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- 121.46 96.34 250.00 -- 41.33 68.95 21.70 2.99­39.60 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- 735.42 14.53 118.92 -- 212.14 278.47 585.08 10.06­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 17.53 1.89 29.80 -- 17.40 37.80 21.94 9.33­123.46 Trading value of top10 stocks ratio (%) -- 51.64 100.00 62.93 90.75 81.89 21.89 57.70 9.84­78.70 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 2.61 13.03 27.40 9.48 8.54 9.15 10.28 31.85­304.85 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 1.28 0.15 36.00 0.07 0.38 0.15 1.91 12.47­244.23 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.49 0.01 0.88 0.001 0.04 0.90 0.21 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 245 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 886.66 5,795.97 741.50 3,216.00 1,574.76 1,052.12 1,528.39 332.36­1,869.49b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- 45.77 100.00 33.67 89.82 58.68 49.71 60.88 30.03­75.23 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 47.55 100.00 33.26 89.67 49.62 51.76 62.43 22.38­71.59 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 43.22 100.00 31.92 93.61 49.34 47.00 60.02 21.16­62.38 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 26.32 11.38 23.80 25.56 27.21 18.04 28.09 42.30­154.98 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) -- 52.78 62.67 67.30 59.50 67.69 47.72 54.51 45.23­172.93 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) -- 5.62 6.24 10.23 6.95 13.20 10.95 5.58 1.97­29.25 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) -- 9.79 27.04 17.43 22.64 16.79 22.52 8.81 11.89­119.99 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,231.00­14,139.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- 8.49 528.88 -- -- -- 241.89 0.56­3,484.43 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- -- 85.40 31.50­81.90 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) -- 37.92 52.52 62.22 47.99 48.75 42.97 32.26 41.08­282.88 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- 1.91 4.50 2.60 0.33 1.50 ­0.08 ­2.13 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) ­5.31 18.63 36.40 23.50 46.35 9.50 18.43 14.40 14.00­42.03 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- 23.75 51.83 28.46 61.01 43.00 45.00 22.05 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- 83.31 29.68 53.45 57.99 78.50 56.83 70.93 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 5.90 -- 3.27 0.31 10.35 4.76 7.78 0.03­2.14 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a,2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; IMF, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; ADB, statistical database; CPSS 2004; Ratha and Xu 2008. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 246 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.3 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2003 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) -- 4.67 5.86 6.25 7.77 1.85 4.61 6.85 5­65 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) -- 0.14 0.27 -- 3.70 0.08 0.37 3.69 37­139 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- 234.60 202.02 418.67 518.48 102.43 190.55 1,000.53 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- 56.87 24.55 55.84 45.90 12.96 18.86 279.15 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) -- 42.25 1.12 22.41 70.00 3.04 8.66 13.63 1­139 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) -- 1.26 0.05 -- 33.30 0.14 0.69 7.34 2­364 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) -- 12.39 17.98 21.00 30.63 ­22.33 33.70 26.33 3.40­65.02 Return on assets (%) -- 0.59 1.24 1.50 3.73 ­0.85 2.10 1.36 0.20­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) -- 64.53 50.12 62.10 39.29 306.16 51.48 49.58 18.89­45.76 Operating cost ratio (%) -- 161.86 44.30 80.71 46.29 40.14 83.20 94.02 49.20­200.73 Net interest margin (%) -- 1.09 2.18 2.85 4.12 1.58 2.98 4.16 0.98­3.37 Recurring earning power (%) -- 1.68 1.76 2.50 4.65 ­0.01 2.57 2.58 0.14­2.30 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) -- 8.42 19.93 12.70 23.44 ­11.74 11.10 10.31 10.00­17.90a Leverage ratio (times) -- 4.77 0.09 15.87 0.12 3.87 5.03 5.53 0.75­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 22.13 7.78 8.80 10.10 28.80 13.70 16.36 0.30­20.40 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 18.35 40.67 52.40 41.06 7.55 64.80 58.74 25.50­140.40 Liquid assets ratio (%) -- 24.67 38.18 48.70 53.71 12.49 46.10 17.30 7.59­37.31 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- 127.19 94.20 260.00 -- 27.03 63.44 20.00 2.46­36.66 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market -- 435.22 37.61 72.77 -- 240.19 186.41 389.76 6.46­339.42 capitalization (%) Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 16.73 4.52 31.60 -- 18.50 36.70 27.43 9.94­137.88 Trading value of top10 stocks ratio (%) -- 51.55 100.00 55.42 74.90 58.35 19.18 60.83 11.90­74.00 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 2.43 12.03 22.50 11.34 8.05 15.31 14.92 31.26­382.10 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 1.02 0.07 37.70 0.08 0.13 0.13 4.18 13.17­214.19 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.42 0.01 1.08 0.001 0.02 0.54 0.35 0.37­1.50 Market concentration and competitiveness Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 247 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 702.04 5,676.65 734.59 3,154.00 1,468.53 976.81 1,455.81 341.51­1,864.85b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- 38.33 100.00 33.49 87.33 56.67 47.47 58.19 29.64­72.31 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 43.27 100.00 32.76 87.64 46.80 48.93 60.89 22.70­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 39.57 100.00 31.60 90.96 44.64 43.58 56.81 16.79­64.12 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 29.42 13.40 25.90 25.37 27.80 19.46 29.50 43.11­153.39 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) -- 53.84 59.09 68.80 57.90 69.84 50.10 56.06 45.80­172.10 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 11.83 5.75 6.13 10.73 7.05 12.50 11.64 5.42 1.98­30.39 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) -- 10.13 23.04 18.04 23.34 17.02 26.03 8.87 12.15­129.45 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 61.12 1,321.00­13,653.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- 9.48 548.87 -- -- -- 215.16 0.54­3,603.61 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47.60 38.80­83.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- -- 84.90 20.00­81.10 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) -- 38.96 47.12 66.73 50.86 49.96 46.48 31.87 40.68­308.83 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- ­0.18 2.40 ­0.30 1.79 ­0.50 ­1.45 ­1.03 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) ­35.77 19.53 35.63 26.40 49.11 8.60 20.56 16.00 13.50­43.55 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- 22.98 66.69 26.78 51.11 39.90 44.04 21.72 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- 80.53 31.94 56.93 53.09 80.10 58.83 69.56 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 5.97 -- 4.09 0.29 11.01 4.69 7.75 0.03­1.25 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; IMF, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; ADB, statistical database; CPSS 2004; Ratha and Xu 2008. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. Table A2.4 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2004 248 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 0.14 4.67 5.71 6.26 8.15 1.71 4.64 7.06 5­66 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 0.01 0.17 0.27 -- 3.70 0.11 0.52 4.16 38­152 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- 233.63 206.65 426.11 603.14 115.88 180.28 1,023.58 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- 60.24 25.61 61.88 56.12 11.97 24.51 304.11 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 0.07 42.71 1.12 22.57 73.30 2.87 8.84 14.20 1­133 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 0.003 1.55 0.05 -- 33.30 0.18 0.99 8.37 2­361 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) -- ­13.39 14.19 23.00 36.98 ­46.42 29.00 25.62 1.90­22.80 Return on assets (%) -- ­0.63 1.30 1.70 4.47 1.47 2.00 1.43 0.20­1.70 Staff cost ratio (%) -- 66.24 52.91 60.17 40.70 181.18 51.97 46.98 22.44­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) -- 141.89 39.61 77.05 49.45 31.93 83.62 95.66 59.57­172.59 Net interest margin (%) -- 1.97 2.46 3.07 4.42 1.99 2.87 3.97 1.01­3.12 Recurring earning power (%) -- 1.86 2.08 2.90 5.27 1.81 2.26 2.33 0.61­1.97 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) -- 7.41 18.52 12.90 18.38 ­9.07 11.40 10.29 10.40­16.10a Leverage ratio (times) 0.38 4.16 0.10 15.77 0.12 ­3.00 6.45 5.63 0.68­15.18 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 17.63 5.98 7.20 6.24 22.77 9.00 11.29 0.20­12.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 19.15 45.38 62.00 56.59 3.82 72.40 68.29 29.90­182.90 Liquid assets ratio (%) -- 23.50 44.89 48.70 45.40 13.61 37.00 20.30 7.50­34.98 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- 121.94 116.79 260.00 -- 27.30 51.88 23.10 2.47­29.42 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- 239.99 42.30 64.33 -- 204.93 108.60 299.80 5.58­299.09 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 16.57 5.63 33.40 -- 17.30 33.00 31.70 9.67­148.43 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 46.67 99.90 44.86 87.13 86.25 16.01 42.92 11.90­75.60 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 4.28 13.30 41.90 16.06 8.72 24.07 18.83 23.18­486.34 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 0.74 0.34 57.80 0.25 0.45 0.19 2.92 15.45­269.33 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.23 0.03 1.10 0.002 0.06 0.50 0.18 0.40­1.82 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 724.09 5,552.71 677.93 3,328.00 1,245.62 903.97 1,377.33 247.12­1,449.90b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- 39.33 100.00 33.17 85.66 52.88 43.95 55.68 21.16­64.96 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 249 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 40.31 100.00 31.29 85.47 44.00 45.55 58.25 18.25­61.90 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 36.54 100.00 30.97 89.63 42.14 42.56 53.28 16.79­50.45 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 30.96 15.77 27.50 35.57 28.95 22.59 31.26 44.00­147.61 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 4.84 51.82 61.77 71.20 67.16 71.55 52.07 56.92 46.22­166.75 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 14.06 6.10 6.41 10.89 7.67 12.60 11.62 5.54 1.96­30.01 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 18.67 10.63 24.92 18.57 24.92 17.51 27.33 9.01 13.24­75.85 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.07 n.a. n.a. n.a. 61.51 1,133.00­14,931.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- 12.05 420.18 -- -- -- 153.89 0.54­3,914.02 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. -- n.a. n.a. n.a. 39.42 44.70­81.78 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- -- 71.85 19.00­82.50 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 19.09 40.85 51.36 67.15 60.21 51.66 48.42 32.90 39.15­353.91 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- ­0.86 0.30 0.83 0.72 ­0.50 ­6.15 ­3.69 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) ­31.76 20.01 36.71 29.70 46.15 11.70 17.92 16.40 13.67­47.10 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 297.43 21.56 56.19 25.97 48.28 40.60 43.28 21.57 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 30.00 77.87 43.19 55.95 62.04 79.30 68.02 68.93 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 6.38 -- 3.05 0.37 10.92 4.08 7.57 0.02­1.01 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b,2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; IMF, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; ADB, statistical database; CPSS 2004; Ratha and Xu 2008. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 250 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.5 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2005 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 0.22 4.64 6.77 6.33 8.15 1.67 4.82 7.20 5­66 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 0.02 0.20 0.31 1.63 3.70 0.24 0.67 4.50 16­158 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- 237.32 269.28 432.11 703.60 113.58 173.15 1,066.24 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- 60.45 29.61 71.42 115.96 11.30 30.57 344.17 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 0.10 43.41 1.12 22.99 73.30 2.87 9.22 14.64 1­129 2 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km ) 0.01 1.84 0.05 5.93 33.30 0.41 1.29 9.15 3­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 1.72 28.63 15.02 16.90 40.76 ­45.87 36.90 27.01 9.20­25.30 Return on assets (%) 0.73 1.30 1.42 1.30 4.78 1.79 2.90 1.70 0.30­1.80 Staff cost ratio (%) -- 65.00 57.13 58.29 37.54 135.35 50.73 44.53 23.00­52.71 Operating cost ratio (%) -- 107.91 40.96 74.32 43.49 28.55 57.73 87.70 65.19­185.82 Net interest margin (%) -- 2.38 2.62 3.07 4.68 2.22 4.11 4.05 0.71­3.13 Recurring earning power (%) -- 2.36 2.02 2.40 5.76 2.33 3.35 2.26 0.57­2.06 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) -- 7.65 20.81 12.80 15.57 ­6.07 11.90 12.84 2.50­15.80a Leverage ratio (times) 0.45 4.42 0.89 14.20 0.12 ­4.65 7.64 6.93 3.76­15.25 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 13.55 6.57 5.13 6.35 18.94 6.70 8.76 0.20­9.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 24.31 58.25 63.50 45.20 11.49 80.40 72.05 31.20­203.00 Liquid assets ratio (%) -- 20.61 69.54 44.20 30.97 9.33 33.90 19.60 7.30­36.59 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- 104.60 179.44 220.00 -- 20.34 52.77 22.10 2.47­25.90 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- 259.28 40.72 50.46 -- 142.69 73.94 216.69 4.95­274.27 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 16.75 4.99 33.00 -- 16.40 30.90 31.77 10.07­145.19 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 41.89 100.00 41.66 87.60 83.96 20.48 43.10 15.88­76.40 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 6.06 12.25 52.70 14.05 10.49 30.59 24.69 17.91­499.21 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 2.03 0.06 53.30 0.35 0.77 0.11 4.84 16.92­294.85 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.41 0.01 0.75 0.002 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.28­2.19 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 679.31 5,501.59 642.38 3,335.00 1,019.21 805.61 1,279.44 307.66­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- 37.05 100.00 32.02 88.56 45.87 40.35 53.02 21.30­69.34 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 251 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 37.72 100.00 31.09 88.39 41.73 41.49 56.30 19.93­53.53 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 36.46 100.00 30.84 93.19 37.28 41.96 50.44 18.39­50.48 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 31.87 17.96 33.30 57.42 27.57 26.34 33.87 47.84­160.48 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 5.95 54.93 60.52 73.00 90.85 70.25 53.89 61.79 46.50­167.76 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 13.26 6.72 6.59 11.02 9.20 12.50 11.26 5.40 1.97­30.42 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 18.82 11.51 24.6 19.27 31.61 17.00 27.77 9.41 11.23­135.82 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 130.55 n.a. n.a. n.a. 57.41 1,489.00­13,857.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- 10.58 339.28 -- -- -- 151.82 0.54­4,174.21 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. -- n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.70 48.10­79.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- -- 71.73 17.00­81.90 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 20.05 43.46 24.60 68.37 69.66 50.97 49.26 33.55 40.90­378.23 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- ­0.49 ­0.80 1.05 0.96 ­1.10 ­6.51 ­4.80 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) ­14.79 20.25 38.50 31.80 -- 11.60 17.48 17.90 13.73­49.60 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 207.30 23.00 72.12 26.17 45.06 38.50 39.94 20.93 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 31.87 79.52 37.52 62.79 85.32 84.80 72.31 73.10 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 7.76 -- 3.03 0.31 11.12 3.92 8.06 0.02­0.93 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a,2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a,2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; IMF, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; ADB, statistical database; CPSS 2004; Ratha and Xu 2008. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 252 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.6 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2006 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 0.41 4.73 6.65 6.37 9.03 1.73 4.96 7.69 5­65 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 0.06 0.29 0.31 1.93 5.02 0.28 1.25 5.67 39­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- 255.23 287.77 442.87 730.77 110.40 171.14 1,117.82 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- 61.11 33.04 78.00 123.14 10.83 31.78 364.22 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 0.19 44.53 1.12 23.46 90.00 2.97 9.67 15.81 1­119 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 0.03 2.71 0.05 7.11 50.00 0.48 2.44 11.65 3­366 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 3.71 44.26 18.24 17.00 53.51 ­43.30 34.90 25.44 7.50­27.00 Return on assets (%) 1.35 1.66 1.58 1.31 6.36 1.90 3.20 1.82 0.30­1.80 Staff cost ratio (%) -- 61.39 63.95 56.90 47.30 114.32 52.14 42.65 25.51­51.91 Operating cost ratio (%) 97.13 100.48 44.09 75.65 30.60 25.55 55.66 84.44 62.65­226.32 Net interest margin (%) 4.51 2.04 2.73 3.01 5.31 2.26 4.41 4.37 0.63­3.30 Recurring earning power (%) 0.61 2.59 1.58 2.20 7.01 2.39 3.66 2.03 0.58­2.03 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) -- 8.33 18.69 12.40 15.85 ­1.75 13.33 12.67 4.90­15.40a Leverage ratio (times) 0.31 5.33 0.09 12.59 0.12 ­4.14 8.94 13.61 3.23­14.37 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 2.40 13.15 4.92 3.33 2.28 14.22 5.70 7.35 0.20­8.50 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- 26.33 53.46 64.20 89.31 4.72 81.50 73.42 28.10­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) -- 18.67 68.04 38.40 27.28 9.70 32.20 19.26 8.31­38.73 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- 116.27 158.94 180.00 -- 19.07 55.13 22.17 1.82­26.62 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- 316.64 39.21 39.77 -- 92.96 71.20 136.68 2.97­250.87 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 17.13 4.50 29.60 3.10 14.10 27.46 31.62 9.49­154.47 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 39.68 99.86 31.36 88.32 66.50 20.02 57.13 14.46­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 5.41 11.47 82.60 8.20 15.19 35.87 29.80 43.13­903.56 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 1.11 0.09 67.60 0.16 0.54 0.03 3.75 21.41­438.57 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.20 0.01 0.64 0.002 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.36­2.21 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 253 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 596.86 5,388.02 599.43 3,467.00 949.86 784.01 1,255.02 296.88­2,414.97b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- 33.70 100.00 31.97 90.90 43.58 38.96 52.66 30.98­72.25 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 35.29 100.00 30.74 89.28 38.16 40.04 55.73 26.32­58.58 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 34.00 100.00 32.15 95.48 30.30 39.67 52.56 24.26­56.93 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 34.45 21.21 39.40 70.64 26.98 27.73 35.45 59.91­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 7.95 55.43 66.46 78.90 106.28 67.32 53.96 63.61 46.50­167.76 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 11.87 6.92 6.83 11.04 9.11 12.80 11.47 5.35 1.95­30.85 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 19.84 12.07 31.03 20.23 31.64 17.29 41.41 8.84 10.52­143.61 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 326.80 n.a. n.a. n.a. 60.55 1,828.00­15,326.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 3.41 -- 10.23 324.95 -- -- 1,256.00 145.55 0.55­4,541.88 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. -- n.a. n.a. n.a. 43.99 45.30­80.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- 77.00 71.14 17.00­82.20 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 20.14 44.76 60.10 69.71 68.81 53.03 48.19 33.80 45.35­393.80 Real deposit interest rate (%) ­1.49 ­0.37 ­0.50 0.45 0.23 ­4.50 ­4.26 ­2.40 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) ­8.32 20.35 41.39 34.30 -- 8.90 17.70 17.00 13.80­52.41 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 151.49 24.09 58.18 24.33 43.97 38.20 42.64 21.39 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 41.12 83.54 41.39 71.46 105.12 85.80 76.19 80.27 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 8.74 -- 3.15 0.31 14.94 4.04 7.64 0.02­0.99 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; IMF, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; ADB, statistical database; CPSS 2004; Ratha and Xu 2008. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 254 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.7 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2007 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 0.57 4.78 6.53 6.35 9.70 1.78 4.94 8.56 5­56 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 0.07 0.46 1.37 2.40 13.04 0.37 1.66 4.50 35­122 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- 252.93 306.65 459.52 852.56 105.42 153.98 1,356.03 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- 60.99 34.98 83.59 138.40 26.35 31.10 270.81 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 0.26 45.52 1.12 24.13 96.70 3.20 9.82 17.69 1­110 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 0.03 4.39 0.23 9.11 130.00 0.67 3.29 13.45 3­146 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) ­1.07 50.94 18.31 17.31 49.99 ­78.70 21.90 25.37 3.20­28.10 Return on assets (%) ­0.26 1.95 1.54 1.43 6.33 1.87 2.30 1.93 0.20­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) -- 61.69 44.83 54.54 49.47 159.57 48.68 42.91 23.47­54.63 Operating cost ratio (%) 101.79 95.92 49.97 71.05 26.83 22.62 61.54 76.41 55.82­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 7.45 2.11 3.13 2.99 5.41 2.90 4.21 4.54 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) ­2.51 3.01 2.19 2.10 6.43 2.16 3.49 2.35 0.49­1.94 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 38.35 7.52 16.17 12.28 15.58 ­1.71 13.80 13.59 7.15­14.60a Leverage ratio (times) 0.21 4.45 0.08 11.69 0.13 ­0.01 9.35 12.71 3.10­10.08 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 3.00 13.23 4.91 2.50 1.56 10.56 6.30 6.62 0.20­8.60 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 43.49 42.91 48.40 60.20 63.94 12.44 88.20 71.51 28.80­188.90 Liquid assets ratio (%) 31.43 19.51 40.86 35.21 25.44 8.99 33.82 18.55 8.91­38.48 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 32.00 150.01 79.07 144.56 -- 17.34 57.07 21.54 2.21­32.02 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- -- 36.17 48.48 -- 53.30 67.50 164.85 1.94­285.33 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 18.78 3.53 34.71 4.02 13.66 32.94 29.99 8.95­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 44.12 100.00 25.25 98.20 60.37 8.93 58.28 12.50­74.