71482 Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies The cases of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan Guy Lamb 2012 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.tdrp.net www.worldbank.org This study was produced under the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). The find- ings, interpretations, and conclusions herein are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TDRP donors, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Cover Design and Text Layout: Duina Reyes Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Context of Instabilty and Informal Economies The cases of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan December 2011 Guy Lamb With contributions from: Nelson Alusala Amelia Broodryk Jean-Marie Gasana Gregory Mthembu-Salter Orly Stern Table of Contents List of Acronyms .........................................................................................1 Introduction ................................................................................................3 Part I............................................................................................................5 1 Economic reintegration in Africa: Literature review ...............................7 1.1 Reintegration literature: the early years ........................................................................... 7 1.2 Impact of the West African DDR processes, the MDRP and the IDDRS ............................ 8 1.3 Recognition of the informal sector and longer-term peace-building ...............................10 1.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................11 2 An assessment of post-conflict economies............................................. 12 2.1 Defining the informal sector ...........................................................................................12 2.2 Rationale and role of the informal economy....................................................................12 2.3 Informal economies in countries experiencing armed conflict ........................................13 2.4 Post-conflict economies ..................................................................................................15 3 Analytical framework: the reintegration of ex-combatants and the informal sector ................................................................................ 16 3.1 Level of human development ..........................................................................................16 3.2 Economic conditions .......................................................................................................16 3.3 Governance .....................................................................................................................17 3.4 Security and insecurity ...................................................................................................17 3.5 Nature of DDR programming and support ......................................................................17 3.6 Personal circumstances and networks .............................................................................17 Part II ........................................................................................................ 19 4 Central African Republic ...................................................................... 21 4.1 Level of human development ..........................................................................................21 4.2 Economic overview and livelihood support .....................................................................21 4.3 Constraints and barriers to the formal economy .............................................................23 4.4 The informal economic sector .........................................................................................24 4.5 DDR programming .........................................................................................................26 4.6 Reintegration and the informal economy ........................................................................27 4.6.1 Armed groups .........................................................................................................28 4.6.2 Obstacles to economic reintegration .......................................................................28 4.6.3 Mining ....................................................................................................................30 4.6.4 Small business .........................................................................................................30 5 Democratic Republic of Congo ............................................................. 31 5.1 Level of human development ..........................................................................................31 5.2 Economic overview .........................................................................................................31 5.3 Livelihood support ..........................................................................................................33 5.4 Constraints and barriers to the formal economy .............................................................34 Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies iii 5.5 The informal sector .........................................................................................................35 5.6 DDR programming .........................................................................................................37 5.7 Reintegration and the informal sector: Ituri ...................................................................39 5.7.1 Motorcycle taxis in Bunia ........................................................................................39 5.7.2 Mining ....................................................................................................................40 5.7.3 Economic impact of DDR kits .................................................................................42 5.7.4 Crime ......................................................................................................................43 5.8 Reintegration and informal sector: South Kivu ...............................................................44 5.8.1 Cooperatives and small businesses ..........................................................................44 5.8.2 Transport businesses ...............................................................................................45 5.8.3 Mineral sector .........................................................................................................46 5.9 Reintegration and the informal sector: North Kivu .........................................................46 5.9.1 Small businesses and cross border trading ..............................................................47 5.9.2 Armed crime ...........................................................................................................48 5.9.3 Construction and fishing.........................................................................................48 6 South Sudan .......................................................................................... 49 6.1 Level of human development ..........................................................................................49 6.2 Economic overview .........................................................................................................49 6.3 Livelihoods support ........................................................................................................52 6.4 Constraints and barriers to the formal economy .............................................................53 6.5 Urban informal sector .....................................................................................................54 6.6 DDR programming .........................................................................................................56 6.7 Reintegration dynamics ..................................................................................................58 6.8 Informal sector and the impact of reintegration support ................................................59 6.8.1 Overview .................................................................................................................59 6.8.2 Small businesses......................................................................................................60 6.8.3 Rudimentary income-generating activities .............................................................61 6.8.4 Subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry .......................................................61 6.8.5 Community reintegration .......................................................................................61 Part III ....................................................................................................... 63 7 Comparative analysis - Reintegration of former combatants and the informal economy .................................................................... 65 7.1 Human development .......................................................................................................65 7.2 Economic conditions .......................................................................................................65 7.3 Governance .....................................................................................................................66 7.4 Security ...........................................................................................................................66 7.5 DDR programming and support .....................................................................................66 7.6 Personal circumstance and networks ..............................................................................67 7.7 Ex-combatants and types ofeconomic activities ..............................................................68 7.8 Gender and DDR .............................................................................................................68 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 69 References.................................................................................................. 70 iv List of Acronyms ACDAKI Action Communautaire pour le Développement Agro-pastorale de Kiliba ACDK Action Communautaire pour le Développement de Kalundu ANORI Association des Négociants d’Or – Ituri AODERPI Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et le Reconstruction de Paix en Ituri BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion BRAC Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee CAR Central African Republic CNDDR National Commission for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration CNDP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple CONADER Commission Nationale de la Démobilisation et Réinsertion COOPEC Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPJP Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix D&R Demobilisation and Reintegration DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EJDP Encadrement des Jeunes pour le Développement de la Pêche FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo FDLR Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda GDP Gross Domestic Product GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GOSS Government of Southern Sudan HDI Human Development Index IDDRS Integrated DDR Standards IDP Internally Displaced Person ILDELU Initiative Locale pour le Développement de Luvungi Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 1 ILO International Labour Office IOM International Organization for Migration ISS Institute for Security Studies IMF International Monetary Fund MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program MONUC UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DRC NGO Non-Governmental Organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OKIMO Office des mines d’or de Kilo Moto PNDDR National Program of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration PRAC Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Project PRDR National Programme on Disarmament and Reinsertion ROC Republic of Congo ROSS Republic of South Sudan RSSDDRC Republic of South Sudan Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Commission SAF Sudanese Armed Forces SDG Sudanese pound SME Small and Medium Enterprises SNG Special Needs Group SPLA Sudanese People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement SSAF South Sudan Armed Force TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program UFDR Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF UN Children’s Fund UNIDIR UN Institute for Disarmament Research UNDPKO UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan UNPDDR Unité Nationale pour le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Programme 2 Introduction T he implementation of effective disarmament, on the extent to which ex-combatants interact with demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) pro- the informal economy in order to sustain themselves grammes in countries emerging from violent and their dependents. The research was undertaken in conflict are essential for building and maintaining three countries: the Central African Republic (CAR), peace and security. In many instances the disarma- the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC – in the re- ment and demobilisation of former combatants was gions of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu) and South achieved, but reintegration remained a challenge, due Sudan. This project was indelibly linked to another to the long-term focus and the substantial resources research project that exclusively focused on the rein- that are required for such a process to be successful. tegration of ex-combatants in the eastern DRC, the results of which are included in a separate report1. Income generation and livelihood opportunities are arguably vital for the success of reintegration process- The four specific focal areas of the research project es. That is, in order to discourage the remilitarisation were as follows: of ex-combatants, alternative and appealing means of making a sustainable living should be available to 1. An assessment of the state of conflict in terms of these individuals. In addition, if former combatants how it impacts on the economy in all the three are able to make a constructive economic contribu- case study areas; tion to the communities to which they settle, these 2. An assessment of the nature of the economy (and communities are more likely to be receptive to their labour market) in the case study areas; presence. 3. An assessment of the employment and sustain- Reintegration processes are, nonetheless, often imple- able livelihood options that former combatants mented in fragile environments, that include frag- pursue in the case study areas; and mented economies, in which most income generating 4. An analysis of the types, dynamics, successes, activities are informal or unreported. Such economies challenges of ex-combatant income-generating are often characterised by unregulated, illicit activi- activities in the three case study countries. ties, in which official governance is weak. In this con- text, formal sector employment and income generat- The research took place between February and Sep- ing opportunities are limited. However, to date, there tember 2011, with the research findings and analysis has been limited and dispersed data on the manner in being presented in this report. In addition to a litera- which former combatants interact with the informal ture review and an assessment of published research economic sector. and data on the subject matter, the project utilised a comparative case study field research method in each Given this state of affairs, the Transitional Demobilisa- of the three countries, which included: tion and Reintegration Program (TDRP) of the World Bank commissioned the Institute for Security Studies • Semi-structured interviews with key DDR stake- (ISS) in South Africa to undertake a research project holders; Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 3 • Focus group discussions with former combat- Jean-Marie Gasana (DRC) ants; Guy Lamb (South Sudan) • Focus groups with affected community members Gregory Mthembu-Salter (DRC) wherein sizeable numbers of ex-combatants are Orly Stern (CAR) residing. This report is comprised of three parts. Part one in- • Semi-structured interviews with practitioners in cludes a review of the literature on the reintegration agricultural, trade, commerce, mining and other of former combatants and the informal economy in economic sectors; and Africa; a synopsis of post-conflict economies; and an • Semi-structured interviews with key informants outline of the analytical framework. Part two pres- in the same communities as ex-combatants. ents the findings of the case study research, focusing The following persons undertook the in-country on the economies and DDR processes in each of the research: three countries, as well as assessing the reintegration process in relation to the informal economy. The third Nelson Alusala (DRC) component of the report provides a comparative anal- Amelia Broodryk (South Sudan) ysis of, and conclusions from, the research findings. 4 Part I Conceptual framework Literature review Assessment of post-conflict economies 6 1 Economic reintegration in Africa: Literature review T his review provides a critical assessment of the informal sector had an important reintegration role. literature on reintegration, particularly eco- The paper recommended that reintegration should be nomic reintegration. In this regard it considers linked to established community-based development the extent to which the DDR discourse, analysis and projects, and that the families of ex-combatants, rath- technical recommendations take account of the in- er than individual former fighters should be targeted formal economy. This literature review also examines for reintegration support.2 and assesses a wide range of DDR documents, includ- ing peer reviewed journal articles, technical reports, From the mid-1990s the compilation of DDR litera- handbooks, guidelines, training manuals and edited ture gained momentum, mainly due to the increased volumes by independent publishers. interest in peace-making and peace-building by in- ternational organisations and researchers alike. A 1.1 Reintegration literature: the early catalyst was the 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros years Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’, which sought to re-define the role of the UN in promoting international peace, The body of literature on disarmament, demobilisa- and included “post-conflict peace-building�. Conse- tion and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants quently, the UN, through a number of its agencies, in post-colonial Africa primarily emerged in the ear- especially the UN Development Programme (UNDP) ly-1990s. This was the result of the establishment of and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Opera- DDR programmes in mainly Southern and East Af- tions (UNDPKO) began to increasingly focus on rica, and included countries such as Zimbabwe, Na- mibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea, DDR.3 Academics based at universities and research Uganda, Chad and Angola. Such studies were largely institutes also began to dabble in DDR. Both broad technical documents or were part of post-war publi- analyses of DDR (in the context of peacekeeping and cations on sub-Saharan Africa, and in most cases fo- peace-building) as well as specific country case stud- cused on the disarmament and demobilisation com- ies were undertaken, with articles, chapters and books ponents. being published.4 However, as many of the DDR pro- grammes were still in preliminary stages, the reinte- The landmark study of this period was the World gration component in this published research tended Bank’s 1993 Discussion Paper on demobilisation and to be superficial and prescriptive, or was absent. reintegration (D&R) of military personnel, a com- parative assessment that drew evidence from seven During this period the World Bank further invested country experiences. This paper provided a detailed in research, monitoring and evaluation to accom- analysis of the design, institutional management, the pany its investment in post-conflict reconstruc- funding and results of D&R programmes. It focused tion programming. For example, in 1996, the Work predominantly on formal sector economic reintegra- Bank published a detailed technical report on D&R tion, but the findings of this paper implied that the in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda, as well as a more Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 7 general analysis on the transition process from war able to survive by means of subsistence agriculture. to peace.6 Other international organisations, such as Research reports by Creative Associates International the International Labour Office (ILO)7, the German Incorporated (1996)12 and the Chr. Michelsen Insti- Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and others, tute (1997) also added considerable knowledge on the including consultancy organisations, compiled basic peace-building process in Mozambique at that time. handbooks, guidelines and technical assessments on DDR.8 Despite the limited data available at the time, From the late-1990s further interest and research these technical documents and handbooks provided in DDR was stimulated by: the establishment DDR useful information and recommendations on reinte- processes in Liberia; agitation by military veterans gration for the designers and implementers of DDR in Zimbabwe; and a military downsizing process in programmes. South Africa. International research In Zimbabwe, protest action by military veterans International research institutes initiated DDR combined with an acute governance crisis resulted institutes initiated DDR research projects from in former combatants becoming the vanguard of a research projects from the the mid-1990s. The most controversial land redistribution process. A few pub- notable was the Bonn lications, the most notable being authored by Norma mid-1990s. Krieger and Knox Chitiyo, provided fairly compre- International Center for Conversion (BICC -Germany), which recruited DDR hensive analyses of what was essentially reintegration specialists and published annual Conversion Surveys failure. These publications specified evidence that the (which included a demobilisation component), from mismanagement of reintegration processes, particu- 1996. In addition, in 2000 BICC published two edited larly compensation for ex-combatants, could result in books on D&R, which sought to discern D&R trends outbreaks of violence.13 and dynamics by means of comparative analysis.9 The In South Africa, research institutes, namely the Group UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) established a Disarmament and Conflict Resolution for Environmental Monitoring, the Centre for the Project, which led to a number of DDR-related publi- Study of Violence and Reconciliation, the ISS and the cations, with disarmament being the main focus. Centre for Conflict Resolution, undertook extensive and fairly comprehensive research on the reintegra- Some African think tanks, universities and NGOs un- tion of former combatants.14 Both quantitative and dertook research and produced publications on DDR. qualitative research methods were adopted, with all The Institute for Defence Policy (now the ISS) pub- studies indicating that reintegration processes had lished an edited monograph of demobilisation and largely been ineffective, with high levels (close to reintegration in Africa.10 In the late-1990s the Centre two-thirds) of former combatants from the liberation for Conflict Resolution (in collaboration with BICC) armed groups defining themselves as unemployed. established a research project on demilitarisation and Nonetheless these publications suggested that many peace-building in Southern Africa, which commis- former combatants were able to generate income via sioned research from the Instituto Superior de Rela- the informal sector. ções Internacionais, University of the Witwatersrand, University of Zimbabwe, University of Namibia and 1.2 Impact of the West African DDR the Eduardo Mondlane University (amongst others). DDR was a key focus area of the research, and three processes, the MDRP and the IDDRS books were published as a result.11 The brokering of peace agreements to end to civil The literature of this period was generally descriptive, wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and the Dem- and based on qualitative research methods. However, ocratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the early- to there were some quantitative studies, as in the case mid-2000s led to the creation of DDR programmes of Mozambique. For example, a survey of 1,000 ex- in these countries. DDR processes were also reinvigo- combatants was undertaken by UNDP (1996), which rated in Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and the Republic included a useful reintegration component. The re- of Congo, mainly through the Multi-Country Demo- search findings indicated that 71% of the sample con- bilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). There sidered themselves to be ‘unemployed’, despite being was consequently a flurry of research and publications 8 on DDR in Africa. In addition, some scholars and re- However, no detailed suggestions on how to enhance searchers took a more diverse approach to D&R by ad- reintegration in relation to the informal sector were dressing lesser-studied areas, such as female ex-com- provided.19 The final MDRP independent evaluation batants and children associated with armed conflict. report (2010) suggested that: “livelihoods viability is The research in these areas prioritised psychological primarily dependent on dynamics in the larger econ- and social reintegration, particularly with respect to omy�.20 Nonetheless, there was no expansion on this children. Some of the studies relating to women did recommendation, and there was no reference to mak- consider the challenges of economic reintegration.15 ing a distinction between the formal and informal sectors in terms of reintegration programming. The World Bank, the African Development Bank and the UN, in consultation with a range of donor gov- Some independent research was conducted in parallel ernments and agencies, launched the MDRP in 2002. to the MDRP process. One such example was a proj- Its geographical focus was the greater Great Lakes re- ect managed by the University of Bradford (Centre for gion of Central Africa, with the specific countries be- International Cooperation and Security) titled: DDR ing: Angola, Burundi, CAR, the DRC, the Republic of and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building Congo (ROC), Rwanda and Uganda. The MDRP co- in the Interests of the Poor. Elements of this project ordinated and provided assistance to close to 300,000 focused on thematic areas of DDR and country case ex-combatants in these seven countries. The MDRP studies that were relevant to the MDRP, but also gen- erated knowledge on DDR in Liberia and Sierra Le- was concluded in June 2009. one. Reintegration was a key focal area of the project; The MDRP generated a considerable amount of self- nonetheless, economic reintegration in relation to the published literature on reintegration, mainly in the informal sector only received cursory attention.21 form of technical and evaluation reports on the imple- Two prominent exam- The MDRP generated a mentation of D&R programmes in the greater Great ples of recent studies on DDR (with a focus considerable amount of Lakes region of Africa. In 2006, a working paper on reintegration assistance (good practices and lessons) on reintegration) in- self-published literature was published. This paper provided extensive recom- clude edited volumes on reintegration. mendations on reintegration, including economic by Robert Muggah, as reintegration that drew from previous DDR country well as by Mads Berdal and David Ucko. The former programmes and established MDRP processes. There assesses the DDR process in Afghanistan, Colombia, was a focus on supporting income generation and Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor- sustainable livelihoods by former combatants in both Leste and Uganda.22 The latter publication analyses the formal and informal sectors. However, as the bulk the challenges of reintegration former members of of previous reintegration programming appeared to armed groups into civilian society in Afghanistan, have had a formal sector bias, the paper had more of Angola, DRC, Iraq, northern Uganda, Sierra Leone an emphasis on this sector.16 Another working paper, and Tajikistan.23 which highlighted the plight of ex-combatants in Bu- rundi, implied that lesser educated former combatants In 2006 the UN launched its Integrated DDR stan- used the informal economy to generate an income.17 dards (IDDRS), which were designed to provide di- Additionally, in an MDRP Dissemination Note on rection, co-ordination and guidance to those engaged Rwanda, it was suggested, as a “lesson learnt�, that for- in preparing, implementing and supporting DDR mer combatants had used the reintegration assistance programmes. The IDDRS have been used as a refer- provided by the MDRP to generate an income.18 ence in designing DDR process in Sudan, Haiti and elsewhere. The IDDRS emphasises the need “to un- The MDRP’s final report (2010) provided an in-depth derstand the macro- and microeconomic forces that analysis of the wide variety of reintegration activities affect the post-conflict communities into which they that were undertaken. The report also recommended [ex-combatants] hope to reintegrate�.24 The module a series of lessons and implications for future pro- on social and economic reintegration emphasises the grammes in which the limitations of the formal econ- need for reintegration labour market analyses, as well omy for successful reintegration were emphasised. as training and skills development, to take the dynam- Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 9 ics of both the formal and informal economic sectors “absorbs workers that would otherwise be into account. This module nonetheless recognises that without work or income…mainly consisting information about the labour market is unlikely to ex- of women and youth…characterised by a lack ist, and consequently recommends that preliminary of social protection, representation, property and ongoing surveys of the economy, particularly the rights, [and] access to legal and judicial sys- labour market, be undertaken. tem…�28 1.3 Recognition of the informal sector The ILO recommended that labour market assess- ments by reintegration programmers should consider and longer-term peace-building both the formal and informal economies, and that Over the past five years there has been increased focus reintegration training programmes should be geared on economic reintegration by international organisa- towards the informal sector (where appropriate). In tions, some governments25 and NGOs26. Literature, addition, the ILO has stated that small and medium particularly technical material, has emphasised the enterprises (SMEs) are well placed to assist ex-combat- need to take economic realities into account when de- ants to generate an income. Therefore it has made rec- ommendations that, in the view of the ILO, will foster signing reintegration processes. Constructing reinte- the growth and development of SMEs. These include, gration mechanisms suited for the informal economy amongst others, reduced regulation and transaction have also gained credence, with recommendations costs, tax incentives and enhanced land tenure. being included in handbooks and policy manuals developed by the international organisations and The UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Cre- processes, such as the Stockholm Initiative on DDR ation, Income Generation and Reintegration (2009) (SIDDR), the ILO and the UN. highlights the key role that the informal sector can play in promoting post-conflict peace-building. It The SIDDR commissioned and published a study by recommends that employment programmes “must Anton Baaré on transitional economic integration, provide positive and productive alternatives to violent in which the economic realities of reintegration were and illegal activities, creating legal (though perhaps highlighted. The paper em- informal) jobs for young workers�. It also stipulates A conceptual phasised that in order to that: there should be entrepreneurship and other skills shift suggests that reduce possible incidents training which should target the informal sector; and reintegration should of insecurity, transitional there should possibly be regulatory exemptions for economic reintegration the informal sector businesses. Nonetheless, the pol- be located within should be “delineated� icy specifies that in order for there to be sustainable the context of socio- from longer-term peace- employment creation and decent work the informal economic reconstruction building processes, and economy needs to be formalised.29 and development rather introduced at an earlier The written work of NGOs largely echoes the posi- stage in the DDR equation. than DDR. The paper made a series of tion on the informal sector taken by international specific recommendations, organisations. For example, International Alert, especially in relation to: the ‘neglected beneficiaries’ which has published a series of documents on the (such as women, girls, boys and landless youth); the issue, has also highlighted that the informal sector use of cash/vouchers; micro-credit; land allocation; is often overlooked in the planning of reintegration public works programmes and vocational training.27 processes.30 These reports have also indicated that, in reality, income generating opportunities in the infor- The ILO has produced guidelines on the socio-eco- mal economy are the only options for demobilised nomic reintegration of ex-combatants (2009). The ex-combatants in the short- to medium-term. In ad- focus of this document is the reintegration of former dition, these strategies should take into account what combatants into the formal economic sector, but there motivated ex-combatants to take arms and what roles is an acknowledgement of the value of the informal they played during the conflict, as in many cases ex- sector, which is defined as that sector of the economy combatants were engaged in the informal economy which, during a conflict.31 10 As reflected above, reintegration has been most com- and/or prescriptive, and adopt a normative position monly assessed and discussed in the peace-building on why reintegration processes should be pursued. and security sector reform literature as being inte- The work of economic reintegration is, however, un- grally linked to disarmament and demobilisation. derdeveloped. There appears to be research and pub- However, due to the persistent challenges and short- lication momentum building in this area, but more comings of implementing reintegration programmes, in-depth, detailed investigation of how former com- there has been a recent conceptual shift that suggests batants are able to generate income is required. that reintegration should rather be located within the context of socio-economic reconstruction and devel- Since the emergence of DDR literature, a fundamen- opment processes.32 Some academics, such as Joanna tal assumption, although often not explicitly stated, is Spear have even argued that (in line with the SIDDR that a significant number of demobilised ex-combat- background paper) reintegration should be sequenced ants will generate a livelihood through the informal before disarmament and demobilisation phases have economy, as training and material support for small been completed, and that reintegration should have business development and subsistence agriculture a higher peace-building profile. Further to this there have been systematically advocated. However, the have been recommendations that there should be a apparent bias in most of the literature is that income more nuanced approach to reintegration, especially generation in the informal sector should only be tem- making a distinction between urban and rural reinte- porary, with formal sector employment options being gration programmes. The reason for this is that urban preferred. The negative consequence of this partiality approaches tend to be more complex than rural.34 has been that the dynamics of the informal sector in post-conflict environments have not been sufficiently 1.4 Conclusion scrutinised. As indicated in the recent policy and pro- It is evident that considerable literature on all ele- gramming guidelines by the ILO and the UN, there ments of the reintegration of ex-combatants into ci- is a greater focus on the contributory role of the in- vilian life exists. Some of the literature is based on formal economic sector in reintegration. Nonetheless, sound research and rigorous evaluations of previous more detailed and objective analyses of this sector are programmes. Other documents are more descriptive essential for increased reintegration success. