89831 B u d g e t T r a n s pa r e n c y I n i t i at i v e A Local Budget Transparency Index for Cameroon’s Local Councils Insights from a Benchmarking Exercise Transparent budgets and public financial management processes constitute a key pillar of good governance. However, while this has been increasingly recognized for national budgets, little attention is paid to subnational budget transparency. To fill this lacuna, a World Bank-supported initiative piloted a local budget transparency index (LBTI) in two of Cameroon’s ten regions. Thirty-one local councils in the Northwest Region and nineteen in the Adamawa Region self-assessed the openness of their budget processes by filling out questionnaires in 2012. The councils were then ranked, the results were published, and—in Adamawa—discussed in a public meeting called by the region’s governor and attended by mayors and the media. Through this exercise, mayors of low-ranking councils were publicly questioned about their low scores, which led to a palpable desire on their part to better perform in the next round of the survey. In 2013, independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) gathered the same information in a second round of surveys. This note discusses the methodology, main findings, and results from the LBTI pilot in the two regions and concludes with key challenges and lessons learned. Introduction To assess the transparency of the budgets of national govern- ments, the International Budget Partnership launched the Open What Is Budget Transparency and Budget Survey in 2006. Based on this survey, it also pioneered Why Is It Important? the Open Budget Index, which has become widely used to com- pare the transparency level of country budgets and to more Budget transparency refers to the extent and ease with which generally assess their commitment to open and accountable citizens can access information about and provide feedback on governance. A global trend toward decentralization and greater government revenues, allocations, and expenditures. Budgets autonomy of local governments and the attendant increase in are key documents reflecting how scarce resources are allo- the importance of local government policy decisions—hence cated across competing demands. They lay out a government’s budgets—for the quality of life of citizens warrants a greater priorities in terms of policies and programs. Opening up bud- focus on promoting and measuring budget transparency at gets and democratizing the budget process—whether at the the local level. Some interesting efforts have been made in local or national level—allows citizens to have a say in policy recent years to benchmark local government performance,1 but formulation and resource allocation. Budget transparency, while few indicators comparable to the Open Budget Index exist to not a goal in itself, is a prerequisite for public participation and benchmark local government budget transparency. This note government accountability. A budget that is not transparent, accessible, and accurate cannot be properly analyzed. Its imple- mentation cannot be thoroughly monitored nor its outcomes 1. There have been a growing number of Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessments undertaken at the subnational level, including one for Douala, Cameroon. evaluated. Given the technical nature of budgets and the bud- In several countries, methodologies to assess provincial performance, including trans- get process, transparent budgets require that the information parency, have been developed, among them the United States of America’s State Management Report Card (PEW 2008), Vietnam’s Provincial Governance and Public contained in them be actively disseminated to citizens in a Administration Performance Index (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, with the United Nations timely manner and simplified form. Development Programme), and Sierra Leone’s Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment System. The International Budget Partnership has also piloted several initiatives at the subnational level. introduces a new indicator specifically focused on local bud- development outcomes, a greater realization of social rights,3 get transparency, thereby contributing to the growing efforts and better credit ratings4 that lead to lower borrowing costs. to subject local government performance and budget transpar- While several avenues can be pursued to achieve more ency to greater scrutiny. transparency in budget processes, an index to assess the bud- While budget transparency is important at all levels of gov- get transparency of local councils is a powerful tool for several ernment, the possibilities and optimal ways of disseminating reasons: budget information to citizens and obtaining their feedback • A standardized index helps to compare and contrast the differ from the local level to the national level. For instance, the process of budget formulation, allocation, and expenditures local level is much more amenable to public meetings for dis- between local councils. seminating budget information and for allowing direct interac- • An index, if based on independent assessments, can enable tions between local officials and citizens. In the case of local the objective benchmarking of different councils operating councils, budget transparency not only allows mayors and coun- within a common legal framework, which if repeated regu- cilors to receive citizen feedback while formulating policies and larly, adds an element of competition between mayors, pos- prioritizing resources, but can also reduce waste and outright sibly serving as a catalyst for reform toward increased budget corruption. Transparent local budgeting processes allow gov- openness. ernments to reinforce the contract between the state and its • An index provides citizens and higher-level authorities with citizens. Some activities that have been found to be well suited key information that allows them to hold local governments for promoting budget transparency at the local level include the accountable for transparency and performance; in this way, it following:2 can strengthen both downward and upward accountability. • Improving budget literacy of council members and their • An LBTI facilitates the identification and exchange between capacity to analyze budgets. local councils of good practices around budget simplification • Creating and disseminating Citizens Budgets for local and dissemination. governments. • The survey questions are a way of introducing specific mea- • Providing opportunities for budget-related discussions (e.g., sures into policy discussions, thus providing a roadmap to designating council meetings specifically for budget discus- local councils for increasing transparency and trust with the sions and budget-literacy workshops). adoption of desired minimum standards regarding budget • Creating radio programs to sensitize citizens on budgetary processes. issues. • An LBTI complements other measures to promote budget • Setting benchmarks and assessing budget openness of local transparency—potentially at a low cost—and, if undertaken governments using a budget transparency index. periodically, allows progress to be measured. This note discusses the experience of piloting a local budget In the absence of a readily-available instrument to bench- transparency index developed for local councils in Cameroon mark local governments in terms of budget transparency, the under the Budget Transparency Initiative and illustrates how this World Bank-funded Budget Transparency Initiative piloted an can be an effective tool to promote budget transparency. LBTI in two regions of Cameroon—Northwest and Adamawa— chosen because of the explicit requests from the regions’ gover- How Can a Local Budget Transparency Index nors. The index was specifically customized to the Cameroonian Promote Budget Openness and Better Governance? context. Budget transparency, if accompanied by budget literacy, The remainder of this note is divided into four sections. The empowers people to scrutinize the adequacy of the allocation first elaborates on the Cameroonian context with respect to of public resources across different priorities as well as the pro- budget transparency and municipal budgeting. The next two bity of spending, thus reducing inefficiencies and corruption. sections discuss the methodology, main findings, and results Transparent budget processes serve to build trust between from the pilot. The final section concludes with a summary of citizens and the government. Evidence also suggests that key challenges and lessons learned. increased budget transparency is associated with better human 3. Fukuda-Parr and others (2011), “Does Budget Transparency Lead to Stronger Human Development Outcomes and Commitments to Economic and Social Rights?” . 