Causes, Complexities, and Challenges 22067 March 2001 7 rE , at the Millennium Strat gi'c The World Bank Partners hIp with Africa AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM Causes, Complexities, and Challenges Howard White and Tony Killick in collaboration with Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa and Marie-Angelique Savane THE WORLD BANK WASHINGTON, D.C. Copyright ( 2001 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, NW. Washington, D.C. 20433, USA All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing March 2001 1 234030201 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this book are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. 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Please contact the Copyright Clearance Center before photocopying items. For permission to reprint individual articles or chapters, please fax a request with complete information to the Republication Department, Copyright Clearance Center, fax 978-750-4470. All other queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, World Bank, at the address above or faxed to 202-522-2422. Cover design by UltraDesigns. ISBN: 0-8213-4867-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: White, Howard, 1960- African poverty at the millennium : causes, complexities, and challenges / Howard White, Tony Killick. p. cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8213-4867-1 1. Poverty-Africa. 2. Africa-Economic conditions. I. Killick, Tony. II. Title. HC800.Z9 P684 2001 339.4'6'096-dc21 Contents Foreword vii Acknowledgments ix Acronyms and Abbreviations xi Executive Summary xiii Part I Africa's Poverty Problem 1 1. A First View 3 The Growth of African Poverty 3 The Danger of Overgeneralizing 6 Conclusion 8 2. Different Poverty Concepts Can Point in Different Directions 10 Different Poverty Concepts 10 Why Conceptualizations Matter 13 3. African Poverty Has Many Dimensions 15 Categories and Characteristics 15 Profiles of African Poverty 19 The Nature of African Poverty Is Changing 20 The Sobering Implications of Complexity 22 Part II The Causes of Poverty 25 4. Overview of the Proximate and Primary Causes of Poverty 27 The Danger and Value of Generalization 27 The Interaction of Causes and Effects 28 Some Neglected Causes 29 Proximate versus Primary Causes 29 Some Policy Implications 30 5. Economic Stagnation Has Caused Much Poverty 32 Growth and Distribution: The Overall Picture 32 Africa's Growth Has Often Been Slow but May Be Improving 33 The Poor May Not be Able to Benefit from Growth 36 Growth Affects Poverty Groups Differently 37 Conclusion 39 6. Why Has Growth Been So Poor? 40 Causes of Low Growth: the Usual Suspects 40 iv AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Are Bad Policies to Blame? 40 Agricultural Backwardness Is Particularly Serious, but the Causes Go Deep 42 Economic Reform Programs and Poverty Reduction 44 Global Factors Have Not Been a Major Reason for Slow Growth 46 Conclusion 53 7. Both Governments and Markets Have Failed the Poor 55 Political Systems Have Contributed to Economic Stagnation 55 Political Systems Have Also Tended to Keep Poverty off the Agenda 58 Some Markets Fal the Poor 60 What Does the Future Hold? 62 8. The Poor Have Inadequate Capital 66 A Weak Asset Base Undermines Sustainable Livelihoods in Rural Areas 66 Africa Lacks Physical Capital of All Kinds, Stocks of Many Are Being Denuded, and the Access of the Poor Is Increasingly Restricted 67 Accumulation of Human and Social Capital Is Slow and Frequently Biased against Rural Areas 71 Conclusion 74 9. Sustaining Improvements in Social Indicators Requires Growing Income and Better State Service Provision 75 The Direct and Indirect Benefits of Improving Social Outcomes 75 Africa Lags Behind on Social Indicators-and the Gap Is Widening 77 The Poor Are More Sick and Less Educated Than the Nonpoor-and Resources Remain Skewed 79 Further Reforms Can Close the International and National Gaps 83 Conclusion: The Need for Balanced Development 84 10. Household and Population Dynamics: Good and Bad News for Poverty Reduction 86 Household Structure and Poverty 86 The Demographic Transition Is Under Way 87 Changing Household Structures and Demographics Provide a Case for State Intervention 91 11. Women's Unequal Position Pervades the Poverty Problem 92 Social Trends in Gender and Poverty 93 Economic Trends in Gender and Poverty 93 The Importance of Intrahousehold Relations 94 Poverty Reinforces the Subordination of Women 94 The Challenges of Poverty-Sensitive Policy and Planning 95 Part III Poverty Reduction Policies 97 12. Outlines of an Antipoverty Strategy 99 Promoting Social and Political Change for Poverty Reduction 99 The Primacy of Pro-Poor Growth 101 The Need for an Integrated Approach 102 The Role of Donors 102 Conclusion 102 Contents v 13. National Policies for Reducing Poverty 104 The Policy Challenge 104 Two Initial Truisms 106 Other Principles of a Poverty-Reduction Strategy 107 A Checklist of Policy Possibilities for a Poverty-Reduction Strategy 108 The Need to Set Targets 110 Conclusion 110 14. Find out More and Monitor Progress 112 15. Donor Countries Need to Do More, Too 117 The Gap between Donor Aspirations and Practices 117 Responding to Conflict and Postconflict Situations 120 The Way Ahead 121 Conclusion 122 Appendix: Selected Statistical Data 124 References and Bibliography 133 Foreword This report was prepared for the Strategic Partnership with These then are the "sobering implications" of the com- Africa (SPA) by a team from the Institute of Development plexity of the poverty problem in Africa. There are no sim- Studies, University of Sussex, U.K., in association with ple solutions to deal with the kaleidoscope of interlocking Save the Children Fund, U.K., Laval University, Canada, factors that keep many Africans in poverty. But what are and the Overseas Development Institute, U.K. The team the key elements of poverty reduction strategies in the has been supported financially and technically by a Ref- region? The report rightly points to the need for acceler- erence Group of SPA donors made up of Norway, Sweden, ated economic growth if living standards are to improve Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, for the majority of Africans. For this to occur, there obvi- and the World Bank. The enthusiasm and commitment ously has to be peace, stability, and political commitment. of this support is acknowledged with great appreciation. It is also important that growth is broad based, and that According to the recent World Development Report, rural livelihoods are fostered. And for many poor Africans, Attacking Poverty, the number of poor people (those con- it is vital that their human capabilities are strengthened, suming less than $1 a day) in Sub-Sahara Africa "increased through better access to health care and education ser- from an already high 217 million (in 1987) to 291 mil- vices. This, in turn, calls for more effective delivery of pub- lion (in 1998) . . . leaving almost half the residents of that lic services and a strengthened, more accountable public continent poor." (World Bank 2000) Africa's share in glob- administration. The report also warns against the dan- al income poverty has risen. And as more dimensions are gers of overgeneralizing. Each country faces it own par- added in any assessment of human suffering (incorpo- ticular difficulties and challenges. And whatever solutions rating also ill health, illiteracy, isolation, and insecurity), are to be applied, they must be developed and imple- the more challenging Africa's plight appears to be. The mented by Africans in Africa. multifaceted nature of the poverty problem and the widen- ing gap between the levels of human well-being in Africa Alan Gelb compared with the other developing regions are the cen- Chief Economist, Africa Region tral themes of this report. The World Bank vii Acknowledgments This report was prepared by Howard White and Tony Thanks also to Reg Green for comments on an earlier Killick in collaboration with Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa and draft. Some of the ideas have been discussed at seminars Marie-Angelique Savane on behalf of the Strategic at the African Development Bank, Abidjan, and the Partnership with Africa (SPA) under the guidance of the Overseas Development Institute, London. Useful com- World Bank. Thanks are due to the members of SPA for ments on earlier drafts have been received from staff in both their financial and intellectual support to the pro- several agencies, authors of the background papers, and duction of this report. Considerable assistance has been various others. The contents of this report cannot be taken provided by Nicola Desmond and inputs provided by to represent the views of the SPA, World Bank, nor any the project advisors, Robert Chambers and Simon Maxwell. member of the SPA. ix Acronyms andAbbreviations ANG African National Congress CDF Comprehensive Development Framework CFA Communaute Financiere Africaine CGAP Coalition for the Global Abolition of Poverty CPR Contraceptive Prevalence Rates CWIQ Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire DAC Development Assistance Committee DALY Disability Adjusted Life Year DFID Department for International Development DHS Demographic Health Survey EC European Commission EPI Expanded Program of Immunization EWS Early Warning System FDI Foreign Direct Investment GAPVU Gabinte deApoio i Populafdo Vulnerdvel GDP Gross Domestic Product GWE Growth with equity HDI Human Development index HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country IDA International Development Association ILO International Labor Organization IMF International Monetary Fund MAP Monitoring the AIDS Pandemic MIS Management Information System NGO Nongovernmental Organization OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development PA Poverty Assessment PC Private Consumption PPA Participarory Poverty Assessment PR Poverty Reduction PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSR Poverty Status Report RDP Reconstruction and Development Program SME Small and medium enterprise SP Sector Program UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations UNIP United National Independence Party for Zarnbia UPE Universal Primary Education WDR World Development Report xi Executive Summary The Nature of Poverty support systems that may have allowed them to recover their position. These two qualitative points lie behind our Two principles must underpin poverty analysis. First, we description of poverty in Africa, which is necessarily ori- should never forget the hardship and tragedy that lie behind ented toward more quantitative material. Table 1 provides the figures. Each year two million African children die a quantitative overview of the extent of deprivation and before their first birthday. Virtually every one of these hardship experienced by Africans. leaves a grieving family. Second, we must grasp the mean- Two caveats cannot be repeated Frequently enough. ing of the multidimensionality of poverty. We do not mean First, developing country data are of poor quality, and this merely that poverty has many dimensions: that dignity point applies particularly to Africa and, specifically, to and autonomy are every bit as important to well-being as many of the indicators relating to poverty. Second, there income, although this is true. The different dimensions is considerable variability in the data. But even taking of poverty interact in ways that reinforce each other; this these reservations into account, t:here has been an point is the crucial insight from social exclusion. The Africanization of global poverty. Data on income pover- poverty trap is as much a social phenomenon as an eco- ty since the late 1980s show Africa's share of those living nomic one, in many cases more so. The poor can become on less than a dollar a day to have risen: the absolute outcasts, whose very poverty removes them from the social number of poor in Africa has grown five times more than the figure for Latin America, and twice that for South Asia Table 1 The harsh face of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (table 2). Although data are not available over a longer (approximate estimates) time period, the poor economic performance of many African countries for the last two decades implies that The estimated total population of Africa in 1995 was 580 million. these recent changes reflect a long-run trend. Social indi- Of these: cators have improved but more slowly in Africa than * 291 million people had average incomes of below one dol- elsewhere. Twenty years ago infant mortality was lower lar per day in 1998. in Africa than South Asia; today it is substantially high- * 124 million of those up to age 39 years were at risk of er (table 2). Primary school enrollrnents in South Asia dying before 40. have risen from just over 70 percent in the early 1980s to e 43 million children were stunted as a result of malnutri- 100 percent. In Africa, they stand at the same level as tion in 1995. over 20 years ago, having deteriorated in the 1980s, at * 205 million were estimated to be without access to health under 80 percent. services in 1990-95. * 249 million were without safe drinking water in 1990-95. The variability in African performance provides some * More than 2 million infants die annually before reaching grounds for optimism. Botswana has been one of the fastest their first birthday. growing economies in the world and is one of the two * 139 million youths and adults were illiterate in 1995. countries (the other is Cape Verde) in which the elimi- Sources: Word Bank, World Development Indicators 1998; Human nation of poverty in the near future is a real possibility. Development Report 1998; World Bank Web site. Other countries have made notable achievements in some xiii xiv AFRICAN POVERTY AT IHE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table 2 Africa lags behind and the gap is widening Infant mortality Income poverty (absolute no. (per 000 live births) Primary enrollment (net) below poverty line, millions) 1980 1997 Change 1980 1997 Change 1987 1998 Change Sub-SaharanAfrica 115 91 -26 78 77 -1 217 291 74 East Asia and Pacific 56 37 -51 111 118 6 415 278 -137 Latin America and Caribbean 60 32 -88 105 113 7 64 78 14 Middle East and North Africa 95 49 -94 87 96 9 25 21 -4 South Asia 119 77 -55 73 100 27 474 522 48 Note: Change is percentage change. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. important aspects: 15 out of 46 African countries have moved away to establish their own households. Analysis primary gross enrolment rates in excess of 100 percent, of the dynamics of poverty is constrained by the limited although some have struggled to maintain such levels in availability of panel data, but the available evidence shows the face of economic decline and the quality of education that less than one-quarter of the population in a range of is a major concern. But there are also many grounds for African countries are always poor, with up to 60 percent pessimism. The last three decades have seen the weaken- of the population (but more usually around one-quarter) ing of economic and political systems. In the last two moving in and out of poverty (table 3). This pattern con- decades 28 countries have been involved in conflict: in firms what data from other developing countries has the mid- 1990s close to 4 percent of Africa's population shown-that transitory poverty is a common phenome- were displaced persons. The devastating effects of non, pointing to the importance of vulnerability and of HI V/AIDS are far from having worked through, rob- securing livelihoods as an antipoverty strategy. However, bing families of their livelihood, draining family and health how people survive moves into poverty, why it happens service resources and leaving children orphaned. Finally, and how they escape again (and the implications of this many African economies are faced with a fragile envi- phenomenon for poverty measurement) remains one of ronment, with poor soils and frequent drought. the key gaps in our knowledge. But these results should not lead us to ignore the impor- Who are the poor? tance of poverty traps: mechanisms by which once peo- ple become poor they cannot escape it. The poor, of course, Categorizing and characterizing the poor is not an athe- have fewer assets and are less able to accumulate either oretical activity. It defines the understanding of poverty, physical or human capital, and may also be excluded from and directs us to its causes. Three overlapping catego- their community's social capital. More graphically, the rizations are important in the African context: chronic children of the poor are more likely to be malnourished, versus transitory poverty, poor versus destitute, and the illiterate, and landless (table 4). The poor can ill-afford dependent versus the economically active poor. The des- the complementary inputs to enhance the productivity titute, many of whom are dependents such as elderly (par- of the assets they have, be it fertilizer or new technology ticularly women whose assets are taken when they become for land, or school equipment for their children, or allow- widowed) and disabled, count amongst the chronically ing them time to study. Those with few assets are also the poor. But many of the economically active may move in most vulnerable. A period without income caused, for and out of poverty, being vulnerable to spells of poverty example, by illness can lead them to sell off even the few on account of either personally specific (idiosyncratic) assets they have. Inability to afford treatment during ill- shocks such as illness or theft or more general (structur- ness can leave someone permanently debilitated or dis- al) shocks such as conflict, drought, or economic crisis. abled. And they are less likely to have the resources to Households are also more likely to be poor at certain stages either cope with or recover from large-scale shocks such of the household life cycle, when there are many young as displacement or the loss of family members through children (being partly responsible for the link between violence or HIV/AIDS. Poverty traps may also be termed large household size and poverty), or once children have "irreversibilities," where a period of hardship results in Executive Summary xv Table 3 Proportion of households always poor, sometimes and is remitting income. Closer analysis ofTanzanian sur- poor, and never poor vey data reveals that, although female-headed houses have approximately the same per capita cons umption as male- Always Soometimes Nevr headed ones, female-headed households with no sup- porting male (widowed and divorced) have mean Africa consumption barely more than one-half that of other C6te d'lvoire 1985-86 14.5 20.2 65.3 C6te d'lvoire 1986-87 13.0 22.9 64.1 female-headedhouseholds C6te d'lvoire 1987-88 25.0 22.0 53.0 Analysis of the same data set shows households with a Ethiopia 1994-95 24.8 30.1 45.1 disabled member to have mean consumption of less than South Africa 1993-98 22.7 31.5 45.8 60 percent of the average (and a heacdcount 20 percent Zimbabwe 1992-95 10.6 59.6 29.8 greater than average). Disability is a hidden face ofAfrican OChile 1967-85 54.1 31.5 298 poverty. It is not a residual category, unamenable to pol- China 1985-90 6.2 47.8 46.0 icy intervention. The poor are more likely to suffer as the India 1968-70 33.3 36.7 30.0 physical burden of their labor makes them more exposed India 1975-83 21.8 65.8 12.4 to injury and causes them to be disabled by illness or injury Pakistan 1986-91 3.0 55.3 57.2 that would not be a great affliction for a more sedentary Russia 1992-93 12.6 30.2 14.4 worker. Limited access to health care is likely to turn a Source: Baulch and Hoddinot (1999). minor ailment or injury into a perrnanent disability, illustrating another irreversibility faced by the poor. permanent deprivation. The ultimate irreversibility is pre- These averages do not tell us about intrahousehold allo- mature death, which affects millions ofAfricans each year. cation, which further reinforces the patterns already For children who do not die, their physical and intellec- described. Women work longer hours than men (in Ghana tual development can be permanently impaired by peri- and Tanzania women spend nearly three times as much ods of malnutrition. time on transport, and transport four times as much as Key characteristics of the poor lead to the identifica- men), consume less of household income, and are less like- tion of several groups of the poor. Lack of able-bodied ly to resort to medical treatment for illness. Women's adult male labor is the key characteristic of many of the freedom continues to be restricted, female enrollment rates traditional poor: the elderly (particularly widows), female- are lower than those for boys, and they are subject to headed households, disabled, and orphaned. Conflict and high rates of domestic violence: poverty has a double HIV/AIDS are giving rise to an increasing number of street negative impact on women. Within a household, it breeds children and child-headed households, who are margin- violence against women and children. Redistributive social alized from many productive opportunities. Analysis of structures may provide some relief to the poor but does household survey data from several countries suggests that not bring them to equal status. Orphans and "poor cousins" female-headed households are not necessarily poorer than are often less well fed and clothed and have heavier work- those with male heads. But this view is at odds with the loads: once again child poverty emerges as a critical fea- results from qualitative studies, and is explained by the ture ofAfrican poverty requiring direct attention. A Bemba tendency to classify as female-headed those households man commented that "no one would krnow the difference with no currently resident male, thereby including in between a slave and a poor relative," a quote that points this group those with a male relative who has migrated to the position of slaves. Despite laws to the contrary, Table 4 Characteristics of poverty (selected countries)a Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Malawi Uganda Zambia Household size (avg. for poor/avg. for nonpoor) ( %) 116 97 123 127 124 Location in poorest region (% poor relative to national average) 130 163 129 147 138 Literacy (% poor relative to national average) 73 84 94 96b 92 a. Countries selected on basis of data availability. Data mainly relate to late 1980s or early 1990s. b. A later estimate for Uganda yields a ratio of 78 percent. Source: Hanmer, Pyatt, and White 1997, tables A3.1 and A3.2. xvi AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES slavery, or conditions of servitude sufficiently close to slav- The nature of poverty is changing. The catastrophic ery as to make no difference, continue in several countries. effects of conflict undermine the livelihoods of whole com- The economically active poor are characterized by their munities. The estimated 20 million refugees across the lack of assets and lack of access to services and to mar- continent constitute a growing share of the poor. Refugees kets. This lack is conditional on various factors such as often lack access to food and long periods without access remoteness, gender, and ethnicity. In most countries 90 to services. In refugee camps, immunization rates are low percent or more of the poor are rural, many living away and malnourishment and infant mortality high. HIV/AIDS from roads. Women lack access to institutions to increase has also played an important part in reversing the down- the productivity of their labor. Other important groups ward trend in infant and child mortality and strikes at of the poor, both estimated at around 10 percent of Africa's families who might otherwise have been expected to be rural population, are the landless and pastoralists. safe from poverty. In consequence, life expectancy has Landlessness appears to have declined following inde- been falling in the worst hit countries; for Botswana life pendence, but has reemerged in the last two decades, a expectancy will have fallen to 40 during the next decade, process that will probably be accelerated by the privati- whereas if there had been no AIDS epidemic it would have zation of land. Pastoralists tend to be illiterate and both been approaching 70. Both conflict and AIDS have severe geographically and politically remote. They are often not implications for children, who may be forced to join the covered by household surveys (for instance, in Mauritania) swelling ranks of street children, child prostitutes, or child but are clearly among the poor. Other groups, usually soldiers. Less dramatically, urbanization is proceeding- different ethnically but also in their means of livelihood, the share of urban areas in total population doubling to which have been historically marginalized, continue to 30 percent since 1960-and, with it, urban poverty has be so. The San in Botswana are one example, accounting become increasingly important. Formal-sector employ- for the high degree of inequality in that otherwise suc- ment has failed to keep pace, and in some countries cessful country. even fallen; this trend has typically put the burden on Related to the effects of remoteness is the fact that there women to become breadwinners. The urban poor are are very large intranational variations in well-being. For rather different than those in rural areas, living in slum example, although Ghana's infant mortality rate is only conditions and increasing insecurity being major aspects 75 compared to Nigeria's 91, infants in Ghana's northern of their poverty. region face a higher probability of premature death (with These changes make the already scanty data on income a rate of 1 14) than those born in any of Nigeria's four regions poverty difficult to interpret (table 6). There has been a (table 5). With a variation in rates between regions from sharp rise in the percentage of the population below 49 to 1,994, Ghana is an extreme case, but significant vari- the poverty line in Nigeria, little change in Zambia, but ability is also found in other countries, for example, a low a substantial fall in rural Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Uganda. of 56 in Tanzania compared to a maximum of 128. As may be expected in at least some cases, trends for urban Table 5 There is substantial intranational variation in well-being: infant mortality rates by region in selected countries Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 National Tanzania (1996) 128 108 107 99 80 56 ... ... 97 Sudan (1990) 77 71 97 62 75 91 ... ... 79 Nigeria (1990) 88 110 83 85 ... ... ... ... 91 Malawi (1992) 121 130 144 ... ... ... ... ... 132 Namibia (1992) 56 84 56 ... ... ... ... ... ... 65 Ghana (1993) 76 72 58 78 56 65 49 114 105 75 Eritrea (1995) 107 93 70 87 71 57. ... 81 Zambia (1992) 69 114 77 149 71 132 ... ... 102 Zimbabwe (1994) 44 54 ... ... ... ... ... ... 49 Uganda (1995) 77 98 99 75 ... ... ... ... 87 ... Not applicable. Source: Demographic Health Surveys (various years). Exec utive Suwnmaty xvii Table 6 Consumption poverty trends (selected African key finding is the variability in both the experiences of a countries) specific country and in the nature of poverty between countries. First some countries have made, and continue Squared to make, substantial progress in tackling various aspects H t poverty gpa of poverty. Second, the poor are far from undifferentiat- Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 ed, and different groups are poor for different reasons Burkina Faso Rural 51.1 50.7 and will require different interventions. But there are sub- 1994-1998 Urban 10.4 15.8 stantial numbers of both the dependent and economically Total 44.5 45 3 active poor who cannot be automatically assumed to Ethiopia benefit from growth where this does occur. Conflict, 1989-1995 Rural 61.3 45.9 17.4 9.9 HIV/AIDS, and the impact they have on traditional 1994-1997 Urban 40.9 38.7 8.3 7.8 safety nets all point to the fact that poverty reduction is about far more than the pursuit of growth. Ghana Rural 37.5 30.2 1989-1992 Urban 19.0 20.6 The Causes of Poverty Total 31.9 27.4 Mauritania Rural 72.1 58.9 27.4 11.9 There is no established theory of poverty, a conceptual 1987-96 Urban 43.5 19.0 9.7 2.1 framework that allows the identification of the major causal Total 59.5 41.3 17.5 7.5 factors in a particular setting. However, the causes may be classified in various ways, three of which appear par- Nigeria Rural 45.1 67.8 15.9 25.6 1992-96 Urban 29.6 57.5 12.4 24.9 itcularly helpful. First, they may be classified by social Total 42.8 65.6 14.2 25.1 process: economic, political, social/deemographic, and situational (for example, remoteness). Second, they may Uganda Rural 59.4 48.2 10.9 6.56 be classified by level: international, national (macro), 1992-1997 Urban 29.4 16.3 3.5 1.65 and household (micro). One set of factors (for instance, Total 55.6 44.0 9.9 5.9 poor economic performance) determines the overall level Zambia Rural 79.6 74.9 39.1 23.2 of poverty in a country, and another, such as lack of edu- 1991-1996 Urban 31.0 34.0 9.7 5.4 cation, determines which households are poor. Finally, Total 57.0 60.0 25.5 16.6 causes may be identified as being either primary or prox- imate. It is also worth noting that many causes interact, Zimbabwe Rural 51.5 62.8 10.2 13.0 so that cause and effect are not always easy to determine. 1991-1996 Urban 6.2 14.9 0.5 1.4.. Total 37.5 47.2 7.2 9.3 Political and social causes are identified as primary caus- Total_37_5_ 47_2_ 7_2_ 9_3 es of poverty, with a poor environmental base and demo- a. Poverty gap measures the average distance below the poverty line, and the graphic factors also listed as such. Low. rates of economic severity measure gives more weight to the poorest. growth, clearly a key factor in discussing African pover- Source: Data provided by the World Bank. ty, are identified as a proximate causes, an outcome of political systems unfavorable to growth. poverty are less favorable than those for rural areas (Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia). Similar observations apply with Economic stagnation has caused much ploverty, and respect to the squared poverty gap, which captures how worsening distribution has exacerbated the situation far below the line people are with greatest weight to the poorest, with the exception of Uganda where this mea- There is no denying the link between growth and pover- sure has risen despite the fall in the poverty headcount. ty reduction: the incomes of the poor rise with overall This review of the nature of poverty highlights some growth (figure 1). Countries with large numbers of important and sobering facts. First is the scale of the prob- poor need growth to reduce these numbers. The causes lem, and that it is in some respects worsening. The pes- of poverty are thus to be found partly in the causes simism arises from the fact that political instability continues for the relative, and in many cases absolute, decline in unabated, and that many politically stable countries con- African economic performance that began in the mid- tinue to have poor economic performance. But a second 1970s (figure 2). xviii AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Figure 1 The income of the poor grows with overall But the evidence that what growth there is constitutes this growth kind is not encouraging. The macro level evidence shows Africa to have high levels of income inequality and it has Income growth of bottom 20 percent (percent per y'ear) gq 'l 20 _ worsened in the last decade. Gender inequalities persist l 5 * in access to physical, human, and social capital, and are lo 0 + argued by many to result in inefficiencies in resource allocation that undermine productivity. At the sectoral o * + level, the continuing poor performance of African agri- culture suggests a pessimistic picture with respect to the -s - + . . spread of the benefits of growth. And poorer regions, which - - 00 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 1 are usually the more remote, often seem too disconnect- Real 2 3DP gro4th (rcn per 7ear) 9ed from macroeconomic developments to join in increas- Real GDPl orowth (pe rcen-t per year) ~ouce Roe[er nd(gety (I 997, table4es in prosperity. While rapid gains in yield in other *,ource: Roemer and (Augert (1997, table 4)developing areas may hint at the potential to be realized in Africa, the constraints appear formidable. The analy- sis of who the poor are suggests several groups who may Figure 2 Income and consumption show long-term well not benefit from growth: the dependent poor, the decline landless, smallholders producing for subsistence (partic- Percent ularly those in remote areas), pastoralists, the unemployed, and many in the informal sector. 3.0 l What are the causes of this low growth? This poor per- 2.5 formance cannot be blamed on external factors: world 2.0 trade has been booming and Africa received record aid 1.5 inflows until very recently. For many countries political 1.0 instability and outright conflict have undermined eco- 0.5 nomic performance. But in others, in which a measure of o.o _ t: ? _ _ 5 _lXk ES _ stability has been preserved, the fundamentals of economic -0.5 growth-investment in both physical and human capi- -1.0 tal-has remained weak. As described below, the initial -115 l postindependence drive to higher service provision soon i965-73 1973-80 1980-90 1990-97 faltered. Investment was propped up by capital inflows Paterppvc piin the 1970s, but efficiency was low and declined as the .Sourr:c: World Bank darabase; W'orld Bank, World l)e,elop)nent capital stock rapidly depreciated (resulting, of course, in Indicators 1999. the debt problem that persists to this day): infrastructure crumbled and capacity utilization was low. The external Performance in the 1990s has been mixed. Countries environment is not in itself the problem. African economies in conflict have recorded falls in output, and most others have responded weakly to the possibilities offered by glob- averaged rates below population growth. A handful has alization, as a result of the inadequate role accorded mar- achieved average rates close to or above 5 percent, but the ket signals. The export record and export diversification weakness of many fundamentals is not encouraging. A have been poor, and the continent has failed to attract pri- more positive note is that the demographic transition has vate investment on a significant scale. But the reasons for begun in the majority of cases, which, as discussed below, "bad policies" need to be sought in the political situation. can help usher in higher growth. This story of the reasons for low growth is repeated look- The extent to which higher growth, where achieved, ing at the most important sector for poverty reduction: reduces poverty depends on both the initial distribution agriculture. As shown in table 7, African agricultural per- and subsequent changes in distribution. Much is said about formance lags behind that of other regions, and the level the need for pro-poor growth, that is, growth from which of inputs is much lower. Rural households have increas- the poor receive a disproportionate share of the benefits. ingly diversified their income sources to nonagricultural Executive Summary xix Table 7 Indicators of agricultural change (1979-81 to 1995-97) Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa e Caribbean South Asia 1979-81 1995-97 1979-81 1995-97 19079-81 1995-97 1 . Irrigated land (% of cropland) 3.6 3.8 9.8 11.2 27.8 37.2 2. Fertilizer consumption (kg. per arable ha.) 419 576 786 931 918 1370 3. Foodproductionindex(1989-91 = 100) 79.5 108.3 80.4 118.9 70.3 119.2 4. Cereal yield (kg. per ha.) 1089 1050 1840 2576 1410 2197 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999, tables 3.2 and 3.3. activities. But thin rural labor markets and increased com- poverty reduction, which brings us to the issue of gov- petition in the informal sector mean that income from ernment failure. these sources is often very insubstantial (for instance, mak- ing small margins on trading single items). Both states and markets have failed the poor The facts presented here allow us to answer the cen- tral questions in "the debate that won't go away" con- The political context has held back poverty reduction in cerning the impact of economic reform ("structural four ways: (i) the absence of a stable framework for growth, adjustment") on the poor. Against the view that, where including the collapse of the state into conflict; (ii) poor properly implemented, reform policies have resulted in service delivery and skewed distribution of services; (iii) higher growth, others continue to argue that the poor suf- the absence of a poverty reduction strategy; and (iv) the fer. This issue is best approached by considering two ques- inability to target. Underlying each of these four points tions: (i) whether adjustment has caused increases or is the nature of theAfrican state. Newly independent gov- reductions in poverty and (ii) whether the poor have ernments inherited colonial state structures with few roots been adequately protected during adjustment. The main in local society, and politically motivated support during link between most economic reforms and poverty is growth. the Cold War reinforced this lack of accountability, though While some policies, such as macroeconomic stability, governments frequently resorted to repressive means to have a well-demonstrated positive impact of growth, the suppress political activity. Both formal and informal polit- same is not true of all liberalization measures. The cor- ical structures developed along parasitic lines, distribut- rect balance between state and market remains a matter ing benefits through systems of patronage. Economic of considerable debate, with a shift back in the 1990s performance weakened as the state sector was increasing- toward an increased role for the state. Furthermore, the ly plagued by inefficiency and corrtption. The private distributional impact of reforms is at best unclear, but sector was preyed upon for what it could offer, or sup- early claims that policy change would improve distribu- pressed altogether. tion appear to have been unfounded. There are also rea- Such state structures should not be expected to direct sons to believe that women's burden has been increased scarce state resources to the poor, and that they did not by some policies, although there are also cases of gain, is evident from both inter- and intrasectoral spending pat- such as the role of women traders in West Africa. terns. Lacking political voice of their own, the introduc- With respect to the second question-have the poor tion of antipoverty measures usually requires support from been protected?-the answer must be no. The picture with the middle classes, either from enlightened self-interest or respect to social spending is mixed, and, despite efforts to reduce the threat they perceive from the poor. There to build safety nets these have remained largely limited is little evidence of such tendencies emerging in Africa, in both scope and effectiveness. There is no indication which may be partly attributed to growth failure. These that attention has been paid to the distributional impact factors also underlie the difficulty of targeting, where polit- of policies to be implemented let alone redesign of poli- ical support is needed to avoid elite capture of benefits. cies to improve that impact. Policy management under Governments have acted to restrict economic activity adjustment has thus continued a tradition of neglect of in ways that have harmed the poor. But this is not to say xx AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES that removing such restrictions, that is, liberalization, may and poverty reduction are to proceed. Thus empower- be expected to automatically result in pro-poor growth. ment must be accompanied by building coalitions for Knowledge of the working of critical markets, such as rural poverty reduction and extending state responsiveness labor markets and the effect of land market liberaliza- beyond the central level. tion, is an area in which our understanding urgently needs to be improved. However, it seems likely that market The poor have inadequate capital failures are an important impediment to poverty reduc- tion. There are positive externalities to investment in Africa has a weak asset base, and the poor have limited health, education, water, and rural infrastructure. In Africa access to what assets exist. This comment applies to all nearly three-quarters the burden of illness is from com- kinds of capital: physical, environmental, human (dis- municable diseases, far more than the rate in other devel- cussed below), and social. Infrastructure is low, with, for oping countries, making these externalities particularly example, fewer and worse roads than other regions. And strong. Infrastructural investments may also be justified these facilities are less accessible to the poor who are using public goods arguments. Markets important for more likely to live in remote regions (table 8). Women rural development, such as credit and extension services, are further disadvantaged, with less access to land and also fail owing to asymmetric information and uncertainty. credit, and so able to command fewer inputs (table 9). Marketing channels for both inputs and outputs seem not While social capital can protect the vulnerable and sup- to function well in many countries, or at least regions of port the poor, there are limits to it. In particular, at times countries. Markets are not gender blind; barriers to access of general crisis in a community (as with conflict, famine are typically greater for poor men than they are poor or AIDS) support systems may break down. Secondly, women, and power structures mediate the market mech- some of the poor may fall outside the system. anism in ways that favor men (for example, with respect Those excluded from the family support system will to access to land). typically be among the poorest of the poor. In manyAfrican These market failures call for action by the state to languages the word for poor means literally the lack of redress them, but it has also been argued that the state support: umphawi in the Chewa language of modern has failed at poverty reduction. This sobering state of affairs Malawi means one without kin or friends. But social exclu- must temper any optimism about the rapid reduction of sion can extend to those with relatives nearby: a recent poverty in many countries. The empowerment of the poor study among the Chagga in Tanzania records how a child is part of the way out of this double bind, but cannot may die of malnutrition while living in the compound of substitute for the role the state must play if development a wealthy relative if the mother is considered an outcast. Table 8 People in poorer regions have less access to transport and education: the case of Ghana (early 1990s) Percentage of communities with. Primary enrollments Time spent Mean Access to Access to public Primary at least 50 percent fttching water expenditure drivable road transport school Male Female (minutes per day) Greater Accra 234 100 57 100 57 58 15 Ashanti 191 100 89 100 93 93 28 Central 181 100 76 94 67 67 21 Eastern 164 59 48 59 94 90 30 Volta 160 78 39 78 73 70 40 Western 146 100 85 96 100 100 24 Upper East 145 78 0 78 55 23 71 BrongAhafo 136 78 28 78 87 81 38 Northern 133 63 19 63 44 19 37 Upper West 104 60 40 60 30 30 37 Sources: Ghana Statistical Service, Ghana Living Standards Survey: Report on the Third Round; Rural Communities in Ghana. Exective Summary xxi Table 9 Male-headed households have more resources in new forms of social capital, so any simple generaliza- than female-headed ones: ownership of equipment in tion will not suffice. Senegal (percentage) Sustaining improvements in social indicators requires Tractor Plough Cart ... growing income and better state service provision Male-headed household 2.0 36.1 23.2 Female-headed household 0.6 9.5 5.1 Improving social indicators requires economic growth to Source: World Bank (1 995b). allow higher private consumption of welfare-increasing items and to provide the tax base to finance state provi- sion. Hence social indicators, such as life expectancy, Or social safety nets may fall apart when communities improve with income (figure 3). However, the figure shows are under stress, as in the case of the Ik, described in not only that lower income in Africa means lower life ColinTurnball's (1973) The Mountain People, where fam- expectancy, but that Africa underperforms in turning ily members no longer felt any obligation to feed one income into other welfare measures. another. More generally, social change will slowly realign The African poor are triply disadvantaged: first by the traditional support systems, so that the poor will rely more widening international gap as African social indicators lag on the state for support. More generally, there is a con- behind those in the rest of the world, partly as a result of cern that traditional social safety nets are eroding. While poor growth; second, by Africa's relative poor performance it is true that government systems are not emerging to in turning income to social welfare; andI, third, by nation- take their place, communities are adapting by investing al disparities in health and education between the poor Figure 3 Social indicators improve with income but Africa underperforms (scatter plot of life expectancy against income per capita) Life expectancy 85 - * Africa 0 Other countries Fitted line sl 00 e O ar tt8 8~~~~~~~0 75 - GO CD O s~~~~~o° 65 -C 55- 45 , *** , 35 - 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll Logged income per capita Source: World Bank, World Development indicators 1999. xxii AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES and the nonpoor. Improving social indicators requires health status are achievable goals. To attain these targets, growth, both to increase private consumption and to social service reform must overcome the constraints the finance better state provision. Improvements in health, poor face in accessing services, rather than reinforce them. education, and water supply all have an enormous poten- The 1990s have seen a more nuanced approach to user tial contribution to make in reducing poverty, both direct- charges emerge in many countries, with a growing recog- ly by improving the well-being of the poor and indirectly nition that exemption schemes intended for the poor fre- by supporting growth. This potential is far from realized quently did not work. Despite falling expenditure in the in Africa, where human development indicators lag behind 1980s, Africa devotes a higher share of its gross domestic other regions of the world, and in many cases the gap is product to health and education than do other regions, widening. and there is much scope for improved quality through The drive to higher service provision that followed inde- greater efficiency, introducing measures such as double- pendence faltered in the 1970s. Economic decline hit shifting and turning educational administrators into teach- many countries so that real spending fell. Both quality ers. Yet once again both conflict and HIV/AIDS pose and quantity suffered, with some countries, such as Ghana, substantial challenges to these possibilities. experiencing declines in primary enrollment rates of 10 percent or more. In no country outside Africa are gross Household andpopulation dynamics enrollments below 70 percent, but it is below this level for 19 out of 46 African countries. In Somalia the figure The changing nature of social relations embodied in the is less than 10 percent, and only 29 percent in Niger. household is central to an understanding ofAfrican pover- Accurate measures of quality are not available, but par- ty. Household members are more likely to be poor at some ents regularly complain of lower standards; in the words stages of the household life cycle than at others. An agri- of one Nigerian parent, "In our days, I started writing culture-based household with many young children will letters to my parents from the time I was in Primary 3. have low mean consumption, but this will increase as the Nowadays, many Primary 6 pupils cannot even spell children can be productively employed in household their own names properly." production or in the period in which they migrate but Where sickness prevails, or children go uneducated, it have no family of their own. The parents' consumption is the poor who bear a disproportionate share of the bur- will be maintained if grown children successfully estab- den. Mortality rates are typically twice as high for poor lish their own production. For an urban household chil- men as they are for nonpoor and three times as high for dren may be a burden on the household for longer, unless poor women as nonpoor ones; rates for poor children are this burden can be spread among relatives so that young three to five times those of the children of the nonpoor, children are sent to live with grandparents, or others may and again the ratio is higher for girls than boys. Tuberculosis go to another relative nearer school. prevalence is twice as high among the poor. Primary school Third, while household size is typically taken as a cor- enrollment rates are lower for lower income groups than relate of poverty, it is household composition-as reflect- higher ones, and higher for boys than for girls (figure 4), ed in the child/adult ratio, the female/male one, and the and secondary enrollment among the poor is negligible overall dependency ratio-that matters for household wel- (often around 1 or 2 percent or even less). fare. Female-headed households are often, although not Health and education spending is in principle a way always, disproportionately poor; but if such households of targeting the poor. But, in reality, social spending remains include those with an absent male who is remitting income, misdirected, with state subsidies disproportionately ben- then they can be among the better off. But if the house- efiting the nonpoor. On average, public spending on a hold lacks an able-bodied male, it is disadvantaged by a university student is 20 times that of a primary pupil, female/male imbalance, and perhaps doubly so if the although this figure exceeds 100 in Malawi. Data from a child/adult ratio is also high; as already noted, lack of able- number of African countries show that the bottom 20 per- bodied (male) labor is the key characteristic of the poor- cent receive between 5 and 17 percent of public spend- est African households. Families with high child/adult ing on education, whereas the top 20 percent get between ratios are more likely to be poor, but it is also the poor 21 and 44 percent. who are likely to have such ratios. Among better-off fam- A range of factors-financial, physical, cultural, polit- ilies, the woman is more likely to be educated and have ical, and low quality-interact to restrict the access of the access to paid employment, so that the opportunity cost poor. Yet universal primary education and greatly improved of her time is higher. Moreover, richer families may Execriuite Summary xxiii Figure 4 Enrollment rates are higher for the non-poor than the poor, for urban residents than for those in rural areas, and for men than women Burkina Faso: Rural Burkinia Faso: Urban 100 - 100 - 80- 80 - 40- -40 * 20 -20 - 40 - 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Expenditure quintiles Expenditure qunintiles Guinea: Rural Guinea: Urban 100 - 100 80 - 80 60 - 60 1 40 - 20 - 20 .17 71 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Expenditure quintiles Expenditure quintiles Zambia: Rural Zaambia: Urban 100 100 80- 80 - 60 - 60 - 40 - 40 20 -20 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Expenditure quintiles Expenditure quintiles * Male O Fenmale Note: The graph shows net primary enrollment rates for selected countries in the mid-1990s Source: Appiah (1999, Table 4). "substitute child quality for child quantity," this decision three rounds of Demographic Health Surveys, shows large underlying the demographic transition that is starting to falls in fertility in some countries over the last two decades take place. and modest falls in several more. The data are clear: the The demographic transition is the change from high demographic transition has begun. Mortality, fertility, and levels of fertility and mortality to low ones, so that pop- population growth are all falling in Africa (table 10). ulation growth tends to low levels, or even to zero, as fer- The demographic transition has typically been led by tility rates approach the replacement rate. Typically people socioeconomic development, particularly rising incomes. start to live longer, and infant and child mortality drop But many countries in Africa have experience prolonged before any decline in fertility, so that a period of rapid economic decline, so that the source of the African population growth is experienced. Socioeconomic devel- transition has been factors other than growth. The most opment, and lower under-five mortality itself, then set in likely causes are lower under-five mortality and female train a trend toward lower fertility. While there has been education. Associated with these two factors are later speculation about a "delayed demographic transition" in age at marriage and increased contraceptive use. However, Africa, the most recent evidence, mainly collected in the contraceptive use is less than 10 percent in many countries xxiv AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM. CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table 10 The demographic transition: birth and death rates by region Crude birth rate Crude death rate Population growth 1980 1996 1980 1996 1980-96 1996-2010 East Asia and Pacific 22 19 8 7 1.5 0.9 Europe and Central Asia 19 13 10 11 0.7 0.2 Latin America and Caribbean 31 23 8 7 1.9 1.4 Middle East and North Africa 41 29 11 7 2.9 2.1 South Asia 37 27 14 9 2.1 1.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 47 41 18 14 2.8 2.5 Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators 1998, tables 2.1 and 2.2. and under 20 percent in most. There is a large, unmet tifying the limitations on what can be achieved through demand for contraception, and the meeting of that demand the state. Second, one must recognize how policies in prac- is an essential part of a successful poverty-reduction tice frequently depart from what has been planned. strategy. Successful reproductive health programs, of course, Nonetheless, some basic principles to guide policies for require more than the provision of contraceptives and poverty reduction can be established. These principles must take account of the social context. Government stem in the first instance from the social and political and donors would do well to learn from past mistakes. embedment ofAfrican poverty, and thus the need for social Poverty and demographics are linked at both the macro- and political change to achieve lasting poverty reduction. economic and microeconomic levels. There are many con- First, policy initiatives should be homegrown out of a vincing arguments at the macroeconomic level as to why broadly based consensus: these conditions are critical not lower fertility will boost growth and improve income dis- only as ownership is a prerequisite for success, but as strate- tribution. For example, lower dependency ratios will gies must be designed to fit country-specific circumstances. increase savings, and reduced labor supply will increase The key changes needed are government commitment to real wages. Econometric analysis supports such theories: reducing poverty and structures to hold them account- in Africa a reduction in the total fertility rate of 4 per 1,000 able to such targets as they adopt. Second, there is a need may be expected to reduce the incidence of income pover- to know more about the causes of poverty, particularly ty by more than 7 percent. These macroeconomic bene- about how different policies can affect the different groups fits will be felt by poor families even if their own fertility of the poor. Such analysis will require an understanding levels are not falling, but many of the household level gains of how policy effects are mediated through inequalities depend on fertility decline among the poor themselves. between and within households. There is also a related At the microeconomic level larger families tend to be poor- need to collect more and better data, and in a form that er, and family size has a strong inverse relationship with can be analyzed in relevant groupings, for example, men child welfare. Poor households with many children can- versus women. Third, there is the need for a comprehen- not afford to adequately clothe and feed them let alone sive approach, since undue focus on one element of a send them to school. Child mortality is higher among poverty-reduction strategy will not work. Finally, gov- larger families, as is maternal mortality, especially for older ernment institutional capacity to design and implement mothers giving birth to high birth-order children. Reducing programs is often too weak to seriously tackle the causes fertility will thus decrease mortality, which in turn will of poverty. further reduce fertility. Moving beyond these principles, some guidelines (or a checklist) can be established. First is the requirement Poverty Reduction Policies for a stable political and economic environment. Conflict prevention and resolution are a key part of a poverty- Two important caveats must be placed on the discussion reduction strategy. Beyond that, growth is necessary but of poverty-reduction policies. First, one must be realistic also requires attention to distribution. There are doubly about what is feasible, and more specifically about iden- blessed, or win-win, policies that improve both growth Exe:utive Summary xxv and distribution, and these include basic social services, egy needs to be rooted in the country-specific causes of including family planning and rural infrastructure (which poverty and be appropriate to reach those most in need. should usually be labor intensive). These policies will help For example, the economically dependlent poor cannot reinforce or promote the coping strategies of the poor, as benefit directly from public works, and neither can the will limiting state encroachment on their livelihoods by, time-constrained economically active poor. But time is for example, restrictions on formal sector activity. Poverty- required to build up economic, political, and institutional monitoring systems remain rudimentary and are yet to capacity and commitment to poverty reduction. The inter- be developed. But there is no grand big idea that is going national community can be supportive of these efforts, to solve Africa's poverty problem. And each country's strat- but it cannot lead them. Box 1 The many dimensions of poverty There are many manifestations of poverty in the African * Income equality (as measured by one minus the Gini ratio) context, each reinforcing the other. Africa is falling behind * Proportion of the adult population not living with HIV- on all fronts, leading to an Africanization of global poverty. AIDS This message is illustrated by the development cobweb: the * Probability of survival to age five nearer the center you are the worse off you are with respect * Proportion of children (under five years of age) not mal- to eight dimensions of human well-being. The cobweb com- nourished pares levels of well-being in Africa with the standards achieved in the rest of the developing world. We have the following The distance between the dotted line (for other developing well-being dimensions: regions) and the solid line (for Africa) measures the relative gap between Africa and the rest of the developing world. Well- * Proportion of the population living above the consump- being outcomes in Africa are inferior for all dimensions. For tion poverty line some, the gap is significant (income poverty and primary * Gross primary enrollment rate enrollment); for others less so (female-male primary enroll- * Life expectancy at birth ment gap, for example). * Adult literacy rate Percent living above poverty line Percent adults not living with , ' G p e HIV/AIDS , i t i jw ~~~~~Gross primarv enroltment HIV/AlDS Female/male primary Life expectancy enrollment gap Probability of survival to age 5 - Adult literacy Income equality - - - - Other developing regions SSA Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998. xxvi AFRICAN POVFRTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Poverty-monitoring systems can play a valuable role As a starting point donors could address the antipoor bias- in the fight against poverty. Such systems have three es in their own aid programs (urban bias, road bias, and functions: recording, research, and response. The first of so on), but more deep-seated systemic changes are need- these is the recording of progress toward meeting agreed ed in the ways donors work. One direction for these changes upon targets, which is a part of the process of government is to be more selective allocating aid, including debt accountability for poverty reduction. Research includes relief, in accordance with government commitment to both academic study of issues such as the determinants reducing poverty and the openness of domestic debate of poverty but also more policy-oriented analysis, includ- on policy issues. Another aspect of selectivity is to pay ing evaluation of the impact of government policies. Finally, greater attention to the political context, and direct explic- there is response: collecting information in a way that it attention to conflict prevention and resolution. While allows government response so as to best address the pover- donors appear to be moving down this path, there remain ty problem. The latter is perhaps the most important func- great dangers that aid-supported programs will remain tion, requiring close cooperation between producers and "donor driven," as has been the experience of many sec- users of data. tor programs despite a large part of the rationale for sec- The donor community also needs to redefine and tor programs to let government be in the driver's seat. refocus its work if they are to support Africa's efforts at Donors need to accept the time needed for both a learn- poverty reduction. Much of the aid spent in Africa in the ing process and to build the support required for con- last three decades has not demonstrably reduced poverty. structing a domestically owned Poverty Reduction Strategy Although poverty reduction is at the core of most donors' Paper, and not provide "assistance" that ends up control- policy statements, the evidence is that the reality remains ling the process. The recent pilot in Burkina Faso in which somewhat divorced from the rhetoric. This rhetoric has local officials developed a system of performance-based increased in recent years, with the promotion of the monitoring provides an example of how external assis- Comprehensive Development Framework and now the tance can guide without dictating. adoption of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as central Are the International Development Targets for pover- to donors' partnership with developing country govern- ty reduction achievable? Previous international targets ments. While these new steps are welcome, there are rea- have come and gone, and much academic analysis suggests sons for making a more decisive break with the past, and a similar fate awaits these new targets. The impossibility for learning from it. There is a large degree of inertia in of achieving these goals is not, however, our message. most aid programs, so it remains true that still only a small, Rather, it is that, if they are to be achieved, something but increasing, share of aid goes to direct poverty reduc- different, something more, needs to be done than at tion (but this is in the context of declining aid budgets). present. PART I: Afiica's Poverty Problem In this analysis of the nature of Africa's poverty problem, and how it is understood and measured can influence the chapter 1 offers a first account while being wary of the choice of policy responses. Chapter 2 confronts these issues dangers of overgeneralizing about a complex and inter- as an introduction to an attempt in chapter 3 to discov- acting condition, both between and within the coun- er the dimensions of poverty in Africa and describe the tries. There are various conceptualizations of poverty, ways in which they are changing. I CHAPTER 1 A First View The Growth of African Poverty The World Development Report 1990 (WDR 1990) showed not only the large extent of poverty in Africa but Out of a population of 580 million in the mid-1990s, also that this problem increased markedlyduring the 1980s, more than 270 million Africans were living on daily incomes both absolutely and relative to other developing regions. equivalent to less than a dollar a day, 250 million Africans Already, in the "lost decade" of the 1980s, some did not have access to safe drinking water, and over 200 Africanization of global poverty was under way. What of million had no access to health services. About 140 mil- the 1990s? lion youths were illiterate. More than two million chil- Improved data that have become available over the dren die each year before reaching their first birthday. The last decade both validate the conclusions of the World scale of poverty in Africa is staggering and behind it lies Development Report 1990 and point to a continuation, an immense scale of individual tragedy and suffering. Every perhaps acceleration, of the same trends. Table 1.1 and dead child is mourned. A father from Tanzania who lost figure 1.1 present data on social indicators and their chan- two sons through malnutrition asked, "Can you tell me ges between 1980-97, and table 1.2 presents international why this had to happen?" comparisons of income (dollar-a-day) poverty. The Table 1.1 International comparisons of social indicators, 1980-97 EastAsia Latin America Middle East Sub-Saharan and Pacific and Caribbean and North Africa South Asia Africa 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 199v7 1980 1997 Life expectancy at birth (years) 65 69 65 70 59 67 54 6 2 48 51 Infant mortality (per 1000 births) 56 37 60 32 95 49 119 77 115 91 Under five mortality (per 1000) 83 47 ... 41 137 63 180 100 189 147 Child malnutrition (stunting)a 52b 38b 25c 13c 31 22a 66 54 37 39 Undernourishment (% population)d 27b 13b 13 11 9 9 38 23 37 33 Primaryschool enrollment ratee 111 118 105 113 87 96 73 100 78 77 Youth illiteracy: male 5 2 11 7 2b 14 36 25 34 20 Youth illiteracy: female 15 4 11 6 52 27 64 48 55 29 ... Not available. a. Second column is 1995. b. Southeast Asia. c. South America. d. First column is 1979/81. e. Second column is 1996 and second 1995/97. Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999 (World Bank 1999); for child malnutrition, see World Health Organization (WHO), Third Report on the World Nutrition Situation, table 3 (Geneva: WHO 1997); for undernourishment, see Food and Agriculture Organization of the LUnited Nations (FAO), State of Food Insecurity in the World 1999, table 1. 3 4 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Figure 1.1 Changes in social indicators, 1980-1997 (percentage) Primary enrollment Under five mortality Percentage change Percentage decrease 40 - Middle 30 - East & Sub- 20 - East Asia North Saharan 10 - & Pacific Africa Sourh Asia Africa o, ,-- . 