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 11 2 An assessment of post-conflict economies 2.1 Defining the informal sector income generation comprises 48% of non-agricultural employment in North Africa, 51% in Latin America, All economic systems contain formal and informal 65% in Asia, and 72% in sub-Saharan Africa. Esti- components, with the relative size of the components mates of the informal economic sector for developed varying from country to country. In under-developed countries are around 15%.39 According to an OECD regions, such as many parts of Africa, the informal publication (2009), the informal sector is estimated to sector often overshadows the formal sector, with sim- be 43% of the total official GDP in Africa.40 However, ilar dynamics existing in conflict and post-conflict these estimates should be treated with caution. Indeed economies. Hence, the focus of this section will be on it is exceedingly difficult to define and delineate this the informal sector. component of the economy, as it is dynamic in nature, In general, the informal comprises a diverse range of activities and often defies In Sub-Saharan Africa, national boundaries. In addition, the quality of data sector is not typically reg- the ILO estimates ulated, taxed, documented collection varies between countries. that informal income and protected by govern- A vast amount of economic transactions in the in- generation represents ments. It is also referred formal sector are unrecorded. Hence, some scholars 72% of non agricultural to as the hidden, shadow, have suggested that “unrecorded economy�, is more grey, underground, clan- accurate and less derogatory than the more popular employment. destine, subterranean or terms mentioned above “as a verifiable distinction� parallel economy, and it entails “extra-state exchange can be made between this economy and the recorded systems�.35 The informal economy includes the unre- economy.41 The OECD uses the term “non-observed� ported activities related to the manufacture and trade economy and has compiled a handbook for measur- in both legal and illegal goods and services, and such ing this component of the economy.42 economic transactions are typically in cash or by bar- ter. This sector of the economy tends to be prominent 2.2 Rationale and role of the informal in countries where there are high levels of income and economy asset inequality.36 The informal economy is linked to the formal economy at both the national and global There essentially four key reasons that the informal levels.37 economy is so prominent in underdeveloped coun- tries. First, the agriculture sector and the formal It has been estimated that the average size of the economy do not have the capacity to absorb surplus global informal economy (as a percentage of GDP) in labour, which is compounded by high rates of popula- 2002/03 in 96 developing countries was 38.7%, in 25 tion growth or urbanisation. Second, there have been transition countries 40.1%, and in 21 Organisation for significant obstacles to entry into the formal econo- Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) my, including cumbersome regulations, high business countries 16.3%.38 The ILO has estimated that informal registration fees and corruption. A predatory state, for 12 example, tends to erode the formal economy, which not make constructive contributions to building state in turn can stimulate growth in the informal sector. capacity and human development. Militarised elites, Third, formal institutions have lacked the capacity to fronted by strongmen or warlords, tend to dominate provide training and establish infrastructure to facili- such economic systems. These elites retain power by tate growth in the formal sector. Fourth, in the context intentionally undermining state institutions, enshrin- of high levels of poverty, there has been a sustained ing patronage relationships and using violence or the demand for low-cost goods and services, which is threat of violence to reinforce their authority.47 provided more efficiently by the informal sector.43 The informal sector is usually pronounced during periods War economies are usually characterised by looting, of war and political transition due to weakened state exploitation and rent-seeking behaviour, which are controls.44 utilized by elites through rebel groups, government forces and militias to acquire control over assets, natu- There are two opposing schools of thought regarding ral resources, trade and infrastructure networks, cash, the informal economy. According to the first school produce and labour. This form of economy tends to of thought, this sector of the economy provides the be fragmented and privatised, with the informal and potential for income generation in regions with re- criminal sectors being stimulated. War economies stricted formal employment opportunities, and/or consequently destabilize the formal economy, and in large pool of unskilled labour. In most economies, extreme cases override particularly in developing countries, the unrecorded it entirely.48 War econ- In most economies, economy is key to providing a safety net for the poor.45 omies are particularly particularly in The other school of thought regards the unrecorded difficult to dismantle developing countries, the sector as being a pervasive feature of the economy due to the vested inter- that can undermine competitiveness, growth, and the ests of elites, and that a unrecorded economy is rule of law, as informal sector proceeds do not con- war scenario legitimis- key to providing a safety tribute directly to government revenue. In essence, it es these arrangements, is argued that the informal sector crowds out the for- which may be deemed net for the poor. mal sector economic activities, and has the potential criminal offences in a non-war context.49 In war-ori- to undermine the social contract between individuals ented contexts, informal economic activities are more and the state.46 pronounced than during times of peace, and are con- sidered to be a key component of a war economy.50 In general, the informal sector tends to thrive in cir- cumstances where onerous barriers to formal sector A central, but controversial theoretical contribution entrepreneurship exist or emerge, such as: deficient within this literature is the ‘greed and grievance’ the- infrastructure; cumbersome regulations and compli- sis popularised by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ance requirements; inadequate access to credit; high who used panel data of armed conflicts for the period and unpredictable taxation; burdensome trade barri- 1960-99 to examine the risk of civil war using regres- ers and duties; and a risky investment and legal cli- sion analysis. The authors employed a set of rational mate. However, as competition increases, informal choice models of rebellion that revolve around two sector businesses tend to become less profitable. contrasting motivations for rebellion, namely “greed� and “grievance�. The simple greed-rebellion model 2.3 Informal economies in countries holds that rebellion will occur if it is financially profit- experiencing armed conflict able, provided rebel forces are able to evade, endure or There is considerable literature on the subject of econ- repel assaults by government armed forces. The simple omies in times of war or sustained armed conflict. grievance model states that war will occur as a conse- Such an economy is often referred to as a war econo- quence of one or more grievances, such as inter-group my, which is a system of profit, power and protection hatred, political exclusion, and vengeance. Through that directly contributes to, emerges from, and has the an intensive statistical analysis, of the global pattern potential to perpetuate, armed conflicts. The literature of large-scale conflict from 1965, Collier and Hoeffler (in relation to civil wars) describes war economies as found that the grievance models had low explanatory being “parasitic�, “illicit� and “predatory�, which do power, while greed models perform well.51 Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 13 There has been much debate about, critique and sup- In advanced war economies, military goods and ser- port for this thesis, and consequently there have been vices are prioritised in the government budget, which numerous publications.52 This model has three short- is typically financed through increases in public debt. comings. First, it seeks to compare two contrasting Given the security and investment risks, the private motivations for rebellion, namely greed and griev- sector tends to redirect the bulk of its capital to safer, ance. However, while the grievance model considers offshore destinations (capital flight). The increased motivations for armed conflict, such as inter-ethnic insecurity and exploitive behaviour of security forces hatreds, the greed model appears to rather focus on and insurgent groups in a wartime environment usu- opportunities for rebellion (e.g. size of the rebel move- ally results in ordinary people gearing their economic ment, relative military advantage and cost of recruit- activities towards low-level subsistence in the infor- ment). Second, the grievance model does not reflect mal economy.54 In addition, major job losses in the the myriad of sophisticated theories of the causes of public and private sectors force civilians to resort to armed conflict. Third, as the models are concerned informal means of livelihood support.55 with major trends, and hence indigenous/unique fea- tures are not taken into consideration. For example, a 2.4 Post-conflict economies number of rebellions have been initiated and/or spon- sored by foreign governments.53 Many of the dynamics of war economies often persist Figure 1: Change in GDP per capita in select post-conflict countries Source: UNDP61 14 in post-conflict environments, especially in the con- general population tend to remain risk-averse in pur- text peace agreements and conflict stalemates, as there suing a livelihood, and continue to rely on subsistence have been insufficient countervailing forces to recon- activities. Added to this formal sector employment figure and transform the power dynamics within the opportunities in post-conflict countries tend to be in- economy. However, overt violence in the conduct of finitesimal.59 Most countries emerging from a period economic transactions is less evident, with militarised of violent conflict experience a significant decrease elites often swapping combat fatigues for business at- in GDP per capita compared to the period before the tire. Nonetheless, most-conflict environments are of- conflict took place (see figure 1). ten characterized by insecurity and uncertainty, with insurgent groups and spoilers posing a threat to the In such situations, there is a noticeable increase in the government and the peace agreement. Consequently, number of small, informal businesses. This is due to high levels of military spending are typically main- the stabilisation of the economy, the demand for basic tained.56 goods and services, and labour flexibility in this sector. Uncertainty, excessive and unpredictable economic The viability of such economies is often dependent regulations (including taxation), as well as the poten- on a small basket of primary commodity exports, tial for renewed violence remain, however, informal such as minerals, oil and cash crops. Therefore, such business have higher countries are vulnerable to large fluctuations in global tolerance for such risks Many of the dynamics commodity prices.57 They are frequently constrained and constraints, and of war economies often by damaged or destroyed infrastructure; weak state are less dependent on institutions; and incapacitated human and social capi- public institutions and persist in post-conflict tal. Links between areas of production and trade, as infrastructure (such environments. well as between rural communities and urban areas as electricity and fixed have been disrupted. States do not have the requisite business locations), than formal sector businesses. expertise, resources and political will to adequately Such informal sector businesses typically involve re- facilitate economic recovery; and there is usually a se- tail services such as small trade, repair, and construc- vere skills shortage. tion.60 Excessive regulation and cumbersome trade barriers Most post-conflict settings, however, see the sizeable are also the order of the day, with private sector en- intervention of international organisations, aid agen- trepreneurism and large-scale employment creation cies and foreign non-governmental organisations being stymied. Public expenditure is poorly struc- (NGOs), which stimulate both the formal and infor- tured and executed; commercial law is erratic, and mal sectors of the economy. There is evidence to sug- property rights are opaque.58 A further ‘hangover’ of gest that international aid can directly contribute to the conflict-era, which is directly associated with the growth in such settings.62 insecurity of the post-conflict environment, is that the Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 15 3 Analytical framework: the reintegration of ex-combatants and the informal sector T he three case study areas will be assessed with in which ex-combatants reside has a significant im- the following analytical framework: human pact on the degree of individual economic reintegra- development, economic conditions, gover- tion. In essence, human security is determined by the nance, security, DDR support, and the personal cir- extent to which people can pursue their needs and cumstances and networks of ex-combatants. The focus interests relatively unhindered, and consequently of the research of was on individual ex-combatants. lead productive, healthy and fulfilling lives, not only A supplementary analysis ex-combatant households as individuals, but also as community members. A would have been preferable, but this was not pursued key component is therefore individual choice, namely due to time and resource constraints. “what people should have, be and do to be able to en- sure their own livelihood�.66 Gender is widely accepted as a crosscutting issue in the DDR literature, which was observed throughout The Human Development Index (HDI) is a compre- this study. In this regard, it has been widely suggested hensive numeric value used by the UNDP to rank that male ex-combatants have typically received dis- countries’ level of human development, based on the proportionate DDR support over females. The main premise that people are the authentic wealth of na- reason for this state of affairs has arguably been that tions. The HDI reflects life expectancy, literacy, edu- security has been the prime objective of most DDR cation, gender, poverty, political freedoms and living processes, with young men being perceived to be the standards, with a high HDI reflecting an environment greatest threat to the peace-building process.63 Conse- in which people can pursue their full potential and quently, some DDR scholars have intimated that the lead productive, creative lives in accordance with definition of a combatant, and the DDR criteria, has their needs and interests. The HDI will be used as an often been intentionally skewed to favour male ex- assessment tool for the case study analysis. combatants. Similarly, DDR programmes have often linked financial and material support to the surrender 3.2 Economic conditions of firearms; and in most armed formations it has been Macro economic conditions, structures and dynam- men that have had preferential access to firearms.64 ics (including the relationship between the formal In addition, varieties of gender discrimination within and informal economies) fundamentally shape and armed entities have conceivably restricted women’s constrain the local economy. This in turn affects the ability to access DDR support. However, it has not opportunities that are available to ex-combatants and been possible to accurately interrogate and gauge the to the societies in which former combatants and their actual extent and dynamics of the alleged gender dis- families (or dependents) reside. The case study analy- crimination due to the absence of baseline data.65 sis will consider the manner in which ex-combatants have responded to the economic environment, both 3.1 Level of human development opportunities and challenges, in which they find The level of human development in the environments themselves. 16 3.3 Governance manner in which ex-combatants reintegration has been shaped and/or constrained by the dynamics of The nature and extent of government involvement security (or insecurity). of in the economy results in both opportunities and challenges for ex-combatants undergoing reintegra- 3.5 Nature of DDR programming and tion. Ex-combatants are likely to benefit where gov- support ernments seek to facilitate sustainable economic growth, particularly at the micro level. Likewise, an DDR programmes and processes typically provide over-regulation of the economy and predatory prac- ex-combatants with resources and skills, with the aim tices by officials (such as excessive taxation and extor- of assisting these individuals (and their families) with tion) is likely to constrain livelihood options. In addi- the reinsertion and reintegration processes. This case tion, the absence of government presence in sections study research will interrogate the extent to which ex- of the economy has the potential to either undermine combatants have used this support, particularly the ex-combatant reintegration or provide income-gener- impact on reintegration choices and outcomes. ating prospects for the more astute business-minded individuals. The case studies will assess the impact of 3.6 Personal circumstances and net- governance (or the lack thereof) on the reintegration works of ex-combatants. The livelihood choices of individual ex-combatants 3.4 Security and insecurity are directly informed by their personal circumstances (such as personal experiences, family commitments As with the majority of members of society, liveli- and responsibilities), as well as by their relation- hood choices of ex-combatants are informed by se- ships and networks within areas in which they reside. curity considerations and perceptions. Despite the Available resources and enabling processes/systems absence of full-scale war in all three cases studies, at the local and macro levels fundamentally shape incidents of armed conflict and violence continue to ex-combatants choices and the manner in which they feature prominently. The case studies will analyse the interact with others. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 17 18 Part II Case studies: Central African Republic Democratic Republic of Congo South Sudan 20 4 Central African Republic 4.1 Level of human development Farming (predominantly cassava, yams, groundnuts, honey, bananas, cotton, coffee, tobacco and maize) In 2010, CAR was ranked 159 out of 169 countries primarily takes place on smallholdings, often at sub- in the HDI, and has consistently experienced low lev- sistence level, while much of the country suffers from els of human development for more than 30 years. food insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organisa- Therefore, livelihood choices for both ex-combatants tion (FAO) estimates that slightly more than 8% of and civilians have been severely inhibited. Table 1 and the land is used for agricultural purposes, with more figure 2 provide further details on the dimensions of than a third of available land being covered by forest.70 human underdevelopment in CAR. Meat is considered a high value commodity. Figure 3 provides details on the ranking of the top ten com- 4.2 Economic overview and livelihood modities in terms of production value. support Large manufacturing and industrial ventures are vir- Despite its significant natural resources, the econ- tually non-existent, with the omy of CAR is fragile. A history of armed conflicts small exception of timber/saw- Most of the combined with weak governance and crippling gov- mill sector. There are budding ernment debt have had a devastating effect on the developments in the manu- residents of CAR economy, resulting in more than 70,000 internally facture of cigarettes and sugar, live in poverty. displaced persons (IDPs), 130 destroyed industries and the production of palm oil, but these are still small-scale initiatives, and most of and businesses, and 3,000 lost jobs. This contributed the crops that are exported leave in raw form and are to an increase in inflation, as well as a decrease in per still processed outside of the country.71 The wholesale capita income, exports, imports and state revenues.66 and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants) is Since the end of the most recent armed conflict there noteworthy, and contributes about 13% to GDP.72 has been minimal investment in infrastructure. The 2010 the national budget was estimated to US$ Currently, CAR’s significant mineral deposits, such as 333 million, with the government typically generating diamonds, gold and uranium are generally not being 85% of its revenue from taxation and international de- mined on a major industrial scale (despite diamonds velopment/humanitarian aid.73 Publicly available data accounting for 40% of CAR exports, second only to on the categories of government spending is limited, timber exports)67, with non-mechanised, individual with combination of sources estimating that: 4.3% of mining ventures being commonplace. In addition, GDP is spent on health; 1.3% on education; 0.9% on the country’s rich agricultural potential has generally the military; 25% on services (due to the large govern- not been commercially developed, despite agriculture ment bureaucracy and high transportation costs). (excluding forestry) having consistently generated a third of the GDP.68 Forestry is estimated to contribute Most of the residents of CAR live in poverty, with to 10% of GDP.69 62.4% of the estimated population of 4.4 million Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 21 Table 1: Human Development Indicators: CAR Indicator CAR Health Expenditure on health, public (% of GDP) 1.4 Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births) 173 Life expectancy at birth (years) 47.7 Education Adult literacy rate (both sexes) (% aged 15 and above) 48.6 Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (both sexes) (%) 28.6 Expenditure on education (% of GDP) (%) 1.3 Internet users (per 100 people) 0.4 Mean years of schooling (of adults) (years) 3.5 Expected Years of schooling (of children) (years) 6.3 Income GDP per capita (2008 PPP US$) 766 GNI per capita (2008 PPP US$) LN 6.6 Household final consumption expenditure per capita PPP (constant 2005 international $) 497 Inequality Inequality-adjusted education index 0.163 Inequality-adjusted income index 0.17 Inequality-adjusted HDI value 0.183 Poverty Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3) 0.512 Intensity of deprivation 59.3 MPI: Headcount (k greater than or equal to 3), population in poverty (% of population) 86.4 Gender Maternal mortality ratio (deaths of women per 100,000 live births) 980 Population with at least secondary education, female/male ratio 0.393 Gender Inequality Index, value 0.768 Gender Inequality Index (updated) 0.763 Composite indices Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3) 0.512 HDI value 0.315 Gender Inequality Index, value 0.768 Inequality-adjusted HDI value 0.183 Source: UNDP, http://www.hdr.undp.org people living on less than US$ 1.5 per day. The gross ture.75 In Bangui, the capital, close to a quarter of the national product per capita is US$ 410 and the gross economically active population were estimated to be national income per capita is US$ 730 (2008).74 There unemployed. was no available data for the employment / unem- Socio-economic indicators for the CAR are cause for ployment rates, but it was estimated that close to 70% grave concern. Only 55% of the adult population were of the population sustain themselves through agricul- literate, although school enrolment for primary school 22 Figure 2: Human Development Index Trends: CAR 1980-2010 Source UNDP, http://www.hdr.undp.org was 87%. Interviews suggested that most people did the country, leading to a decrease in demand for ex- not complete secondary school. The food security ported produce.79 The lack of electricity was another prevalence in the country was 18.9% and there was hindrance to growth.80 a 30.2% prevalence of food insecurity. Malnutrition Establishing and maintaining formal sector enterpris- measured by the percentage of children under five es in CAR is highly challenging. It takes 22 days and who are underweight was 21.8%.76 8 procedures to establish a business, and the cost is 4.3 Constraints and barriers to the equivalent to 228.4% of income per capita. Register- ing a property takes 75 days, and costs close to 20% formal economy of the property value. Obtaining credit is exceedingly Although the government was taking steps to im- difficult, and there are very few commercial banks in prove the economic environment in CAR, including operation (less than 1% of the population have access facilitating the development of industry, agriculture to banking services). The taxation process is burden- and mining, as well as promoting international invest- some and exploitative, and the protection of property ment,77 there were significant barriers to economic rights is weak, especially in rural areas where govern- development. The lack of serviceable roads and reli- ment has not been able to assert its authority.81 The able public transport, coupled with numerous mili- labour market is also highly regulated, especially with tary and rebel checkpoints, where bribes and ‘taxes’ regards the dismissal of workers, which tends to act are levied, constitute a significant barrier to econom- as a disincentive to entrepreneurs looking to set-up ic development, as well as to safari tourism. CAR is businesses.82 landlocked, which makes it largely dependent on the road network with Cameroon, which is fraught with Government bureaucracy and taxation procedures in security problems (particularly banditry), which fur- CAR are also highly prohibitive towards cross border ther restricts trade.78 In 2008, the global economic cri- trade, as it takes on average 62 days, 17 documents and sis exacerbated the economic hardships already facing US$ 5,554 to import a container of goods/raw materi- Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 23 als, and 54 days, 9 documents and US$ 5,491 to export However, despite these barriers, the general senti- a container of goods/raw materials.83 As with many ment is that the economy has shown some signs other countries with weak governance, corruption in of improvement. In 2010 it was estimated that real CAR is pervasive. Transparency International ranked GDP growth was 3.3%. International investment CAR 154th out of 178 states on its Corruption Percep- has recently gained momentum; some mining com- tions Index 2010, with a low ranking being equated panies are conducting exploratory work; and there to high levels of perceived corruption.84 Corruption has been an increase in certain categories of exports.87 does not only misdirect public funds away from vital However an international NGO employee pointed economic processes and initiatives, but also disrupts out that the sense in the economy is that those who and constricts trade, as well as discourages investment are politically connected are building – “the rest are in the formal economy. merely existing�.88 In CAR, commercial For the most part, commer- 4.4 The informal economic sector cial interactions take place Most of CAR’s economy is made up of the informal interactions take place on a small scale. As an in- economic sector. As indicated above, agriculture is mostly on a small scale. terviewee explained, “sugar the primary means of support for the majority of the is sold by the cube�. In sectors such as crop farming population, however, in order to survive, most house- and livestock, over 90% of farmers are entirely using holds generate livelihoods from a variety of sources. their own labour rather than mechanisation or animal An economist from the Ministry of Economy and traction, with the financial barriers to upgrading to Planning estimated that the informal economy prob- more commercial methods being too great for most ably makes up more than 90% of economic activity.89 In a number of cases it is difficult to classify activi- farmers.85 In addition, further investment in, and ex- pansion of businesses is undermined by the prevail-ties as either formal or informal90, due to the flexible way in which economic formalisation has occurred in ing view that such businesses will be destroyed by the next bout of violence.86 CAR. However, since the end of the armed conflict, almost no jobs have been created Figure 3: CAR Top 10 commodities production value, 2009 in the formal sector. Apart from agriculture, informal !"##"$%&'()*"$+,-".(/01+2(34555(6.