C omm GAP 64986 D isCussion P APers Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP) Communication for Governance and Accountability Program Global Norms: Creation, I nnovative Sol uti ons for Gove rna nc e Diffusion, and Limits Johanna Martinsson August 2011 Innovative Solutions for G overnAnCe GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS ©2011 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank Communication for Governance & Accountability Program (CommGAP) External Affairs 1818 H Street NW, MSN U11-1102 Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-458-7955 Fax: 202-522-2654 Internet: www.worldbank.org/commgap E-mail: commgap@worldbank.org All rights reserved The �ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. 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GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS Table of Contents The Emergence of Norms for Global Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Global Norms and Global Agenda Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Legal Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Multistakeholder Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Global Policy Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Transnational Advocacy by Nonstate Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Lessons Learned: Global Norms and Global Agenda Setting . . 13 Regional and Domestic Agenda Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Transparency International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Lessons Learned: Regional and Domestic Agenda Setting . . . . 17 Implementation Challenges and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Key Challenges to Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Using Political Economy Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Understanding the Complexity of Policy Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Building Effective Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Mobilizing Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS Global Norms: Creation, Diffusion, and Limits Johanna Martinsson Norms in development are typically established at The Emergence of Norms for the global level to solve complex development chal- lenges on the ground. These norms are standards of Global Advocacy expected behavior about how things ought to be Never doubt that a small group of thought- conducted and are deemed crucial for societies to ful, committed citizens can change the flourish. Global norms, however, often fail to suc- world. Indeed, that is the only thing that cessfully diffuse to local contexts. I intend to argue ever has. – Margaret Mead (1901–78) in this report that many initiatives are effective in putting norms on the global agenda, but few of Social change has always started with a person these norms lead to transformational change on the (or a small group of committed people) who shares ground because of cultural and political economy a common belief about an issue she or he wants to challenges that were not considered in the norm pursue to affect normative change. Such individu- formation or in the advocacy campaign process. als, or “norm entrepreneurs,� play a critical role in Nonetheless, there are lessons to consider that the three stages of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) could lead to more successful outcomes. “norm life cycle�: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization. Those authors point out that, at This report explores the journey of norms in each stage, change is “characterized by different ac- development—from emergence to implementa- tors, motives, and mechanisms of influence� (p. tion. Speci�cally, it seeks to identify effective strate- 895). In the campaign process, norm entrepreneurs gies for norms to take root and make part of the speci�cally “identify a problem, specify a cause, and global and domestic agendas and limits. It also propose a solution, all with an eye toward produc- identi�es challenges to the implementation of ing procedural, substantive, and normative change norms and some possible strategies and tools to in their area of concern� (Keck and Sikkink 1998, overcome these challenges. The report draws from 8). Persuasion is at the heart of this process, as the various global policy advocacy campaigns with a aim is to persuade leaders and build public support particular focus on governance; it also includes no- about a particular norm. To this effect, common ad- table historic campaigns, such as Britain’s antislav- vocacy tools include (1) using media, (2) lobbying, ery campaign. (3) mobilizing grassroots, (4) building coalitions, 1 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS and (5) using the legal system (Accenture Founda- tional Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL “About tion 2009). These tools have been used for hun- Us� n.d.). Spearheaded by Jody Williams, a teacher dreds of years, dating back to historic campaigns and aid worker, the campaign was awarded a Nobel such as Britain’s antislavery campaign and the Peace Prize in 1997 for its efforts to ban landmines. women’s suffrage movement that inspired many The campaign later led to the signing of the Mine subsequent campaigns (including the antiapartheid Ban Treaty. Transparency International (TI) is an- campaign in South Africa and the civil rights other example of a one-person idea that evolved movement in the United States). into a global campaign. Throughout his career in international development, TI founder Peter Eigen Thomas Clarkson was the main �gure and had witnessed �rsthand the effects of corruption, norm entrepreneur behind Britain’s antislavery bribery, and embezzlement. Devoted to the cause, campaign, the most successful reform movement in Eigen formed a global coalition to �ght corruption in the 19th century. The norms on the abolishment of 1993 (Eigen 2003). Another example is the Global slavery emerged when Clarkson learned the horri�c Campaign for Education, founded by four major facts about slave trade while conducting research at nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 1999, Cambridge University for an essay contest titled “Is which advocates for education for all and holds gov- It Lawful to Make Slaves of Others against Their ernments accountable for promises made in extend- Will?� (Economist 2007). To form a nationwide an- ing education (Gaventa and Mayo 2009). tislavery movement and change norms about the slave trade, Clarkson gathered evidence and travel- These are just a few examples of norms that ed throughout the country to promote the cause emerged through a person or a small group of peo- and to form coalitions that resulted in two national ple—that is, norm entrepreneurs. For a norm to be- petition campaigns. (Old�eld 2009) come internationally recognized and �nd a place on the global agenda, however, it must �rst become ac- It is interesting that norms about women’s rights cepted by states. emerged with women’s involvement in the anti- slavery movement in the United Kingdom and, in the United States, when women where refused Global Norms and Global seats at the World Anti-Slavery Conference in 1840. The resentment motivated two women, Lu- Agenda Setting cretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, to start an Global norms are de�ned as “the shared expecta- international movement. They organized the very tions or standards of appropriate behavior accepted �rst convention in 1848, composed the Seneca by states and intergovernmental organizations that Falls Declaration of Sentiments (modeled after the can be applied to states, intergovernmental organi- Declaration of Independence), and demanded the zations, and/or nonstate actors of various kinds� same rights possessed by men—including the right (Khagram, Rikker, and Sikkink 2002, 14). In gen- to vote. The campaign was effective in connecting eral, global norms are created in direct response to a norms on women’s rights to the basic values of a crisis, or new measures are built on existing norms. democratic state. (Keck and Sikkink 1998) International organizations, professional associa- tions, and transnational advocacy coalitions are The wave of global changes in the 1990s, in- usually leading the efforts to author, codify, and val- cluding technological advancements and a growing idate global norms (Khagram 2004). international civil society, contributed to a rapid increase and diversity of norms to tackle global This section of the report will explore four pos- challenges through more sophisticated strategies sible routes to how norms are established in the in- and tactics. A noteworthy example is the Interna- ternational community: 2 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS 1. Legal norm setting—International organiza- critical states to adopt the landmines ban were both tions and governments form norms through producers and users of landmines. Also, some states conventions, declarations, treaties, and so were more influential than others (such as South forth. Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela), 2. Multistakeholder initiatives—Stakeholders from and that had a signi�cant impact on other states. government, the private sector, international Moreover, some norms resonate and diffuse more organizations, and civil society form norms effectively than others. According to Keck and through inclusive and deliberative processes. Sikkink (1998), norms that entail equality and bod- 3. Global policy networks—State and nonstate ily harm to “innocent groups� (such as slavery and actors jointly bring new issues and ideas into women’s rights) have a greater impact than other public discourse and complement policy mak- types of norms. ing and international cooperation. 4. Transnational advocacy coalitions—Nonstate Global norms are generally announced by actors advocate norms through transnational states and members of the international community campaigns and monitor implementation. when signing an agreement such as a treaty, a con- vention, a declaration, or a communiqué. By sign- In the literature reviewed for this report, there ing a convention, states are encouraged by fellow is a tendency to refer to some of these initiatives in- members to enforce the norm in their respective terchangeably, especially multistakeholder initia- countries. Peters, Koechlin, and Zinkernagel (2009) tives and global policy networks; I argue that there point out, however, that international legal norm is a distinction and will clarify that in the following setting does not exactly correspond to democratic sections. Table 1 provides a summary of the norm- ideals because many of the states participating are setting initiatives and how they differ. nondemocratic, and some states have limited bar- gaining power. Furthermore, it is not representative because NGOs are excluded from voting. Besides, a Legal Route convention is not legally binding until it has been In the second stage of the norm life cycle, Finne- rati�ed. Thus, the validity of the international legal more and Sikkink (1998) explain that “norm lead- norm setting is more informal in nature. Signing a ers attempt to socialize other states to become norm convention does not guarantee enforcement be- followers� (p. 895), and a “norm cascade� occurs cause domestic cultural and political economy con- when a critical mass of states has adopted a norm. ditions often hinder global norms from being im- As an example, they refer to the International plemented into law. On rati�cation, however, Campaign to Ban Landmines. In early 1997, some consequences may follow if compliance fails—con- 60 states were supporting a total ban of landmines; sequences in the form of sanctions and other means a norm cascade occurred later that year when some of pressure from the international community. 124 states endorsed the landmines treaty. There are several examples of predominant While reasons to adopt a norm may differ, global legal frameworks focusing on changing norms Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norm cascade is on corruption. facilitated by a mixture of factors, such as “pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international le- The United Nations Convention against Corruption gitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem� (p. 895). Depending on The United Nations Convention against Corrup- the issue, the authors also suggest that some states tion (UNCAC), a global initiative enforced in are more critical than others in adopting norms. For 2005, aims to curb corruption through collective example, a state is considered critical if the norm it action. It calls for better transparency and ac- adopts directly affects it. In the landmines case, the countability in countries through private sector 3 Table 1. Global Norm-Setting Initiatives Transnational Advocacy by Attiributes Legal Route Multistakeholder Initiatives Global Policy Networks Nonstate Actors Founders • International organiza- • International organizations(s) • International organizations • A person, a civil society organi- tion(s) and government(s) coming to- and/or individual organiza- zation, or a group of civil society gether or individual organizations tions/associations organizations and associations Membership • Formal membership, in- • Formal memberships, including • Voluntary membership, open • Primarily nonstate actors (civil cluding states signing an members from governments, in- to experts in a specific policy society organizations, grassroots international agreement ternational organizations, the pri- area organizations, social movements) vate sector, and civil society or- • Broad membership provides a • Membership can be limited to ganizations more complete picture of a par- civil society organizations • Not necessarily experts on the ticular policy issue • May have ad hoc partnerships subject matter with other actors • Strict criteria and formal selec- tion process for representatives Purpose • International legal norm- • Fill governance gaps in areas • Seek to complement policy • Seek to influence social change setting, with the aim for where other governance forms making through research, shar- by bringing new ideas and norms states to implement new are insufficient ing of knowlegde, and training into global discussion norms into law • Seek solutions to problems • Aim to influence policy makers • Promote global norms and im- through an inclusive and deliber- and keep a policy issue on the plement them 4 ative approach global agenda • Pressure target actors to adopt • Develop, implement, and moni- • Help develop, negotiate, and new policies tor norms implement norms Characteristics • Nonresponsive; NGOs • Multisectoral initiatives among • Loose coalitions among gov- • Composed primarily of nonstate excluded from voting governments, the private sector, ernment, international organi- actors • Issue-specific, formal, civil society organizations, and zations, the private sector, and • Issue-specific, clear objectives, and long-term sometimes international organi- civil society funded, formal or informal, flexi- • Process-oriented and de- zations • Policy area–specific, clear ob- ble strategies, and often informal liberative, usually long • Issue-specific, formal, purpose- jectives, formal or informal, structure and difficult negotiations driven, short- or long-term, clear funded or unfunded • Nonstate actors working togeth- as states are dealing with mandate and objectives, and • Characterized as dynamic, flu- er across borders to achieve a GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS various contextual chal- clear governance and funding id, interdependent, and com- common goal through intense lenges structure plementary exchange of information and • Process-oriented, inclusive, and strategies deliberative approach to norm setting and implementation Key functions • Advocacy, relationship- • Dialogue and forum • Advocacy, learning, collabora- • Advocacy, persuasion, sharing of building, negotiations, • Advocacy, learning, relationship- tion, innovation, knowledge- information and strategies dialogue, consensus building, communication, negoti- sharing, training, and coordi- among members building ation, consensus-building nation Source: Author’s compilation. GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS regulation and for inclusive participation by citizens however, has been to advance its agenda beyond a and civil society in accountability processes. UN- technocratic audience. Hence, the initiative has re- CAC includes a comprehensive set of standards vamped its efforts to increase awareness about asset and measures comprising norms on criminalization recovery and turn political will into progress in im- of corruption offenses, such as bribery and money plementing �nancial reforms to eliminate asset laundering. To date, there are 140 signatories to the thefts. Recent advocacy efforts focus on building re- convention, and 146 countries are considered “par- lationships with multiple stakeholders and encour- ties.� The Conference of the States Parties to the aging them to play a key role in asset recovery, lever- United Nations Convention against Corruption was aging high-pro�le events, engaging with the media, formed to strengthen cooperation between states and enlisting experts as spokespeople to communi- parties and to promote and review implementation. cate core messages about the important role asset re- (UNODC 2010) Furthermore, the United Nations covery plays in the �ght against corruption. (APCO Of�ce of Drugs and Crime coordinates yearly global Worldwide 2010) campaigns to raise awareness about UNCAC and corruption. TI and other international civil society The Organisation for Economic Co-operation organizations also play a crucial role in raising and Development’s Convention on Combating awareness and monitoring the initiative. Bribery of Foreign Public Of�cials in International Business Transactions Nevertheless, it took several years to put cor- ruption on the global agenda, including systematic The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and efforts �rst at the technical level and later at the po- Development (OECD) Convention on Combating litical level. As a result of the complexity of corrup- Bribery of Foreign Public Of�cials in International tion, governments were dealing with various con- Business Transactions is the only legal instrument in textual challenges. Thus, the