2. For more information, see Agarwal and Alton (2013), “Increasing Accountability through 4. Hameed Farhan (2005), “Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes” and Arbatliand Budget Transparency at the Subnational Level in Cameroon.” and Escolano (2012), “Fiscal Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Credit Ratings.” 2 Box 1. Decentralization in Cameroon In 2004, the national assembly adopted legislation governing decentralization, and its effective implementation is viewed as essential by authorities for improving governance and development effectiveness.a However, a 2012 World Bank report on the Path to Fiscal Decentralizationb notes that, to date, a devolution of central power to departmental units of line ministries (i.e., deconcentration) has predominated over decentralization efforts. Currently, local councils face a number of major challenges in effectively implementing policies independent of the central government, including: • No effective transfer of competences; • Inadequate local own-source revenues—i.e., local governments are mostly dependent on shares in the main taxes levied by the central government but have no control over the formula determining the size of these shares; • Lack of synchronization between central and local budget cycles—central transfers (budgeted in mid-November) are decided after local governments prepare their budgets in early November, and the allocations to local councils are not known until February or March, hindering effective budgeting. In light of these obstacles faced by local councils, local budget transparency indexes must be carefully interpreted. If poor results are a reflection of constraints beyond a council’s control, this must be clearly communicated to the public to avoid a back- lash by mayors feeling unjustly chastened. However, the use of an LBTI remains relevant for assessing the transparency of council budget processes and the spending of available resources, even if limited; for communicating the above-mentioned challenges to constituents; and for creating more public awareness about the inadequacies of decentralization efforts—the only way public pressure to remedy them can build. a. Government of Cameroon. 2009. b. Path to Fiscal Decentralization. Context within regions, departments, and local councils needing sup- port. The assumption is that citizens can demand better prac- Budget Transparency at the National Level tices from their local leaders and government officials if they in Cameroon can challenge and compare their performance with others. Compared to other countries, Cameroon’s score on the In Cameroon, legal provisions requiring the publication of Mo-Ibrahim governance index is consistently low,5 and in 2012, budget documents do exist. The government is obliged to pub- it was only 45 out of a 100, resulting in a ranking of 36 out of lish all projects of the national investment budget at the begin- 52 countries, and in the same year it was only ranked 144th ning of the fiscal year in the Journal des Projets, which can be on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.6 obtained in some government offices, including the regional Over the past three years, its Open Budget Index score has not delegations of the ministry of economy and planning. However, improved significantly; in 2012, Cameroon scored only 10 out of access to recurrent budget information is more limited because 100, far below the average score of 31 for Sub-Saharan African there is no equivalent to the Journal des Projets in which it is countries.7 included and the government’s financial management systems However, this low aggregate score masks a number of bud- make its extraction by subnational officials technically difficult, get initiatives that are currently underway at several levels of if not impossible. government and in various parts of the country—with differing Access-to-information legislation has existed in Cameroon degrees of success. The importance of an LBTI lies in its poten- since 1991, but the law is vague and without enforcement mech- tial not only to help build local capacity to provide and demand anisms—there are no sanctions for failing to provide informa- better budget processes, but also to identify local champions tion. Furthermore, the law stipulates that civil servants should only disseminate information after receiving clearance from 5. http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/2012-IIAG-summary-report.pdf. their superiors (“devoir de reserve”). As a consequence, in 2008, 6. http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/#myAnchor1 7. http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/full-report. 3 Figure 1. Roles and Accountability Relationships at the Local Level Municipal Council • Meets every quarter (or less) • Adopts budget and o unts t administrative account Senior Divisional Officer Acco Approves budget and administrative account to ts Accounts to Ac n co c ou un ts Ac to State Financial Services Audit Bench • Regional/divisional Control after Technical control (Cour des Comptes) Mayor implementation during execution controllers of finance • Regional treasurer • Tax divisions Collaboration Co ple Accounts to im nt me ro n l a ta fte tio r n Collaboration Municipal Treasurer • Payment of expenditures • Elaboration of management account Source: SNV 2012, annex 16. Global Integrity deemed that effective access to information under the control of deconcentrated entities; this can lead to was very weak.8 confusion as well as a lack of clear accountability relationships.12 This dynamic is also apparent in the local council budget The Budget Process and Budget Transparency process, which requires that mayors prepare budgets in close at the Local Level9 collaboration with the deconcentrated state financial services. Cameroon’s 1972 constitution envisaged a role for local gov- Draft budgets prepared by the mayor must be submitted to the ernments to ensure effective public service delivery in line municipal council for adoption. However, while Law 2009/011 with local needs and to enhance the accountability of public requires that the council must be convened at least 15 days prior officials, but did not clearly delineate the role of local coun- to the budget session, it does not explicitly specify that coun- cils.10 The role and institutional set-up of Cameroon’s 360 local cilors must be presented with a draft budget during the session; councils (45 urban and 315 rural municipalities) was more clearly it merely states that a vote on the budget must be held on the delineated by a series of laws adopted since 2004.11 However, 15th of November of each year. After the adoption of the bud- ambiguity remains regarding the division of responsibilities for get by the council, the senior divisional officer must approve it specific functions between deconcentrated agents of the cen- prior to its enactment. ter and decentralized local governments. Thus, within one geo- The budget is then executed in collaboration with state finan- graphic area, functions may be decentralized and yet still remain cial services and the municipal treasurer. The treasurer is respon- sible for tax collections, expenditures, recordkeeping, and the management account that is submitted to the municipal council and to the Cour des Comptes” (Audit Bench of the Supreme 8. http://report.globalintegrity.org/Cameroon/2008/scorecard. 