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 10.07 9.76 83.77 26.65 25.62 46.20 23.00 36.70­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 3.49 0.05 70.33 1.70 1.15 0.29 2.93 18.68­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.47 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.52­2.70 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 255 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 484.32 5,414.57 541.35 3,676.00 821.85 773.50 1,217.18 280.88­2,080.86b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- 31.58 100.00 31.12 92.55 35.83 38.62 51.79 25.21­66.89 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 34.00 100.00 30.00 89.96 35.95 39.12 54.43 24.98­67.29 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 28.97 100.00 31.90 95.12 32.06 38.31 52.39 18.41­64.23 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 33.11 24.19 44.30 91.28 31.94 28.43 33.26 62.44­189.58 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 11.21 58.71 58.04 83.89 135.81 67.48 57.83 58.55 138.67­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 12.07 7.50 6.27 11.13 8.46 12.50 11.55 4.85 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 22.94 11.00 33.92 20.79 32.65 17.45 45.03 7.46 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 596.72 n.a. n.a. n.a. 65.03 2,147­17,557 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 7.95 -- 12.08 297.92 -- -- 1,423.00 130.68 0.57­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. -- n.a. n.a. n.a. 48.35 50.70­80.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- 80.00 69.79 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 23.76 46.00 53.70 71.71 73.91 54.40 50.52 32.10 42.03­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) 1.20 ­3.16 ­0.70 1.88 ­0.40 ­2.90 ­3.47 ­5.49 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) ­8.72 20.40 60.07 35.70 -- 9.70 17.78 17.60 15.19­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 111.68 23.93 50.90 23.64 43.93 35.70 40.31 20.23 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 54.06 80.28 48.80 73.94 122.64 82.10 72.11 80.53 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 10.00 -- 2.96 0.28 13.77 4.17 7.74 0.02­1.02 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; IMF, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; ADB, statistical database; CPSS 2004; CBSL, Annual Report, 2008; Ratha and Xu 2008; Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka 2009. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 256 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.8 Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2008 Indicator Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 0.61 4.84 6.71 6.60 10.37 2.05 5.35 8.84 5­56 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 0.09 0.63 2.09 3.28 13.04 0.73 2.04 5.67 35­122 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 26.79 255.77 325.39 467.35 965.02 106.73 154.93 1,304.31 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 1.30 68.65 42.82 89.03 141.97 24.64 30.75 240.37 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 0.28 46.70 1.17 25.49 103.30 3.78 10.77 18.28 1­110 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 0.04 6.10 0.36 12.68 130.00 1.34 4.11 15.00 3­146 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 8.93 48.35 17.08 17.34 30.36 503.55a 19.30 27.64 3.20­28.10 Return on assets (%) 1.77 2.63 1.50 1.57 4.53 2.77 2.05 2.01 0.20­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 36.00 61.12 60.73 51.55 33.64 172.89 49.64 42.74 23.47­54.63 Operating cost ratio (%) 83.87 88.87 31.76 76.03 36.30 21.56 66.82 76.82 55.82­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 7.12 2.33 3.46 2.61 4.60 3.13 3.26 4.48 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 0.51 3.43 2.18 2.15 5.28 2.34 2.49 2.40 0.49­1.94 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 31.77 10.06 13.93 13.01 21.01 4.04 12.20 12.62 7.15­14.60b Leverage ratio (times) 0.19 6.21 0.08 10.63 0.16 0.02 9.23 13.15 3.10­10.08 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.90 10.79 7.21 2.25 8.90 6.08 7.60 7.92 0.20­8.60 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 88.93 56.15 44.79 56.18 14.02 8.16 81.10 61.41 28.80­188.90 Liquid assets ratio (%) 23.80 21.31 31.74 34.12 22.60 11.80 28.74 20.11 8.91­38.48 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 29.00 132.60 61.92 146.23 -- 20.58 50.79 23.46 2.21­32.02 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- -- 23.89 40.25 -- 48.19 93.55 332.22 1.94­285.33 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- 18.42 3.14 36.24 4.51 13.55 33.13 29.07 8.95­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 39.83 100.00 26.78 99.35 92.48 6.81 67.30 12.50­74.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 19.26 13.14 106.05 20.60 28.12 36.05 11.08 36.70­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 6.07 0.06 108.86 3.19 1.68 0.14 2.50 18.68­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.33 0.01 1.13 0.01 0.07 0.004 0.17 0.52­2.70 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 257 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- 500.56 5,077.44 535.63 3,648.00 712.01 741.00 1,198.75 280.88­2,080.86c K-bank concentration ratio (k =3 ), assets (%) -- 30.28 100.00 30.52 92.50 35.26 37.83 51.06 25.21­66.89 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- 30.66 100.00 28.56 91.11 30.98 38.89 54.48 24.98­67.29 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- 25.90 100.00 30.52 94.60 26.22 38.63 49.43 18.41­64.23 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- 36.30 38.82 48.78 100.8 26.44 27.56 28.94 62.44­189.58 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 14.3 57.04 63.74 91.80 143.14 69.05 51.38 53.39 138.67­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 10.97 7.54 6.46 11.17 9.37 12.20 11.05 4.22 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 21.38 12.00 25.54 21.06 37.75 18.80 39.73 6.29 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,024.69 n.a. n.a. 389.75 67.11 2,147.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 4.91 -- 13.08 306.13 -- -- 1,444.00 116.29 0.57­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. -- n.a. n.a. 32.39 45.42 50.70­80.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- 100.00 -- -- -- 79.00 69.27 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 22.18 49.00 45.75 76.45 76.51 60.35 45.31 29.07 42.03­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) ­4.17 ­1.58 ­3.60 1.05 ­0.65 ­3.50 ­12.63 ­10.97 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) ­1.18 20.10 -- 37.70 -- 11.50 13.25 14.13 15.19­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 98.77 23.62 61.42 24.62 44.67 34.30 41.62 19.03 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 62.99 82.12 51.69 73.88 133.41 82.60 79.23 88.78 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- 6.00 -- 3.64 0.24 17.38 4.24 7.20 0.02­1.02 Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b; IMF, International Financial Statistics database, World Economic Outlook database; ADB, statistical database, 2009c; CPSS 2004; CBSL, Annual Report, 2008; Ratha and Xu 2008; Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka 2009. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. An unusually high ratio due to negative equity at the beginning of the year turned positive during the year, making average equity for the year much smaller than year-end equity. b. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. c. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 258 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.9 Getting Finance Indicators for Afghanistan, 2001­08 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) -- -- -- 0.14 0.22 0.41 0.57 0.61 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) -- -- -- 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.09 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 26.79 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.30 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) -- -- -- 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.28 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) -- -- -- 0.003 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) -- -- -- -- 1.72 3.71 ­1.07 8.93 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) -- -- -- -- 0.73 1.35 ­0.26 1.77 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 36.00 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- 97.13 101.79 83.87 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) -- -- -- -- -- 4.51 7.45 7.12 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) -- -- -- -- -- 0.61 ­2.51 0.51 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- 38.35 31.77 2.50­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) -- -- -- 0.38 0.45 0.31 0.21 0.19 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- 2.40 3.00 0.90 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- 43.49 88.93 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- 31.43 23.80 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- 32.00 29.00 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 259 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 247.12­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) -- -- -- 4.84 5.95 7.95 11.21 14.30 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) -- -- 11.83 14.06 13.26 11.87 12.07 10.97 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) -- -- -- 18.67 18.82 19.84 22.94 21.38 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- 3.41 7.95 4.91 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) -- -- -- 19.09 20.05 20.14 23.76 22.18 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- ­1.49 1.20 ­4.17 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) -- ­5.31 ­35.77 ­31.76 ­14.79 ­8.32 ­8.72 ­1.18 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- 297.43 207.30 151.49 111.68 98.77 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- 30.00 31.87 41.12 54.06 62.99 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.02­2.14 Sources: Da Afghanistan Bank; World Bank, World Development Indicators database (gross domestic savings to GDP for 2001); IMF, World Economic Outlook database (GDP for 2004­08). Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. Table A2.10 Getting Finance Indicators for Bangladesh, 2001­08 260 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 4.83 4.74 4.67 4.67 4.64 4.73 4.78 4.84 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.29 0.46 0.63 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 231.97 234.75 234.60 233.63 237.32 255.23 252.93 255.77 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 56.56 57.14 56.87 60.24 60.45 61.11 60.99 68.65 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 42.50 42.26 42.25 42.71 43.41 44.53 45.52 46.70 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 0.91 1.22 1.26 1.55 1.84 2.71 4.39 6.10 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 17.12 12.40 12.39 ­13.39 28.63 44.26 50.94 48.35 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) 0.74 0.54 0.59 ­0.63 1.30 1.66 1.95 2.63 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 44.75 66.53 64.53 66.24 65.00 61.39 61.69 61.12 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) 236.78 187.63 161.86 141.89 107.91 100.48 95.92 88.87 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 1.66 1.04 1.09 1.97 2.38 2.04 2.11 2.33 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 1.70 1.50 1.68 1.86 2.36 2.59 3.01 3.43 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 7.02 7.60 8.42 7.41 7.65 8.33 7.52 10.06 2.50­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) 4.17 4.34 4.77 4.16 4.42 5.33 4.45 6.21 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 31.49 28.10 22.13 17.63 13.55 13.15 13.23 10.79 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 25.36 25.30 18.35 19.15 24.31 26.33 42.91 56.15 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) 30.03 25.84 24.67 23.50 20.61 18.67 19.51 21.31 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 122.90 121.46 127.19 121.94 104.60 116.27 150.01 132.60 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 663.50 735.42 435.22 239.99 259.28 316.64 -- -- 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 16.17 17.53 16.73 16.57 16.75 17.13 18.78 18.42 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 59.16 51.64 51.55 46.67 41.89 39.68 44.12 39.83 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 2.57 2.61 2.43 4.28 6.06 5.41 10.07 19.26 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 1.28 1.28 1.02 0.74 2.03 1.11 3.49 6.07 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.50 0.49 0.42 0.23 0.41 0.20 0.47 0.33 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 261 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 944.90 886.66 702.04 724.09 679.31 596.86 484.32 500.56 247.12­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 47.38 45.77 38.33 39.33 37.05 33.70 31.58 30.28 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 50.55 47.55 43.27 40.31 37.72 35.29 34.00 30.66 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 45.76 43.22 39.57 36.54 36.46 34.00 28.97 25.90 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 24.33 26.32 29.42 30.96 31.87 34.45 33.11 36.30 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 50.35 52.78 53.84 51.82 54.93 55.43 58.71 57.04 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 5.47 5.62 5.75 6.10 6.72 6.92 7.50 7.54 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 9.53 9.79 10.13 10.63 11.51 12.07 11.00 12.00 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 36.10 37.92 38.96 40.85 43.46 44.76 46.00 49.00 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) 3.95 1.91 ­0.18 ­0.86 ­0.49 ­0.37 ­3.16 ­1.58 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 18.16 18.63 19.53 20.01 20.25 20.35 20.40 20.10 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 26.43 23.75 22.98 21.56 23.00 24.09 23.93 23.62 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 84.17 83.31 80.53 77.87 79.52 83.54 80.28 82.12 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) 5.26 5.90 5.97 6.38 7.76 8.74 10.00 6.00 0.02­2.14 Sources: Bangladesh Bank; World Bank, World Development Indicators database; IMF, World Economic Outlook database (stock market capitalization to GDP for 2001); World Bank 2006b (private credit extended by banks to GDP for 2001 and 2002); ADB, statistical database (inflation data for real deposit interest rate for 2001­08). Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 262 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.11 Getting Finance Indicators for Bhutan, 2001­08 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 3.58 3.49 5.86 5.71 6.77 6.65 6.53 6.71 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) -- -- 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.31 1.37 2.09 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- 202.02 206.65 269.28 287.77 306.65 325.39 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 18.75 21.24 24.55 25.61 29.61 33.04 34.98 42.82 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 0.54 0.54 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.17 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) -- -- 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.36 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 19.03 17.03 17.98 14.19 15.02 18.24 18.31 17.08 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) 1.23 1.19 1.24 1.30 1.42 1.58 1.54 1.50 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 55.04 56.88 50.12 52.91 57.13 63.95 44.83 60.73 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) 40.14 46.11 44.30 39.61 40.96 44.09 49.97 31.76 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 1.63 2.02 2.18 2.46 2.62 2.73 3.13 3.46 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 1.76 1.70 1.76 2.08 2.02 1.58 2.19 2.18 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 14.83 13.94 19.93 18.52 20.81 18.69 16.17 13.93 2.50­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.89 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 8.80 7.23 7.78 5.98 6.57 4.92 4.91 7.21 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 38.72 43.62 40.67 45.38 58.25 53.46 48.40 44.79 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) 47.46 40.52 38.18 44.89 69.54 68.04 40.86 31.74 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 136.39 96.34 94.20 116.79 179.44 158.94 79.07 61.92 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 16.98 14.53 37.61 42.30 40.72 39.21 36.17 23.89 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 2.18 1.89 4.52 5.63 4.99 4.50 3.53 3.14 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.90 100.00 99.86 100.00 100.00 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 12.86 13.03 12.03 13.30 12.25 11.47 9.76 13.14 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 0.34 0.15 0.07 0.34 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 263 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 5,774.98 5,795.97 5,676.65 5,552.71 5,501.59 5,388.02 5,414.57 5,077.44 247.12­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 10.61 11.38 13.40 15.77 17.96 21.21 24.19 38.82 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 58.67 62.67 59.09 61.77 60.52 66.46 58.04 63.74 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 7.03 6.24 6.13 6.41 6.59 6.83 6.27 6.46 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 21.55 27.04 23.04 24.92 24.60 31.03 33.92 25.54 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- 8.49 9.48 12.05 10.58 10.23 12.08 13.08 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 47.18 52.52 47.12 51.36 24.60 60.10 53.70 45.75 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) 4.10 4.50 2.40 0.30 ­0.80 ­0.50 ­0.70 ­3.60 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 33.95 36.40 35.63 36.71 38.50 41.39 60.07 -- 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 58.84 51.83 66.69 56.19 72.12 58.18 50.90 61.42 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 26.18 29.68 31.94 43.19 37.52 41.39 49.00 51.69 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.02­2.14 Sources: Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan; World Bank, World Development Indicators database (GDP for 2001 and 2002 to calculate private credit extended by banks to GDP, notes and coins in circulation to GDP, narrow money supply to GDP, broad money supply to GDP, real deposit interest rate, and gross domestic savings to GDP); IMF, International Financial Statistics database (private credit extended by banks, and broad money supply to GDP for 2001 and 2002); ADB, statistical database (inflation data for real deposit interest rate). Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 264 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.12 Getting Finance Indicators for India, 2001­08 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 6.42 6.33 6.25 6.26 6.33 6.37 6.35 6.60 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) -- -- -- -- 1.63 1.93 2.40 3.28 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 416.77 420.84 418.67 426.11 432.11 442.87 459.52 467.35 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 50.99 53.93 55.84 61.88 71.42 78.00 83.59 89.03 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 22.18 22.26 22.41 22.57 22.99 23.46 24.13 25.49 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) -- -- -- -- 5.93 7.11 9.11 12.68 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 13.80 17.30 21.00 23.00 16.90 17.00 17.31 17.34 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) 0.90 1.10 1.50 1.70 1.30 1.31 1.43 1.57 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 68.10 64.70 62.10 60.17 58.29 56.90 54.54 51.55 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) 92.33 85.38 80.71 77.05 74.32 75.65 71.05 76.03 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 2.98 2.66 2.85 3.07 3.07 3.01 2.99 2.61 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 1.60 2.00 2.50 2.90 2.40 2.20 2.10 2.15 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 11.40 12.00 12.70 12.90 12.80 12.40 12.28 13.01 2.50­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) 19.12 15.69 15.87 15.77 14.20 12.59 11.69 10.63 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 11.40 10.40 8.80 7.20 5.13 3.33 2.50 2.25 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 49.70 53.40 52.40 62.00 63.50 64.20 60.20 56.18 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) 48.20 47.40 48.70 48.70 44.20 38.40 35.21 34.12 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 260.00 250.00 260.00 260.00 220.00 180.00 144.56 146.23 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 117.85 118.92 72.77 64.33 50.46 39.77 48.48 40.25 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 26.80 29.80 31.60 33.40 33.00 29.60 34.71 36.24 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 72.90 62.93 55.42 44.86 41.66 31.36 25.25 26.78 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 29.40 27.40 22.50 41.90 52.70 82.60 83.77 106.05 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 112.00 36.00 37.70 57.80 53.30 67.60 70.33 108.86 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 2.13 0.88 1.08 1.10 0.75 0.64 0.67 1.13 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 265 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 784.67 741.50 734.59 677.93 642.38 599.43 541.35 535.63 247.12­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 33.80 33.67 33.49 33.17 32.02 31.97 31.12 30.52 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 33.98 33.26 32.76 31.29 31.09 30.74 30.00 28.56 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 33.04 31.92 31.60 30.97 30.84 32.15 31.90 30.52 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 21.50 23.80 25.90 27.50 33.30 39.40 44.30 48.78 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 61.90 67.30 68.80 71.20 73.00 78.90 83.89 91.80 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 9.90 10.23 10.73 10.89 11.02 11.04 11.13 11.17 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 17.07 17.43 18.04 18.57 19.27 20.23 20.79 21.06 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.07 130.55 326.80 596.72 1024.69 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 514.34 528.88 548.87 420.18 339.28 324.95 297.92 306.10 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. -- -- -- -- -- 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 58.58 62.22 66.73 67.15 68.37 69.71 71.71 76.45 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) 3.35 2.60 ­0.30 0.83 1.05 0.45 1.88 1.05 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 23.70 23.50 26.40 29.70 31.80 34.30 35.70 37.70 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 29.37 28.46 26.78 25.97 26.17 24.33 23.64 24.62 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 53.13 53.45 56.93 55.95 62.79 71.46 73.94 73.88 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) 3.09 3.27 4.09 3.05 3.03 3.15 2.96 3.64 0.02­2.14 Sources: Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years); Ratha and Xu 2008. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 266 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.13 Getting Finance Indicators for Maldives, 2001­08 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 6.29 6.66 7.77 8.15 8.15 9.03 9.70 10.37 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 2.96 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 5.02 13.04 13.04 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 397.13 456.03 518.48 603.14 703.60 730.77 852.56 965.02 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- 45.90 56.12 115.96 123.14 138.40 141.97 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 56.70 60.00 70.00 73.30 73.30 90.00 96.70 103.30 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 26.70 33.30 33.30 33.30 33.30 50.00 130.00 130.00 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 43.72 25.77 30.63 36.98 40.76 53.51 49.99 30.36 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) 5.59 3.42 3.73 4.47 4.78 6.36 6.33 4.53 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 33.96 35.46 39.29 40.70 37.54 47.30 49.47 33.64 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) 40.99 51.83 46.29 49.45 43.49 30.60 26.83 36.30 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 5.06 3.69 4.12 4.42 4.68 5.31 5.41 4.60 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 5.90 4.27 4.65 5.27 5.76 7.01 6.43 5.28 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 24.00 23.13 23.44 18.38 15.57 15.85 15.58 21.01 2.50­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 9.89 10.01 10.10 6.24 6.35 2.28 1.56 8.90 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 24.95 27.59 41.06 56.59 45.20 89.31 63.94 14.02 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) 47.90 50.29 53.71 45.40 30.97 27.28 25.44 22.60 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- 3.10 4.02 4.51 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 90.75 74.90 87.13 87.60 88.32 98.20 99.35 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) -- 9.48 11.34 16.06 14.05 8.20 26.65 20.60 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) -- 0.07 0.08 0.25 0.35 0.16 1.70 3.19 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) -- 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.014 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 267 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 3,347.00 3,216.00 3,154.00 3,328.00 3,335.00 3,467.00 3,676.00 3,648.00 247.12­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 91.69 89.82 87.33 85.66 88.56 90.90 92.55 92.50 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3 ), deposits (%) 91.95 89.67 87.64 85.47 88.39 89.28 89.96 91.11 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 94.12 93.61 90.96 89.63 93.19 95.48 95.12 94.60 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 23.57 25.56 25.37 35.57 57.42 70.64 91.28 100.84 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 50.92 59.50 57.90 67.16 90.85 106.28 135.81 143.14 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 7.40 6.95 7.05 7.67 9.20 9.11 8.46 9.37 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 21.23 22.64 23.34 24.92 31.61 31.64 32.65 37.75 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 43.04 47.99 50.86 60.21 69.66 68.81 73.91 76.51 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) 3.24 0.33 1.79 0.72 0.96 0.23 ­0.40 ­0.65 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 44.93 46.35 49.11 46.15 -- -- -- -- 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 62.90 61.01 51.11 48.28 45.06 43.97 43.93 44.67 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 61.92 57.99 53.09 62.04 85.32 105.12 122.64 133.41 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.02­2.14 Sources: Maldives Monetary Authority; World Bank, World Development Indicators database (gross domestic savings to GDP for 2001­04, worker remittances to GDP for 2001­08). Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 268 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.14 Getting Finance Indicators for Nepal, 2001­08 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 2.09 1.85 1.85 1.71 1.67 1.73 1.78 2.05 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.24 0.28 0.37 0.73 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 111.59 123.21 102.43 115.88 113.58 110.40 105.42 106.73 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 19.07 14.92 12.96 11.97 11.30 10.83 26.35 24.64 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 3.29 2.96 3.04 2.87 2.87 2.97 3.20 3.78 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.41 0.48 0.67 1.34 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) ­93.62 ­96.16 ­22.33 ­46.42 ­45.87 ­43.30 ­78.70 503.55a 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) ­3.04 ­3.37 ­0.85 1.47 1.79 1.90 1.87 2.77 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 194.25 185.00 306.16 181.18 135.35 114.32 159.57 172.89 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) 35.87 59.78 40.14 31.93 28.55 25.55 22.62 21.56 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 1.76 0.92 1.58 1.99 2.22 2.26 2.90 3.13 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 0.86 0.21 ­0.01 1.81 2.33 2.39 2.16 2.34 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 4.00 ­7.25 ­11.74 ­9.07 ­6.07 ­1.75 ­1.71 4.04 2.50­18.20b Leverage ratio (times) 3.27 3.71 3.87 ­3.00 ­4.65 ­4.14 ­0.01 0.02 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 29.31 30.41 28.80 22.77 18.94 14.22 10.56 6.08 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 30.59 29.98 7.55 3.82 11.49 4.72 12.44 8.16 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) 22.10 18.16 12.49 13.61 9.33 9.70 8.99 11.80 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 47.88 41.33 27.03 27.30 20.34 19.07 17.34 20.58 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 129.55 212.14 240.19 204.93 142.69 92.96 53.30 48.19 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 14.50 17.40 18.50 17.30 16.40 14.10 13.66 13.55 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 83.13 81.89 58.35 86.25 83.96 66.50 60.37 92.48 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 11.76 8.54 8.05 8.72 10.49 15.19 25.62 28.12 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 0.59 0.38 0.13 0.45 0.77 0.54 1.15 1.68 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 269 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 1,563.48 1,574.76 1,468.53 1,245.62 1,019.21 949.86 821.85 712.01 247.12­2,561.91c K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 58.02 58.68 56.67 52.88 45.87 43.58 35.83 35.26 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 51.73 49.62 46.80 44.00 41.73 38.16 35.95 30.98 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 52.06 49.34 44.64 42.14 37.28 30.30 32.06 26.22 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 26.95 27.21 27.80 28.95 27.57 26.98 31.94 26.44 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 63.83 67.69 69.84 71.55 70.25 67.32 67.48 69.05 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 11.90 13.20 12.50 12.60 12.50 12.80 12.50 12.20 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 15.99 16.79 17.02 17.51 17.00 17.29 17.45 18.80 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 48.57 48.75 49.96 51.66 50.97 53.03 54.40 60.35 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) 2.40 1.50 ­0.50 ­0.50 ­1.10 ­4.50 ­2.90 ­3.50 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 11.70 9.50 8.60 11.70 11.60 8.90 9.70 11.50 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 38.90 43.00 39.90 40.60 38.50 38.20 35.70 34.30 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 74.80 78.50 80.10 79.30 84.80 85.80 82.10 82.60 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) 10.69 10.35 11.01 10.92 11.12 14.94 13.77 17.38 0.02­2.14 Source: Nepal Rastra Bank. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. An unusually high ratio due to negative equity at the beginning of the year turned positive during the year, making average equity for the year much smaller than year-end equity. b. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. c. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 270 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.15 Getting Finance Indicators for Pakistan, 2001­08 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 4.88 4.73 4.61 4.64 4.82 4.96 4.94 5.35 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) -- -- 0.37 0.52 0.67 1.25 1.66 2.04 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 195.84 194.87 190.55 180.28 173.15 171.14 153.98 154.93 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 16.04 14.93 18.86 24.51 30.57 31.78 31.10 30.75 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 8.77 8.72 8.66 8.84 9.22 9.67 9.82 10.77 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) -- -- 0.69 0.99 1.29 2.44 3.29 4.11 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 12.20 27.50 33.70 29.00 36.90 34.90 21.90 19.30 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) 0.60 1.50 2.10 2.00 2.90 3.20 2.30 2.05 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 52.58 50.75 51.48 51.97 50.73 52.14 48.68 49.64 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) 90.91 85.81 83.20 83.62 57.73 55.66 61.54 66.82 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 3.24 3.10 2.98 2.87 4.11 4.41 4.21 3.26 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 1.17 2.00 2.57 2.26 3.35 3.66 3.49 2.49 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 11.30 12.60 11.10 11.40 11.90 13.33 13.80 12.20 2.50­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) 4.58 4.11 5.03 6.45 7.64 8.94 9.35 9.23 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 19.60 17.70 13.70 9.00 6.70 5.70 6.30 7.60 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 53.20 58.20 64.80 72.40 80.40 81.50 88.20 81.10 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) 39.90 48.10 46.10 37.00 33.90 32.20 33.82 28.74 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 56.25 68.95 63.44 51.88 52.77 55.13 57.07 50.79 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 537.75 278.47 186.41 108.60 73.94 71.20 67.50 93.55 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 38.90 37.80 36.70 33.00 30.90 27.46 32.94 33.13 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 22.52 21.89 19.18 16.01 20.48 20.02 8.93 6.81 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 8.06 9.15 15.31 24.07 30.59 35.87 46.20 36.05 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.29 0.14 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.12 0.90 0.54 0.50 0.22 0.06 0.01 0.004 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 271 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 1,091.80 1,052.12 976.81 903.97 805.61 784.01 773.50 741.00 247.12­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 50.30 49.71 47.47 43.95 40.35 38.96 38.62 37.83 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 53.23 51.76 48.93 45.55 41.49 40.04 39.12 38.89 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 50.86 47.00 43.58 42.56 41.96 39.67 38.31 38.63 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 17.82 18.04 19.46 22.59 26.34 27.73 28.43 27.56 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 43.61 47.72 50.10 52.07 53.89 53.96 57.83 51.38 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 10.20 10.95 11.64 11.62 11.26 11.47 11.55 11.05 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 20.32 22.52 26.03 27.33 27.77 41.41 45.03 39.73 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 389.75 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- -- -- -- -- 1,256.00 1,423.00 1,444.00 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 32.39 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- 77.00 80.00 79.00 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 39.20 42.97 46.48 48.42 49.26 48.19 50.52 45.31 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) 1.38 ­0.08 ­1.45 ­6.15 ­6.51 ­4.26 ­3.47 ­12.63 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 16.28 18.43 20.56 17.92 17.48 17.70 17.78 13.25 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 48.67 45.00 44.04 43.28 39.94 42.64 40.31 41.62 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 63.54 56.83 58.83 68.02 72.31 76.19 72.11 79.23 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) 2.14 4.76 4.69 4.08 3.92 4.04 4.17 4.24 0.02­2.14 Source: State Bank of Pakistan. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 272 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A2.16 Getting Finance Indicators for Sri Lanka, 2001­08 Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Benchmark Access to finance Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 6.03 6.70 6.85 7.06 7.20 7.69 8.56 8.84 5­69 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 2.55 3.27 3.69 4.16 4.50 5.67 4.50 5.67 16­167 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people 939.32 989.94 1,000.53 1,023.58 1,066.24 1,117.82 1,356.03 1,304.31 976­1,671 Loan accounts per 1,000 people 256.88 257.66 279.15 304.11 344.17 364.22 270.81 240.37 248­513 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 11.68 13.17 13.63 14.20 14.64 15.81 17.69 18.28 1­159 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 4.93 6.43 7.34 8.37 9.15 11.65 13.45 15.00 1­437 Performance and efficiency Return on equity (%) 20.57 25.71 26.33 25.62 27.01 25.44 25.37 27.64 1.90­65.02 Return on assets (%) 0.84 1.11 1.36 1.43 1.70 1.82 1.93 2.01 0.10­1.90 Staff cost ratio (%) 46.21 47.62 49.58 46.98 44.53 42.65 42.91 42.74 14.87­56.30 Operating cost ratio (%) 118.66 99.80 94.02 95.66 87.70 84.44 76.41 76.82 49.20­313.18 Net interest margin (%) 3.30 3.78 4.16 3.97 4.05 4.37 4.54 4.48 0.40­3.61 Recurring earning power (%) 1.64 2.07 2.58 2.33 2.26 2.03 2.35 2.40 0.10­2.39 Financial stability Capital adequacy ratio (%) 8.59 10.35 10.31 10.29 12.84 12.67 13.59 12.62 2.50­18.20a Leverage ratio (times) 3.90 4.71 5.53 5.63 6.93 13.61 12.71 13.15 0.68­15.39 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 19.57 19.09 16.36 11.29 8.76 7.35 6.62 7.92 0.20­29.80 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 44.43 50.38 58.74 68.29 72.05 73.42 71.51 61.41 24.50­204.50 Liquid assets ratio (%) 22.80 18.80 17.30 20.30 19.60 19.26 18.55 20.11 7.07­44.39 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 26.30 21.70 20.00 23.10 22.10 22.17 21.54 23.46 1.82­42.20 Capital market development Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 659.05 585.08 389.76 299.80 216.69 136.68 164.85 332.22 1.94­347.68 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 16.28 21.94 27.43 31.70 31.77 31.62 29.99 29.07 8.83­163.25 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 54.37 57.70 60.83 42.92 43.10 57.13 58.28 67.30 6.04­82.10 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 8.81 10.28 14.92 18.83 24.69 29.80 23.00 11.08 17.91­1,284.15 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 0.99 1.91 4.18 2.92 4.84 3.75 2.93 2.50 12.47­1,033.79 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.13 0.21 0.35 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.27­2.91 Appendix 2. Getting Finance Indicators for South Asia, by Country and Year, 2001­08 273 Market concentration and competitiveness Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 1,650.62 1,528.39 1,455.81 1,377.33 1,279.44 1,255.02 1,217.18 1,198.75 247.12­2,561.91b K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 63.09 60.88 58.19 55.68 53.02 52.66 51.79 51.06 21.16­79.45 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 62.02 62.43 60.89 58.25 56.30 55.73 54.43 54.48 18.25­73.60 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 65.16 60.02 56.81 53.28 50.44 52.56 52.39 49.43 16.79­66.30 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 28.19 28.09 29.50 31.26 33.87 35.45 33.26 28.94 42.00­193.60 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 56.80 54.51 56.06 56.92 61.79 63.61 58.55 53.39 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 5.44 5.58 5.42 5.54 5.40 5.35 4.85 4.22 1.94­31.03 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 8.68 8.81 8.87 9.01 9.41 8.84 7.46 6.29 10.05­156.02 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) n.a. n.a. 61.12 61.51 57.41 60.55 65.03 67.11 1,133.00­17,557.00 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 289.85 241.89 215.16 153.89 151.82 145.55 130.68 116.29 0.54­5,067.78 RTGS concentration ratio (%) n.a. n.a. 47.60 39.42 49.70 43.99 48.35 45.42 37.70­84.00 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) 85.70 85.40 84.90 71.85 71.73 71.14 69.79 69.27 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 32.03 32.26 31.87 32.90 33.55 33.80 32.10 29.07 39.15­412.65 Real deposit interest rate (%) ­3.42 ­2.13 ­1.03 ­3.69 ­4.80 ­2.40 ­5.49 ­10.97 -- Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 15.80 14.40 16.00 16.40 17.90 17.00 17.60 14.13 13.50­52.89 Reserve money to total deposits (%) 21.69 22.05 21.72 21.57 20.93 21.39 20.23 19.03 -- Loan to deposit ratio (%) 79.01 70.93 69.56 68.93 73.10 80.27 80.53 88.78 -- Worker remittances to GDP (%) 7.34 7.78 7.75 7.57 8.06 7.64 7.74 7.20 0.02­2.14 Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka; ADB 2009c (worker remittances to GDP for 2008); CBSL, Annual Report, 2008 (domestic bond market to equity market capitalization and domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP for 2007 and 2008 and reserve money to total deposits for 2008); Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka 2009 (domestic bond market to equity market capitalization and domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP for 2007 and 2008); CPSS 2004 (value of retail transactions to GDP for 2001 and 2002, RTGS concentration ratio for 2003, and retail payments concentration ratio for 2001­03). Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). a. Basel guideline: not less than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. b. Accepted norms for HHI: less than 1,000, banking industry is unconcentrated; 1,000­1,800, moderately concentrated; more than 1,800, highly concentrated. -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 274 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 Table A3a.1 Benchmark Indicators, 2001 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 25 29 1a 44 69 26 51 30 10 -- 21 12 5 25 24 5­69 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per100,000 people) 68 115 2a 62 60 -- 64 112 -- -- 47 43 -- 62 114 43­115 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 1 1 47 159 1,766a 97 102 98 -- 3 710a 6 61 8 1­159 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 1 4 2 67 139 -- 122 378 -- -- 7 2,632a -- 152 35 1­378 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 20.10 13.90 4.42 9.60 4.60 17.90 8.60 ­14.30a 12.80 13.30 23.38 9.70 32.80 7.70 13.00 4.42­32.80 8 Return on assets (%) 1.30 0.70 0.21 0.50 0.20 1.40 0.60 ­0.60a 0.70 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.47 0.50 1.10 0.20­1.47 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 41.98 44.55 4.62 a 46.31 36.12 43.86 40.86 14.87 20.01 28.21 42.88 36.93 37.98 41.88 35.51 14.87­46.31 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 118.64 149.64 81.64 294.02 222.89 52.22 150.42 177.01 148.90 98.68 82.78 49.86 107.04 109.90 106.82 49.86­294.02 11 Net interest margin (%) 2.09 2.23 2.12 0.64 1.19 2.53 2.47 1.43 2.13 3.03 2.10 1.81 1.93 1.89 3.55 0.64­3.55 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.55 1.29 0.57 0.45 0.10 1.93 0.88 0.79 1.92 2.29 1.52 1.31 0.54 1.21 2.22 0.10­2.29 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.40 12.30 5.89a 12.10 12.00 16.50 10.40 10.80 11.70 13.00 10.79 18.20 13.30 13.20 12.90 10.40­18.20 14 Leverage ratio (times) 9.32 7.08 4.72 4.74 5.05 9.50 5.96 4.11 4.95 8.45 6.58 15.01 5.44 8.64 10.74 4.11­15.01 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.60 1.50 29.80 4.10 4.60 6.50 6.70 8.40 3.40 17.80 1.20 8.00 11.50 2.60 1.30 0.60­29.80 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 107.10 44.00 -- 59.90 -- 59.20 -- 36.50 -- 37.60 25.40 60.10 47.10 72.20 128.80 25.40­128.80 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 13.33 18.95 17.59 44.39 31.47 35.64 22.26 14.83 10.94 24.43 7.42 40.44 31.66 22.22 16.77 7.42­44.39 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 8.89 2.83 16.67 29.05 23.08 42.20 26.34 14.33 12.69 22.36 7.21 30.18 239.08a 22.28 21.24 2.83­42.20 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 45.48 86.90 76.05 54.91 139.62 8.90 233.29 256.86 150.51 69.84 77.70 42.28 100.70 30.95 108.70 8.90­256.86 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 18.16 58.69 15.19 44.48 31.70 8.83 83.88 95.34 16.04 36.36 27.18 32.11 15.93 29.58 41.92 8.83­95.34 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 50.40 37.30 6.04 29.10 61.90 44.70 60.90 23.53 37.50 10.70 57.00 27.90 23.20 37.00 15.55 6.04­61.90 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 275 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 102.22 110.52 40.00 141.03 56.68 350.02 51.23 55.29 40.35 135.20 35.58 160.80 31.13 169.59 145.98 35.58­350.02 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 65.31 65.53 37.27 156.18 75.27 120.25 56.73 44.79 78.78 27.14 16.21 74.68 26.68 130.77 290.00 16.21­290.00 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.64 0.59 0.93 1.01 1.22 0.34 0.95 1.42 2.21 0.21 0.46 0.47 0.95 0.77 1.99 0.34­2.21 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 952.49 1,375.15 918.00 1,487.22 1,044.49 1,192.77 505.07 326.66 427.10 544.39 924.28 1,658.53 629.54 514.28 498.54 427.10­1,658.53 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 41.19 51.56 79.45 55.27 62.92 52.29 55.31 38.43 46.59 44.45 33.40 61.19 49.32 27.04 34.88 27.04­79.45 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 40.20 51.31 51.26 54.12 45.63 51.01 29.73 23.53 30.60 30.93 34.72 60.18 30.76 27.44 36.16 23.53­60.18 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 37.54 50.19 52.46 29.49 41.06 45.10 29.66 22.28 34.11 31.73 34.73 66.30 27.29 27.02 30.41 22.28­66.30 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 87.65 66.98 111.77 85.03 116.92 157.85 74.91 113.52 85.67 127.23 108.07 112.28 96.91 131.95 42.00 42.00­157.85 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 91.13 76.98 16.27 103.04 145.43 174.28 91.55 199.22 83.15 143.98 113.33 136.51 117.39 131.69 44.90 44.90­174.28 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 15.62 3.41 28.97 1.98 3.22 7.82 4.61 13.40 3.72 7.09 1.93 7.72 9.98 3.26 5.78 1.98­28.97 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 78.82 26.11 110.57 27.13 28.47 17.70 42.02 56.62 36.02 22.62 16.47 23.47 11.29 65.19 11.93 11.29­110.57 33 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) 14,834.77 2,571.51 -- 7,340.15 4,909.79 7,244.76 2,173.83 5,206.44 3,746.80 -- -- 7,511.93 1,381.14 8,518.42 7,260.20 1,381.00­14,835.00 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) -- 467.64 -- 281.71 104.22 890.28 196.12 0.62 1,432.30 -- -- 340.51 3.57 357.98 414.55 0.62­1,432.30 (Table continues on next page) 276 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.1 Benchmark Indicators, 2001 (continued) Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range 35 RTGS concentration 84.00, ratio (%) -- 82.90 -- 43.60 -- -- 38.70 -- -- -- -- -- -- 79.00d -- 38.70­84.00 36 Retail payments concentration 69.00­ ratio (%) -- 83.60 -- -- -- -- 22.50 -- -- -- -- 100.00e -- 81.00 -- 22.50­83.60 Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 286.09 48.81 171.78 68.46 68.46 273.33 68.46 132.87 127.31 101.81 40.91 117.65 127.82 88.32 53.94 48.81­286.09 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 22.37 24.92 38.39 21.22 21.50 29.82 21.95 25.39 31.63 41.84 24.69 41.55 30.59 15.11 15.20 15.11­41.84 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.48 -- 0.63 0.69 0.21 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.85 1.98 -- 1.08 0.33 0.03 0.03­1.98 Sources: See appendix 3B. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. Table A3a.2 Benchmark Indicators, 2002 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 25 29 4a 44 65 24 52 29 10 -- 28 11 5 24 25 5­65 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 277 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 83 128 2a 65 61 -- 69 110 -- -- 48 37 -- 69 122 37­128 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- 976 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- 328 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 1 5 47 149 1,640a 99 98 103 -- 4 650a 6 60 8 1­149 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 2 4 2 71 141 -- 132 371 -- -- 7 2,266a -- 169 38 2­371 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 20.20 9.30 24.94 9.10 2.90 17.20 7.10 ­19.50a 10.90 16.70 25.51 7.60 3.50 6.10 14.10 2.90­25.51 8 Return on assets (%) 1.40 0.40 0.10 0.50 0.10 1.50 0.50 ­0.70a 0.60 1.30 1.25 0.80 0.20 0.40 1.30 0.10­1.50 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 41.91 43.05 16.39 47.27 34.43 43.59 32.62 19.73 23.58 31.02 44.36 33.35 24.20 39.19 35.62 16.39­47.27 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 115.74 138.44 75.74 217.40 238.96 53.39 185.95 158.02 121.15 87.83 75.00 62.27 141.77 106.29 102.21 53.39­238.96 11 Net interest margin (%) 2.09 2.45 2.30 0.84 1.21 2.36 2.02 1.32 2.53 2.86 2.26 2.01 2.11 1.83 3.55 0.84­3.55 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.53 1.24 1.05 0.54 0.17 1.83 0.22 0.83 1.90 2.21 1.77 1.54 1.05 1.18 2.39 0.17­2.39 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 9.60 12.40 ­12.10a 11.50 12.70 15.80 11.20 9.40 11.20 13.20 11.08 16.90 13.00 13.10 13.00 9.60­16.90 14 Leverage ratio (times) 9.18 6.92 1.21 4.56 4.24 9.79 6.32 3.57 4.67 8.77 7.19 14.64 5.77 8.47 10.66 1.21­14.64 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.40 1.60 26.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.50 7.20 2.40 15.90 0.70 7.70 16.50 2.60 1.40 0.70­26.00 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 106.20 41.10 -- 60.40 -- 62.93 -- 24.50 89.60 38.10 37.50 61.20 62.90 75.00 123.70 24.50­123.70 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 13.66 19.24 15.99 37.74 33.05 30.92 36.06 17.15 8.86 25.76 7.07 31.70 30.52 22.16 16.75 7.07­37.74 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 9.15 2.99 15.04 21.23 25.17 39.60 38.79 15.75 9.65 23.82 6.65 31.39 294.40a 22.61 21.34 2.99­39.60 (Table continues on next page) 278 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.2 Benchmark Indicators, 2002 (continued) Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 55.10 109.42 103.74 92.62 254.50 10.06 347.68 322.15 176.25 68.68 84.40 52.99 104.17 40.99 145.00 10.06­347.68 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 16.55 56.57 16.71 52.69 38.72 9.33 91.27 123.46 17.50 35.71 26.99 35.53 22.77 28.52 42.26 9.33­123.46 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 48.40 28.60 9.84 29.80 62.60 46.40 73.90 22.32 37.40 14.60 78.70 22.20 22.40 36.40 17.55 9.84­78.70 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 92.86 88.65 31.85 105.58 34.01 304.85 39.14 52.81 39.52 129.09 33.14 124.91 35.78 131.72 120.61 31.85­304.85 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 72.13 56.00 24.23 135.47 60.11 131.88 52.05 43.09 109.09 34.58 12.47 63.58 32.54 174.36 244.23 12.47­244.23 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.78 0.63 0.71 1.15 1.38 0.43 1.21 0.78 2.91 0.27 0.38 0.51 1.02 1.32 2.03 0.27­2.91 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 927.66 1,386.29 746.79 1,127.64 1,001.83 1,136.50 461.51 332.36 433.45 492.50 907.04 1,869.49 627.49 560.56 484.12 332.36­1,869.49 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 40.18 51.88 75.23 51.09 64.83 50.78 65.99 36.72 46.67 40.68 34.37 63.79 49.65 30.03 33.75 30.03­75.23 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 39.56 51.14 41.81 71.59 44.11 49.03 25.69 22.38 29.02 28.25 35.09 62.26 30.34 29.72 36.17 22.38­71.59 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 37.56 50.34 44.26 59.68 41.90 43.11 28.46 21.16 32.35 28.14 35.47 62.38 28.08 30.95 28.95 21.16­62.38 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 89.79 67.88 118.66 85.57 116.69 154.98 77.31 106.04 93.16 121.35 111.18 111.81 102.54 135.94 42.30 42.30­154.98 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 92.17 78.39 50.74 103.36 144.08 172.93 93.15 154.45 87.78 135.59 116.62 138.06 113.94 136.53 45.23 45.23­172.93 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 15.52 3.49 29.25 4.71 4.71 8.86 4.71 14.52 3.76 7.21 1.97 7.80 10.70 3.22 6.02 1.97­29.25 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 68.17 26.69 119.99 34.49 34.49 20.31 34.49 70.83 41.24 23.71 16.30 22.62 12.17 66.67 11.89 11.89­119.99 33 Value of RTGS transactions to 1,231.00­ GDP (%) 14,139.01 2,511.53 -- 7,183.24 5,822.33 7,211.15 1,941.78 4,919.32 3,434.99 -- -- 6,335.44 1,230.97 7,793.08 6,891.10 14,139.00 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 279 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 3,484.43 435.12 -- 300.24 98.53 800.52 200.56 0.56 1528.68 -- 1.17 314.41 5.03 354.85 439.85 0.56­3,484.43 35 RTGS concentration 84.00, ratio (%) -- 81.30 -- 46.10 54.00 -- 37.70 -- -- -- -- -- -- 78.00d -- 37.70­84.00 36 Retail payments concentration 61.00­ ratio (%) -- 81.90 -- 49.70 -- -- 31.50 -- -- -- -- 100.00e -- 80.00 -- 31.50­81.90 Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 282.88 49.43 190.20 68.74 68.74 275.45 68.74 137.52 135.68 102.37 41.08 113.84 121.95 87.47 55.46 41.08­282.88 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 23.08 23.71 40.44 20.68 21.83 31.13 22.09 24.37 30.46 42.03 24.11 40.55 30.49 14.47 14.00 14.00­42.03 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.47 -- 0.90 0.71 0.23 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.95 2.14 -- 1.09 0.28 0.03 0.03­2.14 Sources: See appendix 3B. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. 280 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.3 Benchmark Indicators, 2003 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 24 29 5a 65 60 23 53 28 10 -- 28 10 5 24 30 5­65 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 102 139 2a 70 62 -- 68 108 -- -- 47 37 -- 78 128 37­139 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,250 1,671 -- -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 329 513 -- -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 1 7 71 139 1,531a 101 94 104 -- 4 592a 6 59 8 1­139 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 3 5 2 76 143 -- 130 364 -- -- 7 2,275a -- 192 40 2­364 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 24.20 14.70 65.02 8.50 ­1.50a 17.80 7.40 ­2.70a 3.40 17.10 25.27 10.10 10.30 8.60 15.00 3.40­65.02 a 8 Return on assets (%) 1.60 0.70 0.30 0.40 ­0.10 1.90 0.50 ­0.10a 0.20 1.30 1.15 1.10 0.60 0.60 1.40 0.20­1.90 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 43.44 45.76 21.42 49.50 38.85 44.30 27.48 23.05 18.89 32.70 40.59 36.65 26.94 39.90 38.29 18.89­45.76 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 113.93 146.08 74.92 183.22 200.73 57.21 232.90 153.59 144.00 81.43 76.14 49.20 120.49 106.24 105.72 49.20­200.73 11 Net interest margin (%) 2.02 2.36 2.33 0.98 1.24 2.11 1.82 1.29 2.83 2.67 2.28 2.08 2.29 1.70 3.37 0.98­3.37 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.63 1.25 1.24 0.66 0.15 1.72 0.14 0.83 2.05 2.02 1.82 1.62 1.32 1.18 2.30 0.14­2.30 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.00 13.40 ­5.90a 11.90 13.40 15.30 11.40 11.10 11.10 13.80 10.30 17.90 13.40 13.00 13.00 10.00­17.90 14 Leverage ratio (times) 9.71 6.63 0.75 4.95 4.50 8.88 8.27 4.05 4.46 8.53 6.01 15.39 7.18 8.64 10.57 0.75­15.39 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.30 1.20 20.40 4.80 5.20 3.90 6.70 5.20 2.60 13.90 0.30 6.70 13.50 2.50 1.10 0.30­20.40 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 131.80 43.50 -- 59.60 -- 64.03 -- 25.50 84.00 38.90 45.40 64.90 72.80 71.20 140.40 25.50­140.40 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 13.76 21.64 16.01 37.31 35.23 29.99 34.43 21.96 9.42 27.06 7.59 29.66 27.14 22.35 16.73 7.59­37.31 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 9.39 2.46 15.69 28.43 25.68 36.66 30.17 21.59 10.30 26.64 7.41 29.25 250.34a 24.87 21.46 2.46­36.66 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 51.92 88.23 95.73 89.50 193.79 6.46 339.42 275.81 149.04 61.32 71.46 39.98 47.72 33.60 123.27 6.46­339.42 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 15.46 54.63 17.51 57.24 41.99 9.94 89.84 137.88 18.73 38.85 26.55 38.43 21.53 27.68 44.17 9.94­137.88 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 44.80 26.00 17.73 29.70 59.00 38.20 64.70 23.56 38.10 11.90 74.00 31.70 25.30 35.50 16.42 11.90­74.00 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 281 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 93.04 86.18 31.26 115.36 44.23 382.10 40.80 69.83 49.05 154.78 34.61 134.49 83.46 120.03 117.25 31.26­382.10 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 70.88 54.61 24.15 107.59 53.26 214.19 54.45 52.52 75.49 50.22 13.17 95.12 71.82 120.11 142.20 13.17­214.19 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.76 0.63 0.81 1.07 1.47 0.56 1.50 0.88 1.78 0.37 0.38 0.71 1.25 1.00 1.21 0.37­1.50 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 926.74 1,470.51 636.75 1,068.85 1,004.01 1,140.87 431.69 341.51 479.40 476.98 898.85 1,864.85 639.82 553.58 459.53 341.51­1,864.85 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 39.43 53.50 72.31 53.59 65.11 50.69 66.45 37.08 46.94 40.09 34.43 64.41 50.38 29.64 32.58 29.64­72.31 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 38.07 53.09 35.60 73.60 44.74 48.56 25.97 22.70 31.91 26.83 35.52 62.80 30.30 29.96 35.03 22.70­73.60 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 35.76 51.57 35.22 64.12 39.23 43.62 16.79 20.96 34.23 28.03 35.77 60.04 28.63 30.91 27.11 16.79­64.12 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 95.43 67.96 126.46 85.88 115.51 153.39 80.41 101.66 95.63 118.59 113.13 107.83 93.22 140.53 43.11 43.11­153.39 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 96.59 78.28 120.15 104.06 142.57 172.10 96.25 153.07 94.70 130.42 119.00 135.21 110.49 141.35 45.80 45.80­172.10 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 15.51 3.43 30.39 5.33 5.33 10.36 5.32 14.78 3.70 7.37 1.98 7.98 11.18 3.24 6.08 1.98­30.39 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 70.54 26.88 129.45 36.49 36.49 28.73 36.49 74.14 42.77 25.65 16.90 24.06 12.96 69.51 12.15 12.15­129.45 (Table continues on next page) 282 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.3 Benchmark Indicators, 2003 (continued) Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range 33 Value of RTGS transactions 1,321.00­ to GDP (%) 13,652.72 2,599.21 -- 7,167.46 5,940.64 7,908.41 1,854.18 4,811.32 3,294.98 3,347.56 6,647.48 6,125.96 1,320.54 7,920.99 7,060.64 13,653.00 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 3,603.61 350.13 -- 292.91 97.11 1,147.07 212.73 0.54 1,478.55 -- 1.18 315.06 6.51 347.81 455.53 0.54­3,603.61 35 RTGS concentration 83.00, ratio (%) -- 80.20 -- 48.40 54.00 -- 38.80 -- -- -- -- -- -- 77.00d -- 38.80­83.00 36 Retail payments concentration 63.00­ ratio (%) -- 81.10 -- 50.70 20.00 -- 33.30 -- -- -- -- 100.00e -- 80.00 -- 20.00­81.10 Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 292.44 49.83 207.91 70.87 70.87 308.83 70.87 139.22 135.53 107.52 40.68 121.07 119.35 88.42 55.63 40.68­308.83 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 22.97 23.75 43.40 19.84 21.37 31.16 21.22 24.48 32.34 42.46 23.84 43.55 31.75 14.42 13.50 13.50­43.55 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.51 -- 1.09 0.63 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.90 1.25 -- 1.13 0.28 0.03 0.03­1.25 Sources: See appendix 3B. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. Table A3a.4 Benchmark Indicators, 2004 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 24 28 5a 66 58 22 53 27 10 -- 28 9 5 23 25 5­66 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 283 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 107 152 2a 72 64 -- 68 107 -- 50 38 -- 91 130 38­152 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,423 -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 248 -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 1 6 72 133 1,512a 103 91 104 -- 4 583a 6 58 8 1­133 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 3 5 2 79 147 -- 132 361 -- 8 2357a -- 225 42 2­361 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 22.80 16.70 13.70 10.60 1.90 20.30 9.30 4.10 15.20 16.60 15.59 11.80 16.80 10.90 13.20 1.90­22.80 8 Return on assets (%) 1.50 0.80 0.50 0.50 0.10 1.70 0.60 0.20 0.90 1.40 0.98 1.30 1.20 0.70 1.30 0.20­1.70 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 44.98 48.36 22.44 41.27 38.75 56.30 47.30 24.34 26.29 34.79 39.68 43.85 30.96 43.05 38.44 22.44­56.30 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 126.78 154.30 69.23 162.67 172.59 63.01 138.38 133.21 105.00 87.49 78.19 59.57 94.76 106.25 109.56 59.57­172.59 11 Net interest margin (%) 1.85 2.19 2.27 1.01 1.12 1.78 2.26 1.24 3.04 2.36 2.04 1.82 2.77 1.45 3.12 1.01­3.12 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.40 1.26 1.32 0.72 0.61 1.55 1.21 0.84 1.98 1.89 1.43 1.38 1.72 1.07 1.97 0.61­1.97 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.40 13.30 ­4.70a 11.50 13.20 15.40 11.60 11.60 12.10 14.40 10.84 16.10 12.40 12.70 13.20 10.40­16.10 14 Leverage ratio (times) 10.12 6.41 0.68 3.78 3.37 8.38 6.27 4.44 5.37 8.10 8.16 15.18 7.65 7.89 10.93 0.68­15.18 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.20 0.70 12.80 4.20 4.90 2.30 6.60 2.90 1.90 11.70 0.30 4.00 11.90 1.90 0.80 0.20­12.80 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 182.90 47.70 -- 61.30 -- 88.43 -- 29.90 104.50 41.00 34.20 76.00 79.80 64.50 168.10 29.90­182.90 (Table continues on next page) 284 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.4 Benchmark Indicators, 2004 (continued) Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 12.99 21.04 14.45 32.70 34.98 31.53 28.22 25.88 8.82 30.03 7.50 31.54 22.59 27.22 16.45 7.50­34.98 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 8.45 2.49 13.89 8.89 24.93 24.43 2.47 24.71 10.07 29.42 7.55 21.89 217.92a 13.32 21.36 2.47­29.42 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 45.85 74.57 117.86 86.18 187.04 5.58 299.09 248.98 146.02 60.90 56.55 38.58 57.54 36.96 118.07 5.58­299.09 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 14.65 55.10 22.45 57.02 43.57 9.67 86.59 148.43 46.94 37.93 24.40 38.22 27.40 27.82 45.38 9.67­148.43 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 42.50 24.30 14.74 28.90 49.40 39.50 65.60 21.65 33.20 11.90 75.60 40.90 25.30 32.80 15.29 11.90­75.60 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 108.40 106.37 23.18 118.43 43.59 486.34 45.73 77.24 57.23 145.65 38.71 149.04 71.54 122.96 131.62 23.18­486.34 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 81.46 66.73 26.78 119.93 56.24 269.33 56.14 72.79 91.87 49.43 15.45 76.00 72.15 173.37 165.81 15.45­269.33 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.75 0.63 1.08 1.09 1.36 0.55 1.38 1.03 1.82 0.36 0.40 0.51 0.99 1.41 1.26 0.40­1.82 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 247.12­ Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 820.08 1,449.90 586.42 1,343.21 975.17 627.51 247.12 257.94 464.25 480.68 1,172.17 1,093.98 634.26 345.65 517.74 1,449.90 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 35.58 53.39 58.25 57.47 64.96 35.35 35.21 37.33 45.49 41.30 46.59 38.04 48.31 21.16 35.07 21.16­64.96 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 34.97 52.37 31.92 61.90 44.76 34.73 18.25 22.80 29.27 26.74 44.08 38.96 30.19 21.84 37.20 18.25­61.90 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 33.19 50.16 30.56 50.45 39.64 31.97 16.79 26.03 31.03 27.31 44.66 37.03 27.93 21.90 28.39 16.79­50.45 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 100.94 69.59 119.71 87.74 112.56 141.34 82.52 97.68 90.09 111.63 116.56 101.38 94.61 147.61 44.00 44.00­147.61 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 101.68 79.31 117.47 105.70 139.45 166.75 98.22 152.95 93.45 122.56 121.12 126.60 105.51 148.50 46.22 46.22­166.75 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 15.85 3.38 30.01 6.04 6.04 10.90 6.02 14.71 3.59 7.59 1.96 7.58 11.44 3.27 6.01 1.96­30.01 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 72.30 27.51 134.14 37.93 37.93 31.94 37.93 75.85 44.21 26.86 16.34 24.46 13.24 71.41 11.99 13.24­75.85 33 Value of RTGS transactions 1,133.00­ to GDP (%) 14,930.67 2,558.08 -- 7,582.94 5,714.82 8,881.18 2,019.09 4,962.01 -- 4,190.48 6,416.99 5,458.93 1,132.53 7,712.13 7,057.57 14,931.00 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 285 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 3,914.02 326.31 -- 275.10 96.00 1,652.37 216.58 0.54 1,162.45 -- 1.18 304.35 8.51 351.41 440.06 0.54­3,914.02 35 RTGS concentration ratio (%) -- 79.90 -- 52.00 54.00 -- 44.70 -- -- -- -- 52.00 -- 81.00, -- 44.70­81.78 78.00d 36 Retail payments concentration 65.00­ ratio (%) -- 81.10 -- 60.50 19.00 -- 36.60 -- -- -- -- 100.00e -- 79.00 -- 19.00­82.50 Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 310.26 49.70 353.91 72.44 72.44 322.53 72.44 139.68 137.57 126.06 39.15 114.64 115.13 92.26 55.19 39.15­353.91 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 23.57 24.93 45.81 19.66 22.07 30.70 21.52 24.97 34.63 43.42 23.77 47.10 31.65 14.53 13.67 13.67­47.10 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.47 -- 0.98 0.60 0.24 0.14 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.90 0.96 -- 1.01 0.29 0.02 0.02­1.01 Sources: See appendix 3B. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. 286 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.5 Benchmark Indicators, 2005 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 24 28 4a 66 56 22 54 26 13 10 28 9 5 23 26 5­66 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 115 158 4a 79 65 -- 69 107 90 16 57 39 17 97 134 16­158 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 1 6 73 129 1,502a 105 88 65 7 4 580a 6 57 8 1­129 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 3 6 5 87 149 -- 135 361 437 12 9 2,487a 21 241 43 3­437 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 25.30 14.90 15.10 11.80 9.20 19.10 9.70 11.30 18.40 14.10 14.54 11.10 14.20 11.80 12.70 9.20­25.30 8 Return on assets (%) 1.80 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.30 1.70 0.70 0.50 1.30 1.40 0.94 1.20 1.40 0.80 1.30 0.30­1.80 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 42.26 44.97 26.99 39.44 42.59 52.71 50.30 29.45 37.90 35.02 23.00 43.23 33.73 42.69 40.00 23.00­52.71 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 101.14 168.99 67.38 185.82 162.89 65.19 122.20 100.93 78.91 91.45 112.46 66.94 82.48 110.00 108.06 65.19­185.82 11 Net interest margin (%) 1.98 1.95 2.22 0.71 1.03 1.84 1.70 1.24 3.00 2.25 2.82 1.80 3.08 1.17 3.13 0.71­3.13 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.51 1.09 1.32 0.65 0.57 1.49 1.11 0.81 1.71 1.94 1.39 1.33 1.80 0.82 2.06 0.57­2.06 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.40 12.90 2.50 11.40 12.20 15.30 10.60 12.20 13.00 13.70 10.91 15.80 13.20 12.80 13.00 2.50­15.80 14 Leverage ratio (times) 9.31 6.32 4.11 3.76 3.93 8.13 6.48 5.10 6.40 7.82 8.03 15.25 8.37 6.58 11.68 3.76­15.25 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.20 0.50 9.80 3.50 4.00 1.40 6.20 1.80 1.20 9.60 0.30 3.00 9.10 1.00 0.70 0.20­9.80 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 203.00 49.30 -- 63.80 -- 81.34 -- 31.20 131.40 45.40 38.20 80.90 83.70 56.10 155.00 31.20­203.00 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 10.10 22.59 14.34 36.59 35.50 31.26 21.52 22.71 8.89 29.37 7.30 29.87 20.58 30.94 15.81 7.30­36.59 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 5.65 2.47 13.06 9.36 23.34 23.26 4.24 21.73 10.86 25.90 5.81 13.21 172.58a 11.78 20.36 2.47­25.90 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 45.84 63.76 150.63 69.63 156.55 4.95 274.27 175.68 91.32 68.41 57.43 32.78 63.77 32.79 123.66 4.95­274.27 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 15.25 57.38 27.45 50.55 38.47 10.07 74.82 145.19 48.57 37.75 25.40 39.78 30.42 28.95 47.23 10.07­145.19 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 38.60 23.00 15.90 29.20 49.60 43.80 59.40 18.01 19.00 26.80 76.40 39.20 28.80 29.60 15.88 15.88­76.40 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 111.27 109.19 17.91 126.69 43.81 499.21 44.59 104.74 90.73 132.05 39.74 152.99 70.31 126.22 135.10 17.91­499.21 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 89.17 73.06 17.50 136.03 68.72 294.85 73.10 102.87 152.98 37.75 16.92 83.20 54.28 189.80 181.53 16.92­294.85 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.77 0.65 0.92 1.13 1.59 0.57 1.64 1.12 2.19 0.28 0.41 0.52 0.80 1.45 1.30 0.28­2.19 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 307.66­ 475.57 1,447.54 590.57 2,561.91 1,147.93 1,033.59 597.79 307.66 470.67 473.35 877.84 1,139.75 595.03 596.43 526.01 2,561.91 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 21.30 54.23 62.68 59.83 69.34 47.56 30.25 40.56 45.23 41.74 38.83 41.05 45.72 32.87 35.24 21.30­69.34 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 287 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 19.93 53.53 31.42 53.37 46.46 48.75 35.43 27.13 27.99 26.83 37.05 42.32 28.50 35.10 37.26 19.93­53.53 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 18.39 50.48 29.38 43.65 41.12 42.37 36.62 24.74 29.58 28.03 36.72 40.35 26.60 30.54 28.72 18.39­50.48 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 109.73 75.65 110.99 90.17 111.11 160.18 86.28 99.97 93.03 110.59 129.47 110.21 93.21 160.48 47.84 47.84­160.48 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 102.30 79.80 126.35 108.10 137.52 167.76 101.63 153.67 94.90 120.15 121.91 127.37 104.14 149.40 46.50 46.50­167.76 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 16.19 3.32 30.42 6.64 6.64 10.29 6.61 15.01 3.61 7.68 1.97 7.50 11.02 3.31 5.86 1.97­30.42 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 75.62 27.59 135.82 43.16 43.16 25.18 43.16 79.56 46.04 27.77 15.01 23.71 12.84 74.85 11.23 11.23­135.82 33 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) 13,857.02 2,670.13 -- 8,007.35 6,170.26 9,529.72 2,310.68 5,115.97 -- 4,313.05 5,221.62 6,478.40 1,489.31 7,876.84 6,984.27 1,489.00­ 13,857.00 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 4,174.21 329.71 -- 276.81 93.62 1,554.16 223.38 0.54 1,183.11 -- 1.20 303.80 11.36 354.04 433.59 0.54­4,174.21 35 RTGS concentration ratio (%) -- 77.00 -- 51.20 54.00 -- 48.