&78( sector economic activity in CAR typically includes petty trading 300000   in marketplaces, which has usu- ally involved the selling of food, 250000   beverages, cell phone vouchers, household items, clothing and 200000   other consumables. The manu- Commodity   facture and sale of sorghum beer, =rodu>?on   150000   value  (1000   and other types of alcohol, has Int$)   also been a popular means of 100000   generating an income, particu- larly for women. Another signifi- cant economic activity is cross 50000   border trade with neighbouring states, which is undertaken by 0   both women and men. The main s   t   a       s     t   t   y   products that are traded includ- ed ts ro ea ea ea m na av ne nu Ta se Ya m m  m ss na Ho nd e   e   e   Ca at Ba ed: mining and forestry products m m ou )l Go sa Ga Ca Gr Se and services; as well as agricul- Source: FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on July 21, 2011 http://faostat.fao.org/ ture and industrial products. site/612/default.aspx#ancor Many of the constraints of that 24 mining equipment. However, miners are obliged to Table 2: Indicators of barriers to formal sector business development (CAR) sell the stones at process below market value. For ex- ample, in 2010 it was reported that a miner might re- Sub-Saharan ceive 80,000 CFA francs (US$ 160) from a collector Procedure CAR rank average rank for a one-carat diamond. The collector would then sell Ease of doing business 182 137 the stone to a buying office for between CFA 200,000 Starting a business 162 126 to 300,000 francs (US$ 400 to US$ 600). An additional drawback to this system is that most collectors, rather Registering property 142 121 than investing their profits in developing the mining Getting credit 139 120 sector, remit it to their home countries.94 Protecting investors 131 113 CAR mining legislation provides for rigid control and Paying taxes 182 116 excessive taxation. However, attempts by the CAR government to regulate informal sector mining have Trading across borders 182 136 been largely unsuccessful. The disjuncture between Enforcing contracts 173 118 the government regulations and reality has allowed for corruption and diamond smuggling (mainly into Resolving insolvency 183 128 Cameroon) to flourish. By law, artisanal miners are afflict the informal economy undermine the develop- required to pay annual license fees, with the first year’s ment of the formal sector, particularly excessive taxa- fee being CFA 158,850 (US$ 518). Many miners have regarded this fee as exorbitant, and consequently, less tion; poor access to credit; security issues; and high than 5% of artisanal miners were operating with a li- transportation costs.91 cense in 2010. There was a similar disregard for reg- As with most economies, there are less savoury and ulations by collectors and buyers, who were also re- criminal components to the CAR informal economy. quired to pay high licensing costs. Consequently, the This includes poaching and the trade in bush-meat, main stakeholders in the informal mining sector were as well as the smuggling of diamonds, endangered vulnerable to extortion and exploitation by rapacious wildlife, animal skins, ivory, traditional medicine and officials and some members of the ruling elite.95 cigarettes. There were linkages between informal mining and armed Most households CAR has mineral wealth, mainly in the form of gold, groups operating in CAR, generate livelihoods diamonds and uranium, with only gold and diamonds as the diamond trade pro- from a variety of being exploited on a significant scale, predominantly vided such groups with the through low-level mining. Artisanal mining is a key resources to maintain their sources. component of the CAR informal economy, and is re- powerbases and pursue their political and military ported to provide direct livelihood support to an es- objectives. The principal armed groups in CAR were timated 400,000 people. Taking the dependents into the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemble- account, it has been suggested that 54% of the CAR ment (UFDR) and the Convention des patriotes pour la population derives a livelihood, directly and indirect- justice et la paix (CPJP). Both groups have occupied ly, from informal sector mining.92 Miners and their diamond areas and generated income through dia- dependents predominantly live in ramshackle mining mond smuggling. There have been reports of miners camps where the standard of living is low in an envi- joining rebel groups for protection and access to min- ronment characterised by insecurity and hazards. ing areas.96 West African middlemen (more commonly referred One reason for the dominance of the informal sec- to as collectors) purchase the uncut diamonds from tor is the lack of government presence in large parts miners and sell them onto buying offices (bureaux of the country. Economically, this absence has meant d’achat), which in turn export the precious stones.93 that the government does not collect taxes; does not Artisanal and small-scale miners are highly depen- develop infrastructure; and does not facilitate trade. dent on collectors to finance the purchase/rental of Where there is government presence, an impression Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 25 among CAR inhabitants existed that the bureaucracy the largest number of combatants.101 While combat- was parasitic, hindering rather than facilitating the ants were being supported with training and start-up formalisation of economic ventures. In areas where kits, a number of projects were also implemented in the state was less dominant, militias collected infor- the communities into which they would settle.102 mal taxes, with an interviewee explaining that in these areas, “it’s a state in a state.�97 PRAC was the structure that dealt with the imple- mentation and operational management of the pro- 4.5 DDR programming gramme. UNDP took the lead in the execution of CAR’s DDR programmes have been implemented in PRAC, although a number of national and govern- an unstable political, security and economic situation. ment representatives also formed part of the PRAC Previous disarmament initiatives have only enjoyed structure.103 The programme experienced a number of limited success. Beginning in 2002, three distinct setbacks, mostly due to problems in planning, com- DDR processes were undertaken, including the latest munication and monitoring.104 It struggled with a lim- programme, which is currently in progress. The DDR ited budget, a lack of proper access and inexperienced programmes worked with those armed groups that staff who did not have experience in DDR.105 had reached agreement with the government about demobilisation. Below is a brief description of CAR’s The main government body responsible for coordinat- two concluded DDR programmes: ing DDR was the National Commission for Demobili- sation, Disarmament and Reintegration (CNDDR), National Programme on Disarmament and Reinser- a subsidiary of the National Defence Council. The tion (PRDR) (2002-2003) CNDDR included two sub-commissions, one that was This programme aimed to offer livelihoods training responsible for disarmament and demobilisation and to 2,000 people and to recover 10,000 small arms the other that was responsible for reintegration and and light weapons. Unfortu- community support.106 The CNDDR dealt with the The PRAC nately, the political and mili- political aspects of DDR and programme strategy.107 demobilized 7,556 tary events taking place in the The CNDDR received technical assistance from the members of armed country at the time prevented World Bank and UNDP. groups. the programme from being im- plemented as planned. A failed There were coordination problems between the UN military coup attempt in October 2002, the period of and other parties involved in DDR, as well as coordi- heightened insecurity that followed, and the success- nation problems within the UN system.108 An MDRP ful coup of March 2003, affected and complicated the fact sheet explained that, “...differing management implementation of this programme, eventually lead- systems between implementing partner and donor, ing to its early termination in 2003.98 together with the absence of a realistic action plan for the duration of the project, contributed to the difficul- Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Sup- ties in planning.�109 port Project (PRAC) (2004-2008) Former combatants were identified and registered, PRAC was implemented between March 2004 and photographed and given former combatant identity April 2007, and 7,556 members of armed groups were demobilised.99 PRAC had an operating budget of US$ cards and demobilisation documents in demobili- 13.2 million, which equated to an average cost of US$ sation camps. They participated in information and 1,758 per demobilised individual. US$ 3 million were sensitization activities and were provided with coun- spent on disarmament and demobilisation (22.7% of selling about their reintegration options. They were funds) while US$ 10.22 million were spent on reinte- also given medical examinations, and if needed, ap- gration (77.3% of funds).100 propriate medical care.110 With demobilisation, for- mer combatants received a demobilisation kit consist- PRAC’s overall objectives were to support the demo- ing of blankets, sheets, soap, clothes, cooking utensils bilisation and reintegration of former combatants and and other personal necessities.111 Kits differed for men to enhance the capacities of communities receiving and women. 26 For reintegration, a feasibility study for DDR was former combatant working successfully as a tailor conducted by a consultant in 2004 at the request of explained that those tailors that were successful after UNDP, and was submitted for comments at a stake- PRAC were those who had been working as tailors holder meeting.112 The findings of this study fed into before joining armed groups and/or before demobili- the planning of the DDR project documents. There sation.122 A combatant who chose the cattle breeding was no initial socio-economic study conducted to option recalled that the training had been helpful in explore the market and the economic opportunities preparing them for the work, however it did not pre- available to former combatants.113 pare them to deal with unexpected problems, such as cattle contracting diseases.123 Former combatants were to be identified by their armed group leaders, who would propose lists of Once trained, former combatants were provided with members of their groups. On the basis of these lists, start-up kits, consisting of money and the tools re- DDR beneficiaries would be demobilised.114 There quired for their trade, in order to assist them in setting was alleged corruption in the process, and there were up their income generation projects. Different options reports that local authorities manipulated the process were provided with differ- ent kits, and the amounts to include family and friends.115 of money provided varied After the PRAC, tailors The major focus of the reintegration programme was depending on the option who were successful on the economic component. Former combatants selected. Every former were those who had were permitted to choose an economic option, after combatant interviewed which they were provided with training and a start- said that the amount of been working as tailors up kit tailored to that option. The options included money they had been giv- before the war. agriculture, cattle breeding, small trade, school train- en was not enough to suc- ing, fishing, tailoring and certain types of profession- cessfully start up a business. Even a former employee al training to become a mechanic, driver, plumber, of PRAC agreed that the amounts given should have carpenter or brick layer.116 A key problem was that been higher.124 there was no difference in the options provided from Community based reintegration was one of the un- area to area, meaning that the choice of options did derlying pillars of PRAC, and PRAC’s community not take the economic opportunities in a specific area projects formed a crucial component of the project. into account.117 In addition, the capacity of individu- PRAC was therefore much broader then just DDR.125 als was not prioritised, and former combatants were Forty-one micro-projects were implemented in com- allowed to select options that may have been inap- munities. Examples included: the rehabilitation of so- propriate for them.118 cio-economic infrastructure; hospitals; dispensaries; Once former combatants had chosen their options, schools; administrative offices; and wells. Most of the PRAC identified national training institutions that projects aimed to rehabilitate existing structures, al- provided training on the various options. For the most though a few projects built new ones.127 A key prob- part, training institutions were located in the areas lem that emerged was the lack of involvement of com- where former combatants resided, and beneficiaries munities in the implementation of these projects.128 lived at home while undergoing training. They were An additional problem was that little connection was given World Food Programme (WFP) food items made between the community projects and the rein- during the period of training.119 However, there was sertion of former combatants. widespread criticism of the training provided. 4.6 Reintegration and the informal For example, a tailor explained that he was given a economy one-month tailoring training, after which he still did not know how to do the job.120 A female ex-combatant In CAR the prevailing view was that the reintegration in Sibut echoed this sentiment, recalling that by the process, despite the assistance provided by PRAC, time the training had ended and they were provided was ineffective. An independent evaluation of PRAC with sewing machines, they still did not know how was carried out in October 2007.129 The evaluation to use them, so they rented them out to others.121 A concluded that PRAC had not met many of the ob- Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 27 jectives it had set for itself, and that implementation in non-mechanised agriculture was an unappealing was therefore not considered entirely successful.130 prospect.137 There was widespread speculation that The dominant view among ex-combatants in CAR this situation might encourage former combatants to was that the economic component of the reintegra- re-join armed groups.138 tion process had ‘failed’, with one former combatant suggesting that “many former combatants died of fail- 4.6.1 Armed groups ure�.131 However, Sakanoko Ndiai, former Executive There have been anecdotal reports of ex-combatants Secretary of PRAC, stated that follow-up evaluations re-joining armed groups after DDR, with similar had shown that 72% of former combatants had suc- assertions having been repeated in former combat- ceeded in their economic activities.132 This assertion, ant focus group discussions.139 Accurate information however, could not be verified. on such developments however was not available. The The former combatants’ strong views probably stem former Executive Secretary of the National Commis- from unmet expectations that they would secure lu- sion on DDR indicated that he was aware that some crative jobs as part of the reintegration process. For DDR beneficiaries had joined rebel groups in Chad the most part, former combatants did not secure and Sudan, and that fighters in the current rebel- formal sector employment these were rate in cities lions within CAR were not part of the DDR (PRAC) and towns. In addition, according to a former PRAC process.140 employee, where job opportunities existed, ex-com- batants did not have the necessary qualifications for 4.6.2 Obstacles to economic reintegration these jobs.133 For former combatants attempting to establish Despite the widely held perception of reintegration economic ventures in the CAR, the challenges were failure, it is important to note that almost all of the numerous and often insurmountable. The main chal- former combatants interviewed were generating an lenge has been the high cost of doing business, espe- income, through a variety of means. These livelihood cially input costs. For example, a former combatant activities replicated those of economically active non- working as a cattle breeder reported that the price of combatants in CAR, and there were with seemingly animal feed was often inflated.141 Similarly, a fisher- similar levels of success and adversity. man explained, The 2007 PRAC evaluation report found the cattle “If you want to get another person to help breeding and mechanics reintegration schemes to have you fish, you need to feed them daily. This been relatively successful (in terms of post-demobili- is an additional cost... Once you fish you sation livelihoods), and lesser degrees of success with need to dry fish and bring them to Bangui. If fishing and commerce.134 In the case of commerce, it someone helps you, you have to pay. So often was reported that former combatants had merely been once you sell your fish, you end up getting given money, with very limited training.135 less than it costs.�142 It was noteworthy that many former combatants were The lack of infrastructure is an added constraint to not working in the fields for which they had received economic growth. The conditions of the roads are reintegration training/support. Rather, they were pur- poor, especially during the rainy season. Checkpoints suing livelihood options that were more pragmatic also hinder business, limiting mobility and profits. given the prevailing limitations of the CAR economy. For example, a female combatant used to travel to the In the rural areas, for example, when economic rein- north of the country in order to buy peanuts to re-sell tegration ventures (such as small businesses) were un- in Bangui. There were numerous checkpoints on the successful, most former combatants eventually opted route where she had to pay ‘customs fees’ to govern- for subsistence agriculture.136 Nonetheless, for those ment soldiers as well as armed groups manning the former combatants, who previously held positions checkpoints. It got to a point where her business was of power and status within armed groups, working no longer profitable due to these costs, and she con- 28 sequently pursued other options.143 has been an exclusive focus on ‘today’s profit’, which made it difficult to promote a tradition of saving and Reliable and affordable access to equipment and planning for the future. Each year, hundreds of people capital to sustain economic ventures was a cause of are accused of witchcraft, with there being specula- frustration for ex-combatants. For example, a fisher- tion that in some cases the witchcraft incitements are man explained that freezers were needed to store fresh borne out of personal jealousy of the relative econom- fish and these were often unavailable, which made ic success of the accused.149 it difficult expand the business, and fish becomes unsellable if not refrigerated. Added to this, much Persistent insecurity was an obstacle to economic de- of the equipment and goods for the fishing industry velopment in CAR, not only for ex-combatants, but needed to be imported, and consequently expensive also for the population as a whole.150 In insecure ar- transportation costs were incurred.144 eas, particularly those with active armed groups and bandits, the movement of people and goods was re- Significant fluctuations in market forces, which were stricted.151 According to the Prefect of Sibut, the pro- particularly pronounced for small-scale businesses, liferation of arms was a major security concern.152 This have the potential to undermine ex-combatant liveli- assertion was reinforced by published research on the hood ventures. According to a female ex-combatants- transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons turned-trader, during harvest period there was usual- in Central Africa.153 ly an oversupply of produce, which meant that goods were sold at lower prices. Conversely, during the low There have also been suggestions that reintegration agricultural season, the cost of sourcing produce from had been undermined by corruption. Reports sug- farmers was high, which consequently affected the re- gested that there were tail price. Consumers in urban areas were often loath several layers of cor- Significant fluctuations to pay such high prices for agricultural products.145 ruption in the imple- in market forces have the mentation of PRAC. One of the problems repeatedly raised was that after Perceptions existed potential to undermine DDR beneficiaries had set up their economic ven- amongst former com- ex-combatant livelihood tures, they had insufficient funds available to respond batants that much of ventures. to problems that arose or to expand their ventures. the money and benefits This was compounded by the lack of accessible and that were intended for them was siphoned off by offi- affordable credit. While there were a handful of mi- cials.154 Other forms of corruption allegedly included crofinance institutions supported by UNDP and some cases where local authorities enrolled their relatives commercial banks, interest rates were considered to and friends in the DDR programme.155 In Sibut, for be too high.146 In addition, micro-finance institutions example, PRAC constructed a market from which were reluctant to provide loans to former combatants, former combatants were supposed to run their busi- as typically former combatants could not provide nesses. A number of former combatants alleged that security for the loans.147 Where credit was available, the mayor’s office took over control of the market and most former combatants were unaware of such a re- rented stalls to non-ex-combatants. In addition, for- source.148 mer combatants had to pay rent to the mayor’s office in order to work in this market, which they consid- Traditions and cultural practices have also affected ered unfair.156 business performance. Throughout CAR a communi- ty-centred, altruistic way of life exists. That is, if a per- Most of the 200 women who were beneficiaries of son generates income, or acquires wealth, that person PRAC reintegration support established small busi- was expected to share their good fortune with rela- nesses, raised cattle and engaged in tailoring.157 Inter- tives and/or community members, often leaving little views suggested that female former combatants had a available cash to reinvest in the economic venture. A relatively negative reintegration experience. A key fac- ‘hand-to-mouth’ approach to survival was common tor was that in the latter reintegration phases women in CAR, with an interviewee suggesting that there were allegedly disqualified from the DDR process and Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 29 had their names deleted from DDR lists. The reason 4.6.3 Mining for this, according to a former PRAC employee, was An area which was largely neglected by the CAR DDR that the DDR authorities were sceptical that women programmes was mining. No significant training or could have been combatants, and therefore presumed support was provided for artisanal and small-scale that those who reported for DDR had merely received mining, which was surprising given the important weapons from their families.158The responsibility of role that mining has played in the CAR economy. It is raising a family, often as a single parent, affected the highly probable that some former combatants settled ability of women to generate income.159 According in mining areas to ply their trade as artisanal miners. to one interviewee, “most females who were fight- The CAR government has reportedly taken steps to ing didn’t have a chance to get responsible husbands. support groups of miners working together in co- Therefore they had to look after children on their operatives, providing them with materials and other own.�160 Female combatants were also not given the support.166 option to join the army and this disappointed many women.161 4.6.4 Small business One of the key problems highlighted by former com- The CAR government has reportedly attempted to batants was the lack of follow-up reintegration sup- improve the conditions for doing business through port. Former combatants indicated that they would reducing the bureaucracy and formalising certain have preferred to be ‘accompanied’ and further sup- economic activities. Whereas in the past it took close ported, in order to devise and implement solutions to to a year to register a company, the process has sup- the problems they encountered.162 It was emphasised posedly been simplified to reduce the registration that a six-month DDR programme was insufficient, time.168 A government ministry responsible for the and rather, interviewees suggested that DDR should promotion of small and medium enterprises and the be viewed as a longer-term development project.163 informal sector has also been established.169 Former combatants complained that the DDR pro- There was some positive feedback from ex-combat- gramme had ignored practicalities of prevailing eco- ants. For example, a former combatant who owns an nomic conditions, which had hindered their econom- informal sector shop that was not registered with the ic reintegration success. For example, some former Ministry of Commerce indicated that government of- combatants who selected the agricultural reintegra- ficials had granted him reprieve from taxation until tion support received farming tools, but no land to such a time as his revenue increased.170 Tailors, who farm on.164 Some beneficiaries acquired driving per- received reintegration support, however claimed that mits, but did not have cars and therefore could not they were required to be registered with the govern- generate income. Added to this was insufficient access ment offices, and that it was mandatory for them to to credit and the lack of support services (such as vet- display a registration certificate on the wall of their erinary services for livestock).165 business premises.171 30 5 Democratic Republic of Congo 5.1 Level of human development and neglect effectively rendered them “moribund and producing a fraction of the production of previous In 2010, the DRC was ranked 168th out of a total of years�.175 Consequently, government revenues from 169 countries in terms of HDI. On average the DRC’s mining are substantially lower than they should be. HDI has declined since 1980, and has been well below Processes to restructure state mining companies have the sub-Saharan HDI average. Levels of human devel- been underway, with a number of foreign mining opment vary throughout the DRC, with residents of companies that have the eastern provinces arguably experiencing the high- invested in the DRC GDP grew by an average est levels of underdevelopment in the country. Table (Australia, Canada, of 6.5% between 2006 3 and figure 4 provide further details of the DRC’s China, South Af- HDI. rica and the United and 2010. States). The involvement of the military and armed 5.2 Economic overview groups in the mining sector in the east, however, has The main GDP source in the DRC is agriculture, constrained the contribution of mining revenues to which contributes more than 40% (including the improving human development. The artisanal mining forestry sector). Mining adds more than a quarter to sector critically produces the highest volume of min- GDP, with other significant contributors being indus- eral commodities in the DRC. For example, this sec- try (16.1%) and services: (31.8%). Between 2006 and tor was responsible for approximately 70% of the total 2010 there was an average real GDP growth of 6.5%. of DRC diamond extraction.176 Mining has been identified as a major growth area for the country, given the substantial reserves of cobalt DRC forested areas are estimated to be 145 million ore copper, coltan, tantalum, tin and diamonds.172 hectares in size, of which 20 million hectares were The World Bank has suggested that mining could granted as timber concessions to about 60 formal sec- contribute as much as 25% to GDP.173 Estimated min- tor companies, but “only about a dozen companies are eral exports were in the region of US$6.6 billion in in operation�.177 The formal sector production is pri- 2008. Cobalt accounted for more than a third (38%) marily for export purposes, and exports are typically of the total value of mineral exports; copper, 35%; in the form of logs.178 Between 1995 and 2010, timber crude petroleum, 12%; and diamonds, 11%.174 None- production increased by 27.7%. theless, agriculture will continue to be the bedrock of There was some diversification in the manufactur- economic and livelihood security of the DRC in the ing, wholesale, retail and service sector in the DRC. foreseeable future. Prominent business areas included: petroleum, ce- The mineral (extractive) sector in the DRC has typi- ment, construction, hydroelectricity, beer brewing, cally been dominated by state-owned industrial min- sugar milling, palm oil, soap, cigarette making, fish- ing enterprises, but sustained war, poor governance ing, textiles, plastics, transportation and telecommu- Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 31 Table 3: Human Development Indicators DRC Indicator DRC Health Expenditure on health, public (% of GDP) 1.2 Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births) 199 Life expectancy at birth (years) 48 Education Adult literacy rate (both sexes) (% aged 15 and above) 67.2 Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (both sexes) (%) 48.2 Expenditure on education (% of GDP) (%) .. Internet users (per 100 people) .. Mean years of schooling (of adults) (years) 3.8 Expected Years of schooling (of children) (years) 7.8 Income GDP per capita (2008 PPP US$) 327 GNI per capita (2008 PPP US$) LN 5.7 Household final consumption expenditure per capita PPP (constant 2005 international $) 154 Inequality Inequality-adjusted education index 0.244 Inequality-adjusted income index 0.07 Inequality-adjusted HDI value 0.153 Poverty Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3) 0.393 Intensity of deprivation 53.7 MPI: Headcount (k greater than or equal to 3), population in poverty (% of population) 73.2 Gender Maternal mortality ratio (deaths of women per 100,000 live births) 1,100 Population with at least secondary education, female/male ratio 0.295 Gender Inequality Index, value 0.814 Gender Inequality Index (updated) 0.802 Composite indices Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3) 0.393 HDI value 0.239 Gender Inequality Index, value 0.814 Inequality-adjusted HDI value 0.153 Source: UNDP, http://www.hdr.undp.org nications. There was also a significant small business of production value (2009). The urban areas with the component of the economy, with business persons most vigorous economic activity include Kinshasa, primarily operating from makeshift stalls, or hawk- Lubumbashi and Kisangani. However, there has been ing goods on the side of the road in urban areas.179 inadequate infrastructural links between these three Figure 5 indicates the top ten commodities in terms cities.180 32 Figure 4: Human Development Index Trends: DRC. 1980-2010 Source UNDP, http://www.hdr.undp.org Government revenue has been derived from taxation • Life expectancy is 48 (African average of 53), and and international donor aid, and in recent years, do- the infant mortality rate is 126 (African average nor aid has comprised more than a third of govern- of 80). ment revenue.181 Publically available information on • 59% of the population live on less than US$ 1 a government spending was severely limited, with the day (African average: 52.8%). Open Budget Index 2010 ranking the DRC as one of the least transparent states in Africa in terms of bud- • 70% literacy of the population aged 15-24 (Afri- getary information. can average 75). Key demographic and socio-economic data are as fol- 5.3 Livelihood support lows:183 Approximately 80% of the DRC population derive • The DRC has an estimated population of 67.8 mil- a livelihood from the informal sector. As indicated lion people, 35% of which reside in urban areas. above, agriculture provides the greatest contribu- • 75% of the urban population live in slums. tion to GDP in terms of productive sectors, and it has been estimated that close • Between 1992 and 2007 the food supply per capi- to 60% of the economically 80% of the DRC ta declined by 25%. active population derive a livelihood from agricultural population derive a • The DRC has a substantial domestic food deficit, sector,184 with there being livelihood from the and consequently, a number of basic food prod- both subsistence and com- informal sector. ucts are imported. mercial (predominantly for export) agricultural production.185 Nonetheless, only • The FAO estimates that 42% of the population is 10% of land in the DRC is used for agricultural pur- undernourished. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 33 poses, and agriculture only receives 0.64% of the total loes, reptiles and birds190 . It has been estimated that national budget.186 The principal subsistence crops the annual consumption of bush meat by the DRC include: cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts, and population is between one and two tonnes. In some rice. The key export crops are: tobacco, coffee, sugar, of the more isolated areas, bush meat is one of only wheat, palm oil, cocoa and rubber.187 products “that can provide income that outweighs transportation costs�.191 Inland fisheries contribute between 25% and 50% of the population’s protein intake. In addition, it is esti- Households also generated livelihoods through the mated that more than 600,000 people derive a liveli- informal timber trade (pit-sawing), alluvial mining hood (both directly and indirectly) from the fishing and petting trading, either running a market stall, or engaging in cross border trading. Details on these sector (capture, possessing, marketing, fishing supply, economic activities are provided in the section on the transportation, boat construction and equipment re- informal economy below. pairs) with most fish being caught in lakes and rivers (inland fisheries).188 However, those communities that 5.4 Constraints and barriers to the are located in close proximity to the inland fishery ar- eas are amongst the poorest in the DRC.189 formal economy There were significant structural and process barriers As indicated in figure 5, meat, particularly bush meat, to the average DRC resident establishing and main- was a noteworthy commodity in DRC, as the preva- taining a formal sector business, particularly high lence of disease restricts animal husbandry in the for- start-up costs (DRC is one of the most expensive est areas (which make up 68% of the territory of the countries in the world to establish a business), as well DRC). A significant number of households survive as government regulations/bureaucracy. For example, and/or derive a livelihood from hunting wild animals, in 2011 it took on average ten procedures, 84 days, such as duikers, monkeys, rodents, wild pigs, buffa- and cost 735% of income per capita to start a business. Table 4 provides the ranking Figure 5: DRC Top 10 commodities production value, 2009 of the DRC relative to other economies in terms of “doing !"##"$%&'()*"$+,-".(/01+2(34555(6.&78( Commodity production value (1000 Int$) business�.192 Registering a property took six 1800000   procedures and 54 days; and paying taxes took 336 hours.193 1600000   For many years there was a lack 1400000   of a property register, which prevented businesses from ef- 1200000   fectively using property assets Commodity   1000000   to leverage credit. In addi- ?roduc@on   800000   value  (tion, there allegedly has been 1000   Int$)   “double taxation� (at the pro- 600000   vincial and national levels).194 400000   The growth of formal sector businesses was also hampered 200000   by widespread corruption. For 0   example, Transparency Inter- national ranked DRC 164 out t   t   a         s       il   ns ze tc ce ts ea ea na  o av nu s  e ai i Ri of 178 states on its Corruption ta lm m M ss na M nd e an e   Ca Pa go Ba m ou Pl Perceptions Index 2010, with an Ga Gr M a low ranking being equated Source: FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on July 21, 2011 http://faostat.fao.org/site/612/ with high levels of perceived default.aspx#ancor corruption.195 34 residual armed conflict, as well as the economy of the Table 4: Indicators of barriers to formal sector business development (DRC) various armed groups. Sub-Saharan In terms of forestry, the Congolese Association of Small Procedure DRC rank average rank Scale Loggers has estimated that on average there are Ease of doing business 176 137 8,000 active logging companies (rough estimate) op- erating in the informal sector in the DRC, commonly Starting a business 145 126 referred to as scieurs de long. These logging companies Registering property 113 121 primarily engaged in pit sawing for both the domestic (for furniture and construction) and export markets. Getting credit 170 120 Included in this number were part-time and full-time Protecting investors 153 113 enterprises, with personnel numbers varying between Paying taxes 163 116 businesses. The common feature, however, was that these entities generally operated without licenses from Trading across borders 167 136 the national government. However, these business en- Enforcing contracts 170 118 tities paid taxes and royalties to local authorities and Resolving insolvency 165 128 traditional leaders respectively.199 In 2007, annual timber production from this sec- Banking services and access to credit for private sec- tor was estimated to be between 1.5 and 2.4 million tor businesses, especially small and medium sized square metres, which equated to about half a million enterprises, has been severely limited. Most commer- square metres of sawn wood. In addition, it has been cial banks (of which there were 18 registered in 2009) suggested that the tended to prioritise credit for international institu- output of informal The timber output from tions. Consequently, it was estimated in 2009 that in sector exceeds the excess of 80% of the money supply was not within the formal sector by close the informal sector banking system. In the same year, the DRC Central to 1000%. The reason exceeds the formal sector Bank estimated that there were only 60,000 individual for this was that the by close to 1000%. bank accounts in the entire country.196 However, the informal sector was microfinance sector has seen some growth in recent more adaptive to conditions of armed conflict, due to years. In 2010 there were US$ 59.2 million in micro- low levels of technology, small business entities and finance loans provided by 18 institutions to 91,649 its ability to cope with adverse infrastructural condi- borrowers.197 tions.200 The costs and regulation of engaging in formal sector Included in the informal timber sector were artisa- cross-border trade were also prohibitive to most Con- nal businesses (such as carpentry and furniture mak- golese, as for exports, eight documents are required, ing) and fuel wood consumption (charcoal produc- and it took 44 days to transfer the goods at a cost of tion and use) and trade. Charcoal, as in many other US$ 3,055 per shipping container. To import it re- underdeveloped African countries, is the primary quired nine documents, 63 days and costs US$ 3,285 energy source for households in DRC, and was esti- per shipping container.198 Added to this, the poor mated to constitute 72 million cubic metres of timber conditions of the road and rail network contributed per year.201 to trade delays and increased transport costs. Much of the bush meat trade is located in the informal 5.5 The informal sector sector. As indicated above, bush meat was not only a prevalent source of protein for many households, it Economic dynamics in the informal sector mimic was also a means to generate an income. Typically the formal sector, with the most financially viable ac- hunters catch and slaughter wild animals in the deep tivities taking place in the agricultural/forestry, small forest areas, then transport it to urban marketplaces. business and extraction (mining) sectors. In the east- In some cases the meat is smoked (to preserve it) pri- ern regions of the DRC, a number of informal sec- or to transportation. However, the trade was allegedly tor activities have been linked to, or shaped by the subject to numerous informal fees, which results in Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 35 the relatively high cost of the meat in the urban mar- tools) to mine for valuable minerals. Small-scale min- ketplace. For example, bush meat sold in Kinshasa has ing, usually takes the form of a collection of artisa- reportedly been as much as five times higher than the nal miners who either collaborate in a joint mining sum the hunters received.202 venture, or are employed by an entrepreneur. More advanced technology, compared to artisanal mining, As with most economies in the Great Lakes region, is often utilised.207 there is a significant small business component to the informal economy in the DRC. Congolese law is pro- In the DRC, artisanal miners are involved in extract- tectionist on this matter, as only indigenous Congo- ing a wide spectrum of valuable minerals, such as lese are permitted to own small businesses. However, gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt, cassiterite and coltan this was not widely enforced and non-Congolese have (with diamonds being the most popular). These min- been openly trading in marketplaces. There have been ers generally settle in camps with their dependents on alleged incidents of xenophobia as a consequence of or near the mining site, and living in conditions char- increasing levels of competition in this sector.203 acterised by abject poverty and insecurity. Many ar- tisanal miners operate on concessionary land that has Many households, particularly in urban areas, derive been allocated to large-scale mining companies. This an income for running market stalls, however, the effectively means that such mining are activities ille- majority of consumer goods that are sold in market- gal, and that the livelihood of these subsistence min- places, including agricultural produce, are imported ers are tenuous. In mining camps women who do not from other countries. Given the considerable costs as- sociated with importing goods in the formal sector, engage in digging often generate an income through there was consequently a vibrant informal trade be- the transportation, washing, sorting, grading of min- tween the DRC and it neighbours. For example, the erals, as well as trading in consumable goods, tools DRC was the second largest destination for Ugandan and materials. Some have established restaurants, informal sector imports in 2009 and 2010.204 while others have entered the sex trade.208 Artisanal and small-scale mining are arguably the According to the DRC Mine Law (2002): small-scale most important components of the informal econo- mining permits and “diggers� cards should be made my in the DRC. The reason for this is that low-level available; and artisanal mining zones should be es- mining was estimated to provide direct and indirect tablished. Nonetheless, the implementation of this livelihood support to 10 million people in the DRC, legislation has been feeble, and there was consensus with women and children reported to constitute 20% that the legal protection afforded to informal sector and 40% of the artisanal miners was woefully inadequate. Only a minority of Artisanal and mining community re- miners secured “diggers� cards, as the annual cost of small-scale mining spectively. This sector is US$25 and time required to respond to the bureau- cratic requirements were perceived to be excessive. are the most important often considered to be the In addition, the DRC government has not been able “backbone of the trading components of the economy in the DRC�.205 consistently protect the concession rights provided informal economy in As with the informal tim- for in the permits and cards. The DRC government, the DRC. ber sector, output from the has however, had some success in providing technical informal mining sector support through the Small-Scale and Artisanal Min- was substantially higher than the output from the for- ing Extension Service (SAESSCAM).209 mal (large-scale, commercial) sector, especially in the eastern provinces, were large-scale mining operations Due to poor infrastructure in most mining areas, there are yet to gain momentum. It is estimated that artisa- have been numerous reports of miners being exploit- nal mining accounted for 90% of mineral production ed and fleeced by government officials, intermediar- in the DRC.206 ies (négociants), militias/armed groups, soldiers and criminal organisations that have preferential access to Artisanal (subsistence) miners are typically individu- transport networks. In many cases, miners have only als that are not legally employed by mining compa- been paid a fraction of the market value of the miner- nies, and who use low technology (often merely hand als they mined. The relationship with the négociants is 36 however complex, as these incendiaries often provide with other armed groups. In 2007, a rebel group, the the capital to artisanal miners.210 Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), reactivated the armed conflict in the eastern DRC. In the case of armed groups, the UN Security Council The violence was restrained through a peace accord in Group of Experts estimated in 2010 that the Forces 2009, with it being agreed that the bulk of the CNDP Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), forces, as well as some militia groups, would be in- one of the main rebels groups in the eastern DRC, corporated into the Congolese armed forces. How- generated 75% of its revenues from illegally taxing ever, despite this, certain areas in the eastern DRC artisanal gold miners. Other armed groups have re- remained unstable, with a mishmash of armed/militia portedly attacked and pillaged mining areas, and/or groups remaining active. employed middlemen to extract resources from min- ers. Elements within the government armed forces, Consequently, it has been no surprise that the DDR the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du process that has unfolded in the DRC has arguably Congo (FARDC), have been linked to the illicit min- been the most complex and multi-faceted programme eral trade as a result of their occupation of strategic ever implemented in mining areas. Evidence also exists of informal sec- Africa. It was comprised The DDR process that tor miners being subject to human rights abuses by of, among other ele- ments, a national pro- unfolded in the DRC has members of the armed forces. For example, in Sep- tember 2010, DRC President Joseph Kabila publicly gramme; programmes been the most complex condemned the Mafioso activities by some members to disarm and repatriate and multi-faceted of the armed forces, and the Minister of Mines re- foreign combatants and ferred to “the manifest involvement of certain local, their dependants; pro- programme ever provincial, and national authorities, both civilian and cesses for special needs implemented in Africa. military, in the illegal exploitation and illicit trade of groups (such as wom- mineral substances�.211 en, disabled ex-combatants and children); and proj- ects to disarm members of militia groups and reinte- 5.6 DDR programming grate them into civilian life. There was also a specific DDR programme for Ituri, which was located within The DRC was the stage for multi-state armed conflicts the national DDR programme. The World Bank and in the mid to late-1990s involving militaries from the UN, predominantly through the Multi-Country various states, as well as an assortment of rebel/mi- Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), litia groups. The first phase of the armed conflict was were the main facilitators of the DDR process in the initiated by a rebellion in the eastern DRC, backed by DRC, along with the DRC government. Rwanda and Uganda. The rebellion was in response to repression by the Mobutu regime of certain ethnic DDR was further complicated by two other devel- groups, as well as to the threat posed by Rwandese opments. Firstly, security sector reform, a necessity rebels (associated with the 1994 Rwandan genocide) brought about by peace accords, which paved the who were operating in the area. The rebellion suc- way for the formation of a new national army and the ceeded, and Mobutu was forced into exile. In 1998 an- Structure Militaire d’Intégration (SMI). The SMI was other rebellion in the eastern DRC was ignited, again the process by which the armed components of most supported by Rwanda and Uganda. Other Africa of the significant armed groups would be incorporat- states then entered the fray, namely: Angola, Burundi, ed into the FARDC. Secondly, stabilisation initiatives, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe. and particularly those dealing with the various armed groups and their access to mineral resources.212 Peace was secured through the Lusaka Ceasefire Ac- cords (1999), and was later consolidated with the In- The DRC was the most significant component of the ter-Congolese Dialogue (2002) and the deployment of MDRP, with 50% of the entire budget being devoted to a UN peacekeeping mission. Post-conflict democratic DDR-related projects in this country. The final report elections were held in 2006, with Joseph Kabila being of the MDRP also revealed that the DRC segment ac- elected president. However, Hutu rebels, the FDLR counted for 36% of all demobilised beneficiaries; 41% continued to operate from the eastern DRC, along and 22% of reinsertion and reintegration beneficiaries Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 37 respectively; and four out of the five special projects ing the FARDC or undergoing DDR. The following for child soldiers were implemented in the DRC.213 armed groups (and their combatants) were identified for integration into the FARDC: Forces Armées Con- In December 2003, the DRC government established golaises (FAC) (former DRC government military); an interdepartmental committee, the Comité inter- Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ); the three RCD factions, ministériel chargé de la conception et de l’orientation MLC; Mai-Mai; and a number of other armed groups. en matière de DDR (CI-DDR) to oversee the National The first step of the SMI was that all combatants were Program of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rein- assembled at FARDC-run centres de regroupement tegration (PNDDR) (adopted May 2004). The Com- and then transferred to centres d’orientation, which mission Nationale de la Démobilisation et Réinsertion were administered by CONADER, where combatants (CONADER), with the support of UNDP, became the were required to select integration in FARDC or de- entity responsible for implementing the PNDDR. Re- mobilisation.218 grouping Centres were set-up to implement the disar- mament targets, while Integration and Training Cen- In response to the teething problems associated with tres were established for reintegration purposes.214 the operationalisation of the national DDR pro- The DDR process in the DRC however, faced similar gramme, an emergency initiative, the Désarmement challenges to other African DDR processes, which et Réinsertion Communautaire (DCR) was created. included a lack of capacity, inefficiency, mismanage- It sought to disarm and pacify those armed groups ment, institutional rivalries and alleged corruption.215 that were not party to ceasefire/peace accords, and were considered to be a considerable destabilis- MONUC played a key role in the DDR programme, assisting with the implementation of the national pro- ing force. The actions of armed groups were acutely gramme, and focused almost exclusively on disarma- problematic in Ituri, and consequently the focus of ment. The main focus, however, was the dismantling the DRC programme was in that region.219 The DCR and disarming of foreign armed groups, particularly contributed to the demobilisation of 15,811 combat- the FDLR, which was pursued via the UN Disarma- ants (which included 4,525 children). However, the ment, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration reintegration support was described as “chaotic�, and Resettlement (DDRRR) programme. “half-hearted� and “problematic� due to prolonged implementation delays.220 DDRRR interventions often included armed peace- keepers, which provided protection and security to The national DRC DDR programme sought to pro- those combatants that were voluntarily seeking to vide ex-combatants with assistance to facilitate their abscond from an armed transition to civilian life, which included ‘safety tran- sition allowances’, and reintegration support. Various In 2009, 102,014 group. The reason for this donor governments provided considerable financial is that such combatants former combatants may have been violently and technical support, with a total of US$ 272 mil- had received both assaulted or killed by their lion being made available for DDR processes through the MDRP.221 Ex-combatants that underwent demo- demobilization and fellow fighters if their ef- bilisation received an initial payment of US$ 110 (for desert reinsertion support in forts toproved the armed group unsuccess- transport, food and other expenses), and thereafter a the DRC. ful. Following surrender monthly allowance of US$ 25 for a year. to MONUSCO, the former A variety of socio-economic support was made avail- combatants were transported to the transit centres in able to ex-combatants through non-governmental or- Uvira, Bukavu, Beni, Dungu, and Goma, where they were provided with clothing and food. After three ganisations (NGOs), international organisations and days these individuals were repatriated to their coun- UN agencies, such as the International Labour Office tries of origin where they received reinsertion and (ILO), the FAO and Caritas. Targeted programmes for reintegration support.217 female ex-combatants and children were also offered. Reintegration training was provided in a variety of The SMI was established in 2004, and was linked to the fields, including, but not limited to, agriculture, fish- DDR system through national legislation, with com- ing, sewing/tailoring, woodwork, bricklaying, driv- batants being provided with the option of either join- ing, and metal work.222 38 The MDRP concluded all its activities in the greater mixed, but generally there have been positive devel- Great Lakes region 2009. At this time, 102,014 former opments. The vast majority of former combatants, combatants had received both demobilisation and re- despite the socio-economic and security challenges in insertion support in the DRC, and 52,172 had received the Eastern DRC, have been able to pursue economi- reintegration support.223 The TDRP, financed by the cally productive livelihoods. In the town of Bunia the African Development Bank and a range of donor gov- most popular economic activity for ex-combatants ernments, has provided follow-up DDR assistance. appeared to be motorcycle taxi driving, with most motorcycle taxi drivers being ex-combatants. Outside In July 2010, UN Security Council Resolution 1925 of the urban centre, thousands generate an income as (2010) extended the UN operation in the DRC, with artisanal miners, mostly working gold concessions MONUC being re-labelled the UN Stabilisation Mis- held by industrial mining companies.226 sion in the DRC (MONUSCO). The resolution also reaffirmed the UN objective of DDR with respect to 5.7.1 Motorcycle taxis in Bunia Congolese armed groups, and the DDRRR of foreign There is one motorcycle taxi association in Ituri, armed groups, particularly the FDLR, Allied Demo- called the Association des Chauffeurs du Congo/ cratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Moto-Ituri. There are however several hundred other Uganda (ADF-NALU), the Lord’s Resistance Army motorcycle taxi drivers in Bunia that were not mem- (LRA) and Forces nationales de libération (FNL).224 bers of the association. The association began as an independent organi- sation, but became Motorcyle taxi driving is MONUSCO in cooperation with FARDC has made steady progress in its DDRRR efforts, despite the affiliated to the na- appealing because it requires complexities and insurmountable odds confronted tional association in the various interventions, particularly the history 2005. The association no academic qualification of poor governance and ongoing violence and ac- claimed 2,475 mem- nor any workplace skills tivities of armed groups in the eastern provinces. bers in Bunia town, except driving and courage. However, further achievements have been stymied which has an esti- by domestic political dynamics. For example, in De- mated population of 330,000. Members pay a US$ 20 cember 2010 the UN Peace-building Fund allocated joining fee, and then US$ 5 per year thereafter. 90% of funds for the DDR of some 4,000 members of Con- the members are under 30, and in excess of 90% were golese armed groups, but this programme was sus- ex-combatants. The association included ex-combat- pended by the DRC government, and consequently ants from all the Ituri militias, as well as a number of did not materialise.225 deserters from the FARDC. According to the presi- dent and vice-president of the association, Between 2002 and mid-2011, the DDRRR section of the UN mission in the DRC repatriated more than “In our association, everyone’s objective is 25,000 foreign ex-combatants (58% of total repatri- to earn a living. So we are not fighting each ated) and their dependants, and destroyed 1,435 arms other. You see how that helps us mentally? and 46,006 rounds of ammunition. Rwanda was the Some of our members were colonels, or ma- destination of 80% of the total repatriated group. A jors in the armed groups. But they are leaving strategic success was the facilitation of the demobili- behind their dreams of that, and are working sation and repatriation of some FDLR officers, includ- to make a living…� 227 ing FDLR liaison officers from North and South Kivu, which reportedly interrupted the recruitment, logisti- According to ex-combatants, part of the appeal of mo- cal support, and illicit trading by the armed group. torcycle taxi driving was that it requires no academic qualifications, nor any workplace skills except driv- 5.7 Reintegration and the informal ing, and ‘courage’. Few ex-combatants in Ituri attained academic qualifications, and consequently struggled sector: Ituri to secure government or formal sector employment, In the eastern DRC territory of Ituri, the reintegra- where these qualifications are required. Another as- tion of former combatants into civilian life has been pect of the appeal was: Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 39 “It is à la mode. Young women think you have to pay US$ 74 for insurance and US$ 85 for a vehicle good money if you drive a taxi, so we always licence each year.229 have girlfriends.�228 Despite the popularity of motorcycle taxis among There were three types of taxi driver: those who work ex-combatants in Bunia, the involvement of inter- for themselves; those who work for others; and those national agencies distributing DDRRR kits in this who work temporarily (by contract). The association and related activities was negligible. The UNDP gave reckoned that among its members, half own their own motorcycles to a small number of ex-combatants, as motorcycles, 30% work for the motorcycle owners, did a local NGO called the Fédération des Mamans and the balance work by contract. Owning a motor- de l’Ituri. These interventions encountered problems, cycle was the most profitable of the three options, and however, because the motorcycles were not donated to those who do not own their own bikes are reported to individuals, but to groups of ex-combatants, resulting aspire to do so. Those driving for others must remit- in disputes between the members about who was en- ted all their earnings to the motorcycle owners for the titled to use the motorcycles. As a result, before long, Monday to Friday trade, and were only permitted to the groups disbanded and the motorcycles passed to retain Saturday’s takings. individual owners.230 Due to the popularity of motor- cycles among ex-combatants in Bunia, there has been Virtually all the drivers drove Chinese motorcycles, considerable demand for motorcycle mechanics. A which at the time of research retailed for US$ 600. number of ex-combatants indicated that they would These models were considerably cheaper than the Jap- have chosen a mechanics had it been available as one anese motorcycles available for purchase, but drivers of the reintegration support options. readily conceded that the Chinese motorcycles, when subjected to Bunia’s poor roads, and those of the sur- 5.7.2 Mining rounding areas, and persistent over-loading, generally only lasted up to eight months. Drivers preferred the Ituri is rich in gold, and gold mines have been in op- Chinese bikes nonetheless because of their allegedly eration in the area since the early twentieth century. superior carrying capacity, which meant they were Ituri’s gold mines were nationalised during the presi- more profitable to drivers despite their short lifespan. dency of Mobutu Sese Seko, and the Office des mines Although inexpensive compared to Japanese bikes, the d’or de Kilo Moto (OKIMO) established. Like other cost of Chinese bikes far exceeded the amount given nationalised mines during the Mobutu era, poor man- to ex-combatants for their demobilisation packages, agement, and the excessive theft, which resulted in and it appeared that very few, if any, ex-combatants chronic under-investment, beleaguered OKIMO. As used the packages to purchase motorcycles. gold output fell, and OKIMO’s ability to generate em- ployment declined, artisanal gold mining increased, There seemed to be a strong association between mo- with output typically sold by diggers to négociants, torcycle taxi drivers and artisanal miners in Ituri. The who consolidated the material and then re-sold it. main reason, according to miners and taxi drivers was Most of the gold was then smuggled across the DRC’s that ex-combatants dominated both economic activi- eastern borders, usually to Uganda and Kenya, and ties. Additionally, artisanal miners used motorcycle from there to Dubai. taxis to travel between Mongbwalu and other digging sites to Bunia and back, and often invest their profits Mobutu’s government authorised artisanal gold min- in motorcycles. ing in Ituri in 1982. By the turn of the century, in- dustrial gold production had ceased entirely in Ituri, Like most Congolese entrepreneurs, Bunia’s motor- while artisanal gold mining had become entrenched, cycle taxi drivers considered themselves to be exces- employing tens of thousands of people as diggers and sively taxed, though it seems they actually pay a lower crushers, and a smaller number as négociants and proportion of their income than most economically traders. International mining companies entered into active residents of the town. According to represen- joint ventures with OKIMO to revive the Kilo Moto tatives of the motorcycle taxi association, operators gold mines in the early 2000s, and have since carried must pay a US$ 6 tax to the mairie and a US$ 20 fee to out extensive exploration, but none have yet started the province annually. In addition, they were required large-scale production. 40 The strong presence of ex-combatants among the arti- AODERPI and NGO rep- Most ex-combatants sanal miners of Ituri was extensively documented in a resentatives also concurred 2009 study, conducted by Channel Research. The study that most ex-combatants that turned to mining found that while some ex-combatant artisanal miners had taken up artisanal min- after the fighting, had been miners before the Ituri conflict, the major- ing had not disarmed, even attracted by its ‘high ity turned to mining after the fighting, attracted by though many had surren- its ‘high risk and high return’ profile, which mirrored dered weapons in order to risk, high return’ their military experience. The study further found receive demobilisation kits. profile. that ex-combatant miners from different militia and This consequently posed a different ethnic groups worked together on mining risk to industrial mining companies, who were plan- sites side-by-side without conflict. Importantly, the ning to evict artisanal miners from their concessions, study also concluded that roughly half of all demobil- in preparation for industrial development.237 ised ex-combatants in Ituri were artisanal miners.232 Interviews confirmed the main findings of the Chan- In late 2010, OKIMO gave permission for its nel Research report. According to one NGO worker, gold tailings at Galayi, about 50 kilometres who works with ex-combatants in Mongbwalu: from Mongbwalu, to be exploited by artisanal diggers. Despite poor transport connections “Most of the demobilised in Mongbwalu are between Mongbwalu and Galyai, and no mo- artisanal miners.�233 bile phone reception at the site, within only a few months hundreds of artisanal diggers had According to the Mongbwalu representatives of the settled in Galayi. A small town emerged in the Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et forest clearing, complete with bars, shops and la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri (AODERPI): brothels. By March 2011, there were, however, “There are so many of us demobilised fighters no schools or clinics. The site was controlled in the mines. There is no other work for us by CECOKI, which presented itself as a cul- to do.�234 tural association, though its detractors have claimed it is a front for the business interests AODERPI and NGO representatives working with of powerful politicians and military com- artisanal miners agreed that members of different mi- manders.238 According to a CECOKI repre- litia mined side by side without conflict. According to sentative, more than half of the residents are AODERPI: ex-combatants.�239 “We have members all the militias in our as- There were eleven négociants in Galayi, who buy the sociation. UPC, FNI, PUSIC…but that is gold the diggers produce, which was then subjected to over. We have reconciled. Our hate was ma- a 30% tax by CECOKI. According to Mapa Majo, the nipulated. I don’t think we will fight again. president of the Galayi négociants: Some people have tried to stir us up, but they failed.