Diagnostic Report Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Kosovo © 2021 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This report is a product of the staff of The World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors or the governments they represent. The World Bank and GFDRR does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the author. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Cover photos (left to right): Aphoto1; pijoe; kali9. Back cover photos: left: Eak sikgun; center and right: REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photos Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 3 Acknowledgments This report and associated activities are financed by the European Union in the framework of the Western Balkans Disaster Risk Management Program, managed by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery and the World Bank. This document is one of five Ready2Respond (R2R) analysis reports commissioned by the World Bank and conducted by Prepared International (PPI) to assess the emergency preparedness and response capacities of five Western Balkan nations. Each report includes a summary of the findings and identifies key investment recommendations for each of the five R2R components. The full diagnostic report is included as annex 1; further details on data collection are to be found in annex 2. 4 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Table of Contents Abbreviations 5 Executive Summary 6 Introduction 8 This Report 8 Country Risk Profile 8 Methodology 9 Overall R2R Results 10 Component 1: Legal and Institutional Accountability 12 Component Overview 12 Component Conclusions 12 Key Investment Opportunities 14 Component 2: Information 15 Component Overview 15 Component Conclusions 15 Key Investment Opportunities 17 Component 3: Facilities 18 Component Overview 18 Component Conclusions 18 Key Investment Opportunities 20 Component 4: Equipment 21 Component Overview 21 Component Conclusions 21 Key Investment Opportunities 23 Component 5: Personnel 24 Component Overview 24 Component Conclusions 24 Key Investment Opportunities 26 Annex 1: Full Diagnostic Report 27 Annex 2: Interview Overview 55 Annex 3: References and Consulted Documents 56 Figure 1. Emergency Preparedness and Response System Core Components 9 Figure 2. Diagnostic Scores for Kosovo 11 Figure 3. Scoring for Legal and Institutional Accountability 12 Figure 4. Scoring for Information 17 Figure 5. Scoring for Facilities 18 Figure 6. Scoring for Equipment 22 Figure 7. Scoring for Personnel 26 Table 1. Average EP&R Component and Criterion Scores for Kosovo 10 Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 5 Abbreviations CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear DMIS Disaster Management Information System EMA Emergency Management Agency EOC emergency operations center EP&R emergency preparedness and response EU European Union GIS geographic information system hazmat hazardous material IPA DRAM Programme for Disaster Risk Assessment and Mapping JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency KEC Kosovo Energy Corporation MESP Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning MIAPA Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO nongovernmental organization OCEMA Operations Center of Emergency Management Agency PIA Pristina International Airport PPI Prepared International R2R Ready2Respond SOP standard operating procedure UNDP United Nations Development Programme UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs USAR urban search and rescue WASH water, sanitation, and hygiene 6 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Executive Summary I n 2020, the World Bank engaged Prepared International (PPI) to support the Western Balkan disaster risk management program by providing an assessment of current national and regional emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) capacities. PPI undertook country-specific assessments of EP&R capacity in five Western Balkan nations (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) using the Ready2Respond (R2R) diagnostic methodology. Based on these findings, PPI identified priority EP&R investments at country and regional levels. This report includes the assessment of Kosovo’s EP&R capacities and the associated priority investments; a more detailed investment report is published separately. The diagnostic is designed to be an objective, data-driven foundation to engage country counterparts in EP&R development projects. The methodology builds on five core components—legal and institutional frameworks, information, facilities, equipment, and personnel—which are further divided into 18 criteria, 72 indicators, and 360 attributes. Kosovo has an overall score of 174 out of 360. The country’s scores range widely across criteria and indicators, with the lowest scores received for information and for legal and institutional accountabilities, and the highest scores for facilities, equipment, and personnel. The diagnostic found that Kosovo’s EP&R system is relatively young and therefore missing several important elements of a fully mature system. Comprehensive investment in all components is therefore recommended, with particular attention to the redefinition of national-local relationships, which can be strengthened together with overall capacity building. Kosovo’s system for response to small-scale incidents is quite functional. However, the system needs strategic reinforcements so that it can prepare for and respond to larger-scale calamities and disasters, and so it can sustain further development. Better coordination between organizations, an emphasis on systemic planning and preparedness, and overall capacity building are priorities. Because of limited institutional memory and policy capacity, the system’s ability to transform investment into growth is relatively low. The system is orientated toward response and lacks the capacity to prepare for challenges related to climate change, pandemics, or other natural or man-made disasters. It also lacks the capacity to engage local community and grassroots organizations through private sector actors. The R2R diagnostic identified several gaps in structures, frameworks, and capacities. PPI recommends that before hazard-specific investments are made, investment should focus on the fundamental EP&R components—related to legislation, governance, and financial frameworks—so the country can respond to the main risks it faces: floods, earthquakes, and wildfires. At the same time, the risk environment also encompasses new challenges such as climate change, migration, and pandemics. The system needs to recognize these challenges, and to do so needs professional capacity building, as well as replacement and expansion of equipment, especially for basic search, rescue, and firefighting and communication technology. These changes will help Kosovo meet both existing and new challenges in a professional and coherent manner, while allowing the EP&R system to mature in a resilient and financially sustainable way. Kosovo has many good practices in its EP&R system; the current challenge is bringing them together so they strengthen one another. The most important goal should be the creation of a unified framework that will grow into a fully mature system. Kosovo’s foremost challenges include strengthening the connection between national and local levels, and cultivating professionalism within a system that will be supported by an engaged community, sound data management, and strong analytical capacities. Building academically based professional leadership capacities and fostering top-level decision-making abilities throughout the civil protection system are fundamental for systemic EP&R development. The separate investment plan includes three investment scenarios for a total of US$93 million, divided into short- term investments taking place in the first year (US$2.45 million), medium-term investments taking place over one to three years (US$49.92 million), and long-term investments taking place over more than three years (US$40.99). The investment plan also includes three sets of priorities for investments, as summarized in table ES.1. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 7 Table ES1 Investment Priorities Reduce dualities, strengthen local agencies Legal and institutional accountability Strengthen the financial model's sustainability Legal and institutional accountability Review and revise procurement system Legal and institutional accountability Develop community engagement and volunteer programs Information Strengthen early warning systems Information Strengthen alert system for the general public Information Priority 1 Improve GIS capabilities; improve vulnerability and risk mapping Information Invest in network of emergency operation centers (only ICT Facilities 20,049,600 USD equipment) Implement radio communications system Equipment Assess equipment for urban and wildfire suppression Equipment Develop systematic interagency training program Personnel Link exercises and drills to systematic development (Phases 1 and 2 Personnel only) Establish academic support for EP&R in Kosovo Personnel Invest in a stronger network of emergency operations centers Facilities Priority 2 Improve the resilience and capacities of response stations Facilities 60,645,200 USD Invest in equipment for search & rescue, wildfire (50%) Equipment Invest in medical first response capacities, airlift rescue (50%) Equipment Lay a foundation for temporary shelters Facilities Priority 3 Invest in equipment for search & rescue, wildfire (Phase 2) Equipment Invest in medical first response capacities, airlift rescue (Phase 2) Equipment 39,360,000 USD Link exercises and drills with systematic development Personnel Record lessons learned from the ongoing COVID-19 crisis Personnel Note: GIS = geographic information system. At the same time that it invests in development projects, the government of Kosovo is advised to structurally grow the personnel budget and hire and train new personnel in order to absorb the new tasks related policy, analysis, and data management associated with the maturing system. The government is also advised to budget for maintenance and replacement of equipment and facilities at the end of their expected life spans (figure ES.1). Identified priorities are based on the R2R diagnostic and first seek to strengthen the legislative and financial frameworks to support the functioning of the other components. Priorities are also based on priority needs as assessed. In order to strengthen broad institutional support for investments, discussion of priorities among stakeholders is advised. Figure ES1 Parallel Structural Budget Requirements Government is structurally Government is structurally growing the number of Government is structurally reserving budget for personnel to absorb new tasks funding maintenance of replacement of stock and associated with the maturing facilities and equipment equipment system 8 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Introduction T he Ready2Respond (R2R) framework elaborates on the role of the World Bank in disaster risk reduction. While strengthening emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) is a sound investment on its own, it also supports the World Bank Group’s broader risk reduction efforts and its fundamental goals of eliminating poverty and promoting shared prosperity. According to a recent World Bank report, the impact of extreme natural disasters is equivalent to a US$520 billion loss in annual global consumption, and forces some 26 million people into poverty each year (Hallegatte et al. 2017). A functional response reduces felt consequences and enables rapid recovery, reducing cumulative impacts to public safety and the economy. Thus ensuring capacity for emergency response protects World Bank Group investments across development sectors, as well as the development gains that have resulted from those investments. EP&R capacity must keep pace with development and demographics to ensure these gains are not lost as a consequence of disasters and emergencies. In essence, an EP&R system with sufficient capacity is the first line of defence for World Bank Group investments and country development. This Report This report includes the assessment of the EP&R capacities of Kosovo based on the R2R diagnostic methodology, as designed by the World Bank and executed by PPI. Data from a desk review1 and from key informant interviews conducted as part of an online field mission2 generated findings on the five components of the diagnostic—legal and institutional frameworks, information, facilities, equipment, and personnel—which include 18 criteria, 72 indicators, and 360 attributes. This report provides a summary of the EP&R capacities per component, as assessed by PPI in the first half of 2020; the full assessment report, structured in accordance with the R2R methodology, can be found in annex 1. The report also identifies and makes recommendations about key investments that the World Bank and other stakeholders can consider as they seek to strengthen EP&R capacities in the country. A more detailed investment report is published separately. Country Risk Profile Kosovo’s population of 1.9 million is exposed to both hydrometeorological and geological hazards: floods, heavy snowfall, drought, forest fires, and earthquakes. Flash floods are common in mountainous areas, sometimes leading to mudslides. Kosovo is also exposed to landslides, particularly in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Prishtinë/Pristina, Peja/Pec, and Shtërpcë/Strpce. At least one quarter of the communities are vulnerable to landslides and rock falls. Other hazards that threaten Kosovo are riverine floods (in plains) and cloudbursts (in Prishtinë/Pristine, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Besianë/ Podujevo, and Gjakovë, due to the structural vulnerability of dams in these areas). In some highly exposed river basins (such as the Drini basin, in the western half of the country) floods occur every two to three years. Between November 2007 and June 2008, three floods displaced 3,500 people, caused damage to homes and agricultural land, and eventually necessitated humanitarian assistance from the international community. Seasonal fluctuations in precipitation can severely affect agricultural production in regions that depend on rainfall for growing crops and have no alternative irrigation system. Kosovo has faced drought several times in the last two decades (in 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2008). In 2000, moderate to severe droughts affected most of the territory of Kosovo. Since 2004, 80 percent of Kosovo municipalities have at one time or another suffered from water shortages because of inefficient water management systems (Save the Children 2018). Forests comprise 43 percent of the territory of Kosovo and are especially prone to fires during the dry or summer season. Since 2000, the number of forest fires has increased; fire brigades and other relevant operational teams have carried out 2,000 to 3,000 interventions in the course of a single year. It is anticipated that exposure to hazards A list of the documents reviewed is included in annex 3. 1 The online mission schedule is included in annex 2. 2 Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 9 such as drought, floods, and wildfires will increase with climate change and the greater frequency of extreme climate events (Republic of Kosovo 2013). Just over half of Kosovo’s population lives in rural environments. The country’s gross domestic product was approximately US$6.4 million in 2015, with most derived from services and industry and the remainder from agriculture (World Bank and GFDRR 2016). Methodology The assessment uses the R2R diagnostic methodology, as designed by the World Bank. The methodology “improves national, sub-national and city resilience mechanisms and protects development gains through investments in emergency preparedness and response . . . systems” (GFDRR and GSURR 2017, 5). “The encompassing City Resilience Program . . . and other World Bank resilience platforms” inform the methodology (GFDRR and GSURR 2017, 5). The diagnostic is designed to be an objective, data-driven foundation to engage country counterparts in EP&R development projects. The methodology builds on the five core components of emergency preparedness and response as shown in figure 1: legal and institutional frameworks, information, facilities, equipment, and personnel. Figure ➊ Emergency Preparedness and Response System Core Components Source: GFDRR and GSURR 2017. Each component is measured by a set of criteria that address an aspect of a functional EP&R system for a given country. In addition, 72 indicators related to 360 attributes have been developed to score each criterion. 10 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Overall R2R Results The R2R methodology’s 360 attributes represent elements of the EP&R system that should be in place in a system considered fully mature. The maximum score that can be achieved is therefore 360. Kosovo has an overall score of 174. This means that 186 attributes of the EP&R system were not in place at the time of the analysis. In order to support an overall understanding of the relative weakness or strength of elements in the EP&R system, the average scores for each of the five components and 18 criteria have been calculated and transposed to scales from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). These are listed in table 1 and represented graphically in figure 2. Table ➊ Average EP&R Component and Criterion Scores for Kosovo Component Score (0 to 5) Criteria Score (0 to 5) Legal and institutional 1.1 Legislated accountability 2.50 ➊ 2.25 accountability 1.2 Financial preparedness 2.00 2.1 Community engagement 1.00 2.2 Early warning systems 3.50 ➋ Information 1.56 2.3 Information management systems 0 2.4 Geomatics 1.75 3.1 Emergency operations centers 2.25 3.2 Training centers 4.00 ➌ Facilities 2.87 3.3 Logistics warehouses and response stations 3.00 3.4 Shelters and open spaces 2.25 4.1 Emergency social services 3.25 4.2 Information and communications technology 2.00 ➍ Equipment 2.62 4.3 Hazard-specific response capacity 3.00 4.4 Urban firefighting and technical rescue 2.25 5.1 Incident organization structures 2.00 5.2 Training and knowledge building 2.75 ➊ Personnel 2.75 5.3 Exercises and drills 3.50 5.4 International support coordination 2.75 Source: R2R assessment findings. Note. Scale from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). Facilities, equipment, and personnel are relatively strong components of Kosovo’s R2R system, while information and legal and institutional accountabilities are relatively weak. Within the information component, community engagement is underdeveloped. The score for legal accountability is average relative to the other criteria, but a closer look at the composition of the score exposes significant weaknesses in the EP&R system. Legislation is essentially the backbone of the system and the component that enables development of all other components. A deficiency in the legislative system manifests in challenges that resonate throughout the EP&R system and should receive priority in developments. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 11 Figure ➋ Diagnostic Scores for Kosovo Source: R2R assessment findings. Note: Scale is from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). Kosovo’s relatively young EP&R system is missing important elements and requires improvement through investments in all components. Particular attention should be given to redefining national-local relationships and building overall capacity; better coordination between organizations is also a priority. The diagnostic finds that Kosovo’s system for response to small-scale incidents is quite functional. However, the system needs strategic reinforcements so that it can prepare for and respond to larger-scale calamities and disasters, and so it can sustain further development. Because of limited institutional memory and policy capacity, the system’s ability to transform investment into growth is relatively low; in particular, it has limited ability to harness private sector actors and involve local communities in growth processes. The system is orientated toward response and lacks the capacity to prepare for the challenges related to climate change, pandemics, or other natural or man-made disasters. The R2R diagnostic has identified several gaps in structures, frameworks, and capacities, and recommends that before enhancing the system to target specific hazards, efforts should focus on the fundamental components needed to prepare for and better respond to future impacts. 12 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment COMPONENT 1 Legal and Institutional Accountability Component Overview Internal and external clarity about the role of various public and private agencies is critical during disaster and emergency response. Where ambiguity exists, inefficiency and jurisdictional overlap are likely, and human and economic losses may be greater than they would otherwise be. Improving clarity about institutions’ preparedness and response roles can be a potent means to improve resilience at various levels of government. Further, clarity about roles ensures that World Bank investments in capacity do not lead policy but instead that policy comes first, with financial and technical support provided at the right time to the right agency. Figure ➌ Scoring for Legal and Institutional Accountability Ideally these accountabilities are clearly enshrined in legislation with directive regulations. 