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- 79.00, -- 48.10­79.00 78.00d 36 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- 81.30 -- 59.30 17.00 -- 38.70 -- -- -- -- 66.00­ -- 78.00 -- 17.00­81.90 100.00e Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 328.15 49.26 378.23 76.43 76.43 316.63 76.43 141.31 141.25 138.75 40.90 113.09 111.76 98.87 54.04 40.90­378.23 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 23.85 25.54 49.60 19.46 22.13 33.00 20.68 24.95 32.42 42.82 22.26 48.65 30.13 13.89 13.73 13.73­49.60 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.44 -- 0.91 0.56 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.93 0.68 -- 0.67 0.28 0.02 0.02­0.93 Sources: See appendix 3B. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. 288 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.6 Benchmark Indicators, 2006 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 25 28 4a 65 51 22 55 25 10 -- 28 9 5 23 26 5­65 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 120 167 5a 78 65 -- 74 108 -- -- 56 39 -- 101 134 39­167 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 1 6 72 119 1,515a 107 85 99 -- 4 580a 6 57 8 1­119 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 3 6 7 87 151 -- 145 366 -- -- 9 2,487a -- 252 43 3­366 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 27.00 20.90 14.80 15.60 7.50 18.17 11.50 8.50 14.60 13.43 14.88 13.70 8.80 8.09 12.80 7.50­27.00 8 Return on assets (%) 1.60 1.00 0.70 0.70 0.30 1.80 0.80 0.40 1.10 1.30 0.98 1.40 0.80 0.50 1.30 0.30­1.80 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 51.90 48.82 28.06 48.44 51.91 50.93 48.57 33.29 40.10 36.01 43.44 48.36 25.51 45.21 41.86 25.51­51.91 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 115.08 157.59 64.08 226.32 186.18 62.65 121.14 99.91 80.99 92.94 70.85 63.28 107.44 117.05 108.66 62.65­226.32 11 Net interest margin (%) 2.03 1.76 2.30 0.63 0.81 1.90 1.96 1.26 2.72 2.15 2.07 1.83 3.30 1.04 2.93 0.63­3.30 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.46 1.30 1.45 0.75 0.58 1.65 1.29 0.81 1.67 1.89 1.44 1.62 1.80 0.81 2.03 0.58­2.03 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.60 12.60 4.90 10.90 12.50 15.00 10.70 13.10 12.80 13.50 10.67 15.40 13.60 12.90 13.10 4.90­15.40 14 Leverage ratio (times) 8.50 6.49 5.12 3.87 3.23 8.69 6.49 5.60 6.57 7.37 7.70 14.37 8.35 6.02 11.77 3.23­14.37 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.20 0.40 7.50 3.00 3.40 1.10 5.30 1.50 0.80 8.50 0.20 2.40 8.10 0.90 0.70 0.20­8.50 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 204.50 55.30 -- 62.90 -- 80.56 46.00 28.10 175.20 50.70 36.30 86.90 82.70 63.54 148.40 28.10­204.50 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 10.88 23.96 15.23 38.73 34.31 30.80 25.66 20.13 8.31 30.76 9.41 29.61 21.48 34.13 16.65 8.31­38.73 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 3.48 1.82 14.23 11.07 13.83 22.31 2.53 19.16 10.12 26.62 6.39 8.47 182.25a 17.80 21.64 1.82­26.62 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 41.67 57.90 103.33 60.50 137.30 2.97 250.87 171.21 121.04 62.06 45.56 20.61 78.27 32.62 145.36 2.97­250.87 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 12.95 48.52 29.70 53.79 42.21 9.49 83.14 154.47 51.79 39.28 19.69 43.03 35.34 35.84 48.57 9.49­154.47 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) -- 26.20 14.92 25.50 41.30 35.30 61.00 19.50 26.50 25.10 82.10 37.60 30.40 28.10 14.46 14.46­82.10 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 142.65 130.82 43.31 165.15 56.53 903.56 55.46 112.40 93.96 156.32 43.13 290.69 67.94 164.97 148.25 43.13­903.56 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 111.89 98.60 43.82 171.40 94.49 438.57 85.96 143.27 151.14 49.90 21.41 136.34 48.92 329.20 259.09 21.41­438.57 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.90 0.81 1.50 1.20 1.91 0.60 1.75 1.29 1.73 0.36 0.52 0.56 0.76 2.21 1.85 0.36­2.21 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 866.11 1,501.22 578.63 2,414.97 1,078.60 1,854.41 799.27 296.88 518.16 517.31 1,611.11 1,707.79 603.12 704.03 563.35 296.88­2,414.97 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 289 assets (%) 30.98 56.14 69.77 68.08 72.25 58.29 39.88 40.70 51.37 53.14 57.99 57.06 50.79 35.57 37.58 30.98­72.25 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 36.51 55.91 30.97 56.39 50.31 58.05 44.93 26.32 26.49 28.01 57.49 58.58 27.33 39.12 39.55 26.32­58.58 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 34.10 52.26 28.38 45.08 37.21 50.93 42.86 24.26 27.51 29.01 56.07 56.93 26.14 35.83 31.01 24.26­56.93 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 123.61 143.04 108.27 94.12 108.84 139.33 90.98 98.27 101.95 107.65 158.70 98.19 87.69 193.60 59.91 59.91­193.60 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 102.30 79.80 130.85 111.71 133.25 167.76 105.89 154.70 101.57 117.45 121.91 127.37 99.04 149.40 46.50 46.50­167.76 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 16.71 3.36 30.85 7.05 7.05 10.19 7.01 15.05 3.66 7.99 1.95 7.28 10.28 3.30 5.72 1.95­30.85 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 83.25 29.19 143.61 44.46 44.46 26.31 44.46 78.33 43.42 29.80 14.83 24.88 11.90 76.45 10.52 10.52­143.61 33 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) 15,325.59 2,887.18 -- 8,371.99 6,492.82 10,756.56 2,559.52 5,853.77 -- 5,264.55 6,127.90 6,627.60 1,827.52 8,419.18 7,330.32 1,828.00­ 15,326.00 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 4,541.88 335.35 -- 280.67 94.51 2,663.84 229.51 0.55 1,593.61 -- 1.20 322.03 10.22 357.86 426.17 0.55­4,541.88 35 RTGS concentration ratio (%) -- 77.70 -- 56.20 53.00 -- 45.30 -- -- -- -- -- -- 80.00, -- 45.30­80.00 78.00d 36 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- 80.90 -- 60.30 17.00 -- 38.60 -- -- -- -- 69.00­ -- 77.00 -- 17.00­82.20 100.00e Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 358.19 51.08 393.80 79.73 79.73 342.84 79.73 140.26 151.17 153.39 45.35 124.94 109.34 106.84 53.57 45.35­393.80 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 25.52 25.10 52.41 19.87 23.20 33.09 20.71 25.20 30.77 43.19 21.44 49.87 32.04 14.42 13.80 13.80­52.41 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.43 -- 0.88 0.54 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.99 0.60 -- 0.64 0.29 0.02 0.02­0.99 Sources: See appendix 3B. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. 290 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.7 Benchmark Indicators, 2007 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 25 -- 4a -- -- 18 56 -- -- -- 27 11 5 22 5­56 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 122 -- 4a -- -- 35 74 -- -- -- 57 36 -- -- -- 35­122 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 -- 6 -- -- 1,234a 110 -- -- -- 4 487a 7 -- 7 1­110 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 3 -- 6 -- -- 2,420a 146 -- -- -- 9 1,658a -- -- -- 3­146 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 28.10 12.50 19.90 9.88 14.04 20.05 11.40 3.20 14.98 16.14 16.24 13.40 7.30 8.25 10.50 3.20­28.10 8 Return on assets (%) 1.60 0.60 1.00 0.31 0.44 1.90 0.76 0.20 1.00 1.40 1.06 1.40 0.30 0.51 1.10 0.20­1.90 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 54.63 48.64 40.78 36.23 53.08 48.84 47.50 -- 41.48 38.79 48.66 46.06 23.47 43.11 38.02 23.47­54.63 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 115.72 169.92 55.82 313.18 170.75 71.76 115.88 101.36 76.91 88.04 66.14 77.64 122.62 135.13 130.92 55.82­313.18 11 Net interest margin (%) 1.65 1.72 2.68 0.40 0.76 1.94 1.84 1.23 2.77 2.16 2.14 2.01 3.61 1.03 2.93 0.40­3.61 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.16 1.24 1.89 0.49 0.52 1.77 1.08 0.68 1.75 1.94 1.63 1.45 1.69 0.86 1.78 0.49­1.94 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.30 12.10 7.70 -- -- 13.40 10.90 12.90 12.70 13.20 7.15 14.00 14.60 -- 12.80 7.15­14.60 14 Leverage ratio (times) 5.76 4.60 6.23 3.18 3.10 7.90 6.71 4.91 6.53 7.13 6.50 10.06 9.45 3.53 10.08 3.10­10.08 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.20 0.40 6.60 2.80 -- 0.90 -- 1.50 0.80 6.60 -- 1.80 8.60 -- 1.10 0.20­8.60 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 188.90 44.90 37.50 -- -- -- -- 28.80 180.00 62.60 -- 105.90 80.10 -- 104.80 28.80­188.90 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 13.81 24.68 18.84 38.48 34.89 32.87 24.42 19.07 8.95 35.03 8.91 25.28 22.64 27.94 19.72 8.91­38.48 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 4.73 2.21 18.24 10.42 8.85 23.42 2.48 17.16 11.66 32.02 5.37 11.39 114.05a 9.87 25.10 2.21­32.02 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 53.55 52.23 37.67 67.18 124.91 1.94 285.33 189.88 98.65 54.90 -- 17.55 68.99 35.28 122.04 1.94­285.33 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 14.46 55.24 34.65 54.84 42.25 8.95 84.10 163.25 48.05 38.57 -- 42.21 38.52 33.10 47.72 8.95­163.25 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 34.70 28.00 13.50 25.60 42.90 35.90 69.20 17.20 21.40 24.80 74.10 35.00 38.80 29.60 12.50 12.50­74.10 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 158.00 164.85 136.55 164.80 63.85 1,284.15 50.89 106.56 115.76 180.00 36.70 334.17 80.19 141.20 144.25 36.70­1,284.15 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 166.94 123.26 188.18 220.11 131.17 1,033.79 109.73 156.04 206.85 93.92 18.68 236.32 47.97 378.83 332.34 18.68­1,033.79 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 1.15 0.84 2.19 1.42 2.31 0.98 2.20 1.43 2.05 0.61 0.52 0.83 0.70 2.70 2.32 0.52­2.70 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 873.69 1,576.82 637.87 2,015.42 1,764.93 1,796.16 2,080.86 280.88 556.97 637.13 1,522.85 1,894.89 735.79 817.30 653.92 280.88­2,080.86 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 291 assets (%) 35.60 57.13 35.01 57.17 64.30 56.87 66.89 25.21 29.01 32.37 55.25 64.11 31.99 39.51 40.47 25.21­66.89 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 36.54 55.64 36.04 67.16 61.75 55.76 64.11 24.98 29.36 32.74 57.97 67.29 33.42 46.55 44.25 24.98­67.29 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 34.25 55.10 33.12 50.45 49.50 48.76 64.23 24.50 30.68 34.01 53.91 18.41 31.39 37.96 33.23 18.41­64.23 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 122.81 127.26 115.83 -- -- 139.58 -- 96.92 107.81 105.13 149.49 95.72 84.10 189.58 62.44 62.44­189.58 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 138.67 -- 138.23 376.27 197.97 -- 187.97 182.79 103.64 175.13 -- -- 94.54 -- 78.34 138.67­376.27 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 16.58 3.30 31.03 7.18 7.18 10.91 7.18 16.66 3.67 8.36 1.94 7.14 10.34 3.51 5.74 1.94­31.03 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 89.30 28.39 156.02 43.84 43.84 26.68 43.84 96.78 39.20 33.51 14.29 27.41 11.77 66.69 10.05 10.05­156.02 33 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) 17,557.12 3,186.06 -- 8,658.22 9,621.95 15,069.65 2,749.44 6,815.76 -- 5,923.89 5,658.53 6,546.88 2,147.19 9,159.75 8,382.42 2,147.00­ 17,557.00 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 5,067.78 358.43 -- 277.80 93.66 4,945.51 220.33 0.57 1,748.76 -- -- 374.42 7.42 355.07 422.78 0.57­5,067.78 35 RTGS concentration ratio (%) -- 76.79 -- 58.20 62.00 -- 50.70 -- -- -- -- -- -- 80.00, -- 50.70­80.00 77.00d 36 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- 80.79 -- 64.80 16.00 -- 43.90 -- -- -- -- 69.50­ -- 77.00 -- 16.00­83.60 100.00e Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 406.36 51.32 412.65 83.68 83.68 388.97 83.68 141.38 159.59 157.99 42.03 127.54 107.26 112.47 54.14 42.03­412.65 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 26.23 -- 52.89 20.20 25.32 32.18 21.18 -- 30.20 42.20 -- 51.41 34.49 15.19 -- 15.19­52.89 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.47 -- 1.02 0.53 0.26 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.97 0.48 -- 0.67 0.30 0.02 0.02­1.02 Sources: See appendix 3B. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. 292 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.8 Benchmark Indicators, 2008 Hong Kong, Korea, New United United Reference Indicator Australia Canada China France Germany China Italy Japan Rep. Malaysia Zealand Singapore Thailand Kingdom States Range Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 25 -- 4a -- -- 18 56 -- -- -- 27 11 5 22 5­56 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 122 -- 4a -- -- 35 74 -- -- -- 57 36 -- -- -- 35­122 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 976­1,671b 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 people -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 248­513c 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km2) 1 -- 6 -- -- 1,234a 110 -- -- -- 4 487a 7 -- 7 1­110 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 3 -- 6 -- -- 2,420a 146 -- -- -- 9 1,658a -- -- -- 3­146 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 28.10 12.50 19.90 9.88 14.04 20.05 11.40 3.20 14.98 16.14 16.24 13.40 7.30 8.25 10.50 3.20­28.10 8 Return on assets (%) 1.60 0.60 1.00 0.31 0.44 1.90 0.76 0.20 1.00 1.40 1.06 1.40 0.30 0.51 1.10 0.20­1.90 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 54.63 48.64 40.78 36.23 53.08 48.84 47.50 -- 41.48 38.79 48.66 46.06 23.47 43.11 38.02 23.47­54.63 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 115.72 169.92 55.82 313.18 170.75 71.76 115.88 101.36 76.91 88.04 66.14 77.64 122.62 135.13 130.92 55.82­313.18 11 Net interest margin (%) 1.65 1.72 2.68 0.40 0.76 1.94 1.84 1.23 2.77 2.16 2.14 2.01 3.61 1.03 2.93 0.40­3.61 12 Recurring earning power (%) 1.16 1.24 1.89 0.49 0.52 1.77 1.08 0.68 1.75 1.94 1.63 1.45 1.69 0.86 1.78 0.49­1.94 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.30 12.10 7.70 -- -- 13.40 10.90 12.90 12.70 13.20 7.15 14.00 14.60 -- 12.80 7.15­14.60 14 Leverage ratio (times) 5.76 4.60 6.23 3.18 3.10 7.90 6.71 4.91 6.53 7.13 6.50 10.06 9.45 3.53 10.08 3.10­10.08 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.20 0.40 6.60 2.80 -- 0.90 -- 1.50 0.80 6.60 -- 1.80 8.60 -- 1.10 0.20­8.60 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 188.90 44.90 37.50 -- -- -- -- 28.80 180.00 62.60 -- 105.90 80.10 -- 104.80 28.80­188.90 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 13.81 24.68 18.84 38.48 34.89 32.87 24.42 19.07 8.95 35.03 8.91 25.28 22.64 27.94 19.72 8.91­38.48 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 4.73 2.21 18.24 10.42 8.85 23.42 2.48 17.16 11.66 32.02 5.37 11.39 114.05a 9.87 25.10 2.21­32.02 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 53.55 52.23 37.67 67.18 124.91 1.94 285.33 189.88 98.65 54.90 -- 17.55 68.99 35.28 122.04 1.94­285.33 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 14.46 55.24 34.65 54.84 42.25 8.95 84.10 163.25 48.05 38.57 -- 42.21 38.52 33.10 47.72 8.95­163.25 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 34.70 28.00 13.50 25.60 42.90 35.90 69.20 17.20 21.40 24.80 74.10 35.00 38.80 29.60 12.50 12.50­74.10 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 158.00 164.85 136.55 164.80 63.85 1,284.15 50.89 106.56 115.76 180.00 36.70 334.17 80.19 141.20 144.25 36.70­1,284.15 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 166.94 123.26 188.18 220.11 131.17 1,033.79 109.73 156.04 206.85 93.92 18.68 236.32 47.97 378.83 332.34 18.68­1,033.79 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 1.15 0.84 2.19 1.42 2.31 0.98 2.20 1.43 2.05 0.61 0.52 0.83 0.70 2.70 2.32 0.52­2.70 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 873.69 1,576.82 637.87 2,015.42 1,764.93 1,796.16 2,080.86 280.88 556.97 637.13 1,522.85 1,894.89 735.79 817.30 653.92 280.88­2,080.86 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 35.60 57.13 35.01 57.17 64.30 56.87 66.89 25.21 29.01 32.37 55.25 64.11 31.99 39.51 40.47 25.21­66.89 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 293 deposits (%) 36.54 55.64 36.04 67.16 61.75 55.76 64.11 24.98 29.36 32.74 57.97 67.29 33.42 46.55 44.25 24.98­67.29 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 34.25 55.10 33.12 50.45 49.50 48.76 64.23 24.50 30.68 34.01 53.91 18.41 31.39 37.96 33.23 18.41­64.23 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 122.81 127.26 115.83 -- -- 139.58 -- 96.92 107.81 105.13 149.49 95.72 84.10 189.58 62.44 62.44­189.58 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 138.67 -- 138.23 376.27 197.97 -- 187.97 182.79 103.64 175.13 -- -- 94.54 -- 78.34 138.67­376.27 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 16.58 3.30 31.03 7.18 7.18 10.91 7.18 16.66 3.67 8.36 1.94 7.14 10.34 3.51 5.74 1.94­31.03 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 89.30 28.39 156.02 43.84 43.84 26.68 43.84 96.78 39.20 33.51 14.29 27.41 11.77 66.69 10.05 10.05­156.02 33 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) 17,557.12 3,186.06 -- 8,658.22 9,621.95 15,069.65 2,749.44 6,815.76 -- 5,923.89 5,658.53 6,546.88 2,147.19 9,159.75 8,382.42 2,147.00­ 17,557.00 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 5,067.78 358.43 -- 277.80 93.66 4,945.51 220.33 0.57 1,748.76 -- -- 374.42 7.42 355.07 422.78 0.57­5,067.78 35 RTGS concentration ratio (%) -- 76.79 -- 58.20 62.00 -- 50.70 -- -- -- -- -- -- 80.00, -- 50.70­80.00 77.00d 36 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) -- 80.79 -- 64.80 16.00 -- 43.90 -- -- -- -- 70.00­ -- 77.00 -- 16.00­83.60 100.00e Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 406.36 51.32 412.65 83.68 83.68 388.97 83.68 141.38 159.59 157.99 42.03 127.54 107.26 112.47 54.14 42.03­412.65 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 26.23 -- 52.89 20.20 25.32 32.18 21.18 -- 30.20 42.20 -- 51.41 34.49 15.19 -- 15.19­52.89 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.47 -- 1.02 0.53 0.26 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.97 0.48 -- 0.67 0.30 0.02 0.02­1.02 Sources: See appendix 3B. Note: Because of data unavailability, data for 2007 are used for 2008. a. Outlier not used in range. b. Range is for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). c. Range is for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). d. The United Kingdom has two RTGS systems, and therefore, two different values are shown. e. Singapore has more than one retail payment system, and therefore, a range of values is shown. -- = not available. 