0 -O - EastAsia Latin Middle SoLith Asia Sub- -20 & Pacific America & East & Saharan -40 Caribbean North Africa -60 Africa Youth illiteracy (male) Infant mortality Percentage decrease Percentage decrease Middle Middle Latin East & Sub- Latin East & Sub- East Asia America & North Saharan East Asia America & North Saharan & Pacific Caribbean Africa South Asia Africa & Pacific Caribbean Afirica South Asia Africa 0 (5___________________________ -20U -40 2 -60 -40 -80 -60 Youth illiteracy (female) Life expectancy at birth Percentage decrease Percentage increase Middle 15 Latin East & Sub- 10 East Asia America & North Saharan 10 & Pacific Caribbean Africa South Asia Africa ** * 0 - _ -20 - _ East Asia Latin Middle South Asia Sub- -40 & Pacific America & East & Saharan -60 Caribbean North Africa -80 Africa Child malnutrition Percentage change Middle Latin East & Sub- East Asia America & North Saharan & Pacific Caribbean Africa South Asia Africa 20 0- -20 m f U -60 Sourc es. World Development Inidicators 1999; Third Report on World Nutrition Situation. reliability of allthese data is suspect, particularly for Sub- particularly regarding life expectancy (still a mere 51 Saharan Africa, so it is important not to overinterpret the years of age and barely improved since the beginning of results. However, broad trends emerge that are likely to the 1980s), infant and child mortality, and general mal- be outside the error margins of the data. nutrition. Figures are much higher for all these variables The social indicators in table 1.1 show immediately that than for the rest of the developing world, although sig- Africas comparative record is poor in almost all respects, nificantly down from the 1980 levels. Primary school A First View 5 enrollment rates are also severely to the disadvantage of tries of eastern and southern Africa, there are now dra- Africa, where there has been no improvement over the matically deteriorating mortality and health indicators, in period covered.2 In other respects-child malnutrition substantial part due to the spread of the HIV/AIDS pan- and illiteracyamongyouths-theAfrican figures are more demic (see chapter 3, table 3.3). in the middle range: a lot worse than the best but well Table 1.2 presents major developing, regions' estimates below the worst (South Asia). of the number of people with incomes equivalent to less By examining changes from 1980 to 1997, the full grav- than US$1 a day (adjusted for international differences ity of the situation becomes evident. Along with South in currencypurchasing powers) in 1987 and 1998.4 Nearly Asia, Africa started the period with a very adverse situa- 300 million Africans-almost half of Africa's total popu- tion. Since it should be easier to improve on a bad situa- lation-were below this poverty line in 1998. Poverty tion than on a good one, Africa's results over these two has increased in three of the five regions shown, but most decades might have been expected to be better than aver- rapidly in Africa, causing its share of total income pover- age, as was the case in South Asia for most indicators. ty to rise sharply over the period. In many countries in But Africa did not realize this catching-up potential (fig- Africa, it is not hard to find the opinion that life is in many ure 1.1). Only in the case of youth illiteracy did progress respects harder now than 20 or 30 years ago, a view borne in Africa keep pace with the rest of the developing world. out by longitudinal studies in Tanzania (see, for instance, In all other respects, the continent's record is clearly weak- Howard and Millard 1997) that document a long-run er than the rest, and in two areas (child malnutrition and decline in nutrition. An insight into this general decline primary school enrollment) there was actually a minor is offered by the comment of a woman. from Sukumaland deterioration.3 Figure 1.1 leaves little doubt that, overall, (Tanzania): "In the 1970s bicycles disaippeared" (Drangert Africa's relative position has deteriorated. 1993, p. 230).5 Of course, with the noted exceptions, the indicators Echoing the condusion of the WorldDevelopment Report have improved in absolute terms, so the trend has been 1990 concerning the 1980s, it can truly be said that the in the right direction even if Africa's relative standing has Africanization of world poverty has continued in the 1990s, deteriorated. There are, however, three important caveats. and has probably accelerated. And, as will become clear First, the data in table 1.1 are mostly shares, so the absolute later in this report, there is every prospect of a continua- number of children not going to school has dramatically tion of this trend. Projections on plausible assumptions increased. Similarly, the figure of more than two million about future trends in output growth and income inequal- infants dying each year has not changed greatly in the ity indicate clearly that Africa will have the greatest diffi- last three decades, despite declining mortality rates. Second, culty in reducing the incidence of poverty, by comparison social indicators have a distributional component, so with other regions (Hanmer and Naschold 1999). that observed gains may benefit those already doing well International comparisons, which are standardized rather than the disadvantaged. Finally, in several coun- into ratios and indices, cannot fully catch the scale of the Table 1.2 Population living on less than US$1 per day, 1987-98 (millions of people) Headcount 1998 1987 1998 Absolute change Percentage change (%) (estimated) East Asia 418 278 -140 -33 15 Latin America 64 78 14 22 16 Middle East and North Africa 9 5 -4 -44 2 South Asia 474 522 48 10 40 Sub-Saharan Africa 217 291 74 34 46 Memo item SSA as a % of above regions 22 33 Note: The headcount is the percentage of the population below the poverty line. Figures for 1998 are preliminary estimates but are consistent with firmer fig- ures for 1996. Incomes are calculated at constant international prices adjusted fot purchasing power parity. Source: World Bank (2001), World Development Report, table 1. I. 6 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITlES, AND CHALLENGES Box 1ITh arhfceopvrtnSu-ahrnpoor condition of the social infrastructure and of the state's Box 1.1 The harsh face of poverty in Sub-Saharan abiit to prvd,ai evcs Africa (approximate estimates) abilty to provide basic services. * The estimated total population of Africa in 1995 was The Danger of Overgeneralizing 580 million. Of these * 291 million people had average incomes of below US$1 Africa is a vast continent and care must be taken not to per day in 1998. overgeneralize. There is much variation between coun- * 124 million of those up to age 39 years were at risk of tries tregards ther current situation an trend dying before 40. tries, both as regards their current situations and trends * 43 million children were stunted as a result of malnu- over time. Some of this variation reflects regional differ- tritionlin in 1995. ences, such as higher levels of infant and child mortality * 205 million were estimated to be without access to health in West Africa, although this gap is narrowing, partly services in 1990-95. because the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is higher in eastern * 249 million were without safe drinkingwater in 1990-95. and southern Africa (for infant mortality rate/child mor- * More than rwo million infants die annually before reach- tality rate [IMRICMR] data, see Hanmer and White 1999; ing their first birthday. for data on HIV/AIDS, see MAP (Monitoring the AIDS * 139 million youths and adults were illiterate in 1995. Pandemic) 1998). Sources. World Bank (1 998) and other World Bank sources; United Table 1.3 presents data for 12 countries (selected on Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1998 the basis of data availability and representativeness). There (UNDP 1998); FAG, State ofFoodInsecurig in the World, 1999, table I. is clearly a wide range of values across countries for each indicator. It is also evident that there is no great consis- poverty faced by the people of Africa. Box 1.1 expresses tency between the measures of income poverty and the the problem in terms of the number of people affected. other indicators. Nigeria and Zimbabwe have substantial These data speak for themselves. Note, however, the income poverty but relatively favorable social indicators, Table 1.3 Poverty indicators for selected countries $1 a day poverty measures Child welfare Social infirastructure Headcounta Stunting' Infant mortality' Access to water Access to healthd (percent) Poverty gap2 (percent) (per 1000) (percent) (percent) C6te d'lvoire 18 14 24 85 82 ... Dem. Rep. of Congo ... ... 45 85 25 26 Ethiopia 46 12 64 107 27 46 Kenya 50 22 34 59 49 77 Madagascar 72 33 50 102 32 38 Malawi ... ... 48 132 54 35 Mali ... ... 30 149 44 40 Mozambique ... ... 36 133 28 39 Nigeria 31 13 38 87 43 51 South Africa 24 7 23 48 ... ... Uganda 69 29 38 96 42 49 Zimbabwe 41 14 21 56 74 85 ... Not available. Note: Countries are selected on basis of data availability, population size, and geographical spread. a. Most data relate to late 1980s and early 1990s, although the Ethiopian figures are for 1981-82. The headcount figure shows the percentage of populationis with incomes of less than US$1 per day. The poverty gap is the shortfall of income/consumption below US$1/day, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line and per capita of the total population. b. A measure of height-for-age relative to the norm for a standard international reference population. Data are drawn from the period 1992-97. c. 1995 data. d. Data from 1990-95. Measures population within one hour travelling time to local health services. Sources: For dollar per day and stunting data, see World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999. For other items, see (ADB [African[ Development Bankj 1999), African Development Report 1999. A First View 7 and the same is true to a lesser extent of Kenya. Madagascar, biguous deterioration, and Uganda saw a clear improve- Uganda, and Ethiopia (for which, however, the income ment (both these trends probably being war-related), while estimates relate to the early 1980s, when Ethiopia was in there was little change in Malawi. In the other countries steep economic decline) combine severe income poverty the data were either incomplete or showed differing trends and adverse social indicators (Malawi would almost cer- between water and health services. World Bank data on tainly be added to this list were income poverty data infant mortality in 1980-97 show improvements, some available), whereas C6te d'Ivoire and South Africa are fair- quite large, for all 12 countries except Kenya, where ly consistently at the less unfavorable end of the spectrum. there was no change (see table A.3 in the appendix). There is also considerable variability within countries. Examination of data from demographic health sur- Demographic health surveys provide data on infant and veys for nine countries similarly reveals a complex picture, child mortality by region or province. Table 1.4 shows with substantial variations between countries and also with data from selected countries, giving the various regional alternative indicators pointing in different directions (Sahn, rates reported and the national rate. Only in the case of Stifel, and Younger 1999). Analysis of an asset index encom- Zimbabwe is the maximum rate below the minimum passing ownership of consumer durables, housing char- rate of some other countries. In all other cases, infants in acteristics, and education shows signilficant decline in some regions of relatively low mortality countries have a poverty in seven out of the nine countries (Sahn, Stifel, higher probability of early death than those resident in and Younger 1999, table 2). But data on malnutrition certain regions of countries with higher overall mortali- (reported in table A.5 in the appendix) suggest a more ty. For example, at 114, infant mortality in northern Ghana nuanced picture. Three nutritional indicators are com- is higher than the national rate for Nigeria of over 90, monly used: height-for-age (stunting) is a measure of long- indeed higher than that in all regions of Nigeria, though run nutritional status, weight-for-height (wasting) is a Ghana's overall rate is just 75. At an even greater extreme, short-term indicator, and the two are combined in weight- the low rates achieved in Zimbabwe contrast with those for-age, which is a good measure of nutritional status in in excess of 300 in some refugee camps, or the 80 percent very small children. The figures show the percentage of probability of dying before age five for children born children under the age of three falling below an interna- with AIDS. tionally defined standard for each of these three measures. Table 1.3 provides only snapshot information, but some The picture emerging is that, first, mnalnutrition levels evidence is available on trends over time. Data on changes are very high, with stunting barely dropping below one- in access to social infrastructure between 1985 and 1995 quarter at the minimum and approaching half of all chil- show a mixed picture across the countries listed in table dren at the maximum. Second, malnutrition is worst in 1.3 (data from ADB 1999, table 3.5). The Democratic rural areas-with a few exceptions for weight-for-height, Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) experienced an unam- rural rates exceed urban ones, being on average about 50 Table 1.4 Substantial intranational variation in well-being: infant mortality rates by region in selected countries Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 National Tanzania (1996) 128 108 107 99 80 56 ... ... ... 97 Sudan (1990) 77 71 97 62 75 91 ... ... ... 79 Nigeria (1990) 88 110 83 85 ... ... ... ... ... 91 Malawi (1992) 121 130 144 ... ... ... ... ... ... 132 Namibia (1992) 56 84 56 ... ... ... ... ... ... 65 Ghana(1993) 76 72 58 78 56 65 49 114 105 75 Eritrea (1995) 107 93 70 87 71 57 ... ... ... 81 Zambia (1992) 69 114 77 149 71 132 ... ... ... 102 Zimbabwe (1994) 44 54 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 49 Uganda (1995) 77 98 99 75 ... ... ... ... ... 87 ... Not available. Source: Authors' calculations from Demographic Health Surveys (various years). 8 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES percent higher. As regards change over time, the clearest els of those below it in a way that gives greater weight to pattern is the increase in short-run malnutrition, which the consumption of the poorest. has risen in all countries except Zambia. Paradoxically, Once again, a mixed record is revealed. In Ethiopia, stunting (long-run malnutrition) has decreased over the Mauritania, and Uganda the trend is unambiguously same period in some countries. There are some differences toward less poverty, with substantial reductions in both with respect to rural and urban performance over time. measures. The Nigerian and Zimbabwean results are equal- Most notably, the percentage of underweight children has ly unambiguous but in the opposite direction. In Burkina significantly increased in rural areas in five out of eight Faso and Zambia the trend appears to be toward less countries, whereas it has done so in urban areas in only rural and more urban poverty, although in both coun- one case (and with significant declines in two countries). tries the changes in headcount numbers may well be small As regards income poverty, no directly comparable enough to fall within the error margins of the estimates. country trends are available, but there is World Bank infor- mation on trends in consumption poverty for six African Condusion countries, broken down as between urban and rural areas. These data are presented in table 1.5. The squared pover- Overall, then, Africa as a whole is falling behind the rest ty gap columns provide a measure of the size of the gap of the world in the prevention of poverty, and in some between the poverty line and the mean consumption lev- respects the problem is getting worse, but indicators point Table 1.5 Consumption poverty trends in selected African countries Headcount Squared poverty gap Year ] Year 2 Year I Year 2 Burkina Faso Rural 51.1 50.7 ... ... 1994-98 Urban 10.4 15.8 ... ... Total 44.5 45.3 ... Ethiopia 1989-95 Rural 61.3 45.9 17.4 9.9 1994-97 Urban 40.9 38.7 8.3 7.8 Ghana Rural 37.5 30.2 ... ... 1989-92 Urban 19.0 20.6 ... ... Total 31.9 27.4 ... ... Mauritania Rural 72.1 58.9 27.4 11.9 1987-96 Urban 43.5 19.0 9.7 2.1 Total 59.5 41.3 17.5 7.5 Nigeria Rural 45.1 67.8 15.9 25.6 1992-96 Urban 29.6 57.5 12.4 24.9 Total 42.8 65.6 14.2 25.1 Uganda Rural 59.4 48.2 10.9 6.6 1992-96 Urban 29.4 16.3 3.5 1.7 Total 55.6 44.0 9.9 5.9 Zamhia Rural 79.6 74.9 39.1 23.2 1991-96 Urban 31.0 34.0 9.7 5.4 Total 57.0 60.0 25.5 16.6 Zimbabwe Rural 51.5 62.8 10.2 13.0 1991-96 Urban 6.2 14.9 0.5 1.4 Total 37.5 47.2 7.2 9.3 ... Not available. Source: Demerv (1999), table 5; based on World Bank data. A First View 9 in different directions. The proportion of global poverty Notes attributable to Africa is rising and the likelihood is this will continue unless there are radical changes to policies 1. This report is confined to Sub-Saharan Africa, and use of and performance. The manifestations of poverty blight the term Africa refers to Africa south of the Sahara. the lives of ever more millions of Africans, causing huge 2. As documented in chapter 9, enrollrnent rates deteriorated suffering and diminishing the possibilities of progress. At in the 1980s but picked up again in several countries in the 1990s, the same time, however, the situation on the continent is showing no change over the period shown in table 1.1. complex, and there is much variation in the positions of 3. These changes are small enough to be within the error mar- individual African states. The temptation to overgeneral- gins of the data. ize is large but should be avoided. This temptation should 4. The weaknesses of such poverty measures are discussed later, be avoided partly because the diversity of experience reflects and the difficulties of drawing strong inferenices about changes over diversity in the meaning and nature of poverty. Underlying an 1 1 -year period, given the large error margins of the data, must this is the issue of whether poverty is an appropriate phe- be borne in mind. nomenon to seek to measure. Following this introduction 5. As documented by the same source, bicycles have made a to the African situation, chapter 2 explores more con- comeback in the 1990s, although they remain scarcer than before ceptual issues as a prelude to a fuller discussion of the (see chapter 8). many dimensions and changing nature of the poverty problem in chapter 3. CHAPTER 2 Different Poverty Concepts Can Point in Different Directions Different Poverty Concepts conceptualizations. The range of possibilities is illustrat- ed in figure 2. 1, where band 1 represents a purely income- Material deprivation is at the core of poverty: low income based view and band 6 the most inclusive approach. and consumption levels, resulting in poor nutrition, inad- In this scheme, "PC" stands for private consumption equate clothing, and low-quality housing. But poverty is (or income); "S" refers to services normally provided by not just about income or consumption. It also includes the state (although occasionally by the private sector) such deficient command over productive assets and access to as schooling, health services, and treated water; "assets" key public services. Vulnerability and its resulting inse- refers to such items as land, equipment, and other pro- curity are further characteristics, aggravated by an inabil- ductive inputs; "SEC" refers to the extent of vulnerabil- ity to make provisions for emergencies: vulnerability to ity and insecurity already mentioned; and "dignity" and droughts, floods, and other natural disasters; to human "autonomy" relate to the degree of dependency and social disasters such as the death or illness of a breadwinner, as exclusion. well as war and civil disturbance; and to economic phe- What should be the balance between different approach- nomena such as inflation or market collapses. es? Much of the choice is about the tension between Poverty has important less materialistic aspects, too. functionally useful categories and the extent of social Among these is dependency arising, for example, from contextualization. Measures based on income or con- unequal relationships between landlord and tenant, debtor sumption-the most commonly used for international and creditor, worker and employer, man and woman. Both encompassing and going beyond these various aspects is Figure 2.1 A pyramid of poverty concepts social exclusion, referring to the inferior access of the poor to state services and other collective provisions, and to the labor market; inferior opportunities for participation in social life and collective decisionmaking; and a lack of 1.... PC decisionmaking power. Hopelessness, alienation, and pas- sivity are thus common among those living in poverty. 2 ./ PC+SS Finally, poverty is also relative: people can be said to be poor when they are unable to attain a level of well-being 3 ..PC+SS+Assets ...... A regarded by their society as meeting a reasonable mini- mum standard. 4 ./ PC+SS+Assets+SEC Poverty can thus be viewed narrowly or broadly: the broader the view, the more encompassing it is but the 5 .. PC+SS+Assets+SEC+Dignity . harder to measure. There is therefore a trade-off between relatively narrow income- or consumption-based defini- 6 . PC+SS+Assets+SEC+Dignity+Autonomy . tions that, however, lend themselves to aggregated mea- surement and comparability, and broader but more elusive Source: Based on Baulch (1996), figure 1. 10 Diffrrent Poverty Concepts Can Point in Different Directions 11 comparisons-have the advantage that the required data cussions intended to elucidate local perceptions of the are often available. Moreover, the simple headcount indices nature of poverty, the assets of the pcor, the constraints (of the type reported in table 1.2 in chapter 1) can be eas- they face, and the influence of household dynamics. ily augmented by measures using the same data to indi- Practitioners of such "participatory poverty assessments" cate the severity of the poverty by giving more weight to (PPAs) stress the importance of the social context and observations far below the poverty line than to those just some are dubious about the usefulness of national-level below it (table 1.5 in chapter 1). aggregates, and perhaps of the very idea of measurement. Despite these substantial merits, income-poverty mea- In practice, poor people largely report: their condition in sures also have important limitations. It is difficult to terms of material deprivation: not enough money, employ- ensure comparability across countries and to establish an ment, food, clothing, and housing, combined with inad- objectively robust definition of a poverty line. Individuals equate access to health services and clean water, although should preferably be the unit of analysis, but in practice they are also liable to stress such norimaterial factors as surveys invariably take the household as their unit of analy- security, peace, and power over decisions affecting their sis. They thus abstract from the position of individuals in lives. It can be difficult to ensure representativeness in par- the distribution of household consumption and raise dif- ticipatory assessments, however, with an ever-present dan- ficult issues about what constitutes a household (what to ger that the voices heard will be mainly those of local elites, do about males who have migrated to the towns and who the well-to-do, and men. send remittances back home, and how young children The various poverty concepts, however, should not be should be treated in measuring household size).' seen as competing with each other. The different dimen- Furthermore, a focus on income poverty may miss impor- sions of poverty interact in various ways. Poor education tant dimensions of poverty and thus fail to capture cru- and ill health, which are most common among the chil- cial aspects of the processes of causation. An obvious dren of parents with low income, restrict earning poten- example is that of vulnerability, for which some indica- tial. Income poverty has been shown to be one of the tion of assets is necessary. factors that explains intercountry variations in health out- Asset-based approaches highlight the paucity of vari- comes in addition to a country's overall level of econom- ous kinds of capital as a major source of deprivation and ic development (see Carrin and Politi 1995). Greater stocks as an indicator of vulnerability, since assets provide a buffer of assets make the nonpoor less vulnerable to external against adverse shocks. There are measurement problems shocks than the poor, and the need of the poor to hold here, too, of course, and the approach retains some of the assets as a hedge against shocks means that they cannot materialism of income-based measures. At present, there use them to accumulate further wealth as can their bet- are little systematic data presenting asset-based measure- ter-off neighbors.2 With high direct costs on top of high ments, but the data from Sahn, Stifel, andYounger (1999) indirect opportunity costs, and nothing to fall back on, discussed at the end of chapter 1 begin to fill this gap. the poor literally cannot afford to get ill. This problem is Another approach for which a good deal of (not always particularly severe for the growing nuimbers of urban poor trustworthy) data are available is to augment income who have a narrower range of survival strategies to call with basic-needs indicators, such as mortality and litera- upon. What may be a mild illness or injury for a salaried cy. These can throw important light on aspects of the person in a sedentary occupation may deprive a poor human condition and are less narrowly economic in their person, engaged in hard manual labor, of her or his liveli- approach. They can draw greater attention to individual, hood. The poor can be socially stigmatized by their pover- as opposed to household, well-being and to the centrali- ty, reinforcing the barriers that make it impossible for ty of the opportunities and choices open to people. However, them to climb out of poverty: the poverty trap can be as the combination of social indicators into composite indices, much, or more, a social phenomenon as an economic such as the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) one-this is the point of social exclusion. Human rights Human Development and Human Poverty Indices, have are thus not only one aspect of poverty but, as suggested elicited criticism and are essentially arbitrary in their weight- in box 2.1 below, the poor are more vulnerable to human ing systems. There are also doubts about the accuracy of rights abuses. some of the data employed (see chapter 14). Table 2.1 presents some of the ways in which the dif- At the opposite end of the spectrum from income-based ferent dimensions of poverty may interact with one anoth- measures is an approach based on community-level dis- er. Each cell represents how the dimension listed at the 12 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Box 2.1 Human rights and poverty Practices persist throughout Africa that are incompatible with InWestAfrica, thereare30,000 ot more trokosi, younggirls the achievement of poverty reduction. All of these practices given to priests by families guilty of some offence. To atone restrict the dignity of affected individuals, but several, such for their crime, the family gives a virgin daughter to a priest, as debt bondage and slavery, have an important economic making her subject to economic and sexual exploitation. dimension. Though only one example is given here, many Another widespread practice has been for children to be more could be added. placed in the households of other family members. Where Although slavery has been outlawed in all countries, there the exchange is from a poor family to a rich one, these arrange- is incontrovertible evidence that the practice persists. Lack ments may be only a short step from slavery. As has been of education and restricted access to the outside world are documented in several West African countries, the custom the instruments by which this is maintained, as slaves may be has evolved so that parents are paid for the children to be ignorant of their legal position and unable to seek alternative placed in a family of strangers. All ties with the familv are employment in any case. An escaped slave explained: cut. This type of arrangement is a growing trade in Benin and Togo, with the children ending up in oil-rich countries I have never heard the abolition discussed in my mas- such as Nigeria and Gabon. ter's house.... All the ones I have met who have Poverty forces parents to sell their children, and they may heard of it learned from other black communities, be forced into similar arrangements for themselves. Debt which is why masters are so sensitive to any contact bondage is thus both a cause and consequence of poverty. between slaves on the one hand, and free haratines Poverty drives people into entering debt bondage arrange- [freed slaves] and other blacks, on the other hand. ments from which they cannot then escape. Sources: Anti-slavery International; Aird (1999). top of the column may reinforce the dimension in the cor- The table is not intended to be exhaustive either in terms responding row. For example, human capital can increase of cell contents or in the rows and columns. For exam- income/expenditure through its productivity effects. ple, the devastating effects of conflict are not captured Table 2.1 Interactive effects from column heading to row Income/expenditure Physical assets Human capital Social capital Political rights Income/expenditure ... Asset availability allows Increased productivity Provide access tO Protection against arbitrar-y h/h to withstand shocks income opportunities disruptive interventions and social protectioni Physical assets Allows asset ... Education improves Social networks canl Preferenitial access to accumulation access to some assets providc access to assets assets (including common property) Human capital Can afford health and Can afford period ... Can rely on social Benefit from biases in education of inactivity protection in times of resource allocation need Social capital Able to meet social Asset holdings Weak human capital ... Can provide basis for obligations to access guarantee social may mean unable to rights to level of social social networks standing operate with social protection network Political rights Economic presence provides basis for Less educated less able Can protect basic political influence to articulate demands political rights or participate in political system ... Not applicable. Different Poverty Concepts Can Point in D,ferent Directions 13 here. Many of the interactions mentioned here will recur To what extent are these visions competitive rather than in this report, as will the strong implication that the war complementary? Do those identified as poor differ appre- against poverty is a battle to be fought on many fronts. ciably according to the definition used? A study of C6te d'Ivoire applied varying definitions, confined to materi- Why Conceptualizations Matter al and other objective indicators, to the same set of data and found that they did not choose the same people Being clear about the meaning and nature of poverty is (Glewwe and Van der Gaag 1990). The disparities would important because the definitions used and the measure- surely have been greater had the range of definitions ments applied shape how the problem is viewed and the employed included more subjective indicators. This pre- choice of policies to combat it. But who will decide, and sumption is strengthened by "Jodha's paradox," derived on what basis, between objective indicators and the more from a study of two Indian villages between 1964 and subjective PPA outcomes? Are individual voices to be 1984. Villagers whose real incomes had declined during accepted uncritically or is knowledge mediated by statis- these 20 years reported their situation as having improved, ticians to be preferred? There are different value systems citing decreased dependence on low-pay jobs and on at work here (see box 2.2), so much depends on the impor- patrons and landlords, improved mobility, and better con- tance attached to social context. Objective indicators are sumption patterns (Jodha 1988). At a much more aggre- decontextualized, whereas in PPA all depends on con- gate level, there are divergences for Africa between text, with poverty related to the ability of individuals to performance in social indicators (for example, as sum- live decently within their society. marised in the UNDP's Human Development Index) and At the policy level, income-poverty measures of course in headcount measures, as seen in the discussion of table draw attention to economic concerns. If the poverty line 1.3 in chapter 1. The analysis by Sahn, Stifel, and Younger is set so that around half the population (or more) are (1999) of demographic health survey data shows similar poor, as is the case in much of Africa, then the focus is discrepancies, with rises in the asset index but deteriora- likely to be at the macroeconomic level and on measures tion in nutrition indicators in several cases. to influence the pace and nature of gross domestic prod- At the same time, one should not exaggerate the extent uct (GDP) growth. In contrast, concentration on basic of the differences. Other evidence, for example on Kenya needs indicators points in a more interventionist direc- and Ghana, shows rather close correlation between the tion, for example, toward targeted provision of essential extent of poverty revealed by headcount and PPA meth- services. PPA assessments, in turn, point more toward ods. And, although the C6te d'Ivoire study referred to the coping strategies of the poor and grass-roots actions, above did identify materially different poverty groups, and can be sceptical about the potential of national-level most definitions used were quite strongly correlated with measures. Others argue that political rights are the pre- each other. More generally, the subjectively based partic- requisite for sustained improvements in the well-being of ipatory approaches produce results consistent with those the poor. of household expenditure surveys, vwith the poor stress- ing the importance of access to money, jobs, and assets Box 2.2 A pastoralist view of poverty such as land and education-all income-related-although food security also emerges as a preoccupation. Similarly, Broch-Due (1995, p. 3) contrasts perceptions of poverty there is broad correlation between the cross-country results among savannah dwellers with that of the pastoralists of of income-based poverty line measures and the Human East Africa. Groups like the Turkana conceive of wealth Poverty Index developed by the UNDP that excludes largely in terms of cattle, and "contrast the prosperous life income variables, although there are also important dif- of their nomadic camps with the 'poor' life of foragers, ferences, partly because some of the mreasures used are not farmers, fisher folks and others who they conceive of as existing on the fringes of society. Irrespective of income or sensitive to short-term changes in well-being. nutrition, the cultural constructions surrounding cattle In any case, there is more to this issue than correla- herders place them at the 'centre' of society and portray tion. Each approach yields its own tunique type of infor- them as 'rich' while others who are at the periphery, in the mation, so that the appropriateness of the method depends 'bush,' are regarded as poor." on the nature of the information required. The various Soorce: Broch-Due (1995). approaches to aggregation have their value, just as the PPA approach yields insights that cannol readily be obtained 14 AFRIcAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES from statistical surveys, such as the importance people overlap reinforces the messages that the different dimen- attach to how they are valued by their peers, and draw sions interact, but that they are different and comple- attention to such aspects as whether individuals have to mentary. Indeed, there is growing interest in the potential undertake demeaning types of work, whether they can of research that, for example, combines headcount, asset- feed their children properly, bury their dead decently, based, and PPA approaches: difficult but methodologi- and live securely. PPA studies also draw attention to the cally feasible and potentially very rich. important category of the "dependent poor"-the aban- doned elderly, orphaned, handicapped, and displaced. Notes They may also highlight the position of those missed by more formal techniques, such as the homeless, including 1. In practice, children are usually counted as equivalent to street children and street elderly. half an adult, a pragmatic solution but one that raises many ques- Finally, the view offered here is consistent with one tions. Women are also often counted as less than men, which has stressing capabilities, opportunity, security, and empow- given rise to criticisms (Nelson 1996). erment. To a large extent these are the positive sides of 2. For an application of this argument, see Dercon's (1997) the various dimensions identified in this chapter. This discussion of cattle in western Tanzania. CHAPTER 3 African Poverty Has Many Dimensions Categories and Characteristics needs indicators would almost certainly reveal substan- tially less mobility. And of course the presence of volatil- It is already evident that poverty in Africa, as elsewhere, ity has implications for poverty measurement, making it is a complex phenomenon and takes many forms. Various sensitive to the time at which the daita are collected. categorizations are useful in analyzing Africa's poor and This phenomenon has great potential policy relevance. in designing poverty-reducing interventions. Some of The chronically poor are those trapped in poverty from the most relevant categories are described in this chapter. some mix of poverty causes, such as absence of political influence, few assets, and lack of market access. Removing Chronic and transitory, orpermanent and temporary, poverty armong them requires building their social, phys- poverty ical, human, and political capital. Transitory poverty, by contrast, directs governments to measures that will reduce The relative importance of these two categories is an empir- the incidence of, or vulnerability to, shocks such as har- ical matter on which few good data exist for developing vest failures, fluctuations in prices (and perhaps in poli- countries, particularly for Africa. There are substantial cies), and ill health, and offer temporary safety nets (see measurement problems here, with statistics usually based box 3.1). Of course, the distinction between these two on occasional surveys rather than continuous observation, and with abnormal events liable to produce untypically Table 3.1 Proportion of households always poor, large results. However, available evidence suggests that sometimes poor, and never poor shocks of various kinds cause many Africans to move in and out of poverty, often over surprisingly short time spans. poor poor poor Table 3.1 presents data based on year-to-year observa- or rco tions from a recent review of available panel data series. Africa Cote d'lvoire 1985-86 14.5 20.2 65.3 The proportions of poor cannot be compared across coun- C6te d'lvoire 1986-87 13.0 22.9 64.1 tries, and the extent of mobility across the line is sensi- C6te d'lvoire 1987-88 25.0 22.0 53.0 tive to the number ofyears in the panel and maybe expected Ethiopia 1994-95 24.8 30.1 45.1 to be correlated to the location of the line. The data show South Africa 1993-98 22.7 31.5 45.8 a sizeable proportion ofthe population-generally between Zimbabwe 1992-95 10.6 59.6 29.8 about one-quarter and one-third, but more in Other Zimbabwe'-move in and out of poverty. These figures Chile 1967-85 54.1 31.5 29.8 appearslightlylowerthanthoseforthenon-Africancoun- China 1985-90 6.2 47.8 46.0 tries recorded but are still considerable. There are indica- India 1968-70 33.3 36.7 30.0 tions that there are also substantial within-year, seasonally India 1975-83 21.8 65.8 12.4 based movements, as illustrated for Ethiopia in box 3.1. Pakistan 1986-91 3.0 55.3 57.2 It is very probable that the measured degree of volatility Russia 1992-93 12.6 30.2 14.4 is highly sensitive to the measure of poverty chosen: basic Source: Baulch and Hoddinot (1999). 15 16 AFRICAN POVERIY AT THE MILLENNtUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Box 3.1 Insecurity and poverty mobility in Ethiopia Table 3.1 shows that, even over a two-year period, more previous 20 years that had caused them particularly severe Ethiopians were poor in one of those years than in both losses, with the following cited as the most serious (percent (with less than half remaining above the poverty line in both of all respondents): years), and other data for that country confirm the impor- tance of temporary episodes of poverty. In addition, there is Harvest failures 78 evidence of considerable within-year fluctuations in the num- Policy failures 42 bers in poverty, especially due to seasonal fluctuations in the Labor shortages 40 availability and price of grains and other foodstuffs. For exam- Problems with oxen 39 ple, the estimated headcount of consumption poverty fell Problems with other livestock 35 from 34 percent to 27 percent during two periods of 1994. In order to identify the types of shock that cause such Not surprisingly, Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) marked fluctuations in the numbers below the poverty line, studies in Ethiopia record that villagers are much concerned participants in a rural household survey of 15 Ethiopian vil- with issues of security: food security but also (reflecting the lages during 1989-95 were asked to identify events over the recent history of Ethiopia) freedom from conflict. Source: Unpublished World Bank papers, largely based on work by Dercon and Krishnan. categories is not rigid. For example, for households chron- Dependent and economically active poor ically on the margins of poverty, a shock may be the last straw, making it desperately hard for them to claw their The literature on poverty in Africa has largely concen- way back up. Transitory shocks may lead to irreversible trated on the active poor, and there is a particularly seri- poverty situations. Death is the ultimate irreversibility, ous lack of hard information on this aspect. But the indirect claiming many children, but there are also premature evidence is strong that dependants-handicapped peo- deaths of the elderly and, at times of famine, among the ple, the aged with no immediate family to help them, population at large. Such large shocks feature as the next orphans, refugees and other displaced people, female-head- category. Moreover, the "transitorily poor" is a portman- ed households reliant on remittances from men in the towns, teau category that includes those only occasionally pushed child-headed households where the eldest of the children below the poverty line and those who spend most, but not take care of their siblings following the loss of their par- all, of their time below it (Baulch and Hoddinot 1999). ents-are numerous and particularly likely to be impover- Obviously, it is important for policy purposes to distin- ished. The need for further research into this aspect is urgent guish between these cases. because it too has potentially large policy implications. Among economic dependants, child poverty is partic- Catastrophic poverty ularly serious, both because the incidence is particularly high and because Africa's long-term future lies in the This category of poverty results from a severe shock such well-being of its children. An estimated 40-50 percent of as famine, HIV/AIDS, or conflict. Such shocks need not children in most African countries live below the pover- be entirely exogenous: both famine and conflict (which ty line-some 100 to 150 million children (Harper and are themselves related) are born out of poverty as is, to Marcus 1999). The World Health Organization (WHO some extent, the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. 1997) estimates that two-fifths of all children are mal- nourished (a figure broadly supported by the data in The poor and the destitute, or the poor and the poorest table 1. 1, chapter 1), and the stunting of children as a result of malnutrition may actually be worsening (see fig- Policymakers find it easier to assist the poor than the des- ure 1. 1, chapter 1). According to the 1997 Status ofPoverty titute. The former have the capacity and resources to func- Report, in every African country analyzed the children tion in a sustainable way, albeit at a low level, thus providing were more likely to be poor than adults, in both urban a basis for enhancing their livelihoods. By contrast the and rural communities. When livelihoods fail, children destitute have no means of support, so that this distinc- suffer neglect in health and nutrition and have to give up tion blends into the next category. school in order to work, either for low wages or unpaid African Poverty Has Many Dimensions 17 at home, in order to replace parents seeking to augment approximately the same per capita consumption as male- household earnings outside the home. As a result of alco- headed ones, female-headed households with no sup- holism, depression, and violence, they also absorb many porting male (widowed and divorced) have mean of the social and psychological costs of poverty within consumption barely over one-half that of other female- households. Finally, the scourge of AIDS is resulting in headed households (Cortijo and LeBrun 1999). It is also large increases in the number of orphans in the worst- unambiguously clear that there are gender disparities in affected countries, as is conflict, which children are drawn access to, and control of, directly productive assets such into as combatants. Accompanying this is the emergence as land and credit, human capital in the form of educa- of child-headed households-not captured in many sta- tion and health (chapters 8 and 9), in participation in tistics-living on the margins of society and certainly household and community decisions (chapter 11), and among the poorest. that women suffer in particular from "time poverty," that is, the absence of leisure time, or even time to perform all Urban and ruralpoverty the tasks expected of them. Introduction of the gender element draws attention These types of poverty take different forms: access to to a further characteristic of Africa's poverty, how deeply jobs and to cultivable land are the crucial elements in the it is embedded in social attitudes and structures. Kabeer two respective cases. A high proportion of poverty in Africa and Whitehead (1999, p. 19) put it well: occurs in the rural economy. This includes many of the working poor, although that category straddles both urban The form in which women's poverny manifests itself and rural communities. The urban working poor have depends on cultural context far more than it does earnings (usually within the informal sector) below the for men, suggesting that it cannot be understood poverty line.2 The real value of formal-sector earnings through the same conceptual lens as men. Women has been in secular decline in most African countries over are generally poorer than men are because they lack a long period and, although firm data are absent, the the range of endowments and exchange entitle- same is almost certainly true in the informal sector, too, ments which male members of their households where they started at lower levels in any case. The func- tend to enjoy. They are less able than men to trans- tion of this sector as an employer of last resort makes it late labour into income, income into choice and intrinsically likely to generate low earnings, in the face of choice into personal well-being. labor forces growing far more rapidly than formal-sector employment. The rural analogy to this (especially in One specific way in which disadvantage is built into eastern and southern Africa) is the pressure of popula- the social fabric in many African societies is the inferior tion increasingly pushing farmers onto the extensive rights ofwomen to arable land, which are generally restrict- margin of semiarid land with highly unreliable rainfall, ed to user rights rather than ownership. Even more seri- and/or resulting in the fragmentation of land holdings ous is women's poor access to cash, that is, to the market; into ever smaller plots. their frequent exclusion from cultivation of cash crops; their especially limited access to credit; and the acute pres- Gender-basedpoverty sures on their time, having also to look after the family. Another example of the interaction between social struc- This category of poverty is a major feature of the African tures and poverty is in the particularly high incidence in scene. This is strongly connected to the high incidence of West Africa of poverty in polygamous households, espe- child poverty and has adverse implications for the care of cially among junior wives (Iliffe 1987). A further aspect the elderly. The special disadvantages of women, and the relates to situations in which "strangers" (recent immi- economic inefficiencies arising from these, were the sub- grants) suffer from inferior rights and are substantially ject of the 1998 Status Report entitled Gender, Growth confined to (often poorly paid) agricultural labor, or sit- and Poverty Reduction. Income-poverty measurements uations in which members of particular ethnic groups show a mixed picture for female-versus-male headed house- are discriminated against. The ethnic basis of much pover- holds, probably because there may be an absent male ty provides yet another example of social embededness, supporting the household. Analysis of Tanzanian survey of which the recent history of South Africa provides an data reveals that, although female-headed houses have extreme example. 18 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Some further common characteristics can also be men- unmodernised, rain-fed nature of much smallholder agri- tioned. One is the strong association that exists between culture, combined with an apparent long-term deterio- income poverty and large numbers of dependent children, ration in the quantity and reliability of rainfall in many which helps explain the seriousness of child poverty already regions.3 It is also common for the rural poor not to be described. In most countries for which data are available able to meet their own food needs and to be reliant, the average size of households classified as poor is sub- therefore, on uncertain sources of money income to stantially larger than other households (table 3.2 and chap- make good the deficiency. At the extreme, rural food inse- ter 9). The link between poverty and household size is a curity results in famine. Although largely conquered in fairly universal characteristic of poverty, as is a negative cor- all other regions of the world, famine persists in Africa. relation between poverty and education, particularly the One study lists 15 African countries which have been education of the household head. Table 3.2 shows that illit- affected by famine since 1968 (other sources add further erates are more likely to be poor than the educated. Similarly, countries or regions), and speaks of the "militarization of those with only limited primary education are likely to be famine" because it is increasingly conflict-related.4 poorer than secondary school or college graduates. In the towns, food insecurity is almost certainly grow- A correlate of poverty attracting less attention is remote- ing as poverty becomes progressively urbanized and where ness or residence in a disadvantaged region. Iliffe (1987, the poor spend up to three-quarters of their incomes p. 235) writes of "destitute areas ... remote from trans- on food. It is exacerbated by the rapid rise of the labor port, bereft of services, unable to market crops or secure force relative to the expansion of formal-sector employ- local employment, obliged to export labourers, victimised ment and declining real earnings already mentioned. more by neglect than exploitation." For example, average Publicly provided safety net programs have provided rural incomes in Zambia in regions close to the railway only a very limited safeguard, with the coping strate- in 1980 were six times as large as those far away; expec- gies of the poor themselves providing the main buffer tations of life at birth in Tanzania's capital city, Dar es (Maxwell 1999). Salaam, were one-and-a-half times as long as those born To summarize, it emerges that a number of threads run in the most remote region. Remoteness raises transaction through the various categories of the poor described above. costs, reducing farm-gate prices and returns to labor and The factor of time is one of these, most obviously in the capital, and weakening incentives to participate in the discussion of chronic versus transitory poverty but also monetized economy. The connection between this con- as it relates to the position of children and to what is dition and the underdeveloped, sometimes deteriorat- described as catastrophic poverty. Social position is anoth- ing, condition of transport and other infrastructural services er recurring factor, for example, as it relates to the dis- needs no elaboration. This factor is related to one of the tinction between economically active and dependent poor other correlates ofAfrican poverty: a tendency for it to be and to gender-related poverty. Location, or economic concentrated in one or more geographical regions with- distance, should also be mentioned, as it relates, for exam- in a country, which is also illustrated in table 3.2. ple, to the urban-rural distinction and to the influence A further characteristic is that a high proportion of of remoteness and regional differences. The disparate the poor suffer from food insecurity. In rural areas such nature of these influences-time, social position, and loca- insecurity is heightened by land fragmentation and forced tion-underlines the complexity of the phenomenon movements into remote areas. It is worsened too by the under examination. Table 3.2 Characteristics of poverty (selected countries) Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Malawi Uganda Zambia Household size (average for poor/average for nonpoor, percent) 116 97 123 127 124 Location in poorest region (percent poor relative to national average) 130 163 129 147 138 Literacy (percent poor relative to national average) 73 84 94 g 92 Note: Countries selected on basis of data availability. Data mainly relate to the late 1980s or early 1990s. a. A later estimate for Uganda yields a ratio of 78 percent. Source: Hanmer, Pyatt, and White (1997), tables A3.1 and A3.2. African Poverty Has Many Dimensions 19 Profiles of African Poverty well as official neglect, they are especially likely to be uneducated and to have little access to other services, From these and other generalizations a picture emerges having been called by one commentator "the most strik- of the nature of poverty in Africa, albeit one that inevitably ingly excluded peoples throughout the continent" (Clapham cannot do justice to the complexities or to the differences 1991, p. 99). Such is their exclusion that they are often across geographical regions. Most poverty remains rural, omitted from income and expenditure surveys, as in and the rural poor are the starting point for the discus- Mauritania, despite being a significant part of the popu- sion. But there are some who are at risk wherever they live: lation (Cherel-Robson and Baulch I999). The land over the handicapped, abandoned aged, orphaned, refugees. which they graze their livestock is likely to be under pres- And, remembering the probably large importance of tran- sure, from encroachment by settled farming communi- sitory poverty, those living not far above the poverty line ties and through (a partly consequential) degradation and vulnerable to adverse shocks of various kinds are always caused by overgrazing. Certain fishing communities have at risk, at least temporarily-many farmers, those in also been identified as particularly prone to poverty, chiefly insecure employment, and those in conflict-prone areas. due to declining catches and increased commercial com- Who are the rural poor? Most are eking out an exis- petition (UNDP 1998). tence on smallholdings. These farms are typically very The economically active urban poor can be divided small or in low-fertility regions, or both, dependent upon into the unemployed and the working poor, although in an uncertain rainfall and cultivated with only basic imple- practice these groups blend into each other, for most of ments by methods little different from those of 50 years those with no job per se help to sustain themselves by casu- ago. The land will be sown largely to subsistence crops, al work, or low-level self-employment, such as petty trad- augmented by a few chickens, goats, or other small ani- ing or waste recycling, so that the genuinely unemployed mals. There is a well-above-average chance that the de are only those who can afford to be so. The urban poor facto household head will be a woman-either a widow, are more likely to be adult males and relatively young, and a woman who has been left by her husband or, most fre- many are recent immigrants from villages. Like their rural quently, with a husband who works in a town and who counterparts, they probably have hacl little or no school- struggles to send some of his earnings back to his family. ing and have few other relevant skills to offer. Unlike the Whether woman or man, the chief breadwinner is likely rural poor, the costs of housing and transport are likely to be illiterate or to have had only the most rudimentary to be major items in their budgets. More generally, their primary schooling. There are apt to be an above-average cost of living will be a good deal higher than in the vil- number of children, often (particularly the girls) them- lages from which many of them have come, and they will selves prevented from attending school by shortages of be more vulnerable to the effects of inflation. They are money and the need to work on the farm or in the house. likely to live in slum conditions: unhealthy, overcrowd- If they live in remote areas, far from a paved road and ed, insecure, and neglected. Crime, violence, mental dis- modern services, or in a disadvantaged region, neglected turbance, and alcoholism are common among those around for geographical, ethnic, or political reasons, there is an them. even greater likelihood that they will live below the pover- ty line, and the depth of their condition is likely to be New poor more severe. Frequently, the landless (many of them "strangers") Finally, mention can be made of the new poor-those are another important category of rural poor, estimated who have previously been among the relatively well-to- with their dependants to represent about 10 percent of do who now find themselves in straitened circumstances, the continent's total rural population. They rely upon sell- typically as a result of economic recession and structural ing their labor but, except during seasonal peaks, the oppor- change. Classic examples are former junior-level civil ser- tunities may be few and the rewards slight. They may be vants, such as clerks, secretaries, or public enterprise work- able to augment their earnings by cultivation of small sub- ers, who have lost their jobs and the indirect sistence plots. Pastoralists are a further important cate- income-generating opportunities their work made possi- gory, at least by objective criteria (but see box 2.2, chapter ble, as a result of measures introduced under programs of 2). Well over one-tenth of Africa's rural population is structural adjustment. In objective terms, their condi- estimated to be pastoralist. Because of their lifestyle, as tion is likely to be less severe than the cases described so 20 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES far because they will have more resources to fall back on, numbers into the informal sector, with inevitably depress- more alternative opportunities. But if poverty is also about ing effects on earnings there too. Much of the rise in "employ- felt ill-being, about the shock of adverse change and loss ment" in urban informal sectors really signifies growing of self-esteem, their position can be adverse indeed. underemployment-more part of the problem than the solution. These trends are eroding the ability of urban work- The Nature of African Poverty Is Changing ers to save and remit part of their earnings to their fami- lies in the villages, which also aggravates rural poverty. The above provides a snapshot of the present poverty sit- Recently, AIDS has had devastating effects in the most uation in Africa. But such portraits can mislead if they badly affected countries of eastern and southern Africa, freeze what is actually a fluid situation. Such is the case with two million deaths a day across the continent. In here. Important changes are occurring. just the first seven years of this decade the long-term rise First, poverty is becoming gradually urbanized. While in life expectancies has been drastically reversed in a straightforward comparisons of urban versus rural pover- number of countries (table 3.3). UNAIDS has estimated ty can be misleading, since the cost of living is higher in that in Botswana life expectancy will fall to 40 during the urban areas, meaning that a higher poverty line should next decade, whereas if there were no AIDS epidemic, it be used. If it is not, then the number of urban poor will would approach 70 (UNAIDS 1998). be underestimated. The variation in nutrition is higher The impact of this catastrophe has fallen particularly in urban than rural areas, so that a comparison of mean hard on children, with rising infant and child mortality nutrition levels will also hide the extent of deprivation. rates in several countries. But it has hit their parents Nonetheless, a review of high-quality data on poverty hard, too, particularly in the economically most active age and nutrition shows that the number of urban poor and groups, with severe consequences for household incomes, underweight and children is increasing, as is their share nutritional standards, and health and well-being. There in the national total (Haddad, Ruel, and Garrett 1998). has been a huge rise in the number of orphans, with an Hence while African poverty still occurs disproportion- estimated eight million children having already been ately in the rural economy, it is clear that urban poverty orphaned by HIV/AIDS in Africa (MAP 1998, p. 20), is claiming a rising share of the total. This phenomenon and that number will continue to grow. is partly a consequence of a general urbanization. Africa's A further-but disputed-deterioration that most towns are expanding about twice as fast as the total pop- observers believe is under way is an erosion of traditional ulation, and the proportion of the population living in safety nets that in the past have helped to limit the scale urban communities has more than doubled since 1960, of poverty in Africa: family, community, and ethnically from about 15 percent to well over 30 percent today. The based sharing mechanisms that care for the dependent, failure of amenities, such as water and sanitation, to keep avoid some of the worst inequalities in access to commu- pace with population growth is one of the factors behind nal assets like land, and help to smooth fluctuations in the reemergence of malaria in cities such as Nairobi and livelihoods. It is important to be realistic about the limi- Harare, from which it was thought eradicated. tations of such mechanisms at the best of times. The extent While the urban population is expanding, the growth and effectiveness of such provisions have always varied a in formal-sector jobs has everywhere fallen far below the good deal across different social structures, and it has always pace of urban labor force expansion (and in some coun- been the case that many of the poor have had to rely for tries has actually fallen in recent decades), placing large their survival mainly on their own efforts. Descriptions downward pressures on real earnings, creating more open above have made it clear that groups such as the handi- unemployment and, above all, pushing ever increasing capped, strangers, widows, and the abandoned elderly Table 3.3 AIDS is reducing life expectancy: life expectancy at birth in selected countries (years) Botswana Kenya Malawi Rwanda Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 1990 60 60 48 49 52 53 60 1997 51 54 41 40 41 43 49 Source: World Development Indicators 1999. African Poverty Has Many Dimensions 21 number prominently among the poor, and that is a suffi- so has the search for alternative livelihoods. Indeed, diver- cient caution to those tempted to take an idealized view sifying livelihoods became a commonplace activity for all of traditional arrangements. Without doubt, these have strata of society in the 1970s and 1'980s as crises deep- mitigated the worst inequalities, have been particularly ened. Consumption patterns are adapted by substituting good at caring for the young, and have minimized the most inferior meals, eating less (skipping meals), and eating extreme manifestations of poverty, such as starvation. "wild foods." These arrangements are coming under great pressure, The intensifying link between poverty and environ- however. This is due partly to the growth ofpoverty itself- mental degradation is another aspect of the changing the more poor there are the harder it is for the rest of the African scene. Starting with an unusually high proportion community to look after them. The rapid spread of of arid and semiarid land, Africa faces growing problems HIV/AIDS, particularly in eastern and southern Africa, of deforestation, desertification, water shortages, and soil is another obvious source of extreme stress. The high erosion. The International Food Policy Research Institute incidence of violent conflict similarly erodes the ability estimates that land degradation is affecting two-thirds of of traditional safety nets to cope. Large numbers of peo- total cropland and one-third of the area under pasture. ple have been displaced, putting them gravely at risk, erod- Much of this is due to a combination of overgrazing and ing social organization, and creating many more orphans. agricultural overexploitation, as well as to adverse trends Furthermore, growing population pressures are squeezing in rainfall. The marginal land on which many of the poor the traditional access of poor people to cultivable land, rely is highly vulnerable to soil erosion, leading to a vicious or pushing them onto the low-yielding margins, swamp- circle of falling yields, increased exploitation, and further land, and forests, a process similar to the pressures on erosion. This situation imposes a growing constraint on pastoralists noted earlier. Indeed, landlessness and the asso- poverty reduction at both the macro and the micro lev- ciated feature of increasing fragmentation of land hold- els. However, given the right conditions, such as access to ings are growing features of rural poverty. More generally, capital, poor people have shown themselves able to improve the gradual commercialization of economic life is replac- their environments, and that increased land use can be ing traditional obligations with more contractual rela- accompanied by environmental improvement rather than tionships, a process accelerated by the rapid pace of degradation (Tiffen, Mortimore, and Gichuki 1994). urbanization. Finally, there are the disastrous effects of warfare and At the same time, however, public provision has gener- civil conflict. While conflict is far from a new phenome- ally been uncertain at best. Thus Maxwell (1999, p. 1,950), non and is not obviously on a rising trend (the Nigerian writing about the urban poor, argues the following: civil war of the late 1960s was among the most severe episodes), it is beyond dispute that conflict is a major fea- [I]n contemporary urban Africa ... the individ- ture of postindependence Africa, creating new multitudes ual and the household, and sometimes the extend- of poor. More than half (28) of all Afirican states have been ed family-but not the state-are the locus ofefforts embroiled in conflict during the 1980s and 1990s, and to combat poverty and food insecurity. People are relative to the population affected, Africa was by a con- not passive victims-within the constraints they siderable margin the most conflict-affected region dur- face, people do their best to cope, to make ends ing these decades (Luckham, Ahmed, and Muggah 1999). meet, to protect their livelihoods, and meet their It is estimated that in 1996 3 to 4 percent of the total basic requirements. To a small extent, these efforts population-17 to 23 million people-were international may have the support or financial backing of the refugees or internally displaced, although most were con- state or local government, but by and large they centrated in a few countries. In several affected countries are the efforts of the individuals and households, (Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia) the institu- and may be misunderstood, neglected, or sup- tions of state have been almost completely incapacitated pressed by governments. for shorter or longer periods. The connections between this situation and poverty The poor have always had a wide range of coping strate- are not hard to understand. Large numbers ofthe orphaned, gies (see box 3.2) for periods of stress, to diversify sources widowed, and disabled have been created. The vulnera- of income and consumption. Reliance upon traditional bility of the poor has also been increased by breakdowns social safety nets has been central to these strategies but in the rule of law, seizures of assets, heightened tribal 22 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Box 3.2 How Do They Manage? The Survival Strategies of the Rural Poor The poor of rural Africa, victims of an uncertain climate as migration in search of eniployment, collection of wild foods, well as of the natural rhythm of the seasons, are well accus- reductions in consumption, and sale of possessions or pro- tomed to the need to cope with periods of hardship. But what ductive assets. Women are worse off in terms of diversifica- once were occasional measures have increasingly become the tion strategies because of traditional household responsibilities, norm. In the Mopti region of Mali, for instance, certain wild and inequalities in land ownership and rights. foods, formerly gathered only in a difficult year, are now reg- A participatory living conditions survey in Zambia asked ularly consumed by some groups, particularly in areas of farmers about their coping strategies, and this provided a increasing drought (Lambert 1994). Coping strategies are rather vivid picture of how they coped (World Bank 1997a, thus changing into adaptive strategies throughout the seasons in percentages of respondents mentioning): and in every year. But some traditional coping strategies (for instance, securing assistance from neighbors or kin in times Reducing food intake/meals 67 of crisis) are coming under threat. This is often due to wors- Substituting ordinary meals with poorer food 54 ening ecological conditions and rising living costs, although Reducing other household consumption 51 it is also partly caused by changing relationships and weak- Piecework on other farms 40 ening obligations of mutual assistance, due to generally wors- Food for work 39 ening levels of poverty. Begging from friends 34 Rural dwellers' survival strategies are diverse. Off-farm Other piecework 25 sources of income are extremely important. While such activ- Substitution of wild food 19 ities depend upon social and gender differences, informal Informal borrowing 16 activities include hawking, load carrying, wood collecting, Sales of assets 12 weaving, and hairdressing services, while richer farmers tend Relief food 11 to focus on activities such as repair work, tailoring, cross- border trade, and medium-level commerce. Within the rural Petty vending 9 economy, measures include changes in cropping patterns, Taking children out of school 5 tensions, and growth of insecurity. Conflict has led to the to indications that, at any one time, a large share of total destruction of infrastructure and jobs. It has also been poverty may be transitory and that chronic, long-term associated with rapid inflation, against which many of poverty is quantitatively smaller. Evidently, the amount the poor-particularly in the towns-are unable to pro- and nature of desirable corrective actions will differ marked- tect their living standards. State services have collapsed, ly according to the relative importance of these two cat- or their quality has deteriorated as resources are siphoned egories. Ignorance of the situations of the economically into the war effort. dependent poor, and of how their welfare if affected by the overall performance of the economy, as well as by The Sobering Implications of Complexity specific policy interventions, identifies a further major gap. The second major qualification relates to the wide The analysis of part I has several lessons for the exami- variation in individual country situations established in nation of the causes of poverty that follows in part 11. First, connection with tables 1 .4 and 1.6 of chapter 1. It is there can be no disputing the gravity and widespread nature extremely important for aid donors and other external of the problem, both on the basis of comparisons with actors not to apply blanket judgements and solutions to other developing regions and when looking at the absolute what is in fact a kaleidoscopic situation. extent of poverty. Moreover, and despite the manifold A further corollary from the evidence is that it is unhelp- weakness of data in this area, the emerging picture of a ful to think in an undifferentiated way about "the poor." poverty crisis does not rest upon any one measurement. For the purposes of understanding their condition and Rather, it is validated by awide range of indicators approach- how it might be addressed, it is essential to recognize the ing the topic from various directions. However, there are many faces of poverty in Africa. The various categories of two important qualifications, the first of which identifies the poor identified above, as well as the changing nature an urgent need for additional research. This first relates of the poverty situation, rules out any simplistic single- African Poverty Has Many Dimensions 23 cause-single-solution approach. Careful, discriminating Notes diagnosis is called for. More particularly, an implication of the description in 1. The higher figure for Zimbabwe partly reflects the longer this chapter is that poverty cannot be banished simply by panel, which has four years of poverty estimates. actions confined to improving economic performance and 2. In other regions of the developing world. formal-sector work- raising incomes. This follows from the socially embed- ers may well receive a wage below the poverty line; this has not as ded nature of the problem, pointing to the necessity also yet been a problem in Africa given the relative underdevelopment for consultation and action at the societal level (particu- of formal private sector activity. larly in order to tackle the disadvantages of women), and 3. Thus for the 89 years for which data are available for the Sahel, from our identification of various groups of economic rainfall has been below the long-term mean in 52 of those years. dependants as large components of the complete pover- 4. From von Braun, Teklu, and Webb (1999). The countries ty picture, particularly the scourge of child poverty. Action, identified were Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Madagascar, then, is needed on a wide front, not least to compensate Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, N]ger, Somalia, Sudan, for the increasing pressures on traditional safety nets and Uganda, and Democratic Republic of Congo. to respond to the terrible scourge of HIV/AIDS. Actions for the avoidance or resolution of violent conflicts also emerge as going beyond their own obvious intrinsic mer- its to address major aspects of Africa's poverty. PARr II: The Causes ofPoverty The causes of poverty in Africa are multifaceted: economic, context is explored in chapter 7, which reexamines the social, and political; international, national (macro), and desirable role of the state in the presence of large-scale fail- micro. Part II examines these causes, beginning with an ures of both states and markets. With a particular focus overview in chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines the influence on rural issues, chapter 8 considers how the poor lack of domestic economic performance, specifically the record access to capital, which is pursued further in chapter 9 in on overall and agricultural growth, as well as the evi- the analysis of weak social capital (poor social outcomes) dence on income distribution. Given the slowness of among the poor and the related issue of social sector devel- past economic growth in Africa, chapter 6 examines poten- opment. Chapter 10 explores the evidence for a demo- tial reasons for this, including the influence of weak poli- graphic transition and its links to poverty. Finally, chapter cies, the effectiveness of policy reform programs, and the 11 draws together the various strands of the analysis influence of the outside world: trading conditions, capi- relating to the important gender dimension of Africa's tal movements, and the debt overhang. The political poverty. 