FUTURE OF FOOD Building Stronger Food Systems in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Settings Foreword by Juergen Voegele © 2021 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Disclaimer Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) can occur in many settings and can result from tensions that have evolved over years, decades, and even generations. The World Bank Group annually releases a list of Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations (FCS) as a tool to help adapt its approaches, policies, and instruments in difficult and complex environments. The WBG also uses this list for monitoring and accountability around its support for the most vulnerable and marginalized communities. This list—based on publicly available global indicators—does not include all countries affected by FCV nor does it provide a ranking of countries. This report encompasses lessons, data and pictures from both FCV settings and FCS. *Authors This report has been prepared by a core team comprising Robert Townsend, Dorte Verner, Abimbola Adubi, Jean Saint- Geours, Izabela Leao, Armine Juergenliemk, Tim Robertson, Melissa Williams, Flore de Preneuf, Marketa Jonasova, and Zacharey Carmichael with inputs from Lucia Hammer, Ashwini Sebastian, Viviana Maria Perego, and Paul Barbour. Images Front cover: © Pakistan. Flore de Preneuf/World Bank Title page: © Pakistan. Flore de Preneuf/World Bank Interior pages: 2. © Lebanon. Dorte Verner/World Bank 7. © Uganda. Dorte Verner/World Bank 14. © Nepal. Narendra Shrestha/World Bank 15. © Department of Agriculture, Philippine Rural Development Project 36. © Colombia. Flore de Preneuf/World Bank 37. © Egypt. Dorte Verner/World Bank 42. © Uzbekistan. Mirzobek Ibragimov/World Bank FUTURE OF FOOD Building Stronger Food Systems in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Settings November 2021 Foreword Achieving the UN Sustainable Development impact in FCV settings, not just by prevent- Goals is impossible without addressing is- ing hunger, but by creating employment and sues of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV). increasing shared prosperity, which may con- It is estimated that two-thirds of the extreme tribute to greater peace. It reflects the four poor will live in Fragile and Conflict-affected pillars of the World Bank Group’s (WBG) Situations (FCS) by 2030. Strengthening strategy for FCV settings—promote pre- food systems can be a lever of change that vention, remain engaged in crisis situations contributes to ending poverty while main- and conflict, help countries transition out of taining and restoring peace. fragility, and mitigate spillover impacts. It highlights four sets of actions: The relationships between food shortages and revolutions or wars and famines are well 1. Strengthening governance and institution- known and mutually reinforcing. Food inse- al capacity by supporting food programs curity can drive conflict and be driven by the such as those that focus on the welfare of outbreak of violence. In these settings, cor- the entire population, rather than just a ruption is common among those in control of fraction of it; food resources, and military factions have used 2. Preventing and responding to food crises food as a coercive lever to control populations. to avoid not only hunger, but also people Sudden spikes in food prices can lead to social sliding deeper into poverty; unrest as witnessed during 2007–08 and 2011 when global food price increases were associ- 3. Growing the private sector through agri- ated with riots in more than 40 countries. business development, inclusive jobs in agricultural value chains, particularly for The World Bank Group is scaling up efforts women and youth, and rural livelihoods to to support countries facing food security cri- break the cycle of intergenerational pover- ses with a comprehensive approach to crisis ty common in FCV settings; and risk management that encompasses preven- 4. Reducing conflict risk and environmental tion, preparedness, early-warning measures, fragility through resilient and sustainable as well as crisis response and resilience build- resource management in ways that help ing. It is also a champion of long-term food build government legitimacy. systems transformation, to help countries break the spiral of poverty, environmen- This paper is a critical guide for policy makers tal degradation and low productivity, and in uncertain situations. By setting food sys- achieve lasting food and nutrition security. tems up for success, governments can invest in the very foundations of peace and prosperity. This paper focuses on how stabilizing and Advancing the linkages between food and nu- improving food systems can have a positive trition security, sustainable agriculture, climate, BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 3 natural resources, human capital, and peace Bank and essential for ultimately achieving and stability is a top priority for the World the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Juergen Voegele Vice President Sustainable Development World Bank 4 FUTURE OF FOOD Key Messages Improving economic growth, shared prosperity, and extreme poverty reduction in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) settings at regional, national, and subnational, levels is an immense development challenge. In these situations, per capita income growth is persistent- ly low, food crisis situations are prevalent, and extreme poverty and hunger rates are on the rise; most poor people globally will live in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) by 2030. Two-thirds of the increase in global hunger since 2014 is due to the increase in FCS, and at the end of 2020 over 80 percent of acutely food-insecure people lived in FCS, undermining devel- opment due to lost human capital. COVID-19 is amplifying these challenges. Sustained development in FCV settings is constrained by several interlocking characteris- tics: poor governance and weak institutional capacity reflected in a lack of state legitimacy and low social cohesion; inadequate security reflected in active conflict and interpersonal violence; and high exposure to climate shocks. All of these factors manifest in an undeveloped private sector, significant internal displacement, and food crises that are caught in an unending cycle. Food systems in FCV settings need to address these interlocking characteristics to help countries exit fragility. In these contexts, food insecurity is both a cause and consequence of fragility and conflict and improvements to the food system are a foundational element of pov- erty reduction. Food systems are the largest private sector segment and provider of jobs and can help reduce conflict risk and improve social cohesion. Interventions in food systems can help through: • Strengthening governance and institutional capacity via common purpose programs; im- proving accountability, transparency, predictability, and targeting in food distribution, sub- sidy programs, and public investment; inclusion of vulnerable people and lagging regions in programs; and repairing and strengthening national and local government and commu- nity-based institutions that together can help improve state legitimacy and capacity and social cohesion; • Preventing and responding to food crises via monitoring and early warning systems; im- proving crop and livestock resilience to pests, diseases, droughts, and floods, including development and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes; reducing sudden and unexpected food prices spikes; preserving purchasing power through shock-responsive safety net pro- grams; closing gender gaps in access to productive assets; reducing food losses; building longer-term productivity growth; and developing food and input markets; • Creating jobs through agribusiness development via support for inclusive business mod- els, particularly for youth; considering agrispatial solutions to improve security and BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 5 infrastructure for private sector development; restoring, building, and protecting capital stock in food systems; improving the enabling policy environment; strengthening skills and improving access to finance and insurance, including political risk insurance; • Reducing conflict risk and environmental fragility via resilient and sustainable resource management, particularly access to and use of land and water among herders and crop producers; improving land administration for good governance and conflict management; and increasing water and soil preservation to sustain natural capital and reverse natural resource degradation. Food system actions can support progress across the four pillars of overall World Bank Group (WBG) engagement in FCV settings: 1. Promoting prevention of crises and conflict in high-risk settings includes actions to sustain- ably manage access to and use of land and water, promote gender equality, strengthen early warning systems and response capacity, prevent food price spikes, promote inclusion, and im- prove climate resilience; 2. Remaining engaged in conflict and crisis situations that are often subnational includes actions to protect essential institutions, scale up safety nets and food distribution, restore pro- ductive assets, and invest in next-season food production to prevent a worsening cycle of food insecurity and income loss; 3. Helping countries escape “fragility traps” includes actions for longer-term institution building, improving transparency and accountability, women’s equal participation in economic and so- cial life, and investing in longer-term productivity, markets, and private sector development; and 4. Mitigating spillover impacts of FCV includes action to facilitate self-reliance of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to clothe and feed themselves and prevention of ten- sions over resources—land, water, and livestock. These considerations should also guide program design and implementation. Prioritization of interventions should be driven by governments and informed by broad consultation among stakeholders to improve state legitimacy. An initial focus on two or three rapid results can help build confidence, and realistically defined institution building can increase the likelihood of longer-term impacts. Coordination and transparency in development partner and humanitar- ian efforts can improve their effectiveness. Guiding parameters for program design include realism (within resource and capacity constraints), honesty (integration into government bud- gets with systems in place to ensure funds are spent for intended purposes), predictability (to restore the social contract between citizens and the state), and inclusion (to promote social co- hesion). All efforts need to demonstrate results at the community level. Without the emphasis on local results, citizens lose confidence in their government’s ability to provide a better life. 6 FUTURE OF FOOD The Development Challenge in FCV Settings Improving economic growth, shared pros- Development Association (IDA) coun- perity, and extreme poverty reduction in tries in total1 and one-sixth the growth FCV settings at regional, national, and sub- rate of middle-income countries, lead- national levels is an immense development ing to a growing divergence in per cap- challenge. The impacts of fragility, conflict, ita income.2 Even before COVID-19, and violence tend to persist, in some cases for economic growth and incomes in many a generation, leading to prolonged periods of FCS had contracted significantly. Once low per capita income growth, crisis situa- a country enters FCS status, it tends tions, and high and sometimes rising extreme to remain there for a long time. Of the poverty and hunger. Two-thirds of the in- 35 countries on the World Bank list of crease in global hunger since 2014 is due to Low-Income Countries Under Stress in increasing fragility, conflict, and violence, and FY06, over 57 percent have remained in a at the end of 2020 over 80 percent of acutely stressed and fragile state for 17 years and food-insecure people lived in FCS, undermin- appear on the World Bank’s FY22 List of ing development due to lost human capital. Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations. COVID-19 is amplifying these challenges. Most of these countries have been in this state for even longer. While 15 countries • Per capita income growth has been per- have managed to exit fragile status since sistently low. Over the past decade, per 2006 (for example, Angola, Cambodia, capita gross domestic product (GDP) Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, The Gambia, growth in FCS as a group was one-quar- Guinea, Lao PDR, Liberia, São Tomé ter the growth rate of International and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 7 Togo, Tonga, Uzbekistan, and Vanuatu), crises in 2020, by number of people, all 19 other countries have entered FCV are on the World Bank’s FY22 List of status over the same period (for example, Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Syrian Arab (Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic Republic, and the Republic of Yemen of Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nigeria, the in high-intensity conflict; Burkina Faso, Republic of Yemen, South Sudan, Sudan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Syria, and Zimbabwe).7 Hunger and oth- Mozambique, Niger, and South Sudan in er forms of malnutrition are higher in medium-intensity conflict; Lebanon and FCS than non-FCS. Disruptions to food Républica Bolivariana de Venezuela with systems in FCS lead to poor and less nu- high institutional and social fragility; and trition rich diets, which in turn can con- small island states the Federated States tribute to all forms of malnutrition. of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu).3 • Poverty rates and the number of poor people have been increasing. Projections • Agricultural productivity growth has indicate that by 2030, two-thirds of the been low. Overall GDP growth in global extreme poor will live in FCS.8 In FCS has been similar to agricultural these countries, the poverty rate has in- value-added growth, highlighting the creased from 22 percent in 2012 to 37 importance of agriculture in these coun- percent in 2019, with the number of ex- tries. Agricultural labor productivity treme poor increasing from 180 million growth over the past decade in FCS has to nearly 300 million people, close to half been less than half that of IDA countries the current global poor.9 If trends contin- and less than a fifth that of middle-in- ue, FCS will comprise 10 percent of the come countries.4 Over the past decade, world population by 2030 and two-thirds cereal yields, in aggregate, have declined of the world’s poor. In some of these in FCS.5 In addition, in small island situations, there has been no significant states, production bases are narrow and reduction in poverty rates over the past nearly all are highly vulnerable to exter- decade, with average poverty rates of nal shocks. greater than 40 percent. • Crisis situations are common. Food crises • COVID-19 is amplifying these challenges. and food emergencies are more frequent Because of COVID-19 lockdown mea- in FCS than elsewhere. For example, sures, GDP growth declined in FCS, North-East Nigeria, the Republic of food security worsened, and poverty rates Yemen, Somalia, and South Sudan all increased. Among low-income FCS, per had food emergency situations in 2017, capita GDP is estimated to have con- with famine reported in some coun- tracted by 4.5 percent in 2020.10 Food ties of South Sudan.6 Food and nutri- inflation increased in most FCS and food tion security in these countries is still a and nutrition security worsened (box 1). major current and future concern. Of World Bank estimates of the poverty the 10 countries with the worst food 8 FUTURE OF FOOD BOX 1: COVID-19 Impacts on Food and Nutrition Security in FCS The COVID-19 pandemic began when hunger was already rising in many FCS. One in five people in FCS were undernourished, compared to one in 11 globally; hunger was rising in 70 percent of FCS for which data are available. In 2019, 98 million people in 26 FCS (where data are available) were classified as in food crisis conditions, representing around 14 percent of the total population. Around two-thirds of the increase in global hunger from 2014 to 2019 was found among people in FCS. COVID-19 is impacting food and nutrition security through several channels in addition to impacting human health. Mobility restrictions and massive job losses are among the many factors that have reduced incomes of the poor and near poor who have limited savings. An unprecedented impact of COVID-19 has been the widespread disruption in local food supply chains, resulting in (1) upward pressure on food prices for consumers in urban and food insecure rural areas; (2) downward pressure on prices for food producers in rural areas who have also seen their nonfarm incomes severely impacted; and (3) impaired humanitarian assistance. Evidence from the World Bank High Frequency Phone Surveys shows that incomes in rural areas have been equally impacted or worse than in urban areas, suggesting widespread income shocks. Lower incomes and higher prices are reducing purchasing power and food and nutrition security for the poor and vulnerable, while faster increases in prices of perishable foods are reducing the diversity of foods consumed and worsening nutritional outcomes. Refugees are particularly affected through loss of income. While international food trade has been more resilient than overall trade, many FCS are net importers of food and agricultural inputs, and currency depreciations have translated into domestic food and agricultural input price increases. Many FCS also rely on primary agricultural exports (for example, coffee, cocoa, and cotton) but have faced significantly reduced demand for their exports due to widespread economic impacts of COVID-19 in importing countries. Women have also been disproportionately affected, with businesses owned by women closing at higher rates than those owned by men. Compounding vulnerabilities and stresses are exacerbating impacts. COVID-19 is compounding the stressed food and nutrition security in many FCS that are already suffering from other crises beyond conflict, such as the locust outbreak that began spreading across Africa, the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia in 2019 and weather extremes (droughts and floods) in Africa. Crop destruction from locust swarms occurred in many FCS and the World Bank responded with support in Chad, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Republic of Yemen. Southern Africa has more recently (2016 and 2019-21) experienced the worst drought in several decades, while East Africa experiences recurring drought conditions alongside bouts of severe and destructive flooding. Other countries such as Papua New Guinea are dealing with simultaneous crises of COVID-19, fall armyworm, and African swine fever. Local food prices have increased. Food inflation in FCS was already high before COVID-19 with extreme triple- digit food inflation or worse in some countries such as Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Venezuela. In the first half of 2020, food inflation increased in around 80 percent of FCS and almost half of FCS experienced a greater than 5 percentage-point increase in year-on-year food inflation compared to 1 out of 5 IDA countries (for which data are available). Food security has worsened. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimated a significant increase in the number of acutely food insecure people in FCS due to COVID-19 in 2020. While the number for non-FCS was even larger—similar to World Bank estimates of the increase in poverty in 2020–21 across these groups of countries—as a share of the population, the largest relative impacts have been in FCS. Source: Derived from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data, Global Food Crisis Report 2021, WFP, World Bank COVID and Food Security Updates drawing on International Monetary Fund Consumer Price Index data, FEWSNET, the Norwegian Refugee Council Report, and the World Bank Report on Responding to the Emerging Food Security Crisis, November 2020. impact of COVID-19 also project an in- FCV should not only be viewed at the crease in extreme poverty in fragile and national level but also at the subnation- conflict-affected economies. Refugees al or community-level within countries are particularly hard hit through loss of and at the regional level across coun- livelihoods.11 tries. Common categorizations of fragile BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 9 situations are country-level groupings found rights and unenforceable contracts, un- on the List of Fragile and Conflict-affected dermining private incentives to invest and Situations.12 However, even countries not reducing labor productivity and growth.18 found on this list can have fragile subregions • Inadequate security, reflected by active (for example, Pakistan), and fragility can also conflict situations at the national and sub- extend across countries (for example, Lake national levels, and higher levels of in- Chad, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa). terpersonal violence. Physical insecurity These contexts have diverse and varying reduces investment incentives and vio- sources of FCV. lence disrupts transportation and markets and destroys infrastructure and other Sustained development in FCV settings is capital stocks that form the basis for in- constrained by several interlocking charac- come growth.19 As violence intensifies, teristics. While there are no universal criteria production tends to shift from market used to categorize or rank countries by fragil- orientation to meeting subsistence needs. ity—reflected by the differing methodologies For example, in Colombia, the prolonged used for the World Bank’s (FY22) List of presence of nonstate armed actors in- Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations, the duced farmers to shift to activities with Fund for Peace Fragile States Index,13 and the short-term yields and lower profitability OECD States of Fragility list14—there are from activities that require high invest- some common interlocking characteristics ments, and when violence intensifies that make it difficult for fragile societies to farmers concentrate on subsistence activ- make sustained and broad-based progress:15 ities.20 In some cases, conflicts cause lon- ger-term shifts in production systems and • Poor governance and weak institution- commuter farmers from IDPs or refugee al capacity. Fragile societies are often camps as in Somalia. Most active conflicts fractured into groups with opposing are legacy conflicts that were neither cre- identities, impeding cooperation for the ated quickly nor can be resolved quickly. national good and focusing on the private In addition, gender-based violence pre- gain of the particular group in power.16 vents full socioeconomic participation Lack of state legitimacy among citizens by women, decreases productivity, and results in noncompliance. Corruption reduces economic output. Multiple con- and other forms of elite capture divert flicts within the same areas, islands, and resources from productivity enhancing countries amplifies the challenge. investments, which leads to a downward annual cycle of lower subsequent tax rev- • High exposure to (natural hazard) shocks enues and public investment.17 This adds and high levels of natural resource degra- to weak state capacity and significant dation. Natural hazards such as droughts, underprovision of basic services, securi- floods, and cyclones can set societies ty, and infrastructure. Weak institutions back even when some progress has been cannot support private sector develop- made, and this makes sustained progress ment and manifest in insecure property even more difficult. Pests can have similar 10 FUTURE OF FOOD devastating effects, such as during the Inadequate security and natural haz- recent locust outbreak in the Horn of ard shocks cause significant internal Africa and East Africa. Some societies displacement. New displacements of people have greater exposure to natural hazards associated with conflict and violence have irrespective of capacity to manage the im- been trending upward over the last decade. pacts.21 Significant degradation of natural Natural disasters such as floods, droughts, capital stocks reduces future productivity and cyclones have caused even more forced and can lead to environmental fragility. displacements than conflict and violence—by In Sub-Saharan Africa, which comprises at least 60 percent every year over the past the largest share of FCS, per capita food decade and cumulatively three times as much production shocks22 related to climate over the 2008–18 period.25 events such as droughts and floods have increased from occurring once every 12.5 The food system can either exacerbate fra- years (average for 1982–2006) to once ev- gility, conflict, and violence or be part of the ery 2.5 years (average for 2007–2016).23 solution. The food system in FCS is, on av- Maintaining long-term per capita food erage, the largest private sector segment and production growth, a large part of the provider of jobs and is a key source of income economy in most Sub-Saharan African for poor people and provider of a fundamen- countries, becomes increasingly difficult tal basic need—food—for everyone. Given its when countries are more frequently set dominance in FCS, the food system is often back by production shocks. Impacts are a source of conflict and corruption and used amplified by weak capacity to manage as a coercive lever via capture and control of these shocks. Small island states have food distribution. Degradation of the food higher exposure to cyclones that can have system can increase environmental fragili- devastating impacts. ty and exposure to shocks, and the repeated need to respond to food crises can divert Poor governance and weak institution- public resources away from longer-term pro- al capacity, inadequate security, and ductivity enhancing investments in the food frequent shocks contribute to the under- system and elsewhere. The food system can development of the private sector in fragile also be part of the solution, addressing the societies. Over the past 20 years, growth in interlocking characteristics constraining de- domestic credit to the private sector (as a velopment in FCV settings through at least share of GDP) in FCS, using this as a proxy 10 channels reflected in the bullet points in for private sector development, has been table 1. Neglect of each channel can worsen around half that of IDA countries in total the impacts of FCV. and less than a third of that in middle-in- come countries.24 Over the past 10 years, Urgency for action with large potential there has been no (trend) growth in this gains. The number of countries on the World metric. An underdeveloped private sector Bank’s List of Fragile and Conflict-affected feeds back into a lack of jobs, weak govern- Situations has increased from 35 in FY09 to ment revenue, and low public investments. 