294 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A3a.9 Benchmark Indicator Ranges, 2001­08 Reference Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Overall Access to finance 1 Demographic branch penetration (branches per 100,000 people) 5­69 5­65 5­65 5­66 5­66 5­65 5­56 5­56 5­69 2 Demographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 100,000 people) 43­115 37­128 37­139 38­152 16­158 39­167 35­122 35­122 16­167 3 Deposit accounts per 1,000 peoplea 976­1,671 976­1,671 976­1,671 976­1,671 976­1,671 976­1,671 976­1,671 976­1,671 976­1,671 4 Loan accounts per 1,000 peopleb 248­513 248­513 248­513 248­513 248­513 248­513 248­513 248­513 248­513 2 5 Geographic branch penetration (branches per 1,000 km ) 1­159 1­149 1­139 1­133 1­129 1­119 1­110 1­110 1­159 6 Geographic ATM penetration (ATMs per 1,000 km2) 1­378 2­371 2­364 2­361 3­437 3­366 3­146 3­146 1­437 Performance and efficiency 7 Return on equity (%) 4.42­32.80 2.90­25.51 3.40­65.02 1.90­22.80 9.20­25.30 7.50­27.00 3.20­28.10 3.20­28.10 1.90­65.02 8 Return on assets (%) 0.20­1.47 0.10­1.50 0.20­1.90 0.20­1.70 0.30­1.80 0.30­1.80 0.20­1.90 0.20­1.90 0.10­1.90 9 Staff cost ratio (%) 14.87­46.31 16.39­47.27 18.89­45.76 22.44­56.30 23.00­52.71 25.51­51.91 23.47­54.63 23.47­54.63 14.87­56.30 10 Operating cost ratio (%) 49.86­294.02 53.39­238.96 49.20­200.73 59.57­172.59 65.19­185.82 62.65­226.32 55.82­313.18 55.82­313.18 49.20­313.18 11 Net interest margin (%) 0.64­3.55 0.84­3.55 0.98­3.37 1.01­3.12 0.71­3.13 0.63­3.30 0.40­3.61 0.40­3.61 0.40­3.61 12 Recurring earning power (%) 0.10­2.29 0.17­2.39 0.14­2.30 0.61­1.97 0.57­2.06 0.58­2.03 0.49­1.94 0.49­1.94 0.10­2.39 Financial stability 13 Capital adequacy ratio (%) 10.40­18.20 9.60­16.90 10.00­17.90 10.40­16.10 2.50­15.80 4.90­15.40 7.15­14.60 7.15­14.60 2.50­18.20 14 Leverage ratio (times) 4.11­15.01 1.21­14.64 0.75­15.39 0.68­15.18 3.76­15.25 3.23­14.37 3.10­10.08 3.10­10.08 0.68­15.39 15 Gross nonperforming loans ratio (%) 0.60­29.80 0.70­26.00 0.30­20.40 0.20­12.80 0.20­9.80 0.20­8.50 0.20­8.60 0.20­8.60 0.20­29.80 16 Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 25.40­128.80 24.50­123.70 25.50­140.40 29.90­182.90 31.20­203.00 28.10­204.50 28.80­188.90 28.80­188.90 24.50­204.50 17 Liquid assets ratio (%) 7.42­44.39 7.07­37.74 7.59­37.31 7.50­34.98 7.30­36.59 8.31­38.73 8.91­38.48 8.91­38.48 7.07­44.39 18 Liquid assets to liabilities ratio (%) 2.83­42.20 2.99­39.60 2.46­36.66 2.47­29.42 2.47­25.90 1.82­26.62 2.21­32.02 2.21­32.02 1.82­42.20 Capital market development 19 Domestic bond market to equity market capitalization (%) 8.90­256.86 10.06­347.68 6.46­339.42 5.58­299.09 4.95­274.27 2.97­250.87 1.94­285.33 1.94­285.33 1.94­347.68 20 Domestic public bonds outstanding to GDP (%) 8.83­95.34 9.33­123.46 9.94­137.88 9.67­148.43 10.07­145.19 9.49­154.47 8.95­163.25 8.95­163.25 8.83­163.25 21 Trading value of top 10 stocks ratio (%) 6.04 ­61.90 9.84­78.70 11.90­74.00 11.90­75.60 15.88­76.40 14.46­82.10 12.50­74.10 12.50­74.10 6.04­82.10 22 Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 35.58­350.02 31.85­304.85 31.26­382.10 23.18­486.34 17.91­499.21 43.13­903.56 36.70­1,284.15 36.70­1,284.15 17.91­1,284.15 23 Stock trading value to GDP (%) 16.21­290.00 12.47­244.23 13.17­214.19 15.45­269.33 16.92­294.85 21.41­438.57 18.68­1,033.79 18.68­1,033.79 12.47­1,033.79 24 Stock market turnover ratio (times) 0.34­2.21 0.27­2.91 0.37­1.50 0.40­1.82 0.28­2.19 0.36­2.21 0.52­2.70 0.52­2.70 0.27­2.91 Market concentration and competitiveness 25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 427.10­1,658.53 332.36­1,869.49 341.51­1,864.85 247.12­1,449.90 307.66­2,561.91 296.88­2,414.97 280.88­2,080.86 280.88­2,080.86 247.12­2,561.91 Appendix 3A. Getting Finance Indicators for Benchmark Economies, 2001­08 295 26 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), assets (%) 27.04­79.45 30.03­75.23 29.64­72.31 21.16­64.96 21.30­69.34 30.98­72.25 25.21­66.89 25.21­66.89 21.16­79.45 27 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), deposits (%) 23.53­60.18 22.38­71.59 22.70­73.60 18.25­61.90 19.93­53.53 26.32­58.58 24.98­67.29 24.98­67.29 18.25­73.60 28 K-bank concentration ratio (k = 3), loans (%) 22.28­66.30 21.16­62.38 16.79­64.12 16.79­50.45 18.39­50.48 24.26­56.93 18.41­64.23 18.41­64.23 16.79­66.30 29 Private credit extended by banks to GDP (%) 42.00­157.85 42.30­154.98 43.11­153.39 44.00­147.61 47.84­160.48 59.91­193.60 62.44­189.58 62.44­189.58 42.00­193.60 30 Commercial banking assets to GDP (%) 44.90­174.28 45.23­172.93 45.80­172.10 46.22­166.75 46.50­167.76 46.50­167.76 138.67­376.27 138.67­376.27 44.90­376.27 Payment systems development 31 Notes and coins in circulation to GDP (%) 1.98­28.97 1.97­29.25 1.98­30.39 1.96­30.01 1.97­30.42 1.95­30.85 1.94­31.03 1.94­31.03 1.94­31.03 32 Narrow money supply (M1) to GDP (%) 11.29­110.57 11.89­119.99 12.15­129.45 13.24­75.85 11.23­135.82 10.52­143.61 10.05­156.02 10.05­156.02 10.05­156.02 33 Value of RTGS transactions to GDP (%) 1,381.00­ 1,231.00­ 1,321.00­ 1,133.00­ 1,489.00­ 1,828.00­ 2,147.00­ 2,147.00­ 1,133.00­ 14,835.00 14,139.00 13,653.00 14,931.00 13,857.00 15,326.00 17,557.00 17,557.00 17,557.00 34 Value of retail transactions to GDP (%) 0.62­1,432.30 0.56­3,484.43 0.54­3,603.61 0.54­3,914.02 0.54­4,174.21 0.55­4,541.88 0.57­5,067.78 0.57­5,067.78 0.54­5,067.78 35 RTGS concentration ratio (%) 38.70­84.00 37.70­84.00 38.80­83.00 44.70­81.78 48.10­79.00 45.30­80.00 50.70­80.00 50.70­80.00 37.70­84.00 36 Retail payments concentration ratio (%) 22.50­83.60 31.50­81.90 20.00­81.10 19.00­82.50 17.00­81.90 17.00­82.20 16.00­83.60 16.00­83.60 16.00­83.60 Savings mobilization 37 Broad money supply (M2) to GDP (%) 48.81­286.09 41.08­282.88 40.68­308.83 39.15­353.91 40.90­378.23 45.35­393.80 42.03­412.65 42.03­412.65 39.15­412.65 38 Real deposit interest rate (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 Gross domestic savings to GDP (%) 15.11­41.84 14.00­42.03 13.50­43.55 13.67­47.10 13.73­49.60 13.80­52.41 15.19­52.89 15.19­52.89 13.50­52.89 40 Reserve money to total deposits (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41 Loan to deposit ratio (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 42 Worker remittances to GDP (%) 0.03­1.98 0.03­2.14 0.03­1.25 0.02­1.01 0.02­0.93 0.02­0.99 0.02­1.02 0.02­1.02 0.02­2.14 Sources: See appendix 3B. Note: Because of data unavailability, data for 2007 are used for 2008. a. Ranges are for 2002 (low value) and 2003 (high value). b. Ranges are for 2004 (low value) and 2003 (high value). -- = not available. 296 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Appendix 3B. Data Sources and Notes for Benchmark Economies Sources: By indicator. 1. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006a, staff calcula- tions; CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Coun- tries (various years); data from various central banks; Hong Kong Association of Banks 2007; New Zealand Bankers' Association data; Korea Federation of Banks data. 2. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006a, staff calcula- tions; CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Coun- tries (various years); data from various central banks; Hong Kong Association of Banks 2007; New Zealand Bankers' Association data; UK Payments Administration data. 3. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006a, staff calculations. 4. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006a, staff calculations. 5. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006a, staff calcula- tions; CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Coun- tries (various years); data from various central banks; Hong Kong Association of Banks 2007; New Zealand Bankers' Association data; Korea Federation of Banks data. 6. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006a, staff calcula- tions; CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Coun- tries (various years); data from various central banks; Hong Kong Association of Banks 2007; New Zealand Bankers' Association data; UK Payments Administration data. 7. International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics database, Global Financial Stability Report (various issues); Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP), Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 8. IMF, International Financial Statistics database, Global Financial Stability Report (various issues); BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 9. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 10. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 11. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 12. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 13. BvDEP, Bankscope database; IMF, International Financial Statistics data- base, Global Financial Stability Report (various issues); World Bank staff calculations. 14. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 15. IMF, International Financial Statistics database, Global Financial Stability Report (various issues); World Bank staff calculations. 16. IMF, International Financial Statistics database, Global Financial Stability Report (various issues); World Bank staff calculations. 17. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. Appendix 3B. Data Sources and Notes for Benchmark Economies 297 18. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 19. World Federation of Exchanges data; IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (various issues); BIS 2007; World Bank staff calculations. 20. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, staff calculations; BIS 2007. 21. World Federation of Exchanges data; World Bank staff calculations. 22. World Federation of Exchanges data; IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (various issues); World Bank, World Development Indicators database, staff calculations. 23. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, staff calculations; World Federation of Exchanges data. 24. World Bank staff calculations using data for indicators 22 and 23. 25. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 26. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank 2006b, staff calculations. 27. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 28. BvDEP, Bankscope database; World Bank staff calculations. 29. World Bank 2006b, staff calculations; IMF, International Financial Statistics database. 30. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2006b, staff calcula- tions; IMF, International Financial Statistics database; data from various central banks; BvDEP, Bankscope database. 31. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); data from various central banks; Statistics New Zealand data; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World Bank staff calculations. 32. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); data from various central banks; Statistics New Zealand data; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World Bank staff calculations. 33. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); UK Payments Administration data; Statistics New Zealand data; data from various central banks; IMF, World Economic Outlook data- base; the Clearing House (CHIPS) data; World Bank staff calculations. 34. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); UK Payments Administration data; Statistics New Zealand data; data from various central banks; IMF, World Economic Outlook data- base; World Bank staff calculations. 35. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); World Bank staff calculations. 36. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); World Bank staff calculations. 37. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); data from various central banks; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World Bank staff calculations. 38. Data from various central banks. 39. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); data from various central banks; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World Bank, World Development Indicators database, staff calculations. 40. Data from various central banks. 41. Reserve Bank of Australia data. 298 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 42. CPSS, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries (various years); data from various central banks; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World Bank, World Development Indicators database, staff calculations. Note: All benchmark indicators are for selected high-income OECD member countries and nonmember Asian economies (Australia; Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Thailand; the United Kingdom; and the United States). Outliers noted in the tables are omitted in the calculation of ranges. Because of nonavailability of data, 2007 data are used as benchmarks for 2008 as well. No benchmarks are calculated for indicators 38, 40, and 41 because only partial data were available. Appendix 4A. Corporate Governance Matrix: Questionnaire Responses for South Asian Countries, 2008 Table A4a.1 Ownership Structure and Influence of External Stakeholders Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 1.1 Identification of substantial majority holders 1.1.1 What are the rules that govern disclosure of share ownership? Is the Need DAB In articles of Need x ownership structure transparent? approval association RMA (AA) approval · Top 10 shareholders and percentage of ownership to be disclosed? -- To To Top 20 regulator regulator · Threshold of share ownership that needs to be disclosed (e.g., 5% and over)? Need to 10% 10% 1% 5% 0.5% 10%; 5% report 3% to SBP holdings to DAB · Is the government's ownership disclosed with its special privileges? x In AA x x Appendix 4A. Corporate Governance Matrix 299 · Does government control the nomination and remuneration process for the board Nomination x Nomination of directors (BOD)? for state- Nomination for govern- Nomination owned banks for public ment con- for state banks trolled banks banks · Is there evidence of influence from external stakeholders such as labor unions or x x But x For x x x banking and securities regulators? regulator public can sector banks · Are the preemption rights of minority shareholders firmly protected (e.g., are x x x x x they enshrined in the company law and requiring a supermajority [75%] to Encouraged; disapply them)? no rules (Table continues on next page) 300 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A4a.1 Ownership Structure and Influence of External Stakeholders (continued) Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 1.2 Indirect and beneficial ownership 1.2.1 Are there rules that govern the disclosure by shareholders of ultimate x x No rules, beneficial ownership? but thresholds · If so, please specify the threshold for disclosure of ownership. 20% 10% No 5% 5% 3% 15% threshold · Are shareholders required to disclose their ownership to an authority? x Only in indiv. tax returns · Where, when, by whom, and to whom are such disclosures to be made? DAB keeps Banks to SEC Dept of To bank By Annual a/c To CBSL; central revenue & shareholder to and reports for listed registry customs, CMDA, 7 stock to SBP cos, also tax returns exchanges to CSE · Do shareholders have access to this information? -- · Does the market have access to this information? -- x · Please specify monitoring and enforcement provisions, including penalties Warning -- None Fines Fines, Penalties Shareholdings for noncompliance. letters, fines, imprisonment per bank thru AR only removal of ordinance for listed directors & prudential companies regulations · How many cases of noncompliance have been recorded in the past Many; not -- None -- 1 Action None 5 years, and what actions were taken? specified taken case by case Source: See appendix table A4a.4. -- = not available, = yes, x = no. Table A4a.2 Investor Rights Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2.1 Shareholder meetings and voting procedures 2.1.1 Shareholder meetings · Are shareholders informed of shareholder meetings? · How much notice is given (e.g., 4 weeks before the meeting)? 30 days 3 weeks 21 days 21 days 14 days 3 weeks 21 days 15 days · Do banks provide detailed agendas and explanatory circulars along with x -- the notice of meetings? 2.1.2 Voting procedures · Can shareholders vote by proxy, by post, or electronically? Proxy Proxy x Proxy, Proxy, post, Proxy, post Proxy Proxy post electronic · Is the counting of votes verified by a third party? x x x Depends x on AA · Can shareholders vote on a normal range of issues, including major x Specified x x and related-party transactions? in AA · Are banks required to disclose special voting rights and caps on x x Specified -- x voting rights? 5% cap in Banking Appendix 4A. Corporate Governance Matrix 301 except for Regulation Act; government 10% private sector, 1% public sector (Table continues on next page) 302 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A4a.2 Investor Rights (continued) Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 2.2 Basic ownership rights 2.2.1 Are all directors' appointments and dismissals x only for x SBP has x subject to a shareholder vote? private banks As in AA power to rule subject to RBI · Can the government control such outcomes due to For public x By virtue of Possible higher percentage of ownership (where applicable)? banks s/holding 2.2.2 Is there a clear dividend policy? x Depends Decided by on annual BOD at annual general general meeting meeting (AA) (AGM) 2.2.3 Are there structural takeover defenses that would x x x RBI approval x x prevent a legitimate takeover bid? for above- Purchases more Purchases more threshold than 5% need than 10% need limits SBP approval CBSL/MOF approval (more than 30%, must make offer to all shareholders) · Can the government or regulators reserve the right x x Bank to approve such transactions? Promoters' share management transfers need changes need regulators' approval SBP approval 2.2.4 Can minority shareholders easily nominate Depends x x x Depends on x Depends on independent directors? on individual No right of individual internal bank bank rules nomination; only bank rules rules through election Source: See appendix table A4a.4. -- = not available, = yes, x = no. Table A4a.3 Transparency and Disclosure Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 3.1 Adherence to internationally accepted accounting standards 3.1.1 Do banks prepare their financial statements in accordance x -- x with local generally accepted accounting principles No local body; ROSCa Conform to (Local GAAP, Code says IAS as No reconciliation and provide reconciliation with international accounting banking law Indian GAAP but some do) must comply adopted by with IAS standards? says must with IAS country comply with IAS 3.1.2 Are accounting standards in material conformity with x international accounting standards? Somewhat ROSCa Conform to Mostly -- ROSCa Except Except IAS 32, 34 compliant; Indian GAAP IAS 39 & 40 & IFRS, yet to be see above introduced 3.1.3 What is the frequency of reporting of financial statements Monthly, Annually Monthly, Quarterly, Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly, Monthly, (e.g., quarterly)? quarterly, & quarterly, & semiannually, semiannually, & quarterly, & annually annually & annually annually annually 3.1.4 Are bank financials available to the general public? If yes, how? On the Web, in newspapers, upon request? Upon request All Newspapers All -- All All All 3.1.5 Is disclosure of audit and nonaudit fees paid to the external x -- Appendix 4A. Corporate Governance Matrix 303 auditor required? 3.1.6 Must the chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), or directors sign and certify bank's annual accounts? CEO + CFO CEO + 3 Chairman CEO + CFO Chairman + CEO + CFO + CEO + 3 + directors directors + CEO CEO + CFO directors directors (Table continues on next page) 304 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A4a.3 Transparency and Disclosure (continued) Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 3.2 Independent internal and external auditors and audit committee 3.2.1 Audit committee · Has the bank appointed an audit committee? -- · If banks appoint such a committee, is there a -- mandate or charter that clearly delineates its responsibilities? · How often does the committee meet? Differs from 3­4/yr min. Quarterly Quarterly -- As required Quarterly (min.) Not specified bank to bank (differs from bank to bank) · Does the committee control the selection Not clearly stated; x For private -- -- of auditors? differs from bank banks to bank · Does the committee chair attend shareholder Not clearly stated; -- meetings, and is the chair available to differs from Not clearly RBI has Not clearly Not clear address questions on the audit? bank to bank stated but directed stated but expected, expected, as chair as chair is a is a director director 3.2.2 External auditors · Has the bank appointed a reputed and -- experienced external auditor? · Does the bank's auditor rotation policy conform -- to the requirements set by the regulator? 3 years, 3 times only 3 years 3 years 5 years · Does the auditor perform any nonaudit services (under separate x x -- x x x for the bank? terms of reference) x a a · Are local auditing rules and practices in line ROSC -- ROSC with international standards and practices? Banks to Update needed comply with IAS; in certain areas see 3.1.1 Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 3.2.3 Internal auditor · Has the bank appointed a qualified internal auditor? -- · Is the internal auditor independent? Does he report to the audit -- committee, board of directors, or other governing authorities? · Does the internal auditing program include clearly defined ROSCa -- policies, processes, and metrics as performance benchmarks? · Does the internal auditor provide periodic reports on the risk x -- management, control, and governance processes to the audit committee? -- · If so, what is the frequency of such reports? Depends on BOD Quarterly Depends Annual Quarterly Not specified Differs from of each bank on bank bank to bank Source: See appendix table A4a.4. a. ROSC = Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes. GAAP = generally accepted accounting standards, IAS = International Accounting Standard, IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standard, -- = not available, = yes, x = no. Appendix 4A. Corporate Governance Matrix 305 306 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A4a.4 Board Structure and Effectiveness Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 4.1 Role and effectiveness 4.1.1 Structure · What is the average structure of the board (unitary, two tier, or hybrid)? Hybrid Unitary Unitary Unitary Unitary Hybrid Unitary Hybrid · What is the average size of the board? 3­9 13 Not less than 5 8­12 7­10 5­9 7 ministers 5­11 · Are there minimum qualification requirements for appointment of board x members by law, regulation, and recommended practice? 4.1.2 Role and responsibility · Is the scope of the powers and responsibilities of the board clearly defined? · Are tasks and objectives individually allocated to board members, x x x Defined including the chair and the board secretary? by BOD · Does the board have a process to identify all the laws and regulations x Depends on bank it must comply with? · Is there a process in place for director induction, training, and x x x continuing education? Orientation courses (SBP prior approval needed) 4.1.3 For two-tier boards, do key responsibilities include the following? Corporate n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -- n.a. Direction on (Please specify whether required by law or regulation or governance corporate recommended by a code.) regulation and governance banking laws issued by · Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy and major plan of action address these CBSL · Developing risk policy requirements requiring BOD to be · Drawing up business plans responsible · Setting performance objectives for these issues · Monitoring implementation and corporate performance · Overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions, and divestitures Table A4a.4 Board Structure and Effectiveness Question Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 4.2 Compensation 4.2.1 Determination of board remuneration · Is there a law or regulation that sets board remuneration? x x x x · What role do shareholders play in determining board Approve it -- Depends on Approve it in Not specified Approve it at Approve it at Varies from remuneration? at AGM bank private sector AGM AGM bank to bank banks · Who sets remuneration for the CEO? BOD & BOD, with BB BOD Government for BOD BOD, approve BOD Varies from shareholders approval public banks, it at AGM bank to bank shareholders for private banks 4.2.2 Does the board of directors receive some Varies from x x Executive Corporate x Varies from performance-based compensation in the form bank to bank directors get governance As per bank to bank of an annual cash bonus, stock, or the like? performance code specifies, company bonus for but depends ordinance; achieving on bank approved at targets from AGM March 2006; public sector banks pay performance Appendix 4A. Corporate Governance Matrix 307 bonus only from 2006 and only to full-time executive directors 4.2.3 Do banks disclose the board's compensation? · If so, is disclosure aggregate or detailed? x x -- Aggregate Public, Detailed Detailed Aggregate aggregate; private, detailed Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years). Note: For definitions of acronyms and abbreviations, see the list at the beginning of the report. a. The ROSC Report provides information that is contradictory to questionnaire responses (for Bangladesh, see World Bank 2003; for Nepal, see World Bank 2005a). -- = not available. n.a. = not applicable. 