25 CHAPTER 4 Overview of the Proximate and Primary Causes of Povety The Danger and Value of Generalization sible with an analysis that recognizes that not all candi- date causes have equal status, and so lay bare the most fun- It is both easy and hard to write about the causes of damental factors at work. poverty in Africa. The easy part is to identify candidates. There are two ways in which the "causes of poverty" The multifaceted nature of the poverty problem, the het- can be classified. The first is to distinguish between the erogeneity of the poor, and the variety of country situa- international/macro factors that determine the overall level tions all mean that it is easy enough to recognize factors of poverty in a country from the micro (household) fac- contributing to these situations. The hard parts are to tors that determine who is poor. A second distinction is avoid overgeneralization or the creation of mere shopping that between primary and proximate causes, which is lists, within which it is hard to discriminate. The purpose presented in table 4.1 and will be discussed in the remain- of this chapter is to present a comprehensive overview der of this chapter. while avoiding these pitfalls. Columns 2 and 3 of table 4.1 go beyond an undis- The danger of overgeneralizing was made clear in part criminating shopping list of causal factors to suggest a I. For example, chapter 3 delineated various categories of hierarchy among them. The table classifies the identified the poor and their condition: transitory and chronic pover- causes of poverty in three ways: ty, the poor and the destitute, the economically depen- Interactive factors, which may be both cause and dent and economically active, urban and rural poverty, f p gender-based poverty, and poverty resulting from cata- consequence of poverty strophic shocks. There are also variations in country expe- Primary causes, bein th rience, for example, the particular concentration of the factors causing Afrcan poverty effects of HIV/AIDS in eastern and southern Africa, and * Proximate causes: causes of poverty that are themselves the devastating but geographically specific effects of con- flict situations. Finally, the nature of social and political This classification is not without problems. There is no organization and dominant livelihood strategies vary across accepted theory of poverty that establishes a hierarchy of the continent. causes, nor is there any widely adopted empirical model The validity of generalized explanations is also limit- that might serve the same purpose. Indeed, it is doubtful ed by the different conceptualizations of poverty discussed whether any single theory or model could adequately cover in chapter 2. Thus economic approaches point to differ- the complexities of the African situation. In the absence ent possible causes than, say, an approach that starts from of a generally accepted theory, the approach here can be social exclusion. An eclectic approach must be followed criticized as relying excessively on the judgement of the that takes advantage of the specific insights offered by each authors. Moreover, what should count as primary or prox- of the approaches. imate depends on the time horizon adopted: the idea of At the same time, this variety can lead to obfuscation. a "primary" factor is closely related to, if not synonymous While it is not sensible to search for single-cause, single- with, the notion of a long-term cause. However, the clas- solution answers, it is highly desirable to get as far as pos- sification offered is also open to the objection that it is 27 28 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table 4.1 The causes of poverty are numerous Interactive Primary Proximate (1) (2) (3) A. Economic 1. Low growth/productivity 2. Slow job creation/capital intensitv 3. Inadequate productive assets 4. Macro and market instability 5. Market failures >< 6. Inequalities of income and wealth 7. "Globalization," adjustment B. Situational 1. Location (remoteness, poor-region, etc.) 2. Environmental degradation -- '1 3. Proneness to shocks (disasters, AIDS) -**- C. Social and demographic 1. Household composition -5*- 2. Poor human capital; weak social services 0.43) -0.34 -0.55 oping regions. Itwas not until around the mid-1970s that there was a general slowdown, leaving an increasingly For the high-inequality countries, results for Africa wide gap between the records of Africa and other devel- show consistency with those from other recent studies. oping regions. The African experience is portrayed graph- For rural poverty, Ali and Thorbecke (1998) report an ically in figure 5.2, which records per capita growth rates elasticity of-0. 50, and for total poverty Baulch and Grant for both GDP and private consumption, showing declin- (1999) report one of -0.56. Thus, using the results of ing average incomes and consumption during the 1980s Hanmer and Naschold, in low-inequality countries a 10 and 1990s, although the deterioration is probably over- percent GDP growth will be associated with an 8 percent stated by official statistics, as people increasingly retreat- fall in the headcount income poverty measure, whereas ed into (under-recorded) subsistence production. The there will only be a 5.5 percent fall in high-inequality deterioration in private consumption over this period is countries. A number of studies (see, for example, Demery particularly noteworthy because material poverty can be and others 1995) find poverty elasticities to be lower in expected to be especially sensitive to changes in this, as 34 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Figure 5.2 Income and consumption show long-term is the exception (see Fischer, Hernandez-Cati, and Khan decline 1998). Although Africa was less affected than much of the Average annual growth rates (percent) rest of the world, it too was hit by the 1998 economic crises in East Asia and Russia and by the world econom- 2.50 ic slowdown that followed. Commodity prices, to which Africa's exports are particularly sensitive, fell sharply in 1.50 1998 and remained weak in 1999. And, although weath- er conditions were reasonably favorable in much of the 0.50 region during 1994-96, contributing to above-trend agri- cultural growth, the weather was less favorable in 1997-98. -0.50 In other words, it is at least possible that the slower expan- sion after 1997 was caused by external shocks whose effects -1.50 were likely to be transient. 1965-73 1973 80 1980-90 1990-97 As a further positive consideration, the accelerated mid- El Per capita GDP * Per capita private consumption decade growth was not confined to some small group of Source: World Bank database; WXorld Bank, World Development countries and not specifically to franc zone countries. Well Indicators 1999. over one-half of African economies grew at 4 percent or more. Multiplier (or contagion) effects may mean that to a lesser extent are other welfare indicators, such as health growth in some countries helps lagging neighboring coun- and nutritional status. tries to step up their growth too. International efforts Such long-period averages can, of course, be mislead- to further reduce external debt burdens may encourage ing, both because they conceal variations within periods investment and limit the diversion of government rev- and because they smooth out differences in country expe- enues away from economically productive uses. Even some riences. The record of the 1990s is of particular interest of the more deep-seated development constraints show because it throws a stronger light on the prospects for the signs of improvement-for example, slowing population immediate future, and it shows some revival of growth. growth and improving educational indicators (discussed This latter feature is portrayed in figure 5.3, showing GDP in more detail in later chapters). Moreover, there have growth in excess of population growth in 1995-97. This been some important policy trends, notably toward more recovery prompted optimistic statements suggesting that the region's economies had at last turned the corner and that, with continuing policy efforts, the recovery would Figure 5.3 The 1990s witnessed large growth fluctuations be sustained. (annual real GDP growth) Have Africa's economies really achieved a breakthrough or does the slowdown of 1998-99 suggest that the promise Percent of 1995-96 was a false dawn? It is proper to be wary. In 5.0 the mid-1990s the world economy was booming, creat- 4.5 ing an encouraging environment but one which subse- 4.0 quent events have shown should not be taken for granted 3 5 for the longer term. In addition, 1994 was the year of the 3.0 - - - -- devaluation of the Communaute Financiere Africaine 2.5 (CFA) franc, after 46 years and serious recessions in 2.0 many franc zone countries. Maybe the overall regional fig- 1.5 ures were unduly influenced by an essentially once-for- 1.0 all response by the CFA countries, catching up on the 0.5 income losses of earlier years. Perhaps the apparent return ° ° .. .. . ~~~~~~~~~~1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 to declining per capita incomes in 1998-99 is slmply a return to the long-run trend. Note: The figure for 1998 is preliminary and for 1999 is a World Bank Against such an argument there are reasons for taking average rate of populationt gs droawn hr 2.8 percent, to represent the the more positive view that it is the recent downturn that Sources: International Monetary Fund and World Bank databases. Economic Stagnation Has CatsedMuch Poverty 35 competitive exchange rates and reduced budget deficits, recovery; both face formidable (but different) political and and there has been a long-overdue improvement in Africa's economic difficulties. While some reforms in many coun- export performance. tries appear irreversible, there remain important areas in But against these encouraging trends there are more which it is possible to doubt the extent and depth of eco- negative considerations. First, while the growth recovery nomic policy reforms. A serious factor for the sustain- of 1993-97 was reasonably widespread, few African ability of accelerated growth is the continued depressed economies managed to sustain consistent above-average levels of public and private investment, which remain at growth year by year, and two of the few that did so (Angola levels too low for sustained rapid growth. The continu- and Uganda) were in war-recovery situations. Many coun- ing low levels of private investment suggest that there has tries continue to be beset by conflict: the four countries as yet been little fundamental improvement in investors' with the poorest growth performance in the 1 990s have all perceptions of the balance between risk and reward. experienced war (figure 5.4). The region's economic giants, No doubt perceptions are influenced by the intractable Nigeria and South Africa, were not in the vanguard of the or slow-changing nature of some of the more fundamental Figure 5.4 Growth experiences have varied widely (annual average GDP growth, 1990-97) Sudan Uganda Guinea Mozambique Chad Benin Ethiopia Ghana Malawi Mali Burkina Faso Cote d'lvoire Nigeria Tanzania Senegal Kenya Zimbabwe South Africa Niger Zambia Madagascar Cameroon Angola Burundi Sierra Leone Rwanda Congo DR -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 GDP growth Note: Countries with populations below 5 million are omitted. Soarce: World Deie/lopnnent Indicators, 1999, bable 4.1. 36 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES constraints, of which the poor stock of human capital, the The Poor May Not Be Able to Benefit from Growth associated weak ability to make productive use of mod- ern technology, the parlous condition of the physical infra- Whatever view one takes of prospects in Africa, there is structure, and the weakness of the institutions of the the additional question of the power of growth to reduce state suggest particular importance. The severity and poverty. Recall here the earlier conclusion from more glob- intractability of these constraints help explain why Africas al evidence, that large and growing inequalities consider- economies have responded only weakly to the improved ably dampen that power. How unequal, then, is the price incentives associated with structural adjustment pro- distribution of income in Africa? Here the evidence is par- grams, which, in turn, raises questions about the sus- ticularly incomplete and unreliable. It is not negligible, tainability ofthe policy changes. There are questions, too, however, and the situation it portrays is summarized in about the extent to which recent political changes are like- table 5.1. ly to strengthen the conditions for growth and provide Inequalities are shown to be large in Africa-compa- assurance against policy and institutional reversals in the rable with the extreme inequalities for which Latin America future. And far too many African countries still suffer from is notorious. The poorest one-fifth ofthe population receive the turmoil of war and acute instability, with all their only an estimated one-twentieth oftotal incomes, less than adverse consequences for investment and growth, as well one-tenth of the share enjoyed by the richest one-fifth. as for human suffering. The size of the Gini coefficient for the continent is shown Lastly, such considerations can be criticized as too as greater than that ofLatin America and much larger than general, not paying enough attention to differences in in the Asian subregions and industrial countries.4 Moreover, country experiences. The wide range of recent GDP growth there is evidence that inequality has been increasing dur- experiences is illustrated in figure 5.4, from which it can ing the last decade. Deininger and Squire (1996) show be seen that in 1990-97 country growth rates ranged all that the Gini coefficient for Africa rose from the 1980s the way from minus 6.0 percent in Democratic Republic to the 1990s, although the data are not good enough to of Congo (formerly Zaire) to more than 7 percent in be confident about this. Further analysis is required to Uganda, Botswana (not shown), and, according to the know whether the income skew in Africa is a result of a data, Sudan. In summary, of the 27 countries in figure small elite creaming offmuch ofthe national income, leav- 5.4, six experienced negative growth, 11 had growth ing most others more or less poor, or whether the essence rates in excess of 3.0 percent, with the remaining 10 in ofthe problem lies more with extreme poverty at the lower the 0.0 to 3.0 range, that is, below or about the same as end of the income spectrum. the rate of population growth. As already suggested, with such large inequalities growth On balance, these considerations warn against any facile is less able to reduce income poverty than in a more egal- assumption that Africa can at last look forward to a pro- itarian situation. One partially saving grace ofAfrican esti- longed period of catching up and growth-induced pover- mates is that they generally show the position of the poorest ty reduction. Nonetheless, it is even more important not to be upgraded somewhat more as a result of general eco- to overlook that there are points oflight, with more grounds nomic growth than those closer to the poverty line. for optimism today than there have been for a long time. However, it seems the nonpoor reap greater benefits from Table 5.1 Inequality is severe in Africa Shares of total income Poorest 20% Richest 20% Ratio of richest to poorest Gini coefficient' Sub-Saharan Africa 5 52 10.2 0.51 East Asia 7 44 6.5 0.38 South Asia 9 40 4.6 0.32 Latin America & Caribbean 4.5 53 11.7 0.49 Industrial countries 6 40 6.4 0.34 Note: Data relate to 1990s, with the figure for Africa adjusted to reflect expenditure basis of data. a. A measure of departures from perfect equality, where perfect equality = 0. Source: Deininger and Squire (1996). Economic Stagnation Has Cal ased Much Poverty 37 economic expansion, as evidenced by countries that enjoyed first observation here is that the extent to which growth recoveries in the 1980s. Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania were raises the position of the economically dependent poor all countries that, in various periods during the 1980s and (the disabled, many children and old 1people, unsupport- early 1990s, enjoyed periods of growth whose poverty- ed women) is entirely contingent upon the operation reducing effects were partially undone by rising inequal- of traditional and other safety net provisions and, more ities (Demery and Squire 1996). In Kenya, for example, widely, by changes in the distribution of income. In soci- the estimates indicate that economic growth in 1981-91 eties where income disparities are widening, govern- would, other things being equal, have reduced the head- ments are unable or unwilling to make adequate social count index of poverty by over 6 percentage points. In provisions and the efficacy of traditional sharing mecha- the same period, however, inequalities worsened to an nisms is diminishing, the position of the dependent poor extent that, other things being equal, would have raised is highly exposed. headcount poverty by nearly three-and-a-half points, so As regards the economically active poor, an episode of that combining the growth and inequality effects left a economic growth will not, ofcourse, raise sources ofincome net improvement in the poverty count of under 3 per- equally, and some may be left out altogether. All will depend centage points. Evidence is also available from recent work on the growth path and the extent to which it is pro-poor.6 analyzing asset holdings using demographic health sur- Box 5.1 on Uganda provides a positive example of what vey data (Sahn, Stifel, and Younger 1999): although "asset can be achieved when growth goes hand in hand with poverty" has fallen in the 1990s in eight of the nine declining inequalities. The task is to identify the various countries studied,5 this effect comes largely from growth sources of income of the economically active poor and to of asset holdings, with their distribution becoming more examine the extent to which these can be expected to be unequal over time in all but two cases (these data are pre- improved by GDP growth. While these groups cannot sented in table A.6 of the appendix). be quantified, table 5.2 identifies categories of the active One problem, of course, is that rapid population growth poor who may benefit little from overall economic expan- absorbs much of any increase in total incomes and is sion. Growth will clearly be more pro-poor if it is more especially concentrated in poorer households. Another is concentrated in areas (both geographical and produc- the failure of such economic growth as has occurred to tive) that have the largest contribution to poverty. However, generate new employment at a satisfactory pace. An impor- regional growth patterns tend to discriminate against the tant channel through which economic growth benefits poorest regions, and agricultural performance, particu- the poor is the creation of new jobs, but the general belief larly for subsistence crops, has been poor. is that growth in Africa has often taken excessively capi- In the cases of the rural landless. reliant on selling tal-intensive forms. Unfortunately, it is impossible to be their labor, and the urban unemployed, the crucial factor more affirmative than this because employment data are is the extent to which employment opportunities expand particularly weak. In fact, the whole subject of the inter- actions between the operations of labor markets and pover- ty in Africa is, as suggested in chapter 4, a seriously neglected Table 5.2 Groups of poor that may benefit little from topic. If better information were available, it would almost growth certainly show formal-sector employment growing slow- Economically active poor er than the labor force as a widespread feature of African Rural The landless economies. There is also a need for a fuller understand- ing of the potentially large benefits of the informal sector Smallholders producing mainly ing ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~subsistence crops as a source of employment, training, and enterprise, and of the institutional and policy environment required in Pastoralists order to tap this potential (Meagher 1995). Urban The unemployed Informal sector workers in defensive Growth Affects Poverty Groups Differently activities The dangers of relying upon general economic growth to Dependent poor reduce income poverty are underlined by reference to the Traditional poor Elderly, widows, disabled anatomy of poverty in Africa offered in chapter 3. The New dependent poor AIDS orphans, refugees 38 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Box 5.1 Combining growth with greater equality: a Ugandan success story After years of internal strife and economic disintegration, was a more modest decline among food farmers, who start- Uganda's economy enjoyed a recovery during the 1990s to ed the period even more impoverished. The manufacturing become one of the continent's adjustment success stories. As and trade sectors experienced particularly large improvements, a result, per capita private consumption increased by one- but mining saw much less improvement. Households whose fifth between 1991/92 and 1997/98. So what happened to heads were notworking (mainlybecauseofage) suffered actu- poverty? al increases in their already extreme levels of poverty. There Here too there is a success story to tell. A household con- were also substantial variations across different parts of the sumption survey and four follow-up monitoring surveys country and regional disparities widened somewhat. Broadly, revealed a record of rising household welfare during this the central and western regions enjoyed the greatest reduc- period of recovery. Using a nationally determined poverty tions in the headcount index, while the eastern region ben- line, the data revealed widespread initial poverty, with 56 per- efited least. cent of Ugandans falling below the poverty line as late as 1992. Overall, the Ugandan experience is an object lesson in what Just five years later this proportion was down to a still high can be achieved when growth and reducing inequalities are 44 percent, and the record ofimprovement held both for both combined. But there remain some questions. For instance, if urban and rural areas. Growth proved a powerful means to households with elderly heads slipped further into penury, reduced poverty because it was associated with some, albeit against the general trend, what happened to living standards modest, improvements in the distribution of income. An within the households that gained? How did the women and important reason for that was that agriculture was fully includ- children and other dependants fare? Survey results based on ed in the general economic recovery. the household unit cannot answer this. Another question is Examination below the surface reveals a more complicat- about sustainability. To some extent Uganda's economic gains ed picture, however. Inevitably, some benefited more than were based on a temporary boom in the countrv's main export, others and a few actually became poorer. Within agriculture, coffee. What will happen when that comes to an end? Similarly, for example, it was the cash crop (mainly coffee) farmers, pre- the growth path of the 1 990s is unlikely to be appropriate viously severely impoverished, who gained most. Their num- for the following decades. In that case will Uganda still be bers below the poverty line were reduced sharply, while there able to retain its pro-poor qualities? Source: Appleton and others (1999). as a result of growth. In the case of subsistence farmers But many informal workers will be in defensive enter- who, more or less by definition, are only weakly integrated prises, resulting from the coping strategies of the poor, as into the market economy because they have a limited a way of scraping a living during hard times and declin- surplus to sell, the crucial factor will be the extent to which ing employment. A wide range of such activities spring changes may occur (for example, through improved farm- up, or become overpopulated, during economic reces- gate prices, extension services, the introduction of improved sions. Again, more or less by definition, they will tend to seed varieties, or the example of more progressive neigh- be hard hit by formal-sector expansion, because they will bors) that enable them to raise their yields. Pastoralist poor typically be producing goods or services with low or neg- are even less likely to benefit from growth, as they are apt ative income elasticities of demand. to resist the very economic modernization that may drive It also follows from the analysis in chapter 3 that the the rest of the economy forward.7 risk that the above categories of poor will be left behind Lastly, workers and those self-employed in the urban by growth will be increased by the extent to which their informal sector may or may not benefit from growth situations are affected by certain ofthe correlates ofpover- elsewhere in the economy, depending on the nature of the ty, particularly the following: enterprise they work in. For simplicity, the informal sec- tor may be thought of as divided into modern and defen- * Those who live in a remote region, relatively cut off sive categories. Those in modern enterprises will enjoy from the mainstream ofthe economy by distance and expanding demand for their outputs (positive income elas- poor infrastructure ticities) as a result of growth and will be more or less con- * Members of female-headed households subject to gen- nected to the more formal parts of the productive system. der biases in access to assets Economic Stagnation Has Cas,sed Much Poverty 39 Those who are illiterate and unable to take advantage ty to benefit from general economic growth. Antipoverty of improvements in technologies or increases in job policies must be based on a recognition of this and include opportunities requiring modern skills measures to safeguard those most at risk of being left behind. Finally, chapter 3 showed that, at any one time, the It is evidently crucial to understand what have been the temporarily poor are likely to be a substantial proportion key constraints on growth, and how they may be of the total, thrust into their predicament by shocks of addressed-issues that are the subject of the next chap- various kinds. While many of them are likely to be bet- ter. It is equally evident that the notion of pro-poor growth ter placed to benefit from growth than those who suffer must lie at the heart of any satisfactor)y antipoverty strat- chronically, the nature of their poverty draws attention egy, and that topic is taken up in chapter 12. What can not so much to growth as the solution as to the avoid- be achieved when growth takes forms favorable to the poor ance, dampening, or counteracting of the shocks that push is demonstrated in box 5.1 for Uganda, whose example them below the poverty line-a policy issue taken up in might be taken as a model. Even there, however, the progress part III. is not entirely without qualification, nor should its sus- tainability be taken for granted. Conclusion Notes Past growth, even in the 1990s and in the absence of widen- ing income disparities, has not been fast enough to result 1. The coefficient from the simple regression is 0.92 with a in acceptable rates of poverty reduction. Moreover, there t-statistic of 5.83; for the bottom 40 percent these figures are 1.01 are formidable obstacles in the way of sustaining faster and 8.95, respectively (see Roemer and Gugerty 1997). economic expansion, and the already large income inequal- 2. Strictly speaking, the comparison should be with the 45- ities may be widening. Finally, the agricultural sector (dis- degree line, but the slope of the fitted line is close to unity. cussed in the next chapter) on which so many of the poor 3. On the other hand, Hanmer and Naschold (1999) find a depend has performed weakly and remains backward. higher elasticity for Africa among high-ineqaality countries. This Against these considerations, however, are the more is one area requiring further research. encouraging factors of recent years helping to raise growth 4.The figure reported by Deininger and Squire is 0.47, but that rates, and agriculture is by no means without examples is based largely on expenditure rather than income, which is not of progress. There is a danger in overgeneralizing. If the the case for other regions, so the figure here is that with the situation appears dire in some countries, it is encourag- upward adjustment they propose (see also Ali 1999). ing in others. 5. The eight are Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, What definitely does emerge is that it will require major Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, and the exc eption is Zimbabwe. breaks with the past, with respect to the constraints on 6. Like its predecessor, broad-based growch, the term pro-poor growth and the distribution of income, if satisfactory growth remains undefined. Three possibilities suggest themselves- progress is to be made in the struggle against income pover- the incremental income accruing to the poor (i) exceeds their ty, and if the international targets to which governments population share, (ii) exceeds their existing income share, or (iii) have committed themselves are to stand any chance of exceeds some international norm (see White 1999b for more dis- being realized. It also emerges that, when considering the cussion). benefits of economic growth, it is dangerous in the extreme 7. As with any generalization, there are exceptions to this state- to think of the poor collectively. The situations of poor ment. Some pastoralists experienced a larg, windfall gain from groups vary enormously, not least in terms of their abili- the devaluation of the CFA franc. CHAPTER 6 Wby Has Growth Been So Poor? Causes of Low Growth: The Usual Suspects are that (i) past (lagged) gross domestic product (GDP) growth is significantly negative, which supports the idea Since economic stagnation is so closely associated with that Africa's past slow growth ought to permit faster growth the failure to reduce poverty in Africa, it is important to in the future; (ii) higher investment promotes higher understand the causes of slow growth. Many possible growth; (iii) lowering population growth will raise eco- factors present themselves, which fall into three broad nomic growth; and (iv) raising human capital will increase categories: growth. In addition, there is more limited evidence to sup- • Adverse external environment: the colonial heritage, port the propositions that positive terms of trade move- adverse movements in terms of trade and limited for- ments and aid inflows are good for growth; that conflict adverse movemnts intermsoftradeandlmitedfor- is bad for growth; and, perhaps more controversially, that eign capital inflows political freedom is associated with higher growth. Analysis . Poor policy environment: suppression of markets in the 1998 Poverty Status Report also indicated that gen- and macroeconomic instability and their consequences der discrimination in education has a downward impact (low savings and investment) * Societal, institutional, and geographical factors: from on igrth. ,~ ~ ~~~n ades env.ronmen Moving to policy variables, inflation is found to be poor physical environment anabad for growth in one study but nsgnificant n others. tal trends to cultural attitudes and hot weather La o rwhmoesuybtmlnfcn tes However, running a large budget deficit is bad for growth. This chapter attempts to sort out these various fac- The close relationship between these two variables make tors, starting with a discussion of regression results, which it likely that at least one will be insignificant when both allows a focus on "bad policies." Attention is then focused are included. The results confirm, therefore, the idea, for on the agricultural sector, before coming to an assess- which there is much independent support, that macro sta- ment of the overall impact of economic reform pro- bility is important for growth. It can be noted in passing grams. The role of external factors is then considered. that inflation is also likely to be directly harmful to the Discussion of political issues is deferred until the next poor, particularly in the towns, who have few assets to chapter. diversify into inflation-proof portfolios. Moreover, having an open economy may well be good Are Bad Policies to Blame? for growth. The studies here use export growth or the trade ratio, but other analyses of the determinants of growth Table 6.1 presents the results of seven studies that have have used measures of openness that include a wider range estimated the determinants of growth in Africa.' There is of factors. Such indicators suggest that, even in the 1 990s, a remarkable degree of consistency in these results. While Africa continues to be far less open than other develop- differences in specification or data sets may mean that a ing regions: an index of openness (with 1 representing given variable is significant in one test but not in anoth- maximum openness) is estimated at just 0.04 for Africa er, there is much agreement on the direction of influence and 0.37 for other developing countries (Collier and exerted by almost all variables. The uncontroversial results Gunning 1 999b, p. 69). However, the significance of these 40 Why Has Growth Been So Poor? 41 Table 6.1 Regression results for determinants of growth of GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa Mosley and Ojo and Blackden and Calamitsis World Bank others White Savvides Oshikoya Bhazu and others Lagged growth/GDP -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve ... Investment ... ... ... +ve +ve +ve +vea Population growth ... ... ... -ve -ve -Vt -ve Human capitalb ... ... +ve - +ve +ve +ve Inflation - - - - -ye Growth of exports/trade ratio ... ... ... +ve ... +ve +ve Growth in government consumption ... ... ... ... ... ... Fiscal policyd +ve - +ve ... ... ... +ve Financial development' ... ... ... ... ... ... Real exchange rate +ve +ve ... +ve External debt ... ... ... ... -ve ... ... External transfers - - +ve ... ... ... ... Terms of trade - - +ve ... ... ... +ve Political freedom ... ... ... +ve ... ... +ve Conflict ... ... ... ... ... ... -ve Sustained adjuster dummy ... ... ... ... ... ... +ve Education gender equality ... ... ... ... ... +v ... Note: +ve = significant positive effect: -ve = significant negative effect; = insignificant; ... = not included in regression. Dependent variable is growth turn- around for first three studies and growth for the other two. a. Public and private investment included separately and both significant. b. See papers for definitions of variables. c. Regression also includes standard deviation of inflation, which is also insignificant. d. Measure of fiscal balance and revenue collection, +ve indicates deficit is harmful for growth. e. Ratio of quasi-liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP. Sources: Blackden and Bhanu (1999); Calamitsis. Anupam, and Ghura (1999); Mosley, Subasat, and Weeks (1995); Ojo and Oshikoya 1995): Savvides (1995): White (1997); World Bank (1994). findings has been questioned owing to the conflicting Countries that have done well in thc post-war peri- results given by different measures of openness. od are those that have been able to formulate a These results broadly support the idea that the pursuit domestic investment strategy to kick-start growth of policies that closed off African economies to external and those that have had the appropriate institu- competitiveness and fiscal laxity were detrimental to growth. tions to handle adverse external shocks, not those Western culpability should be mentioned here too, since that have relied on reduced barriers to trade and these policies (import substitution and expansion of the capital flow. The evidence from the last two decades government sector) were supported by the international is quite clear: the countries that have grown the community throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and to some most rapidly since the mid-1970s are those that extent into the 1980s.2 have invested a high share of GDP and maintained These results do not, however, constitute support for macroeconomic stability .. . Policy makers there- an exclusively market-oriented development strategy, since fore have to focus on fundamentals of economic none of the variables, with the possible exception of the growth-investment, macroeconomic stability, measures of exchange rate misalignment, capture the extent human resources and good governance-and not of "market distortions."3 As it relates to growth equations, let international economic integration dominate the empirical and theoretical basis for liberalization is far their thinking on development. weaker than that in support of macro stabilization and openness. It has also been contested by widely respected Similarly, Stiglitz (1998, pp. 5, 9, and 10) has argued experts, including a former chief economist of the World that Bank, emphasizing instead the importance of institutions. It is worth quoting these opinions at some length. Rodrik many of the most successful countries (represent- (1999, p. 4) has stated the following: ing the largest partofgrowthwithin the lowincome 42 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES countries) have not actually followed the "recom- ment has been generally sluggish, although varying across mended" policies.... The Washington consensus countries. Thus in one recent study of a sample of 13 failed [owing to] a failure to understand the sub- African countries, agricultural responsiveness was classi- tleties of the market economy, to understand that fied as weak, very weak, or zero in eight countries, and as private property and "getting the prices right" (that strong or moderate to strong in the other five; moreover, is, liberalization) are not sufficient to make a mar- average performance did not vary across the different eco- ket work. An economy needs institutional struc- nomic regimes (White and Leavy 1999). ture. . . . Perhaps had [the East Asian] countries Agriculture is of central importance to the course of followed all the dictums of liberalization and pri- poverty in Africa for an additional reason-it is associat- vatization, they would have grown faster, but there ed with strong seasonal variations in human welfare. The is litde evidence for that proposition. rural poor are particularly vulnerable to the effects of sea- sonality. Most of the very poor live in environments marked These themes are taken up in chapter 7, where it is argued by a wet-dry seasonality, which affects all aspects of their that market failures mean that liberalization alone is unlike- lives, from income and consumption to health, nutritional ly to succeed in the African context. status, and education. The wet season is the time of great- est difficulty. It is then that exposure to infection is often Agricultural Backwardness Is Particularly Serious, most pronounced and morbidity is at its highest. This is but the Causes Go Deep also the hungry season, with a combination of low food availability and a necessity for high-energy inputs into cul- Given the rural location of most poverty in Africa, the tivation, for this is also the weeding season. This combi- development of the rural economy is of key importance nation results in energy deficiency and weight loss, for raising the welfare of most of the poor: there is a neg- particularly affecting women and children. ative correlation between the incidence of poverty and the Food prices rise in the wet season due to shortages, level ofvalue added per worker in agriculture. While fewer increasing debt. Families have fewer resources to meet rural dwellers depend solely on agriculture, the health of the costs of treatment for illness and transport, and the the agricultural sector remains central to rural well-being. labor lost because of this has high opportunity costs for Besides providing the primary direct source of incomes the family. Acute or prolonged sickness risks making in the rural economy, the multiplier effects of agricultur- people permanently poorer through distress sales of assets, al growth also have a potent effect on the expansion of reducing family earning capacity and the possibility of the rest of the economy and on the development of off- rebuilding lost assets. Combined with all these factors, the farm sources of rural income. One estimate has it that a health services at this time of year are likely to be at their US$1 increase in agricultural output leads to a US$4 least effective, due to high demand for treatment and short- increase in induced demand for nonagricultural inputs ages of supplies and personnel, which are apt to be dis- (Adelman and Vogel 1992), creating the possibility of an rupted by transport difficulties. agriculture-led growth path. Another estimate suggests Agricultural improvement is key, therefore, and there that a US$1 rise in agricultural income generates addi- is little doubt that there is much potential for improve- tional rural nontradable production of US$1 to $2 (Delgado ment. Although international comparisons are open to and others 1998)-a factor of the greatest importance objection because of the extent of variation within regions, because of the enormous importance to the rural poor of differences between them in factor endowments, and the an ability to diversify income sources away from exclu- ecological specificity of recommended cultivation tech- sive reliance on farm income. niques, it is hard to quarrel with the general message emerg- The sad fact is, however, that African agriculture has ing from tables 6.2a and 6.2b. In terms of the comparative proved too static to propel the broader growth of the econ- levels attained in Africa for the four indicators presented, omy, despite the enormous catching up potential of this and the pace of change during the mid- 1980s and 1990s, sector. World Bank data indicate that, on average, there Africa is lagging far behind Latin America and South Asia. was no change in agricultural productivity per worker Comparable data for export crops tell a similar story (Killick between the beginning of the 1980s and the later 1990s.4 1995a, table 6.3). Africa's continuing heavy reliance on Similarly, the responsiveness of the agricultural sectors of rain-fed agriculture-with all the associated vulnerabili- African countries undergoing programs of structural adjust- cy of poor people to adverse weather and the tyranny of Why Has Grotth Been So Poor? 43 Table 6.2a Indicators of agricultural change, 1979-81 to 1995-97 Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa and Caribbean South Asia 1979-81 1995-97 1979-81 1995-97 1975L-81 1995-97 1. Irrigated land (percentage of cropland) 3.6 3.8 9.8 11.2 27.8 37.2 2. Fertilizer consumption (kg per arable ha.) 419 576 786 931 918 1370 3. Food production index (1989-91 = 100) 79.5 108.3 80.4 118.9 70.3 119.2 4. Cereal yield (kg per ha.) 1089 1050 1840 2576 141Ci 2197 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999, tables 3.2 and 3.3. Table 6.2b Africa is lagging behind other regions Percent Fertilizer Food cropland irrigated consumption production Cerealyield 1. Change, 1979-81 to 1995-97 (percentage) Africa 6 37 36 -4 Latin America 14 18 48 40 South Asia 34 49 70 56 2. Africa's level, 1995-97, as percentage of next lowest 34 62 91 48 Source: Author's computations from table 5.3a. the hungry season-is especially disconcerting. Even with- To a substantial extent, this phenojmenon reflects the in ecological zones, there is typically a large spread between combined effects of often still low population densities the technologies and productivities of the best and the and the limited past ability and willingness of govern- worst farmers. Such contrasts indicate a large scope for ments to invest in rural infrastructure, as well as a past improvement. tendency to burden agriculture with inefficient, high-cost, At the same time, the constraints on the types of agri- state-owned marketing monopolies. T'he often underde- cultural development that will most benefit the poor, veloped and decaying state of rural roads5 and other notably greater production of cash crops, are formidable. parts of the infrastructure system is a potent obstacle, Perhaps at the top of the list is the set of factors causing dulling responses to price incentives, increasing market extremely high costs of transportation and distribution, imperfections, and perpetuating agriculture's marginal- which have the effect of dulling the price incentives for ization from the modern economy. So too is limited access farmers to raise their yields and productivities, and to shift to health services, which reduces productivity and detracts into potentially income-raising cash-crop production. For from the time available for women and children. all of Africa's trade dependence, these high costs mean that But market failures also contribute significantly. much of its agriculture is relatively closed off from the Although there has in recent years been a major state with- benefits of international commerce (Delgado 1995, p. 5): drawal from marketing, the response of the private sec- tor to the opportunities thus opened up has fallen well African economies are [only] "semi-open" because short of the ideal. Besides the high transport and market- transport and other marketing costs to and from ing costs resulting from underinvestment in infrastructure, the ports for bulky items-including food staples weaknesses identified have included limited trade invest- and major exportables-end up doubling and ment, thin markets, poor public market information, and tripling African port values . .. of exportables rel- high transactions costs (Gabre-Madhin andJohnson 1999, ative to their farm gate prices. p. 52). The resulting weakening of farm-gate incentives 44 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHIALLENCES in turn feeds into the continuing technological backwardness opment of research and extension services oriented to the of much of smallholder agriculture, still substantially reliant needs of poor farmers. However, improved agricultural on the methods of the past, aggravated by the low under- policies can be expected to make their best contribution lying levels of education, training, research, and extension to reducing the hardships of the poor only if the rest of support characterizing this part of the economy. the economy is also moving forward at a reasonable pace, Although this is much harder to generalize about, the and if the poor have both the incentives and the capabil- uncertainties and insecurity resulting from unreformed ities and assistance needed to be able to participate in the land tenure systems is often also an obstacle to invest- rural marketplace. ments in agricultural improvement, discouraging long- More fundamentally, there must be real doubts about term investment and hampering the extension of credit the long-term sustainability of smallholder agriculture in to farmers anxious to make improvements. The gender the face of globalization and agricultural liberalization. biases already discussed add a further potent dimension. This has huge implications for the rural poor. Africa's agri- The inferior access of women to schooling and health, cultural future is almost certainly bound up with accel- land, credit, and support services, as well as the excessive erated commercialization and development of larger farms, demands made on their time by the combination of farm- with greater use of modern know-how and lower unit ing work, childcare, and other household duties, quite costs. The implication of this is to draw even greater atten- apart from the inequities involved, hold back the progress tion, for the welfare of the rural poor, to the following: of agriculture, where women's labor is particularly impor- The importance of developing the industrial, service, rant. The extent and inefficiency of this was demonstrat- and other aspects of the urban economy, to create alter- ed in the 1998 Poverty Status Report, which estimated native employment and enterprise opportunities for that the various disadvantages faced by women reduce economic growth in Africa by nearly a full percentage The development of a wider range of nonfarming point (0.8 percent) each year, with the best explanation o w forths lssreltig t aricltre opportunities withmn the rural economy, heightened for this loss relating to agriculture.. Besides those already mentioned, various other factors by the already large importance of off-farm income lie behind Africas poor agricultural record. First, many sources for the rural poor. * rr f' . I L i * ~~~~Efficient labor markets that will encourage labor-inten- parts of the continent suffer from a weak ecological base, . . . particularly poor soil quality but also a tendency toward sive development paths and facilitate the absorption, at reasonable levels of productivity and earnings, of tAdr g.ecn Are ic has e riencoe no tequiv rural labor within both the rural and urban economies. tol asiasgee rut it on tere reat. scope fortci- This latter point underscores the importance of the cal advance, but It has not been realized. Finally, conflict asrino h motneo ann ulrudr , ,. ', , . . . ' ~~~~~~~~assertion of the importance of gaining a fuller under- has disrupted production in many countries, standing of the operation of labor markets in Africa In the past, policy biases have made the task harder. and their impact on the poor. Macroeconomic incentives have been inadequate and gov- ernments have been unable to support the introduction Economic Reform Programs and Poverty Reduction of high-yielding technologies. In periods of economic aus- terity, extension services to farmers (or the means where- There has been much controversy about the impact of by extension workers can reach farmers) are often among economic reform programs (often labeled "adjustment") the first items slashed. The rural infrastructure remains on vulnerable groups.6 There are two questions to pur- neglected and has in many cases deteriorated. Top-down sue: (i) how reforms have affected poverty-reducing growth and inefficient agricultural research and extension systems and (ii) the extent to which there have been measures to (often more oriented to the problems of the larger com- protect the poor during the adjustment process. mercial farmers than to poor smallholders) have con- tributed, sometimes compounded by governmental Has reform promotedpro-poor growth? unresponsiveness to smallholders' problems and always undermined by the weak farm-gate price incentives Not surprisingly, the influence of programs on economic described earlier. performance is a function of the extent to which they have Some improvements have been effected in recent years, actually been implemented. When implementation is good, but much remains to be done, particularly in the devel- there is strong evidence of an associated improvement in Why Has Grou th Been So Poor? 45 economic performance, and with that improvement comes by household duties and discriminaticn in credit, prod- an enhanced potential to reduce poverty. Implementation uct, and labor markets from taking advantage of the new is often weak, however. One symptom of this is that reform opportunities that reforms may create. Some traditional programs have high mortality or interruption rates.A high divisions of labor in the rural economy, in which the proportion of IMF programs break down before the end men are responsible for cash crops while the women of their intended life and, on average, past World Bank grow the food, would weigh against women when reforms programs have taken twice as long to complete as intend- shift prices in favor of cash crops, for which there is evi- ed, with both shortcomings largely due to nonimple- dence from Malawi. However, a contrary speculation sug- mentation of policy conditions. gests that, since the incidence of poverty among households A further symptom of poor implementation is that pro- headed by women is greatest in rural areas whereas pover- grams have only modest impact on key policy variables, ty in the towns is related more to the low incomes of even less on institutions. There is little evidence that male household heads, reforms that shift relative incomes IMF programs exert restraint on domestic credit, although in favor of the rural economy may improve the relative they do strongly influence exchange rates, and there is also position of female-headed householdLs. Unfortunately, quite a strong association with reform of other price vari- there is little more than anecdotal evidence against which ables, such as interest rates. But reforms have much greater to test these speculations, and what does exist produces difficulty in influencing institutional change, for exam- mixed results. ple, in financial sector reforms and privatization programs. Indeed, this is the overall picture, too: apart from the TheWorldBank's 1994AdjustmentinAfricareport judged earlier generalization about the impact on the urban that only six out of 29 adjusting countries had achieved population, there is a distinct lack of evidence that pro- decisive improvements in macroeconomic policies. In a grams change income inequalities or poverty to any large follow-up study (Bouton,Jones, and Kiguel 1994), 15 out extent. Perhaps this is not so surprising, since reform of 25 adjusting African countries were still judged to programs are not much addressed to the causes of pover- have poor or very poor macroeconomic policy stances in ty as set out in this report. Apart fromn their impact on 1991-92 even though between them these countries had government services, reforms are not intended to address received 110 World Bank adjustment credits and 95 the social structures and demographic factors contribut- IMF programs since 1980. The quality of policy was judged ing to the poverty problem, nor the civil and political strife to have deteriorated during 1992 in eight of the 25, even that aggravate it. Economic reforms can do little for the though seven of the eight had Bank structural adjust- empowerment of the poor. They are rarely addressed to ment programs during that year and five of them also the initial inequalities that aggravate the poverty problem. had IMF programs. Reforms are addressed to some of the sources of low pro- If the growth effects of programs have been mixed, what ductivities that underlie the poverty problem, and to cor- about their distributional consequences? They have often recting the past capital intensity of growth by raising the been criticized for imposing excessive burdens on vul- cost of capital relative to labor, but the responses ofAfrican nerable groups. However, the evidence suggests that the economies to measures intended to shift prices in favor distributional effects of reforms have been quite com- of job creation have been disappointing. Overall, adjust- plex. Evidence on C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, ment measures are somewhat peripheral to the causes of and Nigeria suggests that reforms have either been asso- poverty and, therefore, unlikely to make a large impact ciated with, or have been unable to prevent, growing in either direction. What is clear, however, is that more inequalities. For C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana, andTanzania, there energetic execution of agreed programs could be expect- is also evidence that the differential effects of adjustment ed to improve economies' growth perfor mance and, hence, measures have been sufficiently powerful to induce a mea- the scope for poverty reduction. Halfllearted reform has surable narrowing in the size of urban-rural inequalities, been a major weakness, for which both national govern- but mainly by squeezing urban incomes. In fact, that a ments and international agencies share responsibility. disproportionate part of the burden of adjustment is borne by the urban labor force is one of the few firmly estab- The poor have not been adequately protected lished generalizations in this area. Women are often regarded as being put particularly at There are two chief aspects here: (i) the ways in which risk by adjustment policies. They are apt to be constrained the composition of government spending has been changed 46 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES by the introduction of reforms, particularly spending on vatizations. These schemes have included targeted subsi- the social services, and (ii) the effectiveness of safety net dies and transfers of various kinds; employment-creation provisions designed to alleviate programs' possible pover- and retraining schemes; and special infrastructural devel- ty-worsening effects. opment schemes in poor areas. Early evidence suggested Reforms appear not to have made a decisive difference they had made little impression, being too small, reach- to social spending. To summarize drastically, research on ing only a fraction of the targeted poor and with region- the effects of adjustment on state spending points to the al, gender, and class biases. But lessons have been learned following conclusions: and later results (although mostly relating to non-African The interest cost of servicing public debt, domestic countries) are more encouraging. Targeting and project and external, has beenrising a, p designs have improved, and schemes have been made more and external, has been rising in many countries, plac- acesil totepo.Hwvr,hi nentoa pn ing a squeee on nondeb spending.accessible to the poor. However, their international spon- i When faced with the necessity to cut nondebt spend- sors are at pains to stress the limitations of what can be * Whe facrnednwth thenecessitry to prtcut nondebt spend- ach ieved by safety .net measures in the absence of wider ing, governments generally try to protect social spend- antipoverty strategies. Box 6.1 on Tanzania illustrates the ing, with the heaviest cuts falling on capital budgets and dagrtoheprofeommaseshtaentst ,. 