39 in FY22. Forced displacement has almost BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 11 TABLE 1: Channels Through Which the Food System can Help Address Interlocking Characteristics Constraining Development in FCV Settings Interlocking characteristics Contributions the food system can make to address these constraining development characteristics Poor governance and weak ¾ Support government-driven common purpose programs to help institutional capacity develop a shared national identity and deliver impacts to broad rural populations that can build state legitimacy and strengthen social cohesion Lack of state legitimacy ¾ Improve accountability, transparency, predictability, and targeting in Lack of social cohesion food distribution, subsidy programs, and public investments to help reduce Lack of state capacity elite capture and corruption that favors particular groups and restore the social contract between citizens and the state ¾ Improve inclusion of vulnerable people and lagging regions in programs in rural areas where most of the populations live. This can help improve state legitimacy and social cohesion and reduce conflict risk. ¾ Strengthen state capacity of institutions in the food system to improve delivery of services to broader rural populations, anticipate and respond to shocks, and help make cheaper food available for consumers. This can help strengthen state legitimacy. Conflict situations ¾ Provide opportunities for conflict resolution. While the food system can be a cause of conflicts it can also provide opportunities for conflict resolution and peace building, including through better natural resource management, reduced food price volatility, and inclusion. High exposure to shocks ¾ Improve resilience to shocks. Improving food system resilience can reduce the magnitude of impact from weather shocks, zoonotic and pest outbreaks, and livestock diseases. This includes improved monitoring, surveillance, and capacity to respond to these shocks. Underdeveloped private sector ¾ Build capital stock and strengthen property rights. Restoring, building, and protecting capital stock, including infrastructure, in the food system often destroyed by conflict can help restore lost production and raise productivity. Improving property rights (land, water, and value-chain infrastructure improvements) increases private sector incentives to invest. ¾ Provide jobs. The food system is the largest provider of jobs in FCS and can enhance livelihoods, including those of former combatants and youth. Internal displacement ¾ Provide livelihoods for displaced people and refugees. The production of food and agriculture is a way for refugees and IDPs to add value to the host community economy, feed themselves, and earn incomes. Food crisis situations ¾ Improve food and nutrition security. Preventing food crises can avoid the subsequent reallocation of public resources needed for longer- term productivity generating activities to shorter-term humanitarian responses needed to save lives. Improved food and nutrition security is a foundational element of poverty reduction in FCS because food poverty accounts for most of overall poverty. Improved nutrition helps break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. 12 FUTURE OF FOOD doubled since 2010 with 80 million dis- Mozambique, in the decade following their placed people by the end of 2019.26 Conflict civil war (1977–1992), per capita incomes in- has been a major driver of forced displace- creased 70 percent compared with 4 percent ment.27 Interpersonal and gang violence is in the previous decade. This development was also rising. The frequency and severity of cli- largely driven by the 60 percent improve- mate-related shocks have increased. Food ments in agricultural value added.28 For those security crises and risk of famine persist, countries exiting fragility status since 2006, amplified by COVID-19, with rising under- growth in both agricultural value added and nourishment and poverty rates in many FCS GDP per capita has been more than double that undermine human capital for current the growth in those countries that remained and future economic growth. Gains from in fragile status and more than 5 percent in peace can be significant. For example, in 40 percent of the countries exiting fragility.29 BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 13 14 FUTURE OF FOOD Build Stronger Food Systems: What to Do, When, and Where The wide range of FCV settings requires The wide heterogeneity across FCV settings differentiated actions. For example, some implies diverse challenges and solutions. This countries and subregions are in active con- makes the agenda large and complex, which flict; others are postconflict but with weak is reflected in the extensive menu of possible institutions, while still others may be at interventions (table 2). high risk of falling into fragility. The recent- ly released WBG’s Strategy for Fragility, Support should be provided within param- Conflict, and Violence: 2020–2025 reflects eters of realism, honesty, predictability, and these differing situations in its four pillars: inclusion.30 To help countries escape fragili- (1) preventing violent conflict and inter- ty traps, beyond crisis response, support needs personal violence; (2) remaining engaged to help build state legitimacy through gov- during crises and active conflicts; (3) helping ernments taking responsibility for policies countries transition out of fragility; and (4) and programs (rather than being driven by mitigating spillover impacts of FCV. There is development partners). The Commission on also a range of food insecurity situations that State Fragility, Growth and Development31 progress in phases: minimal food insecurity, suggested that support should be guided by to stressed, to crisis, to emergency, to famine parameters of realism (what is feasible given (as reflected in the Integrated Food Security limited resources and capacity); honesty (the Phase Classification [IPC]; see table 3). program is reflected in the public budget Different phases can exist across different with systems in place to ensure that funds regions of the same country. These phases of are spent for intended purposes); and in- food insecurity require differing responses. clusion. Comprehensive public expenditure TABLE 2:. Spectrum of Potential Entry Points to Build Stronger Food Systems in FCV Settings Food system entry points Action: Action: Develop Action: Reduce Strengthen the private sector conflict risk and governance and Action: Prevent and though agribusiness environmental Four WBG institutional respond to food development, inclusive fragility through FCV Strategy capacity* crises and improve jobs, and rural sustainable resource Pillars (crosscutting) nutrition livelihoods management 1. Preventing Strengthen ¾ Develop early ¾ Support inclusive ¾ Manage natural violent institutions to warning systems business models, resources conflict and address sources ¾ Reduce food price including in lagging ¾ Improve land interpersonal of conflict risk and spikes regions governance violence resilience to shocks ¾ Improve resilience ¾ Prevent livestock disease 2. Remaining Protect essential ¾ Improve food ¾ Consider agrispatial ¾ Foster community engaged institutions distribution solutions management of during & nutrition ¾ Rehabilitate land and water conflicts enhancement infrastructure and crisis ¾ Scale safety net situations programs ¾ Restore productive assets ¾ Improve gender equality 3. Helping Strengthen capacity ¾ Develop food Improve the following: ¾ Manage natural countries and legitimacy of markets, including resources ¾ Inclusion (women, transition core institutions; for lagging food ¾ Improve land youth, opposing out of improve groups governance groups) fragility transparency, ¾ Invest for ¾ Enabling environment predictability, and productivity ¾ Knowledge and skills targeting of public growth ¾ Access to finance, support; empower including political risk women leaders insurance 4. Mitigating Support institutions ¾ Increase self- ¾ Ensure refugees have ¾ Manage natural the spillovers in host communities reliance for the right to work and resources of FCV of displaced people refugees and IDPs produce Note: * Shaded second column is crosscutting across the other three unshaded columns. While the same action areas could be relevant for two or more rows, they are reflected in the WBG FCV strategy pillar where their contributions are likely greatest. reviews and investment plans can help foster for support programs is predictability to re- medium-term planning and better integra- store the social contract between citizens and tion and alignment of often fragmented and the state. Unpredictable support for citizens uncoordinated donor-financed sector in- can increase tensions and undermine the vestment. Another important dimension trust-building process. 16 FUTURE OF FOOD There are general guides on what to do, attention will need to vary by context as noted when, and where. While actions undertaken in the WBG strategy pillars in table 2: should be decided by national governments, there are general guides for building stronger • In countries or regions with high risk food systems in FCV settings when consid- of conflict and food crises. Attention ering what to do, when, and where. This paper is needed to strengthen institutions to reflects these actions across the four pillars address the root and proximate causes of the WBG Strategy for FCV—promote of conflict risk and high levels of gen- prevention of crises and conflict, remain en- der-based violence, improve resilience gaged in crisis situations and active conflict, to shocks, and improve capacity to re- help countries transition out of fragility, and spond. These institutions include natural mitigate spillover impacts of FCV. Table 2 resource and land governance, inclusion, highlights four sets of actions across these capacity for livestock disease prevention different contexts: (1) strengthen gover- and response, monitoring and early warn- nance and institutional capacity; (2) prevent ing systems for food crises, social protec- and respond to food crises; (3) develop the tion programs and information, advisory private sector through agribusiness devel- services, and improved access to technol- opment, inclusive jobs in agricultural value ogy for a more climate-resilient produc- chains, particularly for women and youth, tion system. and rural livelihoods; and (4) reduce conflict • In countries or regions that are already risk and environmental fragility through re- in crisis or active conflict, attention is silient and sustainable resource management. needed to protect essential institutions. These aspects cover the contribution areas These are often community-level institu- highlighted in table 1. While macroeconom- tions, capacity and safety for food distri- ic shocks, including hyperinflation, also have bution and nutrition enhancement, safety significant impacts in FCV settings, address- net programs, and safe zones and connec- ing these are beyond the scope of this paper. tivity for the private sector in agricultural value chains. Strengthen Governance • In contexts of high institutional and and Institutional Capacity social fragility, including postconflict A key crosscutting aspect is the need to situations, attention is needed to devel- strengthen governance and institution- op approaches that can renew the social al capacity across three interrelated actions: contract between the state and society, (1) prevent and respond to food crisis situ- foster the private sector, and strengthen ations; (2) foster development of the private legitimacy and capacity of institutions. sector in agricultural value chains; and (3) Approaches include developing com- reduce conflict risks and environmental fragil- mon purpose programs; improving the ity. While the subsequent sections on each of transparency, predictability, and target- these areas in the paper highlight the related ing of public support; strengthening in- governance and capacity development aspects, stitutions for natural resources and land BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 17 governance; and improving agricultural effects, which could be due to increased productivity growth, access to finance, food demand and hence prices of prod- and the broader enabling policy environ- ucts not included in aid packages provid- ment. Importantly, broader inclusion of ed to refugees. vulnerable people, those with opposition- al identities, and lagging regions in de- While these areas are addressed in more velopment programs can help build state detail in the respective sections of the pa- legitimacy and social cohesion. per, several are worth highlighting upfront, particularly in contexts of high institution- • In areas with high inflows of IDPs as a al and social fragility: government-driven spillover effect of FCV settings, support common purpose programs; accountability, is needed for local institutions in high transparency, and predictability; inclusion; migrant areas to help cope with migrant gender-based violence; repairing and build- inflows and increase their opportunities ing inclusive community-based institutions; for self-reliance. Refugees and IDPs are and improving capacity of local governments. consumers, laborers, and entrepreneurs and can bring positive economic impacts Government-driven common purpose to the host country or area. This requires programs can help develop a shared na- that forcibly displaced people can work. tional identity and deliver impacts to broad For example, most Syrian adult refugees rural populations that can build legitimacy hosted in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey and strengthen social cohesion. An ex- have a background in agriculture.32 ample is found in Rwanda. Following the Agriculture GDP increased 18 percent 1994 genocide, Rwanda developed a for- in Jordan after the refugee crisis began. ward-looking common purpose of rapid, Recent Venezuelan refugees in Colombia broad-based economic growth. The govern- are more likely to be employed in agri- ment’s long-term national strategy–Vision food activities than nationals, but they 2020–was launched in 2000 to help devel- endure worse working conditions, includ- op a united, shared, and inclusive Rwandan ing lower wages, higher working hours, identity. A key pillar was the “transformation and informality.33 Tanzanian host house- of agriculture into a productive, high value, holds on average experienced positive market-oriented sector, with forward linkag- effects on consumption due to refugee es to other sectors.”36 Priority was given to arrivals and so did the Tanzania economy land tenure reform, private sector involve- overall.34 Households in rural Tanzania ment, agriculture investment, and rural experienced positive wealth effects.35 development.37 Subsequent improvements This may be due to factors including land in agricultural performance contributed to rental, increased agriculture labor sup- the significant decline in poverty, measured ply, and increased demand and prices for by the national poverty line, from 59 percent agriculture products of food producing in 2001 to 39 percent in 2014. Investments households. However, Tanzanian urban in agriculture helped provide visible, quick households experienced negative wealth wins to broad rural populations that helped 18 FUTURE OF FOOD build legitimacy, confidence, and hope and to address inequalities across groups with strengthened social cohesion. oppositional identities (a source of conflict risk) through their inclusive representation Improving accountability, transparency, in program design and implementation. As predictability, and targeting in food distri- wars divert mainly male labor from agri- bution, subsidy programs, and investments culture, the vulnerability of rural women is can help reduce corruption and improve amplified. Women are often left to tend to the social contract between the state and its farms, family, and community responsibili- citizens, most of whom live in rural areas. ties such as watershed management. In these Food distribution and subsidy programs in situations, agricultural and rural programs FCV settings are sometimes prone to politi- can more directly address the needs of wom- cal and elite capture that can widen divisions en through their inclusion in program design and increase distrust in government. Digital and implementation. In addition, efforts are technologies offer new opportunities for im- needed to reduce gender-based violence. proved transparency and can help reduce corruption, ensuring that more food and sub- Preventing and responding to gen- sidies reach those most in need. For example, der-based violence. Gender-based violence, in Nigeria, the government reached a high- including intimate partner violence, prevents er number of recipients with lower costs and the full participation of women in food sys- lower leakage through an e-wallet program tems. In FCV settings, levels of gender-based for subsidized fertilizers. E-voucher pro- violence tend to be amplified, so prevention grams for subsidized inputs have also been of gender-based violence is an essential com- piloted in Mali and Niger. These technolo- ponent of program design in livelihoods and gies offer new tools to improve accountability, food security interventions.  