�235 “I buy about 30 grams of gold a day. So far, I have had no security problems. There is no There was concurrence among AODERPI representa- banditry. The military are invested in the pits tives and NGO workers that it was unfortunate that here. That is why they do not bother us… there had been no DDR kits for artisanal mining. Ac- None of the négociants here in Galayi are ex- cording to one NGO worker: combatants. I don’t know why, but that is how it is.�240 “Because most of the demobilised round here are diggers, I proposed that the demobilisa- There are reported to be between 60 and 70 gold négo- tion kit system be adapted to this truth. It ciants in Mongbwalu. Very few of them, it seems, are would have been a very good idea if there had ex-combatants: been a kit for diggers. That would be adapted to the reality here. Instead, everyone round “I have been a négociant here in Mongbwalu here just sells their kits. None of these miners for 17 years. I am not an ex-combatant, and want bicycles…�236 neither are most of the négociants here. There Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 41 are some though… I buy from the small né- persed manner into the province, and arguably has gociants, since I am a big négociant. I then sell had a positive impact. For example, the kits that were to the OKIMO comptoir here, or in Butembo. sold were subsequently bought by others presumably Sometimes I sell in Bunia. I also have a pit better placed to make use of them. That said, the kits at Pili Pili241 where I have 346 ex-combatants have been at their most effective when used by their working for me. I don’t care which militia recipients to start or re-start successful businesses, ca- they used to be in.�242 pable of generating incomes over not just the short but also the medium term. According to Dziju Malozi As in Monbwalu, there are a few ex-combatants among Jacqueline of the Fédération des Mamans de l’Ituri, a the gold négociants of Bunia, though the majority are Bunia-based NGO founded in 2001, that has worked not, according to the Association des Négociants d’Or with large numbers of ex-combatants, and particu- – Ituri (ANORI): larly women: “There are 45 négociants, big and small, in our association. ANORI was created two years “Fewer women ex-combatants then men sold ago, after the wars here, to regroup négociants their kits. In my view, this is because the main in a peaceful way, so that diggers can sell gold responsibility for keeping households going peacefully, regardless of their tribe. We have falls on women, so they have had more mo- also disseminated the mining code, to per- tivation to keep the materials that were given suade négociants to sell legally. It is thanks to them, and to make good use of them.�244 ANORI that there are now two gold buying Ms. Malozi complained that ex-combatant women comptoirs in Bunia, though it is true that not had been unfairly discriminated against in the DDR all our members sell all their material to them. process, and had consequently received fewer demo- The problem is that the comptoirs’ prices are bilisation kits then they should have: too low, and taxes are too high. This encour- ages smuggling.�243 “The circumstances of women ex-combatants were not taken into account properly during 5.7.3 Economic impact of DDR kits the process. To get the demobilisation pack- A range of Ituri’s recipients of DDR kits were inter- age you needed to surrender a weapon. But viewed, including people who received kits for bread women ex-combatants often did not have baking, tailoring, shop keeping, fishing and hairdress- weapons. Where they had weapons, often ing. Interviews were also conducted with government their commanders took them off them, so officials, and representatives of UN and non-govern- they were unable to present a weapon at the mental organisations responsible for distributing DDR demobilisation camps. And others did not kits. There were – unsurprisingly - marked differences have weapons to start with, since they were in performance among performing other tasks, such as carrying mes- DDR kits best succeeded the interviewees. Some of sages, providing sex, and cooking. Another when recipients were the businesses were flour- issue was that with some women who did ishing. Others showed receive kits, their husbands or their families reentering professions signs that they might be stole them.�245 they conducted before sustainable. Other busi- they were combatants. nesses were stagnating The most common complaint about the kits, voiced and the remainder had by nearly all interviewees, was that they were insuffi- either already failed or had never been initiated, with cient, providing too little money and equipment. NGO the equipment sold to cover the recipients’ day-to-day representatives also voiced frustrations that the kits expenses. they had distributed were inadequate, though some acknowledged that had the kits been more generous, Nonetheless, the DDR kits have added up to a sig- the resentment of non-ex-combatants, most of whom nificant recapitalisation of the Ituri economy. Money, had suffered greatly during the war at the hands of the livestock, seeds, foods and equipment (from the kits) very fighters apparently being rewarded for their vio- was injected into the local economy in a widely dis- lence, would have been far greater. A common theme 42 among interviewees was that DDR kits had best suc- “We pay so many taxes. You would be amazed. ceeded when recipients were re-entering professions The FARDC takes two kilograms of fish from they had conducted before they were combatants. Ex- each of our boats, every day. That is illegal, amples are outlined below: but what can we do? Then we pay $25 per year tax on our motor, another US$ 25 on Besica-Duku Tchekedis was the president of Encad- our boat, and then there is the tax we pay to rement des Jeunes pour le Développement de la Pêche the collectivité. We pay another tax on our (EJDP), an association of 25 fishermen in Kasenyi, on fish. And another one for our fishing permit. the western shore of Lake Albert. The EJDP’s mem- Then there is the provincial tax, and a hygiene bership included ex-combatants from several Ituri tax… This is why we are not progressing. We militia, but there have, reportedly, been no tensions pay so much tax.�249 or conflict between the ex-combatants. Tchekedis re- ported that the EJDP had received a boat with an out- 5.7.4 Crime board motor, a fridge and a generator from the UNDP, The lack of disarmament among Ituri ex-combatants, and its members had used their own kits to purchase and the high rate of economic insecurity in the ter- a net and a motorcycle. The EJDP is a successful busi- ritory, would appear to be a perfect recipe for armed ness, which according to Tchekedis was because: criminality. Encouragingly, however, this does not ap- “We were all fishermen before and know what pear to be the case. According to Bideko Murhabazi we are doing. Fishing is not an easy business, Juvenal, the Bunia police chief: and many of the ex-combatants who chose it “When I arrived here 16 months ago, armed had no experience in it before. They have all crime was a serious problem. After 6pm, no failed, while we have succeeded.�246 one was moving and there was always shoot- ing at night. There were ten armed robberies According to representatives of the FAO in Bunia, a night. Now it’s more like one every three it had been the same experience with recipients of months… Much of this criminality was com- farming DDR kits, with those who were farmers be- ing from ex-combatants, though there was fore the conflict proving more likely to succeed and also involvement of the FARDC and even make use of their kits then those who were not. Ac- police officers. But in collaboration with MO- cess to land for farmers, however, proved to be a con- NUSCO, we have controlled the situation, straining factor.247 largely through extensive patrolling, and at Similarly, obstacles affecting the fate of donor-assist- this stage I would say Bunia is the most se- ed fishing projects for ex-combatants on Lake Albert cure town in eastern DRC, particularly when included: poor road infrastructure between the lake compared to Goma…. I will not pretend and Bunia; no electricity in the lakeside settlements there is no banditry. The criminals have been (caused by destruction of power lines during the pe- weakened but not defeated, and they have not riod of armed conflict; and looting of replacement surrendered their arms. They still use their power lines after it); and increasingly problematic weapons, but to threaten, not to shoot. These days you hardly hear any shooting.�250 over-fishing in the lake, including in the fish breeding grounds.248 Other interviewees confirmed the police chief ’s the- sis, noting that armed criminality had greatly declined Very few of those interviewed for this study made since 2009. There was a similar situation in Mongbwa- any use of banking services, though there appears to lu, where AODERPI representatives reported: be considerable latent demand for them. In addition, there were numerous references to the lack of avail- “People do fight sometimes but they don’t use ability of affordable credit. Related to this, a common arms for their fights. We don’t have a problem complaint among DDR kit recipients was that exces- of armed criminality. In Bunia we hear that sive taxation was damaging their business prospects. there is this problem, but not here in Mong- According to Tchekedis of the EJDP in Kasenyi: bwalu.�251 Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 43 5.8 Reintegration and informal sector: This financial support enabled ACDK to buy fishing nets and a pirogue (canoe), which they used to fish South Kivu on Lake Tanganyika. They would fish overnight and In the South Kivu province, as with other provinces sell the bulk of their catch at the port of Kalimabenge in the eastern DRC, thousands of ex-combatants have (Uvira) the following morning. A small portion of been demobilised since the late-1990s in successive the catch was reserved for family consumption, and waves of DDR interventions. The majority of these was shared equally among the families.253 individuals have reintegrated into civilian society, al- beit precariously, with many pursuing livelihoods in With the savings made from fish sales, the ACDK the pervasive informal sector. Examples of ex-com- purchased an additional pirogue, lamps (used for batant income-generating activities included: small attracting fish at night), and nets. ACDK also diversi- market businesses; fishing cooperatives; cross-border fied its activities, and from January 2011 the members trading; agriculture; cattle rearing; artisanal mining; divided themselves into three categories: eight focus- and transport. A significant number of marginalised ing on fishing; 15 on crop farming; and five livestock younger ex-combatants were, however vulnerable to rearing. However, the cost of renting agricultural recruitment by armed groups. land was prohibitive to ACDK, and they subsequent- ly only undertook small-scale ‘kitchen’ (subsistence) Most ex-combatants, in pursuit of economic oppor- farming. At the time of this research, ACDK had 34 tunities settled in the urban centres of Bukavu and members (eight of which were not former combat- Uvira, or in mining areas. In towns, former combat- ants), of whom four were women and 30 men. ACDK’s ants often congregated and set-up homes in the same daily fish sales were on average between US$30 and neighbourhoods. In Uvira, for example, the suburbs US$ 40.254 (quartiers) of Kilibula and Kalundu received a fairly large number of demobilised ex-combatants and their The ACDK also opened a bank account with a co- dependents.252 In mining areas ex-combatants, lived operative credit society in Kalundu, the Coopéra- in squalid conditions. tive d’Epargne et de Crédit (COOPEC), into which they deposited their savings. The advantage was that 5.8.1 Cooperatives and small businesses COOPEC administered a micro credit facility that ACDK members could access on relatively favourable Some ex-combatants used their DDR kits to enhance terms. The savings account also came handy during their income generating potential, while others sold the Saison Ndenga time of a year when the moon is the disposable components of the kits to invest in too bright to effectively fish at night. Consequently, business ventures or for short-term consumption. A fish catches are substantially reduced, with ACDK reintegration development has been that in some lo- barely being able to acquire sufficient fish for their cations, former combatants, for a variety of reasons, own subsistence.255 established businesses and self-help cooperatives with individuals who did not have a military back- Ex-combatants in South Kivu have also sought to ground. Limited assistance through the official DDR generate income through small businesses, with mechanisms was available to some ex-combatants, varying degrees of success. Most ACDK members, but was only supplementary in nature. Examples of for example, established their own small businesses some relatively successful business and cooperative through the loans accessed from COOPEC. The busi- venues are outlined below. nesses included the selling of petrol on the roadside (commonly referred to as ‘le Quadaffi’), welding, mo- Former combatants established the Action Commu- torcycle transportation and kiosks. Others generated nautaire pour le Développement de Kalundu (ACDK) an income as dockworkers and porters. Two specific in Uvira in 2008. They subsequently approached individual examples include: several potential donors for financial and/or mate- rial support and eventually received support from • Mokili wa Bongo travelled to Bujumbura every CONADER, now the Uniteé Nationale pour le dés- Saturday to buy fuel so that he could resell it in armement, la démobilisation et la réintégration (UEP- Uvira for a profit. Mokili hired a motorcycle for NDDR), through Caritas, an international NGO. US$ 20 and then transported two 20-litre con- 44 tainers of petrol from the Burundian capital. He 17 non ex-combatants in 2009 to form a self-help made a profit of between US$ 35 and US$ 50 per group called L’Action Communautaire pour le Dével- 20-litre container.256 257 oppement Agro-pastorale de Kiliba (ACDAKI). Ac- cording to Munyereza Alimasi, the chairperson of • Mafikiri ya Nzoni, accessed a loan from COO- ACDAKI, the creation of the group was motivated PEC, and set up a kiosk in Uvira. He used the bi- by the successes of the ACDK. ACDAKI approached cycle he received as part of the reinsertion kit for Caritas for support in the form of training and start- transporting merchandise to his kiosk. He made up capital.261 Caritas provided training on agriculture, a profit of between US$ 30 and US$ 40 USD per including livestock keeping, after which it leased three month.258 acres of land in the Plains of Ruzizi to ACDAKI for a In Luvungi, Paul Mukeba, a former combatant, who, once-off single harvest period as a start-up package. after being demobilised in 2005, established a small The group grew maize, cabbages and beans, and gen- kiosk with a US$ 60 loan from his sister (who was erated US$ 3,280 in income from the first harvest.262 employed as a tailor in Bukavu at the time) and sold Another example of small business dynamics in South cigarettes and beans. In 2007, he set up a second hand Kivu included: Lualua Josue, who was demobilised in clothing business with Issa Kagera, a non-combatant Kitona in 2006 and used his reintegration package for neighbour in which they would buy clothing in Bu- short-term consumption, borrowed US$ 80 from his jumbura and then resell it in Luvungi at a profit.259 brother (who made a living baking bricks near Bu- The rationale for the joint venture was that Mukeba kavu) in 2007, to start a sugarcane business. He then did not have the necessary identity document to cross the border into Burundi (due to his previous com- used the proceeds from his sugarcane enterprise to batant status). Kagera on the other hand was able to purchase a kiosk in Panzi location. He reportedly travel to Bujumbura legally. make a profit of between US$ 120 – 150 a month.263 In 2008 two newly demobilised ex-combatants joined However, the small business sector has been con- them in their business venue with contributions of strained by excessive bureaucracy and taxation. For the US$ 310 (which was part of the reintegration sup- example, female business owners have reported that port), and kit provided by Caritas. Thereafter, a Cari- they have been required to pay as many as 24 different tas agricultural extension officer encouraged the four taxes/fees to a variety of government officials and mil- businessmen to create a self-help group that would itary personnel, from those responsible for overseeing open up their business to investments from more ex- local markets to the Administrateur du Territoire.264 combatants (including non ex-combatants). The mo- The owners of businesses were taxed on their business tivation was that this would in turn enable them to income as well as their net profit. Small informal busi- diversify into other areas such as cattle rearing. nesses were required to pay a site tax. Other taxes are levied at a variety of levels of government. There have The entrepreneurs consequently established a self-help also been numerous allegations of corruption associ- group called l’Initiative Locale pour le Développement ated with the system of taxation.265 de Luvungi (ILDELU). With a collective saving of US$ 1,500, the four bought three cows, and the remain- 5.8.2 Transport businesses ing US$ 620 was reinvested in the trading business. As with other towns in the eastern DRC, the motor- The agreement under ILDELU was that heifers pro- cycle taxi sector in the urban centres of South Kivu duced by the cows would be shared between the mem- is relatively vibrant, with similar characteristics to the bers of ILDELU, while the breeding cows remained motorcycle taxi enterprises in Ituri province. A num- the property of the association. At the time of this in- ber of ex-combatants, particularly young men, have terview, ILDELU had a total of eleven members, with derived an income from this trade. The experience of seven having received their share of heifers. The asso- an ACDK member in this regard provides some in- ciation also had a stock of second hand clothes, beans, sightful information. corn and cassava estimated at US$ 3,400.260 Byamungu Kambaza benefitted from a COOPEC loan In Kiliba location, 22 ex-combatants teamed up with of US$ 600 and purchased a second-hand motorcycle, Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 45 which he subsequently used as a taxi to ferry people ing actively mined (mainly in the Kahuzi-Biega Na- between Uvira and Baraka. In the dry season Kam- tional Park, and in the area south of Fizi), by artisa- baza undertakes a return trip from Uvira to Baraka nal miners. In addition, some of the main comptoirs, every day, a total distance of approximately 180km, the trading houses that buy, sell and export minerals in which he transports both passengers and cargo. He mined in the eastern Congo, are based in Bukavu. A charged between US$ 10 and US$ 20 per trip depend- significant number of former combatants have pur- ing on the size of cargo and the number of passengers. sued a livelihood from mining, and their role in this Passengers sharing the motorbike paid less compared sector has been diverse. The FDLR and armed groups to single passengers. In a week Kambaza made a profit in the mining areas have exploited some former com- of between US$ 60 and US$ 80. According to Kam- batants, while others have been fortunate to avoid the baza, predatory activities of these groups. However, some ex-combatants have been implicated in human rights “The biggest threat to my business is the am- abuses and illegally taxing other miners.269 bushes that armed groups such as the Mai Mai Yokutumba stage along the Baraka-Uvira Some ex-combatants have generated income from road. Two weeks ago armed men attacked trafficking of minerals. As was the case with Claude Lupofu, a motorcyclist friend of mine and Bulukwa and two friends who opted for demobilisa- took away his bike and the passenger’s goods. tion when the CNDP rebel group integrated into the The mama and Lupofu were left to trek from FARDC. According to Bulukwa: Vitobola where the attack took place, to Lwe- ba…I always fear for myself, but I cannot “Life of a demobilised soldier is the most diffi- abandon the job, as it is my only means of cult thing here. We can hardly get employment survival. Twice, armed rebels have intercept- and therefore we have to fend for ourselves ed me. The first time by two people whom in any way possible. The easiest way out has I thought were FNL elements from Rokoko been to revive our contacts with our friends swamp and another time by a group of Yoku- who were reintegrated into FARDC, and who tumba rebels.�266 are deployed in mining locations [Shabunda, Mwenga and Walungu territories]. This way, To discourage ambushes, Kambaza and three other they channel the minerals through us to the motorcycle taxi drivers made their trips in convoy. markets in Bukavu, Uvira and Bujumbura… Unlike Kambaza who owned his motorcycle, his three However, the danger is that often we get in- colleagues were renting theirs from a local business- tercepted by armed groups such as FDLR and man. The agreement was that the drivers could retain Mai Mai and have to part with the entire ‘tola’ all proceeds over-and-above the US$ 40 rental cost (pack of minerals, notably gold).270 per day and fuel costs.267 Ex-combatants have also been involved in water 5.9 Reintegration and the informal transportation. For example, in Mboko town, which sector: North Kivu is located in Tanganyika District, on the shores of The economic environment in North Kivu is similar Lake Tanganyika, ex-combatants have been operat- to those in South Kivu, with some of the dimensions ing boats to transport timber, minerals and other being more pronounced, particularly the linkages be- goods to Rumonge (Burundi) on the other side of the tween demobilised ex-combatants, the mineral trade lake. One such ex-combatant business was comprised and criminality. Similar to the other provinces in the of eight Mai Mai former ex-combatants who volun- eastern DRC, ex-combatant livelihood decisions were tarily demobilised when their group joined FARDC. informed by the omnipresence and activities of armed The group owned two canoes (one of which was mo- groups and the Congolese military. torised).268 It appeared that younger former rebel/militia mem- 5.8.3 Mineral sector bers were more vulnerable to being recruited into The mineral trade is a key component of the South armed groups and/or engaging in criminal activities. Kivu economy, with coltan, cassiterite and gold be- Such endeavours included: smuggling of gold; armed 46 robbery; drug trafficking; and gunrunning. Those for- between US$ 10 and US$ 15, of which Tumaini would mer combatants with families/dependents opted for be paid an average of US$ 5 a day. Through saving, more legitimate and stable livelihood options, mainly Tumaini was able to invest in other trading endeav- operating small businesses (such as retail, fishing, ours and purchase additional transport and construction) and engaging in cross- equipment, steadily expand- Younger former border trading. Those ex-combatants without the ing his business. At the time rebel members are skills, networks and start-up capital for small busi- of the research he owned five chukudus of which he leased more vulnerable to nesses typically opted for livelihood options such as artisanal mining, subsistence agriculture and casual out four (at US$ 20 each per engaging in criminal labour. month) and operated the fifth activities. himself. His monthly income Some ex-combatants used the training and resources reportedly ranged between US$ 100 and US$120. acquired from the DDR process to generate income in the civilian economy. Nonetheless, a number of Kambamba Makenga, an ex-FRF (Forces républicaines former rebel/militia group members utilised the skills fédéralistes) combatant used the approximately two acquired (some of which were unsavoury), and per- kilograms of gold he had amassed from the mines sonal networks that they had developed whilst oper- in Shabunda whilst a member of the armed group to ating as combatants, for livelihood purposes. These finance a vieti (second-hand clothing) business. At individuals typically deserted from the various armed the start he bought bags of used clothing from whole- groups, and did not receive any significant reinser- salers and hawked them around Goma until he se- tion/reintegration support. Below are examples of the cured a trading space on a street corner. According livelihood options that have been pursued by a variety to Makenga: of former combatants. “Since I got this location in February 2010, There were three key observations from the research I have built confidence in my customers be- relating to ex-combatant livelihoods. Firstly, many ex- cause they know they can always find me here combatants engaged in a variety of income-generat- as opposed to when I used to roam around. ing activities in order survive. Secondly, a number of In a week I get to sell between three to five entrepreneurial ex-combatants with meagre resources bags, which earns me a profit of about US$ started modest businesses, which they subsequently 50 week…I have two friends who handle the expanded with savings and/or including partners/ [three] chukudus…and they go out to look for investors. Thirdly, livelihood success for most ex- businesses around those hardware stores and combatants was primarily determined by individual nearby market places…These chukudus are persistence and perseverance. The examples below a lifesaver; unlike motorcycles and bicycles, provide a micro-analysis of the livelihood choices they cost almost nothing to maintain, and and consequences for some ex-combatants in North don’t require petrol to run. If I make more Kivu. money I will buy more of them.� 5.9.1 Small businesses and cross border trading Maisha Bora, an ex-combatant from FDLR received six months of carpentry training at Tumaini centre273 The village of Kibumba is close to the border with as part of a DDR package. After graduating Maisha Rwanda and is located on the slopes of the volcanic worked for nine months as a carpenter in Mabanga Mt Nyiragongo. However, Kibumba has perennial wa- suburb of Goma, where he earned between US$ 30 ter scarcity due to the difficulty in drilling boreholes and US$ 50 a month. However, according to him: through the multiple layers of lava that have formed as a result of frequent eruptions. Some ex-combatants “When I got married I was compelled to look in the area established businesses to address the de- for alternatives, as the earnings from carpen- mand for water. For example, Tumaini Hamisi, an ex- try could not make my ends meet. I almost combatant271 entered into business partnership with went back to the bush although dangerous, a friend to transport water from the Rwandan side of life was easier there with a gun. One day an the border to Kibumba on his chukudu272. According old friend with whom we served in the war, to Tumaini, the pair would generate a daily income informed me of his flourishing gold business. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 47 He bought gold from old friends in Walikale then sold the loot onto senior FARDC commanders. and sold it in Rutshuru�. Katamba and his colleagues also trafficked in can- nabis for soldiers and armed groups. According to Bora subsequently used the US$ 150 he had saved Katamba: from carpentry, and accompanied a fellow former combatant on two occasions to buy gold in Walikale. “Soldiers exchange cannabis for ammunition From the two trips (made mostly at night), he gener- and minerals with rebels, who occupy mines ated US$ 2,500. He discontinued his involvement in and possess plantations of cannabis in the the gold trade after his colleague was shot and killed. high plateaux, deep in the forest. Everyone in Thereafter Bora bought a motorcycle in January 2011 the trade abides by the same rules, and be- at a cost of US$ 1,550 to use as a taxi. He then provid- trayal is often met with death�. ed a taxi service along Rutshuru-Ishasa road (despite the activities of the FLDR rebels in the Virunga Na- Katamba spent eight months with the armed gang, tional Park), carrying two or three passengers a trip, until one of the gang members killed a motorcyclist who was childhood friend of Katamba’s. According to for which he charged US$ 5 per passenger. According Katamba: to Bora: “If some form of economic support had been “In January [2011] when I bought the moteur availed to me when I quit the rebel life, I could [motorcycle] I used to make between US$ 20 never have joined that murderous gang. Be- and US$ 30 per day after subtracting fuel costs, sides, people in my village know about my but now there are too many moteurs, making former affiliation with the armed groups and the competition too stiff. Also, accidents are therefore treat me with a lot of fear…I had too many, which makes me fear all the time. I to struggle within my own means to get this now make between US$ 15 and US$ 25 a day, chukudu in order to quit that criminal life. Al- which I still find better than carpentry and though what I earn is pittance compared to less risky than gold smuggling…� life with a gun, I am much more at ease, and From the profits generated out of the motorcycle able to support my wife and child�. transport, he opened a quadaffi (petrol) selling point 5.9.3 Construction and fishing outside his house in Rutshuru town in March 2011, which his wife was managing, as well as selling cell Jacques Kaembe, also a Tumaini graduate established phone vouchers. The quaddaffi business generated a his own masonry business as he was unable to secure weekly profit of approximately US$ 25. He indicated employment with construction companies. At the time that these earnings provided him with the resources of the research he was employing five other masons to pay school fees for his two children and meet the and in July 2011 they secured contracts to construct daily living expenses. two maisonettes. For Kaembe, it takes an individual ex-combatant’s own initiative to break the legacy of 5.9.2 Armed crime the war and embark on economic progress. Katamba Bisheko, an ex-combatant, was operating Bahati Kahimbi and two ex-combatant colleagues sus- a small trading business (with a chukudu) in Masisi tained themselves by fishing on Lake Kivu after leav- territory at the time of the research. Prior to this he ing the CNDP rebel group in 2009. They established a had served as a major in the FDLR and then surren- commercial fishing venture called the Kawaida Group, dered to MONUC. He was then transferred to Centre which is comprised of eight fishermen. They fished at d’appuis aux jeunes démobilisés (Centre for Demobil- night and then sold their catch to restaurants and ho- ised Youth), where he was provided with clothing. At tels, and generated a daily average income of between the Centre he was promised reintegration training, US$ 120 and US$ 160. According to Kahimbi: but this did not materialise, and Bisheko subsequently returned to his home village. Bisheko claimed there “This is a skill that we acquired during the were little in the way of economic opportunities in the war. We used to go fishing to supplement our village, so he and two other ex-combatants formed an food in the bush…We used to hijack civilian armed gang. The gang targeted gold smugglers and canoes including their catch…� 48 6 South Sudan 6.1 Level of human development relatively insignificant, very little agricultural produce and livestock being geared for export. In essence, In 2010, Sudan was ranked 154th out of a total of 169 South Sudan was a net importer of goods.276 Be- countries in terms of HDI. South Sudan achieved in- tween 2005 and 2010 there was a dramatic expansion dependence from Sudan in mid-2011, and therefore of most urban economies in was not included as a separate country entry in the South Sudan, particularly Juba. The South Sudanese HDI rankings. South Sudan has historically been one Conversely, the size of the ur- economy is entirely of the most underdeveloped regions within Sudan, ban poor has also increased. and hence it is conceivable that South Sudan would The reason for this is that the dependent on oil. have a lower HDI ranking than the entire Sudan. formal economy has grown to meet the demands of the international donor/aid/NGO277 community and 6.2 Economic overview national government. Foreign businesses (mainly The South Sudanese economy is entirely dependent from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia) have largely met on oil, with on average 98.7% of total government rev- the demands of this sector, but most of the profits are enue having been derived from oil since 2005. In 2008 not invested in South Sudan. It is important to note oil revenue increased three-fold from the previous that no more than 10% of the South Sudanese derive year due to Southern Sudan’s enhanced autonomy, an income from formal sector employment.278 then declined by 38% in 2009 due to the global finan- For South Sudan the key demographic, social and cial crisis, and then increased by 37% in 2010. Only economic indicators in 2010 were as follows:279 one-tenth of a percent of revenue is generated from personal income taxation.274 Agriculture is the main • The total population was estimated to be 8.26 economic activity, but mainly takes place in “small, million people. hand-cultivated units often farmed by women-head- ed households�. Sorghum is the main cultivated crop, • Half of the population was below the age of 18, with maize, cassava, sesame, millet, groundnuts and with 72% under the age of 30. a number of other crops also being farmed. Howev- • Less than a third of the adult population was liter- er, agricultural production is insufficient for domes- ate, with the literacy rate for males being 40% and tic consumption, and the FAO estimated that there 16% for females. would be close to a 300,000 ton deficit of cereal crops in 2011.275 • 83% of the population resided in rural areas, with the average number of members in a private Due to the historical economic marginalisation of household being seven. Southern Sudan by the North, and decades of armed conflict, trade in South Sudan has been highly lo- • 79% of urban household owned their own hous- calised and predominantly sourced from Kenya and ing, with 96% ownership amongst rural house- Uganda. In addition, the manufacturing sector was Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 49 Table 5: Human Development Indicators Sudan Indicator South Sudan Health Expenditure on health, public (% of GDP) 1.3 Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births) 109 Life expectancy at birth (years) 58.9 Education Adult literacy rate (both sexes) (% aged 15 and above) 60.9 Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (both sexes) (%) 39.9 Expenditure on education (% of GDP) (%) 8.5 Internet users (per 100 people) 10.2 Mean years of schooling (of adults) (years) 2.9 Expected Years of schooling (of children) (years) 4.4 Income GDP per capita (2008 PPP US$) 2,300 GNI per capita (2008 PPP US$) LN 7.6 Household final consumption expenditure per capita PPP 1,024 (constant 2005 international $) Inequality Inequality-adjusted education index .. Inequality-adjusted income index .. Inequality-adjusted HDI value .. Poverty Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3) .. Intensity of deprivation .. MPI: Headcount (k greater than or equal to 3), population in poverty .. (% of population) Gender Maternal mortality ratio (deaths of women per 100,000 live births) 450 Population with at least secondary education, female/male ratio 0.702 Gender Inequality Index, value 0.708 Gender Inequality Index (updated) 0.73 Composite indices Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3) .. HDI value 0.379 Gender Inequality Index, value 0.708 Inequality-adjusted HDI value .. Source: UNDP, http://www.hdr.undp.org 50 Figure 6: Human Development Index Trends: Sudan. 