1, , ~dangers to the poor of reform measures that are not set economic services, so that social spending actually tends in the context of an overall antipoverty strategy. Moreover, to claim a rising share of total nondebt spending. there is a possibility that distress and dislocation caused * This relative protection has not prevented large absolute by adjustment measures may have contributed to the weak- declines in social service provision in some African ening of traditional sharing mechanisms described else- countries. This has often been worsened by a deterio- ehino i hio si e s sb l rating quality of services (schools without books, clin- In s vle. w. H I aIn summary, the evidence surveyed does not support ICS without medicines) . However, IMF data show the strongest allegations of those who criticize reform pro- increasing real per capita social spending in its African Incrasm rel pr cplt soca sen g I lt rlan rams for causing poverry. When properly implemented, program countries in 1986-97, although that still left g . W p nonprogram countrs wh h r athey have tended to bring improved economic perfor- nonprogram countrs wh hmance and, with it, increasedpotential for reducing pover- ing levels. It should also be pointed out that substan- , , . ~~ty, but incomplete implementation has been a major tial declines in social spending took place in many weakness. Programs have had adverse effects on the urban countries prior to the adoption of adjustment programs. poor, have been unable to prevent widening inequalities, * Comparisons of expenditure patterns in adjusting and and have often not effectively protected those placed at nonadjusting countries reveal little systematic differ- risk. At the same time there is little strong evidence of ence, suggesting that programs per se are not partic- riste the ametie therecis l erstrong ev of ulryasuc frgesv bugtarus This.is systematically adverse poverty effects; perhaps most reform ularly a source of regressive budgetary cuts. Thils is measures have left the more basic causes of poverty large- reinforced by findings of a positive link between socia ly unaffected. spending and program implementation: it may be that While the Bretton Woods institutions have been slow the worst outcomes are in countries that adopt reform programs but onl halfheartedly.to act to at least reduce the dangers that reform measures programs but only halveneartedly. may harm vulnerable people, there have more recently * In many cases, reforms have not been able to improve been important and welcome moves in this direction, the quality of government spending. Micro-level for example, in connection with the Enhanced Highly changes in social spending patterns often reinforce the Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief scheme. Such tendency for the richer portions of developing coun- moves should be supported for, while concern for the wel- try populations to capture a disproportionate share of fare of the poor is not a good reason for rejecting adjust- social~~~~~~~~~ sevcs wit shift awa from ther primaryo eso orrJcugad social services, with shifts away from the primary ment, more could be done to reduce programs' ill effects education and preventative medicine services that bring on vulnerable people. greatest benefits to the poor (see chapter 9). The indications are that safety nets have had a mixed Global Factors Have Not Been a Major Reason for but improving record. Provisions have been increasingly Slow Growth employed to protect groups especially vulnerable to adjust- ment measures, notably public sector employees who There is a clear sense in which the outside world, in the lose their jobs as a result of civil service reforms and pri- form of colonialism, has had a determining influence on Why Has Growth Been So Poor? 47 Box 6.1 Economic reform in Tanzania has neglected the poor Over the last decade there have been substantial liberaliza- Our findings show that, in terms of agricultural policy, tion and other policy reforms in Tanzania. How have these movements towards the favoring of export crops and liber- affected the poor? In several instances, there has been a mis- alization of input and product markets may be decisive for match between the policies implemented (or to be imple- the country but will either neglect the poor or negatively affect mented) and the needs of the poorest. Evidently, it is not the them. In terms of education, the message is not so clear-cut. first goal of SAPs to tackle the problem of poverty but to The situation is deficient but deficient for everyone. Educational confront the more general economic problems of a country. infrastructures in rural areas are slowly collapsing and both However, in Tanzania, the mechanisms by which this effect poor and wealthy families are affected, although this is a could potentially happen are faulty, since policymakers some- larger problem for the less well-off. The health sector is also times depart from wrong assumptions concerning the situa- in a critical state in rural areas. tion and attitudes of the poor. As Castro-Leal and others Thus it is clear that strategies aimed at alleviating pover- (1999) rightly point out, "improving targeting to the poor ty must be directly focused on the poor. Indirect approach- involves not simply rearranging the public subsidies but also es that rely on trickle-down and the functioning of the addressing the constraints that prevent the poor from access- microeconomy may not benefit the poor. Poverty alleviation ing these services." plans must be part and parcel of overall social-economic plans. Source: Cortijo and Lebrun (1999. p. 57). Africa's economic condition. While it is increasingly implau- activity and shifts in demand, and they have a potent influ- sible to attribute the continent's economic ills to colo- ence on Africa's commodity terms of trade. There is now nialism, the neglects of that period-in the development widely agreed to be a long-term deteriorating trend in of the physical and human capital stocks, technological real commodity prices. There are fluctuations around the capabilities, and institutions-made it predictable that trend and periods of recovery, but the most recent years the new states of Africa would have great difficulties in have shown a fluctuation in the adverse direction, in sustaining reasonable rates of economic progress, just as response to the slump in world growth following the 1998 it is not surprising that the colonial experience, and the economic crises in Russia and East Asia. In 1998 alone way this interacted with traditional social structures, result- (in nominal dollar terms), nonfuel cornmodity prices fell ed in postindependence states that would often prove inca- by nearly 15 percent and oil prices by 32 percent, with pable of responding adequately to emerging economic prospects for further substantial falls during1999. Figure deficiencies. 6.1 shows very clearly the great variability in Africa's terms But what of the contemporary influence of the world of trade, and the decline since the boom in the mid-i 970s. economy? The long-standing debate about the balance Both the trend and the fluctuations naturally affect between external and domestic influences on Africa's Africa's terms of trade and these, in turn, affect domestic economic problems has been given new life by concerns investment and economic performance, including abili- that the quickening pace of globalization may be increas- ty to respond to the poverty problem, particularly in the ing inequalities and disadvantages among the poor in short term. However, the scale of the terms of trade dete- developing countries. In taking up this set of issues, trade rioration is easy to exaggerate. According to African questions are first considered and then the influence of Development Bank data, Africa's ternis of trade actually the financial connections between Africa and the rest of improved at an average rate of 1 percent ayear in the 1980s the world. and, although they worsened in the 1990s (1991-98), this was only at 2 percent per year.8 It is similarly easy to World trading conditions: some difficulties but big unduly emphasize the negative influence of external shocks opportunities like the EastAsian crisis. By virtue of their poor long-term export performance and exceptionally hiigh protectionism, One major way in which the outside world affects Africa most African economies are less fully integrated into the is through movements in the prices of the primary prod- world trading economy than would be predicted by their uct exports on which the continent remains heavily depen- small size, as already reported. This situation is strongly dent. Through these are transmitted fluctuations in world adverse to Africa, but it does provide a (legree of insulation 48 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Figure 6.1 Macroeconomic indicators Index, 1968= 100 Percentage 140 10 - 135 8 - Real GDP growth 130 125 6 - . 120 4 t . \ ... 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 - World Africa Percentage Annual percentage 8 - 20 - 115~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 2 10 -2 - -4~ 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 --eveloped countries Developing countries Source: IMF, Incernational Finance Statistis; Global Economic O uclook. from global economic shocks. It seems that the 1998-99 to take advantage of the opportunities created by this world economic downturn may have knocked 1-1.5 development,afailureillustratedbyfiguresshowingAfrica's percentage points off Africa's growth in both years-seri- share of total world exports to have more than halved ouenough against afragile background but less than trau- over the last two decades, from 3.9 percent in 1980 to matic and with a recovery forecast for 2 100.9 1.5 percent in 1997.10 Concern is also sometimes expressed about the nega- Why has Africa become such a tiny actor in world trade? tive effects of the long-term slowdown in world eco- It cannot be explained in terms of the trade barriers of nomic growth that appears to be under way. The data do the rest of the world because exporters from other devel- indeed suggest the existence of such a trend but against oping regions have faced, and often overcome, far more this has to be set a more potent compensating factor: discriminatory treatment, whereas Africa has been rather the growth of trade relative to world output. Consider favorably treated. This conundrum is closely related to the statistics in table 6.3. These confirm a slower world another big question. Africa's exports and terms of trade GDP growth rate in the 1990s but show a faster trade growth, with trade in the 1990s growing three times as Table 6.3 World trade has been booming (annual real fast as output, underlining the accelerating trend toward growth, percent) globalization. A situation in which world trade is growing at morer1981-90 1sbe -99 than 6 percent a year ought to be enormously favorable World GDP growth 2.8 2.1 to small, trade-reliant economies, as it has been for many World trade growth 4.5 6.2 * r * r ~~~Multiple of trade to GDP growth (ratio) i.6 3.0 countries outside Africa. This is the big truth about thele o r influence of the world trading environment. The big ques- Source: Computed from United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey tion is why Africa's economies have generally been unable 1999, table 1.1. Why Has Grouwth Been So Poor? 49 are vulnerable to adverse price movements because the has made muh less progess indivrsiyn Box 6.2 Trade reform and poverty in Zambia and continent has made much less progress dversyng Zimbabwe out of reliance on primary product exports than any other developing region, as illustrated by the statistics of the The experience of Zambia and Zimbabwe illustrates some share of primary products in total exports (table 6.4). of the ways in which the poor may gairn from trade liber- The share of primary products in total exports was more alization, but also that such gains may f'ail to be realized. than 90 percent in both South America and Africa in 1970; The majority ofZambian farmers are maize producers who in ti s thave been most affected by internal trade liberalization, n the 1990s it was close to 60 percent inSuArica with the removal of panterritorial and panseasonal pricing but stil nearly 80 percent in Africa. This dependence is along with subsidies on inputs. These changes have hit only partly explained by Africa's rich endowment in nat- ang with some on whom hese chates have hit uralresorcesit i als anoutcme o poo polciesand many farmers, some of whom have retr-eated into subsis- ural resources-it iS also an outcome of poor policies and tence, at a time when their cash needs are greater than before infrastructure that mitigate successful investment in man- (as user charges have been introduced for social services ufacturing, and it has also been shown to be the result of and inputs must now be purchased). Many traders engage the continent's weak skills base on account of low levels in barter rather than pay cash. of education (Wood and Mayer 1999). The Zimbabwean experience has been more positive, The question of the causes of Africa's weak response is with a greater degree of diversification. This success brings returned to below, but the expansion of world trade also different problems of increased vulnerability to the volatil- poses another issue, concerning its impact on the distri- ity of international markets. bution of income. Such rapid growth implies major struc- In both countries liberalization has brought more goods tural changes, as economies adapt to this shift in global to the shops in rural areas. But, particularly in Zambia, demand.Inallstructural changesadpt there are winns gband many of the poor can afford few of these items. Evidence demand. In all structural change there are winners and from both countries suggests that both men and women losers and an ever present danger that prominent among engage in cash crop production but that men control the the losers will be the already vulnerable (see box 6.2). Is income earned from these sources, which will affect the this happening in Africa? There are reasons for fearing that pattern of household expenditures. it might. Changes in the pattern of world demand hard- ly favor the foodstuffs grown by most African farmers, to Sozerce: Stevens (1 999). say nothing of its myriad informal-sector workers. Trade is a potent vehicle for technological change, but most tech- real wages, not only among traded-goods producers but nology originates in capital-rich, labor-scarce industrial also in nontraded good industries that service them (McKay countries and is thus apt to be biased away from the job and others 1999). However, these predicted benefits are creation that is so central to any attack on poverty in Africa. long term and net. There are losers as well as gainers, and And, to the extent that jobs are created, they may call for there are apt to be particularly substantial losses during modern skills the poor lack. the process of adaptation and change. Evidence on the There is, unfortunately, scant hard evidence to bring impact of structural adjustment programs on smallhold- to bear here, partly because of the research complexities ers' incomes varies from case to case and leads to no strong involved. The balance of the (mainly non-African) liter- conclusion. Influences operating through the trade chan- ature predicts that the relative growth of international nel may be contributing to the widening inequalities in trade is growth- and employment-enhancing, and there- Africa hinted at earlier, although it is likely that the main fore pro-poor, so long as appropriate supporting policies explanations lie elsewhere. The influence of trade growth are in place. The literature also predicts that trade will raise on Africa's poverty problem would, perhaps, be a more acute issue if the continent participated more fully in the Table 6.4 Africa's exports have not diversified (percentage global trade explosion. share of primary products in total exports) Capitalflows and aid could help more but are not central 1970 1984 1993 to the poverty problem Sub-Saharan Africa 95 93 78 South America 93 76 62 There is a clear but essentially trivial sense in which trends East and South Asia 51 37 16 on Africa's private capital account are hampering growth Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the potential for poverty reduction. This refers to the Commodity Yearbook 1995. only slight extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) 50 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES and other private flows have gone to Africa in recent decline, as shown in figure 6.2. However, much of this decades, by contrast with other developing regions. In reduction was concentrated in a few countries (Kenya, fact, the United Nations actually estimates that, on a net Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo), basis, the FDI balance was negative in every year from and aid nonetheless remained above the early 1980s level 1987 to 1997, that is, there was net disinvestment. IMF in real terms (but has declined in per capita terms). It is and World Bank figures are less adverse but also show still the case that Africa is strongly favored in the distrib- Africa's receipts to have been small relative to other devel- ution of aid and receives far more, relative to other eco- oping and transitional economies.11 This absence of flows nomic variables, than the other major developing regions is described as trivial not because it is unimportant but (table 6.5). because the key question is why private capital still stays But has the aid been of the right type? In particular, away. The reasons why the risk-reward balance is still has it sufficiently addressed the reduction of poverty? At seen as unfavorable again focus attention on economic the broadest level the facts must suggest that aid has and political conditions within Africa. failed to live up to its promise: as many infants die in One other factor that should be recorded here is the their first year as 30 years ago despite billions of dollars movement of world real interest rates, for although African of aid, indicating some culpability among aid donors for countries receive only limited variable-interest credit, the limited progress. This culpability has been both eco- this factor has apparently exerted a significant influence nomic and political-economic because well into the on growth in the past. 12 The trend in that variable is also 1980s donors supported the sorts of government inter- traced in figure 6.2, from which can be seen a large rise ventions they now blame for Africa's poor growth,'3 and from the mid-I 970s to the mid-I 980s, with a downward political because aid was often given to support regimes drift thereafter. The rise may well have been influential who were clearly bad for the well-being of most the coun- in the economic deterioration from 1975 to 1985, but try's population (see chapter 7). Issues of the impact of the poor economic results of most years since have been aid are further detailed in chapter 15. The main conclu- despite an easing in real rates. sions regarding poverty are listed below (some of which What now of the position with regard to public flows, are also illustrated in box 6.3): of which development assistance is the most important element? There are questions here about the scale of aid * Despite donors' rhetoric, only a modest proportion- receipts and the uses to which it is put. On scale, there perhaps 15-25 percent-of total aid has been direct- has been alarm about the declining real value of total devel- ly poverty oriented, although that proportion is rising. opment assistance, with some talk of the existence of an * Many donors have yet to bring poverty reduction aid crisis. The figures do indeed show a serious recent criteria into the mainstream of agency work by, for example, staff incentives and training, provision of Figure6.2 The real value of aid to Africa is declining guidance, and establishment of poverty-related mon- Figure itoin systems.eofad oAfla Sdelln (net disbursements in constant prices) itorig systems. * Agencies have been poor at trying to understand coun- $US billions try poverty situations, and few have engaged recipi- ent governments in policy dialogue on this subject. 21 * There is little information about the effect of donors' 20 interventions, but the indications are that most projects 19 Table 6.5 Africa's 1997 aid dependency ratios remained 18 - / \ high (percentages, except aid per capita) 17 - / Latin America 16 Africa and Caribbean South Asia 15 Aid per capita($) 26 13 3 1981- 1986- 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Aid/GNP 5.0 0.3 0.8 82 97 Aid/investment 27.7 ... 3.6 average average Aid/imports 12.7 1.4 4.3 Source: OECD-DAC (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Development Assistanice Committee), Developmnent ... Not available. Co-operation, 1998, and earlier issues. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999, table 6. 10. Why Has Growth Been So Poor? 51 Box 6.3 Mixed poverty-reduction results from aid to Zimbabwe A study of European aid to Zimbabwe concluded that "with edge, resources, and rights, to have made positive contribu- the partial exception of Sweden, the donors we have studied tions to the welfare of poor people, particularly by enhanc- could not be said to have given the PR [poverty-reduction] ing their access to knowledge. There are, moreover, legitimate objective much consistent priority. Most had tried to improve objectives for aid programs in addition to PR, particularly in the well-being of poor groups with specific interventions but a country not among the more seriously poverty stricken in the PR content of their programmes was quite limited, none Africa and where the national government itself apparently had come near to applying best-practice PR standards and gives rather low priority to PR. some were quite explicit in stating that PR had not in prac- Nonetheless, the donors could have done more. The study tice been given priority." Of total aid to Zimbabwe by five urged them to engage with the governmcnt in a policy dia- European donors in the mid-1990s, only about one-tenth logue on this subject. It urged donors to i,mprove their own was directly targeted at poor groups, with another third hav- knowledge and conceptualization of the poverty situation in ing significant indirect PR benefits. Three-fifths of total aid the country, to buy into locally generated schemes, particu- fell into neither of these categories. larly those based on beneficiary ownership and participa- There were some mitigating factors, however. A sample of tion, to improve coordination among themselves, to move projects nominated by donor agencies as having antipoverty towards better targeting of poor beneficiary groups, and to objectives was found, by the criteria of livelihoods, knowl- strengthen their own monitoring and evaluation procedures. Source: Killick, Carlsson. and Kierkegaard (1998). with antipoverty objectives produce beneficial results, There is a clear connection between the burdens of particularly those specifically targeted at poor groups. the more severely indebted African countries and their Few of these projects would be financially sustainable poverty situations. The prior claims that debt servicing if donors withdrew, however. makes on domestic saving and on foreign exchange avail- ability impedes both the utilization of existing resources Overall, it is difficult, in comparative terms, to argue and the rate at which productive capacity can be increased that the rise of poverty in Africa has been due to the defi- through investment. Moreover, there is evidence that the ciencies of external assistance. Although the recent volume existence of such a large debt discourages private invest- trend is adverse, and donors could have done much better ment by depressing complementary public sector invest- in using aid to reduce poverty, Africa has been compara- ments, increasing investor uncertainties and reducing tively well treated for a long time, to such an extent that expected rates of return. All these factors impede economic excessive aid dependency is now recognized as a problem. growth and, hence, the potential for reducing poverty. Debt overhang aggravates the poverty problem, but the Also, since most of the debt in question is public or pub- benefits of debt relief have been exaggerated. Much of past licly guaranteed, debt servicing can make a large claim aid, particularly from multilateral agencies, created debt. on governments' scarce budgetary resources and-depend- To this should be added a large volume of export credits ing on their spending priorities-can compete directly and a more modest volume of private, mainly bank, cred- with pro-poor spending on education, health, and rural it. As of the end of 1998, the total size of Africa's out- infrastructure. standing external debt was about US$220 billion, equal At the same time, there is often an exaggerated view of to about one-half of GNP, a higher ratio than for other the strength of the debt-poverty connection. Widespread developing regions. Debt service payments for Africa as poverty predated the emergence of the debt problem and a whole averaged about 13 percent of export earnings, but would remain if all debt were written off. Its fundamen- this ratio was artificially low because about one-half of tal causes lie elsewhere, as described in thLis volume. Similarly, debts were not being serviced. Even so, some debtor coun- concentration on the terms of debt relief may divert atten- tries had ratios of well over 20 percent. A succession of tion from the underlying source of the clebt problem, which debt-relief schemes for heavily indebted, low-income coun- is the low efficiency of investment. Only exceptionally have tries had been introduced and found inadequate in the African countries borrowed on harsh terms. On average, face of debtors' continuing inability to repay. The most terms are below commercial rates and have been for recent of these, the 1996 HIPC initiative, itself had to be many years. Thus in 1997 the average rate of interest on substantially enhanced in 1999. new credit for all African countries taken together was 3.9 52 AFRiCAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES percent, with an average maturity of 22 years and a grant vate investors' continuing perceptions of an unfavorable element of 40 percent (with even softer terms for low- risk-reward balance; (iii) low returns to past investments, income Africa). Even as early as 1984 the equivalent sta- giving rise to major debt problems, the alleviation of which tistics were 5.4 percent, 23 years, and 34 percent. In would, by itself, make a limited difference in the extent addition, much capital (including, nowadays, most bilat- of poverty; and (iv) that these problems have been expe- eral aid) is provided as grants. In 1997 capital received as rienced despite favorable treatment of Africa in the glob- transfers amounted to $10.3 billion, against new long- al distribution of aid. Although there are specific ways in term borrowing (including IMF) of exactly the same value, which globalization makes poverty reduction harder, the so the true grant element of total capital receipts is much argument here has drawn attention to the primacy of the larger than just reported."4 The question that has been domestic economic and political environment, condi- neglected in recent debates is how it can be that economies tioning Africa's responses to globalization. receiving capital on such favorable terms can encounter Why, then, has there been so much concern about the acute debt difficulties. The answer must lie with lowreturns impact of globalization on Africa's poor? Much of the to the capital invested (including its capacity to generate answer has to do with the inflexible nature of Africa's additional foreign exchange earnings and fiscal revenues), economies, making it more difficult and costly for them which takes us back to the manifold causes ofAfrica's weak to adapt to changing global conditions and to take advan- past economic growth. So long as these underlying caus- tage of newly developing trading opportunities. Besides es are not addressed, large-scale poverty will persist, what- its poor export record, symptoms of inflexibility include ever debt relief is provided. a widening technological gap, rather low supply respons- To this cautionary note should be added another: there es to changing price relativities, a generally inferior record is no necessary assurance that resources released by debt of results from policy reform programs, and political struc- relief schemes will actually be devoted to raising the wel- tures that too often remain either unstable or unrespon- fare of the poor. As argued elsewhere in this volume, not sive to demonstrated policy deficiencies. The extent of this all African governments have an established record of inflexibility is illustrated in table 6.6, which shows the giving priority to pro-poor measures. It is true that spend- shares of various sectors in GDP. The most striking fact ing on education and health, relative to GDP, is high in from this table is how little the structure of African Africa (chapter 9), but it is also the case that much of this economies has changed: agriculture's share has remained takes the form of most benefit to non-poor users, and there at around 25 percent, whereas in South Asia it has fallen are considerable political and other obstacles to more effec- from 41 to 30 percent. tive targeting of services on poor groups. Uganda is among Underlying these deficiencies are often weak informa- the countries that have established a mechanism for chan- tion flows and incentive systems, resulting from faulty neling revenues saved by debt relief into pro-poor services, policy interventions and an underdeveloped infrastruc- but so far not many others have followed suit. In any ture but also from market failures of various kinds (chap- case, fungibility limits the value of such devices unless ter 7). Relatively weak technological capabilities are there is genuine political commitment to poverty reduc- particularly serious, flowing from the continent's narrow tion and the released resources can be fed into compre- base of skills and knowledge, and the deficiencies of its hensive antipoverty strategies and policies. Finally, there institutions, raising transactions costs. Africa, in short, is is a danger that increasing the generosity of debt relief ill-placed to realize the promise which globalization holds could divert aid resources from countries that have much out. The costs of adaptation tend to dominate perceived poverty but have avoided large-scale debt difficulties. benefits, particularly in the shorter term, and various cat- African countries falling into this category include Burkina egories of the poor are placed at risk. For example, com- Faso, Malawi, and Senegal. ing to terms with the inefficiency (in international terms) of the bulk of a manufacturing sector which owes its exis- The primacy of domestic inflexibility tence to high protective barriers poses acutely difficult problems of management and restructuring which may Has globalization increased poverty? Not as such. Rather, threaten the livelihoods of many workers on whose remit- Africa's main problems have been (i) a weak export record, tances many poor households depend. And yet, if pover- both with respect to growth and diversification, reducing ty is to be conquered and Africa's future growth is to be the continent to insignificance as a trading force; (ii) pri- sustained at a reasonable pace, adaptation is essential. Why Has Growvth Been So Poor? 53 Table 6.6 The structure of African production has not changed over time (sectoral shares of GDP, period averages) Agriculture Manufacturing Other industry Services 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 East Asia and Pacific 31.4 26.9 21.4 26.1 29.8 31.2 11.4 11.0 10.7 31.1 32.3 36.8 Europe and Central Asia ... 15.2 13.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 36.3 45.6 Latin AmericanandCaribbean 12.2 10.0 10.1 26.0 26.8 21.7 11.1 12.3 11.9 5C.7 50.9 56.2 MiddleEastandNorthAfrica 10.5 14.6 16.9 8.4 10.0 12.5 45.6 29.2 22.3 35.5 46.1 46.8 South Asia 41.3 33.8 29.6 16.0 17.0 17.6 7.0 9.4 9.9 35.7 39.8 42.9 Sub-SaharanAfrica 25.3 24.1 24.0 13.7 14.5 14.7 15.8 17.6 17.0 45.1 43.9 44.4 ... Not available. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. Conclusion However, there have been some strongly positive forces at work, too, notably an extraordinarily rapid expansion Africa's low growth may be explained by a range of fac- in world trade and, norwithstanding recent reductions, tors. A poor policy environment has certainly been a major amounts of development assistance that remain very large part of the explanation, by which is meant a failure to by comparison both with other low-income regions and maintain macro stability and undue neglect of external with economic aggregates in Africa. The most important competitiveness. Although the inefficiencies of state inter- issues are why Africa has been unable to take advantage vention also undermined growth, there is less evidence in of the trade expansion, so that today it is a negligible support of an exclusively market-oriented development. force in world trade, why it continues to be seen as an Rather the problems of low growth are ones to do with unfavorable environment for FDI, wiy its debt servicing the traditional determinants of growth, such as invest- capacities remain so weak despite large inflows of public ment and human capital. It is the failure to improve capital on favorable terms, and why its implementation these fundamentals, combined with weak implementa- of, and responses to, policy reforms have been generally tion of agreed reforms, that underlies the modest success weak. that reform programs have had in turning around African In short, domestic structural, and policy inflexibility economies. In addition, such programs have contained are the key factors. If these could be satisfactorily addressed, little of direct relevance to poverty reduction and have not the global economy could be seen more as enhancing contained adequate protection for the poor where there Africa's ability to tackle its poverty than as an aggravating have been adverse effects. force. This is why the bulk of this report is about condi- There are various ways in which the global economic tions and policies within African cotntries, rather than environment has aggravated Africa's economic problems about the wider environment in which they operate. and lessened the ability of the region's governments to cope with the problem of mass poverty: unstable trading Notes conditions and secularly deteriorating export prices; a pos- sible tendency for the relative growth of trade to leave 1. Many more studies include African countries in addition to many of the poor behind; a continuing perception by those from other regions. The advantage of using larger samples is investors that many African states remain unacceptably that the growth differential attributable to included variables may high-risk locations for FDI; a decline in real aid flows in be calculated, as done in Easterly and Levine (1997). However, recent years, coupled with limited donor effectiveness in such studies typically impose constraints on model coefficients, so using their resources to reach the poor; creditor reluctance that the estimates may not be valid for Afi-ican countries. Hence to offer debt relief in line with the debtor countries' abil- results presented here are for studies using African countries only. ities to pay, leading to a continuing debt overhang prob- 2. For example, donors continued to use import support to lem; and reform programs that are still insensitive to the "underwrite" failing parastatals and so impeded restructuring. needs of the poor and in some cases unnecessarily wors- 3.The "sustainedadjuster" dummyused byCalamitsis, Anupam, en their condition. and Ghura (1999) is based on staying on trackwith the International 54 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Monetary Fund (IMF), which cannot be taken as a good measure 10. Author's calculations from data in World Development of overall policy stance. Indicators 1999, table 4.17. 4. Gabre-Madhin and Johnson (1999, table 1) give data for 20 11. The U.N. source, which is the only one we found that gave African countries from which it can be calculated that agricultur- a time series confined to Sub-Saharan Africa, is the World Economic al value added per worker, in constant 1987 dollars, averaged and Social Survey 1998, table A.25. For IMF estimates, which, how- US$479 in 1979-81 and US$468 in 1994-96 (unweighted means). ever, include North Africa, see World Economic Outlook, December The usual caveats are, of course, necessary concerning the relia- 1998, table 4.9. This indicates an average net inflow of FDI of bility of the primary data on which these figures are based. US$3.8 billion each year. in 1990-98, against a total for all devel- 5. As an indicator of this, Gabre-Madhin and Johnson (1999, oping countries of US$70.9 billion a year. table 1) provide data showing that, on average, well under one- 12. Rather surprisingly, Ghura's (1995) exploration of the deter- fifth of Africa's roads are paved. minants of economic growth in Africa found a rise in world real 6. The following paragraphs are based largely on Killick (forth- interest rates to have been a significant and substantially negative coming). See also White (1997); ODI (Overseas Development influence on African growth in 1970-90. Institute) (1999); Sahn, Dorosh, and Younger (1996); and 13. An early collection by Coulson (1979) documents several Bredenkamp and Schadler (1999). of these failed projects in Tanzania. The World Bank's own review 7. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1999, table 1.1. of its assistance to Tanzania found that, from 23 projects 14 had 8. African Development Bank,Afiican DevelopmentReport 1999, a negative rate of return, and all but one a return substantially below table 2.5. These averages include North African countries (includ- che estimate made at appraisal (World Bank 1990). ing Egypt). Examination of data for these countries suggests that 14. The statistics for borrowing terms are averages for new excluding them would result in an outcome for Sub-Saharan Africa borrowings by Sub-Saharan African countries, from World Bank, marginallylesspositivefor 1980sbutaboutthesameforthe 1990s. World Debt Tables, 1989-90, p. 84 (for 1984 data), and Global 9. These comments are based on data and discussions in World Development Finance, 1999, p. 200 (for 1997). Bank, World Development Indicators 1999 and the IMF's World Economic Outlook, May 1999. CHAPTER 7 Both Governments and Markets Have Failed the Poor Political Systems Have Contributed to Economic characterized as "monopoly states." (Clapham 1996, Stagnation pp. 56-57) A major cause of Africa's poor growth record has been The 1990s have seen some changes, and there have "government failure." Following the spirit of optimism always been exceptions to the above picture. But in gen- at independence, by the 1970s the competence of many eral African states since independence moved away from governments was being eroded by both major and petty accountability and towards what have been variously called corruption, democracy abandoned in favor of the one- regimes of personal rule, and the patrimonial, predatory, party state with power changing hands by the bullet rather or even parasitic state. In the words of one author, "the than the ballot, and accountability undermined by reliance dominant form of political economy became a crony sta- on external support, including aid, or resource-based tism consisting of three interrelated characteristics: (i) taxation.' One authority describes these changes as clientelist networks used to build support through the follows: extraction and distribution of rents; (ii) expansion of state size, including the creation of an extensive parastatal sec- Within an astonishingly short period ... the impo- tor; and (iii) purchase of primarily urban support via sition of control from the top, rather than the state welfare services and subsidies" (Callaghy 1991, p. mobilization of support from below, became the 258) (see box 7.1 for what is perhaps the extreme exam- predominant relationship between African rulers ple of Democratic Republic of Congo). and those who had now become their sub- These developments have held back poverty reduc- jects.... There is no doubt of the virtual univer- tion in several ways. First, and the concern in this sec- sality [of this phenomenon] .... In no state on the tion, is that states have failed to deliver growth: growth African mainland, from independence through to has not been part of their agenda, and at best they have 1990, did any opposition party gain power as the failed to provide the stable framework it requires, but at result of winning a general election against an worst their actions have undermined growth or state struc- incumbent government. tures have dissolved as conflict has erupted. Second, the state has not addressed the needs of the poor, which has In the second phase, even the governing parties been manifested in various ways, such as poor and skewed atrophied as their mobilizing functions were service delivery. The next section takes up the issue of the removed, their electoral organization became redun- neglect of poverty. dant, and their leaders were appointed to govern- African states failed to deliver growth for at least four mental positions which depended on the favor of reasons: (i) absence of a stable legal and institutional frame- the head of state rather than the support of their work for economic activity, (ii) implementation of con- constituents ... . Within a few years of indepen- trolled economy policies that were amenable to rent seeking dence [African] states were turned into organiza- and detrimental to growth, (iii) the rise of corruption, and tions of a broadly similar kind, which may be (iv) state collapse. 55 56 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Box 7.1 The predatory state in Democratic Republic of Congo MacGaffey (1988, pp. 172, 175) has provided a vivid account enterprises in a rational capitalist fashion nor invest- of the consequences of the political system that developed in ed their profits in expansion of their businesses and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) as it developed improved production. during the Mobutu period, and the consequential decay of the state: The ruling class is not a true economic bourgeoisie; it is one that loots the economy and collapses effec- In Democratic Republic of Congo those with porit- tive administration. It is thus unable to exercise the ical position have used the power of their office to control over production necessary to maintain its seize control of the economy ... to acquire manu- dominance and must resort to consolidating its posi- facturing, wholesale and retail businesses and plan- tion by participating in the more lucrative activi- tations. However, they have neither managed their ties of the second [parallel] economy. Source: MacGaffey 1988. A minimum function of the state is the provision of a themselves. It may even be true that economic failure is legal and institutional framework to facilitate the eco- in this respect at least more profitable for many than devel- nomic life of its citizens. Essentially, this is a matter of opment" (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 133). Or, as it was ensuring that the rule of law prevails both to provide peace put more prosaically in a Ghanaian newspaper, "poverty and security, and so that property rights are respected, is rife in Africa because African military despots have raped contracts enforceable in a predictable and cost-effective our economies" (quoted in Ayittey 1998, p. 155). way, transactions costs minimized, and competitive mar- The opportunities offered by administrative controls kets facilitated. Often even these basic responsibilities have have been a principal means of extracting wealth from not been fulfilled. An African writer has put this as fol- the economy: "The rise of the 'policed economy' came lows: "Government as it is known in the West does not about in Africa when the post-colonial state ... began to exist in much of Africa.... One expects at a minimum seek the interest of the ruler and the ruling elite" (Deng a government to be responsive to the basic needs of the 1998, p. 37).2 The interests of the powerful were served people. Or at least, to perform some services for its peo- by both the official activities of the state and through unof- ple. But even this most basic requirement for govern- ficial channels: the main interaction of the politically ment is lacking inAfrica" (Ayittey 1998, p. 150). Equality excluded with the state was to pay taxes and bribes rather before the law has been flouted in favor of political elites than to receive any benefits from state-financed activi- and their friends and supporters; property rights have been ties. Infrastructure was not maintained and preference pushed aside when they clashed with the interests of given to trunk roads rather than feeder roads: mainte- these groups; markets have been overridden or manipu- nance and feeder roads are much less likely to yield rents latedinorderto yieldmonopolyprofitsforfavoredminori- than new construction contracts. By the 1980s, howev- ties; police and judicial systems have been corrupted or er, few governments were paying for any physical invest- subverted. ment from their own revenues, which were funded from Although the state failed to provide the conditions for donor assistance. The declining fiscal situation, resulting growth, the state itself (if not individual governments, as from a weakening tax base, lax collection, and growing takeover by extra-parliamentary means has been rife) was subsidies to failing enterprises cut into capital budgets. remarkably resilient for over two decades. Clapham (1991) The soft budget constraint, corruption, and inefficiency offers two reasons why the state survived. First, there has turned once profitable public enterprises into loss mak- been a large degree of external support-foreign aid as ers whose principal purpose was often to provide a basis well as direct military intervention to prop up tottering for patronage. Social service provision was also deterio- regimes. Second, the support from politically important rating, and the wage bill consumed an increasing share of groups who did benefit: "It is possible for a country's econ- expenditure (even though real public service wages have omy to fall into ruin, for development to be insignifi- been severely reduced in most countries). Eventually these cant, while at the same time the members of a large number circumstances strengthened the domestic constituency for of (informal) networks continue substantially to enrich the reforms that, during the last decade, have started to Both Governments and Markets Ha:m eFailed the Poor 57 alter the situation described above, but not until per sive tax, directly or indirectly drawing resources from the capita incomes had fallen well below their levels at inde- poor to the rich. In many countries in Arica, government- pendence in many countries, with obvious adverse impli- supported farmers' credit programs were often ruined by cations for poverty. corrupt managers and bureaucrats. Second, high-level cor- The same set of political forces combined to frustrate ruption erodes the goodwill of the population, the busi- the development of private enterprise. Rather than pro- ness community, and the donors, encouraging "exit." It viding a stable environment for private activity, the sys- makes the population less amenable to mobilization. tems of government that developed in many African Likewise, if businesses lose confidence in the government's countries restricted and preyed upon the private sector, ability to curb corruption, they might seek to "cut their being called in a study of Ghana "the Vampire state" losses" by paying less tax, since corruption is simply a (Frimpong-Ansah 1991). These tendencies were partly deferred tax, or even to relocate to other countries. Since due to an ideology of African socialism suspicious of corruption affects producer incentives and costs, it also markets, entrepreneurs, and the profit motive, by which inevitably leads to factor substitution, not necessarily in the state should control at least the commanding heights favor of labor-intensive production. Corruption also erodes of the economy (although in many countries national- donor goodwill, threatening resource inflows that are ization extended far further, into retail trade and small still important for development. Donors have learned from services, such as car repair workshops). In agriculture, experience that development and the light against pover- state-run farms were often created but failed to feed the ty are difficult to achieve in corrupt environments. Finally, growing towns and cities as intended. Private agriculture corruption diverts the attention of state employees and was not left untouched, as state-marketing boards, export the activities of the state away from the tasks that need to taxes, and overvalued exchange rates all acted to transfer be undertaken to achieve growth, especially if it is to be surpluses from the rural community to the government of a pro-poor variety. or urban areas. The systematic abuse of state power for personal enrich- Rulers and supporters have benefited from the spread ment is argued by some observers to be so widespread as of corruption: "bureaucratic values were readily subvert- to constitute a "criminalization of the state" in Africa, with ed by patronage and financial corruption that, though in official involvement in drug trafficking, dumping of haz- large measure simply a means through which the power- ardous waste, trading in arms, and international fraud ful reaped the rewards of office, also helped the rulers to (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999). Fairhead (2000) argues meet the expectations of their more favored constituents" that the systematic abuse of natural resources to appro- (Clapham 1991, p. 98). There was little notion of offi- priate profits from rapid depletion is at the roots of much cials being there to serve the people. Rather, bureaucrat- conflict across the continent,4 and is clearly bad for the ic obstacles were created with little concern for the poor as the environment is destroyed by the rich and an inconvenience caused and with bribery often the onlyway unaccountable elite wastes the nation's wealth. The role to get over them. At both formal and informal levels, these of multinational corporations in these activities high- attributes debilitated private initiative. The rewards from light the fact that Western culpability is not an issue of corruption have been very high: Mobutu's billions are well the past. As one example, former Rwandan president, known, but there are many other cases. Charles Taylor is Habryimana, has been implicated in r ackets involving aid estimated to have made US$75 million a year since begin- money, drugs, illegal forex dealing, and body parts of goril- ning the war in Liberia in 1990, and Niger's President las (Ayirtey 1998, p. 177). Ousmane, by his own declaration, tripled his personal for- Combined with the absence of effective choice at the tune within one year of taking office (Ayittey 1998, pp. ballot box, such conditions have led to alienation, disaf- 156-57, 181). The culture of corruption runs through fection, and violent resistance. In the worst cases, these government, with ministers regularly receiving large pay- have led to large-scale civil disturbance and war. In fact, outs to foreign accounts (as one example of many Ayittey war has been a common feature of recent African histo- provides, the US$50,000 paid to a Swiss bank account for ry, affecting at least 28 countries during the 1 980s and Sierra Leone's minister of transport in the early 1990s 1 990s. Somalia and Liberia have essentially been stateless (Ayittey 1998, pp. 152-53). in recent years. It is indeed difficult to find civil wars where Corruption is bad for both growth and poverty reduc- a peace settlement may be said to have solved the politi- fion in several ways.3 First, it is the equivalent of a regres- cal problems. Conflict has thus become embedded in 58 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MJLLENN[UM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES economic and political structures. Poverty is linked to con- * Forms of intervention that provide the agents of the flict at several levels (Luckham, Ahmed, and Muggah state with direct and discretionary control, as against 1999). There are the direct effects of loss of life, which operating impersonally through market mechanisms has reached up to 5 percent of the population per year in * Growth of crony capitalism to the frustration of local Burundi in 1993-95, with several other cases of around entrepreneurial talent 1 percent. Child soldiers should be singled out as among * Persistence of antidevelopmental policies long after the most tragic victims. Others are victims of torture and their ill effects have become apparent, because their rape, or witnesses to such acts, who suffer psychological primary function was to provide a system of rewards trauma. Many more are displaced, often spending years and maintain the ruler in power, rather than promote as refugees. Social indicators rapidly deteriorate as services development per se. collapse and people's livelihood and social capital are destroyed. Indirect effects operate at several levels, with Why such systems have flourished particularly well in worsening growth performance undermining governments African soil goes beyond this report. Likely explanations revenue bases and distorting their spending patterns. are rooted in the colonial experience: "The African state The destruction of physical infrastructure is obvious, but system as we know it today is the direct and obvious descen- institutions are also destroyed, and similarly need to be dant of European colonialism" (Clapham 1991, p. 95). rebuilt for sustainable growth to occur (Haughton 1998). These origins interacted with precolonial social and demo- It can take years, even decades, for investor confidence to graphic conditions, bringing into being at independence be restored following bouts of political instability. nation-states whose fragility reinforced the tendency to Although this report emphasizes the dangers of over- use patronage and centralized authoritarianism in an generalization, there appears to be a remarkable degree of attempt to hold the state together. As with economic consensus over the picture of the African state presented decline, the culpability of foreign powers cannot be ignored, here and its widespread nature. The puzzle is rather why with their willingness to underwrite corrupt and unac- it persisted in the way it did. The evidence presented here countable regimes. The case of Mobutu (see box 7.1), sup- supports the model of the African state in terms of per- ported by both the United States and France, is one extreme sonal rule, or patrimonialism, where the position of the case, but there are other extremes (such as Obote's sec- ruler and his government is maintained by patron-client ond period of rule in Uganda), and a general disregard relationships, based for the most part on familial and for democracy and human rights in dealings with Africa.5 ethnic loyalties. Followers are rewarded with preferential access to loans, import licenses, contracts, and jobs and Political Systems Have Also Tended to Keep Poverty in the distribution of government spending. Institutional off the Agenda rules and constitutional checks and balances are swept aside by the competition for patronage and the struggle Distributional concerns are central to a patrimonial model to maintain power. As a result rulers became presidents of politics, to the extent of being at the expense of economic for life, the dubious virtues of one-party rule became the growth and long-term development. But these concerns are official ideology, open political competition was banned only incidentally about the poor. Resources of the state are or carefully delimited, and the distinction between the used to reward those who support those in power. The public and private domains became blurred. base for this is often ethnic and regional, sometimes reli- gious, sometimes military. The poor within such groups * One of the strengths of this model is that it explicates may benefit from the resulting largesse; those outside will some of the economic distortions described earlier, not. Indeed, many of those seen as in opposition, or just notably the following: politically unimportant, will rather be forced into pover- * Emphasis on the appropriation and distribution of ty through neglect, discrimination, and the ill effects of resources by the state, rather than on growth and wealth the economic stagnation resulting from this form of rule. creation This prediction is consistent with evidence concern- * Growth of the state relative to the private sector, in ing the policy priorities of African governments. Quite order to maximize the opportunities for patronage and recently, the World Bank (1996, p. 16) reported that African reward governments give low priority to poverty reduction as an Both Governments andMarkets Have-Failed the Poor 59 objective. Poverty was rarely identified as a policy prob- Assessment reports the poor as perceiving their govern- lem in governments' Letters of Development Policy and ments as having neglected the econom ic and social infra- only about one-quarter of them had explicitly identified structure, especially in rural areas, resulting in limited poverty reduction as a policy objective in their programs access to markets, health, and education; as having placed with the Bank. Addison (1993, p. 1) similarly suggests obstacles in the way of individual initiatives; and as bias- that "many African countries present a difficult political ing the delivery of public services away from the poor, par- environment for any donor agency that is intent on reduc- ticularly in favor of those who can alford to pay bribes. ing poverty," although the problem is by no means con- The lack of accountability in political structures in Africa fined to Africa. Addison states the following: is part of the explanation of this neglect of the poverty issue. But the reasons also lie in the absence of a con- [M] any of the policies that benefit the poor work stituency for pro-poor measures. The experience of both against the interests of higher-income groups who industrial and developing countries in implementing are politically influential ("vocal") in their demands. antipoverty programs-from the Poor Laws in sixteenth- These are often the very people who constitute century Elizabethan England to the Employment Guarantee the political power base of the region's governments. Schemes in India-is that there needs to be a middle Thus governments often direct public expenditures class lobby for such policies (Toye 1999). For much of to the benefit of high-income groups, both as gov- the elite, these concerns may be moti.vated by self-inter- ernment employees and as users of services, rather est, seeing the poor as a threat of unrest, crime, and dis- than to services that are important to poor people ease. But social reformers inspired by altruism have also such as preventative health care and primary edu- often played an important part. cation. Paying farmers a low share of the world The situation has frequently been worsened by the slow price of their commodities taxes the rural poor rate of economic growth. It is easier for people to accept but creates public revenues with which to buy polit- schemes to help the less fortunate in conditions in which ical support among the vocal. Import controls, by they themselves are well provided for. A daily struggle to limiting competition, create profits for favored survive in the face of declining incomes stunts altruism manufacturers and economic rents for those who and has led to replies by governments to questions about trade in scarce goods but tax the rest of society, their lack of an antipoverty strategy to the effect that especially those on low incomes who have the such strategies are redundant because "we are all poor." least access to scarce goods. (Addison 1993, p. 2) Indeed, one of the greatest challenges facing African pol- icymakers is precisely the scale of the poverty problem. Today the poverty reduction goal would probably receive While not all are poor, very large numbers are indeed more frequent mention by governments and a number engaged in a daily struggle for existence. of them have moved to draw up national antipoverty strate- Another factor contributing to past political neglect is gies (which are further discussed in chapter 13). But the heterogeneity of the poor. Hence their interests vary there is a danger that some of these are merely in response and sometimes conflict. The poor are far from being a sin- to the rise in interest among donors, rather than reflect- gle class and are not confined to any particular ethnic ing a deep-rooted commitment. One manifestation of the group. They therefore rarely exist as an organized politi- relative indifference of political systems in Africa is that cal entity. Antipoverty measures thus tend to relate to par- public service provision has been notable for its lack of ticular poverty groups, according to the basis of their relevance to the poor (see chapter 9). This situation is in livelihoods. In particular, there is a constant danger that contrast to developing countries in both Asia and Latin the interests of the poorest-the least powerful, least America, where explicit attention has been paid to the integrated into the modern economy, and least articu- plight of the poor under both democratic and nonde- late-will lack an effective voice and be left aside. The mocratic governments, and where the poor have been a absence of effective political mobilization is an impor- political force in their own right. tant feature. In the Latin American context it has been Africa's poor are well aware that political systems notedthat"themacropoliticsofpoorpeople'spressurewere work against them. The summary by Lariviere and oth- critical in increasing their potential to benefit from growth," ers (1999, p. 20) of the results of a Participatory Poverty but that in Africa there has been no such realignment of 60 AFRICAN POVERI YAT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPIEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES civil society (Lipton and van der Gaag 1993, p. 25). There to private providers. Underprovision can also occur if there is, of course, a host of African nongovernmental organi- are information asymmetries-the most common exam- zations (NGOs) working at grass roots levels to alleviate ple being that of rural credit, where potential borrowers, the plight of poor people, but most of them have limited particularly those without existing businesses, cannot objectives and are closely watched by their governments. signal their creditworthiness. The second form of market The situation described in the last paragraph restricts failure occurs from noncompetitive practices, such as what even well-motivated governments can do because, monopolies (single seller) or monopsonies (single buyer, politics being the art of the possible, they have to oper- for instance, agricultural marketing boards). Monopolies ate within constraints set by more or less organized inter- may be created by the state, even if they are in private est groups. Notwithstanding the large scale of the poverty hands, or they may be created by the market. In both cases problem, governments may weaken their own power regulation is required to ensure competitive behavior base by introducing antipoverty measures, especially if and so protect consumers. Table 7.1 summarizes some of these involve any form of redistribution from the less poor. the market failures that impinge on the poor, which are South Africa stands as an exception that nonetheless now discussed in more detail. illustrates the general rule. Because of its own unique recent As just mentioned, a common justification for state political history and the democratic nature of its current intervention in the past has been either the presence of political system, the poor there have a unity based on race, positive externalities (where the social gain from an activ- are well organized, and are strongly represented in the rul- ity exceeds the private gain, leading to underinvestment ing party. It is no coincidence, then, that the South African from a social point of view if the market is relied upon) government has one of the strongest antipoverty stances and public goods (where private investment will not occur of any on the continent. because the investor cannot adequately capture the ben- efits to make a profit). Infrastructure is the most frequently Some Markets Fail the Poor cited example of a public good. Although some infra- structural development, such as railways in the United Confronted with the failings described above, the temp- States, have been undertaken by private capital, market tation is to wash our hands of the possibilities of effective pricing of transport facilities remains the exception rather state intervention and leave the matter to the market. than the norm, and the still relatively low densities of pop- But such a reaction would ignore the characteristic of the ulation in much of Africa further reduce the potential for market system that, unless there are safeguards, it sets up private sector provision here. The role of rural infrastructure dynamic forces whereby "money makes money" while in poverty reduction in Africa has already been stressed- many others fall behind into a poverty trap. When it oper- further development of infrastructure will help remote ates within an appropriate institutional and policy frame- communities, which include many of the poorest; facili- work, capitalism is entirely compatible with low and tate market access for those without it; and put essential declining poverty rates, but there is little within the mar- services within reach. Infrastructure is one of the most ket system itself to produce such an outcome. Thus the important public goods for poverty reduction. well-known cases of "equitable growth" in some East Asian There are positive externalities to investments in health, countries rested on massive public investment in health education, water, and sanitation. These externalities arise and education, as well as on redistributive measures such in part through productivity effects, but the health ben- as land reform. This is the view expressed in chapter 6, efits of investment in all these areas are perhaps even and this section elaborates on this view by discussing which more important given the prevalence of communicable markets may be missing or failing in Africa and how such diseases. In Africa, over 70 percent of the burden of dis- a situation harms the poor. ease is accounted for by communicable disease, compared These market failures may be of two types. One is where to only 50 percent in most other developing countries and there are externalities (say, health and education) or pub- as little as 25 percent in China, so that there are very lic goods (providers cannot capture the returns to their large public benefits from improved health services, of a investment, which applies to much public infrastructure). kind which could not be captured through private pro- In such cases a free market will underprovide, creating a vision alone. Given the present inequalities in access (chap- case for either state provision or state support (subsidies) ter 9), expansion of services will benefit the poor. Some Both Governments and Markets Ha,e Failed the Poor 61 Table 7.1 Market failures and distortions as barriers to poverty reduction Experience Marketfailzure! (government General area Specific area distortion Link to poverty reduction Groups of the poor Policy intervention failure) Factor markets Physical capital Infrastructure Public goods Growth/supply response; pattern Rural, remote Public provision Maintenance of growth; access to social services; reduced work burden Investable resources Asymmetric Strengthen and diversify Those with po- Legal reform; Targeting, information; livelihoods