5 Where possible, coordinated policy instruments 4 should identify the operational expectations for agencies assigned a preparedness and response 3 mandate. However, even in the absence of 2 complete organizational clarity, investment in 2.50 preparedness and response can often improve a 1 2.00 jurisdiction’s ability to mitigate impacts and limit 0 disaster- and emergency-related losses. Legal Financial accountability preparedness Source: R2R assessment findings. Note: Scale is from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). Component Conclusions Kosovo’s legal system is currently undergoing a systemic change with the objective of making its workings more efficient. The civil service is undergoing a significant overhaul in which the number of offices and functions have been reduced.3 According to key informants, this change has a timeline of about three years, at which point clearer divisions of authority will be present in Kosovo’s institutions. Informants report frequent turnover in personnel without sufficient time for knowledge transfer between occupants of senior, professional positions; this situation hinders the retention of information learned on the job within the institution and stands in the way of institutional memory growth. While the legislative framework is written to accommodate a decentralized system, government is still very much centralized and tends to operate in self-managing “silos.” The institutional change that has recently been put into motion requires capacity to be fully implemented, but the differences between systems make adaptation difficult on all levels. The capacity to enact such a major change is lessened by the lack of a single oversight agency, responsible for end-to-end implementation of the process. A new law (Law on Organization and Functioning of State Administration and Independent Agencies) has been enacted to define roles and 3 responsibilities and prevent the drafting of sublegal acts by placing the functions of independent agencies under the oversight of Parliament. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 13 The COVID-19 crisis was handled at the level of the emergency system in Kosovo and served to expose some of the gaps in the legal framework that are discussed in the diagnostic. A national state of emergency was not declared when the crisis began but rather a “national health emergency” under a specific section of the Law on Protection against Natural and other Disasters (Republic of Kosovo 2011). This made it possible to enact the National Response Plan (Republic of Kosovo 2010) and exposed some of the plan’s functional shortcomings. Key informants pointed to the disconnect between the operational reality on the ground and governmental levels as the main issue in dealing with the crisis, particularly where national-local relations were concerned. Reports on problematic implementation on the local level did not reach higher levels of government through the appropriate channels; this situation points to a disconnect between national and local levels. Examples given were the intended opening of field agencies by the Emergency Management Agency (EMA), which did not take place, and the uncorrelated and difficult functioning of local response teams established by mayors. The National Response Plan allows for assistance to be extended to local municipalities, but does not go into specifics regarding the mechanism or controls of the process; nor does it indicate how a decision to assist local municipalities is actually to be carried out. This situation highlights the need to establish clearer guidelines for feedback between the field and the center so that all involved are mutually informed. Ingrained problems involving national-local cooperation are an additional challenge to the current system. The Law on Protection against Natural and other Disasters, drafted in 2011, features a separation of budget and responsibilities between the Ministry of Interior and its implementing agency, the EMA. Coupled with a top-down approach that dominates the entire bureaucracy of Kosovo, this creates a disconnect between legal and professional realms in which budgetary inflexibility hinders lateral professional development. This top-down approach dominates budgetary affairs and hampers the ability of professional emergency services to grow laterally and mature into fully rounded emergency organizations. Adjusting these dualities would require a politically supported coordinating entity within Kosovo that that has the capacity to assume a leadership role. Risk assessments, emergency plans, and strategic development plans are mandatory for all EP&R organizations in the country; however, these plans vary greatly across organizations. Critical infrastructure installations are required to draft and update emergency plans and have been found to do so. There is no evidence that assurance planning is being pursued as part of active monitoring by government authorities, nor is there evidence that monitoring is part of a more holistic risk knowledge–centered approach that includes the legislative system. The financial system is not designed to accommodate emergency management. EMA is provided with a fixed budget through a top-down system; it receives an annual budget, which is earmarked for general uses, but can also implement an appeals process to request additional funding through a specific committee. EMA is responsible for overseeing and directing emergency management in Kosovo, but not for financing it. Operational emergency management is the responsibility of local municipalities and falls under their budgets. The government annually provides municipalities with support equal to 10 percent of their budget, and the remainder of funds is obtained through specific government grants or appeals. Under this arrangement certain contradictions emerge. For example, EMA contracts firefighters, so they are in fact government employees; but their salary is meant to come from local municipalities and depends on municipal budgets. Kosovo does not have any financial instruments for emergency response and early recovery in place, nor is there any risk management strategy available to clarify contingent liability and to ensure short- and long-term response financing. There is a designated sum of €9.8 million set aside for post-disaster use, which can be accessed only by government decree. Of this sum, €40,000 is earmarked for immediate use by the Ministry of Finance without the need for special authorization. A legal framework that facilitates rapid emergency procurement is not in place. Also absent are supportive administrative and legal frameworks that motivate post-disaster budget appropriation. The state does not offer national health insurance in Kosovo, nor are there any policies in place to support risk transfer programs. Private homeowners and health insurance options exist and are available for general purchase, but plans are barely affordable and relatively new. 14 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment 1 Key Investment Opportunities RECOMMENDATION 1 Reduce dualities in the ep&r system and strengthen local agencies Legislation is mostly in place, though implementation by institutions at different levels is lagging significantly. The law delegates many authorities to the municipal level. Connections between national and local levels must be improved to eliminate dualities in the system. The diagnostic results indicate that detailed and universally accepted policy, financial, and operational guidelines should be established and substantiated by EMA. EMA should grow to function as an authority and have access to a mix of financial, knowledge, and legal tools to enforce the jurisdictional responsibilities and mandates. A strong advisory role for the academic world should support building EMA as the accepted authority that drives development and capacity building throughout the EP&R system. RECOMMENDATION 2 Strengthen the financial model to secure sustainability The current systemic duality in Kosovo is fed by the disconnect between municipal and national agencies’ control of budgets. The financial model for the EP&R system needs to be improved to avoid ad hoc decision-making and excessive variation in available budgets for emergency response units. The diagnostic recommends developing a sustainable financial model for local and national EP&R bodies through investment models and inspection roles. This model should consider anticipated risks, including climate change, and should regulate the division of resources across EP&R actors. Adopting this model will in turn strengthen the connection between national and local levels and help investments directed at broad, risk-related issues gain traction. RECOMMENDATION 3 Review and revise the current procurement system The R2R diagnostic identified challenges resulting from the lack of an orderly central procurement system. There is a need to ensure that EP&R actors have the necessary flexibility and decision-making power to purchase equipment. The current model should be reviewed to assess how it can be adapted and re-applied to meet the needs of actors on the ground with sufficient flexibility. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 15 COMPONENT 2 Information Component Overview The collection, analysis, and swift dissemination of information enables better decision-making in advance of emergencies, during response operations, and through the transition to early recovery. Impacts from emergencies are felt locally, and so community engagement is vital to a well-developed state of preparedness. The information used for preparedness and response includes the information generated from early warning systems; this information provides local residents—and the response teams that support them—with advance notice of emerging hazardous events. Other relevant emergency information comes from responding agencies and social media; coordination of this information ensures horizontal and vertical situational awareness that enables efficient, coordinated, and prioritized response operations. Finally, the development of hazard and vulnerability maps along with other georeferenced emergency information, captured digitally and shared electronically, provides decision-makers with a key resource for planning across time scales to reduce risk. However, for high-quality information to have an impact, it must be utilized both by the affected community and by well-trained, committed personnel that have the appropriate equipment to respond safely and effectively to the given event. Figure ➍ Scoring for Information 5 4 3 2 3.50 1 1.75 1,00 0 0 Community Early warning Information Geomatics engagement systems management systems Source: R2R assessment findings. Note: Scale is from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). Component Conclusions Community engagement scores relatively low within the component on information. Where volunteerism is concerned, community activities are mostly performed by the Red Cross of Kosovo, whose strong and active presence in the country is substantiated by the Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters (Republic of Kosovo 2011). The Kosovo Red Cross has 3,000 volunteers active across Kosovo in a variety of fields. It offers a train-the-trainers program in community emergency preparedness at its Pristina headquarters, and it collaborates with both EMA and local providers (public and private) in caring for most volunteer-supported EP&R needs, while constantly monitoring its own performance and searching for ways to improve. EMA supports and cooperates with the Red Cross on a 16 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment regular basis through network sharing and common use of facilities and equipment. Both organizations disseminate material to the public and other government agencies, and where needed do so together. The Kosovo Red Cross does not receive financial support from the state, despite the law stating otherwise and a court case in its favor. Its funding is meant to come not only from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and donations, but also from a €5 fee each citizen pays for basic CPR training as part of applying for a driver’s license. Volunteer firefighters are active and receive free training through EMA, though their numbers and abilities have been declining in recent years due to lack of funding. Early warning systems score medium to high within the component, thanks to a high level of professionalism and dedication on the part of the staff at the Kosovo Geological Survey and to the work of international organizations. One such organization, the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), carried out a countrywide risk assessment in 2017. This work will serve as the foundation of a geographic information system (GIS) system that can be improved with additional training and capacities. Kosovo has an early warning system for flood risk, monitored and maintained through the Hydrometeorological Institute and communicated to the public through the media via the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP). Warnings are issued a day and a half before water begins to reach communities in danger, and a coded system for breaking into broadcasts in case of emergencies is in place. There are no specific accommodations for populations at risk or individuals in remote areas. Early warning for earthquakes or fire hazards is not in place despite existing risk, though some sensors are in place for seismic activity monitoring, and the Geological Survey shares the received data with expert centers in the European Union (EU). It is important to note that earthquake sensors are absent in each of the four hydroelectric dams. Kosovo recently incorporated the multi-hazard database DesInventar, an open access database available for professional use and originally established with the support of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. The GIS system is not open for purposes of informing the public despite being accessible through several governmental websites. Only a few layers can be viewed publicly and there is a general lack of explanatory material about system usage, for both the general public and decision-makers. An integrated data management system that supports situational awareness of all first responders during response activities—that is, a Disaster Management Information System (DMIS)—is not in place to date. The alert system in place could not be confirmed as operational, and currently the most prevalent carrier of warning signals is the open media— TV and radio. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 17 2 Key Investment Opportunities RECOMMENDATION 1 Develop a community engagement approach, including support for volunteer programs The existing structures for volunteerism in Kosovo are aging and suffer from lack of funding, though the COVID-19 crisis has helped highlight volunteerism’s importance. Making volunteerism an integral part of the EP&R system should lead to quick results as the baseline is in place through a well-substantiated tradition and an informed legal system. RECOMMENDATION 2 Strengthen early warning systems The review found that none of the hydroelectric power plants (four dams) in Kosovo are equipped with earthquake sensors. Given the significant risk of earthquakes and the potential catastrophic impact of dam collapse, sensors should be installed in all dams. The network of meteorological and hydrological stations should be expanded. RECOMMENDATION 3 Strengthen alert system for the general public Kosovo is in need of an upgraded alert system for the public. The siren system needs to be renewed, and the feasibility of using cell broadcasting and SMS messages through the cellular network should be assessed. Procedures used by measuring stations to issue warnings via multiple media formats should be strengthened. Data and information exchange between relevant organizations requires improvement to create a multi-risk warning system for the public. An information campaign should inform the public, and in particular vulnerable groups, about alert procedures. RECOMMENDATION 4 Improve GIS capabilities and vulnerability and risk mapping Kosovo received assistance to implement GIS technology for general purposes and for risk mapping specifically. Further capacity development among policy workers in the field of special planning and the inspectorates will greatly improve the use of the GIS data that are available. GIS systems are a foundational tool for informing decision-making, particularly where risk management is concerned. In order for the technical and scientific capacities of the existing professional GIS system in Kosovo to manifest as practical information, it will be necessary to conduct hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessments so that results can inform the relevant systems. Assessment results should be made accessible through an integrated platform, supported by well-trained personnel who can increase access to the information within the various layers of the system and better inform decision-makers. 18 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment COMPONENT 3 Facilities Component Overview Coordination of effort for EP&R activities requires a structural presence, be it for command and control, movement of emergency aid, or the staging of response teams and their equipment. These physical facilities act as a core element in establishing a culture of preparedness, ensuring a dependable common operating picture and resilient services when most other critical infrastructure and government services are disrupted. This component ensures that there is a nexus for information, personnel, and equipment as the EP&R system matures through focused investment. Figure ➎ Scoring for Facilities 5 4 3 2 4.00 3.00 1 2.25 2.25 0 Emergency Training centers Logistics Shelters and open operations centers warehouse and spaces response stations Source: R2R assessment findings. Note: Scale is from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). Component Conclusions Emergency operations centers (EOCs) are mandated within the legislative framework of the EP&R system in Kosovo. The Ministry of Interior owns an ad hoc EOC, whose main role, according to the National Response Plan, is “to accommodate the various roles the Government plays during incidents, whether central support (through regional branches for local authorities, intra-governmental support,) or direct implementation powers and central responsibilities for incident management when in compliance with the law” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 21). During an incident, the EOC “consists of [a] monitoring and coordination center operating 24/7”, hosting representatives of multiple agencies, information analysis, critical infrastructure, and readiness and emergency response. These elements work in close coordination to address the analysis of information and coordination of response activities” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 27). Municipalities and regions are mandated to operate EOCs. These facilities act as local and regional EMA branches that are budgeted locally through the municipalities. In reality, EOCs are funded by a fraction of the municipal emergency budget, estimated at 5 percent of the annual municipal budget; to comply with national law, however, functionalities and training for operating the local EOCs have to be executed under a nationally funded program. Employees operating the EOCs are thus still under contract with a single government agency while complying with the law on both accounts. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 19 The network of EOCs has not yet been exposed to an emergency requiring deployment of its resources, aside from during the COVID-19 outbreak. The network is reported to be dysfunctional because of limited capacity; well-trained staff and ICT infrastructures are mostly absent. An overview of EOC capacities currently in place versus overall capacity needed to strengthen the network is not available. Since the EOCs could and should play a vital role in the implementation of the European 112 emergency number, it is critical to invest in the necessary developments. Training centers score high in this component. EMA, the Kosovo Security Forces, Kosovo Energy Corporation, and the Pristina International Airport all have training centers whose layouts support the specific needs of the professional organizations they are meant to serve. These centers can also be converted to act as supplementary or supportive centers for other organizations within the EP&R framework. The Kosovo Red Cross trains with the Kosovo Police Force, which indicates an understanding of the importance of training within the system. Facilities are geographically located in hazard-appropriate locations to address training needs of specific organizations; for example, the Kosovo Security Forces and the national EMA training center are located in the north of Kosovo, in an environment that enables wildland rescue training. Though centers are modern and equipped with appropriate resources for on-site and remote (online) learning, some basic capabilities—such as the ability to mitigate the effects of natural disasters and budgeting for regional and national improvements of training centers—are not in place. The entity responsible for coordinating deployment of logistics warehouses in Kosovo is the Department of State Reserves in the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The reserves themselves are in place by order of the national constitution and can be distributed only according to a decree by the Interministerial Governmental Group, which may be convened by governmental order during times of emergency. Although this group is not necessarily formed during national emergencies (one was convened during COVID-19), the cache stored in the warehouses can be used only in case of a national emergency, declared by Parliament as a threat to national integrity. The system in place contracts warehouses from private suppliers through long-term contracts and is revised and updated according to the National Strategic Plan every three years. The location of the warehouses is kept secret to avoid public speculation about the sufficiency of their contents. Logistical provisions exist for transportation of materials to affected populations. Response stations range in their capacities, with some well-equipped and staffed and some much less so. A central overview of the response stations, including the status of equipment, capacity, and staffing, does not exist. The law regarding response stations allows the national level to intervene at the local level in case of local shortfalls, and to accommodate for recognized legal dualities. No plan of action regarding the overall development of response stations is currently being implemented. Emergency shelters practically fall under the responsibilities of the Red Cross, since the national government does not possess predesignated shelter facilities. Provisions for designating open spaces for use in disaster management exist through a legal act, which details compensation required for the sequestering of public or private land in case of emergency. To what extent municipalities have designated open spaces for general use by response agencies is not known. The responsibility for designating buildings as temporary shelters is divided between the MOI and the Department of Asylum and Refugees. 