9. This section draws heavily on SNV (2012), “Public Expenditure Management Reform Court) for control and approval. In practice, the execution of through Budget Publication and other Social Accountability Approaches in the North West Region of Cameroon,” Final Report. 10. Path to Fiscal Decentralization: 3. 11. Law 2009/011 on the financial regime of regional and local authorities, Law 2004/017 on 12. World Bank, “Cameroon: Path to Fiscal Decentralization, Opportunities and Challenges” the orientation of decentralization, and Law 2004/018 on the rules applicable to councils. p. 22. 4 Box 2. The Budget Process in Njikwa A case study of the Njikwa council’s budget process, carried out as part of the National Community Driven Development Program, brought to light several shortcomings in the practice of budget preparation and execution. During budget preparation, formalities were flaunted and the main interest of municipal councilors during council sessions seemed to be sitting allowances rather than the scrutiny of budget documents. Budget allocations were found to depend mostly on the mayor or other influential individu- als rather than on the council at large. Meanwhile, the study found that the execution of the budget suffered from a lack of prioritization and project follow-up. Source: SNV 2012, annex 16. these tasks and functions varies substantially across the country 2. Define the scope of the exercise. After the support of the and within provinces, and several weaknesses exist (box 2). governors was secured, the scope of the exercise was deter- mined. In general, the scope will often be determined by the Citizen involvement in the budget preparation process is lim- availability of resources. The Budget Transparency Initiative ited and citizen oversight during its execution is even less com- regional steering committees16 chaired by the regional governors mon. The law13 stipulates that any citizen has the right to obtain opted for the inclusion of all local councils in their regions for a copy of the Compte Administratif (the local council budget). the exercise. However, councils rarely stock extra copies of it, forcing citizens to make copies at their own expense if they wish to obtain the 3. Design a customized questionnaire. The development and document. Electronic versions are not usually available. roll out of the questionnaire in the pilot involved three steps: • Development of a draft questionnaire. Prior to inspecting Methodology local council budgets, several studies and surveys about bud- get transparency were scanned for questions with potential This section outlines the five key steps in the implementation relevance for constructing the LBTI. A comprehensive menu of the LBTI in Cameroon between 2011 and 201314 as well as the drawing heavily from the Open Budget Survey was used to methodology for scoring the LBTI questionnaire. develop the basic set of 20 questions; scores were deter- mined for each of them. Five Key Steps in Rolling Out the LBTI • Testing of the questionnaire and budget analysis. Several 1. Identify champions at the right level. The first requirement mayors and councilors were consulted to refine the ques- for a local budget transparency survey and subsequent ranking tionnaire, and a detailed review of council budgets was of the different municipalities is support from relevant authori- undertaken to understand the budget process. It was par- ties. Ideally, mayors and governors of regions or equivalent ticularly important to unearth the legal requirements of local administrative units support the exercise. If consultation with all councils in terms of budget transparency and to understand relevant mayors is not possible, ownership and support from a what leeway they had in molding the budget process in order higher tier of government is indispensable because it is invested to select questions that would not yield identical answers with the authority and administrative capacity to implement from all councils but would instead provide a nuanced pic- the survey.15 In Adamawa and the Northwest, the buy-in by the ture of the varied levels of budget transparency. respective governors was critical during the exercise. The ques- • Adopting the core questionnaire. Finally, after the selection tionnaires were distributed and collected through their offices, of 20 questions, the team field-tested the questionnaire in and their championing of the survey ensured a reasonable num- four local councils, which led to the shedding of additional ber of replies from councils. questions; only 15 were retained in the final version (see annex 1 for final questionnaire). 13. Law 2009/011 on the financial regime of regional and local authorities. 14. The methodology used may easily be adapted to other contexts, but most of the outlined steps should be valid generally. 15. In some countries, organizations which represent the interests of municipalities could 16. Regional steering committees were created to preside over the Budget Transparency also be important partners in a municipal budget transparency survey. Initiative. 5 Table 1. Comparison of LBTI Assessment Options Assessment Options Costa Credibility Self-assessment Low Low Third-party assessments (by NGOs, independent High High researchers, etc.) Direct assessment by citizens Low–High, depending on medium used Low-High, depending on budget literacy (SMS low costs; Surveys high costs) and interest to engage by citizens Assessment by regional governments Low Medium a. Factors that will affect costs irrespective of the assessment options chosen include the number of local councils; the number of questions; the distance between councils; the quality of infrastructure in country or region; and the number of repeat assessments. 4. Collect and analyze data to assess councils. There are vari- throughout the year because the survey relates to different ous options to evaluate the budget transparency of local coun- stages of the budget cycle. Ideally, assessing the availability of cils and fill out the questionnaires. In some instances, a trade-off budget documents should be done by testing it in practice— between costs and credibility of the assessment could exist. i.e., by engaging citizens to approach the councils to ask for rel- The solution to this trade-off depends on available funds, the evant documents—and determining whether or not they are wishes of government counterparts, the level of budget literacy actually handed out. Over time, as the methodology is refined among the general population, and the prevailing budget trans- and capacity built among local civil society, fully independent parency. Thus, a minimum level of budget literacy is a precondi- and more refined assessments can be envisaged. After the data tion for citizens to be able to answer some questions (e.g., on was collected from all of the councils, it was cleaned, triangu- the quality of spending or revenue forecasts). Table 1 provides lated, and analyzed. Subsequently, the local council rankings an overview of potential assessors and the likely size of the were tabulated. associated costs and credibility. 