tential and access institutional sustainability to productive subsidy' barriers to entry opportunities, i.e., not the poorest Labor Human capital: Positive Growth/enhanced All, but bias to Public provi ion Targeting, health, education, externalities productivity; rural poor or subsidy quality and family social indicators planning worse for poor Labor market Legal barriers Improved earning Migrants Remove nat,onal rigidities to migration opportunities and international barriers Land Absence of land Traditional tenure Liberalizing land markets All markets systems has ambiguous effect on poverty reduction Product markets Agricultural Marketing Uncertainty, Supply response Smallholders & Infrastructure State marketing produce monopsony dependants development, bodies often competitior, inefficient or policy exploitative Informal sectors Rerail/ Legal Income generation/provision All, but bias Remove Government microenterprise restrictions goods and services to urban restrictions intolerance interventions, such as malaria eradication and reproduc- initiatives have been launched in recent years as an antipover- tive health services, clearly have poverty-reduction bene- ty provision. fits at both macro and micro levels. Market conditions in Africa also oi-ten fail the poor by Other markets are affected by information asymme- confronting them with monopoly andl monopsony forces tries and uncertainty. These concepts have traditionally against which they have no effective defenses. Agricultural been applied to explain underinvestment and, in partic- marketing is perhaps the most important case in point. ular, high interest rates in rural areas. But they also affect In the past the state itself was the cause of the problem, technology-both research and extension-and some through the creation of state-owned monopoly market- marketing channels. The existence of information asym- ing boards. There has fortunately in recent years been metries, resulting from the high costs of obtaining infor- extensive privatization or liberalization in this area, but mation about small-scale depositors and borrowers, the results have by no means been without problems. A especially in rural settings, has been frequently cited to well-documented case has been Zarmbia in which gov- explain the paucity of financial services in rural areas. ernment had to step in to purchase the bumper budget In particular, a poor person with a creditworthy idea is following liberalization of agricultural marketing. Because unlikely to gain access to loan funds. In consequence, an of low levels of competition among private traders, farm- array of public sector, or not-for-profit, "microcredit" ers are all too often confronted with a single buyer for 62 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES their produce who offers only a low farm-gate price. allegiances other than being a member of some group of Participatory analysis reveals the continuing dissatisfac- the poor. Even if a class awareness is present, the poor tion of many producers, and evidence from Zambia and person may calculate they are better served by selling their Zimbabwe shows that traders are often only willing to vote than casting it for a party claiming it will change their engage in barter (consumer goods and secondhand clothes) situation. On the positive side, the link between democ- rather than pay cash (Stevens 1999). A substantial part of ratization and poverty reduction breaks down, as the the apparently weak responsiveness of the agricultural sec- government can take decisive steps of its own to reduce tor to improved relative prices is due to this factor. Weak poverty, although the record on this front has not been competition within the banking industry is another exam- good in Africa. ple that also contributes to the weak provision of finan- A sharp distinction should be drawn between formal cial services for small-scale savers and borrowers. and "real" democratization. There has been a good deal of progress at the formal level, with reformed constitu- What Does the Future Hold? tions and electoral rules to accommodate multiparty elections in many African states in recent years. During The prognosis from this chapter may appear poor: both the 1990s, 42 out of 50 African countries held multipar- state and market have a history of having failed the African ty elections, to which should be added four functioning poor. The previous section argued that redressing market democracies that already existed at the start of the decade. failure requires state action, but there seem little grounds But in only 10 of these 42 states did the elections result for believing in either the capacity or commitment of the in a change of government, and at the subsequent elec- African state. But there need not be pessimism. Many tion government changed in a mere two countries changes have taken place in the African political scene in (Madagascar and Benin), in both cases in favor of former the 1990s. This section identifies three major areas of military rulers (Economist 1999, p. 69). In a high pro- change and assesses how they affect the prospects for pover- portion of these countries, already ruling and apparently ty reduction. The three are the following: unpopular parties were able to manipulate formal elec- toral processes with some ease, using the resources of * Empowerment and democracy state and the advantages of incumbency to ensure their * Extending beyond central government (decentraliza- own reelection. And in a large proportion of cases elec- tion and civil society) toral politics has found expression as ethnic and region- * Coalition-building al politics, which is unlikely to result in a satisfactory antipoverty strategy. Finally, there is no apparent increase Empowerment and democracy in women's political participation. Genuine empower- ment of the poor appears some way off. There has been a major shift in Africa in the 1990s from On the other hand, the move towards electoral poli- nondemocratic to democratic regimes. Since lack of polit- tics is not meaningless. The entrance of opposition par- ical voice is one dimension of poverty, this step is in itself ties, liberalization of the press, and the emergence of civil poverty reducing. However, the importance of these changes society into the debate has helped to keep pressure on should not be overemphasized since (i) when it comes to incumbent governments, with the plight of the poor and the other dimensions of poverty, such as income poverty, the rural sector receiving increased focus. The days of it is far from readily apparent that there is a clear link "silent eating," that is, corruption without public outcry, between democracy and poverty reduction; and (ii) there are past. Sen (1990) has pointed to the strong link between are limitations to the extent of democratization. political freedoms and the end of famine: "The diverse Several analyses have shown that, while regimes that political freedoms that are available in a democratic state, have been the least successful at reducing poverty are non- including regular elections, free newspapers and freedom democratic, democracies are not inherendy better at pover- of speech, must be seen as the real force behind the elim- ty reduction than nondemocracies (see summary in Moore ination of famines" (cited in de Waal 1997, p. 4). De Waal and Putzel 1999, which is the main source for the fol- extends this notion of an "anti-famine contract" to Africa, lowing arguments). Although democracy in principle "gives arguing that even where it exists-in Botswana and Kenya- the poor a voice," many of the poor remain excluded it is shaky and that in general African governments have and, particularly poor women, do not participate in the not been required to submit themselves to such contracts political process, or if they do they may vote according to to maintain power.6 If it is not yet difficult enough, it is Both Governments and Markets Have Failed the Poor 63 at least harder than it formerly was for incumbent regimes the realities of power within it, donors can work through to control political processes. Formal democratization, in local government agencies, which are closer to the prob- other words, may lead on to the genuine variety in due lems, with particular scope within federal systems. In fact, course, bringing with it a greater empowerment of the poor. donors currently evince a perhaps exce ,sive faith in decen- There are implications here for donor governments that tralization, for at the local level, too, :here is a danger of have been prominent in advocating democratization. They elite capture. The less poor are more articulate, confi- need to build a recognition of the distinction between for- dent, and have the time available for participation (the mal and real change into their own policies and aid allo- time factor particularly weighs against poor women). There cation processes, to encourage the genuine reformers, to may be even fewer checks and balances at the local level penalize the more cynical manipulators, and to work than there are nationally to restrain the elite from pro- with wider society to support the forces for genuine reform moting their own interests, partly because capacity of local wherever they arise. The desirability of doing this is government may be weak, as was found in examination enhanced by the socially embedded nature of much pover- of local government in both Ghana andt Nigeria (see Crook ty and the need, therefore, to work with those who can and Sverrisson 1999). While there have been genuine form and change opinions and values. achievements at the local level, the pattern of spending from recently expanded district-level budgets does not Extending beyond centralgovernment: decentralization appear particularly pro-poor. A cross-country study of and civil society decentralization found that the African cases in general had a poor record (other than improved spatial equity) Working through central government is not the only with respect to both participation by the poor and impact possibility. Depending on the local political system and (see table 7.2). Table 7.2 Impact of decentralization Participation ofthe poor Socioeconomic impact Human Spatial Participation Representation Responsiveness Growth Equity development equity Afiica Cote d'lvoire Low Low Very low ... ... Improvcd Improved Ghana Improved Fair Low Low but little Low but little Low bul: little evidence evidence evidence Fair Kenya Very low Very lo" Very low Lowk, Low Low Fair Nigeria Low Low Very low Low Very low Very lowv Low Other regiorns W Bengal, Improved Improved Improved Improved Improved Improved ... India Karnataka, Fair Improved Low Low Low Fair Fair India Colombia Ambiguous Ambiguous Improved ... ... Improved Improved Philippines Improved Improved Ambiguous ... ... Brazil Low but limited Low but limited Low but limited ... Mixed Mixed Low evidence evidence evidence Chile ... ... Improved Improved Ambiguious Ambiguous to low to low Mexico ... ... ... ... Low Low Low Bangladesh Fair Very low Low Very low Very low Very low Fair No evidence available. Source: Crook and Sverrisson (1999). 64 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES The other shift away from central government that possible, for key groups within political elites may well hasbeenstronglysupportedbythedonorcommunityhas see that mass poverty is an obstacle to the economic been an emphasis on civil society. Civil society is a very modernization on which their own prosperity depends, broad concept, reflecting a great diversity of social orga- and that it may also threaten their interests as a source of nizations. Only a small subset of these are concerned crime, disease, and disaffection.7 with poverty reduction (and some may impede it), and it Nevertheless, it is commonality of interests that has to is these NGOs that have been the focus of donor atten- be stressed, which implies avoiding measures that appear tion. NGOs and their supporters claim they are better at to pitch the interests of the poor and less poor against each working with the poor because they are closer to the prob- other. A case in point relates to the politics of targeting. lems, more likely to adopt participatory approaches to the Targeting is a key element in a poverty reduction strate- design and execution of their programs, and often have gy, especially in a context in which resources are scarce stronger antipoverty motivation than official agencies. and substantial numbers of the poor will be bypassed by Systematic evidence in support of these propositions is growth. But targeting may be either broad or narrow. scanty. However, NGOs offer a way of operating in coun- The former concentrates on activities, such as primary tries with an unsupportive political climate. This modal- health and education or rural development, most likely ity has limitations, however. Many NGOs have an essentially to benefit the poor. Narrow targeting aims to deliver ameliorative and often quite narrow remit, not geared to benefits to defined poverty groups, and is either "indica- tackling the causes of the poverty they address, although tor targeting," identifying group members by certain char- others are active campaigners against the status quo. Some acteristics such as rural landless women, or self-targeting, are opportunistic, existing largely because of the avail- providing food for work or selling inferior goods that ability of donor and private monies. It is also difficult to would be of no interest to the better off. channel large sums of assistance through NGOs without Broad targeting has been criticized for its high leak- changing their nature or diminishing their grassroots cred- age, large revenue costs, and inefficiency, with a large share ibility and other advantages. It would be a mistake, there- of benefits going to the nonpoor. Indeed, as discussed in fore, to think that NGOs can offer a satisfactory substitute chapter 8, in Africa health and education spending has for sympathetic governments. been skewed in favor of the nonpoor, as has what little Despite these qualifications, however, working through investment there has been in rural development. Namibia local government and broader civil society both have the and South Africa are the two countries to have state pen- potential to make real contributions to the antipoverty sions; while these have positive benefits for the poor, they drive, particularly in situations where the central govern- are also received by better-offpensioners who do not depend ment is unsympathetic. on them so much. Broad targeting thus fails in the impor- tant task of minimizing claims on scarce fiscal resources Building coalitions and is a blunt instrument for providing what the poor need. These drawbacks have led to some replacement of broad- It is a large weakness of the recent resurgence of interest ly targeted schemes with narrower ones (this trend has in measures to reduce poverty that it has been largely donor been more apparent in regions other than Africa, although driven. Little progress can be expected unless it becomes there are exceptions like the Gabinte deApoio a Popula,do possible to build domestic political coalitions in favor of Vulnerdvel (GAPVU) scheme in urban Mozambique). But pro-poor action. At the heart of this proposition is the there are both technical and political constraints on nar- premise that achieving successful poverty reduction is row targeting, which suggest that more universal benefits not a matter of identifying an optimal set of policies but may be better after all. rather one of achieving that set of measures that is the The political dilemma is a real one. Broad targeting most feasible within a given political setting. In short, it creates a substantial constituency with a vested interest is necessary to work within existing political constraints in maintaining a provision that is also likely to bring sub- while also seeking to loosen these. This will often involve stantial benefits to the poor. Narrow targeting tends to working with local elites to convince them that antipover- do the opposite because it acts through exclusion. The ty measures, such as improved educational provisions, more precisely defined the target group-the larger the are also in their own long-term interest. Historical expe- numbers excluded-the less likely it is that the provision riences from beyond Africa indicate that this is indeed in question will command wide political support and the Both Governments and Markets Htve Failed the Poor 65 more likely it is that it will be opposed by those excluded. increase political support for the scheme. Targeting women In the extreme case, political support may be so eroded may simply increase their workload, adding to their bur- that eventually a lower level of provision will go to the den the additional task of providing food that was previ- poor than in the pretargeting situation. That was the expe- ously undertaken by men. rience in a number of countries, including Colombia To conclude, this discussion of targeting illustrates both and Sri Lanka. The dilemma is well illustrated where pover- the complexity and delicacy of the policy decisions con- ty is concentrated in some specific region or in a partic- fronting governments wishing to embark on an antipover- ular ethnic group. Targeting in these cases involves excluding ty strategy and the central importance of keeping closely other regions or other groups, not a proposition likely to in mind the need to maintain breadtha in public support commend itself to those excluded. Thus Glewwe and van for the measures undertaken. While it is for statesmen to der Gaag (1990) show that the theoretically poverty- exercise leadership in poverty reduction, they need to minimizing policy in urban C6te d'Ivoire was to con- maintain a coalition of support sufficient to sustain the centrate transfers on the East Forest region. However, the strategy and prevent its reversal. implication was that no households outside that region- some also living in poverty-would receive any transfer Notes and would have no self-interest in supporting such pro- vision. It was therefore politically unfeasible. 1. A single sentence cannot capture the diversity of experience, On the practical side, targeting can be administrative- although there appear to be common elements for many countries. ly costly, with per recipient costs rising the narrower the As selected counterexamples, the Kenyan civil service performed targeting. The management of GAPVU reduced admin- competently into the 1980s, Botswana never discarded democra- istrative costs to just 7 percent, but this was at the expense cy, and corruption was held in check in Malawi under Banda. of proper monitoring of eligibility, with the result that at 2. It is difficult, however, to maintain the argument that con- least one-half of the benefits were lost to ineligible bene- trols were introduced because of the rents t:hey would provide. As ficiaries or corruption. Following changes, a greater pro- Mkandawire (1998) points out, and as was discussed in the last portion of benefits reaches the intended poor beneficiaries chapter, such policies were favored by the development commu- now that more, rather than less, is spent on administra- nity at the time and received the support of international donors. tion. But the narrower the targeting the greater the like- However, the availability of rents certainly built constituencies that lihood that significant numbers of the poor will not benefit. resisted reform. There is also a danger of creating incentives against work: 3. See also the analysis, and empirical verification, provided by those near the poverty line to begin with are particularly Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (1998). likely to fall into a poverty trap in which there is no 4. Statistical analysis by Collier and Hoeffier (1999) confirms incentive to raise themselves above it. a significant link between natural resourie endowment and the These issues mean that targeting schemes must be tai- probability of civil conflict. lored to the local political and social context. Self-target- 5. The most notable exception to this rule was South Africa, ing may command support by, for example, offering low although other particular leaders lost foreign support as a result of wages for hard work. But if the work is too onerous it their excesses (Amin, for instance). Under President Carter the may exclude some, such as the elderly, the moderately dis- United States attempted to incorporate human rights into its for- abled, and some women, who may be among the poor- eign relations, but this only affected Ethiopia under Mengistu. est. There may also be arguments for awarding wages or 6. De Waal's book is also about sharing culpability with other food sufficient to feed the whole family rather than the actors so that African governments are not seen as solely to blame. individual worker (as has been done on the Employment High on his list of those responsible are humanitarian agencies that Guarantee Scheme in Ethiopia). But doing so is likely to "do not subject themselves to any antifansine political contracts; lead to an oversupply of labor, so that jobs have to be directors, professors, and consultants do not lose their jobs if there rationed, most probably to those with easiest access rather are famines" (de Waal 1997, p. 24). than those from more remote, and so poorer, communi- 7. On this theme see the special issues of IDS Bulletin, 30(2), ties. Besides applying either stigma or discomfort, obtain- April 1999 on 'Nationalising the anti-poverty agenda?' See also ing assistance acts both as a targeting mechanism and may Ascher (1984). CHAPTER 8 The Poor Have Inadequate Capital A Weak Asset Base Undermines Sustainable national well-being and rural population share is a sec- Livelihoods in Rural Areas ond reason for paying particular attention to rural pover- ty. A third reason is the contribution of the agricultural This chapter mainly focuses on the rural poor for sever- sector to growth and poverty alleviation, in both rural al reasons. First, they comprise 90 percent or more of the areas and at the level of the economy as a whole. Research poor in most countries. This is partly because the rural from Zimbabwe shows that this sector has a larger mul- population share is large in most countries. But the con- tiplier than other sectors; the ripple effects generating addi- tribution to poverty of rural areas exceeds this popula- tional economic activity are greater for agriculture than tion share: rural people are disproportionately poor. The they are for manufacturing or services. poor have lower incomes and lack access to facilities. We adopt a sustainable livelihoods approach to rural Lack of access to facilities explains the result that, even poverty, which directs our attention to the issue of assets. once the impact of income is taken into account, then A sustainable livelihood is one that does not run down the larger the share of rural residents in the total popula- the asset base on which it depends, undermining future tion the lower the level of welfare, as measured by the welfare. In addition, the livelihood strategy should be such Human Development Index (HDI); this relationship is to withstand shocks occurring in the environment in which shown in figure 8.1.1, 2 This inverse relation between it operates. Vulnerability to shocks also depends crucial- ly on assets, as these can be turned into income in times Figure 8.1 A larger rural population is linked with lower of need. social indicators: the partial regression of HDI on The poor are more vulnerable since they do not have rural population share the ability to build up reserves for hard times, and hold fewer assets to draw upon. In Ethiopia just over one-half HD0-ef6e0 r of income per capita taken out of households in the upper tercile had food stores six 0.60 months after harvest, whereas only 2 percent of those in 0.55 * the lower tercile did so. Without food stores, hardship 0.50 * * * turns a vicious circle into destitution. Beyond a certain 0.45 * * * * point there is no turning back. Analysis of famine in 0.40 _ * ** Ethiopia and Sudan shows that households first sell off 0.35 - * livestock. Next they sell housing materials (for instance, 0.30 + * * + metal roofs and wooden posts) and household items such as beds. Finally, they sell their clothes and cooking uten- 0.25 t sils.3 Once destitute many die. If they survive they have 0.20 little chance to be able to return to their prefamine level 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 of well-being. Note: Rural population (percent)-effect of income per capita taken out. In the analysis that follows assets are divided into Source: Calculated from World Bank World Development Indicators and UNDP Human Development Report. three main categories: physical, human, and social. In all 66 The Poor Have lnadequate Capital 67 cases our analysis concerns both the level of capital, which Infrastructure is generally inadequate in African countries, and access of the poor to these assets. But there is diversity across As argued in chapter 5, infrastructure in Africa is low by the continent as to the relative importance of the con- international standards and has in many respects deteri- straints imposed by the lack of these various assets. Table orated over the last two decades, a trend resulting from 8.1 divides Africa into six agroecological zones. These cat- declining and squandered state resources and exacerbat- egories, of course, apply most readily to natural capital, ed by conflict. The length of paved roads per person grew that is, land and the environment. by about 50 percent from 1965 to the end of the 1970s but declined in the 1980s, picking up only slightly in Africa Lacks Physical Capital of All Kinds, Stocks of recent years to return to the level of the early 1980s Many Are Being Denuded, and the Access of the (ADB 1999 p. 113). Similarly, per capita electricity pro- Poor Is Increasingly Restricted duction doubled in the two decades from 1965, but has since remained relatively stagnant. With respect to roads Five areas of physical capital are considered: infrastruc- and irrigation Africa does not just lag behind other devel- ture, credit, land, environmental capital, and livestock. oping regions but is in a worse state than was India four Table 8.1 Land resource base of Sub-Saharan Africa Groumng Alajor agricultuiral Climate and soil Region Climate period (davs) Soils Vegetation activities constraints Countries Sudano-Sahelian Africa Precipitation exceeds 1 74 Most common Predominantly Extensive grazing Has shorter crop Mauritania, Senegal. potential evapo- soils are red to desert (32%) and of sheep. goats & seasons than other Gambia, Mali, Niger. transpiration from grey ferruginoux arid areas (36%) camels. Cereals semiarid tropics wi:h Burkina Faso, Chad, 2 to 7 months leached soils with occupy 70% of similar rainfalL. Cape Verde annually. Annual low natural cultivated land. rainfall : fertility. Millet and sorghum 100-400 mm. account for 80% of cereal production. Dry season valley bottom farming. Humid and Dominated by moist 75-119 Acid soils in the Forest in the humid Suites for a wide range The alternation of Guinea Bissau, subhumid subhumid (47%) and humid areas, less and savannah of annual and wet and dry seasons Guinea, Sierra Leone, West Africa humid (35%). leached and higher woodland in the perennial crops and leads to formation of Liberia, Cote dIlvoire, Annual rainfall: nutrient content sub-humid forest some small ruminants lateritic crusts not Ghana. Togo, Benin, 1,200-1,500 mm. in the drier areas. Forest- conducive to farming Nigeria savannah areas. savannah mosaic. activities. Humid Central Africa Virrually humid 180-260 Acid soils cannot Forest Suited for perennial Fertility declines Caiiieroon, throughout the year. be cultivated crops and root crops rapidly when Central Africa Rep., Annual rainfall: over continuously under such as cassava. vegetation is removed. Gabon, Congo Rep.. 1.500 mm. loss-input farming. Congo Subhumid and About 88% of East 120 179 Dark clay soils Grass steppes Wide range of uses. Relative land scarcity Madagascar. Reunion, mountainous Africa has a single Temperate and due to differences in Malawi, Seychelles, East Africa rainfall season. tropical crop the rainfall and high Tanzania, Comoros, Temperatures decrease production and population density Burundi, Somalia, with altitude. Rainfall grazing in the semiarid Rsvanda. Ethiopia. is generally not more parts of the region. Sudan, Uganda. than 1,200 mm. Kenya, Eritrea Subhumid and Up to 6 months humid 1-74 Reddish chestnut, Montane forest and Cereal cultivation and Rainfall is inadeqtiate Angola, Zimbabwe, semi-arid southern rainfall. Arid to semi- reddish-brown, grassland. grazing in the drier and unreliable. Namibia, Zambia, Africa arid conditions in 48%/o and brown soils. parts. Botswana, of the area. Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland Source: Benneb (1996). 68 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES decades ago: in the 1980s less than 3 percent of tropical quality road, frequently of several lanes, to the (modern) cropland was irrigated in Africa compared to around 30 international airport. But large tracts of most countries percent in India in 1950, and roads per kilometer squared are not served by all weather roads, or roads at all. Small in Africa were one-fifth those in India in the earlier peri- infrastructure investments, such as bridges, can bring great od (Hayami 1997, pp. 94-95). benefits in terms of greater access and reduced work- By definition, the remote have less access to facilities. loads. These benefits accrue in particular to women who There is a strong correlation between mean incomes and carry the greater load-one source states that in Ghana access to facilities, such as the closest road. In Ghana, for (table 8.3) and Tanzania women spend nearly three times example, the poorer regions have greater proportions of as much time on transport and transport four times as their population without access to a drivable road or much as men in volume (World Bank 1999), and anoth- public transport, have fewer schools, and spend more time er shows that their transport burden can be up to five times in tasks such as fetching water (table 8.2). These data also as high. Women's heavier transport burden, which includes reinforce the importance of intranational variations in items such as water and fuelwood but also reflects their well-being. Some groups of the poor may have limited role in agricultural marketing, is one aspect of their rela- access for special reasons: the elderly, infirm, and dis- tive time poverty. Women usually work two to three hours abled by virtue of limited mobility. Children, even those a day longer than men. responsible for the well-being of siblings in child-headed families, will not have the legal standing or authority to Credit exercise control over capital. However, much infrastructure spending is biased toward Investment rates in African countries are low by interna- the needs of the nonpoor. Most countries have a high- tional standards, as is the share of private investment. Table 8.2 People in poorer regions have less access to transport and education: the case of Ghana (early 1990s) Percent of communities with: Primary Time spent enrollments fetching at least water Mean Access to Access to Primary 50 percent (minutes expenditure drivable road public transport school (male) (female) per day) Greater Accra 234 100 57 100 57 58 15 Ashanti 191 100 89 100 93 93 28 Central 181 100 76 94 67 67 21 Eastern 164 59 48 59 94 90 30 Volta 160 78 39 78 73 70 40 Western 146 100 85 96 100 100 24 Upper East 145 78 0 78 55 23 71 Brong Ahafo 136 78 28 78 87 81 38 Northern 133 63 19 63 44 19 37 Upper West 104 60 40 60 30 30 37 Sources. Ghana Statistical Service, Ghana Living Standards Survey. Report on the Third Round; Rural Communities in Ghana. Table 8.3 Women have a heavier transport burden than men (ton-km. per person per year) Kasama Lusaka - rural Mbale Kaya Dedougu (Zambia) (Zambia) (Uganda) (Burkina) (Burkina) Females 35.7 30.3 39.0 10.3 15.5 Males 7.1 9.8 8.6 3.6 4.4 Source: ADB (1999, p. 108). The Poor Have Iiiadequate Capital 69 The commercial banking system barely touches rural areas, tenure systems since colonial times," that is, land that least of all the smallholder sector of most relevance to the was settled or was clearly in use for agricultural purposes poor. Rural credit has thus been provided through tradi- remained under traditional land tenure systems, whereas tional associations and micro finance schemes. However, all other land became the property of the state, being both of these have mainly benefited the relatively less poor sold to settlers in eastern and southern Africa, and for in rural areas. Savings scheme often exclude the poorest, plantations in West Africa. This system, which has been or producers associations collect funds from all members continued in the postcolonial period, alienated people but only loan to the more prosperous, so that the poor adopting migratory livelihood strategies, such as pas- subsidize the nonpoor. Women are further disadvan- toralists, from much of the land on which they relied. taged through social and legal restrictions on their access Access to land is unequal, with women frequently having to credit. The process by which women are excluded is no access (in the North West Province of Cameroon, for documented for the case of Zambia, where, although nom- example, less than 5 percent of registered titles were issued inally as eligible as men, women are at a disadvantage to women (World Bank 1999, p. 35). Under many kin- because the procedures for securing project assistance (both ship systems, the property of a deac[ man passes to his a loan and other services) are alien to women, normally brothers. If young, the widow is also passed to a brother being carried out at meetings restricted to men. Moreover, as a new wife, or older women become the responsibili- although it is not written as a rule, it is assumed by both ty of their children. Hence the phenomenon of "land grab- project staff and villagers that a loan to a woman would bing," whereby a husband's relatives seize his property have to be guaranteed by her husband (Crehan 1997, p. from the widow on his death. In rural areas traditional 169). Women's labor is therefore less productive, since it land allocation system through a chief would make some is employed with fewer complementary inputs (table 8.4). provision for the woman, but this protection is not avail- Donor-financed micro finance initiatives are seen as a able in urban areas. Furthermore, the impact ofAIDS and major instrument for poverty reduction, and are the conflict on the middle-aged population leave many elder- main tool of the Consultative Group for the Abolition of ly women with no one to support them. Poverty (CGAP). But research shows there to be a clear The scattered available evidence suggests that land hold- trade-off between returns and targeting, a trade-off that ings are becoming more unequal ancd that landlessness is has usually been made at the expense of the poorest (Hulme increasing. Bonte (1999) documents growing inequalities and Mosley 1997). in land holdings in the Sahel as certain ethnic groups acquire large amounts of land, mainly for commercial Land farming purposes. For example, in Mali first colonial paci- fication and then the installation of a series of wells since Historically, Africa has had an abundance of land, with independence have allowed Dogon farmers to extend con- scope for new settlement through migration. This is no trol over larger stretches of the country at the expense of longer the case in several areas, and there is now a land Fulani herders, many of whom are reduced to becoming constraint in eastern and southern Africa and part of the employees to look after the newly acquired herds of wealthy humid zones of western Africa. Other than in humid and Dogons. Various countries have intioduced land legisla- subhumid West Africa, soil is of limited fertility, result- tion that has aimed to reduce the role of chiefs in land ing in cropland accounting for 5-6 percent of total land, allocation. Basotho chiefs resisted tlhe 1979 Land Act in less than one-half the average for all low-income coun- Lesotho on the grounds that the new measure to allow tries. Much of Africa has been characterized by dual land inheritance would eliminate the redistributive mechanism in traditional allocations (Franklin 1995). Franklin doc- Table 8.4 Male-headed households have more resources uments growing land acquisition for commercial farm- than female-headed ones: ownership of equipment in ing in Lesotho by the wealthy, who acquire land through Senegal (percent)mgmLstobthwelh,woaqieantruh numerous individual land deals. Agreements are made Tractor Plough Cart with small farmers either for immediate use, sharecrop- ping, or to inherit the land; there mray be no legal agree- Female-headed household 0.6 9.5 5.1 ment between the parties, but the chief approves the Female-headed_______household_____0__6__9_5 ______ deal, for which payment may be building a house or pro- Source: Wortd Bank ( 995b). viding food and clothing. 70 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Despite these growing inequalities, in Africa, as else- Environment where, there is a case for equitable land holdings on grounds of both efficiency and equity (or growth and poverty reduc- The picture with respect to the environment is rather more tion). There is a well-established inverse relationship complicated. The conventional view supposes a poverty- between yield and size of holding: in settlement schemes population-environment nexus in which increasing in Kenya the smallest holdings produced gross output population creates environmental pressures that are exac- per hectare worth more than six times that of larger hold- erbated by the measures the rural poor are forced to take ings; similar patterns observed for large farms in Trans to survive. Environmental degradation undermines liveli- Nzoia (Kenya) (Hunt 1984, pp. 254-55). These higher hoods, generating a vicious circle in which poverty and outputs are, of course, based on higher labor inputs, which declining environmental quality feed off one another. are up to 10 times higher per hectare-small-scale agri- But two important caveats must be made to this con- culture is the archetypal labor-intensive growth. Yet cur- ventional view. rent policy changes toward liberalization of land markets First, in terms of international comparisons, Africa's are more likely to further concentrate land holdings. environmental situation is relatively good with respect to The agenda of privatizing land is being pursued (and both the level of indicators, which is to be expected, but promoted by the donor community) with little thought also the rate of change (table 8.5);6 though this table does for its consequences for poverty. What evidence we have not include an indicator of soil quality, which is poor in shows that regressive land reform is being carried out in many parts of the continent's agroecological zones and a the 1 990s.5 For example, in Zambia land that was previ- critical constraint on agricultural growth. It is not sur- ously held by the state has been made available to urban prising that water pollution in Africa is less than one-tenth settlers, but the procedures discriminate against the poor that in high-income countries, and the level of CO2 even for small plots, requiring, for example, bank state- emissions per person under one-fifteenth. If the poor are ments as evidence of sufficient funds to develop the site. bad for the environment, the rich are worse. The rates for Meanwhile squatters are given registration certificates that Africa are also lower than those for other developing regions. in fact provide virtually no legal protection against evic- What is perhaps more surprising is that the rate of increase tion. Analysis of the situation in the copperbelt region of in CO2 emissions is lowest for Africa, though this can be the country shows well-connected individuals to be acquir- explained by poor growth performance, and that the rate ing land in forest areas on which they build homes of deforestation is around the average for low-income (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998). countries. This caveat should not, however, be taken as cause Table 8.5 Africa still has relatively good natural resources: international comparison of environmental indicators Levels indicators Clhange indicators Motor Forest area as Forest area Water pollutants vehicles C02 emissions Rate of Percent change a percent of per capita per capita per capita per capita deforestation in CO, total land area (kM2/000 (kg/day! (vehicles/OOO (metric tons! (1990-95, emissions (percent) people) person x106) people) person) percentage) 1980-95 East Asia and Pacific 23.7 2.2 2.2 15 2.4 0.8 126 EuropeandCentralAsia 36.0 18.0 3.0 142 7.8 -0.1 320 Latin America and Caribbean 45.2 18.7 3.9 92 2.5 0.6 43 Middle East and North Africa 0.8 0.3 1.6 53 3.6 0.9 97 South Asia 15.6 0.6 1.3 6 0.8 0.2 161 Sub-Saharan Africa 16.8 6.7 0.8 20 0.8 0.7 36 Memo items: Low income 15.8 1.9 1.6 8 1.4 0.6 121 High income 21.0 7.1 9.8 559 12.1 -0.2 27 Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators 1998; data for 1995 except where indicated. The Poor Have ft,adequate Capital 71 for complacency. Further development maywell be expect- tained by careful management. In fact, most of Africa's ed to put further pressure on environmental capital. livestock is in arid and semiarid areas with highly variable But the second caveat follows from several studies show- rainfall. Drought is the main determinant of both live- ing that environmental quality has improved rather than stock numbers and vegetation status. Blueprint approach- worsened over time, and that the poor are frequently good es are doomed to failure in such a disequilibrium guardians of the environment. The best known example environment. Indeed, by restricting movement they under- is of the Machakos District in Kenya. There was wide- mine the core of the survival strategy to follow in a such spread concern about soil erosion among colonial officials an uncertain setting, which is to move to where vegeta- in the 1930s; but by the 1990s, after a sixfold increase in tion is available (called "tracking"). Tracking strategies population, agricultural yields had increased fivefold and have also been frustrated by interventions with less benign the density of trees had increased (Tiffen, Mortimore, and intentions. Both colonial and postcolonial states have Gichuki 1994). Similarly, Fairhead and Leach (1996) alienated land they see as "unused," using it for resettle- demonstrate that "forest islands" in the savanna of Guinea ment schemes, state farms, and nature reserves. Conflict are not, as was long believed, remnants of a more exten- can also disrupt tracking by blocking migration routes. sive forest degraded by population pressure, but were created by the very people held responsible for that degra- Accumulation of Human and Social Capital Is Slow dation. This argument is not to say that poor people will and Frequently Biased against Rural Areas always enhance, rather than degrade, the environment, but that they may do so when conditions permit, so that The main components of human capital-health and edu- the problem shifts to that of identifying these condi- cation-are discussed in the next chapter. There it is shown tions. Conditions for enhancing the productivity of land that service provision is uneven, bei:ng woefully inade- have been identified as security of tenure, low agricultur- quate in many areas, and that quality of services tends to al taxation, good infrastructure, and access to markets and be low. Biases act against the poor benefiting from ser- credit. However, rather than enhance these conditions, vices. Urban areas are better served than rural ones, with government and donor interventions often operate in nonpecuniary access costs being correspondingly higher the other direction. for rural residents. The poor are more responsive to prices, so that user charges may bias services still further unless Livestock effective exemption schemes are put in place. Enrollment rates are lower for girls than for boys, and women are less Livestock accounts for 25 percent of agricultural GDP in likely to avail themselves of health services. There are some Africa, up to 30 percent if by-products such as manure important exceptions-the Expanded Program of are included. Livestock is thus of critical importance to Immunization (EPI)-has raised immunization rates in the rural economy and, hence, the well-being of the many countries since the 1980s. In recent years several poor, but it has been subject to neglect, misguided inter- countries have successfully raised primary education. ventions, and outright attack. But these achievements are indeed exceptions to the gen- Government and donor interventions to increase the eral underinvestment in human capiral. welfare of pastoralists have failed to meet their objectives of "improved" stock practices and raising living standards: Extension services "the last thirty years have seen the unremitting failure of livestock development projects across Africa. Millions of Knowledge and the dissemination of knowledge are impor- dollars have been spent with few obvious returns and not tant components of human capital. But research and dis- a little damage" (Scoones 1995, p. 3). These interventions semination remain weak; there has been no green revolution have been misconceived because they have seen the prob- in Africa (Mosley 1999; see also chapter 6), and exten- lem as one of overgrazing leading to environmental degra- sion services do not reach the poor. Many colonial sys- dation. The solution imposed has thus been to limit access tems were oriented to serve settler farmers rather than to wvhat is seen as the carrying capacity of the land for indigenous ones, and some of these practices have been sustainable grazing. The misconception here is to see the slow to change, and that change has focused on a minor- environment as being in an equilibrium that can be main- ity of better-off "progressive" farmers. Such an orienta- 72 AFRiCAN POVERTY AI' THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES tion meant that women, who are responsible for the bulk ethnic, although urban-based groupings may be organized of agricultural output, were missed. A study of reports onanonethnicbasis (Tripp 1998).Thispointcanbesummed from the colonial Department of Agriculture in Kenya up by saying that economic relations are mediated by found just 15 references to the gender of the farmer from social space. Transactions are based on trust and reciproc- 1914-52, and it was only in that last year that women ity. While this situation can protect the vulnerable and were first referred to in an annual report, which com- support the poor, it can also disadvantage them under two mented that "the women do all the planting and until a sets of circumstances. First, individuals unable to recipro- greater interest is taken in the work by men, we shall be cate in any way may "drop out of the system" and so not greatly retarded in our efforts. It is most difficult to change be supported in times of need. Second, when whole com- the ways of overworked women." (MacKenzie 1998, p. munities are in crisis, no one can reciprocate and systems 99). After independence, many extension services have of social support can collapse; in other words, in times of continued along the same lines. In Senegal fewer than 5 general hardship social capital rapidly depreciates. percent of students enrolled at agricultural colleges were PPAs often report (but do not elaborate upon) the view women, and only 3 percent of extension workers were that "the poor only have themselves to blame" for their female (World Bank 1995b). Although it is not neces- situation. Some examples from anthropological work sarily the case that women extension workers are needed reveals that this indeed can be an important cause of pover- to reach women, the practice has been to have separate ty. Not, of course, that the poor are to blame but that the services for women, with nonagricultural staff focusing social exclusion embodied in the attitudes expressed cre- on domestic tasks. It is not the case that entrenched ates a poverty trap. An example comes from Howard and social relations will necessarily frustrate attempts to intro- Millard's longitudinal study of the Chagga from Mount duce gender sensitivity to extension services: experiences Kilimanjaro (Tanzania). Community members and local from Siavonga District in Zambia demonstrate that, government officials dismiss the poor as "these people" with changes in the process and content of extension to (hawa watu), responsible for their own plight-they drink a more participatory approach, women's involvement could too much, are ignorant, do not plan ahead, and so forth. be greatly increased, and that men were at least as forth- These attitudes mean that a poor individual cannot get a coming as women in views as to how to overcome gen- loan; the attempt of one of the authors to help the cre- der barriers (Frischmuth 1997). ation of a woodworking cooperative was frustrated by lack of support from both church and government, and the Social capital children of the poor are allowed to die the slow death of malnutrition living next to, or even in the same compound By contrast it may be thought that social capital in Africa as, wealthier relatives. is high and can act to support the poor. It is certainly the Box 8.1 illustrates how illness, in this case leprosy, results case that the extended family, with its associated networks in social exclusion, that is, a loss of rights, and that wid- of support, persists. On hearing of the more limited role owhood has the same effect. Children born disabled are of kinship in Britain, a Kaonde (Zambia) woman exclaimed, not likely to be allowed to survive. Increased numbers of "You Europeans, you're just like fish!" (Crehan 1997, p. disabled from conflict will put a strain on both tradi- 87). But such a view has to be subject to several correc- tional and official support systems. tions. The first is to state that the poor have little politi- It is of course not possible to generalize from the above cal capital. As elaborated in the previous chapter, African examples, and counter examples can be found of the sup- political processes have had adverse implications for pover- port afforded to the needy in a wide range of African ty reduction for several reasons. Institutional capital is also societies, and of customs that ensure that the elderly, infirm, low. Rural institutions, such as cooperatives and market- and orphaned do not become destitute. The widespread ing channels, are often weak or nonexistent. Where they reliance on "help from others" in times of hardship report- do exist, they often exclude the poor (see, for example, ed in PPAs testifies the extent of these traditions and Howard and Millard 1997). how they have adapted to changing circumstances. But A more nuanced picture emerges with respect to tra- these traditions can be severely tested at times of general ditional social capital built on community relations. hardship. Such capital is undoubtedly high, though of course runs If whole communities are affected by poverty, then along traditional lines of association, which are usually social capital depreciates as the usual support systems break The Poor Have liadequate Capital 73 Box 8.1 The disadvantaged are often excluded from normal social relations: Saran's story At 15 Saran, now in her 70s, married Janko, a powerful man, tion gradually improved as more effective treatment with who was head of the hunters' association from a distant vil- antibiotics was introduced after some tinme. lage. The marriage was arranged as a substitute after Janko's She married another leper, Bakari Kamara, and together older brother refused Saran's leprous sister, Hawa. they farmed unused land by the river. Saran had two chil- When Saran developed leprous sores a year later, Janko dren and became involved with a women's association whose threw her out of his house. She went to live in isolation in a members were of many different ethnicities. shelter outside the village where Janko visited her periodically After Saran's husband died, Hawa's daughter and son-in- to beat her and steal her crops. Eventually she returned to her law took away her compound, later selling it and moving own family, but her isolation from community life continued. away. However, she managed to live on a small strip of land Colonial officials came to inspect villagers for illness, and selling vegetables in the local market and gained a reputa- Saran accepted the offer of treatment in Bamako, despite local tion as a healer. Despite all her hardships, she now had a fears that the white men simply rounded them up to kill them. wide circle of friends and lived in a community where she She joined her sister already at the institute, and her condi- felt accepted and valued. Source: Eric Sitla (1998). down. Replying to questions about a period of famine in Overall, the question of whether th e social fabric is dis- Ethiopia, households "argued that things were so bad integrating is more difficult to answer. It is argued that that they could not help anyone but themselves. In the social forces such as urbanization are causing this social Ethiopian lowlands, where the famine was most intense, fabric to disintegrate, so that society becomes more polar- many people did feel a moral obligation to bury a dead ized as the better off no longer share their fortunes with neighbor, but that was the limit of mutual expectations. their less fortunate brethren. Three important caveats must It was hard for respondents to talk about such matters. be placed on this picture. First, it is all too easy to paint Sadness, guilt and fear all mingled in hushed conversa- too cheery a picture of a distant "merry Africa," as we have tion about the still recent deaths of neighbors, friends seen there have been limits to traditional safety nets (Booth and relatives.... There was kindness in the darkness; but and others 1999). Second, the pace of change is not as most individuals averted their eyes from the despair of rapid as might be expected. While there is extensive migra- others" (von Braun, Teklu, and Webb 1999, p. 110). tion, this has been an established feature of African life Turnbull's (1973) study of the Ik from the borders of for at least the last few decades and provides the cash Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya, a tribe deprived of their tra- income that flows through the kin network, paying school ditional livelihood when their main hunting ground was fees and the like. Finally, social organizations develop, so turned into a national park, illustrates how virtually all that traditional structures change their nature or are replaced social life collapsed. People would no longer share food, by alternatives, such as the church, which assume the or even steal it from other family members. The Ik rep- role of social safety net. resent a clear case in which the social fabric has disinte- New forms of social capital are built around nontra- grated. Finally, prolonged or severe economic crisis can ditional groupings. A study in Tanzania identified the have the same effect on social networks as more extreme church, political party, burial society, women's group, and shocks. In the Chawama community of Lusaka (Zambia), farmers' group as organizations contributing to social cap- poor women reported they no longer borrowed from the ital, and only one of these groups (burial societies) may neighbors, as they could no longer repay, and reciprocal be regarded as traditional. Another study documents the links with rural areas had become strained (Moser 1996). rise of women's groups in urban areas in the 1 980s, orga- Economic crisis can also strain the social fabric as depri- nized around their role as market traders, and crossing vation provokes rises in crime, violence, alcoholism, and ethnic boundaries (see Tripp 1998). Household incomes drug abuse, undermining relationships of trust. To gen- were shown to be positively related to the level of social eralize, social safety nets may help the vulnerable who are capital in a village, supporting the idea that such groups subject to an idiosyncratic shock but will not survive a are indeed "capital" and have a social element (as it is vil- more widely felt crisis. lage rather than just household capital which matters). 74 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THF. MILIENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIFS, AND CHALLENGES Equally important as village-level groups that may sup- to social services. Access issues and what is needed to improve port those who fall upon misfortune is the emergence of social indicators is the subject of the next chapter. civil society organizations at the national level that will place poverty on the national political agenda. Notes Democratization in the 1990s has opened the way for this path. Experience from other countries shows that politi- 1. Figure 8.1 shows the partial scatter plot. Of the Y axis are cal mobilization of the poor cannot be relied upon alone: the residuals from regressing the HDI on log(GNP) and the X it does not always happen and they may lackvoice if it does. axis the residuals from the regression of rural population share A poverty-conscious middle class has a role to play in high- (RURAL) on log(GNP). The partial regression passes through the lighting issues, including exposing corrupt and exploitative origin, as residual means are necessarily zero. But in the figure the practices, and supporting redistributive policies. series means have been added to the respective residuals. The cor- responding multiple regression results are (t-statistic in brackets): Conclusion 2. An alternative approach to illustrating the same point comes from Moore and others (1999) who regress the residual of the African capital of all kinds is not high and the poor have regression ofHDI on (logged) income per capita on a range of vari- unequal access to what of it there is. Some groups of the ables, finding population density to be significantly positive. poor are affected worse than others. Those in remote com- 3. The failure of Early Warning Systems is not a failure to pre- munities are, by definition, cut off from infrastructure, dict famine-this they can do-but the failure to respond before and ill-placed to access credit. The landless are defined people have become destitute (see box 13.1 in chapter 13). by their lack of access to land. Women are frequently dis- 4. A systematic review of land tenure systems in each country advantaged in access to land and credit, undermining their is given by Bruce (1998). productivity. Those not in a position to reciprocate- 5. Mozambique at least appears to be an exception in which orphans, the disabled, and childless elderly-may be ill- the new land law was passed through a highly consultative process, served by social networks. Different dimensions to poverty with resulting legislation that should protect the rights of the serve to reinforce these barriers. Those with low human poor, although it is too early to say if this is so in practice (see and political capital will have less access to credit. Social Greeley and Jenkins 1999). capital helps the powerful use institutions to their bene- 6. The number ofthreatened species (mammals, birds, and high- fit, thus excluding the less well off. Those with few assets er plants) is higher in both absolute and relative terms (relative cannot invest in the education of their children or pay to meaning as a percentage of total species in that country) in the preserve their health, laying one basis for unequal access United States than in any African country. CHAPTER 9 Sustaining Improvements in Social Indicators Requires Growing Income and Better State Service Provision The Direct and Indirect Benefits of Improving ed with income per capita-higher income results in Social Outcomes improved social welfare. Second, although there is a high correlation between the two variables., it is far from per- As recognized by their prominence among the International fect: there is considerable variation around the line, indi- Development Targets (see chapter 13), health and edu- cating that some countries are better able to convert income cation have vital roles to play in both direct and indirect into higher social indicators. Although income matters poverty reduction. First and foremost, avoiding ill health, in raising social indicators, other things are also impor- disability, and ignorance are in themselves empowering tant. Third, African countries are almost all "underper- and raise the quality of life. But improving social out- formers," having lower levels of life expectancy than comes also contributes to higher incomes at both the expected given their income levels.2' ` Hence Niger and household and macroeconomic levels. Econometric analy- Nepal have the same income per capita, but life expectan- sis, presented in chapter 6, supports the view that human cy in Nepal is 10 years greater than that in Niger (57 ver- capital accumulation matters for growth. There are clear sus 47). The following pairs of countries also all have the reasons why this is so. For poor families education can same income levels but widely differing life expectancies: provide the stepping stone out of poverty, providing access Nigeria and Vietnam (54 and 68), Zambia and Nicaragua to formal-sector employment, and enhance productivity (43 and 68), and Zimbabwe and Honduras (52 and 69). in informal and agricultural activities, whereas sickness Clearly, in many African countries the "other factors" that can remove the main income source and condemn a fam- promote better social outcomes are not in place. Chapter ily to a vicious circle of deepening deprivation. An oth- 7 argued that the political situation is critical among erwise healthy person can be permanently disabled in the such factors. This chapter focuses more closely on the pro- absence of timely health interventions. At the aggregate vision of social services and water supply (other infra- level, no industrialized or newly industrialized country structure was discussed in chapter 8). has developed with literacy rates as low as they are in Africa The African poor are thus triply disadvantaged. First today. In short, enhancing the capabilities of the poor by the widening international gap as African social indi- will lift them out of poverty and reduce overall poverty. cators lag behind those in the rest of the world, which is Higher social indicators can be achieved by increasing partly explained by the continent's history of poor growth.4 private incomes and by provision of health, education, Second, by the underperformance of African economies water, and infrastructure services. Growth is of central in turning what growth there is into welfare improve- importance, as it both allows welfare-raising expendi- ments. And, finally, by national disparities in health and tures and provides the tax base for public service provi- education between the poor and the nonpoor. Where sick- sion. But Africa has proved relatively poor at turning ness prevails, or children go uneducated, it is the poor income growth into improved welfare indicators. Figure who bear a disproportionate part of the burden. What 9.1 shows the relationship between life expectancy and are the sources of these gaps and can they be closed? income per capita.1 Three important messages emerge Statistical analysis shows that investments in service from this graph. First, life expectancy is highly correlat- provision account for some of the variation in social 75 76 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES indicators, which is not explained by income (Hanmer maternal education can reduce infant illness and death.6 and White 1999). While it is clear that improvements in The links from these to productivity, and thus income health, education, and water supply all have an enor- poverty, were mentioned above. Education clearly enhances mous potential contribution to make in reducing pover- the possibility for effective political participation. Recent ty, both directly by improving the well-being of the poor macro evidence suggests that lack of education is a criti- and indirectly by supporting growth,5 this potential is far cal factor in explaining Africa's underperformance, illus- from realized in Africa for two reasons. First public pro- trated in figure 9.1. Ranis and Stewart (1999) classify good vision appears plagued by low levels of efficiency, with performers as those countries whose ranking on the Human quite high spending levels not being translated into appro- Development Index greatly exceeds that on income per priate outcomes. Second, social spending remains misdi- capita. Two factors are consistently present in good per- rected, with state subsidies disproportionately benefiting formers: high levels of primary enrollment and a high ratio the nonpoor. A range of factors interact to restrict the of female-to-male primary enrollment. A final key link- access of the poor, yet universal primary education and age comes from clean water, where the African poor are greatly improved health status are achievable goals. To again disadvantaged. A recent review of studies of water attain these targets, social service reform must overcome use from a number ofAfrican countries (Rosen and Vincent the constraints the poor face in accessing services, rather 1999) reviews the various ways in which water supply than reinforce them. can enhance productivity. One route is in reducing the The theme of this report that the different dimensions time spent carrying water, which averages more than two of poverty interact with one another deserves special empha- hours a day, this being a burden that falls almost entirely sis here. The positive linkages between health and edu- on women and children. The need to carry reduces usage: cation have long been recognized-for example how the average was found to be about 10 litres/person/day, Figure 9.1 Social indicators improve with income but Africa underperforms (scatter plot of life expectancy against income per capita) Life expectancy 85 * Africa 0 Other countries Fitted line GS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0 0 o c No ° 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 65 00 O0 o. 55 45 * **- * 35 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I Logged income per capita Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999. Sustaining Improvzements in Social Indicators Requires Growing In come and Better State Service Provision 77 which is far less than that required for proper hygiene. fold increase in secondary students. Zimbabwe achieved Thus, unsurprisingly, there is a high level of water-related an even more rapid expansion with the end of white rule diseases, which account for over 10 percent of all mortal- in 1979 and independence the following year, more than ity and morbidity. Rural water supply is shown to be a cost- doubling from well under one million to over two mil- effective way of preventing diarrhea and other diseases. lion from 1979 to 1983; the enrollment rate rose from This interaction also has a downside. Improving edu- 60 to 100 in just two years. In Africa as a whole the cation, or any other single intervention, is not a magic enrollment rate nearly doubled in the first 15 years fol- bullet. Increasing the number of school leavers when there lowing independence (table 9.1). are not productive opportunities for them will only swell A somewhat similar situation prevailed in health care, the ranks of the unemployed. These arguments point to with the health infrastructure, at least that outside urban the need for "balanced development." areas, being the provenance of missionaries. The postin- dependence expansion was at least as rapid as that in Africa Lags Behind on Social Indicators-and the education. In Zambia the number of hospitals rose from Gap Is Widening 48 in 1964 to 76 only 10 years later, and the number of health centers and clinics nearly doubled over the same Improved health comes in substantial part through period (from 306 to 595). improved diet and shelter. Better-off families are more The drive to higher service provision faltered in the able to educate their children. Growing private incomes 1970s. Economic decline hit many countries so that real are thus central to improved social outcomes. But the exis- spending fell. Both quality and quantity suffered, with tence of productivity gains, and other positive externali- some countries, such as Ghana, experiencing declines in ties, from investments in health and education, form the primary enrollment rates of 10 percent or more. Today basis for an argument for state subsidy. There are two Africa not only has the lowest enrollment rates, but the important caveats to this argument. First, the private sec- gap has widened over time as African enrollments have tor may be willing and able to provide some services. In fallen in 1980s (table 9.1). In no country outside Africa an African setting the appropriate role for the modern pri- are gross enrollments below 70 percent, but it is below vate sector is likely to be the "top end" of health and edu- this level for 19 out of 46 African countries. In Somalia cation services, which the poor cannot afford, leaving more the figure is less than 10 percent, and only 29 percent in state resources available for the poor.7 The argument against Niger. Accurate measures of quality are not available, but such a policy is that it will create a twin-track system, run- parents regularly complain of lower standards, such as this ning into the problem that "services intended solely for the Nigerian parent: "In our days, I started writing letters to poor are poor services." The balance between public and my parents from the time I was in Primary 3. Nowadays, private provision is a political decision that countries many Primary 6 pupils cannot even spell their own names must decide for themselves. The second caveat is that properly" (Francis and others 1998). expanding social service provision is not in itself sufficient, Illiteracy in Africa remains at close to one-half of the since healthy school leavers need productive opportuni- population. It has fallen more rapidly than that in South ties to apply their skills, emphasizing once again the impor- Asia (though definitions of literacy vary), but South tance of growth. But there is ample evidence that raising Asias stronger performance on enrollments suggest that the quantity and quality of health and education will this situation may soon be reversed. play a pivotal role in Africds attempts to reduce poverty. Despite continuing improvements in health, as cap- Colonial governments did little or nothing to pro- tured by the infant mortality rate, the gap is also widen- mote education among the African population, which was ing. In 1970 the infant mortality rate in Africa was left in the hands of missionaries. At independence very comparable to that in South Asia, the Middle East, and few universities had been established, and most countries North Africa, but by the late nineties, the rate in Africa had but a handful of graduates and secondary school leavers was over one-third more than that in South Asia and near- that numbered in the hundreds. New governments lydouble that in the Middle East.8 Rate reduction in Africa embarked on rapid expansion of the education system. has decelerated as economic decline, conflict, and In Zambia the number of children attending primary HIV/AIDS have all taken their toll, and the downward school more than doubled in the 10 years after indepen- trend has even been reversed in some countries (Mozam- dence (from 378,600 to 858,200), and there was a five- bique, Uganda, Zambia, andpossiblyZimbabwe).9 Conflict 78 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXIIIES, AND CHALLENGES Table 9.1 Africa lags behind in health and education-and education performance deteriorated in the 1980s 1965 1980 1985 1990 1995 Gross primary enrollment rate (percent) Sub-Saharan Africa 41 78 77 73 74 South Asia 67 76 85 90 94 Latin America and Caribbean 98 106 105 106 112 East Asia and Pacific 87 111 118 118 114 1970 1980 1985 1990 1997 Illiteracy (percent) Sub-Saharan Africa 71 61 56 50 42 Middle East and North Africa 69 57 53 45 38 South Asia 68 61 58 54 49 Latin America and Caribbean 26 20 18 15 13 East Asia and Pacific 45 31 25 20 16 Infant mortality, rate (per 1, 000 live births) Sub-Saharan Africa 137 115 107 99 92 Middle East and North Africa 137 99 75 62 54 SourhAsia 139 122 106 90 75 Latin America and Caribbean 85 62 51 43 37 East Asia and Pacific 80 56 48 45 40 Note: Primary gross enrollment rate is the number enrolled as a percent of relevant age cohort. Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998 and 1999, United Nations Educational, Scien1tific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Yearbook, 1998. has both direct and indirect effects: indirectly it diverts growth reduces the proportion of school age children, resources away from social spending and undermines growth, thereby requiring lower educational expenditure in rela- and directly it destroys facilities (in Mozambique Renamo tion to GDP. But there are other reasons: in China teach- targeted health posts and schools) and displaced people: ers' salaries are equal to mean income per capita, whereas in refugee camps infant mortality rates of over 300 have the African norm is four to six times and is considerably been recorded. Around one-third of children whose moth- higher in some countries (reaching 12 in Senegal). 1 High ers are HIV-positive will get the virus, and 80 percent or teachers' salaries mean that they typically consume 90 per- more of these will die in the first five years of their life. cent or more of the education budget. Consequently, Despite these figures, universal primary education is spending on teaching materials is I or 2 percent of edu- achievable in Africa. There are four compelling arguments cation spending, compared to 5 to 6 percent elsewhere. why this is so. First, the record is not uniformly poor: 11 Finally, the start of the demographic transition in Africa out of46 African countries have enrollment rates in excess (see next chapter) will make this target easier to achieve. of 100 percent, and another three above 90 percent (though Unlike the case for education, spending in Africa on the data only run to the mid-1990s). Second, countries health is a lower percentage of GDP than elsewhere, with such as Malawi and Uganda have made substantial progress differences in both public and private spending (table 9.2). in increasing enrollment in the 1990s. " Third, the issue Nonetheless, substantial improvements in health status is at least as much one of increasing efficiency as of increas- are achievable in Africa for two reasons. First, there is great ing resources. Public spending on education as a percent scope for quality and efficiency improvements. Second, of GDP is higher in Africa than in any other developing the pattern of disease in Africa differs greatly from that region, and considerably higher than East Asia (5.6 per- elsewhere, with over 70 percent of disability adjusted life cent versus 3.0 percent in 1995) where performance is years (DALYs)12 lost being from communicable diseases, best. EastAsian countries with comparable levels of income compared to around 50 percent in most other develop- per capita to Africa have achieved universal primary edu- ing regions (25 percent in China and 10 percent in indus- cation (notably China and Vietnam). This achievement trial countries). HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria is partly a product of demographics: lower population are among the main communicable diseases, with an Sustaining Improvements in Social Indicators Requires Growing Income and Better State Service Provision 79 Table 9.2 Spending on health is lower in Africa than Africa: from less than one-tenth in Eritrea to nearly 80 elsewhere (spending as a percentage of GDP, period percent in Zimbabwe (see tables 1.4 and A.4 in chapter averages for 1 990s) 1 and the appendix, respectively). Public The Poor Are More Sick and Less Educated than the Private Public Total share Africa 1.7 2.0 3.7 56.4 Nonpoor-and Resources Remain Skewed Other developing 2.4 2.7 5.1 53.0 The poor are more sick, less educated, and have worse countries Developed 1.9 5.9 7.8 76.0 access to basic infrastructure than the nonpoor. Mortality countries rates are typically twice as high for poor men as they are for nonpoor and three times as high for poor women as Soturce: World Bank, Worcld Developmenzt Indicators 1999. nonpoor ones; rates for poor children are three to five times those for the children of the nonpoor, and again the ratio is higher for girls than boys (table 9.3). Tuberculosis estimated 270-480 million cases of malaria annually, equal is twice as high among the poor. Finally, figure 9.2 shows to 90 percent of all cases worldwide. that malnutrition is higher among the poor than non- Africa's environment means that water scarcity is a prob- poor; there is not always so much va;riation between the lem in many parts of the continent. The Sahelian region bottom three quintiles, but the percent-age of children who is at risk, as are many countries in eastern and southern are malnourished in the top quintile is usually around half Africa, which have experienced severe droughts during that for the bottom quintile. The same pattern can be the 1980s and 1990s (Sharma and others 1996). Partly found with respect to education. Figure 9.3 shows a pat- related to these factors, the average level of access to save tern that is typical across the continent: enrollment rates water, at just 50 percent (and under 40 percent in rural are lower for lower income groups than higher ones.13 areas) compares unfavorably with the 80 percent achieved Secondary enrollment among the poor is negligible, often in other developing regions. The figure varies widely across around 1 or 2 percent or even less (and rises sharply Table 9.3 Mortality and disease are higher among the poor Adult (15-59) Children (0-5) Male Female Male Female TB Botswana 2.3 4.0 4.9 4.8 1.2 Cote d'lvoire 1.5 1.5 2.4 3.3 1.6 Ethiopia 2.2 3.6 3.0 4.0 2.9 Guinea 2.1 3.5 3.7 5.6 1.9 Guinea-Bissau 1.7 2.1 2.2 3.0 2.6 Kenya 2.1 3.8 3.7 3.8 2.6 Lesotho 2.6 5.4 3.9 5.2 1.7 Madagascar 2.0 3.4 3.8 4.1 2.6 Mauritania 1.9 3.4 3.0 3.7 1.3 Niger 1.9 3.5 3.4 4.8 2.4 Nigeria 1.8 2.8 3.1 3.7 2.2 Rwanda 1.2 1.0 2.7 4.2 2.3 Senegal 2.2 3.8 4.0 4.9 2.5 South Africa 1.7 3.6 4.7 5.3 1.0 Tanzania 2.1 3.3 5.6 5.0 1.4 Uganda 1.4 1.4 2.1 2.5 1.3 Zarnbia 2.5 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 Zimbabwe 2.1 2.3 4.1 5.0 1.2 Note: The table shows the ratio of mortality and the prevalence of tuberculosis for the poor and the nonpoor. Source: WHO (World Health Organization) 1999. 80 AFRICAN POVER1 Y Al THF MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CEIALLENG ES Figure 9.2 The children of the poor are more malnourished than those of the non-poor Percentage malnourished Mali (1995) Senegal (1992) 45 50 40 45 35 40 30 3 25 30 20 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~25 20~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2 15 15 10 10 5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~5 0 0 12 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Asset quintile Asset quilntile Tanzania (1996) Zambia (1997) 50 50 45 45 40 40 35 35 30 30 25 25 20 20O 1 5 15 1 0 10 5 5 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Asser quintilc Asset quintile Nore: PIbhc figure shows the percentage of children with height for age less than two standard deviations from the mean, tabulated by wealth quintiles. Wealth is calcLulated fronti anl asset index (radio or bicycle, for instance). Source: Sahn, Stifel and Younger (1999). thereafter through the income quintiles). The children of water related (typhoid, cholera, dysentery, gastroenteri- the poor are thus likely to make up the poor of the next tis, and hepatitis are all waterborne, and scistosomiasis generation. and guinea-worm are water based) through lack of safe Similarly the gender gap closes as the enrollment rate water for drinking, for hygiene purposes, and for sanita- rises: the gap is more than 20 percent in low enrollment tion (Sharma and others 1996). These problems are being countries like Chad, Guinea, and Ethiopia but small or exacerbated as pollution of water sources increases from nonexistent in high enrollment ones like Kenya, Botswana, urban waste water and industrial effluent. and South Africa (see table A.13, appendix). People are of course aware of these problems, water These factors interact with one another to undermine access being identified as a major priority, especially by the well-being of the poor. Education helps the spread of women, in Participatory Poverty Assessments; in the words health messages, and malnourished children are at best of a South African woman, "The shortage of water is a listless, but it is also likely that their intellectual develop- serious problem in this area which needs immediate atten- ment is impaired. The primary cause of many diseases is tion.. . . I know about eight people who have died of Sustaining Improvements in Social Indicators Requires Growing Income and Better State Service Provisio n 81 Figure 9.3 Enrollment rates are higher for the non-poor than the poor, urban residents than those in rural areas, and men than women (in percent) El Male * Female Burkina Faso: Rural Burkina Faso: Urban 100 100 80 80 60 60 40 40 2072 6 L::L S j 4 j 4'10 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Expenditure quintiles Expenditure quintiles Guinea: Rural Guinea: Urban 100 100 80 80 60 60 40 40 20 20 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 - 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Expenditure quintiles Expenditure quintiles Zambia: Rural Zambia: Urban 100 100 80 80 60 -60 40 -40 20 20 0 0 1 2 3 4 51 2 3 4 5 Expenditure quintiles Expenditure qulintile iVote: T'he graph shows net primary enrollment rates for selected countries in rhe mid-1990s. Source: Appiah (1999, table 4). contagious diseases from water here" (Levin, Solomon, efits the nonpoor. The primary sector typically receives and Weiner 1997, P. 105). half the education budget, although since it has by far Biases in enrollments and use of facilities mean that the largest number of pupils, spending per head is, of state spending on social services disproportionately ben- course, much lower than at other levels. On average, 82 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES public spending on a university student is 20 times that facilities. But there are others. Participatory analysis with spent on a primary pupil, although this figure exceeds 100 poor communities identifies the following key constraints: in Malawi (table 9.4). Combining spending per pupil with information on enrollments by income quintile provides Financial-Both the direct pecuniary costs and the a picture of how much each quintile benefits from spend- indirect opportunity costs are high for the poor, who ing.14 Data from a number of African countries show are not able to be make large one-off payments for that the bottom 20 percent receive between 5 and 17 school fees or to readily change assets to cash to meet percent of public spending on education, whereas the medical emergencies. There is a seasonal or cyclical top 20 percent get between 21 and 44 percent (Castro- element to the ability to pay that is particularly severe Leal and others 1999). for the poor. The opportunity cost may also be sea- Similarly, the nonpoor use all levels of health services sonal so that children are kept away at busy periods. more than do the poor, with the disparities being great- The costs and benefits of education, combined with est for higher service levels. In Tanzania the bottom quin- cultural perspectives, can favor boys. A study in Kenya tile uses primary facilities only slightly less than the top found that 58 percent of parents would rather have a quintile but are more than one-third less likely to use girl drop out of school compared to onlv 27 percent hospital facilities. As a result, the per capita subsidy to for boys (with the remaining 15 percent having no individuals in the top quintile is two to three times that preference). The nonpoor are better able to afford water received by those in the bottom quintile (Castro-Leal supply systems to ensure continuous access to water, and others 1999). However it is not necessarily the case although, paradoxically, the poor in urban areas may that higher budgetary shares for social services result in then pay more for their water by being reliant on improvements in the quality of service delivery in rural street vendors; in rural areas poor women spend a large areas. In Uganda this disjuncture has been blamed on the part of the day collecting water. methods of disbursing funds from the center to the dis- * Physical-Lack of physical access to health services is tricts, and the knowledge gap on implementation that repeatedly identified as a problem by rural commu- currently exists between the ministries and the local level nities who stress the need for all-weather roads and (Ablo and Reinikka 1998). some form of public transport. The problem is seen One key constraint on the access of the poor to health, to be exacerbated by poor geographical coverage of education, and clean water is thus the simple lack of services, especially regarding access to emergency health care, and opening hours that make it impossible for people to attend. In urban areas access is constrained Table 9.4 University students get nearly 20 times as by increased lack of security, a problem that particu- much public money as primary pupils larly affects women, and is most commonly mentioned in relation to women collecting water early in the morn- Purimary Secondary Tertiary ing or late at night. The breakdown of law and order Burundi 1.0 4.9 66.3 is also seen to adversely affect education. Chad 1.0 2.7 19.0 * Gender biases-Gender biases reduce women's access Guinea 1.0 3.7 47.9 to education, health, and water. Girls' education is fre- Lesotho 1.0 4.0 31.7 quently less valued than that of boys given the view Malawi 1.0 15.1 102.0 that "a son belongs to his parents whereas a daughter Mali 1.0 2.0 29.8 belongs to her potential husband," and some rural com- Mauritania 1.0 4.6 12.4 munities may be skeptical of the value of education Togo 1.0 3.5 43.8 more generally. Girls may be kept away from school, Zimbabwe 1.0 2.1 12.4 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 3.3 18.9 or at least be late, because of domestic chores such as East Asia and Pacific 1.0 8.3 3.6 looking after siblings, but may also be kept away if there Portugal 1.0 1.2 1.5 are not properly segregated facilities such as toilets, or if it is thought unsafe walking to (or at) school. Surveys Note: The table shows public spending per student as a ratio of the figure for in several countries show that women are less likely to primary. Source: Appiah (1999), table 10. seek medical attention at times of sickness. Although Sustaining Improvements in Social Indicators Requires Growing Income and Better State Service Provision 83 women are responsible for water collection, which may tasks, and often earn insufficient salaries to survive, consume several hours each day, the decisionmaking so that drug supplies find their way into the private power to ease this burden, through constructing a market, and teachers set their pupils to work growing well, or installing a rain catchment, lies with men. vegetables for sale. Drangert (1993) documents several cases of propos- als to improve access to water in villages in Sukumaland What is the scope for further reform to overcome (Tanzania) that failed through men's unwillingness to these obstacles? engage the problem. Cultural-In addition to gender biases, other cultur- Further Reforms Can Close the International and al factors may limit utilization of state services. National Gaps Anthropological work suggests that belief in witch- craft as a cause of illness remains strong, so that reliance One message of this report is to reaffirm the importance on traditional health is probably greater than that of economic growth for social development and poverty revealed by surveys (both qualitative and quantitative), reduction. Nearly all social indicators are correlated with with home remedies and traditional healers being used income. Growing private incomes will support health and first, with recourse to modern medicine only if these educational development and provide the revenue base alternatives fail. If modern medicine becomes more for sustainable public services. But it is not enough to costly, they will rely on traditional approaches more rely on growth alone: there are good economic and social as an alternative. arguments for investing in human capital while urgently * Political-There is a strong awareness among the poor addressing efficiency issues. Social service reform must that services intended for them are consumed by oth- be undertaken in such way as to redress, rather than rein- ers. Political factors may adversely affect inter- and force, the barriers to access the poor face, in part by bet- intrasectoral spending allocation, geographical cover- ter targeting of resources for the poor. age of facilities, and those who benefit at the local level. User charges have been a central component of social The apparent poor targeting of exemption schemes service reform programs in many countries. By the mid- may be partly attributable to such factors. The poor 1990s all but one country (Botswana) was charging for may be excluded by administrative requirements, such health services. Proponents of fees argued that charges as the need to show birth certificates, which are diffi- would improve both efficiency (through, improved resource cult and costly for them to meet. A Zimbabwean com- allocation by private providers and (liscouragement of mented, "Only the people in our area who are powerful the use of high cost services) and equity (by exempting and well off get the assistance meant for us" (Brocklesby the poor), as the revenues collected allowed for better qual- and Holland 1998, p. 16). ity service with greater accessibility to the poor. However * Quality-Services are not always utilized because of these views underestimated the extent to which fees would poor quality, or, if utilized, there is dissatisfaction with exclude the poor, who have a higher price elasticity of quality: the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire demand for health than the nonpoor, and overestimated (CWIQ) in Ghana found 80 percent of rural residents likely revenues; in the case of health, charges have amount- to be dissatisfied with educational quality (as were 50 ed to about 5 percent of recurrent costs. These argu- percent of urban residents). This comment applies to ments have also not fully taken into account the externalities both health and education in terms of facilities (lack that mean that the poor should receive health and edu- of drugs or textbooks) and to staff (rude health work- cation if they cannot afford to pay. Collection costs can ers and drunk teachers). Education may also be seen also be high. In the case of water and sanitation, it has as irrelevant, with a preference for an emphasis first been claimed that the costs of metering and billing can on basic skills, notably literacy, and then on vocational exceed the revenue thus raised. There is ample evidence training. Health programs may also be seen as lack- that primary school fees have discouraged participation, ing, with some studies revealing a perceived need for particularly of girls, and that exemption schemes are poor- more family planning services. Quality problems are ly targeted. Even with fees, the costs of education-books, partly a function of low morale among health work- uniforms, "voluntary contributions," and the opportuni- ers, who do not have the means to perform their ty cost-can be a considerable burden to the poor. The 84 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES introduction of primary charges in Malawi in the early sive administrative reform and decentralization or mea- 1980s led to a temporary drop in enrollments, followed sures to raise quality to reduce dropouts and repeats. by much slower growth than had been achieved before Efficiency can be raised with no loss ofqualitv, as the expe- fees were introduced. When fees were abolished in 1994, rience of some countries, for example, Senegal, shows. enrollments increased by about two-thirds, from 1.9 to Measures undertaken include double-shifting (also called 3.2 million. A similar increase was achieved in Uganda hot-desking), using more teaching assistants, and turn- when primary education was made free for four children ing educational administrators into teachers. from each family. Attempts to target exemptions have had In health a stricter use of the referral system can increase nowhere near the same effect: an exemption scheme in efficiency, but application of targeting also affects the Zimbabwe only reached 12 percent of the target popula- nature of services provided. The current trend is to iden- tion. In Lesotho people could be exempted if they were tify the most cost-effective way of reducing the burden of certified as paupers, having no income or assets, by the disease as measured by DALYs. But a number of caveats village chief or district officer. While 200 people were thus should be placed on this approach for a poverty-oriented eligible, another 30,000 people enjoyed free health ser- health program. First, there are social constraints on such vices, such as doctors, nurses, and village health workers. an approach: it is not cost-effective to provide care for During the 1990s there has been a move away from the terminally ill, but it is socially unacceptable not to do the simple application of user charges toward a more so. Second, the relative opportunity cost of sickness is nuanced approach. Many countries do not charge for greater to the poor-they can ill-afford the lost income primary education, and this stance commands interna- from those who are sick or from those who care for them, tional support. There is however a view that there should and a marginal family may be pushed into permanent be "community level financing," although the practice poverty by a period of illness. Third, there are comple- and implications of this problematic concept remain to mentarities between different interventions so that they be worked out, especially where the wealthy are reliant are more attractive taken as a package than when consid- upon private facilities. In the case of health and water sup- ered individually. ply, charges seem more firmly established, but means of exemption and cost sharing are being explored. Health Conclusion: The Need for Balanced Development insurance schemes have been established in several coun- tries. But there remains a case for free access for certain This report has emphasized the importance of growth areas (poor districts), facilities (rural health clinics), or for poverty reduction. But it has been stated here that treatment (preventive interventions such as immuniza- enhancing the capabilities of the poor is necessary for tion). Water supply presents a different set of issues, since growth. So which should come first? experience has shown that services are not maintained There has been a "sequencing debate" as to the order- without an element of either cost recovery by the provider ing of investing in human capital and investing in growth or community involvement in management, or both. (see the review in White 1999b). Countries that have It should of course be recognized that there are differ- emphasized growth alone have failed to sustain improve- ent groups of the poor. The dependent poor are more ments in either growth or human development. By con- likely to need free access, whereas some of the economi- trast, pushing on human development may eventually cally active poor may be able to pay for some services yield a growth dividend. But the best returns appear to but not make lump sum payments. Hence, installment come from a balanced development strategy, which is payments or insurance schemes are the appropriate means indeed suggested by the interrelatedness of the various of paying. dimensions of poverty. Such a finding is hardly surpris- Financial reform that charges those who can afford to ing. Social service provision needs a tax base to support pay-for example, replacing the grants for board and lodg- it or it cannot be financed. But growth needs healthy, edu- ing to university students with loans-to help subsidize cated workers. Although the view that adjustment poli- those who cannot is one area in which reforms can be cies squeezed social sectors cannot be sustained as an made. But there is also scope for improvements in effi- argument applying across Africa (see chapter 6), they can ciency and quality, including a role for the private sector be criticized for insufficient effort in building human cap- in providing services not used by the poor. In the educa- ital. This situation has been changing in the 1990s. But tion sector many countries have yet to undertake exten- this chapter has documented the persistence of wide Sustaininglmprovements in Social lndicators Requires GrowingIncome and BetterState Service Provision 85 disparities in access that need to be addressed if the poten- relatives to provide a regular income to meet the basic necessities tial of the poor in contributing to growth is to be realized of daily life. and they are to benefit from it. 6. Both cross-country and household-level regression analyses of the determinants of infant and child mortality consistently find Notes female (or maternal) education to be a significant factor (see the review in Hanmer and White 1999). 1. The same messages would have emerged whatever social indi- 7. The "modern" private sector is specified, since traditional cator had been chosen. Similarly, Purchasing Pow-er Parity (PPP) medicine remains important in Africa, and is frequently the first gross domestic product (GDP) would be more appropriate but would port of call. Households may also spend considerable amounts on not alter the general picture, and so was not used in order to increase private modern medicine, mainly the purchase of drugs, so that the sample size. health care costs can represent a sizeable proportion of the house- 2. Technical note: The scatter plot shows that the relationship hold budget of poor families. berween life expectancy and the log of income is clearly nonlinear. 8. In addition to the issue of data quality, there is substantial The fitted line shown, from a double-log function, is in fact mild- regional variation with mortality rates higher in West Africa than ly convex. From the scatter a concave function may have been expect- those in southern Africa. ed, but the curvature is "pulled the other way" by the small group 9. Although success in combating AIDS may have reversed of relatively high-income, low life expectancyAfrican countries. The this trend in urban Uganda. basic message would not be changed by reestimating the curve 10. Uganda's success had been too recent to show up in the excluding these countries to get a concave line. data available for this report but is documented in Harper and 3. The four African countries lying above the line are, in ascend- Marcus (1999). ing order of income, Madagascar, Ghana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius. 11. These data and most others in this paragraph are from The Seychelles is the highest income African country and lies on Colclough and Lewin (1993). the line. 12. A DALY is a disability-adjusted life year, which measures 4. In a similar analysis (based on the Human Develop-ment the burden of disease as years lost from either premature death or Index) Moore and others (1999) find population density, miner- disability. al and aid dependence, and (with a perverse sign) good gover- 13. Table A. 12 of the appendix reports these data for all coun- nance to significantly affect a country's success at turning income tries for which they are available. into social indicators-but an Africa dummy remains significant 14. There is an assumption here that spending per pupil is the (and one for only West Africa even more so). same across the country; in fact, it almost certainly will not be in 5. Social security systems are also important but virtually a way that will further disadvantage the poor, as poorer regions undeveloped in Africa. Exceptions are Botswana, Namibia, and will have less resources. South Africa, where poor families rely on the pensions of elderly CHAPTER 10 Household and Population Dynamics: Good and Bad News for Poverty Reduction Household Structure and Poverty ed by the family must not be overstated and is often pro- vided in return for service: in the words of a Bemba The changing nature of social relations embodied in the (Zambia), "no one would know the difference between a household is central to an understandingofAfricanpover- slave and a poor relative" (Illiffe 1987, p. 57). As docu- ty. Four key features of the household are important. mented in chapter 8, poverty can remove individuals First is what constitutes a household. European models outside of usual support systems, and at times of wide- of the household are not readily applied in some African spread poverty these systems collapse. Thus a recent settings, and attempts to do so can give misleading results. study among the Chagga in Tanzania records how a child Second, the importance of household structure: different may die of malnutrition while living in the compound of household structures provide support for different indi- a wealthy relative if the mother is considered an outcast viduals. While those excluded from the family support (Howard and Millard 1997). Collapse may occur in times system will typically be among the poorest of the poor, of conflict or famine, or when official interventions under- those included in it are not necessarily protected unless mine livelihoods: members of the Ik would formerly share they can effectively operate in the system of bargaining meat, but now, forbidden to hunt by the creation of a and mutual reciprocity that characterizes social relations nature reserve, they take any kill into the bush to eat alone (see chapter 8). Third, while household size is typically (Turnbull 1973). taken as a correlate of poverty, it is in fact household com- African politicians, such as Kaunda in a statement on position that matters, as reflected in the child/adult ratio humanism, have held up the care of the vulnerable inher- and the dependency ratio more generally; the female/male ent in African social systems as a sign of moral superior- ratio can also be important. Finally, there exists a "house- ity over more developed countries. In fact, different hold life cycle"; household members are more likely to be household structures provide support for different indi- poor at some stages of this life cycle than at others. viduals. Two ethnic groups with a bilateral tradition- In many African languages the word for poor means the Hausa and Amhara-have produced among the highest literally the lack of support: umphawi in the Chewa lan- proportion of beggars on the continent. Although the uni- guage of Malawi means one without kin or friends. A versality of the nuclear family is a matter of contention, participatory survey in Mali showed that most people a sizeable body of opinion holds that more extended did not think of themselves as poor-those without fam- family structures provide social safety nets to prevent fam- ilies were poor. In many societies, though not all, groups ily members from falling into extreme poverty. This extend- such as barren women, the elderly with no surviving ed family goes beyond the bounds of the immediate children, and orphans will be particularly at risk. A nine- household, so that remittances form a large part of the teenth century traveler recorded that "a poor person who income of many households: participatory analysis repeat- has no relatives will seldom be supplied even with water edly finds the poor being identified as those who rely on in illness, and when dead will be dragged out to be devoured others for food in the lean period. by the hyenas, instead of being buried" (Illiffe 1987, p. Surveys typically find that large households are dispro- 58). While undoubtedly important, the security provid- portionately represented among the poor. This finding has 86 Household and Population Dyinamics: Good and Bad Newsfor Poverty Reduction 87 been questioned on methodological grounds related to household lacks an able-bodied male, it is disadvantaged possible economies of scale in household production and by a female/male imbalance, and perhaps doubly so if consumption. The view of an automatic link between the child/adult ratio is also high: lack of able-bodied (male) household size and poverty is also not supported by evi- labor is the key characteristic of the poorest. In Tanzania, dence from Participatory Poverty Assessments-there female-headed households with no supporting male have are some communities in which well-off households are a level of mean consumption that is barely half that of the large ones (partly as "unsuccessful families" break other female-headed households (Cortijo and LeBrun up). But more important than these methodological dis- 1999). The security afforded to a widovw by the tradition putes is a recognition that large households differ con- that one of her sons is responsible for her well-being is siderably from one another: it is household composition rather negated by the loss of her right to the property that matters rather than size per se. This point can be that was her husband's, or widespread land grabbing where simply expressed by saying that a rural household of 10 such a right exists. with two adults and eight children aged less than 10 will An individual's exposure to poverty also depends on very likely be poor, whereas a household with four or five the interaction of family structure, livelihood strategies, able-bodied adults is far less likely to be so.1 The depen- and the stage of household life cycle. An agriculture-based dency ratio is thus an important poverty correlate. The household with many young children will have low mean presence of young children, elderly dependents, or dis- consumption, but this will increase as the children can be abled family members all, by adding a nonproductive productively employed in household production or in the mouth to feed, reduce the family's mean consumption. period in which they migrate but have no family of their In Tanzania households with a disabled family member own. Through remittances, elder children pay for the edu- had mean consumption 20 percent less than the average cation of their younger siblings. In poorer families such for the country as a whole (Cortijo and LeBrun 1999). migration is more a matter of necessity; one mother lament- This point does not deny the possible importance of ed her eldest son having to leave school so he could go economies of scale in household consumption, so that away to earn money so she could buy food for the youngest normalizing by family size may give misleading results. child-"killing the old to save the young" (Howard and Families with high child/adult ratios are more likely to Millard 1997). A poverty trap is thus created in which be poor, but it is also the poor who are likely to have such the children of the poor are denied access to education ratios. Among better off families, women are more like- by the need to feed the family. The parents' consumption ly to be educated and have access to paid employment, will be maintained if grown children successfully estab- so that the opportunity cost of their time is higher. Moreover, lish their own production. For an urban household chil- richer families may "substitute child quality for child quan- dren may be a burden on the household for longer, unless tity," and provide them with the education to also obtain this burden can be spread among relatives, so that young formal employment. Hence the demographic transition- children are sent to live with grandparents or others may described below-that manifests itself in declining go to another relative nearer school. child/adult ratios at the household level will occur first Since poverty depends on household structure, pover- among the nonpoor. ty trends will be affected by changes in these structures, which Different forms of household structure can affect house- are very largely driven by the demographic transition. hold size in ways that might be expected to be related to poverty. For example, polygamous households might be The Demographic Transition Is Under Way expected to be poorer as one man's assets are spread over several wives and their children-and junior wives and The demographic transition is the change from high lev- their children are seen as being particularly at risk. But, els of fertility and mortality to low ones, so that popula- on the other hand, it is richer men who will be able to tion growth tends to low levels, or even zero, as fertility attract multiple wives. Once again, since the household rates approach the replacement rate. Typically people start contains a high proportion of adults, it is not as likely to to live longer and infant and child mortality drop before be poor. Female-headed households are often-although any decline in fertility, so that a periocl of rapid popula- not always-disproportionately poor; but if such house- tion growth is experienced. Socioeconomic development, holds include those with an absent male who is remitting and lower under-five mortality itself, then set in train a income, then they can be among the better off. But if the trend toward lower fertility. The now developed countries 88 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITlES, AND CHALLENGES underwent the demographic transition over several decades prohibited during this period (a period of postpartum starting in the last century. Most developing regions are abstinence of up to two years is not uncommon). Western now well under waywith the transition (table 10.1) although medicine rejects these views, perhaps unwisely as, while Africa has been an apparent exception with birth rates it is not that the milk of a pregnant woman is bad, it is both well above those of elsewhere and having the lowest so that child health suffers from close child-spacing, and observed decrease. Such figures have led some commen- missionaries, particularly the Catholic church, explicitly tators to talk of a "delayed demographic transition" in attacked such beliefs. For these reasons the relationship Africa and speculate upon cultural factors-such as beliefs between female education and fertility in Africa is an about ancestors living on in current generations and less- inverted U shape: education initially leads to higher fer- er social sanctions against pre- and extramarital sex- tility as traditional beliefs are abandoned but later to which act as a barrier to reduced population growth. But declines as educated women are more likely to have the the most recent evidence, mainly collected in the three characteristics associated with lower fertility (namely, rounds of Demographic Health Surveys, shows large formal-sector employment, later marriage, and access to declines in fertility in some countries over the last two modern contraception). decades and modest reductions in several more. Two further factors, HIV/AIDS and conflict, may be Population data are scanty before 1960, so that demo- expected to further accelerate the fertility decline, though graphic trends before the last three decades are necessar- their effects may be less than commonly believed. AIDS ily a matter of some speculation. Nonetheless, it seems will reduce fertility as it encourages contraception and absti- likely that, while mortality decline was being recorded nence, and very directly as women die before completing since at least the 1940s, fertility was actually rising, which the reproductive period of their life. But while fertility is consistent with evidence that fertility rose in other regions reductions may occur on account of AIDS, it is less clear before the onset of fertility decline, and with economic that it will promote the transition to yet lower fertility. This models of the household that predict higher fertility as a transition occurs as the age structure shifts to reduce the result of income rises at low-income levels. The available dependency ratio and there is an improved capacity to save. data confirm that increases in fertility were being observed But the impact of AIDS on the age structure is limited, in some countries into the 1970s; for example, a rise in and any beneficial effects on savings are outweighed by Angola from 6.4 in 1960 to 8.0 in the early 1980s, from the high costs borne by the families of AIDS victims. 4.9 to 6.1 in the Central African Republic from 1959 to Conflict may have a short-term effect on fertility as young 1988, and in Mauritania from 6.5 in the early 1960s to couples are separated and partners killed, but there is every 7.2 a decade later (see appendix 1). Higher fertility may possibility that reunited couples, or remarried widows, be attributed to the erosion of traditional attitudes sup- will still attain their target level of fertility. porting breast-feeding and postpartum abstinence for two In countries with "fair" data, moderate to large reduc- to three years and increased availability of medical treat- tions in fertility (1.5 or more) have taken place in the last ment for causes of infecundity, such as venereal diseases. two decades in Botswana, C6te d'Ivoire, Kenya, Rwanda, Breast-feeding may have a natural contraceptive effect, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, and moderate declines in addition to which in manyAfrican societies it is believed (0.5 to 1.5) in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, bad for a pregnant woman to breast-feed, so that sex is Malawi, andTanzania. Clear, though rather smaller, declines Table 10.1 The demographic transition: birth and death rates by region Crude birth rate Crude death rate Population growth 1980 1996 1980 1996 1980-96 1996-2010 East Asia and Pacific 22 19 8 7 1.5 0.9 Europe and Central Asia 19 13 10 I1 0.7 0.2 Latin America and Caribbean 31 23 8 7 1.9 1.4 Middle East and North Africa 41 29 11 7 2.9 2.1 SouthAsia 37 27 14 9 2.1 1.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 47 41 18 14 2.8 2.5 Source: World Development Indicators 1998, cables 2.1 and 2.2. Household and Popujlation Dynamics: Good and Bad Newsfor Po erty Reduction 89 are also apparent in Namibia, Niger, Madagascar, Uganda, The demographic transition has typi zally been led by and northern Sudan. Although the data are weaker, Ethiopia socioeconomic development, and rising incomes in par- and Swaziland also seem to have experienced large declines ticular. But many countries in Africa lhave experienced and Eritrea, Gambia, Lesotho, and Mauritania smaller prolonged economic decline, leading some to speculate ones. Mali is the only country with fair data showing no that the region is experiencing a "crisis-led transition." perceptible fertility decline. These trends are most marked While this latter argument must be rejected in the face of among educated women and those living in urban areas; overwhelming evidence in support of a positive relation- indeed fertility is falling quite sharply among these groups ship between transition and economic performance, it is even in countries in which the overall trend is quite weak. clear that the source of the African transition has been fac- Thus fertility declines first among groups that are less like- tors other than growth. The most likely causes are lower ly to be poor. under-five mortality and female education. Associated Various mechanisms link lower fertility to poverty reduc- with these two factors are later age at marriage and increased tion. There are many arguments at the macroeconomic contraceptive use. level as to why lower fertility will boost growth and improve Despite speculation about the increase in births out- income distribution. For example, lower dependency ratios side of marriage, there is in Africa, as elsewhere, a strong will increase savings, and reduced labor supply will increase relation between mother's age at first birth and age at mar- real wages. Econometric analysis supports the link between riage: teenage fertility is highest in Niger where the medi- lower fertility and poverty reduction, particularly in the an age at first marriage is 14.9 (among the lowest in Africa), high-fertility/low-income setting that characterizes most but much lower in Burundi where the average at first mar- African countries. A cross-country analysis suggested that, riage is 19.5 years. Comparison of the age of first mar- inAfrica, a reduction in the total fertility rate of4 per 1,000 riage of women aged 20-25 with those now aged 45-49 may be expected to reduce the incidence of income pover- demonstrates an upward trend. In Tanzania, for exam- ty by more than 7 percent. These macroeconomic bene- ple, 60 percent of 20-25-year-olds were married by age fits will be felt by poor families even if their own fertility 20, whereas 70 percent of 45-49 year olds were; for Senegal levels at not falling. But many of the household level gains these figures are 60 and 83 percent, respectively, and for depend upon fertility decline among the poor themselves. C6te d'Ivoire 59 and 68 percent. At the microeconomic level larger families tend to be poor- While there is some truth in the view that "develop- er, and family size has a strong inverse relationship with ment is the best contraceptive," it alone will not prevent child welfare. Poor households with many children can- conception. There is a clear relationship between fertility not afford to adequately clothe and feed them let alone and contraceptive use: countries with lower fertility have send them to school. Child mortality is higher among higher contraceptive use (contraceptive prevalence rates, larger families, as is maternal mortality, especially for older figure 10. 1). Contraceptive supply canniot lead the fertil- mothers giving birth to high birth-order children. Reducing ity decline, but for it to take effect they must be available. fertility will thus decrease mortality, which in turn will further reduce fertility. While there is clear evidence of the start of the demo- Figure 10.1 Lower fertility is linked to adoption of graphic transition, two important caveats apply. First, contraception contraception appears to be used for child-spacing rather Total fertility rate (children per woman) than limiting family size: this conclusion can be drawn 8 both from mothers' expressed preferences and observing 7 the structure of births. Second, and related to the first 6 point, fertility rates remain high by international stan- 5 dards, and there is no immediate prospect of them declin- 4 + ing to replacement levels. On the other hand, the fact 3 that fertility levels remain high means that there is 2 scope for further reductions and the consequent benefi- I cial effects on poverty. So which factors have been respon- 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 sible for falling fertility and are these amenable to policy Contraceptive prevalence rate {percent) intervention? Souirce: Lipton (1999, p. 10). 90 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITI ES, AND CHALLENGES Figure 10.2 There remains a large unmet demand for contraception Percentage of women of reproductive age 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Source: Cohein ( 998 p I, 443) Yet in Africa there is a large unmet demand for contra- available to the vast maj'ority ofAfrican women. Reproduc- ception: in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cote d'lvoire, Eritrea, tive health services make a difference. Pilot proj'ect have Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo, only one-quar- frequently raised prevalence rates to above 20 percent in ter of women wishing to use contraceptives are actually project areas in countries with low prevalence, and sur- P~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ doing so (figure 10.2). Increasing contraceptivc availabil- vey data show prevalence to be related to accessibility. icy is a maj'or action government can take to facilitate the Accessibility can be defined as distance to facilities (the demographic transition and reap its poverty-reducing effects. contraceptive prevalence rate is higher amongst women Contraceptive use is strongly related to female educa- living within five kilometers of a clinic), but also has a cost tion: a study in the early 1990s found that contraceptive component, with the accessiblc alternative being defined prevalence only rose above 10 percent in countries with as costing no more than I to 2 percent of household mean female education of at least four years (Working income, which in the early 1 990s was not true for 19 out Group on Factors Affecting Contraceptive Use 1993). But of 23 countries in Africa. Three countries with the high- for women to use contraceptives they must be available. est rates of contraceptive use-Botswana, Kenya, and Contraceptive prevalence rates of less than IO percent are Zimbabwe (figure 10.2)-have well-established repro- observed, at least in part, as contraception is not readily ductive health systems providing subsidized services. Household and Population Dynamics: Good and Bad Newsfor Pooerty Reduction 91 There have of course been programs to provide repro- this trend will produce both macro and micro benefits ductive health services for many years, and it is impor- that reduce poverty. But the micro benefits go first to the tant to make plans for the future, bearing in mind the nonpoor, and there are impediments to the poor reduc- lessons of the past. Programs have been plagued in part ing family size. These impediments include lack of con- by weak government commitment, inadequate resources, traception and resistance to family planning, particularly and consequent lack of capacity. Reproductive health by men. Countries that have gone the furthest with the services will fail to have an impact if they focus unduly demographic transition are those that have provided strong on women. As is vividly clear from the following account state support to family planning. from a Chagga woman in Tanzania, many women do not While the demographic transition is good news, it may have control over reproduction: be expected to further increase the vulnerability of the poor by limiting traditional safety nets for the poor. As I had been unsuccessful in keeping my door closed, already seen in chapter 8, these safety nets can handle idio- and my husband gave me nine children. So I went syncratic poverty but do not always do so, failing at times to the clinic for some assistance to stop having more of widespread hardship. The policy implications of these babies without informing my husband. They gave facts differ, but once again imply state action if poverty me prescription pills and I locked it in my personal is to be reduced. box, but he found it and exploded. Right then he took me to bed, and that's why I stand before you, Notes pregnant for the tenth time. (Howard and Millard 1997, p. 120) 1. However, this picture is further complicated by differential consumption requirements, which may be partly determined by Although reproductive health services are not that cultural norms. expensive, it is an area that requires continued donor 2. Two recent papers demonstrating the link between demo- support for some time to come. graphic change and macroeconomic performance are Eastwood and Lipton (i999) and Bloom and Canning (1999). The results Changing Household Structures and Demographics quoted here are from the former study. The latter argues there is Provide a Case for State Intervention a virtuous circle between reducing fertility and higher growth, which can be triggered by an exogenous intervention. The critical The evidence presented in this chapter provides good variable in their argument is the ratio between workers and depen- and bad news for poverty reduction. The good news is dents, which remains less than 1.2 in Africac ompared to around that the demographic transition is under way, and that 2.1 in East Asia. CHAPTER 11 Women's Unequal Position Pervades the Poverty Problem Poverty is not gender neutral. Research has demonstrat- second place. In September 1999 the supreme court in ed the disparities between men and women in access and Zimbabwe ruled that women are inherently inferior to control of land, credit, technology, education, and health men, citing "the nature of African society" as the basis for (see chapters 8 and 9). Women's inequality in household its decision (The Guardian, September 25, 1999). decisionmaking and community and public participation The household is an inappropriate unit of analysis in is a well-documented fact. Table 11.1 presents evidence the measurement of poverty on account of intrahouse- from selected countries on the scale of the problem: liter- hold variability in access and control of resources. Such acy is lower among women, theyhave less control over eco- data by themselves will not permit an understanding of nomic resources, and they are scarcely present in government. the dynamic complexity of gender relations. One conse- Gender inequity in Africa operates alongside condi- quence of this is that, despite the fact that the dimen- tions of dire poverty and ill health. Women face multiple sions of poverty are similar among men and women, tasks and competing priorities as well as daily rearrange- their priorities differ significantly. For example, as major ment of their priorities to ensure their survival as well as that of their children. The 1998 Poverty Status Report, Table 11.1 Women are disadvantaged in social, economic, Gender Growth and Poverty Reduction in Africa, argued and political life that there are synergies between positive outcomes for women's well-being and pro-poor economic growth, esti- Real GDP per In government mating that the various disadvantages that women face Female literacy capita (as a positions (as a reduce economic growth by nearlv a full percentage point (as a percentage percentage percentage (0.8 percent) each year, with a concentration of loss in of male) of male) of total) agriculture where women's labor is especially important Benin 44 70 15 but is often held back by the combination of farming work, CAR 53 63 5 childcare, and household duties. Djiboi 66 37 7 This chapter draws together the gender issues from this MalawUi 60 73 4 report. The fundamental aspect of gender relations with- Mauritania 56 59 5 in the context of extreme poverty is based on the survival Mozambique 44 70 13 strategies of individuals, households, and other social Namibia 97 52 11 groups. Within each of these groups, men and women Niger 33 59 1 1 Sierra Leone 42 42 6 are involved in bargaining over resources and obligations South Africa 98 45 7 (Aggarwal 1997). Consequently, the central focus of the Tanzania 76 90 10 debate on gender and poverty should move further than Togo 56 50 3 the discussion of the subordination of women. Nonetheless, Uganda 71 69 9 it is important to state women face constraints that derive Zambia 81 64 8 from cultural attitudes and religious values that give women Source: UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Human low status in society and relegate their work and needs to Development Report 1999. 92 Womens Unequal Position Pervades the P6 verty Problem 93 caretakers of family health and welfare, women place greater Nations-FAO 1999). More generally, the sexual divi- importance on food, water, fuel, and health, while men sion of labor can reduce agricultural production, mean- stress the importance of economic activities (often visible ing that women's needs, such as improved water supply, productive assets such as cattle) that are not related to the go unmet as men accord them lower priority. immediate needs of their families. Hence, these priorities reflect significant differences in the ways men and women Economic Trends in Gender and Poverty allocate their meagre resources. Decisions on family resource allocation therefore become a serious issue when the pri- Some argue there is a feminization of poverty in Africa,' orities of men and women differ and women lack the contributed to by factors such as limited skills and knowl- bargaining power to control decisionmaking over the edge, unfriendly market structures that conicentrate women majority of household resources. in lower paying and time-consuming work and restrict their access to capital and credit, traditional family struc- Social Trends in Gender and Poverty tures perpetuating gender inequality through patriarchal norms of property ownership and inheritance, discrimi- Gender-based poverty is a major feature of the African nation in the public domain, nonrecognition of the value scene, one that is strongly connected to the high incidence of women's work, the permanence of debt, weak and of child poverty, and has adverse implications for the care unequal trade and economic reforms, and the rise of fun- of the elderly. The position of female-headed households damentalism of a religious, ethnic, or military kind. with no economically active male (either present or work- Economic, demographic, and political trends are chang- ing elsewhere) is the most severe. The lack of able-bod- ing the rural landscape and affecting activities carried out ied male labor is a key characteristic of many of the poorest by women. Agriculture is increasingly vertically integrat- Africans. However, women who manage households for ed, coordinated, and responsive to market forces. Policies absent males can also be badly hit, especially if the males of economic liberalization and privatization aim to cre- do not send regular money, perhaps as a consequence of ate a macroeconomic environment favoring economic starting a second family. growth. However, the gains from growth can be unequal- Environmental and civil conflicts also cause displace- ly distributed, and rural women can number among the ment of people just as does the breakdown of tradition- losers since they are ill-equipped to benefit from the intro- al family structures (increasingly high separation and duction of changes in agricultural processes and the rural divorce rates). All these circumstances deprive many economy.2 They have less capacity than men in terms of rural households of male adult workers. Some parts of education and training, less time to devote to productive eastern and southern Africa are afflicted by diseases such resources, and less command over important resources as AIDS or by civil unrest and rebellion, as in central and such as land and capital. In some parts of Africa, the sex- western Africa. Women (wives, grandmothers, and sisters) ual division of labor precludes women from growing crops must then assume complete responsibilityfor raising, feed- for sale, although women remain responsible for the ing, and educating young children. bulk of agricultural labor. But this does not mean that Female household heads tend to be younger and less men are unproductive; they operate in social space from educated than their male counterparts. They also have less which women are normally excluded and is essential for land to work as well as less capital, inputs, and farm labor production and distribution to function (Kabeer and to work it with. Widows may have their land taken from Whitehead 1999). Hence men are active in, and may them, so that they are forced to become dependent. Even well chair, "women's groups" set up in rural areas-and where they retain control over land, the lack of a male both men and women see this as natural, since men have household member denies them access to social net- knowledge of the official world of bureaucracy (see Crewe works necessary for certain types of production: female- and Harrison 1998, for discussion of a Zambian case, headed households thus have to make adjustments to and the more general discussion by Coquery-Vidrovitch cropping patterns and farming systems that can result in 1997, of why women are dependent on men). The gen- decreases in production and, in some cases, shifts toward der bias here is deeply rooted; it is not only ignorance of less nutritious crops. Not surprisingly, these households English or illiteracy in their own language that excludes often suffer from increased malnutrition and food inse- women from these roles but also social norms concern- curity (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United ing appropriate roles. 