20 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment 3 Key Investment Opportunities RECOMMENDATION 1 Invest in a well-equipped network of EOCS at different levels of government The network of EOCs is comparatively dysfunctional because of limited capacity. Trained staff and ICT infrastructures are mostly absent, and there is little clarity concerning EOCs’ responsibilities, governance, lines of communication, operational procedures, and funding. An overview of existing EOC capacities versus overall capacity needed to strengthen the network is not available. The possibility of implementing an incident coordination system like NATO’s Next Generation Incident Command System (NICS) should be explored. Strengthening interagency cooperation and coordination is key to improve the functioning of EOCs. RECOMMENDATION 2 Improve the resilience and capacities of response stations Response stations throughout Kosovo vary in quality, and most are likely unable to withstand large impacts. Appropriate fire protection and alarm systems are missing. The status of all response stations should be assessed, and results should be used to inform a development plan that outlines priorities for upgrading and strengthening the response station network. RECOMMENDATION 3 Lay a foundation for temporary shelters Except for 300 tents offered by the Red Cross, Kosovo does not have provisions for temporary shelters. To meet the need for information on appropriate and cost-effective shelter solutions, support should be provided for a needs assessment in this field, which should also identify existing buildings that could be modified to function as shelter facilities that meet international standards. Regulations regarding shelter usage have not been adopted beyond what is offered by the SPHERE standards. The diagnostic therefore recommends adhering to the SPHERE guidelines— specifically the guidance notes in IFRC (n.d.)—when selecting venues for emergency shelters, particularly when existing structures are being considered. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 21 COMPONENT 4 Equipment Component Overview The appropriate acquisition, use, and maintenance of preparedness and response equipment ensures timely information sharing and safe, effective rescue operations. It allows for effective communication in even the harshest conditions. Investments in equipment help governments overcome the capital requirements to ensure access to lifesaving technologies and resources. Combined with clear implementation guidance, established parts and service supply chains, and program budgets for maintenance and upgrades, these elements ensure a government’s core preparedness and response agencies have the tools to safely and effectively deliver their services. Figure ➏ Scoring for Equipment 5 4 3 2 3.25 3.00 1 2.00 2.25 0 Emergency Information/ Hazard-specific Urban firefighting operations services communications response capacity and technical technology rescue Source: R2R assessment findings. Note: Scale is from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). Component Conclusions The diagnostic confirms that basic emergency social services are in place in Kosovo, including hospitals and a system of public health care clinics at national and local levels. The National Hospital is in Pristina, and clinics are spread out across the jurisdiction. Ambulances are mostly available, though vehicles are old and vary in quality and origin. An overview of ambulances currently in service unfortunately is not kept. Other medical vehicles for evacuation and transportation of casualties are not available; the lack of medical airlift capacity due to the absence of helicopters poses difficulties for a functioning search and rescue system, particularly in mountainous areas. The National Response Plan enables intervention of all government response agencies at the local level in case of an emergency, thus authorizing countrywide coverage by armed forces for purposes of medical evacuation if need arises. The diagnostic confirmed that WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene) services for emergency deployment are largely not adequate to prevent a breakdown in services. Small-scale electrical supply and surveillance systems are not in place; however, emergency outbreak surveillance and public awareness materials are available and distributed to the public on a regular basis. 22 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment With regard to mental and social welfare, programs are in place to provide disaster-related counseling services and most post-disaster family-related support, mainly through the Red Cross. Established protocols regarding handling and burial of the deceased are in place, though not for mass fatality events. Information and communications technology scores low within the component, mainly because radio communication technology is unavailable, aside from isolated use by specific agencies. This renders emergency communication systems considerably less disaster-resilient and makes communication among and between agencies dependent on cellular networks. Though the review was able to confirm that Kosovo has broadband connectivity for its EOCs, radio communications that feature repeat relay are still the most reliable system for emergency services’ use, both daily and during emergencies. Provisions for recovering the communications infrastructure post-disaster are in place by mandate of the Ministry of Interior through a set of agreements with relevant infrastructure and communication providers, and backup systems that allow alternative transmission pathways are available. Hazard-specific response in Kosovo has diverse strengths in various indicators. Functional wildland firefighting capabilities exist on a limited scale only, while water-based rescue is relatively strong, both in training (through the Kosovo Security Forces) and in support (through a functional early warning system). Both fire and water-based services lack proper budget planning, as do the other indicators in the component. Structural collapse rescue is strong, mainly through the abilities of the Kosovo Security Forces, which also handle hazardous materials (hazmat). Capabilities for hazard-specific response in areas such as hazmat, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear), diving, and mountain rescue are mostly fulfilled by the Kosovo Security Forces in their role as so-called third responders. Because there is a shortage of appropriately trained first responders, they are often called upon to handle emergency rescue operations. Hazard-specific response following a disaster in which local systems are overwhelmed is dealt with according to the National Response Plan, which “determines clear flow of communication and coordination from the local to regional level and to central offices” as part of the national structure for incident management (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 22). Urban firefighting and rescue services exist both through EMA, represented locally in each of Kosovo’s municipalities, and through a parallel mechanism of volunteer firefighting services, also run by EMA. The Kosovo Security Forces have a firefighting unit with basic firefighting capacities for local fires only, and the Kosovo Energy Corporation and Pristina International Airport each have their own designated firefighting units, featuring industrial capabilities. The personal protective equipment provided to firefighters generally depends on the organization to which they belong. Professional organizations tend to place a higher priority on the purchase of designated protective equipment, however to professionals and volunteers alike, the problematic double mechanism binding EMA’s firefighters limits the procurement of equipment on all levels. All jurisdictional aspects—including training, equipment needs, employee and deployment costs, and strategic costs—need to be figured into EMA’s €1.4 million annual budget, which falls short of meeting all needs, despite annual reviews designed to ensure that all needs can be met. The capacity to perform rescues from buildings six stories or taller does not exist in Kosovo due to the absence of laddered fire trucks. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 23 4 Key Investment Opportunities RECOMMENDATION 1 Implement a unified radio communications system To strengthen capacities, shorten response times, and foster interoperability, Kosovo needs a radio communication system featuring repeat relay that can be used by all emergency services, with a dedicated channel for interagency communication and backup functions. Such a system will facilitate numerous emergency search and rescue operations that rely on radio technology. RECOMMENDATION 1 Build equipment capacity for (urban) search and rescue and wildfire suppression Firefighting capacities in Kosovo are limited, with only some 240 vehicles (with various operational status) in place. No needs assessment has been carried out in the field of response service equipment capacities of the various EU Civil Protection Mechanism modules, and a longer-term development plan for equipment is not in place. The capacities of urban search and rescue and firefighting in Pristina are limited by the absence of laddered trucks required for structures six stories and taller. These vehicles are missing countrywide. Capacities for wildfire suppression fall short during larger-scale fires. RECOMMENDATION 1 Strengthen medical first response capacities and integrate airlift rescue as part of wildland rescue An assessment of medical first response capacity needs should be carried out as a foundation for developing and sustaining capacity growth. Procurement of helicopters is being discussed. The implementation of financially sustainable airlift rescue capacity in Kosovo should be supported. 24 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment COMPONENT 5 Personnel Component Overview A highly skilled and experienced workforce is the most valuable resource in any disaster preparedness and response system. To achieve this, there must be a culture of preparedness in which both the public and political entities trust the agencies tasked with ensuring public safety and minimizing economic disruptions. Developing such a culture requires intensive and extensive training of those involved in EP&R so that they acquire the necessary knowledge, skills, and practical experience. Training of personnel must take advantage of the best available plans, information, facilities, and equipment to ensure an interoperable systems approach is broadly understood. It must also enable deep capability in focused areas of expertise to ensure that personnel development spreads upward, from the individual to the team, and from the team to the agency.and from the team to the agency. Figure ➐ Scoring for Personnel 5 4 3 2 3.50 2.75 2.75 1 2.00 0 Incident Training Exercises International organization and knowledge and drills support structures building coordination Source: R2R assessment findings. Note: Scale is from 0 (absent) to 5 (fully in place). Component Conclusions Incident organization structures are detailed by the National Response Plan, including an accommodation for the dualities in the system. The structure is flexible and applicable to all locales in Kosovo. A 112 center has been in place since 2017 and is fully operational, though the old lines to each emergency organization are operational as well. The incident organization structures are elaborated in the National Response Plan for national, regional, and local-level functioning, but resources for training and implementation are not part of the plan. The National Response Plan is intended to empower local municipalities to act on their own with the support of national resources, but feedback received about the COVID-19 crisis (which was handled well on a health care level) suggests that in reality the plan had a different effect: although the National Response Plan was signed into law under a national health emergency, and EMA was allowed to delegate authority to municipal field agencies that would operate independently, this in fact did not take place, and there was much confusion in the field. Training and knowledge building are carried out as part of certified and well-planned professional emergency management programs run by EMA and by most specialized emergency organizations surveyed by the diagnostic. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 25 Though the system addresses hazards very professionally, milestones in organizational growth are difficult to attain because budgetary limitations prevent thorough training of additional specialized personnel and contributions to community engagement, thus blocking professional development. Exercise outcomes are not linked with any type of political decision-making, which creates a grave disconnect between the objectives set out by the law that regulates the trainings and their outcomes. Exercises and drills take place on a regular basis both among local agencies and as part of established international cooperation. In September 2019, EMA took part in a NATO- sponsored Silver Sabre exercise together with the Kosovo Security Forces, the Kosovo Security Council, the Kosovo Police, the Red Cross, and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Allied Joint Forces Command Naples 2019). The exercise, which simulated a large-scale natural disaster, is regularly performed twice a year to train the emergency management system. Drills are performed with locally specialized security organizations as well and are delivered at all levels of activity—national, regional, and local. However, none of the drills are connected to a feedback system used to update or revise existing emergency plans at the decision-making level. Without a system that incorporates results into political decision-making processes, Kosovo is missing an opportunity to use drills and exercises to test and revise emergency preparedness plans. The current situation of community participation in drills in Kosovo reflects the situation of the EP&R system as a whole, in which the legislative base, though wide and well drafted, is not sufficient to support connection with the grassroots. Community drills are not mentioned in any of the primary laws, save for the order mandating the Integrated Emergency Management System of 2010. This leaves drills largely and almost entirely in the hands of international organizations; as a result they happen sporadically in locales where NGO activity is present.4 A 2016 desk review and field mission recommended among other things that EMA require drills as part of disaster risk reduction plans in all sectors and at all levels, including local municipalities. A further recommendation was that EMA trainers plan and implement inclusive and gender-sensitive community drills, which would include staff of all essential emergency management services as well as NGOS. This plan would assist in bringing representatives of private sector operations into training activities, and would integrate larger initiatives for community engagement into more significant drills in other emergency sectors as well. These recommendations have yet to be implemented, however. The reception of international support is not regulated by a specific legal framework in Kosovo, though it answers to the Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters. It has not been included in the National Response Plan, despite EMA’s designation as the agency responsible for coordinating and receiving aid. Basic logistical capacities for receiving and distributing aid are in place, and the interfacing with international organizations is a process very well known to EMA and other partners in EP&R in Kosovo. This lack of full legal designation in a system that has, since its establishment, collaborated with a variety of foreign and international aid agencies implies that the issue is a political one, and that this aspect of the EP&R system is controlled by a level of decision-making that is not directly involved in emergency response. A good example of this is earthquake drills at schools. In 2013, an earthquake drill was held at a primary school in the municipality of Gjilan 4 under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Volunteers, Save the Children, and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in partnership with EMA/Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kosovo Red Cross, and the Municipality of Gjilan. The drill included the entire community (Save the Children Kosovo 2013). 26 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment 5 Key Investment Opportunities RECOMMENDATION 1 Support the development of a systematic interagency training program for ep&r at all levels of response; employ legal and practical measures to embed training outcomes in the system to engender growth and learning Kosovo needs to develop an interagency training program to support overall response capacity building and coordination between organizations. Next to a standard basic training, an in-depth training needs assessment should inform an approach to the specific training needs of Kosovo that is in line with existing UN and EU standards. Training programs should be developed at various levels and support a strengthened approach to personnel development, including certification and promotion practices. A train-the-trainer component should be included in the curriculum developments. The standard training program should include the following courses: ● Basic firefighting units training (professional and voluntary level) ● Hazmat trainings ● Basic and specialized training of protection and rescue, including search and rescue and urban search and rescue ● GIS and data-driven (policy) development ● Leadership training, including training in team leadership ● Training in basic incident command system and advanced incident management system ● Basic protection and rescue training for young population (high school students) ● Exchange and sharing of experiences between experts ● Host nation support and international assistance coordination RECOMMENDATION 2 Link the outcomes of exercises and drills with systematic development on all levels Drills and exercises should be used as opportunities to test and improve operational procedures and the emergency system. A unified mechanism of lessons learned should be adopted to act as an enabler for systematic growth and increased institutional memory. RECOMMENDATION 3 Establish academic support for EP&R in kosovo The EP&R system of Kosovo could be strengthened by an academic institution supporting the work of EMA and other relevant institutions by analyzing key topics and driving the system forward. With the proper support, the Faculty of Civil Engineering and Architecture of the University of Pristina could take on this role. By guiding learning processes and summarizing international knowledge and research in this field for relevant authorities, such academic support for EMA could be a key driver for the development of the EP&R system and the capacities of the staff. RECOMMENDATION 4 Record lessons learned from the ongoing COVID-19 crisis The ongoing COVID-19 crisis has significantly tested the EP&R capacities in the country. This real-time situation provided an opportunity to record best practices, identify challenges, and learn for future events. In general, knowledge management and retention were identified as a problem in the existing system. The recording and analysis of current events could provide a first attempt to foster a better knowledge management system, one whose results could inform future training and exercises. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 27 Annex 1 Full Diagnostic Report Component ➊ Legal and Institutional Accountability Criterion 1.1: Legislated Accountability Indicator 1.1.1: Emergency Management Legislation Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: For an emergency preparedness and response system to function well at any government scale, and especially across scales, emergency management legislation and related policy instruments must exist. These instruments must clearly assign accountabilities to specific government departments and ministries to ensure public safety service delivery and resilience. Emergency management legislation is in place in the jurisdiction of Kosovo, through the following laws: ● Law No. 04/L-027 on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters ● Law No. 04/L-049 on Firefighting and Rescue ● Law No. 04/L-012 on Fire Protection ● Regulation on the Methodology for Risk Assessment Development ● Law No. 04/L-230 on the Agency for Emergency Management ● Law No. 06/L-035 on Hydrometeorological Activities (specifically pertaining to the activities of the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning, MESP) Though accountabilities are mostly clear for all phases of emergency management, including coordination, the relationship between central government and local governments is sometimes ambiguous. Problems exist both horizontally and vertically. Appropriate vision is needed in overall agency coordination and cooperation, not just in the response phases. The COVID-19 crisis has served to expose the inability of local agencies to implement central- level decisions appropriately and according to plan. This points to gaps in communication between central and local authorities, as well as issues in implementation of institutional policy. The noncohesive rollout of government policy on local levels during the COVID-19 crisis points to probable issues with implementation of laws on the local level. According to Sections 3.0, 3.1, and 3.1.1 of the National Response Plan, which defines roles and responsibilities, local authorities (headed by mayors) are entrusted with full responsibilities for handling an emergency when it occurs within a jurisdiction. This leaves local jurisdictions with the power to decide what to do, but also requires them to respond only within their means. Mayors are the parties responsible for putting plans into action, but also have a right to appeal to central government for assistance if their means fall short of supporting their needs. The law is not clear on whether it is necessary or not for a national emergency to be declared, or on the sum or percentage that municipalities can request. Under article ESF-8, the Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters allows the declaration of a national health emergency. This was the article followed during the COVID-19 crisis. However, though the letter of the law was followed, implementation was reported to be incohesive and suggested the presence of ingrained problems with communication between the national and local levels. The ambiguity in when to seek help from central levels was a concern raised repeatedly by interviewees; jurisdictional responsibilities are often clearly defined but not always appropriately supported on the ground, despite the strength of the existing legal framework. In particular, this issue rose to the surface where enactment of local emergency plans was concerned. 28 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Within the legal framework itself, ambiguity exists on several levels, and is also present in the professional realms as well: ministry employees who have emergency management concerns do not know which law to turn to when referring to emergency management issues—the Law on Protection against Disasters, or the law governing their professional field. Such was the case in both the MESP and the Geological Survey of Kosovo. On the municipal level, fire services in Kosovo are legally under the responsibility of both the Emergency Management Agency (EMA) and the local municipality to which they belong. They report to EMA professionally, but to the municipalities financially. This has resulted in a confused system that has hindered development processes, particularly on issues of hiring, communications, training, equipment, and professional growth, and it indicates a lack of connection between national and local levels. Issues with implementation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and operational emergency plans are natural offshoots of this situation. These issues were raised repeatedly by interviewees, as were lack of training and disjointed implementation. Indicator 1.1.2: Appropriate Delegations of Authority Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: During disasters and emergencies, decisions must be made more quickly and often by those directly involved in managing or setting priorities for response operations. Clarity about decision-making processes, and about the ability of officials to make decisions that would typically be made at a higher government level, is vital to timely and effective disaster and emergency response. Appropriate delegations of authority have been found to be in place and are supported by enabling legislation. According to the National Response Plan, municipalities are required to draft local response plans, which should be revised on a biannual basis. Once again, the issues of validation, endorsement, and interagency coordination were raised by informants as needing attention by EMA representatives themselves and other actors in the field. During the COVID-19 outbreak, an interministerial committee was established to coordinate all functions delegated to the various authorities by the Ministry of Health based on the National Response Plan. Indicator 1.1.3: Agency-Specific Operational Response Plans Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: An operational response plan ensures that government departments with specific accountabilities for ensuring public safety will be able to fulfill those roles despite organizational challenges such as personnel turnover. It also ensures limited overlap with other government departments and, through testing the plan, enables others to become familiar with how each department will fulfill its obligations. The assessment found that different agencies have their own response and preparedness plans, though these plans vary. Some are elaborate and go into detail, such as that of the city of Mitrovica, while some plans remain much broader. This finding recalls concerns that have been raised about inadequate follow-up by the national level regarding local-level actions, and can be said to reflect the fact that EMA does not have an inspectorate sector that can control and penalize the legislative mechanism on the ground from the central level. Indicator 1.1.4: Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Critical infrastructure is the structural backbone of any jurisdiction. It is the core physical presence of any government, without which essential government and private services could not be provided. Typically, a significant percentage of critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated. Whether public or private, this infrastructure is of vital economic and public safety importance, so a well-developed critical infrastructure assurance program should be established across the jurisdiction. The R2R assessment gathered data on the functioning of critical infrastructure from interviews with the Pristina International Airport (PIA) and the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEC). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the PIA risk assessment was based on an earthquake or flood scenario along with air accidents. The airport has its own preparedness and response system and response plans, overseen by an incident Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 29 management process. When the airport is overwhelmed—for example, if its single runway is out of commission— agreements are in place with neighboring Albania to ensure continuity of services. The KEC has comprehensive training, safety, and maintenance plans that comply with European standards and whose results are reported regularly to EMA. The plans focus on employee safety and on maintenance rather than on functional continuity in case of natural or other disasters; where the latter is concerned, EMA holds responsibility for coordinating the entire response. Both entities are national and therefore all comprehensive programming is in the hands of the state. Among the critical infrastructure that was assessed, private actors were identified mostly as carriers of the network from production to the end users. The review found that though on an individual level critical infrastructure institutions do have functional continuity measures in place, at the national level there is no evidence of a formal official infrastructure assurance program in place. Criterion 1.2: Financial Preparedness  Indicator 1.2.1: Appropriate Financial Instruments Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: The government’s central role in natural disaster emergency response and recovery involves a large financial burden, which varies based on the government’s definition of contingent liabilities related to natural disasters. Contingent liabilities refer to the spending obligations arising from past events that will be incurred in the future if uncertain discrete future events occur. Ex ante disaster funds provide the government with a predefined amount in readily available resources to be used in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Ex ante funding includes the financial allocations, budget contingencies, emergency reserve funding mechanisms, and insurance instruments that exist to support effective preparedness, response, and early recovery. Existing financial preparedness is insufficient and fragmented, hence the low score for this indicator. The budgeting system is not specifically associated with natural disasters and has no specific contingencies for long-term financing. Municipalities are responsible for their own operational budgets, only 10 percent of which comes from the government according to a fixed formula. The rest is allocated according to specific grants. Emergency management is a fraction of this sum. Interviewees repeatedly mentioned that this budget is insufficient for the everyday operational needs of the EP&R system, but said that the system does function well during emergencies. As mentioned above, the Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters states that municipalities have the option of requesting assistance from the central government in times of need; however, what constitutes “need” is not stipulated in the law. According to an interview with the Ministry of Finance, the top-down budgeting system enables each recipient of a budget to request a hearing in order to obtain additional funding if required, but sums are not clear in this case either, and this system cannot be said to function as a parametric insurance instrument or an alternative risk transfer instrument. A disaster fund with dedicated resources is available within the Ministry of Finance. It has a standby line of contingent credit, though not in the traditional sense: the €9.8 million fund is accessible only by government decree. It is labeled as intended for use post-disaster. Of these funds, €40,000 are earmarked for use by the Ministry of Finance in case of a disaster and can be dispensed without any further authorization from above. Such was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. The remaining funds are dissolved and used by the government. Indicator 1.2.2: Emergency Procurement Systems and Frameworks Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Within disaster relief logistics, procurement accounts for a substantial percentage of total expenditures. Good procurement practices are essential for efficient, effective, transparent, and accountable governance and project management in emergency disaster response. Proactive procurement forecasting identifies the goods and services required for effective disaster response by stockpiling and forming vendor partnerships to ensure rapid distribution in emergency situations. Decentralized, fast-track-response procurement procedures incorporate more flexibility and invoke other mechanisms (such as prequalification processes) to minimize serious supply delays, reduce costs, and speed up delivery times. 30 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Procurement forecasting has not been found at the strategic level. All actors spoken with on the subject mentioned the need to reach out of the country for procurement in case of emergency, which indicates a lack of strategic planning. An exception to this general rule is the Kosovo Red Cross, which has a system of procurement in place, including contracts with community-based and private organizations to insure functioning during emergency situations. Though partnerships are not defined with regard to emergency procurement, there is an attempt to learn from the grassroots level regarding their mechanisms of spontaneous organization and assimilate them into national level cooperation. The R2R assessment has learned of these efforts from the representative of the CMG consulting group, a private entity that connects local grassroots actors and the government and raises awareness of grassroots issues among legislators. Legal measures are in place (and have been successfully used) to expedite procurement, shortening the duration of bureaucratic procedures required to access warehouses and making procurement contracts available in days rather than months. The decentralization of emergency procurement rests mainly on the shoulders of the local firefighters. The issue seems to be that the budget to carry out emergency procurement is not available locally because of firefighters being jurisdictionally under EMA but financially under municipalities, which leaves them limited funding for procurement In general. Technology, including geospatial information or telecommunications data, has not been incorporated into the procurement process. Indicator 1.2.3: Public Financial Management Policies and Procedures Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Effective financial management policy outlines and provides guidance on the processes involved in managing response costs during the activation of the emergency response structure and protocols. It outlines those responsible for managing response expenditures for costs incurred during response and recovery as well as the relevant expense authorities and applicable thresholds. Financial management procedures outline the scope, steps, and responsibilities for financial tracking of all eligible and approved emergency response costs, authorizations of those expenditures, and processing of invoices. Administrative and legal frameworks that allow for post-disaster emergency budget appropriation are in place and functioned during the COVID-19 pandemic. A clear financial management policy exists for the emergency management system in Kosovo. EMA’s budget is €1.4 million a year, only 5 percent of which goes to civil emergency management in municipalities. Indicator 1.2.4: Personal Financial Risk Transfer Programs Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: An established personal insurance market that is affordable and available in high- risk areas can significantly reduce the financial burden on individuals, families, and governments in the wake of disasters and emergencies. In combination with other government risk-transfer mechanisms, a robust personal insurance market can significantly reduce government contingent liability while also improving personal accountability and preparedness of individuals and families. Personal financial risk transfer programs in Kosovo have been found to be weak and vague. Private companies do offer insurance programs that address the main risks in the country, but it has been possible to purchase insurance for only a short time (around two years), and it is difficult to gauge at this point how widespread the practice of purchasing insurance has become. Insurance is offered to the public in packages covering earthquakes, theft protection, and health. Health insurance is not offered by the state in Kosovo, and the purchase of private insurance is not common. A representative of the insurance sector did not take part in the diagnostic, nor was any statistical information on the prevalence of insurance acquisition available. However, the interviews conducted suggest that the rate of insurance purchase in the population is between 1 percent and 2 percent. This points to a possible gap in the establishment of financial stability as part of EP&R management, as insurance was reported to be unaffordable for most people, especially in rural areas. The Ministry of Finance has explained that the state is not involved in financing or planning reinsurance coverage for earthquake or other natural disasters in order to absorb the possible financial impact of a large-scale event. Nor can the government encourage the purchase of private insurance products because it is not in Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 31 any way involved in the market; representatives of the Municipality of Pristina and of the Ministry of Health attested to this fact during interviews. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been an advocate for increased awareness of the importance of risk financing and risk transfer, with a focus on insurance, reinsurance, and transfer of financial disaster risk from governments to capital market investors through catastrophe bonds. In 2019, UNDP and the Insurance Association of Kosovo signed a memorandum of understanding to promote these issues, but there has been no further progress on the matter. The private insurance programs that are in place and address common hazards have been proven to be operational and do work when needed, as in the example of COVID-19. 32 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Component ➋ Information  Criterion 2.1: Community Engagement  Indicator 2.1.1: Program for Local Level Volunteer Emergency Responders  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Local responders are the first to act. However, if no systems are in place to engage with local volunteers in advance of an emergency, managing disaster response becomes more difficult. It is helpful to engage with volunteer responders early to maximize response effectiveness, significantly reduce response times, and encourage individual accountability for personal and family preparedness. Informants’ opinions echoed a general sentiment about volunteerism in Kosovo having been stronger in the past. There is a need to better connect existing local systems that do function with policy being drafted at the governmental level, which often does not take local realities and needs into consideration. Programs for engaging and training volunteers in firefighting and first response exist on paper and are mainly drafted by factories as part of individual response plans that meet standard requirements. The strongest program that actually provides basic trainings and drills for search and rescue is that of the Red Cross. The Red Cross has branches in 26 of Kosovo’s 38 municipalities; however, the Red Cross reaches the whole population using the 26 branches as bases. There are several programs run at the headquarters, including one on disaster and emergencies. The entire Red Cross network includes over 3,000 active volunteers, 200 of whom were active in the COVID-19 crisis. Its basic emergency responder train-the-trainers program works together with EMA in educating local communities and providing basic training, drills, and knowledge. The basic emergency responder program offered at the headquarters provides basic equipment to its trainees. The program is not funded by the government notwithstanding the requirement under the national law, and results are tracked internally by the Red Cross but not by EMA. The Red Cross is active in over 75 percent of communities within the jurisdiction and uses and integrates government first responders, including firefighters and medical professionals, in the drills of local volunteer emergency responder teams. Indicator 2.1.2: Program for Community Education Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Addressing preparedness and response at the local level can raise awareness of specific threats and help communities to prepare and engage in problem solving prior to and during a disaster. Further, these programs ensure communities know what local action to take when warnings are issued and thus reduce pressure on response services during widespread and/or more intensive disasters and emergencies. The diagnostic did not find long-term local emergency preparedness and response programs for general emergency preparedness. The one exception is programs operated by the Red Cross, which collaborates with EMA to annually send earthquake simulator trucks to schools in local municipalities to promote preparedness education. Such programs are not centrally budgeted or funded. Plans for educating the public about vaccines by the Ministry of Health and about forest fires by the Firefighting Association have been formed in the past, but these efforts ceased operating because of lack of budgeting. Each program’s content was appropriate to the specific hazard being addressed (earthquakes, health risks, forest fires), but as delivery of most programs has been discontinued, it is not possible to attribute individual and community responses to what has or has not been learned from such programming. This situation points to a significant gap in central-level planning for education in community preparedness, especially since lack of programming does not allow for results on the ground to be gathered or reviewed for purposes of information sharing. Indicator 2.1.3: Program to Support Small-Scale, Community-Led Mitigation Works Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Mitigation of risk at the local level with support from the community helps raise overall risk awareness while reducing the effects of a disaster and promoting rapid recovery following an event. Examples might include retrofitting irrigation equipment for secondary use in wildland fire suppression, local riverbank stabilization, etc. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 33 Risk mitigation on the local level remains an underdeveloped field. Since 2010, the UNDP has been initiating various programs that feature tools for municipalities to use in local risk mitigation and in addressing local climate-related hazards. The diagnostic learned that some of the programs have not been implemented due to lack of manpower at the municipal level, while others were implemented successfully through drills that exposed gaps in local community emergency preparedness, but were not part of a long-term plan. Indicator 2.1.4: Education and Tools for Local Leaders Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Local leaders, elders, and community groups have an important role to play in overall disaster risk reduction. Engaging and training the community leadership in proactive risk management can improve the overall effectiveness of the emergency management program in all phases, ensuring integration with all levels of government and establishing a local culture of preparedness. The diagnostic did not identify education programs intended for community leaders or regional information-sharing forums that aimed to establish a culture of preparedness. In times of emergency, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic, communication between national and local levels that enables the necessary tools to assist local leaders is in place and reportedly works well. Local response is largely coordinated through international organizations such as UNDP and provided through local organizations. Criterion 2.2: Early Warning Systems  Indicator 2.2.1: Functioning Monitoring/Surveillance Program  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Monitoring and surveillance mechanisms and the ability to disseminate the information they generate are the foundation of an effective early warning system. Ideally, there should be an existing system that allows for the prediction and forecasting of potential hazards, grounded in sound science and technology. This system should be able to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Ongoing and frequent monitoring and surveillance of hazards increases the likelihood of accurate and timely warnings. Since there are multiple hazards, there should be a certain level of coordination across sectors/ministries in order to understand and possibly leverage existing monitoring and surveillance systems. The Geological Survey of Kosovo monitors seismic activity in the territory and analyzes seismic activity in the area. Data collected from six stations across Kosovo are shared with international experts and used to conduct professional studies and inform standards and building codes. The Geological Service can monitor seismic activity in real time; however, it is not an alert system. The Hydrometeorological Institute (at the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning) monitors and provides information on water levels that span the entire jurisdiction through 30 hydrological stations; 11 of them are online stations that provide data every 15 minutes. The online stations, which are controlled remotely, have critical thresholds; when water levels rise to reach the threshold, four section employees (the entire relevant section) are alerted through text messaging from the online stations that additional measuring is needed. The remaining stations are equipped with sensors but require physical field access and actual downloading of the data into databases. Flood risk warnings are provided to the media by MESP. Surveillance is active 24/7. Monitoring is active eight hours per day. At the national level, accountabilities relating to earthquake hazard monitoring are shared between EMA and the Geological Service, which are seeking to create a map of seismic risk for the jurisdiction. The data on vulnerability of buildings in Kosovo rests with EMA, while the geological data on seismic risk necessary to complete the picture is with the Geological Service. The resulting model will be able to better inform decision-makers about buildings that are not earthquake-resistant, which includes about 80 percent of buildings in Kosovo today. An accurate map such as the one being created can be shared with European counterparts, both to provide up-to-date information on efforts to bring old and dilapidated buildings up to code and to record the amount and quality of materials needed for the risk code parameters as well as the design of the buildings themselves. These maps can also inform engineers. Architects play a significant role in this process as they are the main users of the code in planning new buildings. 34 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Indicator 2.2.2: Sound Data Analysis Program Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: The analysis of data gathered by monitoring and surveillance systems is crucial to any early warning system. The data gathered should be analyzed using scientifically and technologically sound methodologies to ensure that the information being disseminated is accurate, useful, and timely. The Geological Service recognizes Sphere standards and is working on microzoning studies for important urban zones portioned under Eurocode 8, which is the acceptable standard in Europe. The Hydrometeorological Institute in the MESP collaborates with neighboring countries on a regular basis as part of the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS) and regularly receives awareness and alert information. A German pandas data-sharing model is in use, and the data are being shared with Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Germany. Predictive event modeling is within the professional scope of organizations interviewed, and a yearbook is issued annually and made available online with precipitation data based on the Standard Precipitation Index. However, the ability to use and apply predictive event modeling is often hindered by constraints within the system, which is understaffed, underbudgeted, and subject to political concerns. The Geological Service, for example, currently has three experts collecting data from all six stations and performing all office tasks as well. The system is organized in a simple vertical way, which leaves little to no room for horizontal tasks and results in a silo effect, as described in the USAID (2012) report on human and institutional capacity development in Kosovo. The open problem of dam failure risk is another example. Kosovo has several dams holding artificial lakes, none of which have sensors. Placing sensors is largely a policy decision, and falls between several jurisdictional lines: sensors would be operated locally, by the municipalities to which they belong, and their output would be monitored by their department; but ownership of the dams themselves is not clearly defined, since electricity production is a state affair while its transmission is private, as are several small hydropower stations. Seismic stations are not equipped with redundant systems that enable hazard data analysis despite power outages, and crowdsourced data are not incorporated into hazard data analysis as a secondary source of data about possible events. The information that is available to the public is currently for viewing or downloading only. Indicator 2.2.3: Real-Time Warning Messages Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Functional early warning systems deliver clear, simple messages containing useful information to affected or at-risk populations. This information empowers individuals and communities to take action and adopt protective behaviors that save lives. Messages need to be straightforward and action oriented. They should be consistent across multiple media platforms and message delivery systems. The Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters names the ministry responsible for organizing the system of warning at the country level, and specifies that the system is to be managed at the central, regional, and local levels (Republic of Kosovo 2011). Alerts are disseminated to the public through various media channels, including social media, by EMA or MESP. The MESP handles media coverage of events related to flooding, and EMA handles the remainder. The media itself is aware of how to inform the public of the risk with a system of color codes used by both ministries (red, yellow, and green, from most to least urgent situation). In case of an emergency, TV and radio programming can be interrupted and warnings are issued to the public. Information has not been found regarding use of best practices in communicating with vulnerable populations. Stakeholders acknowledge the issue of not being able to reach people who do not own a cell phone or television set, but beyond that, the inability to issue warnings in a variety of languages is recognized as a gap. It is being filled by the Red Cross and UNDP to a minor extent. Formal message-sharing protocols are in place between the MESP, the Geological Service, and EMA; once an alert is issued from a professional authority to EMA, word goes out to the police force and to local municipalities, which tell their civil emergency departments to take action. On the social media front, all alerts are shared on the Web once they are posted. Though solid agreements with TV and radio are in place, sharing of flood warnings with telecommunication companies is reportedly difficult. The MESP is currently focusing on issuing warnings through local municipalities that are particularly at risk, in order not to overstretch available resources. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 35 Indicator 2.2.4: Functional Warning Message Distribution Systems Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Critical early warnings based on sound analysis and high-quality data are effective only if delivered rapidly to the population at risk. To be effective in reaching the target population, warning messages must be delivered near simultaneously across multiple media platforms, such as television, radio, social media, and mobile phone text message. By ensuring “last mile” connection for early warnings, at-risk populations are able to take lifesaving actions within the community to reduce the consequences of disasters and emergencies. The main warning method is through TV and radio broadcasts. According to Regulation GRK - NO. 18/2013 for Organizing and Operation of Monitoring, Notification and Warning System, TV and radio broadcasts together with alarm signals and website notifications should be the main form of warning in case of emergency. Use of alarm systems is the responsibility of 112 centers and of municipalities, as are system testing and maintenance. During the review, counterparts reported that sirens are in place in Pristina, but not much information exists regarding the state and maintenance of the sirens themselves and whether they are functional during emergencies. The interviews specified that at the community level, church bells and mosque sound systems are also used to alert the public in cases of emergencies. Criterion 2.3: Information Management Systems Indicator 2.3.1: Functional Information Management System  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: The use of a common Disaster Management Information System (DMIS) by all emergency management personnel improves overall situational awareness, decision making, and response coordination. A system based on commercial off the-shelf (COTS) software that is interoperable with common systems in use by international agencies can improve overall response and increase training opportunities for personnel across agencies. Despite the centralized nature of the EP&R system in Kosovo, introducing a functional common information management system is observed to be a challenge. A possible exception to this was discussed in the desk review: the multi-hazard database DesInventar, an open access website for professional use whose development was financed by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. The R2R diagnostic found that the database is updated using information from the Kosovo Environmental and Spatial Protection Agency and the Geological Service, which provides geographic information system (GIS)-based information regarding flash floods and floods, geohazards, erosion layers, environmental hot spots (including minerals or hazardous materials in areas that are not properly maintained and therefore pose a risk to the population), existing mines, and dangerous deposits in the terrain. Cartographic information is sent every six years based on satellite images. There is no system of identification of wildfires aside from the “eyes on the ground,” and currently EMA is working with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to implement the National Forest Fire Information System warning system for wildfires following the Northern Macedonia model. However, DesInventar Sendai—the latest version of the product—is a database and not an information management system, and its contents are currently used mainly to inform professionals using data from past disasters. The situation on the ground seems to be governed by laws that delegate top-down linear responsibilities through centralized control—an arrangement that hinders interoperability because it leaves little room for common discussion outside of actual emergency situations, and at the same time expects professional performance to happen on parallel levels. The ambiguities that still exist in the law prevent information from being shared appropriately even when there is awareness of impending risk, and political decision-making still dominates the field. 36 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Indicator 2.3.2: Budget Allocations for Information Systems Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: A functional DMIS fills a crucial role in supporting situational awareness and organizing information prior to and during a disaster. It is important to ensure that the system is maintained, updated, and upgraded as necessary so that it functions appropriately and valid information is available when required. There is currently no plan for development or maintenance of a DMIS on the horizon. The process of raising awareness about the possibility of a DMIS in Kosovo—as part of a well-aligned, structurally sound EP&R system—has just begun. The idea of such a system is being supported by international organizations such as the UNDP. Should a DMIS be developed in Kosovo, it would largely be reliant on international funding. Indicator 2.3.3: Integration of GIS-Generated Data in DMIS Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: The availability of geolocated information within the DMIS provides superior situational awareness for planning, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts. Real-time updates of GIS data, often by mobile and wireless device users, provide current data for disaster and emergency response and recovery planning. GIS data are readily available and well maintained by the Kosovo Geological Service and EMA, but the data, including layers containing risk information, are not mutually available as discussed above in the case of creating risk maps. Indicator 2.3.4: Integration of Early Warning Data in DMIS Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Early warning systems provide data that are crucial for analyzing the potential impact of an incident. The integration of early warning system data with the DMIS enhances situational awareness and allows for the dissemination of a comprehensive common operating picture for all responding agencies. Given the challenges to the implementation of DMIS in Kosovo, this indicator scores zero. Despite the existence of geolocated information in Kosovo, it is not available through a DMIS system or accessible to multiple users outside of specifically defined professional circles. Criterion 2.4: Geomatics  Indicator 2.4.1: GIS Capacity  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: GIS can be a powerful tool for planning, preparedness, response, and recovery by organizing and making available information on hazards, vulnerabilities, and resources for emergencies. GIS can also be a powerful tool in promoting public risk reduction by helping populations better understand current risks. The Kosovo GIS portal is in the process of creating a new and upgraded geomatics system for the users of the current system (professionals and the public). Though users remain the same, the process of data sharing and transfer exemplifies gaps within the EP&R system. GIS is largely available to responder services in Kosovo, though counterparts report a need for increased capacity in its use throughout the jurisdiction. This is because despite the fact that emergency operations centers (EOCs) and command post facilities make use of GIS, the capacities are used per organization and are not part of an integrated, interoperable platform. The current system, which is a licensed ARC GIS system, is shared with the Kosovo Security Forces. But if organizations wish to share the information between them, they must do so on a situational, ad hoc basis. As EOCs are understaffed, they do not retain GIS specialists who can assist decision-makers or incident commanders in better use of the system during the decision-making process. The system is public through a link on EMA’s website. Though not all layers are accessible to the public, the system can be used to inform the public by helping them understand the risk they face. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 37 Indicator 2.4.2: Georeferenced Data Layers  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Interoperable GIS improves situational awareness and response efficiency, and can prevent further damage or loss of life. Responding agencies and emergency management personnel should have interoperable systems based on common baseline data layers. This foundation significantly contributes to the common operating picture and efficient information flow between responders and integrated command agencies. Seismic risks have been mapped through the assistance of the IPA DRAM (2017) risk mapping survey; however, no new comprehensive surveys have been conducted since. Zoning has been performed for the entire jurisdiction, and microzoning has been completed for the seismically sensitive area of Gjilan and one neighborhood in Pristina, both financed through international donations. To inform the new system, mapping has been performed on a municipal basis, and the system will include information about water quality, air quality, wind speed, and risk for wildfires. Historical data are and will be available for planning use, though the availability and access to data in the system are subject to legal constraints: policy makers who want access to data considered private or protected must jump through various bureaucratic hoops, and there are no particular legal agreements in place to facilitate this process. In the same vein, georeferenced data on vulnerabilities are available but not currently accessible. The new system will be mobile device enabled through an application and is expected to roll out during the next year because of the advent of COVID-19. Indicator 2.4.3: Standards for Georeferenced Data Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Ensuring that data conform to a standard lowers overall operating costs for the GIS while ensuring the data quality is maintained. This enables faster processing and interpretation of the data and increases confidence in the models and outputs from the system. These efficiencies lead to more rapid and informed response operations with higher confidence in decisions. Implementing a georeferenced data standard is urgent and should be aligned with the new GIS portal that will be implemented and the more common GIS platform being developed. It is challenging to respond to this indicator, given that the current system is used by more than one agency—not because it is interoperable but because it is centralized. A centralized system may leave less room for lateral professional growth and development within its ranks on the ground, and this is precisely the problem that the professional response systems in Kosovo seem to have. Jurisdictional standards for compiling and managing GIS data exist because the Kosovo Geological Survey operates under government mandate for compiling existing data—but standards for interpretation of the GIS data received are purely professional and do not exist as part of a law or a binding operational procedure. The same logic applies to periodic verification of GIS data collection and storage with applicable standards. Indicator 2.4.4: Standardized and Periodic Process for Updating Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: GIS data must be current and reliable in order to have value for emergency management activities. A system that regularly updates the information ensures that the information is always useful. It also improves situational awareness for focusing preparedness activities by increasing understanding and transparency about how hazardous areas, community vulnerability, etc., are established. The Geological Survey of Kosovo updates its maps annually on the basis of satellite images and feedback with municipalities. In the feedback process, maps are dispatched to cities to inform them of the boundaries of their designated