5. Disseminate results widely. Ideally, the results should be dis- In Cameroon, two approaches were piloted in consulta- seminated as widely as possible. However, this may often not tion with the respective governors of the two regions. In a be possible for a variety of reasons, as evidenced by the case first round, the questionnaire was circulated to all councils in of Cameroon. The governors opted against publishing the rank- the Northwest and Adamawa. Mayors were asked to fill out ings of the first round of the survey for two main reasons: not the questionnaires and return them to the governor’s office for all mayors responded to the request for information and the analysis and ranking. Thus, the first batch of completed ques- governors were concerned about the reaction of the mayors, tionnaires represented self-assessments.17 While this is far from especially because this was the first time that such an exer- ideal because of the low credibility of such an exercise (table 1), cise had been conducted in Cameroon. Instead, the governors given the unique context, this was the only way to achieve buy- suggested informally disclosing and discussing the scores in a in for the activity. closed meeting of mayors focused on exchanging best practices and improving scores in future surveys. In the end, however, the In the second round, two independent NGOs were con- governor of Adamawa decided to disclose the results in a pub- tracted to visit all local councils in the two regions and to lic meeting in the presence of the media, resulting in a lively complete the questionnaires based on a review of documents discussion and—at least judging from their public pronounce- provided by councils and interviews with council officials. ments—an overt desire on the part of the mayors of poorly- The NGOs were instructed to verify information to whatever ranked councils to better perform in subsequent rounds of the extent possible. Nonetheless, these results must still be inter- survey.18 The second round of the survey appears to bear this preted with the caveat that not all questions can be indepen- out, although results should still be interpreted with some cau- dently answered during one visit. Some answers still reflect tion after only two repetitions. information given by officials. Obtaining independent answers to all questions requires monitoring the affairs of the council 17. This is a crucial difference from the methodology applied in the Open Budget Index in which independent researchers assess the availability and quality of budget documents. This is the most important caveat to bear in mind when interpreting the results of the 18. It is important that this activity be undertaken in a context where funding is available first round of the survey. for government officials willing to improve their performance. 6 LBTI Questionnaire Scoring Methodology there are two important caveats to keep in mind. For the first round, scores of the councils reflect self-assessments and some The 15 questions of the LBTI questionnaire can be grouped into of the points that were not given may have been the result of six broad categories: ignorance or a lack of diligence by the local council officials fill- ing out the questionnaires rather than of actual opacity. For Points per the second round, some questions also probably reflected Category self-assessments by officials because all of them could not be  ocument availabilitya 1. D 3 independently verified at single visits to councils by contracted (Question 1, made up of 20 subquestions) NGOs. Document disseminationb 2.  5 (Question 2, made up of 35 subquestions) However, given the range of the scores, some insights about 3. Forecast qualityc (Questions 3–4) 8 the relative transparency of councils in a given year emerge. A basis for an initial benchmarking of the different councils does 4. Information granularity (Questions 5–9) d 15 exist. A number of observations can be made: the ranks of dif- 5. Public consultation (Questions 10–12) e 10 ferent councils seem to vary considerably across the two sur- 6. Ex-post control (Questions 13–15) 9 veys, but given the different methodologies applied, this is not Total 50 particularly surprising. The range of points narrowed between a. Availability of budget documents. the first and second rounds, substantially so in Adamawa. b. Dissemination of budget documents. c. Quality of revenue and expenditure estimates. Further analysis would be required to conclude whether or not d. Level of detail and disaggregation of information provided in budget documents. this reflects a convergence in practice among different councils e. Consultation with public on budget process, including budged simplification. or changes in the methodology. Points were assigned to each of the 15 questions in the local Budget Transparency of Local Councils—A Synopsis budget transparency questionnaire, with the points obtainable per question reflecting its relative importance. Local councils The data collected during the pilot lends itself to extensive were ranked by the sum of the points they received for the analyses. However, this section does not provide detailed analy- answers. A maximum of 50 points was attainable. ses, but instead offers a synopsis of key responses to the ques- tionnaire according to the six broad categories discussed above, Questions were either binary (eliciting a yes/no answer) or namely, document availability, document dissemination, fore- else they requested information about the grade of transpar- cast quality, information granularity, public consultation, and ex- ency or quality of an aspect of the budget. In the latter case, post control to illustrate the kinds of analyses possible. the awarded points range from 0–4 per question. Questions 1 and 2 are effectively groups of five and seven separate ques- Out of a total of 33 local councils in the Northwest and of tions yielding a total of 3 and 5 points, respectively. 21 in Adamawa, data was provided by 26 local councils in the Northwest and 19 local councils in Adamawa in the first round If a question did not apply to a particular local council and and 29 and 21 local councils in the second round, respectively, a justification was provided for why it did not, this was taken implying a high response rate in both regions and rounds.19 into account and a normalized score calculated. However, for questions answered “nonapplicable” but that clearly applied to Document availability. Two main findings emerge regarding all councils, zero points were awarded. In cases where questions the availability of budget documents: were not answered, zero points were awarded. For the details • Enacted budgets are available to citizens in all councils regarding the points awarded for each answer, refer to annex 1. except one while roughly half of the councils made a bud- get summary and year-end report available in both regions Main Findings and Results in 2011. This figure barely changed in the Northwest but sub- stantially increased in Adamawa in 2012. The availability of The Ranking of Local Councils of the Northwest mid-year and year-end reports appears to have increased in and Adamawa Regions both regions while that of audit reports remains very low. This section depicts how local councils in the Northwest and Adamawa Regions rank in terms of budget transparency for both rounds of data collection. In interpreting these rankings, 19. The main reason for incomplete surveys is the geographical remoteness of councils. 