Program inter- transparency, and targeting. Improving pre- ventions to integrate gender-based violence dictability of support helps restore the social prevention in the food system should be contract between citizens and the state while along the dimensions of reducing vulnerabil- unpredictable support can increase tensions ities; assessing social norms that perpetuate and undermine trust-building processes. violence and discrimination; and improving Predictability should be one of the underly- access by women to productive assets, skills, ing principles of program designs reflecting and knowledge. Interventions must thus be resource and capacity constraints to focus designed to focus on gender equality sup- design efforts on ensuring consistent deliv- ported by positive social norms, including ery of services to citizens. building an understanding and knowledge of women’s rights by different spheres of Inclusion of vulnerable people and lagging influence. Engaging men and boys and regions in rural programs across a country “gatekeepers” of patriarchal norms is a key can improve state legitimacy and social co- strategy in this regard. hesion and reduce conflict risk. As most of the population of countries in FCS live in Repairing and building inclusive com- rural areas, rural programs have the potential munity-based institutions. Conflict can BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 19 significantly damage community-based in- stronger food systems in FCV settings in stitutions that are vital for local wellbeing. three areas: (1) prevent and respond to food This was the case in El Salvador, Nepal, and crises situations and improve nutrition; (2) Eritrea where violence had uprooted liveli- develop the private sector though agribusi- hoods and social and economic networks and ness development, inclusive jobs, and rural had transformed many women into heads of livelihoods; and (3) reduce conflict risk and households.38 Women often faced signifi- economic shocks through resilient and sus- cant inequality and discrimination during tainable resource management. conflicts and in peacebuilding and postcon- flict efforts. Programs to aid ex-combatants through building their community institu- Prevent and Respond to tions and supporting them as actors along Food Crisis Situations and the food chain can help their social and eco- Improve Nutrition nomic recovery from violence. Following the civil war, the Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund Food crisis situations. Food crises are par- II project improved household livelihoods ticularly prevalent in FCS. As indicated, of and increased participation of women and the 10 countries with the worst food cri- minorities in community-based organiza- ses in 2020, by number of people, all are tions and decision-making.39 In El Salvador, on the World Bank’s FY22 List of Fragile former women guerrillas were involved in and Conflict-affected Situations; eight are land reform, which led to the inclusion of conflict-affected countries, and two are in both men and women as beneficiaries, en- situations of high institutional and social suring that grievances on these issues did not fragility. Recent increases in food insecurity affect the postconflict settlement.40 have been driven by conflict, droughts, and economic shocks. For example, in an analy- Improving capacity of local governments sis of 50 countries, the increase in the overall for planning of interventions, priority setting, numbers of people in a food crisis situa- and implementation of activities can have tion in 2019 were driven by conflict, notably significant impacts in FCV settings. For ex- in the Democratic Republic of Congo and ample, the Philippines Rural Development South Sudan, and due to drought and eco- project, jointly implemented by local gov- nomic shocks, notably in Haiti, Pakistan, and ernment units and the Department of Zimbabwe.42 COVID-19 lockdowns (box 1) Agriculture, has supported development of and the recent locust outbreak compounded rural infrastructure and agribusinesses, in- food and nutrition security impacts in 2020. cluding in the conflict-affected areas of the Indeed, conflict, climate extremes, and eco- Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. nomic shocks have been the key drivers of The project helped create jobs, raised in- the increase in global hunger since 2014.43 comes, and contributed to improved peace.41 Food insecurity can be both a consequence The subsequent sections highlight the spec- and a cause of conflict. Physical insecurity trum of potential entry points to build reduces investment incentives and violence 20 FUTURE OF FOOD disrupts transportation to markets and de- increasing to stressed levels of food inse- stroys infrastructure essential for income curity as reflected in phase 2 of the IPC). growth and food security. At the same time, In these contexts, it is important to un- food insecurity, driven by climate shocks, derstand and address the causes of food food price volatility, exclusion, and lack of price spikes that can also be a cause of economic opportunities, can increase con- social tension and conflict, improve resil- flict risk. ience to climate shocks, improve capac- ity for livestock disease prevention, and Improving food security is a foundational develop early warning and monitoring element of poverty reduction in FCS as food systems and response capacity to prevent poverty accounts for most of overall pover- food crises from emerging or worsening. ty. Reduced social tension and conflict from • In countries or regions that are already improved food security can improve broader in crisis or active conflict. These coun- economic opportunities, incomes, and pov- tries or regions are often in states of food erty reduction. Preventing food crises avoids emergencies, and in extreme cases, fam- direct negative human impacts and pre- ine. Emergency food distribution, nutri- vents the need to divert attention and public tion enhancement, and scaling up safety resources from longer-term productivity en- net programs are often needed to save hancing investments—which are needed to lives. Where possible, restoring produc- raise income and reduce poverty—to short- tive assets and investing in next-season term humanitarian responses. Avoiding food production can help prevent a worsening crisis-induced malnutrition impacts preg- cycle, which has been part of many coun- nancy outcomes and child growth, and adult try responses to the COVID-induced productivity helps avoid compromising the food security crisis. broader effectiveness of public investments. The severity of food insecurity situations • In contexts of high institutional and varies by context. While there are some sim- social fragility, including postconflict ilarities in the needed responses—such as situations. Many of the interventions improving long-term agricultural produc- previously mentioned are relevant for tivity growth and resilience—shorter-term these contexts, such as monitoring and needs vary by context, as reflected in table 2 early warning systems, climate resilience, (“Action: Prevent and respond to food crises and emergency response in food crisis and improve nutrition”). situations. However, investing in lon- ger-term agricultural productivity growth • In countries or regions with high risk and food market development, including of conflict or food crises. This includes for lagging food groups, can help set the countries or regions with a high inci- foundations for stronger growth and de- dence of weather extremes, high food velopment. Investing in infrastructure price levels and volatility reflecting food and ensuring institutional capacity will scarcity and uncertainty, and high risks be needed, including strengthening ag- of rising food insecurity (for example, ricultural services, improving technology BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 21 TABLE 3: Tailor Actions to the Severity of Food Insecurity Severity of food insecurity Entry points to prevent and respond to food crisis situations Minimal or no food insecurity ¾ Establish monitoring and early warning systems and develop capacity for response, including for livestock diseases, to help prevent food crises from (IPC phase 1) emerging or worsening ¾ Improve crop and livestock resilience to droughts to reduce the impacts of weather extremes Stressed and crisis situations ¾ Reduce local food prices through facilitating private trade (imports and food movement to affected areas, including lifting gender-based barriers (IPC phase 2 and phase 3) impacting small-scale traders); releasing emergency food stocks where these exist, in affected areas; and reducing import tariffs and food taxes (although these latter two actions are less targeted) ¾ Preserve household purchasing power through scaling up safety net programs such as cash-for-work or direct cash transfers to vulnerable households (especially when food is available and can be purchased in markets) ¾ Invest in next-season food production, replace or upgrade assets, improve access to inputs, and improve climate resilience to prevent a worsening cycle ¾ In food crisis situations, a humanitarian response may be needed to make food available in the most food-insecure areas Food emergency and famine ¾ Make food available in affected areas. As an immediate need, facilitate imports, situations increase the number or volume of vehicles delivering food, improve road access, increase safety and security, and facilitate humanitarian responses (IPC phase 4 and phase 5) by key food security partners such as the United Nations. In extreme cases, support for health care services and epidemiological control are needed to prevent epidemic diseases associated with famines ¾ Invest in next-season food production, build or replace assets, improve access to inputs, and improve climate resilience to prevent a worsening cycle. availability for farmers, and closing gen- combination of food insecurity phases in dif- der gaps in access. ferent parts of the country. • In areas with high numbers of displaced Establish monitoring and early warning people. Globally, more than half of the systems for proactive and timely responses. refugees are hosted in countries with high Droughts and floods, crop pests and diseas- numbers of acutely food-insecure peo- es (for example, locusts and fall armyworm), ple.44 Increasing the self-reliance of ref- and zoonotic diseases (for example, avian ugees and IDPs can help them feed and influenza, Ebola, and COVID-19) can in- clothe themselves. crease food insecurity and loss of assets and Potential interventions are mapped to differ- pose risks to broader health and incomes. ent phases of the severity of food insecurity Early warning systems, including real-time experienced by countries (as measured by the assessments of crop performance, and pests IPC). Countries across the four groupings and disease surveillance can identify risks, noted above in table 3 can sometimes have a provide early alerts, and help facilitate 22 FUTURE OF FOOD proactive risk mitigation. For example, the resilience can reduce the magnitude of these Famine Early Warning Systems Network shocks and prevent a setback in gains made. (FEWSNET) and the IPC provide esti- While investments in research and devel- mates and forward-looking projections of opment of more resilient seeds and breeds food-insecure populations as well as alerts remain vitally important, in many situa- for food crises, emergencies, and famines. tions technologies and practices are available The G20 Agricultural Market Information to improve crop and livestock resilience but System provides global food supply and de- have not been widely adopted, including ir- mand outlooks for maize, wheat, rice, and rigation and water management and broader soybeans. The World Bank’s ongoing estab- production practices. Actions to facilitate the lishment of the Early Warning for Early adoption of technologies and practices to Action: Food Security Information Hub improve resilience include (1) ensuring out- aims to produce critical analysis to support put price policies are not constraining farmer early detection and diagnosis of emerging profits and incentives to invest in improved food security crises and provides a one-stop technologies; (2) improving access to advi- shop to support access to food security re- sory services on improved practices to raise lated data produced by the World Bank awareness and