communities. Changes in the boundaries are not allowed, and structures are subject to inspection to prevent illegal building pending penalty by the environmental inspectorate together with local park directorates. Prior to inspections, geodata from the previous year based on terrain observations and satellite images are consulted. Data are stored and backed up in the system, and interventions are also monitored by authorities involved. Georeferenced situational awareness information is not updated in real or near real time. 38 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Component ➌ Facilities  Criterion 3.1: Emergency Operations Centers Indicator 3.1.1: Available Emergency Operations Centers  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: An emergency operations center (EOC) must be supported by sufficient backup systems, including power, heating and cooling, communications, staff, and operational resources (such as security, break rooms, planning/meeting rooms, media center, etc.). Ideally, an EOC would have a backup facility that is at a geographically distant and safe location and fully capable of operation in the event the primary EOC is not available. During emergencies, the jurisdiction has in it multiple EOCs. Each region has its own municipal center, with the main national EOC under the Ministry of Interior. It is reported to be staffed 24/7 throughout the year, with two rooms, systems that respond to all emergencies, and the ability to support itself should power be lost. However, there are no SOPs in place for continuity or critical service disruptions. Budgeting for the EOC falls under the general EMA budget and does not involve a specific or designated budget line. The EOC normally handles smaller emergencies (requiring the dispatch of search and rescue operations via email correspondence with local municipal EOCs) and is staffed with one liaison officer. The Red Cross has its own EOC as well, equipped with communications systems (including radio communications) and two backup generators. The Red Cross also has representatives in the Ministry of Interior’s EOC. Indicator 3.1.2: Mobile Command Post Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Mobile command post facilities typically include space for incident management activities in a controlled environment (secure, sheltered, etc.). The ability to accurately communicate site conditions, resource needs, and other information to the EOC is necessary. This requires reliable backup communication capabilities and the ability to operate in a self-supporting mode for some period, ideally 36 to 72 hours, without resupply. There are four mobile command posts available in Kosovo, all in a state of readiness for deployment. They are able to gather data, are reported to provide voice and video communication capabilities, and are equipped with resources to be self-supporting for up to 72 hours. They have not been used in incident command to date, so their functionality within the disaster response system has yet to be put to the test. It is also challenging at this point to accurately assess the establishment of standards for mobile command post criteria. Indicator 3.1.3: Clear Lines of Authority Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Policy and authority must be clear for activation of the EOC and for the required staffing, fiscal authority, and operational responsibilities, including the role of elected officials, government staff, NGOs, and other supporting entities. How the EOC will function in relation to other governments (federal, territorial, municipal) and potential foreign disaster agencies or corporations should be spelled out in advance of an emergency. The National Response Plan details the structure for the operation of emergency operations centers in Kosovo (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 24). Regional branches for local authorities or intragovernmental operations centers are headed by coordination and incident management groups, which delegate authority to a joint command in the field, supported if needed by a regional command, which then supervises incident command posts. Criteria are in place for the deployment, partial deployment, and demobilization of the centers post-emergency. However, as the structure has not been tested during an actual emergency, it is difficult to ascertain how closely actual practice would follow regulations on paper, in particular where regional/local lines of authority are concerned. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 39 Indicator 3.1.4: Standardized Process for Social Media and Crowdsourced Data Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: To control the messaging surrounding an incident, it is necessary to know what is being said on social and conventional media and to respond to rumors and incorrect information with an authoritative voice and clear messaging. Collecting, aggregating, and analyzing media can help to identify needs for messaging, and can be valuable tools for analyzing the effectiveness of messaging and overall response. This indicator scored a zero because there is no designated staff or software for the process of interfacing with social media. In discussions of early warnings, however, informants appeared to be aware of the importance of social media platforms. Criterion 3.2: Training Centers  Indicator 3.2.1: Capacity of Training Centers  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: A training center will have limited effectiveness unless it has the capacity to meet the needs of the targeted trainees. Dedicated resources for training will meet both general and specific needs of the training audience. The need for training centers is outlined in general terms in the Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters. Article 4 lists training as one of the responsibilities of those engaged in rescue activities: “training and professional skills of protection rescue and aid tasks” is considered among the “basic tasks of the protection system against natural and other disasters” (Republic of Kosovo 2011, 4). Training as a responsibility is not delegated to a specific authority or placed under a specific entity but falls rather under the general auspices of the state. This arrangement makes budgeting for training centers problematic. In the interviews conducted for the R2R diagnostic, many of the organizations reported that they share training grounds and that this situation is insufficient for their training needs. All counterparts expressed the need for better facilities in order to increase professional capacities. This need was expressed even by organizations that currently have and maintain their own facilities, such as the Pristina International Airport, whose facilities include accommodations and hygiene aids, albeit basic and in need of updates. The Kosovo Red Cross hosts multiple, year-round trainings for trainers on emergency management (among other subjects) and uses the facilities of the Kosovo Police Force, but finds the military facility an inappropriate setting for a humanitarian organization. Indicator 3.2.2: Options for Multi-agency Training Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Multi-agency training centers will allow interagency training and will also reduce costs by avoiding the need for training centers for specific disciplines. Beyond responders, the public and volunteers should have access to training centers to promote a bottom-up approach to emergency preparedness and response. As existing training centers are few and needs are many, it could be said that facilities accommodate all types of personnel to be trained. However, this is a result of circumstances rather than of planning. The case of the PIA is different because it routinely schedules a variety of trainings in addition to firefighting, medical, and security training. The PIA center is not accessible to the public, and jurisdictionally its force is responsible for serving a radius of only 8 km outside the airport. 40 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Indicator 3.2.3: Utilization and Maintenance of Existing Training Centers Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: A strategic plan and operational budget for use of a training site will ensure site optimization; engagement with multiple responder agencies and the private sector should be explored and formalized. Training centers can function effectively as secondary EOCs or regional command posts, if properly designed. The facilities must be maintained to a high standard and equipment kept current with the equipment being used in daily operations by rescue and response services. Training centers are modular and can be converted into classrooms rapidly, and all centers adhere to a preset schedule and rotate classes according to a yearly plan. Photographs show a well-maintained environment with capacity to teach students both on site and remotely through online means. Training is not budgeted individually, but as part of EMA’s budget for goods and services. EMA’s annual budget for 2020 was €1.4 million, of which €1 million was for goods and services and €40,000 was for utilities. Indicator 3.2.4: Geography and Location of Training Sites Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Geography and accessibility are key to training the maximum number of agency personnel and public volunteers. Exploring partnerships with academic institutions and ensuring proximity and easy access to transportation will improve usage patterns for training centers, in turn increasing the opportunity for collaborative learning and establishing a culture of preparedness across public, private, nongovernmental, and academic sectors. Location of training sites depends on the location of host institutions, as is the case with PIA. The training centers have resources to teach remotely, including the police training centers at which the Red Cross trains, and transportation hubs are sufficient to host partners for drills and trainings. Criterion 3.3: Logistics Warehouses and Response Stations  Indicator 3.3.1: Entities and Frameworks for Logistic Hubs and Warehouses  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Logistics management is often a complex process even during ordinary (non- disaster) periods. Due to this complexity, suitable and sustainable networks should be developed and maintained as part of a disaster preparedness plan. Logistics hub networks, including warehousing storage facilities, should be able to work with the private sector, government, and NGOs to successfully coordinate incoming international aid and distribute it to domestic areas in need. EMA is the lead agency for all international and domestic aid and is also responsible for coordinating deployment and storage of emergency supplies during disasters. However, during times of war or when Kosovo’s integrity is threatened, authority is transferred to an Interministerial Governmental Group, which has the authority and competency to distribute goods. The location, quantity, and quality of the goods remain a state secret until the need emerges; this arrangement is meant to keep the stock safe from poisoning or any other type of exposure to risk, including disinformation. The facilities used are contracted from private entities on the basis of a three-year strategic plan and not owned by the state. The compensation is a barter for 20 percent of the goods stored. Under the law, the stock should be enough for a minimum of 20 days, but this requirement is not met due to financial issues. International aid is supposed to be coordinated through and received by EMA. The Pristina Airport has not received international aid before but is prepared to do so if necessary and has a good working relationship with EMA. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 41 Indicator 3.3.2: Capacities of Logistic Warehouses Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Beyond having a network of logistic hubs for distribution of goods and materials, operations management and the physical structure of logistic warehouses are key to increased resiliency during disasters. Warehouses must have the size, staffing, budget, and equipment to successfully intake, sort, maintain, store, and eventually distribute both perishable and nonperishable items and other equipment. As part of the three-year plan by which they are contracted, warehouses are meant to be professionally equipped to deal with the goods that they store, with appropriate staffing and administration. Logistics hubs are distributed throughout the country and not located in vulnerable areas. When goods are received, plans stipulate that they be equally distributed among existent locations. Agreements are also in place for cross-border collaboration with neighboring countries, including storage and mutual assistance. However, since warehouses and storage structures are not government owned and are not used for long periods of time, they are not necessarily resilient to environmental factors and natural hazards. Budgets include facility maintenance costs. Indicator 3.3.3: Capacities, Resources, and Abilities of Local Response Stations Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Local response services are a critical resource during a disaster and will be some of the first responders deployed. While local response stations are primarily for daily emergencies, a regional network of response stations will also provide a resource for disasters until more specialized aid is deployed. Daily emergencies will not cease during disasters, and ensuring that local response stations can continue to carry out their regular duties is key to building a resilient population. Local response stations include resources such as ambulances or paramedics, firefighters, police, and search and rescue. This indicator can accurately address capacities of medical response stations only. Medical response stations situated in hospitals are appropriately equipped to handle daily emergency activities. The National Response Plan clearly defines their roles and responsibilities, including collaboration with EMA, and the centers have functioned at surge capacity during the COVID-19 situation. The Ministry of Health has called for the opening of triage centers in hospitals, which has decreased the pressure on emergency rooms and insured continuous function of the system during the prolonged surge period. According to counterparts from the Ministry of Health, the establishment of a dedicated intensive care ward for COVID-19 patients at the Pristina Hospital has served to increase capacity to deal with pandemics in the future through increased procurement of appropriate equipment. Counterparts expressed concerns regarding the level of construction of health care facilities; hospitals and medical centers are not required to adhere to a design code that would ensure greater resilience and that could facilitate continuing operations during disaster response and recovery. Indicator 3.3.4: Specialized Hazard Response Stations Criteria Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Hazard-specific response stations may be housed or designated in the same structure as local response stations with dual trained personnel. However, specialized equipment may be needed to respond to specific disasters or hazards that are typically beyond the capacity of local response stations. Hazard response stations may also be centralized as standard response situations are less common, but their equipment and trained personnel should reflect local threats and hazards. Local response stations do not typically respond to disasters for prolonged periods, so specialized teams are required. The National Response Plan indicates that “in some cases, government agency in the local territory may act as the first responder and may ensure the management and assistance in accordance with its legal responsibilities and authorities. Normally, in majority of the incidents, local and regional resources and inter-municipal mutual assistances provide the first line of emergency response and support for the incident management” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 20). The structure of first response in Kosovo is unique because of the unusual division of responsibilities between the national and local levels where firefighting is concerned. Funds for firefighting at local level make up about 5 percent 42 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment of municipal budgets for the entire municipal emergency system; as a result, local first response is underbudgeted and many times limited in its ability to respond to local emergencies by lack of training and equipment. When overwhelmed, municipalities commonly call for assistance from neighboring municipalities, and an additional “third response” for specific emergency needs comes from security forces as well. A hazard-specific response following a disaster that overwhelms local systems is dealt with according to the national structure for incident management in the National Response Plan, which “determines clear flow of communication and coordination from the local to regional level and to central offices” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 22). In Section 4.3.11, the National Response Plan calls for an Operations Center of Emergency Management Agency (OCEMA), a multi-institutional center whose function is to coordinate the central response to national level incidents and implement emergency management programing. Though EMA holds the OCEMA as its functional arm in support of incident management operations on the ground, it is meant to act mostly as a supportive center that coordinates the deployment of advanced response needs based on information collected through situation reports. Despite the clarity of the legal framework, information regarding response stations has been challenging to obtain. Locations and numbers of firefighting response centers have not been shared despite specific requests, though capabilities exist to deal with complex emergencies for sustained periods of time in specific zones. Health care facilities are located across the 38 municipalities of the jurisdiction according to a three-system division: primary health care (family centers and ambulances spread throughout the municipalities), general regional hospitals (seven in number), and a university clinical center in Pristina. Criterion 3.4: Shelter and Open Spaces  Indicator 3.4.1: Infrastructure for Emergency Housing and Temporary Shelter  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Temporary shelters and emergency housing are potentially expensive. Preexisting partnerships to use land and provide shelter help defer or lower costs while reducing response time. Temporary housing is not meant to be permanent but should provide the basics of sustainable living, including protection from the elements, security, and a space for mental well-being. Organizing shelter resources during a disaster (rather than before) is not pragmatic and not likely to provide suitable protection to a displaced population. The capacity for sheltering falls short in Kosovo, with too few basic facilities available. Although the mandate for temporary shelters belongs, by law, to municipalities, the capacity has been confirmed to exist only with international or governmental organizations. The Red Cross has 300 tents that can be deployed to house families of up to five people for short periods of time and that can withstand winter conditions. But these tents are likely stored in EMA facilities, and their actual deployment will be more of an ad hoc solution than part of a structured plan. Other units are confirmed to be available at the PIA and the KEC for operational continuity purposes only. Regarding open spaces, there has been no reference to their use for tent deployment or temporary shelter planning, and it seems that the subject has not yet received attention in local planning. Indicator 3.4.2: Designated Open Space for Disaster and Management Operations Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Open spaces such as parks, vacant land, and green spaces are a natural convergence point for displaced people. They also may be relatively free of structures or debris after a disaster and hence be suitable locations for disaster-specific operations, such as mobile command posts and resource staging areas. Pre-disaster identification and planned use of open spaces will help save time and manage resource deployment during a disaster. The need-based designation of open spaces for mobile command posts, standby areas, landing zones, and areas for vehicles is regulated by a legal act, Regulation No. 8/2013, which addresses the contents and procedures of drafting emergency response plans. The act specifies the agreement and compensation to be arranged when open spaces need to be used in an emergency. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 43 Indicator 3.4.3: Disaster Evacuation Routes Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Designated and safe disaster routes are key for saving lives and evacuating portable economic resources (such as livestock) before or during a disaster. The local population must also know when, where, and how to access evacuation routes through outreach and education. Disaster evacuation routes have yet to be properly established and maintained. In the future, these routes should be clearly identified to ensure that the local population is aware of their presence and can use them even without the ability to read. Indicator 3.4.4: Safe, Healthy, and Secure Locations for Temporary Shelter Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: While displaced persons may end up in emergency housing for years, the situation should always be viewed as temporary. In the short term, shelter communities often create added risks through overcrowding, crime, poor sanitation, and the absence of services that are well established in permanent communities. The longer the residence in temporary communities, the greater the risk for residents. A realistic timeline for transition to permanent housing should exist; this will also help speed the transition from response to recovery. According to the National Response Plan, “incidents generally are faced at the lowest jurisdictional possible level. Police, firefighters, public health, emergency management and other personnel are responsible for incident management at the local level” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 20). Services are mostly in place, but they have not previously been cohesively provided under emergency conditions. The capacity to serve the needs of such shelters, should they be necessary, does exist within the system and is meant to be delegated to the municipal authorities using the general system elaborated in the National Response Plan. Basic food and water distribution is under the mandate of the local municipality together with Red Cross volunteers. Public health centers are identified across the jurisdiction and have the ability to provide services to shelters. The Ministry of Defense of Kosovo is responsible for deploying security expertise on a national level should local authorities be overwhelmed with the security situation (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 14). 44 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Component ➍ Equipment  Criterion 4.1: Emergency Social Services Indicator 4.1.1: Medical Responders, Prehospital Health Care, and Medical Transportation Resources for Casualty Care  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Emergency medical care is required during disasters and emergencies. Systems need to be maintained to ensure communication and the tracking and documentation of injuries and patients transported from the field to the hospital (from admittance to discharge). Appropriately equipped responders with medical training or environment-specific first aid are the ideal personnel for transporting patients to higher-level medical facilities or hospitals. Emergency medical care is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health in Kosovo. The ambulances available have all been donated and are therefore not uniform. Current ambulances are equipped with the ability to document and monitor the illness and injuries they respond to. Ambulances are reported to be well maintained; staffs are appropriately trained, though not sufficient in number or type. The Ministry of Defense in its role as “third responder” has medical teams that support first responders carrying out urban search and rescue (USAR), water rescue, and mountain rescue. Knowledge and capacities are being increased in Kosovo’s emergency health care system by the Ministry of Defense, which is training teams as part of the transition toward “101 medical teams.” These teams will be able to give advanced medical support to civilians and will also have field hospital capabilities. The process is expected to take 10 years, with the first field hospital completed in three years. The process of advanced training will also improve triage abilities of medical first response teams, and should enable the performance of field surgery within three years. Indicator 4.1.2: Disease Prevention and Core Services Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: A breakdown in public health and WASH (water, sanitation, hygiene) after disaster and large-scale local emergencies is the largest contributor to disease outbreak. Countries or regions that have underdeveloped public health and WASH services may already have unchecked diseases; in more developed countries, diseases may present themselves only after a disaster or large-scale emergency. A country with adequate WASH resources during non-disaster periods will recover far quicker after a disaster. A detailed law for disease prevention exists for the jurisdiction, Law No. 02/L-109 for Prevention and Fighting Infectious Diseases. The law elaborates on responsibilities for supervision and control over disease prevention at the national, regional, and local levels. It also discusses in detail the monitoring of hygiene services and water sources to maintain appropriate sanitary conditions to prevent the spread of disease. Following a World Health Organization study that found a high risk of communicable diseases for Kosovo, the disease surveillance system was reformed in 2012. Since then, it has been functioning in collaboration with international organizations such as the UNDP, which has been following the system closely and supporting its development. The Malisheva region has increased disease control and prevention activities due to annual outbreaks of hemorrhagic fever. Although the region is rural and has high illiteracy rates, it is well informed on disease risks and is supported by a designated treatment ward at the Pristina Hospital. COVID-19 manifested strongly in the same area, and mechanisms in place were used to inform relevant emergency outbreak authorities of the virus spread in an efficient manner. The supply of sanitary services to population in case of emergency, including clean water for washing, waste removal, and small-scale electrical supply, are planned by the military but are not currently in place. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 45 Indicator 4.1.3: Social Services Programs Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Vulnerable populations, including groups like women and children who are often targets of violence, are the populations most devastated by a disaster. Certain populations, such as the elderly and those with ongoing mental illness, may not have the ability to take care of themselves. Post-disaster contexts can create conditions that lead to extremes in cultural influences that could either exploit or traumatize specific vulnerable populations. The prevalence of social services has been confirmed, but capacities are said to be limited. Functioning social services are of paramount importance to resilience building throughout the disaster cycle; without them, unmet social needs can rapidly become issues of concern in personal and community resilience building. Awareness of the importance of social services is growing through the involvement of international organizations. The Red Cross offers mental health counseling and has a family reunification program called Restoring Family Links. It also supports LGBT groups and childcare during emergencies. There is still need for training and for programs that support the elderly by facilitating access to medication during emergencies. Indicator 4.1.4: Management of Mortality During Emergencies Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Deceased bodies hold minimal physical risk of disease transmission for survivors and responders, but they can attract vector and zoological factors that can cause disease separately. Failure to manage local cultural needs for disposal of bodies will slow disaster recovery. Body identification is important if resources permit, as this may give family members their only opportunity for closure. The lack of proper treatment of dead bodies can result in health hazards to the community, on both the physical and psychological levels. To preempt this possibility, the Kosovo Red Cross has adopted measures concerning sanitary and social treatment of the deceased. At the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies headquarters in Geneva, Red Cross volunteers are trained in appropriate handling of the deceased post-disaster, including religious and community aspects of the process. Availability of local facilities for the emergency handling of the deceased has not been specifically addressed, though designated vehicles for body recovery and transport are confirmed to be in place. Criterion 4.2: Information and Communications Technology Indicator 4.2.1: Availability of Radio Communications in Support of Emergency Operations  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Reliable radio communication forms a crucial lifeline for responders and provides critical information for EOC and command post personnel. Older and unreliable systems compromise safety and operations when they are needed the most. Newer digital systems enhance reliability and provide secure (encrypted) communications, often with text and other advanced capabilities to better manage all communications. The Red Cross uses radios, but among government entities, radio communications are available only to the Kosovo Security Forces. They use Harris Radio on a daily basis, though they do not use repeat relay. Given its limited use, radio technology cannot be said to be relied upon during emergencies. EMA recognizes the importance of enabling radio communications and has set it as a priority goal, though no plans are in place for implementation. 46 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Indicator 4.2.2: Interoperability of Radio Communications in Support of Emergency Operations Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Interoperable radio systems improve situational awareness and response efficiency and can prevent further damage or loss of life. Radio systems for responding agencies should be capable of communicating together in order to allow for a unified response and to ensure efficient information flow between responders, the command post, and EOC as necessary. Emergency operations in Kosovo are greatly challenged by a lack of capacity for interoperable radio communications. Cell phones are currently used in Kosovo for communications that would have been covered by radio. Infrastructure for interoperability is present through the Kosovo Security Forces, but they are not trained in its use, nor is it applicable without partner organizations that are properly equipped. It is anticipated that this situation will improve once EMA implements its initiative for use of radio communications in emergency services. Indicator 4.2.3: Broadband Network Connectivity for EOC Use Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Broadband network connectivity, including connection to the internet, allows for efficient communication between response and relief agencies, incident command posts, and the EOC. This allows voice, data, and video communication that improves situational awareness, provides crucial links to the world outside of the disaster-affected area, and supports use of GIS, incident management systems, and early warning systems technologies. Broadband connectivity is widely available and supports all functionalities of the equipment in the EOC command posts. Maintenance of the system is regular and reliable; however, the functionalities cannot be linked because of the lack of personnel and expertise. Indicator 4.2.4: Protection and Rapid Recovery of Public and Private Sector Communication Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: The general public relies upon communications during and following a disaster event. Hence a program for communication infrastructure protection and recovery must include participation of industry partners and all levels of government. Such participation could require a legislated mandate that ensures cooperation by all parties and provides some level of protection to private business information. The National Response Plan delegates authority to the EMA/Ministry of Interior operations center for “maintenance of communication with the entities of critical infrastructure and exchange of information on key resources of the private sector” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 27). Though broadly phrased, this provision secures the legal framework for cooperation between authorities for rapid recovery of communication infrastructure during emergencies. Criterion 4.3: Hazard-Specific Response Capacity Indicator 4.3.1: Functional Wildland Firefighting Capabilities  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Many jurisdictions, including some heavily urbanized areas, include wildland areas. A functional capacity to prepare for and suppress wildland fires ensures wildland fires are less likely to breach the interface between wildland and built-up areas or communities, causing loss of life and severe economic consequences. As with flooding, wildland fires are often rapid-onset events with little opportunity for evacuation before peak event intensity. Wildland fires differ from fires in urban areas in their behavior and spread and therefore must be addressed with an entirely different set of capacities. Although wildland fires are a recognized risk in Kosovo, the Kosovo Fire Service’s capacity to fight them is limited, in part because there are no helicopters in Kosovo. However, preparedness and prevention are critical stages in the disaster cycle, and extremely effective where reduction of risk from wildland Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 47 fires is concerned. EMA’s prevention department, together with the Forest Agency, is making efforts to educate and inform the public about wildland fires by publishing communication materials and promoting prevention activities in municipalities. Firefighters and first responders regularly visit schools, kindergartens, and other community venues to raise awareness of wildland fires and reduce risks. Indicator 4.3.2: Capabilities for Rescue During Floods or Water-Based Emergencies Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Water-based rescue is a core response capacity in areas where floods or other water risks are prevalent. Specialized training and equipment is mandatory for safety and risk mitigation in water environments. Water rescue is a separate category from coast guard or ocean-based rescue (or rescue from other large water bodies) and requires extremely rapid response deployment to be effective. Floods are a major and reoccurring risk in Kosovo, and the capacity to address them is of primary importance. In addition to the existing flood warning systems, capabilities exist within the Kosovo Security Forces for water rescue and for search and rescue operations that require diving capabilities. The Kosovo Security Forces have a water rescue unit with three rescue boats and diving equipment that is maintained on a regular basis, though because of the uniqueness of the equipment, maintenance services are not always available locally. Indicator 4.3.3: Rescue Capacity for Structural Collapse and Entombed Rescue Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Structural collapse is typified by the victims being buried or otherwise not accessible to the responders. This differs from entrapment, in which victims are physically held by or trapped inside an item but (at least partially) accessible to responders. These two types of rescue disciplines may be present at the same incident and indeed be present with the same victim. In such cases, the rescue is classified as an entombed rescue: the victims are buried and their entrapment is not initially discernable. The Kosovo Security Forces team of responders has been trained by Operation Florian in Britain to respond to all USAR incidents, including the entire array of structural collapse scenarios. The team itself is considered up to INSARAG (International Search and Rescue Advisory Group) heavy capabilities with appropriate equipment, including heat-seeking cameras and a canine unit with two trained dogs. Team members have advanced mountain rescue training and can perform avalanche rescue. Indicator 4.3.4: Functional Hazardous Mitigations Capability Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Hazardous material incidents pose a serious risk to anyone who is not properly protected, including rescuers wearing firefighting equipment. The primary focus at such incidents is to prevent the situation from deteriorating and causing greater harm. Rescue may be secondary. Developing an ability to do more than secure the area and evacuate those at risk requires intense investment in equipment and training. The Kosovo Security Forces perform hazmat inspections and have proper equipment and training to deal with hazmat, including protocols on isolation and post-event inspections. However, there is no hazmat storage in Kosovo. Hazmat storage is considered the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, and there has been an appeal to them regarding this issue. Hospitals have the appropriate capabilities to treat patients who have been exposed to hazmat. 48 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Criterion 4.4: Urban Firefighting and Technical Rescue Indicator 4.4.1: Functional Urban Firefighting Capabilities  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Volunteer fire services are an option in rural or less populated areas. However, full- time services will tend to respond to a greater variety of incidents, as their training level increases with time, experience, and resources. Equipment and training are a major factor in any fire service’s ability to respond. The fire service’s tactics will necessarily reflect its equipment capabilities if responder safety has been fully considered. Firefighting capabilities exist within infrastructure organizations such as the KEC and the PIA, as well as within individual cities. All teams have their own firefighting and technical rescue capabilities, though they differ in their mandates and areas of operation. The territory of Kosovo has 600 active firefighting volunteers in three different units, in the municipalities of Peja, Partes, and Gjilan. Volunteers are reportedly equipped with defunct gear and not organized in professional structures as they were in the past. They volunteer with the fire department through local stations associated with their respective municipalities. A large variety of vehicles, donated starting in 1999 from around the world, is at the disposal of the fire services and in use by volunteers. Vehicles vary in type and quality, and not all can be used. Industrial firefighting is a capability needed and practiced at both the PIA and the KEC, though the airport has jurisdictional limitations and by law can respond only to events that occur within an 8 km radius of the airport itself. The KEC assists in incidents outside its jurisdiction if applicable. Neither of the entities has the ability to extinguish fires in tall buildings because of the absence of laddered vehicles. Though jurisdictional budgets exist, they are not sufficient for the support of urban firefighting readiness. The issue of budgetary and jurisdictional separation/ duality in firefighter employment has been discussed in this report, and there is awareness of this issue among all counterparts who informed the discussion. Indicator 4.4.2: Entrapment and Extrication Rescue Capabilities Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Victim entrapment in a damaged motor vehicle is the most common technical rescue worldwide. Removing the vehicle from the victim, and not the victim from the vehicle, requires specialized equipment, training, and victim care. Such training and equipment may be the basis for responding to other emergency incidents in which a victim or a portion of a victim becomes trapped inside something (household items, farm equipment, commercial/industrial machines, etc.). The Firefighting Service of Kosovo has only basic equipment for lifting entrapped persons, but the Kosovo Security Forces have most of the appropriate equipment needed to conduct entrapment rescue, extraction, and roadside rescue, including breathing support for entrapped victims. Firefighters are trained to use the equipment they have, but not all have advanced knowledge to support crush injuries and handle other medical trauma. Indicator 4.4.3: Functional Rope Rescue Capabilities Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Rope rescue is the basis for other technical rescue disciplines (confined space rescue, water rescue, trench rescue, etc.), which often require ropes, harnesses, anchor and haul devices, etc. to undertake safely. Providing safety regulations for workers will limit death and injury in a high-risk setting. The mountainous area in Kosovo necessitates the presence of a skilled advanced rope rescue unit. The rope rescue unit of the Kosovo Security Forces is trained in performing access-only tasks as well as low, steep, and high angle rescue operations, and performs them in mountainous terrain several times a year. Whether rope rescue skills can be deployed in urban areas is often contingent upon supportive equipment, though teams have the skills and abilities needed to extricate from structural and industrial environments, as well as from canyon and alpine environments. Training schedules and budgets are in place to enable the inspection and maintenance that are required by constant use of such equipment. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 49 Indicator 4.4.4: Functional Confined Space Rescue Capabilities Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Confined space rescue is at the very high end of equipment and training requirements for technical rescue. Such rescues are resource- and trained personnel–intensive. Emergency services able to perform proper confined space rescues are well equipped and trained. This level of emergency service is thus expensive and considered at the apex of emergency response service delivery. Regulation No. 8/2013 on the contents and procedures of drafting emergency response plans explains how rescue plans are composed, including the clauses pertaining specifically to search and rescue activities. The availability of confined space rescuers in Kosovo is quite limited, and as confined space rescue operations can be exceptionally time-consuming, a backup team is always needed. With only one team able to perform part of the specific tasks at hand nationally, it can be said that capabilities to perform confined space rescue are only partially available. 