norm-setting process the world focusing directly on foreign bribery. Speci�- took long and dif�cult negotiations. (UNODC cally, the convention “establishes legally binding 2003) According to TI (2006), the level of rati�ca- standards to criminalize bribery of foreign public of�- tions to UNCAC is low because of (1) the limited cials in international business transactions and pro- endorsement by the Group of Eight countries (that vides for a host of related measures that make this ef- TI suggests sends a negative message to other coun- fective� (OECD “OECD Convention� n.d.). Since the tries), (2) the broadness of the convention (that makes convention was enforced in 1999, it has been adopt- implementation challenging), and (3) the curious ed by 38 member- and nonmember-countries (OECD lack of governments’ awareness that they have not “OECD Anti-Bribery� n.d.). Each country is respon- fully completed the rati�cation process. sible for raising awareness of the convention and for implementing standards, monitored by an OECD The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative working group that includes representatives from all member-states to the convention (OECD “OECD Although not a legal framework, the StAR Ini- Convention� n.d.). tiative was established speci�cally to address one of UNCAC’s main issues: stolen assets. StAR, a joint To raise awareness at a global level, OECD initiative by the United Nations Of�ce of Drugs launched a three-year initiative in 2009 to (1) “raise and Crime and the World Bank, was launched in awareness of foreign bribery as a crime,� (2) “illus- 2007 and endorsed by the Group of 20 in 2009 trate the negative impact of foreign bribery,� and (APCO Worldwide 2010). It speci�cally “supports (3) “increase interest on anti-bribery measures for international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt every country� (OECD 2011). Advocacy activities funds� (StAR n.d.). The initiative’s main challenge, thus far include a global media campaign, a study 5 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS on the impact of foreign bribery, and collaboration these processes free to reimagine global problems, with the academy on integrating the issue into liberated from the need to squeeze ideas into regula- course materials (OECD 2011). tory frames� (p. 235). He also suggests that “legiti- macy of global deliberation often rests on credible Multistakeholder Initiatives claims to represent opinions and interest of state and nonstate actors on an ongoing basis, and on Multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) establish norms high standards of ‘epistemic-deliberative’ qualities in the international community through inclusive, of transparency and participatory procedures� (p. deliberative processes that involve a broad set of 234). In terms of negotiating new norms, Dubash stakeholders from government, international organ- emphasizes the importance of “logic of arguing,� in izations, the private sector, and civil society. The which norms “emerge through interaction between aim of these initiatives is to achieve collective solu- strategic action and shifts in perceptions and iden- tions to problems facing stakeholders individually tities� (p. 223). To have an impact, however, norms or as a group through a comprehensive approach established through these processes must �rst be- (Koechlin and Calland 2009). Those authors de- come socialized and widely accepted among global scribe MSIs as process-oriented initiatives, acting actors and, speci�cally, by states. “as medium of dialogue, con�dence-building, ex- change and…‘non-manipulative persuasion’ through To illustrate how MSIs work in practice, a few learning, communication and argumentation across examples follow. sectors, actors and interests� (p. 90). They identify �ve functions of MSIs: dialogue/forum, institution The World Commission on Dams building, rule setting, rule implementation, and rule monitoring. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) is often referred to as one of the very �rst MSIs. In the In terms of legitimacy and effectiveness, 1990s, the influence that international �nancial in- Koechlin and Calland (2009) question the main stitutions—and particularly the World Bank—had driver’s—usually a country or an international or- on dams became a source of public protest (Dubash ganization(s)—influence on the roles and responsi- 2009). Khagram (2004) explains that forceful efforts bilities assigned to the different stakeholders. Be- from critics and transnational antidam networks cause stakeholders in these initiatives come from and coalitions inspired the World Bank to reduce different sectors, their status may carry different its involvement in large dam projects and to reform weight. Consequently, voices of all stakeholders its policies and practices on issues such as resettle- may not be heard or considered. Moreover, since ment, environmental assessment, indigenous people, participation is voluntary, what are the motives for and information disclosure. Until that point, the joining the process? The selection of representatives World Bank had failed to conduct any evaluation is a major challenge for MSIs. It includes “managing measures on the impact of large dam constructions. the politics of inclusion and exclusion; juggling As a result, the WCD was established in 1998 to multiple criteria for judging credible representa- evaluate the effectiveness of all large dam projects tion, such as interest position, geography, and gen- around the world and to formulate new interna- der; and limiting ‘constituency drift’ over time� tionally accepted norms around the decision making (Dubash 2009, 234). “in the planning, design, construction, monitoring, operation and decommissioning of dams related to While critics argue that deliberative processes the sustainable development and management of have little impact because legitimate representation water and energy resources� (Khagram 2004, 204). at the global level may be impossible, Dubash points out that lack of authority and legitimacy could be The WCD comprised 12 commissioners repre- seen as a strength in that “it leaves participants in senting diverse viewpoints on large dam building, in- 6 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS cluding representatives and critics from NGOs and holder initiatives between governments, the private social movements, supported by a consultative forum sector, and civil society organizations to oversee the of some 60 stakeholders and a professional secretariat. implementation and monitoring of the EITI process The initiative included a two-year process of research (EITI 2010b). The initiative also promotes a culture and deliberation that incorporated public hearings, of transparency that involves stimulating public de- regional consultations, studies, surveys, and feedback bate on natural resources and how revenues are from the general public. These activities and the spent, empowering civil society, and building trust composition of a diverse commission were all success- among stakeholders. Currently, about 30 countries ful measures that led to a comprehensive framework are intending to implement the EITI, and 11 coun- for the decision-making process around dams. It tries have attained “compliant status� (EITI 2009b). was unanimously agreed by the commission. A core It should be noted that more than half of those 11 recommendation in the �nal report stated that peo- countries attained this status in early 2011. To ple directly affected by the construction of large achieve compliant status, countries must go through dams should be considered stakeholders and be in- a rigorous two-year validation process, after which cluded in the decision-making process around the they are revalidated every �ve years (EITI 2009c). project. (Dubash 2009) Koechlin and Calland (2009) address several A key factor in the success of the WCD was its success factors and challenges of the EITI. First of ability to reframe the issue of large dam construction all, the initiative has been successful in setting a from a technocratic approach to that of a human global standard to regulate in an area that has been rights issue by demonstrating the impact of big dams weak in many countries. Partnerships formed with on people living in those areas. However, while the NGOs have played a crucial role in raising WCD had an appropriate selection process with awareness and building support for the initiative. In representatives in place and internal procedures for terms of challenges, it’s been dif�cult reaching con- dialogue and consensus, it became a signi�cant sensus among a diverse set of stakeholders and iden- challenge in practice. Full participation, for exam- tifying a transparent process by which representa- ple, was limited by language barriers; and there tives are selected—speci�cally, the selection and/or were no mechanisms to manage public submissions. exclusion of civil society organizations. Another (Dubash 2009) concern involves the implementation of the EITI because it is driven by the international community. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative The International Aid Transparency Initiative The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)1 was launched in 2002 by then U.K. Prime The International Aid Transparency Initiative was Minister Tony Blair as a solution to combat the lack launched in 2009 to bring donors, recipient coun- of transparency and accountability in government tries, and civil society together in making informa- revenues from the oil, gas, and mining industries tion about aid more accessible to the public so that (“The Latest� 2004). The term “resource curse� is everyone could better understand and track how often used because research has shown a strong cor- aid money is being spent. At the launch, it was de- relation between a country’s natural resource wealth clared that all donors should “publicly disclose reg- and its levels of poverty (EITI 2009c). The goal of ular, detailed and timely information on volume, the EITI is to reverse these trends using a set of prin- allocation and, when available, results of develop- ciples agreed to at a multistakeholder workshop in ment expenditure to enable more accurate budget, 2003. The principles include two fundamental mea- accounting and audit by developing countries�; sures: (1) nations adhering to the EITI must publish “support information systems for managing aid�; payments received from the extractive industries; and “provide full and timely information on annual and (2) member-states should develop multistake- commitments and actual disbursements� (IATI 2008). 7 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS In 2009 and 2010, the initiative has set up its draw and let other independent initiatives take governance structure and has held regional multi- over the leadership role. However, global networks stakeholder consultations. The aim has been to with broad memberships require strong leadership. launch a new set of international standards in 2011, As Witte, Benner, and Reinicke (2003) point out, at which point the initiative will dissolve and trans- “networks do not offer a free lunch. They are com- fer its activities to other organizations. In signing up plex political animals that require much political to the transparency initiative, donors commit to skill and leadership to be successful and sustainable participate in the process of developing new norms in the long term� (p. 4). Accountability is another on aid and to implement these norms within the issue that needs to be addressed: to whom exactly timetable set by members (IATI 2010). are global policy networks accountable? Benner, Reinicke, and Witte (2004) point out that “net- Global Policy Networks works as diffuse, complex and weakly institutional- ized collaborative systems are neither directly ac- Global policy networks contribute to global norm countable to an electoral base nor do they exhibit formation and agenda setting by bringing new clear principal-agent relationships� (p. 198). They issues into public discourse. Policy networks are de- identify �ve types of accountability: professional ac- �ned as “loose alliances of government agencies, in- countability, public reputational accountability, ternational organizations, corporations and elements market accountability, �scal and �nancial account- of civil society such as NGOs, professional associa- ability, and legal accountability. The authors sugg- tions, or religious groups that join together to est that reputational accountability is particularly achieve what none can accomplish on its own� important to ensure accountability in and of the (Reinicke 1999, 44). The broad membership of pol- networks, and “naming and shaming� is an effective icy networks allows for a wealth of information and strategy in this regard. diverse perspectives, including those from previously unheard groups. The strength of networks rests in While global policy networks complement the their ability to innovate, create, share, and bridge policy-making process, they also face the issue of le- knowledge and to seek synergies through collabora- gitimacy. From an outside perspective, they may ap- tion with multiple actors (Selvood and Weyrauch pear legitimate through democratic practices and 2007). leadership. However, turmoil often exists within Global policy networks emerged in the early networks if clear direction and proper procedures are 1990s to help policy makers solve complex problems lacking. Furthermore, a persistent criticism is that in a new and changing environment, especially with networks operate through a top-down approach or technological developments and issues cutting across that Western governments and major international multiple sectors and geographic areas (Reinicke institutions and NGOs are dominating (Reinicke 1999). Emerging from crises or in response to gaps in 1999). The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Im- research, global policy networks assume various func- munizations (GAVI), for example, has been criti- tions, including facilitating the negotiation of new cized for its network approach. GAVI was estab- norms on the global agenda, providing global public lished in 2002 by the World Health Organization goods, coordinating resources for effective use, and and the World Bank, among others, “to both �nance supporting the implementation of international and speed the delivery of new and improved vaccines agreements (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004). to children in the developing world� (Muraskin 2004, 1922). GAVI is a well-recognized global network For global networks to thrive and be sustain- that has established partnerships with all sectors. able, Reinicke (1999) argues that once the network Muraskin, however, draws attention to two funda- is established and seen as a powerful voice in the mental flaws with its network approach—flaws that global sphere, founding organizations should with- he believes could have detrimental effects to GAVI 8 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS and other similar initiatives. First of all, GAVI has In the area of anticorruption, the network brings not been successful in striking a balance between together relevant members to better support the “top-down� and “bottom-up� approaches in its rela- �ght against corruption in developing countries tionship with countries. For example, in-country through coordinated and coherent approaches, in- groups such as NGOs were absent throughout the cluding the support in implementing UNCAC. creation and advocacy of GAVI. As a result, global (OECD “The OECD-DAC� n.d.) actors had no idea what was really going on in the �eld. Second, GAVI has not been successful in The Global Forum for Media Development reaching “genuine consensus on the exact role that The Global Forum for Media Development is a immunization should play in protecting the health global policy network that aims to make media de- of children in developing countries� (p. 1922). velopment an integral part of development. The fo- For global initiatives (such as GAVI) to be sus- rum holds that media is necessary for democratic tainable, it is crucial to engage all actors in the net- development, good governance, and overall better work’s internal procedures and advocacy efforts. development results. Speci�cally, the network be- Doing so will strengthen legitimacy and credibility. lieves that “free, independent, viable and inclusive The following are two examples of global policy media are prerequisites for creating and strengthen- networks that are effective in their respective the- ing democratic society and human development� matic areas. (GFMD 2008a). While policy makers and donors are well aware of the important role the media play The Development Assistance Committee Network in democratic development, media development is on Governance not yet recognized as a sector (GFMD 2008b). Thus, the support from a global network is critical. The Development Assistance Committee Network on Governance is a policy network housed in the Run by a global steering committee with repre- OECD. The network “aims to improve the effec- sentatives from all regions, the network focuses on tiveness of donor assistance in support of democratic several areas. First of all, it brings together actors governance in developing countries� (OECD “The and provides a platform for its members to discuss OECD-DAC� n.d., 1). Network members include and exchange ideas and to share good practice government representatives, development practi- about media development in the �eld. The network tioners, local experts, global NGOs, and policy re- also advocates for and disseminates research on the search institutes. The Network on Governance pro- impact of media development on governance and vides a global policy forum for members to exchange development; and it educates its members, policy knowledge and expertise, disseminate lessons makers, and the broader public about the import- learned, and develop policy tools (OECD “About ance of a free, independent, and plural press. The the OECD-DAC� n.d.). For example, the network network also establishes norms for media develop- develops frameworks, guidelines, and policy papers; ment and encourages cross-sector collaboration. conducts studies; builds capacity; and facilitates dia- (GFMD 2008a) logues and implementation of