knowledge; (3) identifying while making links to external sources of and addressing infrastructure constraints that information. New models of key drivers of inhibit adoption; and (4) financing, including food insecurity have been developed to bet- smart subsidies, to facilitate adoption. ter predict emerging food crises and trends over longer time horizons.45 The key chal- Strengthen capacity for prevention of crop lenge in vulnerable countries is to build local and livestock pests and diseases. The im- monitoring and early warning (crisis predic- pact of pests and diseases on food security in tion) systems to identify and track evolving FCV settings can be substantial. For exam- conditions and capacity to respond. In this ple, the recent desert locust outbreak in East respect, National Agriculture Observatories Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, have been developed and are in operation in and South Asia resulted in significant crop Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. and income losses in many FCS (for exam- ple, the Republic of Yemen, Somalia, and Improve crop resilience to droughts and Sudan); earlier outbreaks of zoonotic diseas- floods. Extreme and frequent weather es such as Ebola had significant detrimental shocks make sustained improvements and impacts on food security in Sierra Leone, growth more challenging. They also increase Liberia, and Guinea; and African swine fe- stress and the risk of conflict, as with extreme ver threatens livelihoods in some small island drought in Syria46 and higher temperatures states. Effectively identifying and respond- in Somalia.47 Large increases in temperature ing to local threats requires community and rainfall also raise the frequency of inter- capacity, which is often weak in vulnerable personal violence and intergroup conflict.48 countries. An effective response includes a Climate shocks to food systems have econo- systematic, comprehensive, and gradual ap- my-wide impacts in FCV settings. Improving proach to strengthening capacity for (1) BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 23 finding and treating locusts, fall armyworm, this section); (4) monitoring local conditions and other invasive infestations in frontline and food markets through better information countries; (2) strengthening veterinary ser- to provide earlier warnings of market dis- vices and livestock disease surveillance and ruptions; (5) promoting internal food trade preparedness; and (3) reducing risk of patho- and improving border efficiency for imports gen transmission from animals to humans, to facilitate movement of food to deficit ar- including improvements to food safety, eas, which includes removing constraints such through a One Health approach. as barriers faced by women traders that hin- der local private sector trade; and (6) reducing Reduce sudden and unexpected food price food loss and waste, including food stock loss- spikes on basic foodstuffs to reduce risks of es. In addition, better managing food stocks social tensions and the worsening of food through stock size, procurement, and release insecurity. Empirical evidence identifies food policies can lower costs, reduce disincentives price hikes as a trigger of social unrest in- for private storage, and ensure available food cluding protests, riots, violence, and conflict.49 for targeting to the poorest groups when cri- Sudden global food price increases in 2007– ses occur.51 This could include pre-positioning 08 and 2011 triggered food riots in more than food stocks for distribution in identified hot 40  countries.50 Sharp food price increases spots. can worsen food insecurity and malnutrition. Some food price increases in FCV settings Preserve purchasing power. Protecting are driven by policies of other countries, purchasing power of poor households to such as export bans in major grain-export- continue access to food through safety net ing countries, with international food price programs in times of heightened stress and transmission to domestic prices through food crises can help dampen food and nutrition imports. However, much of the food price security impacts. Safety nets, including mo- volatility is driven by local conditions and pol- bile payment-based cash transfers that adjust icies, such as macroeconomic conditions (for the size of transfers upward and include example, high general inflation in Lebanon, more beneficiaries in response to drought South Sudan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe), cli- or food price shocks, can help preserve pur- mate shocks (for example, Southern Africa chasing power of the poorest and most drought and East Africa floods), conflict (for vulnerable populations by offsetting some of example, Afghanistan and the Republic of the impacts of income loses and food price Yemen), and, among small island states, sheer spikes. This protection of purchasing pow- distance between scattered islands. Actions to er was a common response under the earlier reduce food price spikes include the follow- Global Food Crisis Response Program and ing: (1) avoiding export bans of major global to COVID-19 in many countries. Examples grain exporters and refraining from local pro- of shock responsive safety nets include the tective trade policies that can amplify local Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Program food price spikes; (2) improving domestic and Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Program macroeconomic stability; (3) improving lo- that scale support in times of crisis. Safety cal climate resilience (as highlighted earlier in nets can also help dampen the political 24 FUTURE OF FOOD pressure to reduce food prices for poor con- security for humanitarian relief along deliv- sumers through trade measures that also ery routes to affected areas is a priority to reduce farmer incentives to produce food ensure access. Food transfers can provide when food prices spike.52 In designing safe- a protective effect among food-insecure ty net programs, particular care is needed to populations in conflict contexts,53 and nu- ensure that where local markets have been trient-dense rather the just calorie-dense significantly disrupted, cash transfers are foods are needed to maximize benefits for complemented with physical distribution of the most vulnerable populations with ad- food to prevent further food price escalations herence to global and national guidelines on in local markets. In addition, ensuring access nutrition in emergencies. There should also to mobile payment systems and reducing be effective communication on the timing transfer fees can help facilitate remittances for and locations of temporary food distri- to households in times of need. bution. In extreme cases, efforts will also be needed to prevent epidemic diseases associ- Prevent worsening nutrition among the ated with famine through provision of health most vulnerable groups. In food crisis sit- care services and epidemiological control in uations, safety nets need to ensure that the the affected areas. most vulnerable are protected from worsen- ing nutritional status by targeting vulnerable Invest in next-season production. populations. These can be identified through Investments include replanting, restocking, triangulation of information from various and rehabilitating basic agricultural infra- sources such as registries for social safety structure and services. Ensuring access to net programs, cash and food transfers, and agricultural inputs for next-season produc- rapid mobile phone-based surveys to bet- tion can help prevent a worsening cycle of ter target beneficiaries with an overlay of food shortages and crises. Access to inputs nutrition prevention services. Scaling up mi- can be facilitated through financial grants cronutrient supplementation programs such such as e-vouchers, dedicated credit lines, or, as Vitamin A and other micronutrients for where needed (where markets are not func- children and iron-folic acid supplements for tioning), targeted and one-time distribution pregnant women, including a balanced bas- of improved seeds and fertilizer to the im- ket of food commodities in food distribution pacted and most vulnerable communities. programs, can help tackle acute malnutrition As nutrient-dense foods are often the most in crisis situations. affected in food crises, attention is need- ed to ensure inputs for production of these Make food and nutritional supplemen- foods. Removing or relaxing trade restric- tation available in food emergency and tions and taxes can help reduce the cost of famine situations through improved dis- inputs. Building or replacing lost assets as tribution. This includes facilitating food and a result of conflict or drought, such as de- nutritional product imports, food movement stroyed irrigation and market infrastructure from surplus areas, and more vehicles used and livestock losses, can also help restore for delivery. In conflict situations, improved production. Providing support to informal BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 25 and formal small- and medium-scale enter- interventions that can both increase in- prises that dominate agricultural input (and comes and improve nutrition outcomes, output) supply chains can help sustain their such as support for the production of puls- operations and recover postcrisis. es, vegetables, fruits, and fish as outlined in recent nutrition-smart agriculture profiles Build longer-term productivity growth developed for Haiti, Mozambique, and the and nutrition enhancement. Increasing ag- Democratic Republic of Congo.55 ricultural productivity is the key pathway to reducing food insecurity in FCV settings. Develop food and input markets, includ- Countries that have exited fragility (as re- ing for lagging food groups. Shifting from flected by those exiting the World Bank’s producing food only for household con- FY22 List of Fragile and Conflict-affected sumption, often driven to subsistence by Situations) had higher agricultural produc- conflict, to producing for sale to earn ad- tivity growth than new entrants and those ditional incomes requires development of that remained. This longer-term agenda be- markets. Markets help expand opportuni- comes more tractable in FCV settings where ties, increase returns to assets, and provide there are no active conflicts and crises, but incentives to shift food from surplus to defi- progress can also be made in conflict-affected cit areas. In conflict situations, markets often states. Improving the adaptation and adop- cease to function because of insecurity of tion of existing improved technologies is a roads, loss of assets, decline in production priority. In this respect, strengthening capac- and incomes, and human displacement that ity for provision of agricultural public goods all negatively affect food supply and demand and services—agricultural extension services, and put traders out of business. Peace helps including farmer help lines with short mes- market activity recover, as experienced fol- sage service (SMS); animal and plant health lowing the South Sudan Peace Agreement services to avoid production losses; and pro- in 2018.56 Prerequisites for initial market motion of climate smart agriculture—can recovery are better security on roads and help. For example, support to the Agricultural recovery of production. Improving road ac- Research Institute of Afghanistan and the cess, support for producer organizations, and improved seed enterprises, together with a improving availability of market price infor- subsidized input voucher program for farm- mation, such as through SMS services, can ers, helped the production, distribution, and help further integrate markets beyond local adoption of improved seeds. Seven new ir- areas and connect surplus and deficit areas. rigated and rainfed varieties of wheat seeds These can also improve competition with adaptable to different agroecological regions imports that are prominent in FCS when lo- of Afghanistan were produced.54 The inter- cal markets are disrupted. Demonopolizing ventions highlighted earlier in this paper food storage and distribution through en- for improving crop and livestock resilience couraging private storage and trade can also to pests, disease, droughts, and floods are broaden market activity. Support for produc- highly relevant for the longer-term agen- tion diversification, such as increasing the da. Consideration should also be given to range of available seeds, restoring orchards, 26 FUTURE OF FOOD restocking livestock, and expanding knowl- are more consumers that demand more food edge on related production practices can items and goods. increase the availability of these products in markets. More perishable products, by Develop the Private Sector definition, have lower storage life and so require production in closer proximity to de- in Agricultural Value Chains mand and more efficient mechanisms to link through Agribusiness consumers to producers, which digital solu- Development, Inclusive tions can help. Limiting fees in markets and Jobs, and Rural Livelihoods at roadblocks can reduce disincentives to trade—for example, it was not uncommon The food system is the largest provider in Zimbabwe to have multiple roadblocks of jobs in FCS and can enhance growth, on relatively short stretches of road, with in- incomes, and livelihoods. Agriculture ac- creased frequency closer to and within urban counts for over half of total employment centers, each usually with “spot fines” that in FCS—and an even higher share of jobs result in significant added costs and disin- if the broader food system is considered. centives for transportation. Due to informality, the food system also has low barriers to entry and exit. Food systems, Support and facilitate capacity for increas- including agricultural value-chain develop- ing self-reliance of refugees and IDPs. ment, can additionally help peacebuilding Refugees and IDPs are skilled and resource- and prevent resurgence of violence in post- ful. Hence support for what they are doing conflict via integration of ex-combatants or envision to do can reduce food insecu- through providing jobs.57 As an example, an rity and poverty among both refugees and agricultural training program of ex-combat- host communities. Support can, for