The World Bank MA R C H 2002 notes NUMBER 63 PUBLIC SECTOR Strengthening legislatures: implications from industrial countries The factors affecting legislative performance in industrial countries offer a frame- work for examining the issues facing reformers of legislatures in developing and transition economies. With more developing and post-communist pendence (Olson and Norton 1996). At one Good governance states embracing democracy, improving the extreme is the U.S. Congress. Because its performance of their congresses, parlia- members are elected separately from the requires improving ments, and other legislative assemblies has U.S. president, their electoral fortunes are become a must. These bodies make laws, only loosely related to his-a setup rein- the performance of hold the executive branch accountable, and forced by a weak party system. As a result represent citizen interests. Good governance members of the president's party face few legistative bodies demands that each of these tasks be done constraints in opposing legislation he backs well. Thus aid agencies have begun sup- or in calling his cabinet members to porting programs that train legislators and account. their staff, provide computers and buildings, Legislators in Germany, the United King- and otherwise strengthen the legislative dom, and other parliamentary systems face branch of government. But while some pro- very different incentives. Parties typically grams have succeeded, the overall results control candidate selection and campaign have been disappointing (Carothers 1999, finance, so voting against one's party can pp. 177-87). be far more costly than in the United States. One reason is that many programs have The electoral interests of legislators in the ignored a key principle of public sector majority are also much more closely aligned reform: success requires changing the incen- with the executive's than in the U.S. system. tives facing public officials (World Bank The executive is drawn from the majority 2000). More effective legislative aid programs in parliament, and that majority will have will require donors to understand what moti- to stand for reelection if it defies the exec- vates legislators and how those incentives utive on an important vote. Thus legislators can be altered. This note surveys the main in parliamentary systems are considerably factors shaping incentives for legislators in less independent of the executive than their industrial countries and suggests how these U.S. counterparts. factors can inform legislative reform in devel- A major determinant of parliamentari- oping and transition economies. ans' independence is whether the execu- tive is formed by a coalition of parties, as is Degree of legislative typical in Germany, the Netherlands, and indcependence other continental countries, or whether it Constitutional structure and party cohesion is drawn from one party, as in the United are key determinants of a legislature's inde- Kingdom (Lijphart 1999, pp. 116-42). Mul- FROM THE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS VICE PRESIDENCY AND POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT NETWORK tiparty governments cannot exert as much Industrial countries have devised differ- control over members of parliament as ent ways of resolving this tension. The pro- single-party governments. cedural rules or standing orders of many The organization and operation of a par- legislatures contain explicit safeguards pro- liament's committees also affect its ability tecting opposition rights. These norms are to act independently of the executive. Leg- often supplemented by long-standing prac- islators from different parties can more eas- tices. In the United Kingdom tradition pro- ily resolve differences in the small group vides that the opposition chairs the settings that committees provide-and the committee responsible for auditing gov- more united the parties, the more influ- ernment spending. Although a legislative ential the legislature. Interparty agreement majority can always change the rules or is often fostered when committee meetings, flaunt convention, it can do so only at some Opposition parties if not closed to the public, at least attract lit- cost to its standing with the public. tle notice. In Germany the constitutional court have the greatest Other features that increase a legislature's serves as the guardian of opposition rights influence include whether committees are (Kommers 1997, pp. 166-80). Over the incentive to permanent or temporary and whether they years the court has issued a number of rul- parallel or cut across executive agency ings upholding the opposition's right to par- oversee responsibilities (Shaw 1997, p. 508). Mem- ticipate in parliamentary committees and bers serving on permanent committees and obtain information from the government. govern ment committees with responsibilities that track Despite the protections afforded to par- those of executive agencies develop greater liamentary opposition in Western Europe, expertise and hence have more scope for parliamentary oversight has declined in independent action. recent years (von Beyme 2000, pp. 81-88). The most likely explanation is the electorate's Rights of opposition parties lack of interest. Although the occasional cor- When the interests of a legislative majority ruption scandal may capture their attention, and the executive branch coincide, the' voters pay little heed to, the details of budget majority has little incentive to oversee the auditsIand performarice reviews (Bach 2000). executive. Doing so could hurt the party's -:.A-legislators .have become more attuned reelection prospects. Absent pressure frorin - to-voter concerns, their interest in sustained, the public, the majority will be reluctant in-depth oversight has waned. to expose malfeasance or missteps by fellow In Australia, by contrast, the legislature .party members in the executive branch- vigorously oversees government (Uhr 1999). and will have even less reason to support The legislature reviews the budget, audits opposition efforts to do so. spending, examines proposed regulation, In all legislatures it is the party or parties and ferrets out abuses of office. The legis- out of power-the opposition-that has the lature has two chambers, and the second incentive to oversee government. The more chamber, the Senate, is the locus of over- government incompetence, malfeasance, or sight. Several small opposition parties hold corruption that is revealed, the better the the balance of power, and opposition con- opposition's chances of winning the next trol provides the incentive to hold govern- election. But the opposition's task is com- ment accountable. plicated by a conflict of interest that arises The Commission to Strengthen Parlia- when the party controlling the executive also ment (2000) recently proposed reforms to has a majority in the legislature. The leg- increase oversight by the British House of islative majority sets the rules for investiga- Commons. One reform would ease parti- tions and debates, and it has a responsibility sanship in committees by reducing parties' to ensure that those rules are fair. But the power over the selection of