agreements. Outputs are used to influence and support donors and policy Currently, the Global Forum for Media Develop- makers and to generate demand for good govern- ment includes some 500 media development organ- ance and accountability. izations that operate around the world. The network is voluntary and offers two types of membership: (1) The network’s current priority areas include aid general membership for individuals, nonpro�t and domestic accountability, human rights, anti- organizations, and NGOs working primarily on corruption, governance assessments, and taxation. media development; and (2) associate membership Each priority area has its own task team and goals. for institutions and the private sector that provides 9 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS �nancial assistance and support to media develop- strengthened advocacy and influence; the essence of ment organizations or projects (GFMD 2008c). the organization/network, however, remains non- state. Transnational nonstate actors may also partic- Transnational Advocacy by Nonstate Actors ipate in other norm-forming initiatives, such as mul- tistakeholder initiatives and global policy networks; Nonstate actors as norm entrepreneurs play a they may also face challenges similar to these in crucial role in creating and strengthening global terms of legitimacy and representation, which span norms and monitoring implementation. Because a broad range of actors with different backgrounds they lack political and economic authority, their in- (Gaventa and Mayo 2009). fluence on policy making is often based on “the use of information, persuasion, and moral pressure to Persuasion, pressure, lobbying, and shaming are contribute to change in international institutions commonly used tactics in transnational advocacy. and governments� (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink Keck and Sikkink (1998) categorize these efforts as 2002, 11). Through collective action, nonstate ac- follows: tors such as civil society organizations, research or- ganizations, foundations, and the media have been 1. Information politics—Nonstate actors are influ- effective in pushing issues onto the global agenda ential in providing alternative sources of in- and influencing policy through independent cam- formation. The flow of information through paigns. Keck and Sikkink (1998) identify �ve stages networks generates facts and testimony used in which nonstate actors are influential: “(1) issue to persuade and stimulate people to act. creation and agenda setting; (2) influence on discur- Credibility is essential, and the use of testi- sive positions of states and international organizations; mony is effective if presented in a timely and (3) influence on institutional procedures; (4) influence dramatic fashion. on policy change in ‘target actors’ which may be states, 2. Symbolic politics—Nonstate actors make use of international organizations like the World Bank, or symbolic events in framing and advocating is- private actors…; (5) influence on state behavior� (p. sues through compelling explanations. 25). The authors point out that “meaningful policy 3. Leverage politics—Nonstate actors use their change� is more likely to occur when the �rst three ability to involve powerful actors to influence stages of influence have occurred. in an area in which network members are less likely to be influential. There are three different types of transnational 4. Accountability politics—Nonstate actors hold collective action: (1) transnational advocacy net- public of�cials accountable for previously works—informal networks primarily focusing on stated norms and commitments (such as information exchange, (2) transnational coali- treaties and declarations). Publicizing “norm- tions—formal networks emphasizing coordination breaking� behavior has been deemed effective of strategies and tactics (transnational campaigns) in making public of�cials conform to norms. to influence social change, and (3) transnational These politics are also referred to as a “mobi- social movements—sets of actors who mobilize at a lization of shame� (Khagram, Riker, and global level for collective action through protest and Sikkink 2002). disruptive activities (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002). All three types involve primarily nonstate The transnational antislavery campaign, for actors who work across borders for a common cause example, relied heavily on information politics, us- through the exchange of information and action ing testimonials and reporting facts to promote (Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, as they seek to change. A network was formed among British and influence other actors in the global sphere, they American antislavery groups to exchange informa- may also seek ad hoc partnerships with them for tion, tactics, research, and language. The most 10 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS common tactics employed were petition, boycotts, more recent accomplishment includes the PWYP’s and the use of eminent speakers traveling across the advocacy efforts that led to the Dodd–Frank Wall Atlantic Ocean. The network was used as a plat- Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a form to diffuse tactics and collective action not U.S. law signed in 2010 that requires all U.S.-regis- only for the antislavery campaigns, but also for tered companies working in the extractive indus- other social movements (such as the women’s tries to publish payments they make to governments rights movement). Although the American and around the world. The PWYP is now campaigning British campaigns worked under very different cir- for strict implementation of the law, expanding cov- cumstances, they inspired each other through the erage to a broader set of companies, and influencing sharing of information. (Keck and Sikkink 1998) other countries to follow (PWYP 2010). Transnational advocacy efforts may involve a Van Oranje and Parham (2009) point out sev- mixture of one or many of the different forms of eral factors contributing to the success of the “politics,� depending on the issue and the stage of PWYP. First of all, the coalition’s message is simple, the campaign process. The following examples of but powerful: “The citizens of countries that are successful global campaigns demonstrate the influ- rich in natural resources should not be poor� (p. ential role nonstate actors can play in creating and 16). Also, the PWYP’s clear objectives have res- advocating for new norms and strategies that have onated well with both the international community brought their issues to the attention of the interna- and civil society organizations on the ground. They tional community. were quick to mobilize and become members of the campaign. Furthermore, the PWYP has positioned Publish What You Pay itself as an equal partner to governments and inter- national organizations. Second, the organizational Publish What You Pay (PWYP) launched in 2002 structure has allowed the coalition to deliver results with the aim “to tackle the ‘resource curse’ by cam- effectively by using the expertise from a diverse set paigning for greater transparency and accountability of members. Third, minimal bureaucracy has al- in the management of revenues from the oil, gas and lowed coalition members on the ground to take mining industries� (van Oranje and Parham 2009, ownership and tailor campaigns to the domestic 15). This global network of civil society organiza- context. It should be pointed out that the PWYP tions was instrumental in creating the EITI by pres- has members from almost 60 countries and has na- suring the U.K. government to take action and tional af�liated coalitions in half of those countries making sure that the participation of civil society (PWYP 2011). Membership is restricted to civil so- organizations would be a main component of the ciety and NGOs. EITI, carrying equal weight with other stakeholders. Since the coalition launched, the PWYP has had External circumstances have also contributed to great impact in the following areas: (1) putting the the PWYP’s success as good governance and ac- issue of resource “revenue transparency� on the countability became priorities for many internation- global agenda, (2) holding EITI stakeholders ac- al institutions in the late 1990s. Van Oranje and countable for commitments to implementation, and Parham (2009) also point out that the media have (3) helping citizens gain better access to informa- played a major role in setting the issue on the global tion needed to hold their governments accountable agenda. They were especially signi�cant early on in (van Oranje and Parham 2009). Moreover, the coali- the campaign process, bringing attention to trans- tion has been successful in making revenue trans- parency in the extractive industries when the EITI parency an accepted norm among corporations. Al- and the PWYP were launched. And they have con- though complete transparency of payments is yet to tinued to publish articles and report on research. To be achieved, the issue is no longer up for debate. A attract the media’s attention, the PWYP has relied 11 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS greatly on members’ individual