1980-2010 Source UNDP, http://www.hdr.undp.org holds, most homesteads be- Figure 7: South Sudan 2011 budget ing constructed of wood. • 53% of the working popu- lation were unpaid fam- Share of expenditure ily workers, with 12% being paid employees. Accountability Economic functions • GDP was 30 billion Suda- nese Pounds (equivalent to Education US$ 13 billion). Health Infrastructure • Average consumption in Natural resources & rural dev urban areas was SDG 168 Public admin per person per month (of Rule of law which 69% is on food) com- Security pared to SDG 88 per person Social & humanitarian affairs per month in rural areas (of States (block transfer) which 79% was on food). • 10% of the population had access to electricity (of which Source: Government of Southern Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 9.6% were in urban areas). Approved budget 2011 As with other post-conflict econ- Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 51 omies, a disproportionate share of the annual govern- Assembly), infrastructure (particularly transport and ment budget has consistently been allocated to the se- roads), and the allocation of funds to the States (coun- curity sector since the signing of the Comprehensive ties). Close to 80% of the budget was for salary and Peace Agreement (CPA). The rationale for the prior- operating costs, with the remaining 20% assigned to itisation of security spending was to “develop an effi- capital expenditure.282 Figure 7 provides a graphical cient and effective armed forces, to safeguard security depiction of the manner in which the South Sudanese and implement the CPA�.280 Between 2006 and 2008, budget was disbursed for the 2011 financial year. more than a third of the total budget was allocated to security, with an average 36% being allotted to the 6.3 Livelihoods support Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) alone. The In South Sudan 79% of rural households were reli- lion’s share of the funds was used for salaries. Secu- ant on subsistence crop farming, and 6% on animal rity spending was also prioritised by donor agencies, husbandry as their main livelihood source. However, receiving the third highest portion of aid after health most households combined crop cultivation and live- and infrastructure.281 stock ownership in order to survive. In urban areas the foremost type of livelihood support for households In 2011, just over a quarter of the total budget was were wages/salaries (44%), followed by crop farming earmarked for security, which included the Demining (22%) and small business enterprises (12%), most of Authority (0.006% of the budget), the DDR Commis- which operated in the informal sector.283 sion (0.04% of the budget) and the SPLA and Veterans Affairs (27.7% of the budget). Despite the drop in the As figure 8 indicates, the annual cereal crop output percentage of the security share in the budget, SPLA from subsistence agriculture has varied between 2004 costs have actually increased by 33.6% compared to and 2009, but FAO data reveals that on average crop 2005. The change in percentage share is due to the in- production increased by 50% for the six years after crease in oil revenues. Other spending priorities in- the CPA (2005-2010) compared to the 2000-2005 cluded public administration (the majority of funds period (when there were active armed conflicts). going to the Office of the President and the Legislative More than 95% of agricultural production is rain-fed, which makes South Sudan Figure 8: Livelihood indicators: Cereal crops, cattle and food production vulnerable to formal businesses drought.284 Cattle are widely regarded as 14000 wealth in South Sudan, and 12000 are linked to social status, as in many other parts of Africa. 10000 As detailed in figure 8, cattle Cereal crops ownership has increased sig- 8000 Cattle nificantly (by a third) since 6000 Businesses 2004. In 2010 it was estimat- ed that there were 11.8 mil- 4000 lion cattle in South Sudan. In addition to the cattle, there 2000 were 14 million goats and 0 12.6 million sheep. If the to- 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 tal livestock population were evenly distributed amongst all Source: Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, South Sudanese households Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010, Juba, 2011 there would be 19 animals per Note: cereal crops (tons) and cattle figures in thousands; actual figures for business presented. household.285 Nonetheless, as with agricultural production, 52 Table 6: Formal sector business type and activity in South Sudan Businesses by type of activity (urban areas) Number % Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Mining, Quarrying, Electricity, Gas, Steam and 10 0.1 Air-conditioning Supply Manufacturing 199 2.7 Water Supply, Sewage, Waste Management and other services 7 0.1 Construction 89 1.2 Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle 5116 69.8 Transportation and Storage 45 0.6 Accommodation and Food Service 1037 14.1 Information and Communication 97 1.3 Financial and Insurance Activities 52 0.7 Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 46 0.6 Administrative and support service activities 10 0.1 Education 31 0.4 Human Health and Social Service activities 361 4.9 Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 22 0.3 Other Service Activities 211 2.9 Total 7333 100 Source: Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010, Juba, 2011 livestock are vulnerable to drought (as it affects the 6.4 Constraints and barriers to the availability of grazing) as well as to disease. formal economy By the end of 2010 there were a total of 7,333 regis- Establishing a formal sector business, or converting tered (formal sector) businesses in urban areas. Prior an informal one into a formal sector business in South to 2005 there were very few formal businesses in exis- Sudan is challenging, especially as the costs and mea- tence, and a business registry was only created in 2006. sures for setting up and As depicted in figure 8 over the past five years there registering a business are Juba is the second most was more than 2000% increase in the number of reg- excessive. It takes 11 pro- expensive commercial istered businesses being established in South Sudan. cedures, and could cost on In 2010, more than a third (37%) of businesses are lo- average SDG 6,801 (US$ capital in the world in 3,077), which equates to which to establish a cated in Juba, with 15%, 12% and 7% being in located in the smaller urban centres of Wau and Malakal and 250.2% of income per formal business. Rumbek respectively. capita. This made Juba Table 6 provides more detail on the business types and the second most expensive commercial capital in the activities in South Sudan, with majority being in the world in which to establish a formal sector business. wholesale, retail and vehicle repair trade (more than Registering private property was also problematic, as two-thirds), followed by accommodation and food it took on average seven procedures, 18 days and cost service. Accurate data on the number of type of in- 14.7% of the property value.286 formal sector businesses was unavailable, but anec- Most communities have traditional rights to the land dotal evidence has suggested that there has also been on which they reside. In many cases community mem- growth in the size and diversity of the informal sector bers are entitled to transfer these rights, however, cus- since the signing of the CPA and an increase in ur- tomary law governs such transfers, and typically accu- banisation. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 53 Table 7: Indicators of barriers to formal sector business in South Sudan is slower and more expensive than the development Juba sub-Saharan average.290 Sub-Saharan Procedure Juba rank In terms road transport, there are numerous check- average rank points, which in most cases required fees or tolls to Ease of doing business 159 137 be paid. On average there are four checkpoints per Starting a business 123 126 100km along major trade routes, while on northerly Registering property 124 121 trade routes there are between six and seven check- points per 100km. Fees paid on internal routes can Getting credit 176 120 be as much as 15% of the value of goods transported, Protecting investors 173 113 with close to 50% of the payments being un-receipt- Paying taxes 84 116 ed. Across all routes, waiting time was on average in Trading across borders 181 136 excess of two hours per 100km, or 65% of driving time.291 These trade constraints have contributed to Enforcing contracts 74 118 the increased costs of imports and exports in South Resolving insolvency 183 128 Sudan, which not only has negative implications for livelihoods, but has also stymied post-conflict con- rate records of such transactions are not maintained. struction efforts due to the high cost of construction Consequently, community members were not in a materials.292 position to use land as surety to access credit through financial institutions to either invest in agriculture or The nature of taxation in South Sudan has also con- business.287 tributed to the slow materialization of the formal sector. The CPA and the Interim Constitution (post- In addition, South Sudan is “heavily under banked�,288 2005) provided the legal basis for three-level gov- with only 42 banking service outlets in South Sudan ernment taxation, namely: Government of National and 76 microfinance institutions in 2010. Close to half Unity; Government of Southern Sudan; and States/ of both institutions were located in Central Equato- Regions. The implementation of this system became ria County, which includes the city of Juba. Only 1% “uncoordinated and un-harmonized…rates are levied of households in South on an ad hoc basis…unauthorised revenue collection There are four to seven Sudan had a bank ac- is rampant.�293 Other constraints included: inadequate checkpoints per 100 km count. Obtaining credit protection for investors; the deficient enforcement of on average along major in South Sudan was ex- contracts and the difficulties involved in closing busi- with trade routes. ceedingly difficult,credit only short-term nesses. on offer (three to six months) and relatively high in- Table 7 provides rankings of how Juba compares to terest rates being levied. Approximately 10% of loans 183 economies in terms of business regulation, based were provided to small and medium sized businesses. on data from the World Bank/International Finance The microfinance sector was small and only provides Corporation’s ‘Doing Business’ project. The table re- services to 5% of the clients in Juba.289 veals that in most categories, Juba is below the Sub- Saharan average, which is considerable more restric- The economy is severely constrained by trade restric- tive than many economies in Asia, Europe and North tions and high associated costs. Most consumer goods America. Consequently, most South Sudanese busi- are imported into South Sudan, and are transported nesses are relatively small and operate in the informal through the country by road, river or air, with du- sector. ties being levied on imports. For example, if a busi- nessperson based in Juba uses Mombasa (Kenya) to import a standardised container of goods 11 official 6.5 Urban informal sector documents will be required; it will take 60 days to re- As indicated above, the majority of people living in ceive the goods; and it will cost US$ 9,420. Exports South Sudan’s urban areas interacted with the infor- require nine official documents; take 52 days; and will mal sector, including informal businesses, in order to cost US$ 5,025. In short, the import/export of goods survive. Most economically active people generated an 54 Table 8: Livelihood activities and average wage rates Livelihood activity Wage rate/profit Firewood collection Small bundle SDG 5–7 (US$ 2–2.50) Big bundle SDG 20–25 (US$ 7–9) Charcoal-burning SDG 30-35 (US$ 11-13) per bag SDG 350-450 (US$ 130-165) per truck load Stone breaking (One truck-load is equivalent to approximately seven tonnes or 1-2 weeks of labour) Making bricks SDG 30 (US$ 11) for 500 bricks SDG 20 (US$ 7) per day Smearing houses (or approximately SDG 200 for 2 rooms) Washing clothes SDG 1 per piece (or approximately SDG 50 (US $18) for 3 days’ work) Washing dishes SDG 10 (US$ 3.50) per day SDG 10 to 20 SDG (US$ 3.50–7) per bag Charcoal retail (Bags bought from charcoal-burners and sold at markets) Food retail, tea-making and baking SDG 10–30 (US$ 3.50–$11) per day Vegetables SDG 5–10 (US$ 2–3.50) per day Alcohol brewing SDG 10–15 (US$ 3.50–$5.50) per day income through a variety of strategies. A 2010 study in July 2010).295 On average, ‘boda-boda’ drivers could undertaken by the United States Agency for Inter- earn between SDG 30–60 (US$ 11–US$ 22) per day, national Development (USAID) identified the main after fuel and motorcycle rental costs have been de- means of income generation in the informal sector in ducted.296 In recent years ‘boda-boda’ drivers have Juba as being: laundry services; bread making/sell- been frequently accused by the authorities of being ing; selling of soft drinks; market stalls; grass collec- responsible for traffic accidents in Juba, which led to tion; charcoal making/selling; artisanal quarrying and increases in regulation, as well as alleged harassment stone crushing; beer making/selling; domestic help; by the traffic police.297 and casual labour in hotels and markets.294 In market places a wide selection of items are on sale, including Relationships exist between types of income gen- prepared food, vegetables, beverages, hardware and eration and gender. In very general terms, women household items, cooking utensils, electronic goods typically engaged in marketplace activities, such as and cell phone vouchers. It is nonetheless important preparing and selling food and beverages, collecting to note that formal sector unemployment in urban ar- grass, collecting/selling firewood and doing laundry. eas remains relatively high. Men were often involved in charcoal making, jobs re- lating to construction, and driving ‘boda-bodas’. As in Operating a ‘boda-boda’ (motorcycle taxi) was a many other developing countries, some women have popular means to generate an income for young, become the ‘bread winners’ for their families, either able-bodied urban men, some of which served in the because the household was female-headed, or their SPLA. ‘Boda-bodas’ are an essential component of husbands/partners were unemployed, or did not gen- the post-war informal urban transport system, fer- erate a stable, regular income.298 rying workers between their homes, places of work and marketplaces (with an average fare being in the Minimum earnings from market stalls, which involved region of US$ 2). However, the industry was largely the selling of food, drinks and other consumables, unregulated, other than drivers requiring a licence were between SDG 5 and SDG 30 per day, while the from the government to operate (which was SDG 30 wages for casual labour in the markets were around Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 55 SDG 5 per day. See table 8 for further details on wag- process and to create an enabling environment to es/profits from informal sector work. In comparison, undertake the activities related to human security, wages/salaries in the formal sector were on a par with reconstruction and development�. The specific objec- market stallholders (also known as the ‘table trade’), tives of the plan were as follows:303 with police and prison personnel monthly remu- neration being approximately SDG 350. Drivers and • Reintegrating the targeted groups psychologi- guards earned around SDG 400–500 per month.299 cally, socially, politically and economically into civil society Most households spent their income on food, school • Enhancement of peaceful coexistence among fees, and medicine, with the costs of all three report- various groups of ex-combatants and their com- ed to be increasing annually, largely due to increases munities through psychological demobilisation in transportation and tariffs/taxes.300 For example in 2010, a crude assessment of the average food costs • Empowering ex-combatants to economically for people of living in informal settles were as fol- compete and to rely on themselves lows: 1kg of meat=SDG 12; 1l cooking oil=SDG 4; 1kg maize=SDG 4; 4 tomatoes=SDG 2; 200l of Nile • Supporting special needs groups (women and water=SDG 5; live chicken=SDG 50; live goat=SDG children associated with armed groups, disabled 180; and a live sheep= SDG200.301 and elderly) • Reducing and controlling small arms to create a 6.6 DDR programming peaceful environment and to enforce the rule of In January 2005, following two decades of civil war in law Sudan, the CPA was concluded between, and signed by, the main conflicting parties, namely the Sudanese • Sensitisation of the targeted groups and host com- People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Gov- munities on issues related to HIV/AIDS, peace ernment of Sudan. The CPA allowed for the establish- building and healing. ment of an interim constitution, which was the legal A number of target groups were identified in the plan, basis on which the Government of Southern Sudan namely: voluntary demobilised combatants from the (GOSS) was established and granted a high degree of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA; ex- autonomy. The Agreement also made provision for a combatants identified as a result of downsizing as en- referendum on the independence of Southern Sudan. visioned in the CPA; disabled and elderly combatants from the SAF and the SPLA; child combatants and In terms of the CPA, the Government of Sudan and the children associated with armed forces and groups; and SPLM agreed to proportional reductions in the size of women associated with armed forces and groups.304 their armed forces, with DDR programming being the key implementation instrument. International donors The National DDR Coordination Council was allocat- and agencies were tasked with financing the DDR ed the responsibility of policy formulation, oversight, process, but the specific DDR objectives, orientation review coordination and evaluation. Two DDR com- and strategies were unspecified.302 Following discus- missions, in Northern and Southern Sudan, were also sions and negotiations between the Sudanese Peoples’ created to facilitate the implementation of the Strate- Liberation Army (SPLA) and international donors, a gic Plan, through the design and execution of DDR DDR target figure of 90,000 was determined. How- processes and activities within their respective ter- ever, this figure was based on loose estimates of the ritories. Both of these commissions were comprised personnel size of the SPLA, as no accurate member of a number of State (provincial) Offices, which were record existed at the time. responsible for implementing DDR activities at the State (provincial) level. After the finalisation of the CPA a National DDR Co- ordination Council and an Interim DDR Programme The UN, especially the UN Mission in Sudan (UN- were established, under whose auspices a National MIS), the UNDP, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as DDR Strategic Plan (2007) was compiled. The funda- well as international organisations, a range of donor mental aim of the plan was “to consolidate the peace agencies and non-governmental organisations pro- 56 vided financial and technical support.305 The UN, for the military organisation. The SPLA subsequently its part, taking into consideration the requirements of adopted a decentralised approach to the Master List the UN IDDRS, sought to synchronize and implement with individuals being nominated at the State level by its DDR activities via an Integrated DDR Unit. senior SPLA officials. However, there appeared to have been a lack of suitable checks and balances within the The main rationale for the Interim DDR Programme, SPLA to verify the reliability of the information on the according to the National DDR Strategic Plan, was to Master List.308 In addition, systems to independently “address the vulnerable groups normally left out in and effectively authenticate the credibility of the Mas- the DDR process and to lay the groundwork for sub- ter List did not materialise. Given these challenges, sequent development and implementation of a multi- the Master List was replaced by a less formal ‘names year DDR program.� This Programme, however, did list’. not progress beyond conceptualising, strategizing and planning, and was dogged by the complexities UN financial (through donor governments) and tech- and challenges of implanting a DDR programme in nical investment in the DDR processes was forthcom- a large, grossly under-resourced country. This state ing, with the bulk of the of affairs was exacerbated by the fragility of the peace reintegration workload Following the agreement and considerable institutional rivalries be- either being undertaken independence in July tween the main DDR stakeholders. by UNMIS or subcon- tracted to ‘implementing 2011, the South Sudan The Interim DDR Programme was subsequently re- partners’, namely the In- DDR Commission was placed by the Multi-Year DDR programme in June ternational Organisation 2009, which was predominantly geared to DDR im- for Migration (IOM), tasked with expediting plementation. With the benefit of hindsight, many FAO, Deutsche Gesell- the process of DDR. DDR specialists lamented the lost opportunities of schaft für Internationale the 2005-2009 period, as the delayed implementation Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Bangladesh Rehabili- of the DDR programming was arguably to haunt the tation Assistance Committee (BRAC). Further sub- effectiveness of post-conflict peace building in South contracting to non-governmental organisations and Sudan.306 the private sector also took place. UNICEF took the lead in facilitating DDR in relation to children. The Multi-Year DDR programme was to be under- pinned by a Master List of 90,000 individuals identi- The Southern Sudan DDR Commission achieved fied to undergo DDR. The SPLA became entirely re- full autonomy from the National DDR Coordina- sponsible for compiling the Master List, which was to tion Council, and with South Sudan’s independence be ultimately linked to a reduction in the salary com- in July 2011. The Southern Sudan Disarmament, De- ponent of the SPLA budget. Consequently, the SPLA mobilization and Reintegration Commission Act was became the key power broker within the revived DDR finalised in 2011, which renamed the Commission the process. The UN, which was responsible for sourcing Republic of South Sudan Demobilisation, Disarma- and disbursing funding for DDR activities, as well as ment, and Reintegration Commission (RSSDDRC), providing technical support, initially endorsed this and stipulated its post-independence mandate as “to arrangement, as it coincided with a central principle provide for the establishment and governance of an of the UN IDDRS, namely that DDR processes should independent Commission to expedite the process of be ‘nationally-owed’.307 disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants into other regular forces, and other A combination of political and security consider- civilian institutions and society, and certain issues re- ations led to this arrangement: the GOSS, which was lated thereto�. concerned about the possibility of renewed military action from the North in the post-CPA period, and Conventional DDR programming was pursued in the existence of tensions in the border areas, delegated both North and South Sudan. In South Sudan, those the responsibility of the Master List to the SPLA. This identified by the SPLA for DDR were required to re- decision was arguably taken to minimise the possibil- port to demobilisation sites, where they would be reg- ity of institutional insecurity and low morale within istered as beneficiaries. They were required to hand-in Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 57 firearms and ammunition (if in their possession) and training options, with the main categories being: agri- undergo medical and/or disability screenings. These culture production and livestock rearing; small busi- individuals were also required to attend information ness and entrepreneurship; vocational training; and sessions on reintegration, and thereafter select a re- education.311 Approximately 80% of the reintegration integration option. For these individuals, demobilisa- beneficiaries chose the small business and agricul- tion equated to being discharged from the SPLA, as ture/livestock options. In addition to the individual they were issued discharge certificates.309 reintegration options, projects were established, and support provided, in those communities that would DDR in South Sudan was divided into two phases, receive demobilised individuals. Examples included with 36,641 individuals from the special needs group women and youth empowerment initiatives.312 (SNG) being earmarked to participate in phase I, and 53,400 SPLA personnel in phase II. Close to 1,000 By the end of the disarmament and demobilisation women associated with armed forces were also identi- components of phase I of the Multi-Year Programme fied to receive DDR benefits. A key drawback of the (April 2011), 12,525 of the targeted 90,000 individu- DDR process was that, by the time the practical DDR als had received disarmament and demobilisation processes were implemented, close to three years had support. In addition, 12,282 had received counsel- past since the conclusion of the CPA, and a significant ling; 9,575 were registered with DDR implementing number of the targeted DDR beneficiaries had already partners; 5,033 had completed formal DDR training; self-demobilised and returned to their home commu- and 4,459 received material DDR packages.313 The nities. These individuals were subsequently recalled by completion of the reintegration component of phase the SPLA to report to demobilisation sites / assembly I was scheduled for December 2011.314 areas in order to undergo DDR. Significant numbers did not report for disarmament and demobilisation 6.7 Reintegration dynamics registration, and numerous others who applied for DDR benefits were deemed to be ineligible. The under-performance of the DDR process in South Sudan is undeniable and has been widely criticised. In Phase I of the reintegration strategy took an indi- September 2011 the Small Arms Survey Sudan Hu- vidualistic approach to reintegration, and focused man Security Baseline Assessment released a report on the reintegration of SNG. According to the 2008 claiming: “by any criteria, phase 1 can be judged as GOSS and SSDDRC Strategy Document, by the end having largely failed…[and that] the programme had of the reintegration process, each ex-combatant was no discernible impact on human security in South supposed to receive a package worth US$ 1,750 with Sudan.�315 No detailed assessment or substantial evi- USD 1,500 being sourced from international donors dence was, however, provided to validate such a bold and US$ 250 coming from the GOSS.310 The budget deduction. Other critiques have been more nuanced, for reintegration in both North Sudan and South Su- and the STHLM Policy Group, for example, in its dan was USD 105 million. evaluation of the DDR process in December 2010, concluded that the DDR process was: After demobilisation, discharged individuals received a reinsertion package, which was comprised of a selec- “More of an expensive livelihoods support tion of the following: clothing, food rations (sorghum, program for a limited group of people than beans, oil and salt), soap, cash (SGD 860), mosquito a relevant contribution to peace and stability nets and a variety of other items. These packages were in southern Sudan…[and] that the DDR has a transitional arrangement to provide stopgap liveli- not been effective in terms of contributing to hood support for beneficiaries and their dependents the reduction of military capability, military for the period between the end of demobilisation and expenditure, nor to confidence building mea- the initiation of reintegration support. sures.�316 Reintegration programming took the form of train- It is important to note that the outcome of the DDR ing, with subsequent material support and technical process in South Sudan was fundamentally shaped advice being provided. The implementing partners and curtailed by dynamics within the SPLA, and the (mentioned above) initiated a variety of reintegration relations between the SPLA, UN agencies responsible 58 for supporting DDR, implementing partners and the the Commission increasingly found itself restricted to DDR Commission in South Sudan. Security consider- coordination, donor liaison and public relations roles. ations could also not be discounted. The South Sudan Since 2009, the majority of its activities have involved: government, particularly the SPLA, concerned about the hosting information and sensitization workshops; armed conflicts in the border regions, and antici- strategy, stakeholder and donor meetings and con- pating the strong possibility of military action from ferences; research; presiding over DDR ceremonies; Khartoum, did not actively prioritise DDR. In short, distribution of public education material; and press the DDR process in South Sudan was undertaken in conferences.319 an acute environment of adversity. The STHLM Policy Group further suggested that: Relations between the Commission and the SPLA, as well as between the UN and the Commission were “The CPA, which is de facto a ceasefire, was consequently strained an insufficient basis for an actual process of on occasion.320 For ex- The outcome of the demobilisation of active-duty combatants… ample, an acrimonious [and that] there is quite a strong feeling disagreement between DDR process in among many of the older SPLA members that the Commission and South Sudan was the current design of the DDR does not pro- UNDP over the manage- fundamentally shaped vide them and the people they fought side- ment of the DDR pro- by-side with, sufficient support.