exam- ants in Liberia, combined with counseling ple, include increasing access to improved and provision of capital inputs (agricultur- technologies for self-production of vegeta- al tools and supplies) and access to land in ble and livestock rearing, craft, and clothes. communities of their choice, increased par- These types of activities, including agricul- ticipants’ farm employment and profits, ture, are already happening in many refugee decreased the amount of time they spent settlements and camps in Africa. Produce is on illicit activities, and reduced interest in consumed and sold in the local markets of- mercenary activity in a nearby war.58 Better ten jointly with host community members. income opportunities via training and access Sometimes refugees work for host commu- to capital can help youth who are often de- nity members, and sometimes it is the other prived of education and coerced into armed way around. In the Middle East and North conflict, often with little choice not to be. Africa, food processing is happening in lo- cal homes and refugee-run stores with local There is a spectrum of actions to reduce partners. These activities expand the variety risk and foster private investments in food of food, increase local production, and con- systems across different FCV contexts. tribute to the local market economy as there Agricultural production is a private sector BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 27 activity. The earlier paper in the Future of of vulnerable people; strengthening gov- Food series on Maximizing Finance for ernment capacity to assess and mitigate Development in Agricultural Value Chains social risks of large-scale private invest- highlights a spectrum of entry points to ad- ments, particularly in land, can reduce dress market failures that lead to inadequate local area conflict risk; and encouraging levels of privately provided goods and ser- private trade can help dampen food price vices in food systems. In FCS, these market spikes and associated tensions and im- failures are more acute and are exacerbated by prove food security. a poor enabling environment and high pri- • In countries or regions that are already vate sector investment risks. The spectrum of in crisis or active conflict. In these en- actions in that paper remains highly instruc- vironments, private sector investment is tive, with different sets of actions relevant for constrained by risks that are often too high the range of FCV contexts. High transaction for the private returns available. Attention costs, the time required for an agribusiness is needed to reduce risks, particularly to become cash flow positive, and high risks physical security risk, and on restoring often make private investment in FCV set- key infrastructure and other capital stock tings unprofitable; these problems need to be destroyed by conflict (for example, roads, addressed to help crowd in more investment bridges, livestock, and irrigation infra- on farms and along agricultural value chains, structure) to help raise private investment particularly de-risking private investment. returns. For example, agrispatial solutions At the same time, public support for private (agriparks, agriclusters, and agrizones) investment needs to help address some of can reduce the costs of security and in- the other characteristics constraining devel- frastructure provision through scale econ- opment in FCV settings such as improving omies, while at the same time enhance inclusion and social cohesion, reducing con- coordination and agglomeration effects to flict risk, improving resilience to shocks, and reduce logistics and transaction costs and reducing food insecurity. The following are postharvest waste. Improving security of some examples of the spectrum of potential key agribusiness transport routes can re- actions to foster private sector investments in tain and even increase private investment. agricultural value chains across the four con- Where there is high-intensity subna- text pillars of the WBG Strategy for FCV tional conflict, private sector engagement and how they can help address some of the (agribusiness investments, medium and other interlocking characteristics constrain- microscale enterprise (MSME) finance, ing development in FCV settings (table 1). and power generation) has focused on more stable areas of the country, as in the • In countries or regions with high risk Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq. of conflict. Supporting inclusive agri- business models can contribute to im- • In contexts of high institutional and proved social cohesion; improving land social fragility, including postconflict tenure security can induce more private situations. Weak rule of law and a poor investment and help protect the rights investment climate in these contexts 28 FUTURE OF FOOD increase private sector risks and transac- supporting start-ups and establishment tion costs. As a result, these contexts of- of agribusinesses can increase self-reli- ten reward private actors with skill sets of ance of refugees and foster economic and acquiring government side deals, corrup- social inclusion. tion, and monopolies to ensure profitabil- ity, rather than with skill sets of market Entry points for support also vary by stage efficiency, competitiveness, and market of private sector enterprise development. returns. In some cases, the government Nascent, often informal, private enterpris- and the “private sector” are the same per- es can benefit from linkages to livelihoods sons raising significant conflicts of interest programs to achieve initial productivity in policy decisions, including disincen- gains via cash transfers for entrepreneur- tives for changing the status quo. While ship, access to finance, business advisory and there may be elements of these aspects training, and safety net programs, building in all countries, they seem particularly infrastructure for links to markets and sim- acute in contexts with high institution- ple processing and aggregation. Formalizing al and social fragility. In these contexts, private enterprises can benefit from building the following can help increase broader capacity to connect to global value chains, private sector investment in agricultur- support for competition and trade, agrispa- al value chains: improving the enabling tial solutions such as special economic zones environment, including the stability and or industrial parks, and improvements to the predictability of policies and land tenure overall investment climate, including mac- security; providing adequate economic roeconomic stability and the availability and infrastructure; improving transparency reliability of power.60 and competitiveness; increasing access to financing, including providing direct More details on some of these potential en- financing to value-chain actors; support try points, as reflected in table 2 (“Action: for training and skills development; and Prevent and respond to food crises and im- political risk insurance for financial insti- prove nutrition”), are spelled out below. tutions and private investors. In postcon- flict settings, agricultural recovery can be Support inclusive business models for mar- rapid as violence recedes, people return to ginalized populations and lagging regions. farms, land is planted again, and markets Inclusive business models can help address reopen. Sustaining growth and income inequality and reduce social tension. In FCV generation beyond initial gains can be settings, it is important to recognize that facilitated by connecting farmers to val- identity group inequality, rather than individ- ue chains and enabling them to produce ual inequality, is a cause of conflict,61 as armed higher value products.59 conflict is not an individual activity but is waged between groups—either between an • In areas with high numbers of displaced organized group and the state or between people as a spillover effect of FCV. organized identity groups (such as ethnic Ensuring the right of IDPs to work and groups). Identity group inequality often leads BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 29 to geographic inequality and conflict.62 In ad- FCV settings, spatial solutions can also help dition, youth unemployment is consistently reduce the costs of security and infrastructure cited in citizen perception surveys as a motive provision through scale economies. When for joining both rebel movements and urban attempting to implement such solutions in gangs.63 In FCV settings, no access to decent FCV settings, community consultations and employment and complete disempowerment consideration of a phased approach take on often drive vulnerable groups (youth and greater importance. In the planning phase, it women) to participate in violence. If inclusion is crucial to understand community concerns, in agricultural value chains can reduce identi- goals, and needs and to inform communities ty group inequality and provide decent work of the implications of the proposed spa- for youths and women, it also helps reduce tial solution. Consultations build trust and the risk of future conflict and violence. While manage  expectations that can prevent con- value-chain development needs to be mar- flict and security issues. Given the often low ket and private sector driven, which includes capacity context in FCS, a more cautious, considerations for costs, private firms should phased approach with strong technical assis- be encouraged to employ people from dis- tance to public institutions involved might advantaged identity groups in circumstances be warranted. Planning for a pilot program where identity group inequality is high or to or smaller beginning phase of development source products from these groups. Linking can also help mitigate the risk of overextend- smallholder farmers to value chains via con- ing capital investment—the public sector can tract farming outgrower schemes can increase establish a pilot program to demonstrate in- productivity and incomes. Public support can vestment potential to the private sector. help build capacity of smallholders to engage in these commercial value chains. Program Restore, build, and protect capital stock design should consider and build in ways to in the food system often destroyed by con- help reduce identity group inequality and flict to help regain lost production and promote inclusion of youth and women. raise productivity. Rebuilding infrastructure such as irrigation canals, roads, and bridg- Consider agrispatial solutions to reduce es and rebuilding other capital stocks such security costs in conflict situations and en- as livestock can help induce more private hance coordination and agglomeration investment. An example of the impact of de- effects to reduce logistics and transaction stroyed capital stock on production is the 60 costs. Spatial solutions such as special eco- percent decline in vegetable production in nomic zones or industrial parks, focused on Homs Governorate in Syria that relied on specific sectors such as the agrifood sector or irrigation systems subsequently damaged catering to many industries, can be used to in the war.64 Considerations will need to be help domestic and foreign investors achieve given to both economic and social aspects in agglomeration economies; they can also over- prioritizing rehabilitation investments. come country-wide enabling environment challenges related to access to land, energy, Improve the enabling environment, in- and transport infrastructure, among others. In cluding the stability and predictability 30 FUTURE OF FOOD of policies. A conducive enabling envi- change. There are often strong vested inter- ronment is critical for private investment ests to maintain the status quo from those and development of the agrifood sec- who are substantially benefiting from it. tor, and FCS have the least conducive environments. For example, the Enabling Support training and skills develop- the Business of Agriculture 2019 report, ment, including for youth, women, and which benchmarked countries against reg- ex-combatants. In situations with high in- ulatory good practices related to market stitutional and social fragility, there is high integration and entrepreneurship in agri- need for training and skills development to culture, showed FCS to have the lowest help integration and development of the average score (least conducive enabling en- private sector. Choice and design of skills vironment), lower that non-FCS low- and programs must be guided by a thorough la- middle-income countries, and half the bor market assessment and inclusive policy score of upper-middle-income countries. dialogue that links public and development FCS scored particularly poorly on the con- partner investments with the private sec- ducive environment related to access to tor. The absence of these elements can lead finance management and resource manage- to a mismatch of job training options with ment, particularly of water. Other aspects of market need, as experienced by ex-combat- the enabling environment are also critical, ants in Sierra Leone where training led to including, among others, macroeconomic a surplus of workers in specific trades—for and political stability; trade policy; predict- example, carpenters, tailors, and hairdress- ability of input and output market policies ers—that the local economy was unable to (including for land, water, seed, and fertil- absorb. As a result, many of the unemployed izer); and the quality of infrastructure (for ex-combatants reverted to illegal activi- example, roads, ports and airports, storage, ties in country or integrated into regional cold chain, electricity, water, and so on). conflicts. Advisory services to agribusiness Given the large agenda in FCS, prioritiza- MSMEs can help these businesses navi- tion should be informed through structured gate the obstacles and develop in fragile and inclusive public-private dialogue. Other contexts; however, these services are often considerations include (1) focusing first on lacking. Some countries have taken a pro- improvements that have a high likelihood active approach to address this issue. For of success to create a demonstration effect; example, Nepal, which exited the World (2) opt, if relevant, for phased approach- Bank’s list of FCS in