communication de- internal campaign structure and processes were partments. nonbureaucratic, and the strategy was flexible. The structure of the campaign committee, which set ob- Although the PWYP’s loose and informal struc- jectives and provided strategic directions, was in- ture has been bene�cial in many ways, it has also formal and loosely organized and it operated with contributed to internal disputes, competition for an informal budget. While Hubert (2000) points power, and democratic de�cit in terms of including out the dif�culty in assessing the impact this had on developing countries in decision making. The the success of the campaign, it is clear that the flex- broad membership has also brought challenges, ibility of the campaign strategy was crucial. Through- such as language barriers, uneven access to technol- out the campaign process, strategies were adapted to ogy, and lack of resources. Finally, the PWYP coali- respond to internal and external influences. Third, tion has been criticized for being elitist by invol- broad-based coalitions were formed among and be- ving only a few powerful NGOs and not enough tween NGOs, international organizations, and gov- grassroots organizations. (van Oranje and Parham ernments. The partnerships established with several 2009) crucial governments contributed to the legitimacy International Campaign to Ban Landmines of the campaign and were deemed crucial in the campaign’s lobbying efforts. Hubert (2000) points Similarities can be drawn from the ICBL’s cam- out that “strategic coordination among like-minded paign tactics that have been carefully studied and governments is ultimately the decisive factor to applied to other human rights campaigns around reach new agreements� (p. 61). He further states the world. The ICBL was launched in 1992 by six that “if governmental coalitions are the key to the NGOs who had all witnessed the horri�c effects of successful conclusion of humanitarian campaigns, land mines (ICBL 2009). Based on an analysis by NGO coalitions are the key to their emergence and Hubert (2000) and others, the ICBL (ICBL “Inspi- development� (p. 62). Fourth, success was also ration� n.d.) draws attention to four contributing based on external circumstances that played in factors that lead up to the signing of the landmines favor of the campaign, such as the ending of the treaty and implementation. First of all, the campaign Cold War that drew attention in the international had a clear message and goal to promote a total ban community to the reconstruction of conflict-torn of antipersonnel mines. To change policy makers’ societies. Also, the ICBL highlights the fact that ne- perceptions and raise public awareness about the gotiations of the treaty were held outside the United magnitude of landmines, the campaign reframed Nations organizations (which allowed for voting the issue from one of disarmament to humanitarian rather than consensual procedures) and NGOs act- terms. Strong visual images from the ground were ing as formal participants. presented at targeted events to support their claims, which also provoked attention in the global media. Transparency International The core members of the coalition were all experts with practical experience on the ground and in dif- TI has also been effective in spearheading a global ferent sectors, which contributed further to the movement by relying a great deal on leverage poli- credibility of the evidence presented and to the tics (involving powerful actors). Peter Eigen, the campaign overall. The campaign also engaged com- founder of TI, built support to �ght corruption not pelling spokespeople, including those who had di- only by partnering with friends, NGOs, and inter- rectly been affected by landmines and who would national organizations; but also by gauging support be dif�cult for decision makers to ignore. Also, al- from African leadership, including President Nelson though not mentioned in the analysis, the late Mandela of South Africa. As noted with other Princess Diana of Wales played a crucial role in global campaigns, the ability to garner support from raising global attention to the cause. Second, the well-recognized leaders lends credibility and often 12 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS advances the cause. What was crucial for TI was coalitions among and between governments, inter- the support solicited from high-level personalities national organizations, and NGOs; (5) leveraging in developing countries beginning early in the cam- high-pro�le events; (6) enlisting prominent spokes- paign process; it helped not to impose Western people; (7) building trust; and (8) seizing external norms. opportunities that can play in favor of the cam- paign and adapting strategies accordingly. The media also played a major role in putting corruption on the global agenda. Global media cov- For norms to become part of the global agenda erage of TI’s efforts was secured early on to promote and maintain priority, campaigns must secure long- the anticorruption message. The coalition also term political will and resources to sustain them. gained momentum through targeted events. While Moreover, campaigns should address internal chal- the initial focus was on large-scale business and lenges that stem from diverse memberships, such as government corruption at a global level, the cam- consensus building, legitimacy, leadership, account- paign broadened its focus to include petty corruption ability, balanced representation, and trust. Estab- upon request from leaders and activists in Latin lishing transparent procedures is crucial because America. This turned out to be a wise decision be- lacking them may impact the quality of norms cre- cause it helped put corruption on the agenda at the ated. But these processes are dif�cult to implement First Summit of the Americas in 1994 and resulted in practice. Although strong backing from the in- in the establishment of several Latin American ternational community lends awareness, legitimacy, chapters of TI. Moreover, this helped advance the drivers, and their motives can pose a challenge. cause on the global agenda. (Eigen 2003) Thus, initiatives should seek independence once they have a prominent voice in the global sphere In terms of accomplishments, TI has been ef- and can be sustained. fective in putting corruption on the global and na- tional agendas through its domestic chapters. Be- In the end, signing a convention or agreeing to cause of their efforts, major institutions are now a global norm does not necessarily lead to change taking corruption seriously; and it is fully integrated on the ground. The following section will speci�- into the development agenda as a major obstacle to cally address how global norms diffuse to domestic development effectiveness. Moreover, TI played a contexts. crucial role in forming two major anticorruption conventions, UNCAC and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corrup- tion. Additionally, it has been effective in changing Regional and Domestic norms about corruption in public life, with more Agenda Setting and more citizens recognizing corrupt behavior (TI National policy making and agenda setting are “Accomplishments� n.d.) greatly influenced by international organizations, transnational networks, and coalitions. Majone Lessons Learned: Global Norms and Global (2006) points out that international organizations Agenda Setting are not only concerned with influencing issues on In terms of strategies and challenges, commonalities the national agenda, but also with changing prior- can be drawn among the initiatives discussed in this ities on the decision-making agenda. He also sug- section. Strategies deemed effective in building po- gests that economic and political interdependence litical and public awareness at the global level in- influences the substance and procedures of agenda clude: (1) providing a strong evidence base for the setting and national policy making. If national norm; (2) framing and creating clear and simple leaders are more aware of the impact their decisions messages; (3) using the global media; (4) building have at the global level, they may be more open to 13 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS international cooperation and ideas coming from contributing factor to the success of the Global international and civil society organizations in Campaign for Education, for example, was its strong shaping the national agenda and/or alternatives for connection to local reality and close allies on the action. As Khagram (2004) points out, “Rapid ground (Gaventa and Mayo 2009). Also, the close changes in state policies and institutions often, and ties between the ICBL and the domestic campaigns increasingly, reflect processes of conformity to glob- were crucial for a consistent and well-coordinated ally spreading transnational norms of development campaign model (Hubert 2000). Moreover, the rather than the diversity of forms and more gradual PWYP’s domestic coalition members are the foun- shifts expected from variations in domestic struc- dation of the campaign’s achievements. While they tures, interactions and processes� (p. 15). are working toward the same policy and advocacy goals as the