�317 cess, and the manner in by dynamics within which financial resourc- the SPLA. Given the abovementioned considerations, the SPLA, es were allocated (and from a military perspective, earmarked its least valu- associated transparency) was widely reported in the able members for DDR. This group included certain Sudanese print and electronic media.321 At the time, disabled and wounded members, as well as women the Chairperson of the Southern Sudan DDR Com- and children, and became more widely referred to mission, William Deng Deng, was reported as saying: as the SNG. There were also indications that SNG “There has been no boss [of the DDR process]. Who individuals were chiefly drawn from militia/armed is the boss? Is it the UNDP? Is it the donors? Is it the groups who had previously been integrated into the government of South Sudan? It must be the govern- SPLA, whose loyalty to the SPLA was unclear, many ment of South Sudan because this is a government of which were not directly benefiting from SPLA sal- project�.322 Added to this, the SSDDRC was of the ary payouts. SPLA members identified as ‘War Veter- view that a number of donor agencies that provided ans and Wounded Heroes and Heroines’, which were financial support to the demilitarisation process were widely respected within the SPLA, were not targeted at times inconsistent in terms of prioritising DDR for DDR. support.323 For the beneficiaries of DDR support, the The effectiveness of UN DDR work was also seem- Swahili proverb, ‘when elephants fight, the grass gets ingly undermined by alleged inter-agency rivalries hurt’ appeared to have had some resonance. and tensions; not only within Juba; but also between Juba and Khartoum; as well as between UNMIS and 6.8 Informal sector and the impact of UN Headquarters in New York. The UN also kept a reintegration support tight rein on the financial resources allocated for DDR 6.8.1 Overview in South Sudan, which provided UN agencies with considerable leverage in determining the type, con- A 2010 study commissioned by the World Bank, Af- tent and manner of support provided as well as the rican Development Bank and Southern Sudan DDR organisations and agencies that would be contracted Commission found that 80% of the 3,000 sample par- to implement the processes and activities.318 ticipants from the DDR process defined themselves as being unemployed.324 Taken at face value this finding The dominant role of the SPLA in the DDR equation, would suggest that the DDR process should be con- sanctioned by the UN and donor agencies, effectively sidered a fiasco (in line with the Small Arms Survey’s diluted the ability of the DDR Commission to fulfil conclusion). However, a more nuanced analysis of its oversight mandate. As the DDR process matured, reintegration in South Sudan indicates that there ap- Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 59 pears to be some surprisingly positive developments. use reintegration support to enhance the livelihood endeavours of former combatants. Similar to CAR and the DRC, there was the prevail- ing view among the majority of former combatants, GIZ reported in June 2011 that 64% of the benefi- that employment was synonymous with receiving a ciaries that underwent GIZ-sponsored training were monthly salary or wage. This was reinforced in two self-employed (majority) or employed. Most of self- ways. Firstly, following the CPA, SPLA members were employed DDR beneficiaries were involved in infor- provided with salaries and other benefits, although mal small businesses, selling fruit, bread, soft drinks, the regularity of payment varied. Over the past five and managing restaurants/cafes. In addition, a high- years the salaries of the lowest ranking SPLA mem- ly successful fishing cooperative, which operated bers have ranged between US$ 300 and US$ 500 per throughout the entire value chain, had been estab- month.325 Secondly, certain government officials and lished.328 These successes appeared to due to ‘oppor- senior SPLA officers, when informing the SPLA rank- tunity and partnership mapping’ being undertaken and-file of the DDR process, allegedly embellished in the areas where GIZ support was being offered; the benefits that would be provided to demobilised appropriately targeted training (small business, vo- SPLA members.326 Many were left with the impression cational activities and agriculture); a comprehensive that lucrative employment (and other remuneration) selection process of beneficiaries; and regular moni- would await those who were demobilised. toring and evaluation.329 Nonetheless, as indicated in the section on the econ- Interviews in Juba with ex-combatants and SNG in- omy of South Sudan, formal sector employment was dividuals who had been beneficiaries of SNG support extremely limited, even in government ministries and revealed that the training support had assisted them agencies. Such employment generally requires indi- in either becoming self-employed or finding em- viduals to be literate, numerative, and be conversant ployment in the informal sector. Some beneficiaries in English. These were skills that the vast majority of had even been able to establish multiple small busi- rank-and-file ex-combatants and SNG individuals did nesses.330 In some cases, ex-combatants had expanded not possess, due to decades of war, and a dysfunction- their small businesses to include other ex-combatants/ al and largely ineffective education system. SNG individuals or family members. Many ex-com- However, despite these expectations, commonly held batants indicated that they were remitting a signifi- views on employment, and a lack of education, sig- cant portion of their income to their families, includ- nificant numbers of SNG and ex-combatants were ing spouses and children, most of whom were living able to pursue civilian livelihoods in post-war South in rural areas. Some of the beneficiaries of vocational Sudan. The greatest successes were in small informal training support were working within the UN sys- businesses in urban areas, as well as in the subsistence tem on short-term contracts (six to eight months) as agriculture, predomi- carpenters, plumbers, electricians and welders. These individuals earned between SDG 40 and SDG 60 per The greatest successes nantly in rural areas. day.331 are in small informal An assessment onlythe reintegration of of 53 6.8.2 Small businesses businesses in former combatants by urban areas and in the Small Arms Survey In terms of income generation, those interviewees in 2010/2011, suggested who operated informal sector businesses in Juba’s subsistence agriculture even though many ex- main markets indicated the following: in rural areas. combatants had been able to pursue civilian • Small restaurants owners could earn a daily profit livelihoods, this had been achieved prior to reinte- of between SDG 100 and SDG 500 gration support being provided. The report therefore • Juice bar vendors could generate an approximate questioned the design and rationale of the South Su- income of SDG 100 per day dan DDR process.327 Some DDR implementing part- ners, such as GIZ and FAO, appeared to have been • Tea/coffee stalls made a profit of about SDG 60 on aware of this dynamic, and sought, where possible to market days 60 • Vegetable/fruit sellers often earned in the region enterprises: field crop production; vegetable grow- of SDG 30 pounds daily ing; ox plough; poultry; bee keeping; fisheries; small ruminants (goats). Beneficiaries were encouraged to • The tailoring business brought in an average be trained in multiple enterprises in order to have income of SDG 30 per day the option of diversified livelihood support. The most • Phone card vendors could earn up SDG 200 popular were: ox plough; field crop production; and daily. small ruminants. The livestock options were particu- larly popular due to the high cultural value attributed The majority of fresh produce (especially fruit and to these animals (particularly cattle).335 vegetables) sold in the urban markets of South Su- At the time of the interview, the FAO had undertaken dan was imported from neighbouring countries. The follow-up visits with approximately 20% of beneficia- former combatants/SNG individuals interviewed re- ries, and indicated that there had been mixed results ported that their profits were negatively affected by in terms of achieving sustainable reintegration. Some poor road infrastructure and numerous checkpoints beneficiaries had improved their standards of living (which delayed the delivery and affected the qual- through using the training and material support pro- ity of the produce), as well as transport/import taxes vided by FAO and other organisations, whilst others (which increased the cost of the produce). Insufficient had been less successful. The key determinants of suc- cold storage, business/market taxes and poor access to cess were previous experience/skills with agriculture credit were also indicated as constraints to business. and livestock, and natural inclination towards entre- DDR beneficiaries who were in vocational trades, and preneurism.336 employed by the UN, expressed concern about job in- security, given that they were only employed on short 6.8.5 Community reintegration term contracts.332 In addition to livelihood reintegration, there were in- 6.8.3 Rudimentary income-generating activities dications of some progress towards community rein- tegration. For example, an understated finding of the Former combatants without skills or entrepreneurial 2010 World Bank, African Development Bank and competencies in urban areas have had to pursue more Southern Sudan DDR Commission socio-economic rudimentary income generating options, such as the study of the reintegration ex-combatants into com- manufacture and sale of charcoal, artisanal quarrying, munities of return was that “more community lead- stone crushing, grass collection and casual labour.333 ers and individuals perceive the engagement of DDR One demobilised former SPLA soldier described the participants in community affairs as normal, rather charcoal trade as “not very profitable and requiring than low or non-existent.�337 However, the reintegra- a lot of energy�.334 Some former combatants earned a tion process to date, for all intensive purposes, is a living operating ‘boda-bodas’. prelude to a far more substantial DDR process that 6.8.4 Subsistence agriculture and animal will be launched in the latter part of 2011. The ob- husbandry jective of the new DDR phase is to disarm, demobi- lise and reintegrate 80,000 active SPLA/South Sudan In rural areas, ex-combatants and SNG individual Armed Force (SSAF) in addition to 70,000 former primarily resorted to subsistence agriculture and live- SPLA personnel that were absorbed into the South stock rearing. The FAO, as well as other implement- Sudan Police Services, the Wildlife Service and Prison ing partners, provided considerable reintegration Services and Fire Brigades from 2005. Therefore the support in this regard. The FAO provided training in total number of individuals that are targeted for DDR these sectors to 1,883 beneficiaries in the following totals 150,000.338 Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 61 62 Part III Comparative Analysis Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 63 64 7 Comparative analysis - Reintegration of former combatants and the informal economy T aking into consideration the analytical frame- dependent on the availability of assets that could be work, a comparative analysis of the key obser- provided for surety. Where ex-combatants had access vations and findings from the three case stud- to credit, as was the case with the fishing cooperative ies are outlined below. in South Kivu, businesses were expanded and operat- ing risks reduced. The inadequate availability of credit 7.1 Human development also negatively affected the agricultural sector, where farmers were restricted from developing their sub- All three case study countries were defined as having sistence crop and animal husbandry livelihoods into low human development, and were in the bottom 10% more commercial/profitable ventures. of all countries listed in the HDI, lower than the sub- Saharan HDI average since 1980. In addition, poverty Ex-combatants who required credit typically borrowed was endemic in all three countries. The implications money from family were that ex-combatants had been confronted with a members, friends and relatives – in most cases The dominance of severely limited bouquet of individual development options and livelihood choices at the time they started to start a business. Oth- the informal sector the reintegration process. The low levels of human de- ers acquired investors is perpetuated by the velopment had also informed the design of the rein- or business partners as sertion and reintegration support. a means to grow their undersized nature of the businesses. In mining commercial banking sector 7.2 Economic conditions areas, impoverished in all three countries. artisanal miners who In all three case studies, governments primarily gener- were unable to access credit were required to lease ated revenue through the export of primary commod- mining equipment from middlemen in order to gen- ities, such as oil, minerals and agricultural produce. erate income. The relationship varied from being sup- Nonetheless, only a small fraction of export earnings portive in some case to exploitative in others. were reinvested in the national economy. This left most key sectors underdeveloped, with the majority of the Dilapidated road networks and related infrastructure population sustaining themselves through low-level, restricted the ability of ex-combatants to enhance informal economic activities; most food was produced their livelihoods particularly through income genera- through subsistence agriculture. Consequently, the in- tion and agricultural production. The reason for this is formal economy eclipsed the formal economy. that in all three countries, the poor system of transport infrastructure made it exceedingly difficult for farmers The dominance of the informal sector was perpetuated to ferry their produce to urban markets, and inflated by the undersized nature of the commercial banking the cost of imported goods. Formal sector import and sector in all three countries, with very little limited export business was beyond the reach of most ex- credit being available for informal sector enterprises. combatant entrepreneurs due to the excessive cost of In some cases microcredit was available, but this was importing/exporting cargo containers. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 65 Consequently, most trading businesses were small, of fees required to be paid, but significant delays were with ex-combatants transferring their goods on their also encountered. This usually increased the price and backs, bicycles, chukudus (as in the case of North reduced the quality (in the case of fresh produce) of Kivu) or motorcycles. Conversely, this state of affairs the goods. presented profitable prospects for entrepreneurial and intrepid ex-combatants who were able to exploit a gap Areas outside of governmental control in all three case studies presented both opportunities and risks in the market by initiating transport businesses, and/ for ex-combatants. Where the ungoverned space cor- or addressing a key consumer demand that the inad- responded with mineral wealth (as in the case of the equate infrastructure created (such as the ex-combat- DRC and CAR), opportunities for significant income ant water business in North Kivu). generation through informal sector activities were en- hanced. However, such activities were usually illegal 7.3 Governance and involved a high degree of risk on the part of the A key paradox of the three post-conflict countries was ex-combatant. Violence was often a feature of such that despite being characterised by weak governance an environment, with ex-combatants being both the and underdevelopment, the economy was regulated victims (artisanal miners, gold smugglers) and perpe- by unwieldy and sluggish bureaucratic systems and trators (member of an armed group/militia, criminal processes. The World Bank has rated all three coun- gang). In addition, armed groups, militias or govern- tries as being amongst the most challenging and ment soldiers often taxed ex-combatants who were expensive globally in which to do business. In such engaged in economic activities. These militarised circumstances, as the case studies reveal, most busi- groups then used these tax revenues to reinforce and ness ventures, including those of ex-combatants, were perpetuate their control of the mineral areas. small and confined to the informal sector. That is the costs and procedures associated with transitioning a 7.4 Security business from the informal to the formal are generally Outside of key urban centres, personal security re- prohibitive. Economic growth and improvements in mained a key concern for most ex-combatants and GDP per capita, living standards and vital infrastruc- civilians alike in all three countries. Such conditions ture are consequently undermined. negatively affected ex-combatant livelihood choices, In all three case studies, a significant number of ex- particularly the investment in activities that would combatants with commercial ventures bemoaned the improve food security and living conditions, as well rate and complexity of taxation. Most often taxes had as contribute to economic growth. The reason for this to be paid to numerous levels of government, and is that rural populations were often at risk of attacks taxpayers received minimal benefits and services in and looting by militias and bandits, particularly in the return. In many instances, ex-combatant businesses CAR and the DRC. did not comply with government regulations, which At times such armed groups and militias took con- made the business owners (and their employees) vul- trol of important transport routes in areas outside of nerable to exploitative behaviour by corrupt govern- the ambit of government authority. This meant that ment officials. Ex-combatants tended to regard the tax transport-related businesses, including those run by system as excessive, and at times predatory. High rates ex-combatants, were susceptible to theft or disruption of taxation reduced the amount of available resources by such armed groups. In the mining areas, personal that ex-combatants could reinvest in or improve their security was low in most cases due to the poor and businesses. Some businesses therefore sought to avoid unsafe working conditions in the mines and the po- paying formal tax (where possible) or paid informal tential for abuse at the hands of armed factions. taxes or bribes to officials, which were typically lower than the official tax. 7.5 DDR programming and support In all three countries, most ex-combatants with cross- The manner in which ex-combatants used the reinser- border trade enterprises encountered numerous tion or reintegration material support, especially the checkpoints when ferrying goods between the source kits that were provided to them, varied. Some used and the market (consumers). Not only were a variety them directly for income generation activities, such 66 as establishing a small business or trade. A significant essential to securing sustainable livelihoods. These number sold the kits, with some using the proceeds networks tended to be comprised of other ex-combat- for short-term consumption, while others invested ants, who then pooled resources and combined their the funds in economic ventures which they felt were expertise to establish informal sector business enter- more appropriate to their personal circumstances and prises. These ex-combatant networks were also used those of the local economy. to access certain markets, as was the case of the gold trade in the eastern DRC. Some former combatants were able to use the skills they had acquired through the reinsertion/reintegra- Where opportunities existed and it was mutually ben- tion capacity-building process to directly generate an eficial, ex-combatants entered into business arrange- income. In this regard, there appeared to have been ments with individuals and networks that did not a correlation between the successful utilisation of have military backgrounds. Ex-combatants also made the DDR training and aptitude and skills of the ex- use of family/relatives networks for both borrowing combatant prior to the provision of DDR support. money and accessing employment opportunities. This was particularly the case in South Sudan and the DRC. However, a number of ex-combatants reported The manner in which the surrounding communi- that they had not received any significant reintegra- ties where ex-combatants resided and pursued live- tion support. Some former combatants employed lihood options (both urban and rural) responded to their skills and expertise acquired from conflict or the ex-combatants influenced ex-combatant liveli- prior to the conflict to generate income in the post- hood choices and the sustainability thereof. Where conflict environment. communities were accepting or indifferent towards ex-combatants, the livelihood choices appeared to There was some criticism of the DDR support, espe- be more sustainable. However, the opposite applied cially in CAR and the DRC, in that no further follow- in situations where communities were suspicious or up support was provided to address the problems encountered with reintegration activities and enter- hostile towards ex-combatants. prises, such as to counter livestock diseases. There There appeared to be a correlation between ex-com- also appeared to have been disparities in the alloca- batants livelihood choice and marital/family status. tion of DDR resources and support in terms of gen- It seemed that in most cases if a male ex-combatant der. In CAR and the DRC some female ex-combatants was married and had children then the livelihood op- alleged that they had been discriminated against (in tion was often stable and comparison to male ex-combatants) in the allocation legitimate. A similar dy- There appears to be a of DDR resources, as reintegration support was often namic existed for female correlation between linked to the possession of a firearm, which did not ex-combatants, particu- larly those who were un- ex-combatants apply to most women. Conversely, in South Sudan, fe- male ex-combatants (as well as children and disabled married and had to pro- livelihood choice and ex-combatants) were prioritised in the DDR process, primarily due to strategic considerations and the im- vide for their dependents. marital/family status. plementation approach of the DDR programme. In the case of young male ex-combatants riskier livelihood options were often In some cases reintegration support was not provided pursued, such as artisanal mining, mineral smug- for certain economic activities that were more rele- gling and the motorcycle taxi sector. Some resorted to vant for ex-combatants, such as artisanal mining and criminal activities or joined armed/militia groups. motorcycle taxis. These diluted the effectiveness of the support. Nonetheless, despite the absence of such sup- In all three countries ex-combatants often undertook port, ex-combatants were able to pursue livelihoods a variety of income generating activities in order to in these sectors. save funds and provide for themselves and their fami- lies. In some cases ex-combatants were running mul- 7.6 Personal circumstance and networks tiple small businesses, usually employing in family members to assist. The availability of personal/support networks that ex- combatants could utilise for economic purposes was In a large number of cases ex-combatants had sought Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 67 to improve their socio-economic status by changing and adapting the manner Figure 9: Categories of informal sector income generation in which they generated an income. Small  business   For example, some ex-combatants &  trading   started working in menial jobs, accu- Agriculture,   mulated savings and then invested in Smuggling   hunting  &   more profitable ventures. There was of- 5ishing   ten a positive, upward spiral process. It was frequently observed that those ex- combatants with ambition and a flare Armed  groups   Forestry/ &  crime   timber   to succeed in their economic ventures were the most successful in the process of economic reintegration. Manufacturing   Mining   7.7 Ex-combatants and types &  construction   of economic activities The case study research has revealed that ex-combatants undertook a wide variety of economic activities in the informal sector cating for a “fairer� allocation of benefits. However, in order to sustain themselves and generate an in- the study was not able to accurately determine the na- come. There were many commonalities between the ture and extent of actual discrimination against female countries and the environments in which ex-combat- ex-combatants (if at all). In addition to conventional ants resided, particularly small business, cross border DDR programming, financial, material and capacity- trading and agriculture. The differences were primar- building support for female ex-combatants and other ily determined by external conditions. That is, forests ‘special needs groups’, was provided, especially in the and mineral deposits in CAR and DRC provided live- DRC and South Sudan. In South Sudan, for example, lihood options that were not available for ex-combat- due to the institutional challenges of implementing ants in South Sudan. conventional DDR, women that had been associated with the armed conflict became the principal group to In some cases, former combatants were drawn into benefit from reinsertion and reintegration support. dubious and criminal activities, while other were re- cruited into armed groups and militias. Figure 9 is It was alleged that discrimination against female ex- a depiction of the main types of income generating combatants was prevalent within most armed entities activities available to ex-combatants in the three case in all the cases under study. This discrimination was studies. arguably entrenched by economic and cultural biases in the communities in which women resided, which 7.8 Gender and DDR some respondents suggested contributed towards There were some similarities and differences in the undermining the ability of women to access DDR re- gendered aspects of DDR in the three case studies. sources. In the eastern DRC there was the added di- It was suggested in some cases that there had been a mension of heightened insecurity and the prevalence prioritisation of male ex-combatants by means of the of sexual violence, which had a negative impact on the DDR selection criteria, with a number of female ex- reintegration of female combatants and females asso- combatants particularly in CAR and the DRC, advo- ciated with the armed conflict. 68 Conclusion T his research report has provided insights into some generational differences with respect to liveli- the manner in which ex-combatants have in- hood choices. For example, some types of economic teracted with the informal economy in post- activities were clearly popular amongst younger male war contexts. It has revealed that the viable livelihood ex-combatants, such as motorcycle taxis and min- options for ex-combatants in the three case-study ing. In the eastern DRC, for example, young male ex- countries were almost entirely within the informal combatants were highly conspicuous in both sectors. economy, but were restricted by low levels of human Small numbers of former combatants of this genera- development, extreme poverty and insecurity, which tion had also engaged in criminal activities or had had primarily been brought about through decades of been recruited into armed or criminal groups. poor governance and a legacy of war. Consequently, Some ex-combatants established cooperatives and the types of reintegration support that was offered to joint business ventures, which seemed to have been ex-combatants were limited in variety. Some respon- relatively successful, as such informal sector enti- dents suggested that there were disparities between ties, compared to individual enterprises, had greater men and women in the allocation of DDR resources, access to capital and with men receiving preferential treatment. However, labour from its mem- Viable livelihood options in the absence of sufficient data it was not possible to bers or partners. In for ex-combatants in the accurately assess gendered components of DDR. some cases, these eco- nomic arrangements three countries are almost Nonetheless, DDR material and training support enabled those associ- entirely in the informal generally assisted the beneficiaries in the three cases ated with the entity economy. studies, both directly and indirectly, to supplement or to access credit from enhance their livelihoods. However, there were a sig- banks. These arrangements also tended to provide an nificant number of incidences where ex-combatants, economic safety net for its members or partners. particularly in the DRC and South Sudan, sold their reinsertion/reintegration kits. In many such instanc- Despite the persistence and ingenuity of ex-combat- es, the proceeds of the sale of the kits were not squan- ants in pursuing viable livelihoods in the face of ad- dered on short-term consumption, but were rather versity, conditions in the local economy severely re- used to invest in more appropriate livelihood options stricted sustainable economic reintegration. The lack for the individuals concerned. of key infrastructure, and overly bureaucratic and ex- ploitative approach of local authorities were key prob- Numerous ex-combatants were resourceful in sus- lem areas. Building and repairing transport infra- taining themselves economically and/or generating structure is essentially a long-term process. However, income. The majority of ex-combatants have pursued key domestic economic reforms, such as the profes- reputable livelihoods, replicating those individu- sionalization of the tax system, and concerted govern- als who did not have a military background, such as ment support for emerging economic enterprises has subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry, operating the potential not only to be highly beneficial for ex- small businesses and trading enterprises. There were combatants, but also for ordinary civilians. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 69 References Publications, reports and media articles Tony Addison, The global economy, conflict prevention, and post-conflict recovery, World Institute for Develop- ment Economics Research, Helsinki, United Nations University, 8 November 2004. African Economic Outlook, Central African Republic 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011. African Economic Outlook, Congo, Dem. 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Woodward, Economic aid to post-conflict countries: a methodological critique of Collier and Hoeffler, WP 2005: 4, Bergen, Chr. Michelsen Institute. 62 UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 5.10 Women, Gender and DDR, Inte- grated disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration standards, New York, UN, 2006. 63 Ana Cutter Patel, Transitional justice and DDR, in Robert Muggah (ed), Security and post conflict reconstruction, Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war, Abingdon, Routledge; Tsjeard Bouta, Gender and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration: building blocs for Dutch policy, The Hague, Clingendael Institute, March 2005. 64 Anton Baaré, Dyan Mazurana, Rethinking gender programming and financing options for women and DDR. Lessons from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (2002 -2009), forthcoming. 65 UNDP, Human development report 2010, New York, UNDP, 2010, chapter 1. 66 Blom and Yamindou, in,Eric Berman, The Central African Republic: a case study of small arms and conflict, 2005, 13-14. 67 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report: Central African Republic, London, September 2011, 6. 68 African Economic Outlook, Central African Republic 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 3-6 69 World Resources Institute et le Ministère des eaux, forêts, chasse et pêche de la République centrafricaine. 2010. Atlas forestier interactif de la République centrafricaine - version 1.0: Document de synthèse, Washington, DC, World Resources Institute, 1. 70 FAO, Central African Republic: Country brief, http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index.asp?lang=en&ISO3=CAF 71 Interview with Etienne Ngounio, Food and Agriculture Organisation, 5 August 2011 72 African Economic Outlook, Central African Republic 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 5. 73 African Economic Outlook, Central African Republic 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 9. 74 Central African Republic, Consolidated Appeal, United Nations, 2011. 75 Interview with Delphine Barret, Economist, UNDP, 5 August 2011. 76 Central African Republic, Consolidated Appeal, UN, 2011, 6. 77 Interview with Delphine Barret, Economist, UNDP, 5 August 2011. 78 Interview with Delphine Barret, Economist, UNDP, 5 August 2011. 