7 Table 2. Budget Transparency Ranking of Local Councils of the Northwest and Adamawa Regionsa Nothwest Region Adamawa Region Local Council Points Points Change from Local Council Points Points Change from Name Round Ib Round IIb Round I to II Rank Name Round Ib Round IIb Round I to II Rank Bafut 0 44 44 1 Banyo 26.32 41 14.7 1 Bamenda III 37.71 34.2 -3.5 2 Tibati 31.37 41 9.6 2 Fundong 30.71 33.8 3.1 3 Bankim 37.89 38.1 0.2 3 Bamenda II 0 33.4 33.4 4 Mayo Baleo 42.74 37.6 -5.1 4 Ndop 29.29 32.1 2.8 5 Nyambeka 15.8 34.2 18.4 5 Babessi 34.54 32.0 -2.5 6 Ngaoundere III 16.91 34.0 17.1 6 Belo 36.8 30.6 -6.2 7 Meiganga 0 33.7 33.7 7 Nkambe 21.57 30 8.4 8 Ngaoui 16.54 32.8 16.3 8 Njinikom 0 29.8 29.8 9 Belel 0 32.6 32.6 9 Fonfuka 0 29.6 29.6 10 Mayo-Darle 4.74 31.6 26.9 10 Batibo 36.43 29.1 -7.3 11 Ngan’ha 18.03 31.6 13.6 11 Jakiri 27.71 29.0 1.3 12 Djohong 27.06 31.4 4.3 12 Nkor 35 28.9 -6.1 13 Ngaoundere II 20.2 29.6 9.4 13 Bali 36.86 27.4 -9.5 14 Martap 21.74 29.6 7.9 14 Mbiame 13.31 26.8 13.5 15 Kontcha 15.77 29.6 13.8 15 Ndu 28.83 25.9 -2.9 16 Ngaoundal 28.54 27.2 -1.3 16 Ako 23.03 24.7 1.7 17 Dir 32.31 23.8 -8.5 17 Misaje 9.89 23.4 13.5 18 Tignere 24 22.2 -1.8 18 Kumbo 31.51 22.6 -8.9 19 Galim Tignere 19.4 22 2.6 19 Bali Kumbat 29.77 21.7 -8.1 20 Ngaoundere I 14.83 20.8 6.0 20 Bamenda City 24.6 21.6 -3.0 21 Mbe 20.69 19.6 -1.1 21 Mbengwi 6.91 20.4 13.5 22 Zhoa 0 18.6 18.6 23 Nkum 27.37 18.2 -9.2 24 Tubah 35.66 17.0 -18.7 25 Bamenda I 10.83 16.8 6.0 26 Njikwa 0 15.8 15.8 27 Nwa 24.40 13.4 -11.0 28 Widikum 27.49 12.2 -15.3 29 Elak Oku 16.63 0 -16.6 30 Benakuma 29.29 0 -29.3 31 Andek 21.00 0 -21.0 32 Average change -2.1 7.5 for councils that answered in both rounds a. Please note that the results between the first and second rounds are not directly comparable in a meaningful way because of the different methodologies used in the two rounds of data collection. b. Out of 50 possible points. 8 Figure 2. Budget Documents Available, Round 2 (percent of total councils) Northwest Adamawa 90 Not produced 80 Produced but not available to the public 70 60 Produced and available to the public, but only on request percent 50 40 Produced and distributed to the public 30 20 10 0 get y t rt t get y t rt t por por por por mar mar o o rep rep bud bud r re it re r re it re sum sum end end -yea -yea cted cted Aud Aud get get r- r- Mid Mid Yea Yea Ena Ena Bud Bud The likely reason for the latter being rarely available is that For each document, it shows the number of councils that used a audits are not commonly performed.20 particular method of dissemination. The main findings are: • Regardless of the level of availability of given documents in • The preferred way of proactively disseminating budget doc- principle, no or only very little effort was made by officials uments is through councilors. to actively disseminate the budget documents. • When councils distribute budget documents proactively (a Document dissemination. Table 3 illustrates the types of rare occurrence), they usually make printed copies of them budget documents that councils spend the most effort at dis- available for free. seminating as well as the methods used for the dissemination. Table 3. Steps Taken to Distribute and Promote Interest in Budget Reports (number of councils) Enacted Budget Budget Summary Mid-year Report Year-end Report Audit Report NW AD NW AD NW AD NW AD NW AD Is the release date known at least one month in advance? 5 2 3 4 2 1 4 2 N/A N/A Is an advance notification of release sent to 5 2 3 3 1 0 4 2 N/A N/A users and the media? Is the document released to the public on 2 1 1 3 1 0 1 2 N/A N/A the same day it is officially released to the media? Is the document available on the Internet 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 N/A N/A free of charge? Are print copies available for free? 5 2 20. This finding comes from interviews of the Budget Transparency Initiative team with 4 4 1 1 5 2 N/A N/A Is mayors the a news of in theto local councilsheld conference field. discuss the 3 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 N/A N/A release of the document? Is the document disseminated by local 6 1 4 3 1 1 5 2 N/A N/A councilors? 20. This finding comes from interviews of the Budget Transparency Initiative team with the mayors of local councils in the field. 9 • Not surprisingly, the Internet was not at all relevant for dis- However, these figures should be seen in the Cameroonian semination. Interestingly, news conferences are also not context where accurate budgeting by local councils is hampered commonly used for dissemination. by a lack of own-sourced revenues as well as by poor synchro- nization between the national and local budget cycles. In addi- Forecast quality. In Adamawa, the first survey showed low- tion, shortfalls in provisions by the central government might quality revenue estimates, with 74 percent of councils reporting force local councils to trim expenditures, and if there is a delay ratios of actual to estimated revenues under 75 percent. This in receiving funds, it might be too late to spend them. improved in the second survey, with only 62 percent of councils having ratios of actual to estimated revenues under 75 percent. In general, to better gauge whether expenditure shortfalls As for expenditure estimates, 66 percent of councils had ratios reflected bad planning or prudent adjustments to realized of actual to estimates below 75 percent in 2011 and 63 percent revenues, they need to be juxtaposed to revenue shortfalls. in 2012. Shortfalls in expenditures vis-a-vis estimates can be related to revenue shortfalls that the council became aware of in the mid- In the Northwest, the revenue forecasts (figure 3) were bet- dle of the year. In such cases, cutting back on expenditures from ter in 2011, with only 35 percent of councils falling more than 25 the budget estimate reflects a prudent decision, not necessarily percent short of their estimated revenues, but this deteriorated poor planning or execution of expenditures. significantly in 2012 to 68 percent. As for expenditure forecasts (figure 4), in 2011, half of the councils achieved expenditures that Of course, the same constraints are faced by all local coun- were more than 25 percent lower than anticipated; this figure cils, so the observed differences in the quality of estimates sug- remained virtually identical in 2012. gest that there is ample room for improvement for some of them. Ratio of Actual Revenues to Estimated Revenues Figure 3.  Ratio of Actual Expenditures to Estimated Figure 4.  for the Last Financial Year (Question 3) Expendituresfor the Last Financial Year (Question 4) Northwest Adamawa Northwest Adamawa (percent) (percent) 3% 6% 7% 5% 5% 14% 17% 21% 21% 33% 28% Round I 21% Round I 47% 58% 33% 45% 33% 4% 3% 10% 9% 11% 14% 14% 19% 31% 21% 32% Round II 24% Round II 29% 35% 52% 43% 32% 17% Less than 25 percent 25–50 percent 50–75 percent Less than 25 percent 25–50 percent 50–75 percent 75–100 percent More than 100 percent 75–100 percent More than 100 percent 10 Figure 5. Do Budget Documents Present Information on Financial Assets (e.g., Bank Deposit Accounts, Debt, Shares) Held by the Local Council? (Question 5) Northwest Region Adamawa Region Round I Yes, extensive information on 48 Yes, extensive information on 21 Round II financial assets is presented 53 financial assets is presented 67 Yes, information is presented, 42 Yes, information is presented, 47 highlighting key information 43 highlighting key information 29 No, information on financial 6 No, information on financial 16 assets is not presented 0 assets is not presented 5 0 11 N/A N/A 0 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent percent Information granularity. The level of detail and disaggrega- Figure 6. Does the council publish nontechnical tion of the information