FY15, established es; and (3) include institutional capacity the Nepal Agribusiness Innovation Center building and technical assistance support (AIC) in 2006, following the end of a de- to government to design and implement cade-long civil war. Nepal’s AIC has a improvements. Understanding the likely mandate to (1) nurture start-ups, small and winners and losers of enabling environment medium-sized enterprises, and innovators changes can help direct any bargained com- in the agribusiness sector through business promises or compensation needed for the incubation from conceptualization, imple- losers to increase the likelihood of policy mentation, and scaling up; (2) contribute BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 31 to commercialization and industrializa- environment challenges highlighted earlier tion of the agribusiness sector in Nepal; and in this paper can help develop more “bank- (3) foster collaboration among ecosystem able” financing opportunities; (3) support actors to promote agribusinesses in Nepal. for informal and community-based in- stitutions can help improve and support Increase access to finance. Access to fi- operations of their savings associations; nance in FCS is lower than elsewhere. and (4) use of blended finance (a package Domestic credit to the private sector (as of concessional funding provided by a de- share of GDP) in FCS is almost half that velopment partner, and commercial funding of IDA countries and lower than the aver- provided by a financier) to offset some of the age for low-income countries. Finance for risks and political risk insurance that is often private actors in food systems is from mul- required for some banks or financiers to pro- tiple sources: formal institutions (such as vide finance. An example of blended finance commercial banks, state banks, and micro- is the private sector window of the Global finance institutions); value chains actors Agriculture and Food Security Program. (for example, food processors and inputs Past experience shows that credit subsidies suppliers); informal and community-based tend to accrue to those who already have ac- institutions (for example, communi- cess to credit without much benefit for those ty savings associations); and development who do not. partners who provide grants (for example, non-governmental organizations [NGOs] Political risk insurance for financial in- and foundations) and finance on more com- stitutions and private investors can help mercial, or blended, terms (for example, the increase private sector investment in ag- International Finance Corporation). The ricultural value chains. Political risks are challenge is how to increase access to financ- higher in FCS, and they deter private invest- ing from all sources. Entry points include ment, including provision of credit to private the following: (1) increasing the means of investors. Political risk insurance can re- local formal financial institutions to engage duce these risks for international investors. via lines of credit, instruments to mitigate For example, the Multilateral Investment risks (for example, partial credit guarantees), Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides in- support to expand digital solutions (better ternational investors with risk insurance tailored to high informality settings, includ- guarantees to protect investors against ing IDPs), and capacity building in financial non-commercial risks such as the following: institutions to better understand the agri- (1) war and civil disturbance that damage food sector; (2) encouraging foreign direct crops, agri-infrastructure, and other assets; investment in agricultural value chains that (2) breach of contract by governments and can bring in cheaper financing to down- the contractual partners—for example, stream actors from external sources—better breach of land lease agreements; (3) expro- structuring value chains, building producer priation (government takeover of assets, and agribusiness MSME capacity, and ad- such as land, farm machinery, or food pro- dressing broader infrastructure and enabling cessing plants); and (4) currency transfer 32 FUTURE OF FOOD restrictions and inconvertibility (preventing Reduce Conflict Risk and repatriation of assets). For example, MIGA has provided risk insurance guarantees that Environmental Fragility have helped facilitate international invest- through Sustainable Natural ment in processing and exports in Burundi Resource Management and in tropical fruit production, harvesting, and processing in Sierra Leone. While the food system is often a cause of conflicts it can also provide opportunities In areas with high forced displacement for conflict resolution and peace build- as a result of conflict and crises, helping ing. As highlighted, extreme volatility in agribusiness development and allowing food prices and acute food shortages have refugees to work can help them become triggered incidents of conflict.66 Increases self-reliant. Refugees and IDPs often set- in food price levels raise the risk of socio- tle across borders close to their place of economic unrest.67 Anomalies in climate origin—for example, South Sudanese in conditions in rural areas increase the risk Northern Uganda, Somalis in northern of violence and conflict, ranging from in- parts of Kenya, and Eritreans in neigh- terpersonal to national intergroup levels.68 boring regions of Ethiopia. These areas Exclusion and large horizontal inequali- are often poorer than the place of origin, ties (between groups of individuals sharing marginalized with scarce infrastructure, a common identity) increase the risk of civil weak services, low development assis- and communal conflict.69 These aspects have tance, and are often environmentally fragile been addressed in previous sections. An ad- and vulnerable to prolonged droughts.65 ditional source of significant conflict risk in Investments in infrastructure and services some areas is increased competition for land in these areas are needed. These are agrari- and water, particularly among and between an areas where agriculture is the dominant pastoralists and crop producers.70 In these source of livelihood and often depends contexts, managing access to and use of nat- on women’s labor. Refugees want to feed ural resources will be particularly important. and clothe themselves and some are high- ly skilled. Engaging with refugees and host Manage access to and use of natural re- communities to understand and address sources, particularly land and water, the development needs of both commu- among livestock herders and crop pro- nities is needed. Identifying economic ducers. Competition for grazing land and opportunities and skills and supporting lo- water, along with the erosion of tradition- cal agribusiness development for men and al range management and tenure systems, women of both communities through skills has increased the incidence of conflicts development, supporting businesses that among pastoralists and between pastoral- hire refugees, expanding access to finance, ists and settled farming populations.71 An and ensuring that refugees have the right to example of increased communal violence work and produce can help foster econom- between pastoral herders and farmers is in ic and social inclusion. the Middle Belt in Nigeria.72 Actions that BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 33 can help reduce the risk of conflict include overtime pay for sitting judges in the inter- the following: (1) improve technology and im can reduce land dispute case backlogs, management practices to increase ground as it did in Ghana and Tanzania; aware- and surface water availability and improve ness raising and training of judges on land the quality of pastures; (2) strengthen in- laws, as in Mozambique, is often a necessi- stitutions and capacity (of government and ty; recognizing that land disputes are often communities) to govern the resources in a better managed and adjudicated in accor- way to avoid conflict, including conflict res- dance with customary norms and processes olution mechanisms; customary institutions than by state institutions alone, as in Kenya; can be particularly effective at regulat- (2) recognize in land laws various forms ing access to and use of rangelands among of land tenure, including rights allocat- pastoralists;73 and (3) equitable and full par- ed under customary and indigenous tenure ticipation of pastoralists in policy dialogue, systems, rights over common property such especially at the local level.74 An example as forests and grazing land, and communi- is the Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support ty-held rights, as in Burkina Faso and Mali; Project spanning Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, (3) improving land acquisition laws and pro- Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal that is help- cedures, including to reflect customary law ing to improve resource management and settings and eliminating gender biases in animal health and reduce conflicts.75 access to land;78 (4) creating inventories of public land to strengthen management and Improve land administration for good reduce corruption, particularly because state governance and conflict management. land ownership is widespread in FCV set- Land-related tensions, if not effectively man- tings; and (5) develop land administration aged, can spill over into social instability and in postconflict states to avoid recurrence of conflict. These tensions can arise from land conflict and support postconflict recovery, as disputes associated with access to land for in Cambodia,79 Liberia, Mozambique,80 and returning refugees and IDPs in conflict-af- Rwanda.81 fected countries (for example, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda), Reduce and reverse natural resource deg- land tensions arising from global commer- radation. Natural resource degradation can cial interests (for example, the Democratic be a source of conflict. For example, live- Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra stock overgrazing can lead to encroachment Leone), and unresolved restitution of land of pastoralists onto crop lands, causing in- rights (for example, Kenya, South Africa, creased tension and conflict between these and Zimbabwe).76 Actions to improve land groups. Degraded water catchments from administration for good governance and deforestation affect the quality, quantity, conflict management include the follow- and timing of water flow, and excessive ex- ing:77 (1) building competent and impartial tractions and water depletion can lead to institutions for resolving land disputes; while conflicts among users, of which the largest this includes broader strengthening of ju- user is agriculture. Key drivers of land deg- dicial systems, hiring retired judges and radation include lack of land tenure security, 34 FUTURE OF FOOD lack of (output, input, and financial) market include improving land tenure security, as access, and lack of knowledge of improved laid out in the earlier paragraphs; strength- management practices.82 In this context, ening farmer linkages to markets; improving there is a two-way relationship between con- knowledge of land management practices; flict and land degradation—conflict reduces and encouraging more landscape approach- the incentives and means to invest in land es that recognize the interactions between improvement, and degraded land can be a forests, water catchment management, and source of conflict. Entry points for action agriculture. BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 35 36 FUTURE OF FOOD How to Do It Given the wide heterogeneity among coun- priorities for capacity building); (2) drivers of tries, the intent of this section is not to conflict and conflict risks and opportunities provide a comprehensive blueprint but to for conflict resolution (for example, conflict highlight select areas that should be consid- risk between pastoralists and crop produc- ered in the design and implementation of ers, conflict risk between other identity programs in FCV settings. groups, and food price volatility); (3) op- portunities to reduce exposure and impact Extend analytics beyond a technical pro- of economic shocks through understanding duction focus. Analytical work on food the likelihood and severity of shocks in food systems needs to not only focus on produc- systems (for example, climate, pests, and dis- tion functions but also on identifying how ease) as a way to prioritize prevention and the food system can help address the under- response capacity; (4) entry points for pri- lying characteristics constraining broader vate sector development and job creation; development in FCV settings. This includes (5) opportunities to provide livelihoods for identifying the following: (1) how food displaced people and refugees; (6) ways to systems can contribute to building state le- prevent and address food crises situations gitimacy, social cohesion, and state capacity and scale responses to risks and severity of beyond just a narrower technical focus on crises; and (7) ways to foster medium-term agricultural growth (for example, inclusion planning processes, less fragmentation, and of vulnerable groups, identifying key gender more coordination of donor-financed sec- gaps, accountability, transparency, predict- tor investments (informed by agriculture ability, and targeting of public support and public expenditure reviews). While data to underpin analytics are often weaker (and confidence, and realistically defined insti- confidence lower) in FCV settings, it does tution building can increase the likelihood not mean that analytics on the above aspects of longer-term impacts.83 Prioritization by should not be undertaken. governments needs to be informed by broad consultation among stakeholder groups, in- Design programs for impact in fragile and cluding local communities, and private sector higher risk environments. Guiding pa- actors in agricultural value chains. rameters for program design provided by the Commission on State Fragility, Growth Follow the “do no harm” principle. In con- and Development are realism (feasible with- flict situations, control over resources such as in resource and capacity constraints, that is, food, water, seeds, and fertilizer can