94 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Women also have less incentive with regard to control elites and not-so-poor men who have more time avail- over income from their labor as well as economic assets, able to contribute to such exercises. Both urban and rural to respond to economic signals. For example, modern- women need to participate in decisions that affect their ization and mechanization can improve farm productiv- livelihoods. Women are unlikely to improve their levels ity and income, but they can also reduce the need for of well-being while they are still marginalized and exclud- manual labor and therefore reduce options in rural com- ed from decisionmaking processes. munities. In poor households, the impact of technical change on men and women is frequently different, depend- The Importance of Intrahousehold Relations ing on whose tasks are mechanized, how workloads are affected, and who loses opportunities for paid work. In the African context, the household should not be under- To sum up, one can state that poor women are con- stood to mean the same as in the Western context. But it fronted with three main obstacles: is one of the social units around which survival strategies * Discriminatory laws, policies, and practices that impede are organized. In rural areas characterized by low pro- ductivity, agricultural production requires the participa- their access to productive resources (land, water) and tionto ach memberot houshldn gende rela instituttonal~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~io supor eacinhg credit, sevies th hoshod anedreain institutional support (training, credit, services) in the household and in society play a critical role in , Women's exclusion or marginal participation in orga- shaping household strategies and determining their response nizations or in representation in public and political to market iicentves. In urban areas women have increas- i nstvtutmons ingly assumed the role of breadwinner, as men cannot find I.ow investment in womens economic, managerial, adequate paid employment. To some extent then house- and technical capability holds are comprised of individuals with common inter- To reverse this negative process, governments and devel- ests, but that does not preclude the importance of bargaining opment agencies are increasingly focusing on programs in the household over respective roles. The fulfillment of to empower women. However, programs designed to alle- each of these roles ensures the survival of the entire house- viate the conditions of poverty through increasing the hold. Conflicts are often overshadowed by the most imme- capacity of women have often been unsuccessful, pro- diate goal of survival, though unsuccessful families can viding minimal benefits and adding new responsibilities cease to exist. to already overworked women. In rural households where girls are fully engaged in helping to take care of younger Poverty Reinforces the Subordination of Women siblings and in the transport of water and fuelwood, fam- ilies cannot afford to relinquish this important contribu- As currently configured, women's projects do not ques- tion that the girl child is making to help the family survive; tion the status of women in their households and in the without addressing these concerns, attempts to expand larger society. The improvement of women's income does girls' education will be frustrated. Similarly, literacy pro- not necessarily guarantee a change in their subordination. grams have also been touted as vehicles to empower women, It is time to balance the process of empowerment through but literacy of itself can do little to help women and fam- initiatives that support women in the domain of laws ilies with their immediate needs. Consequently, it would and culture. Both genders should be aware of the need to seem naive to ask women to spend their limited time reexamine the values that justify some practices whether attending literacy classes without finding ways to lessen they are traditional or modern. their burden. These examples reinforce the message of this African poverty is deeply embedded in social attitudes report that poverty must be tackled on several fronts. and structures, and female poverty is manifested accord- The empowerment ofwomen cannot be achieved with- ing to cultural context more so than male poverty- out representation. But the debate on gender takes place "they are less able to turn labor into income, income into predominantly in urban centers and institutions of high- choice and choice into personal well-being" (Kabeer and er learning where poor rural women have little or no oppor- Whitehead 1999). The fight against poverty requires a tunity to express themselves. Are urban women's concerns concerted effort to understand the cultural mechanisms representative? Even results from Participatory Poverty that create uncertainties and dependency. Unequal rela- Assessments carried out in rural areas are often unrepre- tionships between men and women create high levels of sentative because the voices heard are often those of local dependency and low levels of self-esteem among women Women's Unequal Position Pervades the Poverty Problem 95 who lack the power to make decisions. Based on such politically and socially, they have a higher chance of suc- understanding, programs must design ways to overcome cess. But again, evidence shows that narrow targeting can such disparities, which means addressing both men and lead to exclusionary practices, and because of this there women. For example, issues related to reproductive health is often a lack of political support because they are of no should not be the sole responsibility of women but that benefit other than to those who are directly targeted. of men, too. Empowering women to make informed repro- ductive health decisions must be accompanied by equal The Challenge of Poverty-Sensitive Policy and emphasis on men's role as the primary decisionmakers in Planning matters related to reproduction. Even when women are "empowered" to make decisions, these must have the sup- The challenge today is the modernization of very poor port in the household, especiallyofmen. Unless this occurs, societies when knowledge, services, technologies, and women have to bear the consequences of decisions they democracy condition the market. Human resources devel- make without the support of their husbands and partners. opment comes to the forefront of the challenges and oppor- Hence efforts towards lowering fertility must be directed tunities. What is the vision for the new rnen and women toward men as well as women. Women's voices should be that African societies need? How will thLey become pro- heard in the public debates through their opinion leaders ductive and efficient workers? How will they empower in cabinets, parliaments, and civil society organizations. themselves to become real citizens? What governance struc- The personal behavior of both men and women with- tures are required to allow all this to happen? Africans in the family-on the education of children, emerging will have to create a new lifestyle that is sustainable, a roles and images, and self-esteem-is no longer deter- balance between rural and urban. The new approach toward mined in the private realm only; in fact, the traditional gender equality and development should learn lessons dichotomy between the public (male) and private (female) from the past. Development approaches of the last three spheres is gradually disappearing. Today, traditional norms decades have been frustrated by the intractable poverty in African societies coexist with modern values and behav- in Africa. The reasons for the failure of such programs to ior, which often contradict each other. Such contradic- remedy the situation are numerous. However, one con- tions are manifested in the absence of a coherent set of stant factor that has been an impediment to progress in values and beliefs to guide parents and children, mothers Africa has been the lack of appreciation of the survival and fathers, to meet the challenges of the new millenni- strategies that are already in place in households. A pro- um. The development agenda continues to superimpose gram or an activity cannot replace the delicate balance ideas and strategies that are noble yet unrealistic to the that holds household members as a unil: to provide basic ways in which families are organized. This critical social- necessities. Culture, beliefs, and values where account- ization process should be the concern of any person or ability to the common good is paramount carefully sup- organization involved in the process of the transforma- port this balance. Activities such as empowerment threaten tion of African societies. The fight against poverty is not this balance if directed at a specific member, even for those a mere program or project. It is at the heart of the devel- who can benefit from it. While development programs opment problem of Africa in the era of globalization. have the flexibility to design their programs toward spe- Gender has entered the debate on poverty reduction, cific beneficiaries, it is naive to think that households will but due to its cross-cutting nature it is difficult to esti- reorient the ways they work, relate, help, and cooperate for mate how much has been achieved in policy implemen- daily survival. Terms such as long-term sustainability tation. Policymakers have been known to resort to tokenism hold no meaning to those who are faced with immediate with grand gestures that have little effect on the actual survival. Consequently, it is no wonder ,hat those women lives of rural women, while other policies are having an beneficiaries who are supposedly waiting to be empowered adverse impact on women (as noted above in the context are reluctant to abandon their collective security for indi- of adjustment policies). Gender inequality cannot be sole- vidual empowerment, which holds very little meaning. ly tackled through the improvement of economic per- It is matter of high priority to enhance the capacity of formance because of its socially embedded nature, but it governments, civil society associations, nongovernmen- can be addressed through narrow targeting that aims to tal organizations, and international partners to collect pri- deliver benefits to particular social groups such as rural mary data and to analyze and use gender disaggregated data landless women. If schemes can be context specific, both for formulation of gender-responsive policies, strategies, 96 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES and programs. Institutionalization of gender-sensitive * Changing the mindset and operational procedures of planning will allow capture and response to new global institutions both public and private to increase their trends and emerging issues. More specifically, the chal- responsiveness to women's needs lenge is to help poor women take advantages of the new * Building support for mechanisms that will allow men dynamics that the current macroeconomic trends are sup- to be more responsive to the changes, to cope with posed to create. This involves promoting a systematic strat- their new responsibilities egy directed towards the following: * Raising the level of skills and productivity of women Notes workers (rural and urban) through public and private w . A caveat is in order here since "feminization" implies a dvnam- investment in basic education and literacy, skills pro- gnvestmn ind bocasicn educationiandgliteracy,skillspro- ic process. Data at any single point in time provide a static picture grams,atn vociationa tadini m illustrating clear gender disparities. In some respects, such as school Eimi andattitdingalelatrive, administ'rati e,soiocoom enrollments, these disparities are narrowing. For others, the belief ic, and attitudinal barriers to women's access to assets istathyrewdng,lhohdtareadtocmhy (land, capital, technology) through changes in legis- iS that they are widening, although data are hard to come bv. lationd pitaltechnology) nthrough lhangesyininegi- 2. There can be exceptions to this general statement. In West aia pave ocl, t Africa trading networks are dominated by women, some of whom tutional restructuring, and socioeconomic and gender have become very wealthy as internal trade has been liberalized. analysis training Even here, however, many women at the bottom end of the chain B Building and empowering women's organizations and eke out a living on tiny margins. enhancing their participation in mainstream policy and decisionmaking bodies PArr III: Poverty Reduction Policies Part III of the report discusses strategies for combat- national policies, (ii) poverty monitoring, and (iii) the role ing poverty. Chapter 12 outlines elements ofan antipover- of donors. ty strategy, which the following chapters address as (i) 97 CHAPTER 12 Outlines ofan Antipoverty Strategy Promoting Social and Political Change for Poverty Most African governments have had poverty reduction Reduction on top of their policy agendas. But practice has fallen far short ofthe ideal, even where, as in, say, Mozambique and Part II of this report demonstrated that poverty is deeply Tanzania in the past, the government has been genuine- embedded in African social structures, and that political ly committed to social change. Effective streps toward pover- systems have militated against rather than promoted pover- ty reduction require more concerted efforts than in the ty reduction. Sustainable poverty reduction will only be past and call for a method that enables the poor to sanc- achieved through social and political change. This is not tion government. Unlike India, where poor people have to say that things cannot be done with the support of established political parties that contest the elections, the outside agencies to address proximate causes of poverty. African poor have little means of exercising their collec- They can, but they will only have short-term effects unless tive power. In this regard the new emphasis on decen- the underlying issues are also addressed, which can only tralization as a means to greater rural participation might be done in the domestic political context. Thus while part prove a useful means of getting the voices of the poor III lays out the elements of a poverty reduction strategy, heard, although doubts have also been expressed about it does not offer a blueprint. Each country's strategy this. More generally, the growth of civil society, including must be borne out of a process of consultation and result- a free press, will create mechanisms that hold government ing government commitment to agreed-upon poverty accountable in ways that can protect the poor, as the reduction goals. antifamine contract has in South Asia (see chapter 7). It follows from the analysis of chapter 5 that poverty Policymakers' unwillingness to concede to the seri- reduction requires increases in the rate of economic growth ousness of the poverty problem also meant that the capac- and improvement in income distribution. But, in the end, ity for evaluation, policy prescription, and monitoring has poverty reduction is ultimately a political act. Governments been poorly developed. As the process of internalizing that are not politically committed to poverty reduction poverty reduction policies gets under way in most African will always find other areas and projects on which to spend countries, it will be necessary to develop capacities in all the surpluses generated by the economy. But experiences areas of poverty analysis. The credibility of African gov- from across Africa show that where governments have ernments will be enhanced when they have set them- the will to act, they have the capacity to achieve results selves realistic poverty reduction goals and initiated (see box 12.1; Greeley and Jenkins 1999). However, pover- monitoring programs by which they may be held account- ty reduction need not always derive from altruism; it is able for progress, or lack thereof, toward these goals. The important for sustainable development and can even be creation of such systems requires training, implying a so for political survival, and may become more so as role for donor support. Not only do countries need to political systems are liberalized. The disruptive political monitor and analyze all aspects of household composi- changes of the past decades have partly stemmed from tion, determinants of poverty, and access to services, they the dissatisfaction of the common people. also need to develop the competence needed to evaluate 99 1 00 AFRICAN POvERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXYITES, AND CHALLENGES Box 12.1 Government action to improve well-being: AIDS prevention in Senegal While HIV/AIDS has taken hold in countries across Africa, lated into changed behavior. Women are postponing the age in Senegal the prevalence rate has remained at less than 2 at which they first have sex-the median being nearly 19 percent over the last 10 years. Forestalling the spread of the among 20-24-year-olds compared to under 17 for 40-44 year epidemic has been achieved through changes in sexual prac- olds. Data on condom use are hard to gather for the popula- tices brought about by a concerted government campaign. tion as a whole, but sales have risen from 800,000 in 1988 to Unlike some other African countries, the Senegalese gov- seven million in 1997. The vast majority of sex workers report ernment has been the driving force behind tackling AIDS at that they use condoms with all paying partners. Such high home, and led the way for the Organization ofAfrican Unity's levels of condom use are unknown elsewhere in Africa, with AIDS declaration in 1992. Most of the country's population the exception of Uganda, where a combination of observing is either Muslim or Christian, so religious leaders were brought the effects of the disease firsthand and government efforts into the program at an early stage, gaining their acceptance have raised AIDS awareness and preventative practices. of the messages to be conveyed. Senegal's success in combating AIDS clearly shows that Surveys show a very high knowledge of AIDS, how it is African governments can have the capacity to implement suc- spread, and how to prevent it. And this knowledge has trans- cessful programs if they have the commitment. Source: UNAIDS (1999). the impact of macroeconomic policies on the income gen- of children for whom poverty has irreversible consequences, eration and livelihoods of the poor. There have been particularly orphans created by the ravages of conflict steps in this direction in the 1990s, with the develop- and HIV/AIDS, requires special emphasis here. ment of poverty monitoring systems. Such systems can The harder challenge is confronting the social inequal- also be developed on a sector basis, a good example being ities that perpetuate poverty through discrimination against performance agreements in the Ghanaian health service, marginal groups by reasons of age, sex, disability, or eth- including targets for both service delivery and improve- nicity. As has been done in India in the case of the caste ments in output indicators (Booth 1999). Building a polit- system, legal measures can make some progress toward ical consensus around poverty reduction targets is at the redressing the situation. For example, women's rights to heart of the rights-based approach to poverty reduction, access to land on an equal basis with men can be legally in which improved living standards become a right citi- enshrined. On the other hand, legal measures alone will zens can claim from a country's leaders. not be sufficient, as the continuation of slavery shows. As more and more African governments begin to While women are hardly a homogeneous group, they acknowledge the importance of poverty reduction, they are disproportionately represented among the poorest need to begin changing their structures and priorities. The groups of the country, who can be subject to many types most crucial of these relate to the national budget. A pover- of deprivation. While many African countries are for- ty-reducing government will not be credible if it contin- mulating gender-friendly policies, the recent experience ues to sustain a budget structure that favors, for example, of South Africa indicates that serious implementation of military expenditure as opposed to health and education gender-sensitive programs will only begin when women or rural development. However, even countries with high- in their own right become policymakers, as well as com- er social-sector expenditure have not always been able to munity leaders. However, as Pregs Govender, an African have a real impact on service provision in the country- National Congress Member of Parliament, warned, when side, since spending has been skewed to services less uti- "women begin to engage in economic debates, they will lized by the poor, and the bulk of the resources were initially have to run the gamut of dismissive responses spent within line ministries, with little reaching the local which put issues such as poverty or lack of child care or level. The public sector thus also needs to develop sys- loss of parental rights outside the arena of economic debate tems that can deliver resources efficiently to the local because the latter is concerned with the much more seri- administration, and at that level to make sure that the ous and significant macro level" (see Govender 1998). target groups are reached. Few governments have devel- Although female involvement in politics and decision- oped social safety nets, but there is ample scope for tar- making is crucial to reversing the gender imbalance and geting the most vulnerable groups. The special position related poverty, the means of implementation must evolve Outlines of an Antip9verty Strategy 101 within the political structures and environment of each However, little thought has been given by policymakers country. It cannot be assumed that formal democratiza- even to the meaning of pro-poor growth, let alone how tion will go far enough in empowering disempowered it is to be achieved. What, then, are pro-poor growth groups such as rural women, so that mechanisms need to policies? be in place to ensure their voice is heard. The impact of growth on the poor depends largely on the extent of their participation in the economy, reflect- The Primacy of Pro-Poor Growth ing in turn on their ownership of assets, the supply and demand of their factors of production, as well as their Past experience and an examination of fundamental growth access to markets for inputs and outputs. However, in determinants in Africa suggests that most countries are many countries the poor have withdrawn from the mod- unlikely to sustain the growth rates required to reduce ern economy. While this withdrawal, often forced, could poverty if growth is distribution neutral. While there is imply short-term advantages, notably escaping "taxation no clear picture of the extent to which growth has been without services," households that have entirely with- pro- or antipoor, this statement alone is sufficient to sug- drawn from the mainstream tend to fall deeper into pover- gest that there should be a concern with distribution. ty. Their reincorporation into the economy will depend Growth is central to poverty reduction, but so is ensur- in large part on improving their access to assets of all kinds. ing that growth is inclusive. It is thus important for gov- A related argument is that policies should pay attention ernments to re-create and promote policy environments to the vulnerable as well as the poor-action should be that are supportive of the expansion of sectors that increase taken to prevent those dependent on fragile livelihoods the income-generating capacities of the poor. There is gen- from falling into destitution. eral agreement that credible poverty reduction cannot be Enhancing the assets of the poor includes investing in pursued in an environment of macroeconomic instabili- physical and human capital. Labor-intensive public works ty, or of serious fiscal and external payments imbalance. are among the doubly blessed measures that directly increase The postindependence experience, including the era of the incomes of the poor while at the same time laying the economic reform, indicates that countries that pursued basis for growth. Access to affordable healthcare is also sensible policies, including those that reduced inflation, important for the productivity of the farmers and other created incentives for increased domestic investment, and poor groups. However, as in the case of education, this encouraged economic efficiency by promoting market- presupposes a more dynamic economic environment- based economic activities, were best placed to generate including good access to markets-in which investments sustainable economic growth. While growth increased in in human capital, that is good health and better educa- the 1990s, however, the impact on some of the poorest tion or information, are worthwhile. Given limited employ- groups may have been small (though the evidence remains ment opportunities, there is also a requirement for improved scanty), with even signs in some countries of further depri- access to other factors of production, notably land and vation of the weaker groups, either as growth has not been capital. That is, action on one front alone will not be suf- sufficient to offset other adverse trends or poverty-induc- ficient: there is not a single bottleneck holding back pover- ing effects of policies themselves. Important groups of ty reduction but rather an interacting range of factors. the poor are likely to be bypassed by growth, which means Both governments and donors have failed to confront that government must pay attention to the pattern of issues of asset redistribution, which is a possible fast- growth and provide safety nets. If it is to reduce poverty, track to sustained poverty reduction. Development of rural growth must be inclusive growth. infrastructure is an important example of an asset that can Hence current policies for promoting growth are not benefit the poor in many ways: employment creation sufficient. First, the structural impediments to sustained through public works, improved access to markets and growth need be addressed. Second, the pattern of growth services, and greater availability of goods. Biases in both should be a matter of policy concern, requiring reformu- government and donor spending have shifted infrastruc- lation of some policies and addition of others. Third, ture development away from such activities. supplementary interventions are required to reach the sub- The role of the private sector in Afirican economies in stantial numbers who will not benefit from growth. The the past decade has been greatly enhanced by economic last two points follow from the fact that distribution liberalization. The donor community has also emphasized must improve if poverty reduction is to be achieved. the importance of encouraging the private sector in all 102 AFRICAN POVER'FY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES areas, including provision of services and infrastructure Stressing the importance of an integrated approach development, as well as the provision of transport services. often goes under the label of sustainable livelihoods. But Since it is believed that with time the bulk of the African many will see echoes of the integrated rural development economies will be in private hands, it is imperative to projects of the 1970s and early 1980s, or even of the begin defining a role for the private sector in poverty reduc- community development movement in the 1 950s (and tion. However, the expanding formal private sector is in earlier in Africa, being promoted by both British and many countries vehemently opposed to labor unions and French colonial governments in the 1940s). These approach- minimum wage legislation. The sector also opposes all fis- es are widely perceived to have failed. Learning from the cal adjustment that has tax implications on its activities. mistakes of the past is crucial in succeeding today. A pri- Still, in the emerging framework, which in some coun- mary lesson is to be wary of grandiose schemes, particu- tries is seeing the beginning of the growth of a middle larly ones that have little basis in reality. The current fashion class, the poor might yet find champions among the for Poverty Reduction Strategies may be helpful in focus- business classes, even if more for reasons of profit than ing attention on poverty reduction. They may not be altruism. helpful if they promote the idea that a simple planning Making growth more inclusive will benefit many of the exercise will really tackle the problem. There is indeed a poor. But some, such as the elderly, disabled, and many need to tackle the problem on many fronts, whether or single women, may be left out of this process, so that not that requires unifying them into a single strategy is a consumption transfers will be a part of a poverty-reduc- moot point. tion strategy. But government actions are only a part of the lives of The Role of Donors the poor, and most of the effort in reducing African pover- ty will come from the poor themselves. Thus govern- Donors need to behave rather differently than in the past ment actions should reinforce rather than counteract the in two ways. First, they must take seriously their own com- coping strategies adopted by the poor. The policy mea- mitment to poverty reduction and so improve their rather sures mentioned here can largely be seen in that light- poor record at devoting resources to this end and in hav- for example, improving access to markets and services and ing a positive impact on the poor. Second, the formula- providing a secure environment. But some governments tion of poverty-reduction policies must be a matter for continue to take steps to the detriment of the poor- national governments, so that donors must provide the action against street traders is a common, visible mani- space for these policies to be formulated and discussed festation of this, but other constraints are also placed on and plans prepared for implementation. Important areas the workings of the informal sector. for donor involvement will remain, of which debt relief is one that deserves to be singled out. The Need for an Integrated Approach Conclusion Since the different dimensions of poverty reinforce each other, many poverty-reducing policies are complemen- The antipoverty agenda outlined here is based on the sim- tary to one another. Good health, education, and water ple precept of inclusion. To realize sustainable reductions supply go hand in hand, and all of them, along with in poverty, the poor must be included in the growth process, infrastructure and credit, facilitate higher incomes. But which has to be broad enough to include sectors where there is, of course, a social base to social exclusion that the poor derive a livelihood. However, owing to sickness reminds us that poverty reduction will be part of a longer and poor nutrition, the poor might not be in a position run process of social change. to raise their productivity, even if the market incentives It is a mistake, therefore, to think that the priority is were to improve, pointing to the necessity for better ser- to get growth going" before having the luxury of turn- vice provision in the countryside. However, African expe- ing attention to these other issues. It is in part precisely rience shows that policymakers' capacity for commitment because growth is so important that these other things is inadequate, and that there is need for constant political matter so much. Without increasing the basic capabili- challenge as well as pressure. It is thus useful to see pover- ties of the poor, the prospects for sustained growth are ty reduction as a political act that reflects the government's not encouraging. The need is for balanced development. capacity to respond to the needs of the majority of the Outlines ofan Antipoverty Strategy 103 population. However, poverty is dynamic and multifac- tion as solely a public sector activity, the view needs revi- eted, demanding that governments also evolve capacities sion in light of the expanding role of the private sector in for its monitoring in order to reach relevant policy pre- the African economies. scriptions. Finally, while it is tempting to see poverty reduc- CHAPTER 13 National Polies for Reducing Poverty The Policy Challenge In most African countries, lack of information and means to appreciate the full extent and nature of poverty remains The problem of mass poverty is an acutely difficult one a serious impediment to poverty-reduction efforts. Hence for African policymakers as well as for donors wishing to chapter 14 discusses recommendations for data collection, support their efforts, for the eradication of poverty is not research, and monitoring. The need is not just for more readily achieved through the conventional instruments information about the specifics of poverty in a given and modalities of policy, and quick results will be partic- country but also about how the poor participate in the ularly hard to achieve. Indeed, poverty is not a single afflic- wider economy and the degree to which they are able to tion but represents a range of problems. There are two influence the policies that affect them. It is individuals who sources of difficulty, one arising from the nature of the are poor, so policymakers need to understand how the problem, and another arising from the limitations of what policies they can deploy work their way through to poor the state can achieve in the circumstances of manyAfrican people. This need is all the greater because many of the countries. structurally poor are economically marginalized, operat- ing on the fringes of the modern economy, touched more The dif cult nature of the problem by state failure, for example, lack of social services, than success, with adjustment-induced improvements in eco- The description of poverty in chapter 3 provided an insight nomic performance bringing few immediate benefits. Or, into some of the difficulties. Some stress is placed there as also addressed in chapter 3, they may not be economi- on the multifaceted and socially relative nature of pover- cally active at all: the dependent poor, including orphans, ty, factors that necessitate flexible and inclusive approach- poor widows, the aged generally, and the disabled. Many es to its reduction. Social analysts stress the importance of these rely on relatives for survival, often female, but many of the social context in which poverty occurs and the dif- others, such as street children, beggars, and AIDS victims, ferencesamongpoorindividualsorhouseholds, evenwith- have slipped through traditional safety nets. These are in a given community. In the extreme case, they contest people for whom it is difficult for the states to reach. the validity of aggregations and general policy recom- The socially entrenched nature of important aspects mendations. Even if such a position is seen as too extreme, of the poverty problem, particularly as it serves to disad- there remains the large kernel of truth that governments vantage women, is also critical. This fact draws attention and their advisers are grappling with a complex array of to a limitation on what it is realistic to expect to achieve dilemmas that take different forms in different places through the state. What usually happens when policy and at different times and, therefore, call for much more gets much ahead of social practice and opinion is that large information-and capacity to utilize it-than will nor- discrepancies emerge between what the law (or the pres- mally be available. The multifaceted nature of the pover- ident) specifies should happen and actual practice. Recent ty problem presents a web of factors that cannot be African experience is littered with well-meaning attempts penetrated by interventions focusing on a single item or at social engineering that were ignored in practice. While emanating from just one level of government. a large number of countries have in recent years adopted 104 National Policies for R,ducing Poverty 105 legislation and other measures to protect women and chil- There is a particular problem with targeting. Slight dren and other vulnerable categories, they have few means resources and often growing inequalities indicate the desir- of enforcing them. The persistence of slavery has already ability of targeting interventions on poverty groups. been cited as another example. Instability of govern- Depending on how the poor are definecd, efficient target- ments and policies, and weak executive capabilities, under- ing makes heavy informational and administrative demands. mine the credibility of announced measures. It also has a larger drawback: the political sustainability Although poor policy implementation is often blamed of narrowly targeted services, excluding the nonpoor from on inadequate resources, lack of political support for pover- benefits, is often fragile. This is a particular example of ty reduction has been the real culprit. In Sub-Saharan the more generic problem of the limited constituency for Africa, countries that have been able to tackle the AIDS pro-poor measures (see chapter 7). pandemic, reducing the rate ofprevalence, notably Uganda Political cultures may get in the way by other routes. and Senegal, are not among the continent's richest. In many African countries the established modalities of Moreover, although no African country has been able to government are generally top-down, with little recent establish a firm record on poverty reduction, countries tradition of strong local governments and effective grass- that are making strides in the right direction are charac- roots initiatives. Against this, many argue that the best terized by a higher level of political commitment than antipoverty interventions for reaching the poor are bot- their poorly performing neighbors. The main requirement tom-up, incorporating local participation and ownership. for poverty reduction in Africa is thus for poverty reduc- However, experience has shown that even grassroots ini- tion to be placed firmly and seriously on the political agen- tiatives, for example those in primary education cited by da. There are limits to the role the donor community can Hoppers (1989) and Fuller (1989) for Zambia and Malawi, play in this process, though the International Development respectively, are often undertaken by the better off, even Targets may have a part to play in holding governments in rural areas. Moreover, the participatory approach itself accountable for their performance (see section on setting remains controversial, with its advantages needing to be targets below). While these political changes are essen- set against the dangers of undermining the development tial, it is important not to forget the limitations to what of representative local political structures. the state can achieve. These considerations need not imply a fatalistic retreat into laissez-faire. Rather, it poses a challenge to policy- The limitations of the state makers to overcome the difficulties described. There is still much that governments can do, as becomes clear The difficulties just described should be set against the below. But it is important, too, to be realistic about what limited capabilities of the state in Africa: a result of the can be achieved and how rapidly. Once again, the impor- narrowness of the tax base relative to the manifold claims tance of mobilizing a large constituency of support for on revenues (including those of external and domestic antipoverty measures is underlined. So, too is the message creditors). They are also limited by shortages of skills and that governments and donors should work in a sustained social capital. The power of decentralization is partly way at local levels, with communities and civil society. constrained by limited capacity at the local level (chapter 7), but analysis of poverty-reduction policies more gen- The need to fill gaps in knowledge erally in Ghana (Booth 1999) has stressed the impor- tance of effective government, which must be able to do At various points in this report, gaps in knowledge have anything, and moves toward such a position are a vital been identified. Filling these gaps is one crucial element step toward more specific attempts at poverty reduction. to devising effective poverty-reduction strategies. The most Enhancing institutional capacity is a critical part of tack- pressing areas are the following: ling poverty. Presently governments are often overwhelmed by the scale of the tasks they confront, sometimes com- * Determining the extent and nature of transitory pounded by the excessive demands of a multitude of aid poverty donors. Hence governments in Africa have revealed lim- * Understanding better the workings of labor markets, ited capacity to deliver education, health, and other ser- particularly in rural areas vices of a sufficient quality and in appropriate forms to * Assessing how changes in land tenure systems will affect benefit the poor. the poor 106 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES * Developing guidelines for effective targeted programs ing existing inequalities, which not only reduce the pover- * Identifying the trade-offs between growth and distri- ty-reduction effects of growth but also tend to retard the bution. In other words, determining how growth can pace of growth itself. That highly skewed income distri- be made more pro-poor without sacrificing a high rate bution is bad for growth, and thus for poverty reduction, of growth. is illustrated by a number of African experiences. In the boom decades of the 1960s and 1970s, many African Two Initial Truisms countries, including C6te d'Ivoire and Nigeria, were able to raise their rates of capital formation to "tiger" levels, There can be no solution toAfricanpovertywithoutsustained but failed, in spite of initially high growth, to reach the accelerated growth. Chapter 5 illustrated the past slowness prosperity of the East Asian countries with which they of African growth and the grave implications of this fact were at par at the end of the 1950s. The latter had been for the extent of material poverty. Given the severe limi- able to include more of their populations in the growth tations on what can be achieved in the face of widespread process by enhancing their human capital via improve- poverty by redistribution of existing income and assets, ment of social services, boosting agriculture via land reform, improved growth is essential for satisfactory poverty reduc- and ensuring a degree of political accountability. The bulk tion. There are cases of rapid growth in Africa, notably of the African investment was in "enclaves," plantations Botswana, and Ghana and Uganda have also achieved and oil production, and urban-based industry so that the periods of sustained growth at reasonable levels, and resulting benefits of infrastructure expansion, growth, and these successes can be linked with reversing the tide of rapid income increases were poorly distributed among sec- rising poverty. Each of these three countries had a gov- tors and the population. In few cases, the many projects ernment with a serious political commitment to growth. undertaken in the expansive years had a lasting effect on In the 1970s African growth managed to stay ahead of poverty reduction. In some cases, the expansion of the population growth, albeit only slightly. But in the 1 980s "modern" economy hit directly at rural agriculture, with the average rate fell back to around 2 percent, reducing some peasants retreating entirely into subsistence. Poor per capita incomes. There has been some recovery in the distribution of benefits ultimately led to fragility of the 1 990s, but this has not spread to all countries, so average growth process. With the recent recovery and resump- growth remains at around 2.5 percent, or about the same tion of per capita growth in some countries, govern- as the rate of population growth. Various estimates, such ments are attempting to make the growth impact broader as those by the Economic Commission for Africa, indi- and more inclusive by undertaking administrative and cate that, with unchanging income distributions, gross land reforms, and improving marketing structures and domestic product growth needs to reach around 7 per- rural access to services. However, for growth to be pover- cent to achieve the international target of a 50 percent ty reducing, policy implementation must be more effec- poverty reduction by 2015, or even simply to prevent tive in the future. further increases in absolute numbers of the poor. It is thus important to reiterate the point made in chap- While there are grounds for some optimism on the ter 5 that measures to address distributional issues are required basis of a handful of success stories and the modest upturn for African poverty reduction. The dissection of the nature in growth in the 1 990s, there are two clear implications of poverty reveals a number of groups seriously at risk of from the analysis of Africa's growth performance. First, being left out of general economic expansion. Hence the there remain significant structural impediments to growth, possible gains of economically dependent poor (children, such as the continent's weak infrastructure base, as well aged, handicapped, single women) are contingent on shar- as also political factors, which need to be addressed as part ing mechanisms, social structures, and distributional trends. of growth-promotion policies. Second, growth is extreme- But even some of the economically active poor are at ly unlikely to attain the required levels. The second point risk, and are particularly likely to be so if unfettered mar- leads us to the next truism. ket forces remain the mainstay of development strategy, There can be no solution toAfrican poverty withoutatten- including many among subsistence farmers, pastoralists, tion to income distribution. The constraints on growth and informal-sector workers. Thus satisfactory poverty acceleration imply that growth cannot solve the problem reduction also depends on the pattern of growth, partic- at a satisfactory pace without attending to the distribu- ularly with respect to its employment-creating qualities, tion of benefits. This fact is compounded by the negative and the safety nets put in place to protect those most at effects of the large and, in some cases, apparently grow- risk. These arguments are strengthened by the growing National Policies for Reducing Poverty 107 evidence that the poor distribution has in itself been a at reducing poverty. Donors should not use aid to make major factor behind the continent's flawed growth record. governments accountable to the internat:ional communi- Many of these factors point to the importance of the ty but to facilitate platforms for domestic accountability. agricultural sector, which can provide labor-intensive Thus the third principle is that poverty reduction is helped growth, generating higher incomes for many of the poor- if government structures are in place to hold government est. There is not a choice between growth and distribu- accountable for its actions, including its record on pover- tion: both are essential. ty reduction. The fact that African political systems developed in Other Principles of a Poverty-Reduction Strategy ways that made governments increasingly unaccountable is a primary factor behind the failure to reduce poverty. This chapter outlines other principles for a poverty-reduc- Comparisons with the South Asian experience suggest tion strategy. The first, which the donor community par- that the persistence of famine in Africa is a direct conse- ticularly needs to take to heart, is precisely that there cannot quence of nonaccountability and the absence of a more and should not be a blueprint for poverty reduction. open civil society. The promotion of 1.he International The other principles discussed are that ownership should Development Targets thus draws on the notion of a rights- extend beyond central governments, the importance of a based approach to poverty reduction to hold governments comprehensive strategy, and the need to address causes of accountable for progress toward these targets (or their poverty. domestic equivalents). Of course, committing to meeting targets is just a first There can be no blueprintfor poverty reduction step. It must be followed up by actions to reduce pover- ty. The fourth principle emerges from the complexity of Earlier chapters illustrated the wide variety of countries' the poverty situation in different countries: the impor- initial situations, histories, economic and social structures, tance of governments' developing comprehensive antipover- resource endowments, incidence and nature of poverty, ty strategies, that is, of an integrated, or comprehensive, growth records, and so forth. The great variety in the approach. level and composition of poverty imply a similar variety There is no single cause of poverty and any single in country poverty-reduction strategies with respect to intervention is likely to fail. At the most basic level, gov- specificity and local ownership. The only way to ensure ernments need to pay attention to both growth and dis- such a variety is the basis for the second principle: wider tribution. The pattern of growth can be affected both by society needs to be engaged, and a coalition of support altering current policy packages and by additional inter- needs to be built. ventions, such as investment in infrastructure and provi- Local strategies require local knowledge of both the sion of rural credit, to spread growth more widely (and nature of poverty and of political conditions. A second multiplier effects would lead us to expect that if growth equally important reason for local design is that poverty- is spread more widely it will be thicker rather than thin- reduction strategies will only make a lasting difference to ner). For the poor to benefit from additional interven- poverty if there is local ownership. Local ownership does tions and to access markets requires changes in the political not mean holding a few meetings for government to dis- and legal framework. The argument here is not necessar- seminate a strategy agreed upon between top-level offi- ily that government needs to publish a single strategy doc- cials and donors. Ownership must extend beyond ument (though this may be one way of signaling government to elements of civil society, meaning more commitment and certainly seems a condition for attract- than the usual round of donor-financed nongovernmen- ing donor support at present), but that poverty reduc- tal organizations. The poverty-reduction strategy is prefer- tion will be achieved by policies that tackle the several ably developed through a system of consultation and causes of poverty. debate, which builds a political consensus around its main Two specific examples of the need for a comprehensive elements. There have been only slight moves in that direc- approach are provided by the analysis of gender, on the tion-poverty reduction has been absent from African one hand (chapter 11), and economic reform (chapter 6) political discourse, suggesting there is still far to go in on the other. The pervasive and embedded nature of the this regard. However, donor impetus for poverty reduc- gender dimension of the poverty problem shows that it tion must not be taken as a substitute for domestic action: manifestly cannot simply be solved by government dic- it cannot be so and, at best, will result in ineffectual attempts tate, although legislation of women's tights can help, and 108 AFRICAN POVERIY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES even less by donor interventions. Chapter 6 argued that diversification, which are to be achieved in part through reforms have not done enough to address the causes of exchange rate competitiveness. There should also be poverty, and that they can be modified in this respect. measures to encourage greater saving and investment (pub- However, such modification will not in itself be sufficient, lic and private), which can in part be done by lifting con- and there will remain a need for add-on safety nets for trols. Moving toward addressing the structural basis for the dependent poor and some of the most vulnerable. poor growth should also include measures to reduce per- The above list of the different elements of a poverty- ceived uncertainties and raise expected private returns, reduction strategy may be restated as saying that no thus encouraging domestic capital formation, for instance, poverty-reduction strategy is likely to produce satisfacto- through public provision of infrastructure and support ry, lasting results unless it addresses the causes of the coun- services. At a structural level are also measures to enhance try's poverty. human capital, technological capabilities, and factor pro- Although alleviating symptoms has its place, it can only ductivity. There is also the need for an appropriate legal touch the surface. The causes of African poverty are long and institutional framework, with enforceable contracts, term and structural. Lasting poverty reduction can only predictability, and time consistency of policies, and the be achieved by addressing these causes. Tackling the roots development of institutions for social harmony. of low growth is one element as is tackling the most antipoor None of this negates the need for the maintenance of income distribution in the world, but there are also social macro stability. But this needs to be done without under- and political dimensions to poverty that need to be miningtheformationofphysicalorhumancapitalbycut- addressed. ting into the government's social spending. Against this, governments must avoid crowding out of private sector A Checklist of Policy Possibilities for a Poverty- credit by controlling the size of their budget deficits. African Reduction Strategy governments thus have a tightrope to walk between infla- tion control and developmental expenditure. It is a walk Although no blueprint is put forward, a checklist is sug- they must take, however. gested of items that should probably be featured in a coun- Finally there is a need for a reduction of external debt trys poverty-reduction strategy. These are the following: overhang (see chapters 5 and 6), which is an area in promoting faster growth; making growth more pro-poor which donors can play a role. and addressing inequalities; promoting twice-blessed poli- cies, which both reduce poverty and enhance growth Making growth more pro-poor (addressing gender biases, constructing infrastructure, and renovating social services, including population policy); The pattern of growth can be affected by the alteration and addressing other causes of poverty, namely, vulnera- of existing policies and additional interventions, spanning bility, instability, uncertainty; HIV/AIDS; and conflict. a range of sectors. The policies here are those that can affect the distribution of growth, and under the next point Promotingfaster growth are those that promote both growth and poverty reduc- tion (though this distinction is not a hard and fast one). Adjustment policies have been pursued in parts of Africa The one that has received some attention is the cor- for nearly two decades. Although the general comment rection of antipoor biases in social spending: there is no that they do not work begs the point. Since they rarely doubt that addressing the basic capabilities of the poor by are fully implemented, continuing poor growth perfor- improving the health (including water supply) and edu- mance indicates a need for better policy implementation cation status is a central element of a pro-poor growth strat- as well as augmentation by other measures. While a return egy. However, achievements have been somewhat limited. to the days of the control regime are not advocated, it is But there are other important areas that have received necessary to recognize the fact that the successful devel- little attention; for example, the distributional impact of oping countries in the last 50 years combined market forces tax changes, privatization in the absence of a regulatory with a measure of intervention to power their develop- framework, and the possible poverty-creating effects of ment. So what should pro-growth policies consist of? some liberalization measures such as input subsidy removal There should be measures to take greater advantage of and the creation of land markets. There are other areas of trade opportunities, including greater openness and export anti-poor bias in government spending, such as the neglect National Policies for Reducing Poverty 109 of rural infrastructure and the distribution of agricultur- ty but also to the inefficient use of resources and retard- al extension services, including their bias against women ed economic expansion, particularly in agriculture. that need to be redressed. Public works have been under- * Actions to raise productivity in small-farn household used in the African context, and infrastructure develop- agriculture. These will help directly raise the incomes ment has been excessively capital intensive in countries of many of the rural poor, boost overall agricultural in which more labor-intensive approaches would provide growth, and stimulate the growth of off-farm sources an ideal opportunity for putting cash into the hands of of income. poor people. * Improved access by the poor to education and health, In order for the economically active poor to benefit allowing better use of a country's human capabilities, from measures such as improved infrastructure and exten- improving the income-earning potential of poor peo- sions, it is necessary to enhance their diverse assets: improv- ple, widening their range of choice, improving the ing education and health; improving property rights, for quality of their lives, and reducing their social exclu- example, security/clarity of property rights to land and sion. There are some core measures, such as malaria access to land, by land reform; improved access to credit eradication and reproductive health services, that have through the extension of microfinance schemes, and clear and strong links to poverty reduction and growth promoting the productivity of smallholder agriculture at both macro and micro levels. (research and extension; reducing gender biases for a more Improvement of the economy's basic physical infra- rational use of resources; improved infrastructure and mar- structure, particularly the network of rural roads, keting arrangements). Greater attention should also be increasing the responsiveness of the rural economy to paid to stimulating job creation, for instance, through economic opportunities (supply elasticities), raising measures to encourage relative expansion of labor-inten- farm-gate prices, lowering costs and raising marketed sive sectors and industries and in government and donor- agricultural output, and reducing the poverty-increas- supported construction activities; encouraging greater ing effects of remoteness. linkages between small- and medium-sized enterprises and * Public works that directly transfer resources to rural larger enterprises; and more support for urban informal communities through payments to the poor and cre- sectors. ate the important infrastructure mentioned above. Finally, there is a need for the provision of measures to * Measures to encourage/facilitate reducedfertility and spread benefits to the dependent poor, especially those at slowerpopulationgrowth, satisfying the unmet demand risk, of which children require special priority. School for family planning services, striking at one of the most feeding and targeted food supplementation programs are powerful correlates of poverty and a strongly negative feasible examples even in poor countries, the former hav- influence on economic growth in Africa. ing the extra advantage of creating an additional incen- tive for parents to send children to school. Addressing other causes ofpoverty Centering poverty reduction strategies around twice-blessed The lines of action proposed above would address vari- measures ous of the causes of poverty but not all. They should be augmented in various ways, including the following: Although specific trade-offs are likely to arise, there is also a range of policy possibilities that are twice blessed * Actions to reduce the extent of transitorypoverty, which in the sense that they promote both growth and a more was shown in chapter 3 to be a probable large part of broad-based distribution of benefits. These include the total poverty. This draws attention to the desirability following: of greater economic stability (linking in with earlier advocacy of sound macro management) but also to * Actions to reduce gender-basedpoverty. Although this such variables as reduced reliance on rain-fed cultiva- goes deep into social structures, there is a range of tion methods and other food security policies, early specific measures that can be undertaken, elaborated warning information systems, water management strate- in the 1998 Poverty Status Report. Such measures are gies, improved transport, and comrmunications systems. twice blessed because, as the report shows, gender * Action to bring the HIV epidemic under greater con- bias leads not only to inequities and avoidable pover- trol. This actually belongs as a twice-blessed measure, 110 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES because HIV is both a large source of poverty and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development also a grave burden to economies' growth potential, adopted the International Development Targets that set particularly in eastern and southern Africa. A few dates at which certain goals relating to a whole array of African governments have shown that, working with poverty indicators will be met (box 13.1). These targets local society, real progress can be made, but other have since been embraced by the donor community, with governments have been reluctant to acknowledge the some donor countries and institutions including them extent of the problem and to act. explicitly in their aid programs and policies.' Action to minimize the extent ofconflict, which also is However, while donors agree on the feasibility of these both a huge brake on the possibilities of economic targets, the most important determinant of success remains growth and a source of much poverty. the attitude of developing country governments. Two ques- tions arise in this regard: How will success in meeting Finally, it is necessary to be brought back to politics. targets be ensured among developing countries, notably There are no new ideas in this section. There is no big idea in Africa? Can recipient governments be called to account waiting to be discovered that provides the key to elimi- (and by whom) in the event of failure to meet them? For nating poverty in Africa. The measures described here are attempts at enforcing targets to not disintegrate into sim- known, but have been implemented only partially or not ple conditionality, it will be important for African gov- at all. Both governments and donors have allowed other ernments to evolve their own concept of poverty around interests to impede implementation of pro-poor policies. which they are willing to design economic programs. While Public commitment to poverty reduction is a first step donors could influence recipient programs in various ways, toward taking the actions required to reduce it. Hence the sustainability requires that the concept evolve from domes- importance of development targets. tic political processes. In this regard the so-called part- nerships approach currently advocated by the donor The Need to Set Targets community is attractive: donors and recipients would agree on the targets to be achieved by their development col- Although poverty-reduction targets should not be carved laboration, with the understanding that there will be a in stone, they are useful in focusing domestic efforts and parting of ways when they are consistently not met. This garnering international support. While setting targets issue is pursued in chapter 14. has been a feature of international development efforts in recent years, there are always the questions of feasibility Conclusion and enforcement: many internationally agreed upon devel- opment targets have come and gone with little progress A poverty-reduction focus implies a serious policy chal- toward their being met (or even movement away from lenge to African policymakers not only owing to a pauci- them). In 1996, a group of 21 donor governments who ty of resources but, more crucially, owing to a lack of make up the Development Assistance Committee of the political commitment. It is twice-blessed policies, that is, Box 13.1 The international development targets * The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in * The rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three- developing countries should be reduced by at least one- fourths by 2015. half by 2015. * Access should be available through the primary health care * There should be universal primary education in all coun- system to reproductive health services for all individuals tries by the year 2015. of appropriate ages, no later than 2015. * Progress towards gender equality and the empowerment * There should be a current national strategy for sustain- of women should be demonstrated by eliminating gen- able development, in the process of implementation, in der disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005. every country by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends * The death rates for infants and children under the age of in the loss of environmental resources are effectively reversed five years should be reduced in each developing country at both global and national levels by 2015. by two-thirds of the 1990 level. National Policiesfor 'educing Poverty 111 those generating the conditions for renewed growth while in more detail in chapter 15, but first the role of poverty ensuring greater participation of the poor in economic monitoring is examined more closely. activities through egalitarian distribution of its benefits, which can ensure sustainable poverty reduction. Luckily, Notes few of the required measures, such as improvements in basic health and education, land reform, and improved 1. The International Development Targets are being embraced roads, are quite beyond the means of African countries. by donors in a way that the 20/20 initiative was not. The targets The extent to which the donor community can help are, for example, explicitly adopted in the U.K. 1997 White Paper bring about poverty policy change in African countries on International Development. The World Bank is incorporating should not be exaggerated. Sustainability of efforts can the targets into its Country Assistance Strategies to guide policy only be ensured by the evolution a solid domestic con- dialogue, and in February 1998 the World Bank, United Nations, stituency in Africa in favor of poverty reduction. the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Accountability of governments is important and donors and developing country governments met to agree on 21 indica- should strive to be supportive without preventing this tors by which progress towards the targets can be measured. process from taking place. The role of donors is discussed CHAPTER 14 Find Out More and Monitor Progress Why monitor poverty? Data from poverty monitoring for the less developed art of more general poverty moni- systems may serve three purposes: recording, research, and toring. A discussion of EWS is, of course, also important response. First, the monitoring function of recording in its own right as food security is an important dimen- progress in poverty reduction must hold government sion of poverty. accountable for its performance. A main foundation for Early EWS focused on food availability. However, dur- poverty monitoring is the poverty-reduction goals that ing the 1980s it was increasingly recognized that famine government sets itself. Although the International results from entitlement failure rather than the lack of Development Targets (IDTs) provide a useful context for food per se. Hence the focus began to shift from food pro- such an exercise, actual goals should be homegrown ones duction to livelihood monitoring systems. Such a devel- to which there is a genuine government commitment opment has made EWS more responsive, identifying likely and for which government can be held accountable for famine situations earlier and being sensitive to a broader progress toward these goals. Second, there must be a gen- range of food insecurity situations than full-scale famine. eration of data that allows poverty analysis (research) to More recent approaches to EWS promotes "saving liveli- take place. This function includes evaluation of the impact hoods rather than lives" (Buchanan-Smith and Davies of policies and other interventions, although this activi- 1995), for it identifies the vulnerable before they are dri- ty is not the direct responsibility of the poverty-moni- ven into destitution. In the context of countries with poten- toring unit. And, finally, information can be collected that tial food insecurity, which is most if not all ofAfrica, EWS allows government to respond to current and emerging can play a critical role in a poverty-monitoring system. poverty problems. From the point of view of poverty reduc- Indeed, where such systems are well oriented to local liveli- tion, collecting indicators that allow a rapid policy response hoods, poverty monitoring systems can be developed by is the most important component of a poverty monitor- augmenting existing channels of data gathering. ing system. 1 However, collecting indicators that can potentially The data requirements for each of these three purpos- inform life-saving poverty interventions is not the same es are somewhat different. Recording progress relies on as saying that such interventions will take place. The les- outcome indicators for the recent past, such as mortality son of EWS is again instructive in this regard (see box data and income poverty. Poverty analysis relies upon infor- 14. 