provided in local council budgets var- presentation intended for citizens (e.g.,a budget summary, ies considerably depending on the type of information; it was a citizen-friendly version of the budget) that describes the budget and its proposals? (Question 10) generally higher in Adamawa in 2012, a reversal of the 2011 results (figure 5). Northwest Region Adamawa Region Public consultation. In both regions, a majority of councils Yes 32 37 53 Yes that answered Question 10 stated that they had not published 52 61 53 nontechnical presentations of the budget (figure 6). This is an No 43 No 48 area that can be addressed fairly easily with the requisite politi- 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 cal will and technical support. Citizens Budgets can be devel- percent percent oped at the local level to present budget information in a Round I user-friendly way. Round II Table 4. Main Results of Second Round of Local Budget Transparency Index from the Northwest and Adamawa Regions Document • Enacted budgets were available to citizens in over 80 percent of councils. availability • Budget summaries were available in approximately 70 percent of councils in the Northwest and in all councils in Adamawa. • Availability of mid-year reports and audit reports was very low. Document • Documents are rarely proactively disseminated. dissemination Forecast quality Northwest Region: • 68 percent fall short of estimated revenues by more than 25 percent. • 49 percent of councils fall short of estimated expenditures by more than 25 percent. Adamawa Region: • 62 percent of councils undershot revenues by at least 25 percent. • 63 percent of councils undershot estimated expenditures by more than 25 percent. Northwest and Adamawa Regions: • Poor estimates are due in part to uncertain national budget allocations. • Having lower than projected expenditures could be interpreted in a positive light if the reason for the shortfall was that expenditures were kept in line with revenues that had fallen short of forecasts. Information • Information was generally more detailed in Adamawa than in the Northwest. granularity Consultation with • Majority of councils do not publish citizen-friendly versions of budgets. public • 95 percent of councils in Adamawa and 77 percent in Northwest directly consult the public. • Quality of consultation remains a question. Ex-post control • Ex-post control is weak. • Audits are rarely conducted. 11 The participation of and consultation with councilors and Ex-post control. Ex-post control is weak in both regions. citizens is high (figures 7 and 8). However, in order to meaning- Only 37 percent of councils in the Northwest and 67 percent fully ascertain the degree of public participation, it is necessary in Adamawa release mid-year reports within three months, to obtain further information on the quality of stated consul- while 53 percent of councils in the Northwest and 81 per- tations because the findings of a case study on the relation- cent in Adamawa release year-end reports within six months. ship between citizens and the local council of Nkijwa in the Frequently, audit reports are not produced at all (figure 9). Northwest Region suggests that it might be low (box 2). Figure 7. What Percentage of Local Council Members Actually Participate or Are Consulted in the Process of Determining Budget Priorities? (Question 11) Northwest Region Adamawa Region Round I Round II 3 0 <25 percent <25 percent 0 0 10 11 25–50 percent 25–50 percent 3 0 6 11 50–75 percent 13 50–75 percent 5 77 63 >75 percent 80 >75 percent 95 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent percent Figure 8. Does the Executive Hold Consultations with the Public as Part of its Process of Determining Budget Priorities? (Question 12) Northwest Region Adamawa Region Round I Round II 68 84 Yes 77 Yes 95 26 5 No 17 No 26 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 percent percent Figure 9. How Long after the End of the Fiscal Year are the Final Annual Expenditures Audited and Released to the Public? (Question 12) Northwest Region Adamawa Region Round I Round II ≤ 6 months after the end 42 ≤ 6 months after the end 16 of the fiscal year 33 of the fiscal year 29 6–12 months after the end 13 6–12 months after the end 5 of the fiscal year 0 of the fiscal year 0 12–24 months after the end 3 12–24 months after the end of the fiscal year 0 of the fiscal year 0 Not completed within 24 months 6 Not completed within 24 months 11 after the end of the fiscal year 10 after the end of the fiscal year 10 29 37 N/A 50 N/A 57 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 percent percent 12 Key Challenges and Lessons Learned avoid erroneous answers. When possible, it is advisable to field test templates before rolling out the exercise. As previously mentioned, the Budget Transparency Initiative piloted the LBTI in local councils in two regions in Cameroon A competent third-party assessor is vital. It is imperative for the very first time, helping the team to identify several chal- that a suitable third party be selected to assess the transparency lenges and to learn many lessons. Some of the key challenges of local councils in order to avoid self-assessments. An organiza- and lessons learned are discussed below. tion with a strong network on the ground, that understands the context, and that has access to a higher government authority Support from a champion is crucial. In many cases, may- can be the most effective. ors—particularly those lacking transparency—will object to participation in a budget transparency survey. However, high Third-party assessors must be trained to ensure consis- participation of local councils is important to truly benchmark tency in reporting. If multiple third-party assessors are used to one council’s transparency against its peers. Pressure from a fill in questionnaires in various regions, they should be trained higher-level government official such as a governor can be in a workshop attended by all assessors. This is crucial to ensure instrumental in nudging reluctant mayors to participate. everyone who is assessing local council budget transparency has a common understanding of how to complete the questionnaire. Nonetheless, it can be a formidable challenge to obtain a good response rate. Apart from outright reluctance by may- Avoid backlash from mayors of low-ranking councils if ors to participate in the survey, capacity and logistics can pose results are published. Because a budget transparency index can major obstacles. In Cameroon, for instance, a low level of com- only lead to higher transparency if it is repeatedly conducted, it puterization and Internet use at the local government level is important to avoid alienating the mayors of low-performing meant that questionnaires had to be hand delivered and col- councils when publishing initial results so they will not refuse to lected, often using roads in very poor condition; this resulted in participate in the subsequent rounds. Presenting the exercise as lengthy delays in the collection of data. a peer-learning opportunity rather than as an opportunity to name and shame transparency laggards will likely be more effec- The questionnaire must be tailored to each context and tive for sustainability. However, once an LBTI is established as a formulated as clearly as possible. Budget processes differ from benchmarking tool in a particular context, its potential to name country to country so questionnaires should reflect local prac- and shame can be more fully exploited. tices. Furthermore, questions should be clearly formulated to 13 Sustainability is a formidable challenge. For an LBTI to make a • In low-capacity environments, consider relaxing the require- lasting