global campaign, they operate as inde- Transnational networks and coalitions play a pendent entities and adapt strategies to reflect do- crucial role in advocating for global norms to be- mestic issues and priorities (van Oranje and come institutionalized processes and structures in re- Parham 2009). gional and domestic contexts. True and Mintrom’s analysis (2001), for example, shows that transna- Advocacy alone, however, is not enough. Khagram tional networks have been the driving forces (2004) suggests that the presence of democratic institu- behind the diffusion of gender mainstreaming and tions or some degree of democratization is a must are making a great impact on domestic politics and for global norms to become institutionalized prac- policies. Also, Khagram (2004) says that the more tices because these factors “condition the broader states interact with transnational actors, the more impacts of growing transnational contentious poli- likely they are to integrate global norms into their tics and spreading global norms on the political institutions. Transnational networks and coalitions economy of development� (p. 20). For example, have the ability to provide a link between global True and Mintrom (2001) found that adopting gen- norms and national contexts and to play a crucial der-mainstreaming institutions was associated with role in empowering nonstate actors to hold public democratic ideals or countries in transition. Their of�cials accountable to commitments made at the analysis concludes that “when the political struc- global level. Their role can be seen as threefold: (1) tures of nation-states are open to new voices and advocate for the adoption of global norms, (2) hold new ideas and when people sympathetic to those state leaders accountable to institutionalize norms voices and ideas actually hold important decision- they have agreed to, and (3) monitor implementa- making power, then compelling advocacy on the tion of norms. part of nonstate actors can result in the rapid diffu- sion of ideas for policy innovation� (p. 51). While Many international campaigns, however, have the level of democracy can be a crucial factor for a been criticized for the lack of domestic representa- successful diffusion, global norms could actually tion and for “relying heavily on international solu- also lead to democratic ideals. tions to problems that are national in nature, and thereby shifting the authority of national policy de- When local channels between nonstate actors cision-making into the international arena� (Pitt, and governments are blocked, the use of boomerang Loehr, and Malviya 2005, 11). For lasting success, strategies can be effective. Keck and Sikkink domestic actors are crucial in providing informa- (1998) explain that a boomerang pattern occurs tion from a bottom-up perspective that will when “domestic NGOs bypass their state and di- strengthen and inform strategies in transnational rectly search out international allies to try to bring and domestic advocacy efforts. Domestic civil soci- pressure on their states from outside� (p. 13). Inter- ety organizations should be seen as an important national pressure may actually improve the quality ally in pressuring leaders to adopt global norms. A of national agenda setting (Majone 2006). Keck 14 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS and Sikkink (1998) further discuss the bene�ts and nisms of framing and grafting may have enabled ac- importance of the global/domestic links from both tors to align themselves with global norms, they sides. For domestic NGOs, international allies “pro- have proven entirely inadequate for triggering the vide access, leverage, and information (and often radical shifts needed to advance long-term sustain- money) they could not expect to have on their ability� (p. 14). In terms of global climate change, own; for northern groups, they make credible the she asserts that congruence-building mechanisms of assertion that they are struggling with, and not only framing and grafting have barely been absorbed for, their southern partners� (pp. 12–13). into domestic structures because these processes “rely on a limited number of elite actors with an ev- One reason why state leaders may not conform idently limited capacity for consequential innova- to global norms is simply that they are not consid- tive reasoning� (p. 15). Stevenson also points out ered relevant to the domestic context; at the same that the short electoral cycles in liberal democratic time, however, leaders want to gain credibility in the systems can be an obstacle for radical shifts to international community. Collier (2007) states that occur. As an alternative approach, she proposes the the majority of norms reflect behaviors desired in use of public deliberation because it would allow for developed nations or emerging market economies, a broader set of actors to engage in the norm diffu- but developing countries need rules that are appro- sion process—a practice that could also play a cru- priate to their contexts. Considering the intercon- cial factor in sustainability. A main challenge, how- nected world we live in, however, this may well de- ever, is feeding ideas from public deliberation into pend on the issue. Peters, Koechlin, and Zinkernagel policy-making processes. (2009) point out that policy issues are becoming in- creasingly globalized and can no longer be tackled With these points in mind, let us revisit some by states on their own or through national standard of the initiatives discussed previously—speci�cally, setting. what strategies have been effective in diffusing the norms they advocate as well as challenges they are Stevenson (2010) provides a useful analysis on facing. the process of norm diffusion in global climate change. She states that global norms are fluid and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative open to reinterpretation; as they diffuse through the system, the original focus usually gets lost. For a global To date, 24 countries have achieved “candidate sta- norm to successfully diffuse there must be a match be- tus� of the EITI—that is, they have met the four tween domestic and international structures. Steven- sign-up indicators; and 11 countries have reached son implies that the way local actors interpret norms compliant status, with 6 countries achieving this is dependent on their ability to “build congruence be- status in 2011 (EITI 2009b). The EITI’s validation tween a foreign idea and their local practices and be- standards include a wide range of norms: transparent liefs through ‘framing’ or ‘grafting’� (p. 9). Framing accounting, government accountability, and ex- refers to the way a norm is communicated to make tractive industry disclosure, among others. Before a sense to local reality. Grafting, on the other hand, is country can embark on this process, it must have the tactic by which a norm is associated “with a pre- cooperation from civil society, multinational ex- existing norm in the same issue area, which makes a tractive industry companies, and the government at similar prohibition or injunction� (Acharya 2004, the national and municipal levels; and it must form 244). No matter which process is used, global norms multistakeholder initiatives among these parties to will not necessarily be interpreted in its original form oversee implementation. but rather in some adapted fashion. While the low compliance rate may result in Stevenson (2010) points out several limitations part from a rigorous validation process, the com- to these processes. She says that “while the mecha- plexity of the issue should not be ignored. Accord- 15 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS ing to Darby (2008), “in most countries few people LEITI, the president centered her platform on na- understand the taxation or royalties system; few tional growth, poverty reduction, and the �ght people understand how oil, gas, and mining compa- against corruption. She continues to effectively tie nies operate; governments and companies often the LEITI Act to her platform by focusing on build- have a very imperfect understanding of what people ing trust among communities and engaging in a na- want; and virtually no one understands all these is- tional dialogue about the country’s resources. With sues� (p. 13). Communicating the importance of the president’s support of the LEITI and her under- transparency to all stakeholders involved is critical. standing of the important role of communication, If the citizenry does not appreciate the rami�ca- the initiative has been able to engage a multitude of tions of opaque transactions because they are not stakeholders about the results in Liberia’s �rst EITI exposed to a relatable message, it will be dif�cult to report. The results were communicated through mobilize their support. For example, the EITI in several channels, including newspaper, radio pro- Kazakhstan has not gained traction because of inef- gramming, and street theater that generated a great fective communication. The country’s communica- deal of public interest in the subject. tion campaign focused its efforts in Astana and Al- maty (the capital city and the center of commerce, While presidential leadership has been