50 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Component ➎ Personnel  Criterion 5.1: Incident Organization Structures  Indicator 5.1.1: Existing Policy for a Common Incident Organization Structure  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Incident organization structures, such as the Incident Command System or the National Incident Management System in the United States, are more successful if the system is directed by policy. Formal policy more strongly encourages response agencies to follow a common and standardized system. Without political backing on a common incident organization structure, all response entities will not have the benefits of a comprehensive, jurisdiction-wide, systematic approach to managing incidents. Ideally an incident organization structure is consistent with international best practice when forming system standards. The National Response Plan establishes an incident organization structure for the coordination of all government- associated response agencies, cooperating international organizations, and the Red Cross: “The framework established from these coordination structures is destined to accommodate various roles the Government plays during the incident, whether central support (through regional branches for local authorities, intra-governmental support,) or direct implementation powers and central responsibilities for incident management when in compliance with the law. This structure also includes dual roles and responsibilities of the Minister of Internal Affairs for coordination of operations and resources in the context of incident management” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 8). The incident organization structure detailed by the plan has yet to be applied among the various organizations in Kosovo, despite the strong legal provisions. In 2017, implementation began for 112 coverage, and today the territory of Kosovo has full coverage served by six system centers. Caller location is implemented through 3D GIS. The system includes the police force, firefighters, and medical first responders. However, the old numbers are still in active use—192 for the police force and 194 for firefighters. The two systems are on the ground and working in parallel through separate centers, and no provisions have been made for transition into a single system. Indicator 5.1.2: Flexible and Scalable Incident Organization Structure Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: A flexible and scalable response structure allows for emergency incident flexibility and promotes user familiarity through a common structure for multiple incident types. The system should apply to any incident regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. This allows various organizations and agencies to work together in a predictable, coordinated manner. The incident organization structure offered by the National Response Plan is flexible and intended to address emergencies on all jurisdictional levels. The framework offered has some ingrained dualities, though they are accounted for as much as possible to avoid pitfalls. The system manages by clear objectives, so it accommodates prioritized response, and it is applicable to any location across the country. At the same time, regulations are vague and as such often leave local leaders to their own devices. Indicator 5.1.3: Training and Implementation Resources Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: An incident organization structure consistent with internationally recommended practices should be supported by resources, including reference materials, training materials, and exercise scenarios that allow responders to practice in a consequence-free environment. These reference and training resources should be provided to emergency responders as well as coordinators who may be working in emergency operations centers. The National Response Plan reflects the fact that on the ground, implementation should be delegated to local actors—primarily municipalities and local response agencies in the form of EMA subsidiaries. The plan accommodates the integration of a wide range of local strategic and operational plans in its framework; it includes and incorporates Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 51 supporting documents such as “contingency strategic plans and procedures” as well as “operational, tactical and specific [plans] for risk or certain incident. Strategic plans are developed by the entities of central level office based on goals, objectives and long-term priorities” (Republic of Kosovo 2010, 54). However, as in most cases, local realities differ from what is stipulated on paper; and training materials, as well as budgets for trained instructors, are very much missing and needed. Indicator 5.1.4: Roster of Trained Personnel and Database of Common Response Resources Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Emergency response agencies are trained and equipped to manage a particular threshold for both number of simultaneous events and event complexity/intensity. When these thresholds are exceeded, the responsible agency must have access to additional resources to effectively manage the emergency. Sharing of personnel and resources through a formal process can ensure collective preparedness of response agencies, help manage cost, and improve response efficiency. This personnel and resource sharing begins with shared understanding of what supports may be available to responding agencies when they are needed most. A roster of trained personnel exists internally on an organizational basis and is not shared between organizations. The Red Cross, the KEC, and the PIA have personnel databases and update them regularly according to their training cycles. The data are not included in a common database and are not accessible from the outside. Criterion 5.2: Training and Knowledge Building  Indicator 5.2.1: Training program in place  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Those within an organization who may be involved in planning for and responding to an emergency should be appropriately prepared. They require a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities and how they fit into the wider emergency preparedness and response system. Training builds capability and capacity for emergency response incidents. Training should also extend beyond those employed by the jurisdiction and include contractors and the staff of voluntary organizations who might support emergency planning or response. A comprehensive training and exercise program is currently in place, though it is stronger for capability-based organizations than for other actors. Among emergency organizations, specific capabilities that have been developed on a professional and/or local basis are shared through trainings, sometimes under the auspices of and supported by international organizations such as the UNDP and NATO. The Pristina International Airport, the KEC, and the Kosovo Security Forces each have training programs that are systematic and robust and have the ability to train firefighters from municipalities in specific capabilities relating to their fields. Indicator 5.2.2: Availability of Qualified Trainers and Appropriate Training Materials Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: A robust training program offers multiple methods of training, including off-site, on-site, instructor-led classroom training, self-directed, hands-on study, etc. While online training for basic concepts may be easy to deliver for those whose primary role is not emergency preparedness or response, in-person training coupled with workshop activities is more meaningful for participants and more easily absorbed. Having a variety of training methods is important to ensure comprehensive understanding of the material. Indicators regarding training, training materials, assessment, and experience and expertise can be addressed together and scored as part of a group because they are informed by similar circumstances. Program materials, outlines, and checklists are available and up to date. Instructors who create and deliver courses are experienced in emergency preparedness, and programs are available throughout the jurisdiction via multiple modes. However, the programs offered by EMA are narrow in scope, and the budget to develop them further is scarce. There is still much room to develop these programs in all categories. As part of this diagnostic, materials were requested to clarify and further inform the situation, but they have unfortunately not been received. 52 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Indicator 5.2.3: Formal Assessment Program Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Regular program evaluation is critical to ensuring a comprehensive and effective training program. Feedback should be obtained from all participants to determine training and instructor effectiveness as well as knowledge or skill acquisition. Analyzing this feedback can identify weaknesses in the training program and aid in closing critical learning gaps that may otherwise compromise effective emergency response operations. Training programs offered by EMA (for firefighters), the PIA, the KEC, and the Kosovo Security Forces all feature certifications, and they all evaluate participants through in-class testing. However, in-class audits and post-classroom follow-up are a weak point in Kosovo in general and could be improved. Real emergency events are not linked back to training to identify potential curriculum and delivery improvements. Indicator 5.2.4: Planning and Tracking of Personnel Development Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: When responder agencies formally and deliberately plan personnel development and track its results, agency-specific capacity can be known. This information provides agencies with heightened awareness and advance knowledge of when additional resources or special emphasis may be required to ensure they have the capacity to continually meet their responsibilities. Responder agencies participate in refresher drills, but otherwise this indicator is challenging to the system in Kosovo because it requires a level of maturity that the system has yet to achieve. t. Criterion 5.3: Exercises and Drill  Indicator 5.3.1: Comprehensive Exercise Program  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: A formal and functional exercise and drill program enables testing of response plans and application of training in a consequence-free environment. Exercises allow for team building within and among responder agencies, especially when exercises and drills are collaboratively designed and delivered. Exercises should reflect appropriate jurisdictional risks and increase in complexity and difficulty as participants and their agencies increase their operational response capacity. According to the National Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters, EMA is assigned as the lead agency for exercise scheduling and design and delivery of drills. The process of drill development is an inherent part of the EP&R system, and drills are therefore developed with participating agencies and response partners to benefit all agencies involved. Drills held with the Kosovo Security Forces in 2019 were considered satisfactory. However, a lessons learned process is not part of the exercise program, and a standard feedback loop is not in place. These gaps, and concerns about the need to monitor and track improvements, are especially important to address in a system that seeks to encourage growth. Indicator 5.3.2: Collaboration and Coordination Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Collaborative and centrally coordinated exercises that involve multiple response agencies provide opportunities for collective learning that could otherwise be realized only during actual emergencies and disasters. Such exercises, while somewhat more complex, are also more reflective of real-world response operations, which tend to involve a variety of sectors and agencies. Joint exercises are performed within the jurisdiction with various response agencies as well as private sector and international organizations involving community volunteers, particularly the Red Cross. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 53 Indicator 5.3.3: Exercises Designed to Validate Response Plans Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Evaluation is the key to a successful exercise. It is where all lessons learned and gaps are identified. An essential part of a successful evaluation process is ensuring objectives are developed based on plans and assessed jurisdictional risks. Clear and concise objectives are key factors that form evaluation criteria and performance measures. A post-exercise report on how to implement changes needs to be carefully documented, tracked, and used during annual work planning for following fiscal years. Drill evaluation occurs after every common exercise, and participant organizations report a learning process that indicates internal growth. However, some also report a need for additional emphasis on community involvement in local drill delivery. Indicator 5.3.4: Robust Exercise and Drill Planning Process Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Exercises can be difficult and time-consuming to develop. Personnel with multiple other duties may not prioritize development of complex field exercises with multiple stakeholders. Significant time and money must be dedicated to develop a robust and useful program. In many cases, large-scale operational exercises have been successful only with year-long planning, a dedicated budget, and experienced exercise planners. Smaller budgets are acceptable as long as the scale of the exercise equals that of the budget. For example, a multi-day, multi-stakeholder, 24/7 exercise would be challenging without the support of a dedicated design and delivery team. A designated budget exists for exercises, though it is likely insufficient. Drills are included in the €1 million for equipment and training that EMA receives annually. EMA ensures that drills and exercises are relevant in design and content to the locales they address. Exercises are contextually relevant and address hazards that affect the territory of Kosovo, such as floods, forest fires, and earthquakes. Criterion 5.4: International Support Coordination  Indicator 5.4.1: Agency Assigned to Coordinate International Support  Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: Designating an agency to officially request disaster relief formalizes and streamlines the assistance request process and improves the speed and efficiency of international aid delivery following widespread and/or intensive emergencies and disasters. Improved capability enables the jurisdiction to make the best use of internationally accepted tools and resources. With this capacity, the jurisdiction can complete advanced planning to identify likely disasters and potential aid requirements. It is also better able to coordinate with international and humanitarian aid agencies as well as other levels of government. Kosovo has agreements with a variety of bilateral and international organizations, including UNDP, JICA, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program, United States Agency for International Development, and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). However, the framework for receiving international aid is not yet defined in the National Response Plan. EMA’s responsibility for coordinating international support is defined by the Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters. A situation in which aid is necessary has not yet occurred, and the workings of the system are not quite there to accommodate one. EMA is essentially a liaison agent between international organizations and the government of Kosovo. Kosovo is not a member of the UN or the EU. However, there is interest in working with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and in participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. This ambition should be supported by the international community. 54 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Indicator 5.4.2: Minimum Standard for Provision of Aid by International Groups Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: The accountable agency for coordinating international support should be aware of international standards that ensure service quality and consistency of aid during very complex and difficult times. Such standards provide formal procedures for collaborative decision-making, identify best practices, and enable performance monitoring and issue reporting. These standards also typically include minimum standards for documentation, an operational framework, and oversight to ensure outcomes are being met. No minimum international standards have been adopted, such as those of Sphere or EU Host Nation Support, although EMA has been assigned as the coordinating agency for UN OCHA in case there is a need for aid coordination. The interface that already exists with international organizations has served as a foundation for the growth of a process to evaluate the quality of international support and determine whether it meets international standards. Indicator 5.4.3: Functional Logistics System in Place to Receive International Support Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: In a post-disaster environment, tight communication and control will be required in order to carry out effective and reliable disaster relief coordination. To enable expedited and efficient movement of aid resources, the agency coordinating support should have agreements or memorandums of understanding established with warehouses, airports, and transportation entities before a disaster. EMA has put a full system of formal agreements in place for the appropriate reception of foreign aid to Kosovo, should it be needed. Currently, however, the agreements are on paper only and have not been tested or rehearsed as part of a drill or an SOP. The reception of such support is based on agreements, but ultimately depends on how these agreements are understood and applied in the field—and systems have yet to be tested. Indicator 5.4.4: Functional Logistics System in Place to Distribute International Support Rationale given by the R2R diagnostic: The capacity to distribute aid resources that have been cached in advance of a disaster, or received immediately following a disaster, is vital to managing the consequences of the event and transitioning to recovery. In particular, determining how aid will be prioritized for distribution and identifying redundant distribution channels for remote and/or unreachable areas are important in advance planning. The functional logistics indicator scores high but (like other indicators under this criterion) has not been tested in practice. Predetermined locations for teams, accommodation for USAR teams, and other logistical measures for distributing aid in remote and unreachable areas are all part of plans that EMA reportedly has (partly in response to the migrant crisis). However, their functionality on the ground is difficult to ascertain. Diagnostic Report – Kosovo | 55 Annex 2 Interview Overview Date Time Institution Contact 09:00–10:30 OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Mr. Edward Anderson Mission in Kosovo 10:45–12:15 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Administration (MIAPA), Mr. Nehat Koçinaj May 19, 2020 Emergency Management Agency, Focal Point and International Cooperation 13:15–14:45 MIAPA, Department for Fire and Rescue Mr. Nexhat Behrami 15:00–16:30 MIAPA, IT Division Mr. Muhamet Mala 09:00–10:30 MIAPA, Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Mr. Hajriz Sejdiu Preparedness Department 10:45–12:15 Prizren Municipality Mr. Faruk Daka May 20, 2020 13:10–14:30 Ministry of Defense, Kosovo Security Forces Col. Ejup Maqedonci 14:45–16:15 National Advisor, Community Safety Program, International Mrs.Drita Pereziç Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 09:05–10:30 Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning Mr. Bashkim Kastrati 10:45–12:10 Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, Kosovo Mr. Përparim Gashi Environmental Protection Agency May 21, 2020 13:10–14:40 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development Mr. Naser Krasniqi 14:55–16:20 Ministry of Economic Development, Kosovo Geological Survey, Mr. Shemsi Mustafa Division of Seismology 09:10–10:40 Kosovo Energy Corporation Mr. Milazim Plakaj 10:55–12:20 Pristina International Airport Kosovo Mr. Afrim Haziri May 22, 2020 13:05–14:35 Ministry of Health Dr. Pashk Buzhala 14:50–16:20 Consulting and Management Group LLC, Kosovo Mr. Arben Shala 09:10–10:30 United Nations Development Programme Mrs. Xhevrije Berisha 10:45–12:10 MIAPA Mr. Ron Krasniqi May 25, 2020 14:50–16:20 Ministry of Economy, Employment, Trade, Industry, Mr. Arton Muçaj Entrepreneurship and Strategic Investments 09:00–10:30 Ministry of Finance Mr. Bashkim Mehmetaj or Mr. Milaim Aliu May 26, 2020 10:45–12:15 Municipality of Pristina Mrs. Medina Braha 14:55–16:20 Kosovo Red Cross Mr. Burim Seferi 56 | Emergency Preparedness and Response Assessment Annex 3 References and Consulted Documents Allied Joint Forces Command Naples. 2019. “Exercise Silver Sabre, 2019-2.” September 30, 2019. https://jfcnaples. nato.int/kfor/media-center/archive/news/2019/exercise-silver-sabre-20192. 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