impact, regular assessment and publication of local coun- ments for the highest score (e.g., “all programs have nonfi- cil’s budget transparency is required. Sustaining such an exercise nancial indicators,” or “all donor programs are identified”) over many years is contingent on local actors who have an inter- and narrowing the gap between the highest and next highest est, the authority, the means, and the capacity to administer the score because this could yield more gradated results. survey, analyze the responses, and disseminate the index results. • Depending on the main objectives of the practitioners Often, in resource-scare environments, few such actors exist. In in conducting the LBTI, consider changing the weights Cameroon, the strategy to entrench the exercise beyond the attached to the questions. For instance, if the goal is to pilot phase was comprised of three aspects: a concerted effort increase participation by citizens in budget formulation and to nurture the buy-in of the pilot regions’ governors; a dialogue to better reflect their priorities in policies, then the weight with the ministry overseeing the local councils to brief them— of the questions on consultation (questions 10–12) should be orally and through a policy brief—on the initiative, its results, increased. and its future potential benefits, and to discuss with them the possibility of rolling out the index to the entire country; and the References sharing of the tool with civil society organizations engaged in Agarwal, Sanjay and Martin Luis Alton. 2013. “Increasing Accountability through budget transparency work so that they can potentially take own- Budget Transparency at the Subnational Level in Cameroon.” Social Development Department, World Bank, Washington, DC. ership and apply the tool themselves in the future. In addition, sustainability could hinge on the provision of tools to local offi- Arbatliand, Elif, and Julio Escolano. “Fiscal Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Credit Ratings.” 2012. Working Paper 12/156, International Monetary Fund, cials that deconstruct and present the budget in a manner that Washington, DC. facilitates citizen understanding of the budget (e.g., in a Citizens Chase, Rob, Paul Francis, Fionnuala O’Neill, Paula Rossiasco, and Vera Songwe. 2008. Budget). Only then can citizens express their priorities. After “Nigeria’s Experience Publishing Budget Allocations: A Practical Tool to Promote all, the responsiveness of the budget to citizen priorities is one Demand for Better Governance.” Social Development Notes, World Bank, Washington, DC. major goal for which transparency is just the first step. Farhan, Hameed. 2005. “Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes.” Working Proposed changes to the questionnaire. Finally, based on the Paper 05/225, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. pilot experience, the following adaptations to the questionnaire Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, Patrick Gruyer, and Terra Lawson-Remer. 2011. “Does Budget are suggested for teams using the LBTI going forward: Transparency Lead to Stronger Human Development Outcomes and Commitments to Economic and Social Rights?” Working Paper 4, International • Group all questions pertaining to one document rather than Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. asking about, for example, the year-end report in questions World Bank. 2011. “Towards Better Service Delivery, An Economic Update on 1, 2, and 15. This approach decreases the likelihood that there Cameroon.” will be inconsistencies in the answers provided. Cameroon Economic Update, 2 (July), Poverty Reduction and Economic Management • Include the draft budget in the list of documents about Unit Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. which respondents are being questioned. Transparent bud- ———. 2012. “Cameroon: The Path to Fiscal Decentralization: Opportunities and get proposals and the allowance of sufficient time for citi- Challenges.” Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Report 63369- CM, World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ zens and councilors to discuss them are crucial if citizen bitstream/handle/10986/11875/633690ESW0Gray0disclosed01105020120. priorities are to be incorporated into the actual budget. pdf?sequence=1 • Inquire about the ratio of actual expenditures to actual rev- Government of Cameroon. 2009. Growth and Employment Strategy Paper, enues because revenues are usually provided primarily by 2010–2020. the central government, and local governments must use International Budget Partnership. 2012. “Open Budget Survey 2012.” International the funds by the end of the fiscal year to avoid them being Budget Partnership, Washington, DC. http://internationalbudget.org/ what-we-do/open-budget-survey/full-report. forfeited. Therefore, the proposed ratio is a good indicator Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 2012. “2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Summary.” of local council performance and efficiency. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London. http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/ • Depending on the context, ask about the provision of dif- downloads/2012-IIAG-summary-report.pdf. ferent aggregations of data. For instance, the allocations for SNV. 2012. “Public Expenditure Management Reform through Budget Publication social services might be particularly relevant for citizens. The and other Social Accountability Approaches in the North West Region of provision of other breakdowns, such as the percentage for Cameroon.” Final report presented to World Bank, Netherlands Development Organization. salaries versus other expenditures or administrative versus Transparency International. 2012. “Corruption Perception Index 2012.” http://cpi. operational expenditures, could also be relevant to gauge transparency.org/cpi2012/results/#myAnchor1. transparency and performance. 14 Annex 1. For Question 1, respondents receive the points shown in each box if it is checked, divided by 5. For Question 2, respondents receive the points shown in each box if it is checked, divided by 7. Note that in Question 1, only one box per row can be checked, while in Question 2, each box per row can potentially be checked. The total is a simple sum of the earned points. 1. Budget Documents Available For each document type (1–5), select the appropriate answer (I, II, II, or IV). Select only one answer per document by checking the appropriate box in the table. Document Type I II III IV Produced and Produced but Available to the Produced and Not Available to Public, But Only Distributed to   Not Produced the Public on Request the Public Enacted Budget 0 1 2 3 Budget Summary 0 1 2 3 Mid-Year Report 0 1 2 3 Year-End Report 0 1 2 3 Audit Report 0 1 2 3 Weight applied to points received in Q1 1/5 Maximum possible points for Q1 3 2. For budget reports that are produced and distributed to the public, what steps are taken to distribute these reports and to promote inter- est in them? (If report is produced, for each question 1–7, mark “Yes” or “No” in the boxes in columns I–V). I. Enacted Budget II. Budget III. Mid-Year IV. Year-End V. Audit Report Summary Report Report 1. Is the release date known at least one 1 1 1 1 month in advance? 2. Is an advance notification of release 1 1 1 1 sent to users/media? 3. Is document released to the public 1 1 1 1 on the same day as the official release to media? 4. Is document available on the Internet 1 1 1 1 free of charge? 5. Are free print copies available? 1 1 1 1 6. Is a news conference held to discuss 1 1 1 1 release of document? 