79 Interview with Jean-Sebastien Munie – UNOCHA Head of Office, 27 July 2011. 80 Interview with Irene Pounebingui, Economists, Ministry of Economy and Planning, 4 August 2011. 81 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, Doing business 2012: economy profile: Central African Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 83 Republic, Washington, DC, 2011, 10-71. 82 Heritage Foundation, Central African Republic, 2011 index of economic freedom, Washington DC, 2011. 83 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Doing business 2012: economy profile: Central African Republic, Washington, DC, 2011, 73-81. 84 Transparency International, Corruption perceptions index 2010, Berlin, 2010. 85 Interview with Etienne Ngounio, FAO, 5 August 2011. 86 Interview with John Hanson, Mercy Corps, 30 July 2011. 87 Interview with Delphine Barret, Economist, UNDP, 5 August 2011. 88 Interview with John Hanson, Mercy Corps, 30 July 2011. 89 Interview with Irene Pounebingui, Economists, Ministry of Economy and Planning, 4 August 2011. 90 Interview with Delphine Barret, Economist, UNDP, 5 August 2011. 91 Ousmanou Njikam and Gérard Tchouassi, Women in informal cross-border trade: Evidence from the Central Africa Region African Journal of Business Management Vol. 5, No. 12 , 18 June, 2011, 4835-4846. 92 Karen Hayes, Artisanal & small-scale mining and livelihoods in Africa, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2008, 11. 93 International Crisis Group, Dangerous little stones: diamonds in the Central African Republic, Africa Report no. 167, Nairobi/ Brussels, 16 December 2010, 2. 94 International Crisis Group, Dangerous little stones: diamonds in the Central African Republic, Africa Report no. 167, Nairobi/ Brussels, 16 December 2010, 9-10. 95 International Crisis Group, Dangerous little stones: diamonds in the Central African Republic, Africa Report no. 167, Nairobi/ Brussels, 16 December 2010, 11. 96 Ned Dalby, The dark side of diamonds, AllAfrica.com, 21 February 2011; International Crisis Group, Dangerous little stones: diamonds in the Central African Republic, Africa Report no. 167, Nairobi/Brussels, 16 December 2010, 15-19; KP renews vigil against Central African Republic diamonds, Commodity Online, 30 September 2011. 97 Anonymous interview, August 2011. 98 Eric Berman, The Central African Republic: A Case Study of Small Arms and Conflict, Small Arms Survey, 2005. 99 Albert Caramés, CAR (PRAC, 2004-2008), in Albert Cara¬més and E. Sanz, DDR 2009. Analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in the world during 2008, Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009, 39-44.. 100 Albert Caramés, CAR (PRAC, 2004-2008), in Albert Cara¬més and E. Sanz, DDR 2009. Analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in the world during 2008, Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009, 39-44.. 101 MDRP Fact Sheet: Central African Republic, MDRP-supported activities in Central African Republic, March 2009. 102 MDRP, MDRP dissemination note, Central African Republic: lessons from a disarmament, demoblization and reintegration program, Note No 4. August – September 2008. 103 MDRP, MDRP dissemination note, Central African Republic: lessons from a disarmament, demoblization and reintegration program, Note No 4. August – September 2008 104 MDRP, MDRP fact sheet: Central African Republic, MDRP-supported activities in Central African Republic, March 2009. 105 Interview with Etienne Mpeco, Former Executive Secretary of National Commission on DDR, 4 August 2011. 106 Albert Caramés, CAR (PRAC, 2004-2008), in Albert Cara¬més and E. Sanz, DDR 2009. Analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in the world during 2008, Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009, 39-44. 107 Interview with Etienne Mpeco, Former Executive Secretary of National Commission on DDR, 4 August 2011. 108 Interview with Charles Muvira, World Bank, 27 July 2011. 109 MDRP, MDRP fact sheet: Central African Republic, MDRP-supported activities in Central African Republic, March 2009. 110 Albert Caramés, CAR (PRAC, 2004-2008), in Albert Cara¬més and E. Sanz, DDR 2009. Analysis of disarmament, demobilisa- tion and reintegration (DDR) programmes in the world during 2008, Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009, 39-44; and Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 29 July 2011. 84 111 Interview with Sakando Ndiai, Executive Secretary of CNPDR (formerly Executive Secretary PRAC), 27 July 2011. 112 Interview with Etienne Mpeco, Former Executive Secretary of National Commission on DDR, 4 August 2011. 113 Interview with Jean Jacques Demanfourth, leader of APRD rebel group, 29 July 2011 and Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 2 August 2011. 114 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 29 July 2011. 115 Interview with Lorere Jeau-Nestos, prefect of Sibut, 2 August 2011, Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 2 August 2011. 116 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 29 July 2011. 117 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 2 August 2011. 118 Interview with Jean Jacques Demanfourth, leader of APRD rebel group, 29 July and Laurent Ouoko, former combatant, Karako militia, 30 July 2011. 119 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 29 July 2011. 120 Interview with Former combatant focus group, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 121 Interview with Colette Seremalet, female combatant, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 122 Former combatant focus group, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 123 Interview with Adrien Koyangatoua, former combatant, mutineer from government army, 30 July 2011. 124 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 2 August 2011. 125 Interview with Sakando Ndiai, Executive Secretary of PDR (formerly Executive Secretary PRAC), 27 July 2011. 126 Interview with Etienne Mpeco, Former Executive Secretary of National Commission on DDR, 4 August 2011. 127 MDRP. MDRP dissemination note, Central African Republic: lessons from a disarmament, demoblization and reintegration program, Note no 4. August – September 2008. 128 MDRP, MDRP dissemination note, Central African Republic: lessons from a disarmament, demoblization and reintegration program, Note no 4. August – September 2008. 129 MDRP, MDRP fact sheet: Central African Republic, MDRP-supported activities in Central African Republic, March 2009. 130 Nelson Alusala, Ex-combatant reintegration and community support in the Central African Republic, Reintegrating Ex-Combat- ants in the Great Lakes Region, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies. 131 Interview with Adrien Koyangatoua, former combatant, mutineer from government army, 30 July 2011. 132 Interview with Sakando Ndiai, Executive Secretary of CNPDR (formerly Executive Secretary PRAC), 27 July 2011. 133 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 2 August 2011. 134 MDRP, MDRP dissemination note, Central African Republic: lessons from a disarmament, demoblization and reintegration program, Note no 4. August – September 2008 135 Interview with David Stephanine, Danish Refugee Council (but was UNDP at time of old DDR programme), 29 July 2011. 136 Interview with Lucienne Maliyombo, Mayor of Sibut, 2 August 2011; Former combatant focus group discussion, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 137 Interview with John Hanson, Mercy Corps, 30 July 2011. 138 Interview with Wilfred Kaba-Ndoumbet, Head of Cabinet for Government of CAR, 28 July 2011; Interview with Pascale Blanch- etiere, Country Director, Premiere Urgence, 28 July 2011. 139 Former combatant focus group discussion, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 140 Interview with Etienne Mpeco, Former Executive Secretary of National Commission on DDR, 4 August 2011. 141 Interview with Adrien Koyangatoua, former combatant, mutineer from government army, 30 July 2011. 142 Interview with Laurent Ouoko, former combatant, Karako militia, 30 July 2011. 143 Interview with Delphine Rachelle Bambou, female combatant, Balawa Militia, Bangui, 3 August 2011. 144 Interview with Laurent Ouoko, former combatant, Karako militia, 30 July 2011. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 85 145 Interview with Delphine Rachelle Bambou, female combatant, Balawa Militia, Bangui, 3 August 2011. 146 Interview with Irene Pounebingui, Economics, Ministry of Economy and Planning, 4 August 2011. 147 Interview with Irene Pounebingui, Economists, Ministry of Economy and Planning, 4 August 2011. 148 Interview with Delphine Barret, Economist, UNDP, 5 August 2011. 149 Interview with John Hanson, Mercy Corps, 30 July 2011. 150 Interview with Adrien Koyangatoua, former, mutineer from government army, 30 July 2011 151 Interview with Fosca Giulidori, UNICEF, 29 July 2011. 152 Interview with Lorere Jeau-Nestos, Prefect of Sibut, 2 August 2011. 153 Eric G. Berman and Louisa N. Lombard, The Central African Republic and small arms: a regional tinderbox, Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2008. 154 Former combatant focus group discussion, Sibut, 2 August 2011; Interview with Evrard Armel Bondade, Observatoire Centrafri- can des Droits de l’Homme, 27 July 2011. 155 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 2 August 2011. 156 Former combatant focus group discussion, Sibut, 2 August; Interview with Colette Seremalet, female combatant, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 157 Interview with Colette Seremalet, female combatant, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 158 Interview with Eugine Binguimalet, former PRAC employee, 2 August 2011. 159 Interview with Lucienne Maliyombo, Mayor of Sibut, 2 August 2011. 160 Interviews with Delphine Rachelle Bambou, female combatant; and Balawa Militia, Bangui, 3 August 2011. 161 Interview with Colette Seremalet, female combatant, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 162 Former combatant focus group discussion, Sibut, 2 August 2011. 163 Interview with David Stephanine, Danish Refugee Council (but was a UNDP staff member at time of old DDR programme), 29 July 2011; Interview with Lucienne Maliyombo, Mayor of Sibut, 2 August 2011. 164 Interview with Timoleon Kokongo, Observatoire Centrafrican des Droits de l’Homme, 27 July 2011. 165 Interview with Etienne Mpeco, Former Executive Secretary of National Commission on DDR, 4 August 2011. 166 Interview with Nathan Beangai, Department of Mining, 4 August 2011. 167 Interview with Jean Jacques Demanfourth, leader of APRD rebel group, 29 July 2011. 168 Interview with Delphine Barret, Economist, UNDP, 5 August 2011. 169 Interview with Irene Pounebingui, Economist, Ministry of Economy and Planning, 4 August 2011. 170 Interview with Abel Banda, former combatant, Balawa Militia, Bangui, 3 August 2011. 171 Interview with Laurent Ouoko, former combatant, Karako militia, 30 July 2011. 172 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report: Democratic Republic of Congo, London, September, 2011. 173 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 4. 174 U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Minerals yearbook, Congo (Kinshasa), May 2011, 11.1. 175 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 6. 176 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 6-7; Business Monitor International, Democratic Republic of Congo mining report Q1 2010, January 6, 2010. 177 Forests Monitor, The timber sector in the DRC: a brief overview, Cambridge, 2007. 178 L. Debroux et al (eds.), Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda, Center for Interna- 86 tional Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007. 179 Raymond Gilpin and Richard Downie, Conflict-business dynamics in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Special Report 234, US Institute for Peace, Washington DC. 180 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Infrastruc- ture: A Continental Perspective, Washington DC, March 2010, 3. 181 African Economic Outlook, Congo, Dem. Rep. 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 8. 182 International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Index: Democratic Republic of Congo, Washington DC, 2011. 183 World Health Organisation, Democratic Republic of the Congo, factsheets of health statistics 2010, Brazzaville, 2011; FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on June 23, 2011, http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/ default.aspx#ancor 184 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on June 23, 2011, http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/ default.aspx#ancor 185 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on June 23, 2011, http://faostat.fao.org/site/377/ default.aspx#ancor 186 African Economic Outlook, Congo, Dem. Rep. 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 12 187 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on October 7, 2011, http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx 188 FAO, Vue générale du secteur des pêches national, Républic du Congo, Août, 2009. 189 FAO, Vue générale du secteur des pêches national, Républic du Congo, Août, 2009. 190 Emmanuel de Merode, Katherine Homewood and Guy Cowlishaw, Wild resources and livelihoods of poor households in Demo- cratic Republic of Congo, ODI wildlife policy brief, No. 1 November 2003. 191 Center for International Forestry Research, Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: analysis of a priority agenda, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, 2007, 7-9. 192 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Doing business 2012: economy profile: Congo Dem. Rep., Washington, DC, 2011, 5-94. 193 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Doing business 2012: economy profile: Congo Dem. Rep., Washington, DC, 2011, 5-94. 194 African Economic Outlook, Congo, Dem. Rep. 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 11. 195 Transparency International, Corruption perceptions index 2010, Berlin, 2010. 196 Eiko Ooka and Susan Keppelman, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009, 2-3. 197 Mix Market, Microfinance in Congo, Democratic Republic of the, country profile, 2010, http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/ Congo%2C%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the 198 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Doing business 2012: economy profile: Congo Dem. Rep., Washington, DC, 2011, 5-94. 199 L. Hart Debroux et al (eds.), Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 7. 200 L. Hart Debroux et al (eds.), Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 7. 201 L. Hart Debroux et al (eds.), Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 7. 202 L. Hart Debroux et al (eds.), Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 8-9. 203 Uakali Kambale, DRC premier tells foreigners to leave small business to locals, African Review, 4 August 2011. http://www. africareview.com/News/DRC+premier+tells+foreigners+to+leave+small+business+to+locals/-/979180/1213414/-/ac4vffz/-/index.html. 204 Bank of Uganda, Informal cross border trade survey report 2009-10, Kampala, 2011. 205 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 56-58; Karen Hayes, Women in artisanal mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo Pact Congo, Lubumbashi, Pact DRC, 2007. 206 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 87 governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 56; U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Minerals yearbook, Congo (Kinshasa), May 2011, 11.1. 207 Karen Hayes, Artisanal & small-scale mining and livelihoods in Africa, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2008, 7. 208 Ruben de Koning Artisanal mining and post-conflict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, SIRPI back- ground paper, Solna, October 2009, 6-8.; Karen Hayes, Artisanal & small-scale mining and livelihoods in Africa, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2008, 11. 209 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 60-61. 210 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 60-61. 211 UN Security Council, Letter dated 26 October 2010 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo ad- dressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), New York, UN. 212 UN DDR Resource Centre, Country programme: DRC, http://www.unddr.org/. 213 MDRP, MDRP Final Report, Overview of program achievements, Washington DC, World Bank, July 2010, 9-24. 214 UN DDR Resource Centre, Country programme: DRC, http://www.unddr.org/. 215 UN Security Council, Twenty-first report of the UN Secretary-General on UN Mission in the DRC, UN document S/2006/390, 13 June 2006, paragraph 50; MDRP, DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo: program update, Washington DC, World Bank. 216 Public Information Division, MONUC, Briefing materials, August 2009. 217 MONUSCO, Collaboration and DDRRR process, http://monusco.unmissions.org 218 Hans Rouw and Rens Willems, Connecting community security and DDR: experiences from eastern DRC, Network for Peace, Security and Development, April 2010, 9. 219 UN DDR Resource Centre, DRC, http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=25 220 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and reform of the army, London: Amnesty International, 2007, 17; T. Bouta, Assessment of the Ituri disarmament and community reinsertion pro- gramme, The Hague, Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2005, 28. 221 MDRP, MDRP factsheet: Democratic Republic of Congo, Washington DC, MDRP, March 2009. 222 MDRP, DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo: program update, Washington DC, MDRP. 223 MDRP, MDRP final report, overview of program achievements, Washington DC, July 2010, 24. 224 UN Security Council, Resolution 1925 (2010), UN document S/Res/1925/2010, New York, UN. 225 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraph 55. 226 UN Security Council, Interim report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, UN document S/2011/345, 12 May 2011, para- graph 34. 227 Interview with Willy Musingo, president of the Association des Chauffeurs du Congo – Section Moto-Ituri, and John Paul Lodda Lossa, vice-president of the same association, Bunia, 26 March 2011. 228 Interview with Willy Musingo, 26 March 2011. 229 Interview with Willy Musingo and John Paul Lodda Lossa, 26 March 2006 230 Interview with Willy Musingo and John Paul Lodda Lossa, 26 March 2006 and interview with director of local NGO, Bunia, 26 March 2011. 231 Interview with Jacques Kalumi, secretary of the mining comité de pilotage, Mongbwalu, 30 March 2011. 232 Etude sur les vecteurs, contraintes et relations des ex-combattants dans les mines artisanales en Ituri. Concessions 39 et 40, Rap- port Final. Channel Research, Brussels, 2009. 233 Interview with Pascal Kahindo, CARITAS, Mongbwalu, 30 March 2011. 234 Interview with Isiadore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of Association des Orpailleurs pour le Developpement et le Reconstruction de Paix en Ituri (AODERPI), Mongbwalu 30 March 2011. 88 235 Interview with Isiadore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of Association des Orpailleurs pour le Developpement et le Reconstruction de Paix en Ituri (AODERPI), 30 March 2011. 236 Interview with Pascal Kahindo, 30 March 2011. 237 Interview with Isiadore Tamile, 30 March 2011. 238 Interview with NGO workers, Mongbwalu, 29 March 2011. 239 Interview with Pascal Baseyembise, CECOKI representative, Galayi, 29 March 2011. 240 Interview with Mapa Majo, Galayi, 29 March 2011. 241 An artisanal gold mining site on Anglo Gold’s concession, a few kilometres from Mongbwalu. 242 Interview with Fai Avon, Monbwalu, 29 March 2011. 243 Interview with Lomema Batsi Mukwa Christophe, ANORI, Bunia, 1 April 2011. 244 Interview with Dziju Malozi Jacqueline, Federation des Mamans de l’Ituri, Bunia, 1 April 2011. 245 Interview with Dziju Malozi Jacqueline, 1 April 2011. 246 Interview with Besica-Duku Tchekedis, president of EJDP, Kasenyi, 31 March 2011. 247 Interview with Benjamin Ambura and Faustin Mitumba, FAO, Bunia, 28 March 2011. 248 Interview with Muzungu Tabaro Janvier, administrative secretary of Kasenyi, and Samuel Singh N’ku, fishing officer, ministry of the environment, Kasenyi, 31 March 2011. 249 Interview with Besica-Duku Tchekedis, 31 March 2011. 250 Interview with Bideko Murhabazi Juvenal, inspecteur principal, commandant district de l’Ituri, Police Nationale Congolais, Bunia, 1 April 2011. 251 Interview with Isiadore Tamile, 30 March 2011. 252 Interview with a UNPDDR staff in Uvira, 28 May 2011. 253 Focus group discussion with ACDK self-help group, of which Mazembe is member. Kalundu, 29 May 2011; Interview with Bush- obzi, the Chairman of ACDK, Uvira, 30 May 2011. 254 Interview with Ndegeya Ndakurundi, advisor to ACDK. Uvira, 27 May 2011. 255 Interview with Ndegeya Ndakurundi, 30 May 2011. 256 Interview with Mokili, Kalimabenge bridge. Uvira, 28 May 2011. 257 Group interview with self-employed ex-combatants (among them Mokili). Uvira, 1 June 2011. 258 Interview with Mafikiri at his kiosk in Kalundu, 29 May 2011. 259 Focus group discussion with ILDELU members, Luvungi, 30 May 2011. 260 Focus group discussion with ILDELU members, Luvungi, 30 May 2011. 261 Focus group discussion with ACDAKI members. Kiliba, 30 May 2011. 262 Interview with Munyereza, the chairperson of ACDAKI. Kiliba, 30 May 2011. 263 Interview with Lulua in Panzi, Bukavu, 1 June 2011. 264 Jennifer Smith with Edward Bell, Governance in mining zones in North and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lon- don, Initiative for Peacebuiding, March 2010, 9. 265 Thaddée Hyawe-Hinyi, DRC: the slow march towards a tax agreement, Afronline, 8 August 2010, http://www.afronline. org/?p=9255 266 Interview with Kambaza, Uvira, 27 May 2011. 267 Interview with Kambaza’s colleague, Uvira, 27 May 2011. 268 Interview with former Mai Mai ex-combatant, Mboko, 29 May 2011. 269 Global Witness, Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in the eastern Congo, London, 2009, Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 89 50. 270 Interview with Claude Bulukwa, a former CNDP rebel (now demobilized), Lemera Plateau, 1 June 2011. 271 Tumaini Hamisi fought on the side of RCD-Goma during the 1998 war and later for the CNDP in 2008 and did not receive any DDRRR support. 272 A chukudu is a wooden, non-mechanised means of cargo transportation. It resembles a large wooden scooter, and is arguably the backbone of the urban informal economy in North Kivu.The symbolic importance of chukudu is immortalized in a golden statue located on Boulevard Kanyamuhanga in the centre of Goma. 273 Tumaini Centre is located in the Commune de Karisimbi, in Goma. It offers training to child-ex-combatants. The centre is the only one of its kind in North Kivu Province. However, due to overwhelming demand, the centre also offers training even to adult ex- combatants in search of skills. 274 Government of Southern Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Approved budget 2011, Juba, 2011, 2. 275 FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment mission to Southern Sudan, Rome, 12 January 2011, 7-17. 276 World Bank, Sudan: The road toward sustainable and broad-based growth, Washington DC, World Bank, December 2009, 10. 277 According to the Juba business registry approximately 700 NGOs were registered between 2006 and 2010. 278 Ellen Martin and Irina Mosel City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan: Juba case study, Humanitarian Policy Group, London, January 2011, 13-14. 279 Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, Key indicators for Southern Sudan, Juba, Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, 8 February 2011. 280 Government of Southern Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Approved budget 2010, Juba, 2010, 1. 281 Government of Southern Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Donor book 2010, Juba, 2010, 3. 282 Government of Southern Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Approved budget 2011, Juba, 2011, 2-5. 283 Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010, Juba, 2011, 45. 284 FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment mission to Southern Sudan, Rome, 12 January 2011, 7-17. 285 FAO/World Food Programme (WFP) crop and food security assessment mission to Southern Sudan, Rome, 12 January 2011, 15-16. 286 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Doing Business in Juba 2011, Washington D.C., 2011, 11-15. 287 World Bank, Sudan: The road toward sustainable and broad-based growth, Washington DC, World Bank, December 2009, 92. 288 World Bank, Sudan: The road toward sustainable and broad-based growth, Washington DC, World Bank, December 2009, 9. 289 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Doing Business in Juba 2011, Washington D.C., 2011, 24-25. 290 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Doing Business in Juba 2011, Washington D.C., 2011, 35-36. 291 Republic of South Sudan: National Bureau of Statistics, South Sudan cost-to-market report: an analysis of check-points on the major trade routes in South Sudan, Juba, National Bureau of Statistics, August 2011. 292 World Bank, Sudan: The road toward sustainable and broad-based growth, Washington DC, World Bank, December 2009, 76. 293 Zeru Gebre Selassie, Non-oil revenue study, Southern Sudan Volume II, Final report, October 2009, 31-32. 294 USAID, Land tenure and property rights in Southern Sudan: a case study of informal settlements in Juba, USAID, Washington, DC, December 2010, c-27. 295 Getting’ by with a Senke, Roving Bandit, http://www.rovingbandit.com/2010/02/gettin-by-with-senke.html, 6 February 2010. 296 Ellen Martin and Irina Mosel City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan: Juba case study, Humanitarian Policy Group, London, January 2011, 15. 297 Newly Formed South Sudan boda-boda association, Sudan Radio Service, 10 May 2011, http://www.sudanradio.org/newly- formed-south-sudan-boda-boda-association Maggie Fick, Juba Police Crackdown on Motorcycle Taxi Drivers, 7 July 2010, http://news. change.org/stories/juba-police-crackdown-on-motorcyle-taxi-drivers; Motorcycle-taxi driver files complaint against police in Juba, 90 Radio Miraya, 6 April 2011, http://radiomiraya.org/. 298 Ellen Martin and Irina Mosel City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan: Juba case study, Humanitarian Policy Group, London, January 2011, 14. 299 USAID, Land tenure and property rights in Southern Sudan: a case study of informal settlements in Juba, USAID, Washington, DC, December 2010, c-27. 300 Ellen Martin and Irina Mosel City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan: Juba case study, Humanitarian Policy Group, London, January 2011, 15. 301 U.S. Agency for International Development, Land tenure and property rights in Southern Sudan: a case study of informal settle- ments in Juba, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, December 2010, c-28. 302 Lydia Stone, Failures and opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan, Sudan Issue Brief, No. 17, May 2011, Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 1-2. 303 The Presidency of the Republic of Sudan: The National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Coordination Council, The National DDR Strategic Plan, Khartoum, August 2007, 2-5. 304 The Presidency of the Republic of Sudan: The National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Coordination Council, The National DDR Strategic Plan, Khartoum, August 2007, 5. 305 Lydia Stone, Failures and opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan, Sudan Issue Brief, No. 17, May 2011, Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2. 306 Interview with William Deng Deng, Chairperson, SSDDRC and Wolf-Christian Paes, Technical Advisor, SSDDRC, Juba, 7 June 2011. 307 UN Integrated DDR Standards, Module 2.10, The UN approach to DDR, http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/02/ 308 Interviews with representatives of Implementing Partners, Juba, 6-13 June 2011. 309 DDR information booklet, NSDDRC, UNMIS and UNDP. 310 GoSS and SSDDRC, SSDDRC Strategy Document, Juba, 2008. 311 Small business development involves brief training in the following fields: tea and coffee, airtime card vending, juice bar, peanut butter making, vegetable growing, and vendor kiosks. Vocational training involved tailoring, driving, auto mechanics, carpentry and joinery, plumbing and pipefitting, welding and metal fabrication, construction including bricklaying and concrete practise, food pro- cessing and electrical installation. 312 Interview with Jean-Christophe Goussaud and Kathrin Nutt, GIZ, Juba, 7 June 2011; Interview with Phanuel Adwera, DDR Programme Coordinator, FAO, Juba, 8 June 2011; Interview with Gerard Waite, Head of Office, IOM South Sudan, Juba, 10 June 2011; Interview with UNMISS DDR officials, Juba, 13 June 2011. 313 UNDP Sudan, DDR Dispatch, Khartoum, UNDP, April 2011, 2. 314 Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration, Version July 15, 2011. 315 Small Arms Survey: Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, DDR in South Sudan, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, September 2011. 316 STHLM Policy Group, South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report, 30 December 2010, Stockholm, STHLM Policy Group, 65. 317 STHLM Policy Group, South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report, 30 December 2010, Stockholm, STHLM Policy Group, 65. 318 Interviews with SSDDRC commission personnel, UN officials, implementing partners and donor representatives, Juba, 6-13 June; observations during DDR Stakeholder Conference, Home and Away Hotel, Juba, 7 June 2011; observations during the SSDDRP Strate- gic Planning Priority Setting Workshop, Juba Bridge Hotel, Juba, 26-29 July 2011. 319 South Sudan Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, DDR digest, vol. 1, issues 1-4 and Vol. 2, issues 1-12. 320 Interviews with SSDDRC commission personnel, UN officials, implementing partners and donor representatives, Juba, 6-13 June; Observations during DDR Stakeholder Conference, Home and Away Hotel, Juba, 7 June 2011. 321 Sudan threatens UN over auditory report on DDR funds, Sudan Tribune, 28 December 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com/ Sudan-threatens-UN-over-auditory,37429. 322 Sudan demands UN audit on soldier rehab fund, RFI, 29 December 2010, http://www.english.rfi.fr/node/67217 323 Interview with William Deng Deng, Chairperson, SSDDRC and Wolf-Christian Paes, Technical Advisor, SSDDRC, Juba, 7 June 2011. Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 91 324 World Bank – African Development Bank and Southern Sudan Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Southern Sudan: Socio-economic study of communities of return, August 2010. 325 Jon Bennett et al, Appendix 5, Aiding the peace, A multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005–2010, Final report, London, ITAD Ltd, December 2010. 326 Interview with William Deng Deng, Chairperson, Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and Wolf-Christian Paes, Tech- nical Advisor, SSDDRC, Juba, 7 June 2011; Interview with Gerard Waite, Head of Office, IOM South Sudan, Juba, 10 June 2011. 327 Lydia Stone, Failures and opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan, Sudan Issue Brief, No. 17, May 2011, Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 5-7. 328 Interview with Jean-Christophe Goussaud and Kathrin Nutt, GIZ, Juba, 7 June 2011. 329 GIZ, Economic reintegration of ex-combatants in Southern Sudan. A programmatic implementation guide, Juba, February 2011; Reintegration of ex-combatants in Eastern Equatoria State: opportunity & partnership mapping, Torit, March 2011; Leben Nelson Moro et al, Market survey: economic opportunities for demobilized ex-combatants in Juba, Juba, GIZ, August 2010. 330 Interview with Mary Alak Lakoon and Monica Amakou Majak, DDR support beneficiaries, New Market, Juba, 10 June 2011. 331 Interviews with former combatants and SNG individuals, Juba, 10 June 2011. Also see Leben Nelson Moro et al, Market survey: economic opportunities for demobilized ex-combatants in Juba, Juba, GIZ, August 2010. 332 Interviews with former combatants and SNG individuals, Juba, 10 June 2011. 333 U.S. Agency for International Development, Land tenure and property rights in Southern Sudan: a case study of informal settle- ments in Juba, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, December 2010, c-27. 334 A tale of two successful ex-combatants, The Citizen, 1 January 2011. 335 Interview with Phanuel Adwera, DDR Programme Coordinator, FAO, Juba, 8 June 2011. 336 Interview with Phanuel Adwera, DDR Programme Coordinator, FAO, Juba, 8 June 2011. 337 World Bank – African Development Bank and Southern Sudan Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Southern Sudan: Socio-economic study of communities of return, August 2010. 338 Republic of South Sudan, Policy Paper on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration, South Sudan DDR Commission, Juba, 23 September 2011. 92 Assessing the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of instability and informal economies 93 94