contrib- simple design), honesty (the program is re- ute to the perpetuation of conflict. Where flected in the public budget with systems in development programs involve the trans- place to ensure funds are spent for intended fer of these types of resources, it is critical purposes), and inclusion (of women, youth, both to understand, ex ante, the risk of these IDPs, ex-combatants, and other vulnerable transfers being used to facilitate conflict and or excluded groups as the context requires). to develop corresponding mitigation mea- Predictability of support, to restore the so- sures. Analysis of risk should include an cial contract between citizens and the state, assessment of how these types of resources is another important guiding parameter. A are currently being used by various groups crosscutting question to consider in the de- engaged in conflict. Failing to recognize po- sign of programs in the food system is, how tential negative impacts of resource transfers will it contribute to addressing the interlock- can result in development assistance caus- ing characteristics constraining development ing harm rather than helping. At the same in FCS (table 1), including social cohesion, time, development program design can help state legitimacy, capacity, reducing conflict strengthen local capacities for peace, bring and crisis risks, and private sector develop- communities together, and reduce the divi- ment? Emphasis across these aspects will vary sions and sources of tensions and conflict. by country or area context. While programs in the food system cannot solve all prob- Adapt implementation arrangements. lems, they need to try to contribute, even in Given the diversity of FCV settings, con- a small way, to addressing these interlocking text-specific implementation arrangements characteristics to help countries move to- are needed. Hybrid arrangements, involv- ward exiting fragility. In some areas with high ing state and nonstate actors and formal needs but low or no state legitimacy among and informal institutions can help adapt im- local communities, community-driven pro- plementation to local conditions. In some grams through nonstate actors may provide contexts, such as temporary support for cri- an intermittent way to provide support to ses, using separate program implementation these communities. While the agenda pre- units may ensure faster and more effective sented in this paper is large, an initial focus delivery. In this context, it is important to rec- on two or three rapid results can help build ognize the distinction between humanitarian 38 FUTURE OF FOOD assistance and the longer-term process of Support initially focused on strengthen- building government capacity. For lon- ing community institutions and livelihoods; ger-term development, rather than separate then on rapid recovery and return of IDPs; semiautonomous project implementation then on strengthening local and provincial units, using government systems, with com- capacity to deliver services for sustained lon- plementary training, can help develop and ger-term recovery and development. While strengthen public institutions and capacity at the start of these three support measures was the national and local levels. In these latter sequenced, implementation time periods contexts, there needs to be realism in design were overlapping. More specifically: and program targets linked to local capacity. High security risks may also limit the abil- • The Community Livelihoods in Conflict- ity of safe travel to program areas. In these Affected Areas Project (2005–12) start- situations, among other approaches, digital ed during the war in Sri Lanka to help technologies can potentially play an import- conflicted-affect communities restore ant role in monitoring implementation. For livelihoods and enhance agricultural and example, the Geo-Enabling Initiative for other production and income. The project Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS), a used a community-driven development smartphone-based system, enables input of approach to empower community institu- time-stamped GPS coordinate-linked data tions to plan and implement village-level on implementation progress, including pho- development activities. Matching grants tos, that can be uploaded to a central database. helped build farm assets and input use to GEMS is being increasingly used to monitor boost food production. implementation progress of projects in FCS, • The Emergency Northern Recovery such as in the Central African Republic and Project (2009–13) supported the return the Democratic Republic of Congo. of IDPs and helped restore economic and social life through emergency assistance Give attention to both immediate needs to IDPs (addressing contested land and and longer-term institution building for provision of basic inputs for farming), recovery and development. In FCV settings a work-fare program (to bridge the in- the focus is often on needed short-term re- come gap between planting and imme- sponses, particularly in food crisis situations diate resettlement assistance and first with a focus on immediate food availability, harvest, while at the same time helping rather than on aspects of longer-term food to restore small-scale infrastructure), and stability. However, this latter aspect is vital rehabilitation and reconstruction of larg- for longer-term development and should be er-scale infrastructure (irrigation systems, given attention in parallel or after provision rural roads, drinking water, and public of immediate needs. For example, in northern facilities). and eastern Sri Lanka, a sequence of support was provided during and immediately af- • The North East Local Services ter the civil war to address immediate needs Improvement Project (2010–17) strength- and longer-term recovery and development. ened local and provincial government BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 39 capacity to deliver infrastructure services, outlining stakeholder engagement strategies, including longer-term maintenance. and development of pest management plans (for example, for desert locust management). Indeed, earlier lessons from support for These efforts need to be driven and owned by food security in the Democratic Republic of governments. Congo, Somalia, and Sudan highlighted the need to build national and local institutions, Leverage implementation partnerships. the absence of which can lead to protracted Improving food and nutrition security, pov- food security crises.84 erty reduction, and prosperity in FCV Increase provision of funds through simple settings is an immense development chal- and faster mechanisms. Provision of addi- lenge. Development partners have a range tional financing to help prevent crises from of experiences, country presence, exper- worsening and immediately after natural di- tise, and comparative advantage that should sasters can improve both the speed and scale all be drawn on to improve effectiveness of response—including for destocking, scal- of national responses to help countries lift ing up the size of safety net payments and themselves out of fragility. The most ef- their geographic coverage, provision of hu- fective coordination is when governments manitarian food needs, and providing seeds set the priorities for all development part- and other inputs for replanting lost crops. ners to align around and help implement Examples include the following: (1) the World and achieve. Governments needs to own the Bank IDA Crisis Response Window–Early agenda and programs to help improve their Response Financing that provides addition- legitimacy and accountably to their citizens al financing to poor countries that can help and increase likelihood of implementation. In prevent food emergencies from worsening to some cases, governments are not able to ful- more acute phases through protecting pur- ly drive the development process, such as in chasing power of affected household through contexts of civil wars and splintered govern- safety net transfers; in some cases, provid- ments. In these situations, there is a critical ing food and nutritional supplements; and need to balance interventions between gov- helping resume farming; (2) Catastrophe ernment and oppositional territories, where Deferred Drawdowns Options as part of partnerships with the United Nations (UN) IDA Development Policy lending that pro- and NGOs become especially important, as vides immediate contingent financing to they are sometimes the only actors who can address shocks related to natural disasters; access conflict-affected areas. At the same and (3) project-level instruments, such as time, fostering dialogue between govern- the World Bank’s Contingency Emergency ment and opposition territories is crucial to Response Component to facilitate rapid re- finding longer-term sustainable development sponse to emergencies should they arise. solutions. An example of an implementation Broader analytical and technical support can partnership is the Global Network Against help pave the way for fast action and access to Food Crises which includes humanitari- additional financing, such as Food Security an and development organizations, donors, Crisis Preparedness Plans (FSCPPs), UN agencies, NGOs, and academic and data 40 FUTURE OF FOOD institutions that help foster a shared under- multisectoral aspects need to be consid- standing of the countries at greatest risk of ered for each element of the agenda being food security crises, the drivers of these risks, prioritized and taken forward in nation- and broad anticipatory and early actions that al programs. For example, the partnership could help prevent and mitigate the escala- for recovery and resilience in South Sudan tion of these risks. The World Bank, under is working to bring government and devel- its partnership framework with the UN, has opment partners together for multisector worked with UN agencies to help imple- area-based investments, with area selection ment World Bank supported programs such based on the level of security and political as the WFP for food distribution aspects willingness to adopt good governance. and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for entire program implementation Balance national, subnational, regional, in some settings (for example, the Republic and local approaches. While common cat- of Yemen). It has also partnered with NGOs egorizations of fragile situations are at the such as the International Committee of the national level, as reflected in the World Bank’s Red Cross (for example, South Sudan). list of fragile and conflict-affected situations, countries not on the list can have fragile sub- Integrate multisectoral support. As the regions, and fragility can also extend across previous sections of the paper illustrate, mul- regions (for example, Lake Chad and the tisectoral support is needed to help build Sahel region). For example, a driver of escalat- stronger food systems in FCV settings—in- ing tensions and violence in West Africa has cluding agriculture, security, infrastructure, been conflicts between pastoralists from the social protection, health, public service Sahel and sedentary people in coastal coun- strengthening, and environmental and macro tries over access to natural resources along policies. Investments in agriculture with- transhumance routes. A regional approach is out improved security on roads in conflict best suited to assist with transhumance man- situations will do little to revive agricultur- agement and livestock trade to help reduce al markets. Reconstruction of infrastructure conflict and violence. In addition, fragility de- without land tenure security or availabili- creases with economic integration. All efforts ty and access to improved seeds will have need to demonstrate results at the local lev- limited impact on the agricultural supply re- el. Without emphasis on local results, citizens sponse. Lack of shock responsive safety net lose confidence in their government’s ability programs will deepen impacts of food cri- to provide a better life. Actions to restore se- ses. And lack of investment in agricultural curity, create trust, generate employment, and climate resilience will continue to set back provide services in local communities lay the gains when climate shocks occur. State ca- foundation for national progress.85 pacity-building efforts in the food system also need to complement broader public Making gains in FCS will be critical to service strengthening programs. While it is achieving the Sustainable Development not possible to do everything, everywhere, Goals, particularly as two-thirds of the all at once, especially in FCV settings, these extreme poor is projected to be living in BUILDING STRONGER FOOD SYSTEMS IN FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE SETTINGS 41 these situations by 2030. The food system require commitment by governments and can make a substantial contribution to ad- development partners to make sustained dressing the interlocking characteristics progress, tailoring approaches to match spe- constraining overall development in FCV cific local contexts. While fragility is often settings to help countries transition out of protracted, many countries have managed to fragility and reduce conflict risk. The agen- transition out of this state, offering hope for da is large and complex, reflective of the wide a more prosperous future for those that have heterogeneity among FCV settings, and will not yet managed to make this transition. 42 FUTURE OF FOOD Endnotes * This report has been prepared by a core team and Displaced People (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee comprising Robert Townsend, Dorte Verner, Council, 2020). Abimbola Adubi, Jean Saint-Geours, Izabela Leao, 12. World Bank, FY22 List of Fragile and Conflict- Armine Juergenliemk, Tim Robertson, Melissa affected Situations. Williams, Flore de Preneuf, Marketa Jonasova, and Zacharey Carmichael with inputs from Lucia 13. Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index Annual Report Hammer, Ashwini Sebastian, Viviana Maria Perego, 2021 (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2021). and Paul Barbour. 14. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 1. 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