7. Is document disseminated by local 1 1 1 1 councilors? Weight applied to points received in Q2 1/7 Maximum possible Points for Q2 5 15 For Questions 3–15, the points received if a given box is ticked to answer a question are listed in the penultimate column of the table below, and the maximum points possible to receive per question is highlighted in yellow in the last column. If a question is not applicable, the score should be normalized to reflect this. Justifications should be given for “not applicable” (N/A) responses. 3. What is the ratio of actual revenues to estimated revenues for the last financial year? Points/ Maximum Please refer to last year’s administrative accounts to answer this question. Answer Attainable Points a. Less than 25 percent 0   b. Between 25–50 percent 1   c. Between 50–75 percent 2   d. Between 75–100 percent 4 4 e. More than 100 percent 2   f. Other (please comment):     4. What is the ratio of actual expenditures to estimated expenditures for the last financial year? Points/ Maximum Please refer to last year’s administrative accounts to answer this question. Answer Attainable Points a. Less than 25 percent 0   b. Between 25–50 percent 1   c. Between 50–75 percent 2   d. Between 75–100 percent 4 4 e. More than 100 percent 0   f. Other (please comment):     5. Do budget documents present information on financial assets (e.g., bank deposit accounts, debt, shares) Points/ Maximum held by the local council? Answer Attainable Points a. Yes, extensive information on financial assets is presented, including a listing of the assets, a discussion 3 3 of their purpose, and an estimate of their market value. b. Yes, information is presented, highlighting key information with some details. 1   c. No, information on financial assets is not presented. 0   d. Not applicable/other (please comment):     16 6. Do budget documents present information on nonfinancial assets (e.g., buildings, vehicles) Points/ Maximum held by the local council? Answer Attainable Points a. Yes, extensive information on nonfinancial assets is presented, including a listing of the assets and (where pos- 3 3 sible) an estimate of their market value. b. Yes, information is presented, highlighting key information, with some details. 1   c. No, information on nonfinancial assets is not presented. 0   d. Not applicable/other (please comment):     7. Do budget documents provide details on the sources of donor assistance, both financial and in-kind Points/ Maximum (e.g., material provided or infrastructure built)? Answer Attainable Points a. All sources of donor assistance are identified individually. 3 3 b. Some sources of donor assistance are identified individually. 1   c. No sources of donor assistance are identified individually. 0   d. Not applicable/other (please comment):     8. Do budget documents (e.g., budget, minutes of the budgetary session, or the administrative account Points/ Maximum session) present nonfinancial data, such as the number of beneficiaries, for expenditure programs? Answer Attainable Points a. Non-financial data are presented for all programs. 3 3 b. Nonfinancial data are presented for some programs. 1   c. No nonfinancial data are presented. 0   d. Not applicable/other (please comment):     9. Do budget documents contain performance indicators (e.g., kilometers of roads built, number of class- Points/ Maximum rooms constructed, number of school desks supplied) for expenditure programs? Answer Attainable Points a. Performance indicators are presented for all programs. 3 3 b. Performance indicators are presented for some programs. 1   c. No performance indicators are presented. 0   d. Not applicable/other (please comment):     17 10. Does the council publish a nontechnical presentation intended for citizens that describes the budget and Points/ Maximum its proposals (e.g., a budget summary or a citizen-friendly version of the budget)? Answer Attainable Points a. Yes 3 3 b. No 0   If yes, what kind of information does the nontechnical presentation include? Please comment:     11. What percentage of local council members actually participate or are consulted in the process of deter- Points/ Maximum mining budget priorities? Answer Attainable Points a. Less than 25 percent 0   b. Between 25–50 percent 1   c. Between 50–75 percent 2   d. More than 75 percent 3 3 Not applicable/other (please comment):   12. Does the executive hold consultations with the public as part of its process of determining budget  Points/  Maximum priorities? Answer Attainable Points a. Yes 1   b. No 0   c. If yes, what kind of consultations with the public are held?     1) Active participation by citizens in discussions of the local council. 4 4 2) Local councils discuss the budget with citizens in their district. 2   3) Other (please describe): 1   Not applicable/other (please comment):     13. For the mid-year report on actual expenditure released to the public by the executive, how much time  Points/  Maximum typically elapses between the end of the reporting period and when the report is released? (E.g., the report is Answer Attainable released less than four weeks after the end of the second quarter.) Points a. Report is released three months or less after the end of the period. 3 3 b. Report is released six months or less (but more than three months) after the end of the period. 2   c. Report is released more than six months after the end of the period. 1   d. Mid-year report is not released. 0   Not applicable/other (please comment):     18 14. How long after the end of the budget year does the executive release to the public a year-end report that  Points/  Maximum discusses the budget’s actual outcome for the year? Answer Attainable Points a. The report is released six months or less after the end of the fiscal year. 3 3 c. The report is released between 6 to 12 months after the end of the fiscal year. 2   c. The report is released more than 12 months after the end of the fiscal year. 1   d. The executive does not release a year-end report. 0   Not applicable/other (please comment):     15. How long after the end of the fiscal year are the final annual expenditures audited and released to the  Points/  Maximum public? Answer Attainable Points a. Final audited accounts are released to the public six months or less after the end of the fiscal year. 3 3 b. Final audited accounts are released between 6 to 12 months after the end of the fiscal year. 2   c. Final audit accounts are released more than 12 months, but within 24 months of the end of the fiscal year. 1   d. Final audited accounts are not completed within 24 months after the end of the fiscal year or they are not 0   released to the public. Not applicable/other (please comment):     Maximum Possible Q3–Q15 42 Total Possible Points 50 19 Acknowledgements This learning note was prepared by Martin Luis Alton, Sanjay Agarwal, and Vera Songwe of the World Bank. The authors would like to express their gratitude to Abel Bove, Gregor Binkert, Judith Edstrom, Olivier P. Godron, Helene Grandvoinnet, Vivek Ramkumar, Babacar Sarr, Cia Sjetnan, Raju Singh, and Serdar Yilmaz for their invaluable contributions, guidance, and comments during the course of the initiative; to Integrity Network Cameroon and Dr. Patrick Okwen for their assistance in data collection; and finally, to Laura Johnson for her editorial and design support and to Rachel Roth, TechChange, for the illustration. The authors would like to thank the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) for supporting the activities under this initiative. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this note are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. For additional information on this and other pilots under the Budget Transparency Initiative, please contact Sanjay Agarwal (sagarwal2@worldbank.org).