308 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Appendix 4B. Status of Corporate Governance of Banks in South Asian Countries, 2008 Afghanistan Da Afghanistan Bank issued a regulation on corporate governance in 2005, but it is limited to specifying responsibilities, qualifications, and the like for banks' boards of supervisors and management boards. Although most other areas are broadly covered by the banking law, comprehensive guidelines need to be issued to strengthen the institutional capacity of the banking sector. Moreover, while the banking law requires commercial banks to follow international accounting and auditing standards, the lack of local standard-setting bodies hampers transparency and enforceability. Bangladesh Bangladesh Bank has issued several key guidelines for banks, but they remain at the development stage. Corporate governance needs to be clearly defined and standardized so that market discipline would be improved. In particular, the guidelines need to be augmented by legal provisions governing beneficial ownership, minority shareholder rights, the remuneration of directors, and the roles and responsibilities of external and internal auditors. Bangladesh also needs to work toward full conformity with international accounting and auditing standards. And while the regulatory authorities have started moving ahead with the process of infusing the banking system with a corporate governance culture and educating shareholders about their rights and responsibilities, much more needs to be done in this area. Bhutan The Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan (RMA) issued prudential regulations relating to corporate governance in 2002. These cover such areas as reporting requirements, submission of annual accounts, guidelines for compliance officers, dividends and reserves, regulations for directors and CEOs, and share ownership of banks and nonbank financial institutions. But Bhutan lacks a code of corporate governance or specific guidelines for banks. Developing a corporate governance code for banks and streamlining accounting and auditing procedures are key areas on which the RMA needs to focus. India The Reserve Bank of India has issued guidelines that are both comprehensive and laudable. Yet several areas need further review, including corporate governance issues relating to government ownership of banks as well as harmonization of standards and codes. Revision of statutes and guidelines should be undertaken to improve transparency and consistency. In addition, given recent events in the international arena, performance-based compensation mechanisms should be reviewed carefully, and the monitoring of performance levels discussed. Maldives Maldives has taken important steps by issuing a corporate governance code as well as corporate governance regulations for banks. Since these were issued very recently, it is still too early to assess their effectiveness. But among the issues that need to be addressed are the heavy government ownership, voting procedures, minority shareholder rights, compliance with guidelines and standards, and transparency and disclosure principles with an emphasis on accounting and auditing standards. The recently established local accounting body needs to be further strengthened, and compliance with international standards pursued. Developing governance practices and compliance would further improve transparency and accountability. Nepal Corporate governance is an area needing immediate attention in Nepal. While Nepal Rastra Bank has issued detailed guidelines for banks, the guidelines need to be broadened to include investor rights and disclosure requirements, beneficial ownership, and the responsibilities of auditors. A key improvement would be better adherence to international accounting and auditing standards. Weak corporate governance in some private sector banks is a matter of growing concern because of the intense competition and high-risk activity being observed in the market. And while guidelines have been issued, compliance by banks is low. Governance standards need to be improved, and compliance ensured through effective enforcement. And banks need be encouraged to undertake more meaningful implementation of the guidelines. Pakistan The State Bank of Pakistan has issued a comprehensive handbook on the code of corporate governance for banks. In addition, in late 2005 Pakistan established the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance to further strengthen the corporate governance culture by providing training and building awareness. Still, some areas need review, including disclosures on beneficial ownership, safeguards on stakeholders' rights, transfer of ownership and management, and competitive compensation packages. Compliance and enforcement are two other areas that need further review. Compliance is key, and the success of governance procedures depends largely on the commitment of banks, which should go beyond simple compliance with legal requirements. Regulatory surveillance and enforcement are equally important. Sri Lanka The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has issued a code of corporate governance for banks and other financial institutions. The guidelines are mandatory. But some areas need to be reviewed to make the guidelines more comprehensive and effective. Among these areas are stakeholder rights, special voting rights, minority shareholder rights, the rights of shareholders to vote on bank operations, and regulatory and government control of share transactions. In addition, disclosure requirements need to be expanded, and compliance and enforcement improved. Equally important is to encourage banks to incorporate the best practices of corporate governance. Sri Lanka has made credit rating mandatory for banks and implemented Basel II guidelines, moves that would also support better corporate governance. Sources: Corporate governance questionnaire responses received from South Asian supervisory authorities; Indian Banks' Association 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; RBI 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, Annual Report (various years). Appendix 5. Payment Systems in Place in South Asian Countries 309 Appendix 5. Payment Systems in Place in South Asian Countries Real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system Retail payment system Afghanistan No RTGS system One system for both large- and small-value transactions Partially automated gross settlement system The Afghanistan Clearing and Settlement System is operated by Da Afghanistan Bank. Its services are offered to commercial banks and to banks' clients. Bangladesh No RTGS system End-of-day net settlement system Bangladesh Bank (BB) is working toward a Manual clearing system strategy for modernizing the payment systems BB allows telegraphic transfer (TT) discounting and implementing an RTGS system in the future. facilities to scheduled banks against the collateral The National Payment Systems Council was of government securities. formed in 2007. Installation of the Bangladesh Automated Clearing House (BACH), with an automated check processing system and electronic fund transfer network, has started in BB. Bhutan No RTGS system One system for both large- and small-value transactions End-of-day net settlement system Automated clearing system The Bhutan Electronic Clearing House is operated by the Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan (RMA). A check truncation system using magnetic ink character recognition (MICR), operated through the clearinghouse, was launched in January 2007. The RMA, with financial assistance from the World Bank, is undertaking a project aimed at developing an efficient payment system for Bhutan. India The RTGS system, in operation since March Small- or retail-value payment systems 2004, is primarily for large-value transactions End-of-day net settlement system (the minimum threshold is Rs 1 lakh, or Rs 100,000). Automated and manual clearing systems The number of RTGS-enabled bank branches The retail payment system includes automated check stood at 55,006 on March 31, 2009, with 11,494 clearing (MICR and non-MICR), retail electronic fund branches added to the RTGS network in 2008/09. transfer, and card payments. Some 71 MICR check processing centers operate in the country. Where setting up MICR check processing was found to be nonviable (the case in 1,064 clearinghouses), the settlement operations have been computerized so that settlement is done electronically even though the instruments are still sorted manually. (Table continues on next page) 310 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Appendix 5. Payment Systems in Place in South Asian Countries (continued) Real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system Retail payment system High-value clearing is available at 24 major locations in the country. For enhancement of the efficiency of the paper- based clearing system, a check truncation system was implemented in February 2008 as a pilot project with the 10 banks in the National Capital Region. Electronic fund transfer systems include the electronic clearing service, electronic fund transfer, and national electronic fund transfer. Maldives No RTGS system One system for both large- and small-value transactions The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) is working toward implementing an RTGS system End-of-day net settlement system as part of the mobile phone banking project, Manual clearing system initiated in 2009 to introduce branchless banking. In addition to an RTGS system, the mobile phone banking project is expected to implement several other systems: an automated clearinghouse (ACH) system, a mobile payment system, and an electronic fund transfer point-of-sale/ATM (EFTPOS/ATM) switch system. Nepal No RTGS system One system for both large- and small-value transactions Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) is working to formulate and implement a payment system End-of-day net settlement system master plan, including implementation of an Manual clearing system RTGS system and a script security settlement system. More than 10 check clearinghouses operate at regional and district levels for clearing and settling transactions relating to paper-based instruments such as checks, drafts, and payment orders. NRB manages all clearinghouses, which still run with entirely manual systems. Pakistan The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) launched an Small- or retail-value payment systems RTGS system, the Pakistan Real Time Interbank End-of-day net settlement system Settlement Mechanism (PRISM), in July 2008. The system is designed to handle all large- Automated clearing system value payments in Pakistan, including interbank money and securities market transactions, the The National Institutional Facilitation Technologies domestic leg of foreign exchange transactions, (NIFT) network serves more than 4,500 branches of and net settlement positions from retail and 40 banks (including the SBP) in 100 major cities of bank card clearings. Pakistan. Sri Lanka The Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Small- or retail-value payment systems established an RTGS system, which it operates, End-of-day net settlement system in September 2003 for processing large-value, time-critical fund transfers. Automated clearing system For securities settlement, the CBSL established A check-based retail payment system is operated by and operates LankaSecure, which consists LankaClear Pvt. Ltd. and jointly owned by the CBSL of a scripless securities settlement system and commercial banks. and scripless securities depository system. LankaSecure maintains central records of The Sri Lanka Interbank Payment System (SLIPS, ownership and transfers securities between owned and operated by LankaClear) facilitates security holders' accounts. It also handles interbank transfer of retail payments. government securities in scripless form. A U.S. dollar clearing system is operated by a The CBSL operates the RTGS system and commercial bank. LankaSecure as an integrated system, known A check imaging and truncation system automated as LankaSettle. retail payments, reducing the time for check payment and settlement from about T+10 to T+1. Sources: South Asian central banks, securities and exchange commissions and boards, and stock exchanges. Appendix 6. Annual Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 311 Appendix 6. Annual Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2004­08 Table A6.1 Annual Ranking on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2004 Dimension Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Access to finance 8 32 23 27 43 16 24 43 Rank 8 3 6 4 1 7 5 1 Performance and efficiency 6 12 27 33 46 21 34 33 Rank 8 7 5 3 1 6 2 3 Financial stability 9 25 34 42 30 12 35 27 Rank 8 6 3 1 4 7 2 5 Capital market development 6 28 19 46 15 27 38 35 Rank 8 4 6 1 7 5 2 3 Market concentration and competitiveness 6 36 15 43 26 35 28 27 Rank 8 2 7 1 6 3 4 5 Payment systems development 9 18 18 26 12 12 8 47 Rank 7 3 3 2 5 5 8 1 Savings mobilization 13 25 28 38 31 23 22 23 Rank 8 4 3 1 2 5 7 5 Total aggregate score 57 176 164 255 203 146 189 235 Overall rank 8 5 6 1 3 7 4 2 Source: Authors' calculations based on data from appendixes 2 and 4. Note: No ranking is shown for corporate governance, as data for all eight countries are available only for 2008. Table A6.2 Annual Ranking on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2005 Dimension Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Access to finance 6 26 22 35 45 15 24 43 Rank 8 4 6 3 1 7 5 2 Performance and efficiency 6 22 25 26 46 23 39 29 Rank 8 7 5 4 1 6 2 3 Financial stability 8 24 38 42 26 11 35 30 Rank 8 6 2 1 5 7 3 4 Capital market development 6 30 17 47 16 26 36 36 Rank 8 4 6 1 7 5 2 2 Market concentration and competitiveness 6 36 14 45 28 31 28 28 Rank 8 2 7 1 4 3 4 4 Payment systems development 10 17 19 26 10 12 9 46 Rank 6 4 3 2 6 5 8 1 Savings mobilization 13 27 21 38 21 25 24 28 Rank 8 3 6 1 6 4 5 2 Total aggregate score 55 182 156 259 192 143 195 240 Overall rank 8 5 6 1 4 7 3 2 Source: Authors' calculations based on data from appendixes 2 and 4. Note: No ranking is shown for corporate governance, as data for all eight countries are available only for 2008. 312 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 Table A6.3 Annual Ranking on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2006 Dimension Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Access to finance 6 27 23 35 45 14 23 43 Rank 8 4 5 3 1 7 5 2 Performance and efficiency 15 23 21 21 46 24 37 29 Rank 8 5 6 6 1 4 2 3 Financial stability 15 22 34 37 32 10 34 30 Rank 7 6 2 1 4 8 2 5 Capital market development 6 30 18 46 15 28 35 37 Rank 8 4 6 1 7 5 3 2 Market concentration and competitiveness 6 36 15 44 28 33 28 26 Rank 7 2 6 1 4 3 4 5 Payment systems development 14 17 18 25 11 11 21 45 Rank 6 5 4 2 7 7 3 1 Savings mobilization 13 27 25 39 20 24 24 25 Rank 8 2 3 1 7 5 5 3 Total aggregate score 75 182 154 247 197 144 202 235 Overall rank 8 5 6 1 4 7 3 2 Source: Authors' calculations based on data from appendixes 2 and 4. Note: No ranking is shown for corporate governance, as data for all eight countries are available only for 2008. Table A6.4 Annual Ranking on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2007 Dimension Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Access to finance 6 27 23 35 46 14 23 42 Rank 8 4 5 3 1 7 5 2 Performance and efficiency 13 26 28 18 42 20 35 33 Rank 8 5 4 7 1 6 2 3 Financial stability 30 21 32 36 28 8 34 27 Rank 4 7 3 1 5 8 2 6 Capital market development 6 29 16 47 22 29 35 32 Rank 8 4 7 1 6 4 2 3 Market concentration and competitiveness 6 40 13 44 28 33 26 21 Rank 8 2 7 1 4 3 5 6 Payment systems development 13 17 17 26 12 11 22 44 Rank 6 4 4 2 7 8 3 1 Savings mobilization 18 27 25 38 15 25 25 24 Rank 7 2 3 1 8 3 3 6 Total aggregate score 92 187 154 244 193 140 200 223 Overall rank 8 5 6 1 4 7 3 2 Source: Authors' calculations based on data from appendixes 2 and 4. Note: No ranking is shown for corporate governance, as data for all eight countries are available only for 2008. Appendix 6. Annual Rankings on the Getting Finance Indicators 313 Table A6.5 Annual Ranking on the Getting Finance Indicators for South Asian Countries, 2008 Dimension Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Access to finance 6 26 24 35 46 15 22 42 Rank 8 4 5 3 1 7 6 2 Performance and efficiency 22 24 21 17 43 31 29 29 Rank 6 5 7 8 1 2 3 3 Financial stability 37 22 29 40 19 12 31 26 Rank 2 6 4 1 7 8 3 5 Capital market development 6 30 17 47 22 30 33 29 Rank 8 3 7 1 6 3 2 5 Market concentration and competitiveness 6 40 19 42 28 33 25 23 Rank 8 2 7 1 4 3 5 6 Payment systems development 15 17 18 24 11 11 34 43 Rank 6 5 4 3 7 7 2 1 Savings mobilization 12 30 17 39 15 27 23 26 Rank 8 2 6 1 7 3 5 4 Corporate governance 25 28 24 31 21 27 35 31 Rank 6 4 7 2 8 5 1 2 Total aggregate score 129 217 169 275 205 186 232 249 Overall rank 8 4 7 1 5 6 3 2 Source: Authors' calculations based on data from appendixes 2 and 4. References ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2009a. 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Web Sites Consulted Central Banks Bangladesh Bank, http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/ Bank of Canada, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/index.html Bank of England, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ Bank of Italy, http://www.bancaditalia.it/ Bank of Japan, http://www.boj.or.jp/en/index.htm Bank of Korea, http://eng.bok.or.kr/eng/engMain.action Bank of Thailand, http://www.bot.or.th/English/Pages/BOTDefault.aspx References 319 Central Bank of Malaysia, http://www.bnm.gov.my/ Central Bank of Sri Lanka, http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/ Hong Kong [China] Monetary Authority, http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/ Maldives Monetary Authority, http://www.mma.gov.mv/laws.php Nepal Rastra Bank, http://www.nrb.org.np/ People's Bank of China, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/ Reserve Bank of Australia, http://www.rba.gov.au/ Reserve Bank of New Zealand, http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/ State Bank of Pakistan, http://www.sbp.org.pk/ U.S. Federal Reserve Board, http://www.federalreserve.gov/ Others The Clearing House (CHIPS), http://www.chips.org/home.php Colombo Stock Exchange, http://www.cse.lk Hong Kong [China] Association of Banks, http://www.hkab.org.hk/index.jsp Korea Federation of Banks, http://www.kfb.or.kr/kfb_eng_09/index.htm Maldives Attorney General's Office, http://www.agoffice.gov.mv/V2/Dhivehi/IndexDhi.asp Maldives Capital Market Development Authority, http://www.cmda.gov.mv/laws-and- regulations/ New Zealand Bankers' Association, http://www.nzba.org.nz/ Securities and Exchange Board of India, http://www.sebi.gov.in/ Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh, http://www.secbd.org/ Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, http://www.secp.gov.pk/ Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka, http://www.sec.gov.lk/ Securities Board of Nepal, http://www.sebonp.com/ Statistics New Zealand, http://www.stats.govt.nz/ UK Payments Administration, http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/ World Federation of Exchanges, http://www.world-exchanges.org/ Index Boxes, figures, notes, and tables are indicated by b, f, n, and t, respectively. A savings mobilization in, 31 access to finance, 2­3 stability, financial, 29­30 benchmark comparisons, 116f, 124f African Development Bank Group, 201b demographic penetration, 3, 139­140 annual rankings, 104­106, 105t findings and observations regarding, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 130 Nations), 201b geographic penetration, 3, 6f, 140­141 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 201b guide to underlying data, 139­141 assets and asset quality in Afghanistan, 28 commercial banking assets to GDP in Bangladesh, 35­36 ratio, 5, 148 in Bhutan, 42­43 financial stability measured in terms of, in India, 49­50 4, 144 (See also stability, financial) in Maldives, 59­60, 107f, 113n1 prudential regulations regarding, 21­22 in Nepal, 68­69 Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Pakistan, 78 (ASEAN), 201b in Sri Lanka, 89­90, 107f ATMs (automated teller machines), access rankings, 9, 106, 107f to finance via, 3, 12n1, 140, 141 account ratios, 3, 140. See also access to Australia. See benchmark comparisons finance automated teller machines (ATMs), access ADB (Asian Development Bank), 201b to finance via, 3, 12n1, 140, 141. See Afghanistan, 26­33. See also specific also access to finance topics, e.g. access to finance, which may contain general information B pertinent to Afghanistan Bangladesh, 33­41. See also specific topics, access to finance in, 28 e.g. access to finance, which may Basel II Capital Accord, 29 contain general information capital market development in, 30 pertinent to Bangladesh corporate governance in, 31­33 access to finance in, 35­36 global financial crisis affecting, 202, Basel II Capital Accord, 35, 37 206, 210, 213 capital market development in, 37 in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f corporate governance in, 39­41 inflation in, 26, 31 deposit insurance scheme in, 35, 213 key economic indicators, 27t global financial crisis in, 201, 202, market concentration and 206, 207t, 210, 213 competitiveness in, 30 in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f microfinance in, 12t, 28 inflation in, 34, 38 opium trade, 26, 98n1 key economic indicators, 27t payment systems development in, 30­31 market concentration and performance and efficiency in, 29f competitiveness in, 35f, 37, 110f prudential regulations, 161­163 microfinance in, 12t, 36 321 322 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 payment systems development in, 38 Bhutan, 41­47. See also specific topics, performance and efficiency in, 36 e.g. access to finance, which may prudential regulations, 163­170 contain general information savings mobilization in, 38­39 pertinent to Bhutan stability, financial, 36­37 access to finance in, 42­43 bank branches, access to finance via, 3, capital market development in, 43­44 12n1, 139­141 corporate governance in, 45­47 Basel Committee principles on corporate global financial crisis in, 202, 206, governance, 7, 153t 210, 213 Basel I Capital Accord, 18­19, 29, high liquidity position, 42f, 43 50, 70, 210 in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f Basel II Capital Accord Indian economy affecting, 41 Afghanistan, 29 inflation in, 41, 45 Bangladesh, 35, 37 key economic indicators, 27t benchmark comparisons, 118 market concentration and Bhutan, 43 competitiveness in, 44 findings and observations regarding, microfinance in, 43 131 payment systems development in, 38 global financial crisis and, 210 performance and efficiency in, 43 implementation of framework, 