members. majority also has an interest in shielding party Another would provide more time for mem- .colleagues from embarrassing revelations. bers to question ministers and foster more PREMNOTE 63 MARCH 2002 give and take during the exchanges. A third Improving oversight reform would provide the parliamentary Industrial countries offer examples of steps opposition with a separate research budget. that can be taken to bolster a legislature's As parliamentary oversight has declined oversight role. One is to ensure that rules in Western Europe, other institutions have or conventions enable opposition parties to started to perform this function. Constitu- oversee government. A second is to make tional courts and pan-European courts now sure that members of the majority respect play a significant role in holding govern- these rules and conventions. Where.com- ments accountable. An ombudsman is mitment to minority rights is weak, a con- another widely used accountability device. stitutional court or other third-party In the United Kingdom ombudsmen and enforcer is one option for protecting minor- independent authorities oversee several ity rights. Another is for donors to empha- aspects of executive branch performance size the importance of this issue.in their Legislative aid (Vile 1998, p. 398). And in all Western Euro- discussions with recipient countries. A more pean societies the media and pressure significant reform would be to create a programs should groups help hold governments accountable "house of review," as in Australia. by fueling public pressure for parliamen- begin with a tary action. Providing training Experiences in industrial countries caution thorough analysis of Implications for developing against relying solely on training programs countries to change legislators' behavior. Legislators parties' impact on The experiences in industrial countries sug- respond to incentives-and in the absence gest several considerations for reformers in of incentives to scrutinize government, legislative developing and transition economies. iespond to citizen pressures, or otherwise pursue the public interest, training is unlikely performance Assessing party cohesion to have an effect. Training legislators can Political parties can have an enourmous provide benefits, however. It can inform effect on legislative performance-indeed, deliberations on legislation, and if-as in in industrial countries party cohesion is the many industrial countries-serving in a devel- most important determinant of legislative oping country legislature is a means to higher behavior (Mezey 1993, p. 346). Thus leg- office, training may reach future decision- islative aid programs should begin with a makers at an important point in their careers. thorough analysis of parties' impact on leg- islative performance. Strengthening committees Some legislative aid programs have tried to Securing independent analysis strengthen legislative committees. Indus- Several legislative aid programs have sought trial countries show that partisanship and to create offices resembling the U.S. Con- committee effectiveness are inversely gressional Budget Office and U.S. Congres- related: the less partisan the committee, the sional Research Service, which provide the more effective it is likely to be. Partisanship Congress with independent analysis of the is greater when committee meetings are budget and other issues. But these efforts open to the public. While there are risks have had little success, and industrial coun- to conducting public business in private, try experiences explain why. The majority in there are tradeoffs between the benefits parliamentary systems has no need for-or of open meetings and the need for more interest in-information provided indepen- effective legislative committees. dently of government. Only the opposition does. And the more the opposition uses such Further reading information to criticize government, the Bach, Stanley. 2000. "Incentives and Oppor- greater the majority's interest in abolishing tunities for Oversight: Comparative Impli- or weakening the units that provide it. cations of the American Congressional PREMNOTE 63 MARCH 2002 Experience." Paper prepared for the 2000 Shaw, Malcolm. 1997. "Committee Patterns World Congress of the International Polit- in Parliaments: A Global Perspective." In ical Science Association, Quebec, Canada. Lawrence D. Longley and Attila Agh, eds., [wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ Working Papers on Comparative Legislative courts.htm] Studies II: The Changing Roles of Parlia- Carothers, Thomas. 1999. AidingDemocracy mentary Committees. Appleton, Wisc.: Inter- Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, national Political Science Association. D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna- Uhr,John. 1999. "Generating Divided Gov- tional Peace. ernment: The Australian Senate." In Commission to Strengthen Parliament. 2000. Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony StrengtheningParliament. London: Con- Mughan, eds., Senates: Bicameralism in the servative Party. [wwwl.worldbank.org/ Contemporary World. Columbus: Ohio State publicsector/legal/courts.htm] University. Kommers, Donald P. 1997. The Constitutional Vile, M. J. C. 1998. Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Ger- the Separation of Powers. 2nd ed. Indi- many. 2nd ed. Durham, N.C.: Duke Uni- anapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund. versity Press. von Beyrne, Klaus. 2000. ParliamentaryDemoc- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns ofDemocracy: racy: Democratization, Destabilization, Recon- Government Forms and Performance in solidation, 1789-1999. New York: St. Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, Conn.: Martin's Press. Yale University Press. World Bank. 2000. Reforming Public Institu- Mezey, Michael L. 1993. "Legislatures: Indi- tions and Strengthening Governance. Public vidual Purpose and Institutional Perfor- Sector Group. Washington, D.C. mance." In Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. Wash- This note was written by Richard E. Messick ington, D.C.: American Political Science (Senior Public Sector Specialist, Public Sector Association. Group, PREM Network). Olson, David M., and Philip Norton. 1996. Ifyou are interested in similar topics, consider "Legislatures in Democratic Transition." joining the Legal Institutions Thematic Group. In David M. Olson and Philip Norton, Contact Luba Beardsley (x88164) or Richard eds., The New Parliaments of Central and Messick (x8 7942) or visit www. worldbank. org/ Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass. publicsector/legal. .~ - -This note series is intended to summarize good practice and key policy find- |w §||| ings on PREM-related topics. The views expressed in these notes are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank. PREM- notes are distributed widely to Bank staff and are also available on the PREM website (http://prem). If you are interested in writing a PREMnote, email your idea to Sarah Nedolast. For additional copies of this PREMnote please contact PctReduonandEonomicbBageme the PREM Advisory Service at x87736. Prepared for World Bank staff