1). Poverty monitoring should not stop at developing mation on a wider range of variables covering inputs and data collection systems but encompass the institutional process. Indicators for government response should include framework to respond to the signals given by the data. some of a predictive nature, what economists call "lead- It is often said that little is known about poverty in ing indicators," which allow anticipation of problems Africa and available data are of poor quality. Many data before they arise. The best known examples of such lead- are simply unavailable, but those that are available may ing indicators are famine early warning systems (EWS). be simply misleading. The columns of numbers filling the Although poverty monitoring systems are in place in a tables in the appendices of many international reports, number of African countries, they are not yet at the stage such as the Human Development Report (HDR), are esti- of EWS, the development of which holds some lessons mates. Sources presenting time series, such as the World 112 Find OutMareand fMonitorProgress 113 Box 14.1 Better monitoring must go hand in hand with the development of systems for an adequate policy response: lessons from the experience of the Famine Early Warning Systems (EWS) Failure to respond to famine in the Sahel and the Horn of established systems that alert them to the threat of famine, Africa in 1984-85 was widely attributed to the absence of both donors and governments have failed to develop appro- adequate early warning to alert government and the inter- priate institutional systems facilitating an appropriate response national community. In the second half of the 1980s con- to this information. siderable resources were devoted to the establishment of an Donors are reluctant to accept government's own assess- EWS, which has been refined from a simple focus on food ments, preferring the more "independent" voice of interna- availability to multi-indicator systems that can moniror chang- tional agencies, although the information in the international ing entitlements. By 1990 donors and government were bet- EWS is only as good as that in the national EWS on which ter informed of the likelihood of famine than ever before. it is usually based. Agencies wait to react until there is a large Astudyoffive countries thatexperiencedfamine in 1990-91, degree of certainty, whereas the earlier the information the Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mali, and the Turkana District in more it is necessarily based on probabilities. Hence a crisis Kenya, found that in all cases the EWS did indeed give time- has to be under way before a response is forthcoming. But ly signals as to imminent problems. But the response was too by that time the victims of famine are beyond the stage at little, too late. The delay between the signals from the EWS which interventions can seek to sustain livelihoods rather than and a decision being taken to act was up to six months, and lives. Besides, in most agencies emergency aid and develop- it took a further six months or more for deliveries to arise. ment aid are organizationally separate, with the former geared The lag between identification of the problem and response to the provision of food. All these problem.s are exacerbated to the problem was thus a year or more. by systems that are excessively centralized, with decision- Analysis of these five cases reveals that the international making neither involving nor accountable to those who will community can, political circumstances permitting, respond suffer if the response is inadequate. to famines once they are underway. But they are ill- equipped The experience with the EWS illustratcs the necessity of to react on the basis of genuine early warning that would putting in place systems to respond to data, rather than mere- allow action to prevent mass starvation. Although they have ly to collect it. Source: Buchanan-Smith and Davies (1995). Bank's World Development Indicators CD-ROM, rely on lower for 12 and about the same for 17. Some differences techniques such as linear interpolation. For domestic pover- are substantial, for example, Benin at 800 and 161, Mali ty monitoring-systems it is important that locally pro- at 850 and 2,325, and Malaysia 120 and 26. The corre- duced data with local ownership are used in tracking lation coefficient between the two sets of figures is only progress toward targets, but international discussions 0.7, dropping to only 0.4 for high-morality countries. and documents rely on these international sources. Even Both sources use the World Health Organization's Mate7nal country-specific reports by donors often rely on these Mortality: A Global Factbook, which presents a range of "international data" rather than "national data." Many estimates for each country. In some cases the respective World Bank reports have literally photocopied the rele- reports pick one of the estimates, while in other cases vant pages of Social Indicators of Development to include they report an average, and still in other cases it is unclear in country reports. Such practices echo donor mistrust of where the number comes from. Nor is it clear why some local data, a problem that has bedeviled the EWS. countries are omitted. Maternal mortality data have One manifestation of these practices is that rather dif- improved in recent years as the health-facility-based sta- ferent numbers can be given for the same series. Maternal tistics have been replaced by more reliable (and higher) mortality, which for Ghana jumped from 400 to 1,000 estimates from survey methods. Bul: table 14.1 shows from one issue of the World Development Report (WDR) maternal mortality data from the early 1 990s, illustrat- to the next, is often mentioned in this regard.2 Mauldin ing that marked discrepancies may remain. (1994) showed that, although they both used the same But the nonavailability of data should not be overstated. source, the WDR reported data for 56 developing coun- There are a wide range of surveys that can yield relevant tries and the HDR for 55 of these 56 and a further 48. information for poverty monitoring, and several coun- Counting differences of less than 50 points as the same, tries have made considerable progress in establishing pover- HDR gave higher values than WDR for 26 countries, ty-monitoring systems. The most usual sources are 114 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table 14.1 Poor data quality can give misleading results: These sources may all be described as quantitative in maternal mortality from different sources (deaths per nature. This need not mean they are restricted to solely 100,000 live births) economic concerns, since the 1996 Living Standards WDR as a Measurement Survey (LSMS) in Zambia contained ques- DHS WDR percent of DHS tions on attitudes to domestic violence. But the rise of participatory approaches, particularly Participatory Poverty Central African 1,451 700 48 Assessments, in recent years has highlighted the impor- Madagascar 663 660 100 tance of more qualitative data.4 Participatory approaches Matawi 752 620 82 can play several important roles in a poverty-monitoring Morocco 380 372 98 system, not least of which is defining the parameters of the Namibia 395 - - monitoring system itself by broadening understanding of Senegal 672 593 88 poverty and identifying the priority concerns of the poor. Sudan 569 370 65 Both quantitative and qualitative data should be col- Zimbabwe 393 280 71 lected in ways that may be disaggregated in analytically useful ways. When the welfare of population subgroups -Not available. is changing in different ways, then aggregate figures can Sources: DHS (Demographic Health Surveys) (1997); World Bank, World give a misleading picture. Most socioeconomic data lend De2velopmnent Indicaors. veamsedn ctr.Mssoicnmcdtald themselves to gender disaggregation. Analysis can also be household income and expenditure surveys, of which there made on the basis of region and ethnicity, and for other have been more than 70 in Sub-Saharan Africa since the marginal or vulnerable groups. There can be a difficulty mid-1980s in 35 countries. But labor force, agricultural, here of the sample size required to give reliable results at manufacturing, informal-sector and administrative sur- the desired level of disaggregation. Given the importance veys, as well as the population census may all yield use- of geographical patterns in poverty, and the demand that ful information, as will more obvious sources such as the should be generated for such data by decentralization, Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), nutrition surveys, there are good grounds for supporting surveys of the nec- and, as already indicated, data collected as a part of famine essary size. More problematic is the continuing difficul- EWS. Finally, the recent development of the Core Welfare ty of disaggregation of data collected at the level of the Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) (box 14.2) promises household. Alternative survey techniques are being devel- to make more data available more quickly. The problem oped to handle the biases that may result from, for exam- is only in part, if at all, that data are not available, but ple, asking a man about tasks performed by women. they are not being captured and analyzed in a way that Despite the progress that has been made, the develop- makes them usable (or at least used) by policymakers.3 ment of poverty-monitoring systems is at an early stage Box 14.2 Getting poverty data quickly: the CWIQ The CWIQ is a survey tool that complements other surveys ple) and satisfaction, but also includes some "output" indi- by quickly making available information: results can be pre- cators such as illness. For example, CWIQ in Lagos State sented within one or two months of the fieldwork. Rapid pro- (Nigeria) revealed that 42 percent of urban households are cessing is made possible by reliance on high-tech methods, within 15 minutes of a school, whereas none of the rural though the procedures are not technically demanding of the households sampled were-less than 10 percent of urban users. The standard questionnaire includes data on house- households were more than an hour away, compared to hold characteristics and welfare matters such as health, nutri- nearly one-third of rural ones. tion, and employment. The data may be broken down by CWIQ was piloted in Kenya in 1996 with a sample of poverty quintiles (based on a few normative questions on 700 households, followed by one in Ghana later that year. household income and expenditure), rural/urban, socioeco- Both countries then carried out national surveys (covering nomic groups, and geographic region. 15,000 households in Ghana) the followingyear, and in Ghana The focus is on simple indicators, such as usage (school some of the technology is being adopted for the year 2000 enrollment, for instance), access (to clean water, for exam- census. Other countries are now adopting the questionnaire. Find OutMl,ore and.lIfonitor Progress 115 in many countries. Units responsible for these activities questionnaire is a prototype, but there have been far are now being established in the context of national pro- more variations between countries than has been the case grams to eradicate poverty. Just as for poverty-reduction for the DHS. These three approaches can be character- policies in general, poverty monitoring need not imply ized as (i) support to institutional development, (ii) doing new activities. The surveys that constitute a poverty- the survey, and (iii) survey-specific institutional develop- monitoring system may well be in place but not conceived ment, although this characterization is a bit extreme, as in of as such. Hence existing activities need to be drawn practice the second model has involved local institutions. together into a coherent program consistent with a gov- Two trade-offs are at work in determining the appro- ernment conceived strategy for poverty reduction. A pover- priate form of support: institutional development versus ty-monitoring unit will thus act primarily as an umbrella, getting the job done and adapting to local circumstances which coordinates information flows, bringing together versus maintaining intercountry cornparability. With data producers and users and producing publicly avail- respect to the first of these, the completion of surveys in able information so that government can be held account- most African countries has tilted the balance in favor of able for its record of progress toward meeting its developing local capacity. The position with respect to the poverty-reduction goals. Ideally, such units should be asso- second depends upon the nature of the data being col- ciated with, or be a part of, the coordinating body for lected. However the trade-off may not be as great as poverty-reduction activities, as is the case with, for exam- imagined, since adaptation to local circumstances may ple, Uganda's poverty planning and eradication unit in make data more comparable rather than less; modifying the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic questionnaires to embrace diversity In systems of pro- Development. In the Ugandan case, poverty-reduction duction and consumption will result in overall welfare targets are an integral part of the medium-term expendi- indicators (such as consumption) that are comparable in ture framework, laying a basis for reporting progress in a way they would not be if important elements of local poverty reduction. To date, systems for response to the livelihood strategies were missed by surveys. information collected are less well established. Although poverty-monitoring systems should be adapt- Given government budget constraints, donor support ed to local circumstances, the followirLg principles can be is likely to be vital for poverty-monitoring systems. Such proposed: support should not, of course, undermine domestic con- trol ("ownership" in donor parlance) of the system. But * Clear identification of existing data products and the problem with the EWS is that donors have been reluc- producers, and uses and users. tant to trust government information as a basis for action. Though data may be widely available, much of these A balance is clearly required between external quality con- data are not well used. The starting point for a pover- trol and development of a domestically based system. ty-monitoring system is an audit of what is available. Donors may support the development of the poverty- Equally important is to identify current and potential monitoring systems in similar ways to previous support users of data. The current situation suggests that the for the collection and processing of statistics. Such sup- challenge is not so much to meet demand as to gen- port has followed three models. The traditional model has erate demand, which implies facilitating a process of been technical support to the statistics office through train- dialogue in which potential data users are persuaded ing and the provision of expatriate assistance. Within of its benefits and so become committed to data col- this context support could be given to initiate or sustain lection and dissemination. specific survey activities. A second model is to provide * Assessment ofcdata products against international stan- the expertise to undertake and process specific surveys. dards and local circumstances. The DHSs have come closest to this model, where a There is a need to develop international trust in standardized questionnaire and report format are used locally produced data, which means that internation- across countries, produced by Macro International in al standards should be applied, and the donors have Maryland. Finally, support may be given for a specific sur- a window on data collection processes, which will be vey though the responsibility for the survey rests with the provided by their continuing support for activities in local institution; the Social Dimensions of Adjustment this area. But these needs have to be weighed against (SDA) and subsequent assistance to household income not only the importance of local ownership but also and expenditure surveys have been of this form. The LSMS of adapting to country-specific circumstances: "one 11 6 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES size fits all" is not a rule that applies to surveys of pover- Most surveys are oriented toward outcomes (such ty-related issues in Africa. A further consideration is as income and mortality), though data are also col- domestic continuity. Although many more data are lected with relevance to analyzing causes (such as now available, there are still few countries for which asset distribution and access to services). But there reliable time series data on poverty measures can be are areas of data collection that can play a valuable part compiled. Changes in survey design and sampling have in monitoring processes that may be overlooked as a compounded this problem. Panel data are virtually part of poverty monitoring. For example, line min- unavailable.5 istries have, or are developing, Management Information * Mapping of data needs for reporting, research and Systems (MISs) that provide timely data covering all response, and identification of data. gaps three of input, process, and outcome. The beginning of this chapter outlined the main * A balance between rapidly available information and functions of a poverty-monitoring system. Despite the more traditional data gathering. quantity of data available, it is possible that there are The timely provision of data, as can be provided by gaps in the nature of data collected, so that addition- MISs and CWIQs, is important in providing infor- al collection work should be scheduled. Some of these mation on which policymakers can act. In particular, gaps will be the result of emerging data needs as pover- if poverty-monitoring systems are to develop an EWS, ty-reduction policies are put in place, such as data allow- so that the vulnerable can be protected before they ing analysis of the targeting of public expenditures. cross the line into destitution, then the process indi- * Listing of priority poverty indicators through a con- cators of MISs and the intermediate ones collected in sultative process, with public commitment by gov- a CWIQ will be particularly valuable. However, the ernment to meeting agreed upon goals. importance of these should not undermine contin- The importance of political commitment to pover- ued collection of quality data by traditional large-scale ty reduction has been a major theme of this report, a surveys. part of which is government commitment to pover- ty-reduction targets. But these targets should be domes- Notes tically determined with the government held accountable to the local population for progress toward 1. Bamberger (1996) suggests that the data and expertise are them. Target setting should thus be part of a nation- not available in Africa for the sort of targeted approaches used in al consultative process, which sets requirements and Latin America. But poverty data are improving rapidly: in public interest in data collection. Mozambique, for example, a central database is being compiled of * Identify and establish links between reporting data and its various safety net programs (Greeley and Jenkins 1999). channels for accountability, research data and local 2. Since maternal mortality data are notoriously poor, this may researchers, and response data and policymakers. seem an unfair example. But it is one of the indicators used for the Establishing links between producers and users has IDTs (box 13.1, chapter 13), raising the question ofwhether changes been stressed, as has generating demand among poten- reflect actual changes or improved data quality. tial users. But such measures are only the starting point 3. In Benin the poverty monitoring unit (Ce/lule Technique pour for providing a basis for action on what the data show. IaDSD, CTDSD) was placed in the influential National Monitoring Public accountability is important here, pointing to Commission for the Structural Adjustment Program, giving pover- the need for the timely provision of publicly available ty matters a central position in policy debates. data. In Ghana the most recently available published 4. Speed of collection and processing has been a main advan- income-poverty data are from 1992, although results tage ofqualitative approaches. But first LSMS, and now the CWIQ from the 1998 survey are being processed (Booth 1999), surveys, have overseen major strides in more rapid processing of and the nonavailability of more recent data casts doubt quantitative data. on government's willingness to have its record exposed 5. The LSMS sampling methodology is an unsatisfactory com- to public scrutiny. promise between repeated random samples and a panel. It would * Creating the umbrella for the poverty-monitoring sys- probably be more satisfactory to use random samples for major tem, with an appropriate mix of input, process, and household surveys while conducting a panel survey as a separate outcome indicators based on both quantitative and exercise. qualitative approaches. CHAPTER 15 Donor Countries Need to Do More, Too The Gap between Donor Aspirations and Practices operational cycle begins correctly with a poverty assess- ment, the poverty focus is often lost by the time a lend- If all aid could be targeted successfully and without cost ing program is implemented" (World Bank 1997b, p. 15). at the extreme poor, it would be possible to rapidly elim- Third, a review of the treatment of poverty by the Swedish inate extreme poverty, nearly doubling the mean income International Development Agency (S IDA) found that "a of the poorest (White 1996). Of course, there is a multi- large number of projects and programs supported by SIDA tude of reasons why such a transformation is not feasible, do not specify poverty reduction as an explicit objective. but this fact provides a dramatic yardstick against which Swedish development cooperation is largely driven by actual achievements can be assessed. This is all the more objectives other than (direct) poverty reduction" (Tobisson relevant because at the 1995 World Social Summit, donor and de Vylder 1997, pp.21-22). Finally, a study of a num- governments committed themselves to devote at least 20 ber of European donors (Cox and Healey 1998) analyzed percent of their aid budgets to basic services that benefit 90 projects, which were designated by the donors con- the poor, and in the following year donors adopted the cerned as their most poverty-oriented projects. However, target to halve extreme poverty in developing countries when classified according to objective criteria, less than by 2015. Various of them state that they pursue poverty one-third of the projects could be said to have a direct reduction as the overarching goal of their development poverty orientation, and 23 percent did not even have an cooperation policies, or as one of two or three central goals, indirect one (see table 15. la). with France and the United States the only major excep- But as donors' policy statements renew their commit- tions. How well do actual donor records match up to these ment to poverty reduction, more evidence is now becom- aspirations? ing available, and a picture is beginning to develop. The It is a sign of the low priority that has been placed on following is a highly condensed statement of the main the poverty-reduction goal in the past that until very recent- results of recent research: ly there was little systematic information with which to answer this question. Evidence of this low priority for * Real aid flows to poor countries 'have declined quite poverty reduction can be taken from a number of sources, sharply in recent years, as indicated in figure 5.6, chap- of which four examples are given here. First, an evalua- ter 5. This shows net aid to Africa to have fallen in tion of the poverty impact of Danish aid found "there real terms by a one-fifth between 1994 and 1997. was neither ubiquitous nor explicit poverty orientation Other Development Assistance Committee data show reflected in most of the project designs or documenta- that, contrary to the international commitments just tion of the selected interventions assessed" (DANIDA Table 15.la Little aid is directly targeted at the poor (Danish International Development Agency) 1996, p. viii). Second, a World Bank review of their own poverty- Direct Indirect Other reduction strategy in Africa found that "poverty reduc- tion is rarely a central or motivating theme in the business Poverty orientation (n 90) 29 48 23 plan or country assistance strategy [and] even though the Source: Cox and Healey (1998). 117 11 8 AFRICAN POVERFY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES cited, a declining share of total aid is going to the drugs, school books, and rural infrastructure that will least developed countries, with the proportion falling make a direct difference to the lives of the poor. between 1986/87 and 1996/97, from 38.1 percent to Change is also apparent with respect to process. Donors 31.5 percent.1 now place great stress on partnership. But thus far there * Donors have apparently not used recipient govern- has been far more donor rhetoric than action on this front, ments' revealed commitment to tackling poverty as a to the extent that donors continue to subvert account- basis for country aid allocations. Econometric analy- ability by making governments responsive more to donor sis of aid allocations shows that "donor interest varables," needs than those of the local population. The proper role capturing commercial and political considerations, are for donors is to facilitate domestic platforms for policy a major determining factor for bilateral aid allocations. debate and create space for the pro-poor political coali- * Until a few years ago, only a small proportion of aid tions. These processes will generate systems of account- deliveries was explicitly designed as poverty reducing. ability onto which donors will have a window, rather For example, as recently as 1993 none of the OECD than requiring separate channels of accountability to bilateral donors nor the World Bank allocated aid to donors. Difficulties also exist here in the partnership basic health and education at a rate significantly dif- concept that deserve explicit recognition. One is the ten- ferent from zero. sion between donors' desire for influence and genuine * Donor policy statements have shifted toward a stronger partnership. Second is the fundamental inequality in the emphasis on poverty in the 1990s, but much of the partnership, particularly when donors appear reluctant policy remains poorly articulated, with little or no clear to relinquish the power afforded them by being the ones idea how to achieve pro-poor growth and a reluc- giving the money.2 Related to this inequality is the extent tance to embrace land reform. to which donors are willing to enter contractual obliga- * Along with the shift toward a stronger poverty empha- tions. Finally, difficulties lie in identifying appropriate sis, the donor agenda is converging around a consen- partners who share donor objectives, and what to do if sus on common issues such as partnership, sector they don't (or don't fully), or they change their mind. programs, and the need for a comprehensive approach. A part of the move to partnership is a supposed increased reliance on a sector approach in which aid is provided as There is general agreement, however, that the situation budget support. However, donors have retained a high is changing quite fast, so that the proportions for 1996 degree of earmarking of funds to specific activities, thus (latest available) equivalent to those quoted in the last impeding the intended government-led nature of the paragraph were a little under 6 percent for the DAC donors process and creating potential distortions in resource allo- and 7 percent for the World Bank. About 28 percent of cations. Finally donors are also embracing the need for a all International Development Association commitments comprehensive approach, referred to in this report most- were stated to be poverty targeted in 1995, although that ly as an integrated approach. These is no detracting from proportion had not been rising, and the labeling of funds the importance of this approach, but once again the gov- in this manner is somewhat problematic (see White 1996). ernment should have the lead in this process. Preparation Among European donors, proportions of total aid port- of individual donor strategies, including even those of folios with a specific poverty focus in the mid-i 990s ranged the World Bank, do not take precedence over local ini- from a high of 19 percent (Netherlands) to approximately tiatives and should not be allowed to dominate them. zero (European Community, France, Spain). As of the Despite these changes donors are still struggling to some mid- 1990s, estimates of the overall average share ofpover- extent with putting poverty reduction into practice. Many ty-focused aid were 10 to 15 percent; a comparable fig- donors have not developed a clearly defined conceptual- ure for today is probably on the order of 20 percent. ization of the poverty problem and few donors utilize But even if the share of aid directed to the poor is increas- country assistance strategies as a mechanism for main- ing, that does nor mean that the benefits end up in the streaming poverty reduction and for engaging with recip- hands of the poor. Vested interests and entrenched bureau- ient governments and civil societies on poverty reduction. cracy on the side of both African governments and donors Some have moved in this direction, however, resulting in can result in inappropriate use of aid resources. Too a large gap between best donor practices and the aver- much is spent on studies and salaries, consultants and con- age.3 Poverty concerns, although not entirely absent, have ferences, expatriates and expertise, and too little on the not formed an important part of the policy dialogue with Donor Countries Need To Do More, Too 119 African governments.4 Understanding the causes ofpover- It is clear from the above account that, although the ty is not an easy task, and not one that all Poverty Assess- situation is an improving one, there remains a gulf between ments have been up to, partly because they appear the aspirations or rhetoric of the donors and their actual constrained to have neglected political aspects (Hanmer, practices in the poverty-reduction area. At present, it is Pyatt, and White 1997). An analysis of country strategy doubtful whether donors' explicitly poverty-related work papers prepared by the U.K. aid agency Department for has made a significant difference to the overall extent of International Development revealed the problem of the poverty. Many of the more important ways in which donors "missing middle," a failure to identify how planned inter- need to improve their records are the nmirror image of the ventions rooted in weak analysis would reduce poverty of facts just reported. The following points require particu- the causes of poverty or prioritization of either major caus- lar emphasis: es of poverty or major groups of the poor (Booth and White 1999). The importance of exercising greater selectivity in aid Although the situation is improving over time among allocations, to enhance the support given to govern- several of the leading aid agencies, there is still far to go ments pursuing vigorous antipoverty strategies and in mainstreaming poverty reduction in their operational to exclude support for governments hostile to this policies and modalities. Despite the pressures in this direc- objective. Engaging with recipient governments and tion, success is not assured. Incentive structures within civil society in a dialogue on poverty-related policy agencies are not specifically designed to encourage staff topics and utilizing country assistance strategy process- to prioritize poverty reduction in practice; and often lit- es as a means of building a consensus on an antipover- tle training and operational guidance has been provided ty strategy. to them in the poverty area. Monitoring systems that could Alongside selectivity goes the notion of partnership, provide accountability against poverty reduction objec- which means placing more reliance on government tives, and stimulate lesson learning and feedback, although to take the lead, both in defining the poverty-reduc- improving, are still deficient. But there are also vested tion strategy and in managing the role of aid in this interests, such as commercial pressures on aid programs, process.5 However, the caveats with respect to part- and the interests of aid workers and consultants, that resist nership in practice mentioned above should be borne too great a change in the way aid works. in mind. So far as the weak available evidence permits a judge- Improved project identification and design, including ment: it appears that more than 70 percent of projects a less top-down approach and involvement of the poor nominated by donors as having an explicit poverty focus at the outset; more systematic integration of gender brought positive benefits to the poor, and a 25 percent equality aspects; supporting more locally initiated pro- had a large impact (table 15. lb). However only a one- jects and programs; and adopting project designs that fifth of these poverty-focused projects had actually been maximize visible benefits to the poor. Where coun- closely targeted on poor groups, and only about the same tries have well-functioning system, of accountability, proportion were judged very likely to be sustainable when these define government's spending priorities, and the time came for donors to withdraw. aid funds should be subsumed into this system. Reduced biases towards urban interventions and projects located in the more prosperous parts of the rural econ- Table 15.1b Poverty effects are often not large (results of omy; more effective targeting of poor beneficiaries. survey of poverty-oriented projects of European donors) * Following from the previous point, donors can invest more in agriculture and prioritize activities that trans- High Moderate Negligible fer resources to the poor, such as labor-intensive works. Targeting (n =82) 21 41 38 * Actions to mainstream the poverty-reduction goal with- Degree of participation (n =89) 17 48 35 in agencies' internal management systems, including Integration of gender (n = 75) 28 35 37 stronger incentives and guidance for agency staff; Sustainability (n= 67) 19 45 36 better poverty monitoring of country programs; broad- Poverty impact (n = 73) 25 48 27 ening the range of skills available to agencies and increas- Notes: n is sample size, and figures are a percentage of sample. ing the training provided for staff; and greater Source: Cox and Healey (1998). decentralization of expertise and authority. 120 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES The discussion in chapter 6 of the influence of eco- to help defuse potentially violent situations, to help bring nomic reforms supported by the International Monetary conflicts to an end, to protect those most at risk, and to Fund (IMF) and the World Bank argued that more could aid postconflict recovery. It is only relatively recently that be done to reduce programs' ill effects on vulnerable peo- donors have begun to bring their responses to conflict ple. More specifically, the following is recommended: situations within the mainstream of their activities. They • Reforms should be consciously designed so as to min- should accelerate this trend. More specific suggestions cosiul designed include the following: imize the costs and maximize the benefits to poor groups-a principle the IMF was slow to accept * Starting with conflict assessments-these should be (arguably doing so following the results of the Extended historically sensitive and should recognize the ten- Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) evaluation, and dency for violence to become embedded in social and more recently with the adoption of Poverty Reduction political structures. Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are discussed below)- - Giving greater priority to finding ways to encourage and pro-poor measures should be integral to the design conflict prevention. of programs.6 Particular care should be taken with * Recognizing that conflict is often not exogenous to measures changing government spending patterns, and the wider economic and social situation and integrating with other fiscal measures. it into their broader relief development aid planning. * Positive measures are better than ameliorative respons- * Giving more attention to the macroeconomic frame- es: strengthening the rural infrastructure, provision work for recovery from conflict, particularly in deter- of primary health and education, and of treated water. mining how to deal with hyperinflation, capital flight, Export promotion also has a good pro-poor record. and urban bias, and the effects of these on the poor. * Safety net provisions should continue to be improved - Seeking to ensure that any peace dividend resulting in the light of emerging experience, particularly to from ending a conflict should benefit most those who improve participation of, and accessibility to, target- have suffered worst from the violence in question. ed groups. * Giving explicit dimension to the gender dimensions Finally, donors can play a role, albeit a limited one, in of conflict and also to the special vulnerability of chil- building consensus toward poverty reduction. One use- dren. ful way in which they can do this is by sponsoring (but * Official and nongovernmental organization donors not setting) the research agenda to fill the gaps in knowl- should more fully recognize the potentially perverse edge mentioned above, consequences of their aid and take active steps to minimize this risk. They should be more proactive and Responding to Conflict and Postconflict Situations strategic in their relations with local parties to con- flicts, to avoid cooptation by them and to moderate This report has illustrated the various ways in which war- their excesses. fare and other forms of violent conflict are a potent source While the role of the international community in of poverty in Africa. Indeed, some have suggested that it conflict situations is a difficult one, since their actions, has become the largest single determinant of poverty on even if benign, may extend the conflict, they have a clear- the continent, with a high proportion of all states having er, and important, part to play in postconflict recon- experienced substantial levels of violence in recent decades. struction. It is easy to respond to the most obvious and Donor agencies affect this situation both negatively and pressing need, such as refugees or rebuilding hospitals and positively. bridges. But the reconstruction effort is also social and Negatively, there is the ever present danger that the institutional. During prolonged conflict particularly, gov- resources they provide may be diverted, through fungi- ernment capacity to provide normal services will be under- bility, into fueling the conflict, or that donor governments mined (Haughton 1998). Iffurther conflict is to be avoided, may explicitly aggravate the situation by engaging in, then development must go hand in hand with reconstruc- and providing arms for, proxy wars in pursuit of wider tion. As several studies have shown (see, for example, Collier geopolitical policy objectives. Positively, and particularly 1999), poor economic performance is a significant deter- when they are seen as standing outside the conflict, donors minant of the probability of conflict. Hence, as emphasized may be in a position to use their influence and resources by Haughton (1998), the international community must Donor Countries Neea' To Do More, Too 121 not focus only on the obvious "immediate needs," but true that donors are paying attention to process, it is con- also on addressing long-term development needs. In the ceivable that the consultative process will involve donor- first instance this can be done fairly quickly through a wide friendly nongovernmental organizations the donors see as range of projects, with few conditions imposed on the gov- representing civil society rather than addressing genuine ernment; more normal donor relations can resume after political groupings. But nothing will change, for there will two to three years of successful reconstruction and growth. be no domestic constituency. The track record of donors being able to take a hands-off approach to allow the nec- The Way Ahead essary time and institutional and political processes to take place is not encouraging. The talk among aid workers is that the way they do busi- There is a widespread consensus among academics that ness is changing radically-ideas are more important than formal policy conditionality failed to bring about many money, and influence matters more than investment. These of the desired policy changes in a timely manner (see, for changes took root with the adoption of sector programs, example, Killick, Carlsson, and Kierkegaard 1998). But discussed above, which, partly on account of the Strategic this is not to say that the international community is Partnership with Africa, are most advanced in Africa. Sector irrelevant to the policy debate; they can and do have a programs fit well with the World Bank's advocacy for a role to play. But a more deep rooted and longer lasting Comprehensive Development Framework, and better still effect is more likely if the focus is on facilitating policy with the notion of PRSPs, which have been given an added debate on key issues, perhaps influencing the agenda, but impetus by the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country only informing debate rather than trying to preempt the (HIPC) initiative for accelerated debt reduction (see below). outcome. It is in any case far from obvious that the donor Current thinking suggests that conditionality is going to community has all the answers; this report has highlighted change; the main requirement to be placed on governments some key gaps in knowledge, such as the impact of land will be that they prepare and implement a PRSP; that is, liberalization. government, on the basis of available data, defines a pover- These comments apply equally to dlonor attempts to ty reduction strategy and thus sets an expenditure program influence governance. Reviews of political conditionality that responds to the needs of that strategy. Government's conclude that it has had, at best, mixed effects (see, for own priorities will therefore determine the areas of focus instance, Stokke 1995 and Crawford 1997). Donors for the various donors operating in that country. have also funded projects to promote democratic institu- While these developments are certainly to be welcomed tions (anticorruption commissions, for example), but these as a step in the right direction, the record of past failures can only be as good as the overall environment, so the must certainly raise doubt as to whether "the answer" has question comes back to how that may be influenced. But now been discovered. Indeed, there are good reasons to despite the importance placed in this report on the polit- exercise some caution as to both the concept and how it ical context, it would be wrong to see "getting gover- will work in practice. It is possible to question the need nance right" as the panacea to poverty reduction. There for "a strategy," most now industrial countries (and indeed is no single quick fix (no big idea waiting to be discov- those of East Asia) have achieved poverty reduction with- ered), a fact with which the donor community needs to out an umbrella strategy. What matters most is that ade- reconcile itself. quate resources flow to the right sectors (such as education) that ensure both growth and poverty reduction. That said, Using debt relieffor the poor a PRSP may play a useful political role in shifting the center of political gravity in a poverty-oriented manner, It may be right to say that influence matters more than as the New Deal did in the United States and the 1945 investment, but aid is still money, so the question remains Labour government did in the United Kingdom. To work, of how aid funds should be spent. Presently, more funds however, PRSPs must be rooted in the domestic political are to be directed to give debt relief to HIPC, but pro- scene, and this will take time. There is a very real danger vided there is a demonstrable linkwith poverty reduction. that donors will rush through PRSPs, governments will Chapter 6 argued that the large overhang of external make the necessary verbal commitments, and donors debt in many of the poor countries of Africa represents a will come up with the funds to pay consultants to write serious obstacle to effective antipoverty programs, by divert- the plans, which government will adopt. Although it is ing resources from public investment and social services, 122 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES and by discouraging private saving and investment through targeted at poverty groups, along lines similar to arrange- increasing uncertainties and reducing prospective rates ments introduced by the Ugandan authorities. of return. Hence at the macro level a link between debt * However, such spending should not necessarily be con- relief and poverty reduction is to be expected. But can a fined to the social sector. For example, this report has stronger link be forged? at a number of points stressed the value for many Chapter 6 cautioned against erecting too close a con- poor people, as well as for the economy as a whole, of nection between external debt relief and poverty reduc- improving rural infrastructure. tion, not least because of the opportunity cost of much of the relief provided, the associated risk that poor coun- Conclusion tries without large debts may lose out, and because of the difficulties of ensuring that resources released through It is clear from the above that responsibility for acting debt relief schemes actually benefit poor people. The cre- against the scourge of poverty is far from being a matter ation of more or less elaborate mechanisms for channel- for African governments alone. Donor governments are ing the proceeds of debt relief into social spending may only now beginning to address the problem seriously, yield poor results, partly because of fungibility but also and there is still far to go in improving their policies and because previous attempts to micromanage what are essen- practices. African governments need to change their tially free resources have slowed down disbursements and approaches. But so do OECD governments, as creditors created allocative inefficiencies.7 The ideal is where the and as donors. For too long vested interests have prevented indebted governments are themselves politically commit- aid budgets from benefiting the poorest. New trends in ted to the poverty-reduction objective, in which case mech- the use of aid and in aid management are encouraging, anisms to earmark the funds are redundant in any case. but not without problems. Most of these problems revolve However, there are things that can be done. Without around the design of effective poverty-reducing aid pro- going into the complexities of the debt situation, four grams and allowing African governments a lead role in points may be made: partnership arrangements. The current moves toward the Comprehensive Development Framework and the * Greater debt relief is still needed. Because they must PRSP are certainly steps in the right direction, though move at the pace of the most reluctant creditors, suc- past donor practice does not inspire confidence that donors cessive debt relief arrangements have proved inadequate. will allow the time and space for the emergence of domes- The HIPC initiative, targeted specifically on low-income tic constituencies for poverty reduction. The answer to countries, while marking a major advance on previous the reduction of African poverty lies in Africa, and the schemes, is no exception to this generalization. Even biggest contribution donors can make is to recognize after the further improvements agreed at the 1999 G- that fact. 8 summit in Cologne, the indications remain that fur- ther broadening and deepening of its coverage will be Notes required. In the meantime, various governments of poor countries will continue to be hamstrung by an 1. Source: OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation unsustainable and draining debt burden.8 and Development) (i999, table 26). These proportions related to * There is a strong case for using debt relief to encour- all least developed countries, not just African ones. age recipient governments to adopt a poverty-reduc- 2. By contrast, the United States was only one equal member tion goal. Governments judged to have demonstrated of the OEED (forerunner of the OECD) which oversaw the Marshall a strong commitment to poverty reduction should be Plan. The Colombo Plan had an element of self-administration. eligible for exceptional treatment in debt relief. But Africa has not enjoyed the same right to play a part in man- Governments actively hostile to poverty reduction agement of aid to the continent. should, as a consequence, be disbarred from debt relief. 3. There is a movement now to have "participatory" country * Provided that there is sufficient government commit- assistance strategies, with the World Bank having perhaps moved ment to make such arrangements meaningful, credi- furthest in this direction with the piloting of the Comprehensive tor governments and their aid agencies should encourage Development Framework. There is a real danger of swamping creation of special fiscal mechanisms for channeling government and some civil society organizations if each donor the "debt relief dividend" into expenditure programs engages in such participatory exercises on an individual basis. The Donor Countries Need To Do More, Too 123 ideal is for a government-led process involving all major donors, requiring fundamental shifts in the structure of production, can which is a generalization of the Sector Program approach. achieve this end. A more realistic conception is to focus on "win- 4. This state of affairs will change, at least in form, if the Policy ners" and "losers," with systems of compensation, or safety nets, Framework Paper is replaced with a poverty reduction strategy. as required. 5. African governments have generally left aid management to 7. The experience of import support was that donor attempts the donors, whereas they should take a more active stance on such to channel funds to particular uses resulted in cumbersome pro- issues (which of course requires that the donors give them the space cedures that weighed down government and donor bureaucracies to do so). One area to start this process would be for government and slowed procurement, with little or no discernible benefits (see to assume responsibility for evaluation, with some mechanism for White 1 999a). donor quality control. 8. Under both the original HIPC and in its enhanced form gov- 6. A currently fashionable notion is that adjustment should ernments are required to commit more resources to poverty reduc- "do no harm," but it is not clear how the process of adjustment, tion some time in advance of receiving additional debt relief. APPENDIX Selected Statistical Data Table A. 1 Poverty indices at PPP$/day, selected African countries PPP$1/day PPP$2/day Countries Year Headcount Poverty gap Headcount Poverty gap Botswana 1985-86 33.0 12.4 61.0 30.4 C6te d'lvoire 1988 17.7 4.3 54.8 20.4 Ethiopia 1981-82 46.0 12.4 89.0 42.7 Kenya 1992 50.2 22.2 78.1 44.4 Madagascar 1993 72.3 33.2 93.2 59.6 Niger 1992 61.5 22.2 92.0 51.8 Nigeria 1992-93 31.1 12.9 59.9 29.8 Rwanda 1983-85 45.7 11.3 88.7 42.9 Senegal 1991-92 54.0 25.5 79.6 47.2 South Africa 1993 23.7 6.6 50.2 22.5 Uganda 1989-90 69.3 29.1 92.2 56.6 Zambia 1993 84.6 53.8 98.1 73.4 Zimbabwe 1990-91 41.0 14.3 68.2 35.5 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999. Table A.2 Poverty headcounts based on national poverty lines Year National Urban Rural Benin 1995 33 Burkina Fasoa 1994-1995 56 13 65 Burundi 1990 36 Cameroon 1984 40 44 32 CAR 1993 61 33 77 Chad 1995-1996 64 63 67 C6te d'Ivoirea 1995 42 29 51 Djiboutia 1996 41 38 84 Ethiopia' 1995-1996 46 21 50 Gambiaa 1992 50 21 73 Ghana 1992 31 27 34 Guinea' 1994-1995 44 18 57 Guinea-Bissau 1991 49 24 61 Kenya 1992 42 29 46 Malawi 1990-91 54 (Table continued on next page) 124 Appendix: Selected Statistical Data 125 Table A.2 continued Year National Urban Rural Mali' 1994 55 8 64 Mauritaniaa 1995 39 18 56 Niger 1989-93 63 52 66 Nigeria 1985 43 32 50 Rwanda 1993 5 1 ... ... Senegal' 1991 33 16 40 Sierra Leone 1989 68 53 76 South Africaa 1993 44 40 86 Swaziland' 1994 63 36 70 Tanzaniaa 1993 42 20 51 Togo 1987-89 32 ... ... Uganda 1993 55 ... ... Zambia 1991 68 46 88 Zimbabwe 1990-91 26 ... ... ... Not available. a. Source data is from African Development Indicators (ADI); remaining data from World Development Indicators (WDI). Table A.3 Mortality indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa Infant mortality Under-five Life expectancy rate (per 1,000) mortality (per 1,000) at birth (years) 1970 1980 1997 1970 1980 1997 1980 1997 Angola 178 154 125 301 261 209 41 46 Benin 146 116 88 ... 214 149 48 53 Botswana 95 71 58 139 94 88 58 47 Burkina Faso 141 121 99 278 ... 169 44 44 Burundi 138 122 119 228 193 200 47 42 Cameroon 126 94 52 215 173 78 50 57 CAR 139 117 98 248 ... 169 46 45 Chad 171 123 100 252 235 182 42 49 Congo Dem. Rep. 131 112 92 245 210 148 49 51 Congo Rep. 101 89 90 160 125 145 50 48 C6te d'lvoire 135 108 87 240 170 140 49 47 Eritrea 91 62 ... 95 44 51 Ethiopia 158 155 107 239 213 175 42 43 Gabon 138 116 87 232 194 136 48 52 Gambia 185 159 78 319 216 110 40 53 Ghana 112 94 66 186 157 102 53 60 Guinea 181 185 120 345 299 182 40 46 Guinea-Bissau 185 169 130 316 290 220 39 44 Kenya 102 75 74 156 115 112 55 52 Lesotho 134 119 93 190 168 137 53 56 Madagascar 153 119 94 285 216 158 51 57 Malawi 193 169 133 330 265 224 44 43 Mali 204 184 118 391 ... 235 42 50 Mauritania 148 120 92 250 175 149 47 53 Niger 170 150 118 320 320 ... 42 47 Nigeria 139 99 77 201 196 122 46 54 Rwanda 142 128 124 210 ... 209 46 40 Senegal 135 117 70 279 190 110 45 52 Sierta Leone 197 190 170 363 336 286 35 37 South Africa 79 67 48 108 91 65 57 65 Tanzania 129 108 85 218 176 136 50 48 Uganda 109 116 99 185 180 162 48 42 Zambia 106 90 113 181 149 189 50 43 Zimbabwe 96 80 69 138 108 108 55 52 Source: World Bank, World Development Jndicators. 126 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table A.4 Nutrition and water access indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa Access to safe water Underweighta Stunteda 1996 1992-97 1992-97 Angola 32 35 ... Benin 72 29 25 Botswana 70 27 ... Burkina Faso ... 33 29 Burundi 58 38 ... Cameroon 41 ... ... CAR 23 23 28 Chad 24 39 40 Congo Dem. Rep. 34 45 Congo Rep. 24 45 C6te d'lvoire 72 24 24 Eritrea 7 44 38 Ethiopia 26 48 64 Gabon 67 ... ... Gambia 50 26 30 Ghana 65 27 26 Guinea 55 24 ... Guinea-Bissau 53 23 ... Kenya 45 23 34 Lesotho 62 16 44 Madagascar 16 34 50 Malawi 60 30 48 Mali 48 40 30 Mauritania 64 23 44 Niger 48 43 40 Nigeria 50 39 38 Rwanda .. 29 49 Senegal 50 22 23 Sierra Leone 34 ... ... South Africa 59 9 23 Tanzania 49 31 43 Uganda 42 26 38 Zambia 53 24 42 Zimbabwe 77 16 21 ... Not available. a. Percentage of children with weight less than two standard deviations below that of the reference population of that height. b. Percentage of children with height less than two standard deviations below that of the reference population of that age. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999. Appendix: Selected Statistical Data 127 Table A.5 Nutrition indicators for eight African countries Height for age Weightfor height Weigh.,for age Firstyear Secondyear Change Firstyear Secondyear Change Firstyear Secoadyear Change National Ghana (1988-93) 29.5 26.2 -3.3 8.0 12.0 4.0 1 30.8 29.6 -1.2 Madagascar (1992-97) 49.3 48.6 -0.7 5.7 7.8 2.0' 39.2 40.2 1.0 Mali (1987-95) 24.0 33.0 9.0 1 10.8 24.6 13.8 30.9 43.7 12.8 Senegal (1986-92) 23.0 22.1 -0.9 6.0 10.4 4.4 1 22.0 26.9 4.9 Tanzania (1991-96) 43.6 43.7 0.2 6.4 7.3 1.01 29.5 30.9 1.4 Uganda (1988-95) 43.2 38.7 -4.5 1 1.9 5.3 3.4 1 23.3 26.1 2.91 Zambia (1992-96) 40.0 42.6 2.5 1 5.2 4.2 -0.9 1 23.4 23.8 0.4 Zimbabwe (1988-94) 30.0 23.5 6.6 1 1.2 5.8 4.6 1 12.8 ]7.2 4.4 1 Rural Ghana (1988-93) 31.4 32.3 0.9 8.5 13.1 4.61 33.0 -33.6 0.7 Madagascar (1992-97) 50.6 49.5 -1.1 6.0 8.3 2.3 40.3 41.3 1.0 Mali (1987-95) 26.2 36.2 10.0 1 12.3 24.4 12.2 33.6 46.6 13.0' Senegal (1986-92) 26.5 32.7 6.3 7.1 13.4 6.4 1 25.9 33.0 7.1 Tanzania (1991-96) 44.9 46.1 1.3 6.4 7.3 0.9 30.4 .33.2 2.8 Uganda (1988-95) 45.2 40.7 -4.5 1 2.0 3.2 1.3 24.2 27.5 3.2 Zambia (1992-96) 46.5 48.9 2.4 5.0 4.9 -0.1 29.3 28.4 -0.9 Zimbabwe (1988-94) 34.3 25.0 -9.3 1 1.1 5.6 4.5 1 14.6 18.5 3.91 Urban Ghana (1988-93) 24.6 17.0 -7.6 7.3 9.1 1.8 25.2 19.5 -5.7 Madagascar (1992-97) 40.5 44.8 4.3 3.8 5.3 1.5 32.0 35.6 3.6 Mali (1987-95) 19.6 23.9 4.3 9.9 24.9 15.0 1 25.7 35.4 9.7 Senegal (1986-92) 17.5 15.2 -2.3 3.5 8.8 5.3 ' 15.3 16.5 1.2 Tanzania (1991-96) 38.0 32.6 -5.5 5.1 8.1 3.0 1 26.0 20.1 -5.9 Uganda (1988-95) 24.8 22.7 -2.1 O.6 1.4 0.7 1 13.4 15.3 2.0 Zambia (1992-96) 32.8 32.9 0.1 5.4 3.3 -2.1 20.9 16.7 -4.2 Zimbabwe (1988-94) 16.0 19.0 3.0 1.4 6.5 5.0 1 6.9 13.5 6.6 1 Note: Superscript '1" indicates significant at the 5 percent level. Source: Sahn, Stifel, and Younger (1999), tables 3 and 4. Table A.6 Level and change in poverty of asset index (and decomposition) First period Second period Change Growth Redistribution Residual Ghana (1988-93) 25.0 8.5 -16.4 -38.7 8.5 13.7 Kenya (1988-93) 24.9 23.2 -1.7 -2.8 5.5 -4.3 Madagascar (1992-97) 25.5 12.5 -13.0 -18.4 -13.0 18.4 Mali (1987-95) 23.0 16.0 -7.0 -43.0 16.0 20.0 Senegal (1986-92) 24.6 28.8 4.2 -1.9 4.2 1.9 Senegal (1992-97) 28.8 24.7 -4.1 -13.2 1.0 8.1 Tanzania (1991-96) 22.6 19.1 -3.5 -11.9 1.1 7.3 Uganda (1988-95) 26.8 24.4 -2.4 -9.3 7.5 -0.6 Zambia (1992-96) 24.9 18.2 -6.7 2.0 -11.7 3.0 Zimbabwe (1988-94) 23.3 30.1 6.8 8.1 -2.0 0.8 Source: Sahn, Stifel, and Younger (1999). 128 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table A.7 Net primary school enrollment rates by consumption quintile, region, and gender Rural areas Urban areas Poorest quintile Richest quintile Poorest quintile Richest quintile Year Countries Male Female Male Female All Male Female Male Female All All 1994-95 Burkina Faso 22 12 45 42 27 58 48 87 74 69 33 1993 CAR 39 19 58 38 37 50 42 78 74 65 48 1995 C6te d'Ivoire 20 13 45 31 30 43 35 75 42 50 38 1996 Djibouti 64 32 87 73 64 59 48 82 74 68 68 1995-96 Ethiopia 14 8 23 13 13 62 56 75 74 67 21 1992 Gambia 13 6 38 28 19 42 26 53 68 49 31 1997 Ghana 60 53 71 70 61 60 65 71 76 6(8 63 1994-95 Guinea 21 5 31 24 18 46 29 77 65 56 29 1994 Kenya 67 64 80 81 75 71 76 98 91 84 76 1993-94 Madagascar 10 13 44 41 26 38 37 66 70 57 31 1994 Mali 24 9 38 23 21 62 51 64 63 57 23 1995 Mauritania 25 18 52 38 34 48 51 71 58 58 44 1995 Niger 14 8 20 9 15 42 29 65 60 50 21 1992 Nigeria 48 47 71 62 51 56 55 74 73 63 56 1994-95 Senegal 21 22 32 25 22 47 50 84 82 63 37 1996 Zambia 54 50 68 72 60 69 72 84 83 78 67 Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators (1998-99). Table A.8 Net primary school enrollment rates by consumption quintile, region, and gender Rural areas Urban areas Poorest quintile Richest quintile Poorest quintile Richest quintile Year Countries Male Female Male Female All Male Female Male Female All All 1994/95 Burkina Faso 22 12 45 42 27 58 48 87 74 69 33 1993 CAR 39 19 58 38 37 50 42 78 74 65 48 1995 C6te d'Ivoire 20 13 45 31 30 43 35 75 42 50 38 1996 Djibouti 64 32 87 73 64 59 48 82 74 68 68 1995/96 Ethiopia 14 8 23 13 13 62 56 75 74 67 21 1992 Gambia 13 6 38 28 19 42 26 53 68 49 31 1997 Ghana 60 53 71 70 61 60 65 71 76 68 63 1994/95 Guinea 21 5 31 24 18 46 29 77 65 56 29 1994 Kenya 67 64 80 81 75 71 76 98 91 84 76 1993/94 Madagascar 10 13 44 41 26 38 37 66 70 57 31 1994 Mali 24 9 38 23 21 62 51 64 63 57 23 1995 Mauritania 25 18 52 38 34 48 51 71 58 58 44 1995 Niger 14 8 20 9 15 42 29 65 60 50 21 1992 Nigeria 48 47 71 62 51 56 55 74 73 63 56 1994/95 Senegal 21 22 32 25 22 47 50 84 82 63 37 1996 Zambia 54 50 68 72 60 69 72 84 83 78 67 Source: World Bank, African Developmentlndicators (1998-99). Appendix: Selected Statistical Data 129 Table A.9 Net secondary school enrollment rates by consumption quintile and region Rural areas Urban areas National Lowest Upper Lowest Upper Year Countries quintile quintile All quintile quintile All All 1994-95 Burkina Faso 2 14 6 18 57 36 12 1993 Central African Republic 21 22 23 42 62 52 36 1995 C6te d'lvoire 3 11 9 20 38 28 18 1996 Djibouti 3 9 7 10 52 31 30 1995-96 Ethiopia 0 1 1 20 34 30 6 1992 Gambia 3 11 8 19 26 25 16 1997 Ghana 32 40 35 40 49 45 38 1994-95 Guinea 1 3 3 16 34 25 12 1994 Kenya 3 16 9 15 44 27 11 1993-94 Madagascar 1 23 8 15 64 41 15 1994 Mali 2 8 4 12 23 18 5 1995 Mauritania 1 11 6 17 33 26 15 1995 Niger 1 3 3 13 29 24 7 1992 Nigeria 26 46 38 41 61 58 46 1994-95 Senegal 1 6 3 11 52 25 13 1996 Zambia 8 17 12 23 46 33 20 Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators (1998-99). Table A.10 Benefit incidence of public spending on health in selected countries Quintile shares of Total subsidy as percentage ofper Primary facilities Hospital outpatient4 Hospital inpatient All health capita expenditure Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Poorest Richest Africa C6te d'lvoire (1995) 14 22 8 39 ... ... 11 32 2.0 1.3 Ghana (1992) 10 31 13 35 11 32 12 33 3.5 2.3 Guinea (1994) 10 36 1 55 ... ... 4 48 ... .. Kenya (1992)b 22 14 13 26 ... ... 14 24 6.0 1.1 Madagascar (1993) 10 29 14 30 ... ... 12 30 4.5 0.5 Tanzania (1992/93) 18 21 11 37 20 36 17 29 ... ... SouthAfrica (1994) 18 10 15 17 ... ... 16 17 28.2 1.5 ... Not available. a. Hospital subsidies combine inpatient and outpatient spending in C6te d'lvoire, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa. b. Rural only. Source: Castro-Leal and others (1999). 130 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table A. 11 Primary enrollments and literacy Primary GER Countr-/ 1985 1995 Adult literacy Somalia 11.5 8.7 ... Niger 25.5 29.0 13.6 Liberia 36.9 33.4 ... Mali 22.7 34.2 31.0 Ethiopia 37.4 37.5 35.5 Djibouti 40.0 38.5 46.3 Burkina Faso 27.0 39.5 19.2 Guinea 34.5 48.4 35.9 Burundi 52.5 50.6 35.4 Sudan 50.0 51.8 46.1 Sierra Leone 62.7 53.0 31.4 Eritrea ... 56.6 ... Chad 43.5 57.7 48.1 Central African Republic 75.0 58.9 60.0 Mozambique 87.3 60.3 40.1 Senegal 56.4 64.8 33.1 Tanzania 74.9 67.0 67.8 Guinea-Bissau 63.4 67.9 54.9 C6te d'lvoire 71.6 68.7 40.2 Democratic Rep. ofCongo 86.5 71.7 77.3 Benin 67.7 72.0 37.0 Madagascar 103.6 72.5 ... Uganda 73.0 73.0 61.8 Comoros 83.7 74.4 57.3 Ghana 75.7 76.1 64.5 Angola 106.3 76.7 ... Gambia 68.1 77.0 38.6 Mauritania 48.3 78.5 37.7 Kenya 98.8 85.2 ... Nigeria 95.8 88.0 57.1 Cameroon ... 88.0 ... Zambia 104.2 89.3 78.2 Seychelles ... 96.0 79.0 Rwanda 62.9 96.5 ... Lesotho 110.1 99.8 71.4 Mauritius 109.5 106.6 82.9 Botswana 105.2 112.2 69.8 Democratic Republic of Congo 147.2 113.9 74.9 Zimbabwe 135.6 115.5 85.1 South Africa 91.8 116.7 81.8 Togo 92.7 118.5 .. Swaziland 101.9 125.6 76.7 Namibia 132.5 132.7 ... Malawi 59.9 135.0 56.4 Cape Verde 117.0 135.0 71.6 Gabon ... 142.0b 48.0 ... Not available. a. Data are not available for Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. b.1993-95 average. Sources: UNESCO Yearbook, 1998; World Development Indicators 1998. Appendix: Selected Statistical Data 131 Table A.12 Net primary enrollments by expenditure quintiles, urban/rural, and gendera (percentages) country expenditure quintiles 1 2 3 4 5 T M F T M F T M F T M F T M F Burkina urban 53 58 48 66 69 62 73 78 68 79 85 74 80 87 74 Faso rural 17 22 12 20 27 12 24 31 15 33 39 26 44 45 42 Central urban 46 50 42 65 70 59 69 71 66 73 74 71 76 78 74 African Rep. rural 29 39 19 35 42 27 37 46 27 40 48 33 48 58 38 Bte d'lvoire urban 40 43 35 41 43 40 50 51 50 69 78 60 53 75 42 rural 17 20 13 33 36 30 30 24 37 34 38 25 39 45 31 Djibouti urban 54 59 48 70 74 65 70 77 64 75 78 71 79 82 74 rural 48 64 32 65 79 52 74 82 62 65 78 53 82 87 73 Ethiopia urban 59 62 56 66 66 67 68 66 70 71 74 69 74 75 74 rural 11 14 8 12 15 9 14 17 10 14 18 10 18 23 13 Gambia urban 34 42 26 49 58 41 54 58 41 49 45 52 60 53 68 rural 9 13 6 15 18 11 16 19 14 25 30 19 33 38 28 Ghana urban 62 60 65 67 71 63 71 73 68 70 72 68 73 71 76 rural 57 60 53 55 56 54 62 60 63 66 67 65 71 71 70 Guinea urban 38 46 29 55 63 47 57 69 46 66 74 58 71 77 65 rural 13 21 5 14 17 9 15 18 12 22 34 12 28 31 24 Kenya urban 73 71 76 85 82 90 83 88 80 92 94 89 95 98 91 rural 66 67 64 73 75 72 78 79 78 80 82 78 80 80 81 Madagascar urban 38 38 37 51 50 53 68 69 67 68 69 67 68 66 70 rural 12 10 13 21 22 19 28 26 31 36 31 42 43 44 41 Mali urban 57 62 51 55 57 53 51 50 52 58 61 55 64 64 63 rural 17 24 9 13 14 11 20 26 14 21 28 13 31 38 23 Mauritania urban 49 48 51 59 55 62 62 65 59 57 62 52 65 71 58 rural 22 25 18 33 32 35 36 35 37 39 42 35 46 52 38 Niger urban 36 42 29 45 50 42 55 59 50 54 57 50 63 65 60 rural 11 14 8 15 22 8 19 26 14 14 17 12 14 20 9 Nigeria urban 55 56 55 63 62 65 69 71 66 69 72 67 74 74 73 rural 48 48 47 50 51 49 55 54 56 58 59 56 67 71 62 Senegal urban 49 47 50 60 64 57 55 60 51 72 76 68 83 84 82 rural 21 21 22 18 20 17 21 27 15 23 27 19 28 32 25 Sierra Leone urban 62 65 59 55 61 50 77 78 75 68 71 65 75 81 66 rural 63 66 59 66 70 61 66 67 64 29 34 23 23 24 22 Zambia urban 70 69 72 78 81 76 80 82 78 82 83 82 83 84 83 rural 52 54 50 58 55 60 62 62 62 65 64 65 70 68 72 a. The data are for various years from 1989/90 to 1997, the majority of which are for 1992-96. Source. Afiican Development Indicators, 1998/99. tables 15-1 to 15-22. 132 AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES Table A.13 1996 gender gaps in primary gross enrollment ratios (GER), 1996 Gender gap Gendergap Low primary (female-male Moderate primary (female-male High primary Gender gap GER countries enrollment) GER countries enrollment) GER countries (female-male enrollment) Chad -40.8 Benin -40.7 Togo -40.1 Guinea -29.9 Guinea-Bissau -37.2 Malawi -12.9 Central African Rep. -25.1 Congo, Dem. Rep. -26.2 Congo, Rep -10.8 Ethiopia -23.3 C6te d'lvoire -21.2 Swaziland -6.5 Mozambique -20.4 Gambia -20.3 Zimbabwe -3.5 Sierra Leone -19.1 Nigeria -20.2 Rwanda -2.6 Burkina Faso -16.9 Uganda -13.0 South Africa -2.1 Mali -16.2 Ghana -12.8 Mauritius -0.9 Niger -14.0 Comoros -10.8 Cape Verde +0.5 Senegal -13.8 Mauritania -9.6 Botswana +lI Djibouti -12 Cameroon -8.6 Namibia +1.8 Liberia -11.9 Angola -5.9 Lesorho +10.6 Eritrea -10.6 Zambia -5.7 Seychelles ... Burundi -9.4 Madagascar -2.3 Gabon Sudan -9.1 Tanzania -1.2 Somalia -5.3 Kenya 0 ... Not available. Sources: UNESCO Yearbook (1998); UNDP (1998). R#erences and Bibliography Background Papers Luckham, Robin, Ismail Ahmed, and Robert Muggah. 1999. "The Impact of Conflict on Poverty." Background paper 9. Appiah, Kweku. 1999. "Poverty and Education in Sub-Saharan McCulloch,Neil,andBobBaulch. 1999. "Poverty, Inequality, and Africa." Background paper 10. Growth in Zambia." Background paper 3a. Baulch, Bob, and Ursula Grant. 1999. 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A frican Poverty at the Millennium explores the complex natuire of poverty in the region, identifies its political and social causes, and assesses the impact of recent economic growth on the welfare of poor people. To reduce povertv permanently, it calls for realistic, home-grown policy initiatives, government commitment to the effort, a realignment of the donor community's role, and the development of institutional structures, such as poverty monitoring systems, that can hold governments accountable. The authors conclude, "There is no 'big idea' that is going to solve Africa's poverty problem.... each country's strategy needs to be rooted in the country-specific causes of poverty and .. . reach those most in need." STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRICA (SPA): The SPA has provided a framework for the donor community to help African countries recover from a deep economic crisis and achieve significant improvements in economic performance. The partnership coordinates resources to support African economic growth and development and works to improve donor policies and practices for greater aid effectiveness. Poverty reduction is now at the core of the SPA program of support. The World Bank Regional Vice President for Africa chairs the SPA. The donors and supporting institutions are: The World Bank International Monetary Fund African Development Bank European Commission United Nations Development Program Economic Commission for Africa Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee The governments of: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Telephone: 202-477-1234 Facsimile: 202-477-6391 E-mail: feedback@worldbank.org ISBN: 0-8213-4867-1