7, prudential regulations, 170­173 15, 16, 17­20 savings mobilization in, 44­45 India, 50 stability, financial, 43, 113n2 Nepal, 68, 70, 74 bond markets Pakistan, 77, 80 capital market development, domestic SAARC and, 24n4 bond market ratios as measure Sri Lanka, 88, 91, 98 of, 4, 145 (See also capital market benchmark comparisons, 115­127 development) access to finance, 116f, 124f in India, 51­52 capital market development, in South Asia generally, 25 119f, 125f branches, access to finance via, 3, 12n1, development dimensions/getting 139­141. See also access to finance finance indicators data sources and notes, 296­298 C tables, by country, 274­295t Canada. See benchmark comparisons expansion of economies used for, 7, capital adequacy 8b, xi Basel II Framework, 7, 15, 18­20 market concentration and financial stability, ratios as indicator of, competitiveness, 119­120, 4, 143 (See also stability, financial) 120f, 126f global financial crisis and, 210, 211f OECD economies, use of, 2, 7, 8b, 115, prudential regulations regarding, 16­18 122­127, 123t, 124­127f capital market development, 4 of individual economies, 122­127, benchmark comparisons, 119f, 125f 123t, 124­127f domestic bond market ratios as payment systems development, measure of, 4, 145 120­121, 121f, 126f findings and observations regarding, performance and efficiency, 117f, 124f 132 remittances, 121, 122f, 123t, 127f guide to underlying data, 145­146 savings mobilization, 121­122, in Afghanistan, 30 122f, 127f in Bangladesh, 37 SEANZA group, use of, 8b, 115 in Bhutan, 43­44 selected Asian economies, use of, 7, 8b, in India, 51­52, 110f 115, 122­127, 123t, 124­127f in Maldives, 61 stability, financial, 117­119, 118f, 125f in Nepal, 71­72 Index 323 in Pakistan, 81 India, credit growth in, 52 in Sri Lanka, 92 private credit extended by banks rankings, 10, 102, 105f, 107, 110f global financial crisis and, 208, stock market ratios as measure of, 4, 146 209f, 214 CAR (capital adequacy ratios). See capital market concentration and adequacy competitiveness, as measure of, 5, China, 201b. See also benchmark 148 (See also market concentration comparisons and competitiveness) commercial banking assets to GDP Sri Lanka, credit growth in, 93 ratio, 5, 148. See also market credit information bureaus concentration and competitiveness in Bangladesh, 35 Committee on Payment and Settlement in India, 48 Systems (CPSS), Bank for in Maldives, 58­59, 61 International Settlements, 5 in Nepal, 66 competition. See market concentration in Pakistan, 78 and competitiveness in Sri Lanka, 88 Compilation Guide, definition and concepts of ratios, 139­153 D compilation of data, 155 data compilation, 155 concentration of market. See market data presentation, 157 concentration and competitiveness debt restructuring, prudential regulations corporate governance, 6­7 for, 23­24 Basel Committee principles, 7, 153t demographic penetration, 3, 139­140. findings and observations regarding, See also access to finance 134­135 deposit insurance schemes guide to underlying data, 152­153 global financial crisis and, 213­214 in Afghanistan, 31­33 in Bangladesh, 35, 213 in Bangladesh, 39­41 in India, 48, 213 in Bhutan, 45­47 in Sri Lanka, 88­89 in India, 54­57 Nepal's lack of, 66 in Maldives, 63­65 development dimensions/getting finance in Nepal, 73­75 indicators, 2­7. See also specific in Pakistan, 83­87, 112f dimensions and indicators in Sri Lanka, 96­98 choice of, 155­156 OECD good governance practices, 7, ranking methodology and, 152, 153t 155­156 questionnaire responses, by country, relative performance on, 102, 105f 299­307t tables rankings, 11 benchmark economies, by country, five-year average, 109, 112f 274­295t methodology, 157 South Asian economies, by country relative composite performance, 102, and year, 242­273t 105f directed lending to priority sectors, 23 status, by country, 308t domestic bond market ratios, 4, 145 Countercyclical Support Facility, 201b drug trade in Afghanistan, 26, 98n1 CPSS (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems), Bank for E International Settlements, 5 economic crisis and slowdown. See global credit financial crisis asset quality measured in terms of, 4, efficiency. See performance and efficiency 144 electronic fund transfer (EFT) Bangladesh, credit growth in, 38 in Bangladesh, 38 exposure limits, 22 in Bhutan, 44 324 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 in India, 52­53 in India, 47­48, 51, 56­57, 200, 202, in Maldives, 62 206, 207t, 210, 213 European Bank for Reconstruction and in Maldives, 57, 200, 201, 202, 206, Development, 201b 208, 210, 213 exposure limits, 22 in Nepal, 202, 206, 208, 210 in Pakistan, 76, 200, 202, 206, 207t, F 208, 210, 213 financial systems in South Asia, 1­12, in Sri Lanka, 87, 200, 202, 204, 206, xi­xii 207t, 208, 210, 213 bank dominance of, 25 institutional and donor response to, benchmarks (See benchmark 201b comparisons) recovery from, 202­206, 205f country perspective on, 25­26 (See also repercussions for financial systems and specific countries) regulation, 1, 161, 206­214, 209f, development dimensions/getting 211f, 212f finance indicators, 2­7 (See also governance. See corporate governance development dimensions/getting Group of Twenty, 201b finance indicators) findings and observations regarding, H 129­136 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). See global financial crisis, repercussions of, also market concentration and 1, 161, 206­214, 209f, 211f, 212f competitiveness (See also global financial crisis) as measure of market concentration methodology for analyzing, 7­8, 101, and competitiveness, 5, 146­147 155­157, 158­160t (See also market concentration and microfinance, 11­12, 12t competitiveness) prudential regulations for, 15­24 (See benchmark comparisons, 120 also prudential regulations) defined, 12n2 rankings, 8­11, 101­113 (See also in Bangladesh, 35f, 37 rankings) in Bhutan, 44 fiscal stimulus packages, 206, 207t in India, 52 France. See benchmark comparisons in Maldives, 61­62 in Nepal, 72 G in Pakistan, 81 geographic penetration, 3, 6f, 140­141. See in Sri Lanka, 93 also access to finance high-value clearing German Agency for Technical in India, 53 Cooperation, 90 in Pakistan, 82 Germany. See benchmark comparisons Hong Kong, China. See benchmark getting finance indicators. See comparisons development dimensions/getting finance indicators I global financial crisis, 199­214 ICAB (Institute of Chartered Accountants background and overview, 200 of Bangladesh), 40 banking and, 208­212, 209f, 211­212f IFC (International Finance Corporation), fiscal stimulus packages, 206, 207t 61, 66, 84 growth deceleration due to, 201­202, IMF (International Monetary Fund), 76, 203­204f 87, 99n14, 200, 201b impact on South Asia, 135­136, 200­206 income recognition, 22 in Afghanistan, 202, 206, 210, 213 India, 47­57. See also specific topics, in Bangladesh, 201, 202, 206, e.g. access to finance, which may 207t, 210, 213 contain general information in Bhutan, 202, 206, 210, 213 pertinent to India Index 325 access to finance in, 49­50 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 76, Basel II Capital Accord, 50 87, 99n14, 200, 201b Bhutan economy affected by, 41 Islamic banking in Pakistan, 78, 79t capital market development in, 51­52, Italy. See benchmark comparisons 110f corporate governance in, 54­57 J deposit insurance scheme, 48, 213 Japan, 201b. See also benchmark economic growth in, 47 comparisons global financial crisis in, 47­48, 51, 56­57, 200, 202, 206, 207t, 210, 213 K in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f K-bank concentration ratios, 5, 147. See inflation in, 41, 47, 54 also market concentration and key economic indicators, 27t competitiveness market concentration and Korea, Republic of, 201b. See also competitiveness in, 52, 110f benchmark comparisons microfinance in, 12t, 49­50 payment systems development in, 52­54 L performance and efficiency in, 50 LankaClear, 94­95, 100n25 prudential regulations, 173­180 legislation and regulations, prudential. See savings mobilization in, 54, 111f prudential regulations stability, financial, 48f, 50­51, 109f Lehman Brothers, collapse of, 200 India-Nepal Remittance Corridor, 73 leverage ratio, 4, 143. See also stability, indicators. See development dimensions of financial financial systems in South Asia liquidity inflation Bhutan, high liquidity position in Afghanistan, 26, 31 in, 42f, 43 in Bangladesh, 34, 38 financial stability measured in terms of, in Bhutan, 41, 45 4, 144 (See also stability, financial) in India, 41, 47, 54 global financial crisis and, 208, 209f in Maldives, 57, 59, 62, 63 Maldives, high liquidity position in, 61, in Nepal, 23, 65­66, 73 98­99n7 in Pakistan, 76, 83, 99n14 prudential regulations regarding, 23 in Sri Lanka, 87, 95­96 Liquidity Program for Growth real deposit interest rates affected by, 11 Sustainability, 201b Institute of Chartered Accountants of loan to deposit ratio, 6, 151­152, 208. See Bangladesh (ICAB), 40 also savings mobilization Institute of Chartered Accountants of loans, nonperforming. See nonperforming India, 56 loans Inter-American Development Bank, 201b interest rates M global financial crisis and, 210 magnetic ink character recognition net interest margin, 3, 142, 210, 211f (MICR), 44, 52 (See also performance Malaysia. See benchmark comparisons and efficiency) Maldives, 57­65. See also specific topics, real deposit interest rate, 6, 11, 151 (See e.g. access to finance, which may also savings mobilization) contain general information International Accounting Standards, 15, 25 pertinent to Maldives international benchmarking. See access to finance in, 59­60, 107f, 113n1 benchmark comparisons capital market development in, 61 International Finance Corporation (IFC), corporate governance in, 63­65 61, 66, 84 global financial crisis affecting, 57, 200, International Financial Reporting 201, 202, 206, 208, 210, 213 Standards, 56 high liquidity position in, 61, 98­99n7 326 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f Multilateralised Chiang Mai Initiative, inflation in, 57, 59, 62, 63 201b key economic indicators, 27t market concentration and N competitiveness in, 61­62 Nepal, 65­75. See also specific topics, payment systems development in, 62 e.g. access to finance, which may performance and efficiency in, 60, 108f contain general information prudential regulations, 180­182 pertinent to Nepal savings mobilization in, 62­63 access to finance in, 68­69 stability, financial, 58f, 60­61 Basel II Capital Accord, 68, 70, 74 tourism and fisheries sectors, capital market development in, 71­72 dominance of, 57, 60 corporate governance in, 73­75 tsunami of 2004 affecting, 57 deposit insurance scheme, lack of, 66 market concentration and global financial crisis in, 202, competitiveness, 4­5 206, 208, 210 benchmark comparisons, 119­120, in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f 120f, 126f inflation in, 23, 65­66, 73 commercial banking assets to key economic indicators, 27t GDP ratio, 5, 148 market concentration and findings and observations regarding, competitiveness in, 72, 113n3 132­133 microfinance in, 12t guide to underlying data, 146­148 payment systems development in, 72­73 HHI as measure of, 5, 146­147 performance and efficiency in, 57f, 69 in Afghanistan, 30 prudential regulations, 182­185 in Bangladesh, 35f, 37, 110f savings mobilization in, 62­63 in Bhutan, 44 stability, financial, 69­70 in India, 52, 109f net interest margin, 3, 142, 210, 211f. See in Maldives, 61­62 also performance and efficiency in Nepal, 72, 113n3 New Zealand. See benchmark comparisons in Pakistan, 81­82 nonperforming loans in Sri Lanka, 93 financial stability, measures of, 4, K-bank concentration ratios, 5, 147 143­144 (See also stability, financial) private credit extended by banks as global financial crisis and, 210, 212f measure of, 5, 148 recognition of, 21 rankings, 10, 107­108, 110f May, Ernesto, xii O methodology, 7­8, 101, 155­157, 158­160t OECD. See Organisation for Economic MICR (magnetic ink character Co-operation and Development recognition), 44, 52 operating cost ratio, 3, 142. See also microfinance in South Asia, 11­12, 12t performance and efficiency Afghanistan, 12t, 28 opium trade in Afghanistan, 26, 98n1 Bangladesh, 12t, 36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation Bhutan, 43 and Development (OECD) India, 12t, 49­50 as benchmark economies, 2, 7, 8b, 115, Pakistan, 78 122­127, 123t, 124­127f Sri Lanka, 90 good governance practices, 7, 152, 153t money supply ratios payment systems development, as P indicator of, 5­6, 148­149 (See also Pakistan, 75­87. See also specific topics, payment systems development) e.g. access to finance, which may savings mobilization, as indicator contain general information of, 6, 150­151 (See also savings pertinent to Pakistan mobilization) access to finance in, 78 Index 327 Basel II Capital Accord, 77, 80 operating cost ratio, 3, 142 capital market development in, 81 rankings, 9, 102, 105f, 106, 108f corporate governance in, 83­87, 112f recurring earning power, 3, 142­143 global financial crisis affecting, 76, 200, return on assets, 3, 142, 208, 211f 202, 206, 207t, 208, 210, 213 return on equity, 3, 141 in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f staff cost ratio, 3, 142 inflation in, 76, 83, 99n14 presentation of data, 157 Islamic banking in, 78, 79t priority sectors, directed lending to, 23 key economic indicators, 27t private credit extended by banks market concentration and global financial crisis and, 208, 209f, 214 competitiveness in, 81­82 market concentration and microfinance in, 11­12, 12t, 78 competitiveness, as measure of, 5, payment systems development in, 72­73 148 (See also market concentration performance and efficiency in, 76, and competitiveness) 77f, 78­79 prudential regulations, 15­24 prudential regulations, 185­192 asset quality, 21­22 savings mobilization in, 83 Basel II, implementation of, 7, 15, 16, stability, financial, 80­81 17­20 (See also Basel II Capital payment systems development, 5­6 Accord) benchmark comparisons, 120­121, capital adequacy, 16­18 121f, 126f commercial bank regulators, by country, findings and observations regarding, 15, 16t 133 debt restructuring, 23­24 guide to underlying data, 148­150 directed lending, 23 in Afghanistan, 30­31 exposure limits, 22 in Bangladesh, 38 global financial crisis, repercussions in Bhutan, 38 of, 1 in India, 52­54 income recognition, 22 in Maldives, 62 liquidity requirements, 23 in Nepal, 72­73 major policy developments, by country, in Pakistan, 72­73 161­198 in Sri Lanka, 88, 89f, 93­95, Afghanistan, 161­163 100n25, 111f Bangladesh, 163­170 money supply ratios, 5­6, 148­149 Bhutan, 170­173 rankings, 11, 102, 105f, 108­109, 111f India, 173­180 retail transactions, 6, 149­150 Maldives, 180­182 RTGS system, 6, 149, 150 Nepal, 182­185 systems in place, by country, 309­310t Pakistan, 185­192 performance and efficiency, 3 Sri Lanka, 192­198 benchmark comparisons, 117f, 124f reform in, 25 findings and observations regarding, table, country by country, 216­241t 130 write-off provisions, 22 global financial crisis and, 208­210 guide to underlying data, 141­143 R in Afghanistan, 29f rankings, 8­11, 101­113 in Bangladesh, 36 annual, 104­106, 105t, 311­313t in Bhutan, 43 composite, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f in India, 50 five-year average in Maldives, 60, 108f access to finance, 106, 107f in Nepal, 57f, 69 capital market development, 107, in Pakistan, 76, 77f, 78­79 110f in Sri Lanka, 90­91 composite scores, 158­160t net interest margin, 3, 142, 210, 211f corporate governance, 109, 112f 328 Getting Finance in South Asia 2010 market concentration and S competitiveness, 107­108, 110f SAARC (South Asian Association for payment systems development, Regional Cooperation), 24n4, 133 108­109, 111f SAARCFINANCE network, 24n4 performance and efficiency, Samurdhi banking societies, 90, 100n19 106, 108f Sanasa thrift and credit cooperatives, 90, savings mobilization, 108­109, 111f 100n19 stability, financial, 106­107, 109f savings mobilization, 6 methodology, 101, 156­157 benchmark comparisons, 121­122, real deposit interest rate, 6, 11, 151. See 122f, 127f also savings mobilization findings and observations regarding, real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system 133­134 Afghanistan's lack of, 30 global financial crisis, recovery from, findings and observations regarding, 204­206, 205f 133 guide to underlying data, 150­152 in Bangladesh, 38 in Afghanistan, 31 in India, 53 in Bangladesh, 38­39 in Maldives, 62 in Bhutan, 44­45 in Pakistan, 82­83 in India, 54, 111f in Sri Lanka, 93­95 in Maldives, 62­63 Nepal's lack of, 73 in Nepal, 62­63 payment systems development, as in Pakistan, 83 indicator of, 6, 149, 150 (See also in Sri Lanka, 95­96 payment systems development) loan to deposit ratio, 6, 151­152, 208 recurring earning power, 3, 142­143. See money supply ratios, 6, 150­151 also performance and efficiency rankings, 11, 108­109, 111f regulations, prudential. See prudential real deposit interest rate, 6, 11, 151 regulations remittances as indicator of, 6, 152 remittances (See also remittances) benchmark comparisons, 121, 122f, SEANZA (South East Asia, New Zealand, 123t, 127f and Australia) group, 8b, 115 findings and observations regarding, Singapore. See benchmark comparisons 133­134 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial global financial crisis, recovery from, Telecommunications (SWIFT), 30, 204­206, 205f 82, 94­95 in Bangladesh, 34, 38­39 South Asia in India, 47, 49, 54 financial systems in (See financial in Maldives, 63 systems in South Asia) in Nepal, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73 key economic indicators for countries in Pakistan, 76, 77, 78, 83 in, 27t in Sri Lanka, 87, 95 South Asian Association for Regional savings mobilization, as indicator of, 6, Cooperation (SAARC), 24n4, 133 152 (See also savings mobilization) South East Asia, New Zealand, and Republic of Korea, 201b. See also Australia (SEANZA) group, 8b, 115 benchmark comparisons speed clearing, in India, 53 retail transactions, 6, 149­150. See also Sri Lanka, 87­98. See also specific topics, payment systems development e.g. access to finance, which may return on assets, 3, 142, 208, 211f. See also contain general information performance and efficiency pertinent to Sri Lanka return on equity, 3, 141. See also access to finance in, 89­90, 107f performance and efficiency Basel II Capital Accord, 88, 91, 98 RTGS. See real-time gross settlement capital market development in, 92 (RTGS) system corporate governance in, 96­98 Index 329 deposit insurance scheme, 88­89 in Sri Lanka, 91­92 global financial crisis affecting, 87, 200, leverage ratio, 4, 143 202, 204, 206, 207t, 208, 210, 213 liquidity, measured in terms of, 4, 144 in rankings, 8­10, 102, 103t, 104f, 105f nonperforming loans, 4, 143­144 inflation in, 87, 95­96 rankings, 10, 106­107, 109f, 157 key economic indicators, 27t staff cost ratio, 3, 142. See also market concentration and performance and efficiency competitiveness in, 93 stimulus packages, 206, 207t microfinance in, 12t, 90 stock markets payment systems development in, 88, capital market development, stock 89f, 93­95, 100n25, 111f market ratios as measure of, performance and efficiency in, 90­91 4, 146 (See also capital market prudential regulations, 192­198 development) savings mobilization in, 95­96 in India, 51­52 stability, financial, 91­92 in South Asia generally, 25 stability, financial, 3­4 SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank assets and asset quality, measured in Financial Telecommunications), terms of, 4, 144 30, 82, 94­95 benchmark comparisons, 117­119, 118f, 125f T capital adequacy ratios as indicator of, Thailand. See benchmark comparisons 4, 143 tsunami of 2004, 57 findings and observations regarding, 130­132 U global financial crisis and, 208­210 United Kingdom. See benchmark guide to underlying data, 143­144 comparisons in Afghanistan, 29­30 United States, 201b. See also benchmark in Bangladesh, 36­37 comparisons in Bhutan, 43, 113n2 in India, 48f, 50­51, 109f W in Maldives, 58f, 60­61 worker remittances to GDP ratio, 6 in Nepal, 69­70 World Bank, 199, 201b, 203, xi in Pakistan, 80­81 write-off provisions, 22 ECO-AUDIT Environmental Benefits Statement The World Bank is committed to preserving Saved: endangered forests and natural resources. · 27 trees The Office of the Publisher has chosen to · 4 million British print Getting Finance in South Asia 2010: thermal units of Indicators and Analysis of the Commer- total energy cial Banking Sector on recycled paper with · 1,273 pounds of 30 percent postconsumer fiber in accordance greenhouse gases with the recommended standards for paper (CO2 equivalent) usage set by the Green Press Initiative, a · 6,131 pounds of nonprofit program supporting publishers in waste water using fiber that is not sourced from endan- · 372 pounds of gered forests. For more information, visit solid waste www.greenpressinitiative.org. New in the 2010 Edition: · A special feature on the impact of the global financial crisis · All South Asia Region countries now covered by the analysis; number of benchmark economies increased to 15 · Two new categories of indicators The commendable initiative taken by the World Bank to develop standardized indicators for measuring the performance and soundness of the financial sector in South Asia has, over the years, served to strengthen the financial risk assessment framework in the region. Since the launch of the first report five years ago, these indicators have been of immense help to supervisory authorities in South Asia, including the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, in monitoring vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the financial system and in drawing comparative analyses with regional counterparts. -- Ajith Nivard Cabraal Governor, Central Bank of Sri Lanka It is widely acknowledged that the Asian Crisis of 1997 ­ 98 triggered the need for better financial stability data sources, with indicators and analysis of the banking sector. Initiatives such as this report reinforce the fact that better data provision not only improves the functioning of financial institutions and markets but also leads to better-informed decisions. -- Mohibullah Safi First Deputy Governor, Da Afghanistan Bank This initiative is especially impressive given the difficulty of accessing comparable data in the South Asia region, especially those prepared based on uniform assumptions and using common methodologies. The addition of benchmark indicators for select high-income countries and a group of leading Asian countries is but one important feature of this report, because it provides a useful yardstick for assessing the performance and soundness of the South Asian financial sector from a global perspective. -- Md. Nazrul Huda Deputy Governor, Bangladesh Bank ISBN 978-0-8213-8057-4 SKU 18057