impor- respectively); they did not create strategies for the tant in Liberia, Azerbaijan has taken a more grass- industrial areas outside the urban centers nor did roots approach to the EITI. In this emerging econo- they translate communication materials to the my, oil is the main source of income. The current Kazakh language. It is not surprising that survey re- democratic governance system is relatively young; sults found that the public had vastly diverse under- the public sector is still being developed; and there standings of the EITI because of the accessibility of is civic pressure for access to information. The suc- messaging (Darby 2008). That said, the EITI has a cess of the EITI in Azerbaijan is based on the several strong communication component and encourages coalitions formed by nonstate actors to support and those involved in the planning of communication advocate for transparency. For example, the Trans- activities to customize their approach to the speci�c parency of Oil Revenues and Public Finance Program environment. is a coalition that links transparency to concrete im- provements for people through research, advocacy, The Liberian EITI (LEITI), on the other hand, and capacity building (Revenue Watch 2010). Fur- has emerged as an example of a successful thermore, several networks exist: for example, the campaign. In 2009, Liberia was the �rst nation in Civic Response Network that focuses on increasing Africa to become EITI compliant, and it had been community involvement and dialogue with the in the process of implementing the initiative since government in the regions directly affected by oil 2006 (EITI 2010a). LEITI has overcome obstacles extraction; and the Investigative Journalist Net- impeding transparency through a series of actions work and Access 2 Information that builds that led to the LEITI Act in July 2009. The act re- capacity, monitors resources, and has drawn public quires all extractive industry enterprises and gov- attention to challenges in the EITI monitoring ernment agencies operating in Liberia to report and process. (OSIAF 2007) publish all payments for licenses and operating con- tracts. If a company does not comply, it is subject to In addition to efforts by these coalitions, na- criminal proceedings. (EITI 2009a) tional agenda setting is also likely to be influenced by the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Euro- The success of the LEITI has greatly contrib- pe and Central Asia, a coalition involving national uted to the leadership of President Ellen Johnson- governments from more than 20 countries in the Sirleaf, who has strong support from Liberians and region (including Azerbaijan), OECD governments, the international community. Leading up to the civil society organizations, the private sector, and 16 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS international organizations. The network’s main more than 50 stakeholders, TI-Pakistan produced a objective is to support countries in their �ght against national anticorruption strategy report detailing corruption by providing a platform for members to causes and impacts of corruption and a set or rec- exchange information, promote anticorruption ac- ommendations to combat the problem. As a result, tivities, and coordinate donor activities. (OECD the National Anti-Corruption Strategy Project was “Anti-Corruption� n.d.) formed, funded by Pakistan’s government and the U.K. Department of International Development. Transparency International The project had two phases: diagnostic development and strategy development. Soliciting input from more TI has been effective in establishing strong domestic than 3,000 stakeholders, the project found that pro- ties through some 90 national chapters that “bring curement was a major area of corruption in the public together relevant players from government, civil so- sector. The strategy report, produced in the second ciety, business and the media to promote trans- part of the project, entails major issue areas and parency in elections, in public administration, in norms to guide the country’s future vision in com- procurement and in business,� and “use advocacy bating corruption—the need for political will, ac- campaigns to lobby governments to implement anti- countability, independent and free media, and in- corruption reforms� (TI n.d.). The coalition also or- tegrity pacts (a norm in which parties of a business ganizes at a regional level. It was instrumental in the transaction promise not to offer or accept a bribe). advocacy efforts around the implementation and Overall, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy enforcement of the Inter-American Convention Project has created a strong emphasis on the part of against Corruption, which includes norms to elimi- the Pakistani government to making reforms that nate corruption in the region. After the convention will increase transparency and reduce corruption. was signed in 1996, TI’s network in Latin America (TI 2003) was established and came to play a crucial role in raising awareness about the convention, contrib- The case of Pakistan demonstrates the effec- uting to the rati�cation, developing an of�cial mon- tiveness of TI in bringing together the relevant itoring mechanism, and advocating that civil stakeholders to effect change on the ground. As in society organizations take part in the monitoring the case of the landmine campaign, a civil society and complex policy processes. They were also effec- organization came to play a critical role in the tive in building capacity of civil society organiza- emergence of government coalitions. tions and creating advocacy tools to strengthen do- mestic and regional anticorruption campaigns. TI’s Lessons Learned: Regional and Domestic accomplishments in Latin America were based on Agenda Setting several factors: effective regional coordination, assis- tance from the TI secretariat, nurturing “political For global norms to successfully diffuse, cooperation sensitivity,� and creating new communication chan- among multiple stakeholders extends from the global nels transnationally and with local governments. level to regional and domestic levels. To effect (Selvood and Weyrauch 2007) change, advocacy campaigns should secure long-term political will and public support. Transnational net- TI has also been effective in putting corruption works and campaign coalitions can play a crucial role on the domestic agenda in Pakistan. In 2002, TI- in advocating and monitoring the domestic norm dif- Pakistan and other anticorruption organizations fusion process, building strong relationships and ca- felt that the National Accountability Bureau, an pacity of local actors, holding public of�cials account- arm of the Pakistani government, was not suf�cient able, and adapting global advocacy strategies and to handle the many facets of corruption, a deeply tools to accommodate domestic environments. Fram- entrenched social norm. In collaboration with ing of norms is critical at this level because the norm 17 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS must be communicated in a way that makes sense to a toring of UNCAC. Although both the EITI and TI domestic audience. Furthermore, to make an impact, have a strong presence in many countries and are advocacy campaigns should develop flexible strate- raising awareness, this is clearly not enough. Obsta- gies that accommodate environmental changes. cles on the ground often hinder implementation and must therefore be tackled and integrated into No matter through which route a norm is es- global advocacy campaigns. tablished, it will not be implemented unless domes- tic challenges are overcome. The following section In Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life will discuss these challenges in more detail, as well cycle, “internalization� is the �nal stage—one in as possible strategies and tools to overcome these. which a norm attains a “taken-for-granted� quality and is no longer part of public discourse. According to the authors, norms reaching this stage are usually not controversial or at the center of domestic poli- Implementation Challenges tics. As we know, the contrary position usually and Strategies applies in development and, speci�cally, in gover- nance reform. The issues dealt with are complex, In reviewing different initiatives for this report, there and countries are dealing with different contextual is a great deal of emphasis put into raising awareness challenges. This leads us to the following questions: of norms at the global level—mainly to secure and What are the exact challenges to governance re- maintain political will. Clearly, in today’s rapidly form? What tools can be used to overcome these changing environment, issues and norms compete challenges? What are the lessons for future advocacy for attention, priority, and resources to sustain them campaigns? on the global agenda. However, norms agreed to at the global level will not necessarily lead to transfor- mational change on the ground. Thus, global advo- Key Challenges to Implementation cacy campaigns must also integrate strategies for Odugbemi and Jacobson (2008) identify �ve key implementation and monitoring and must hold challenges that have proved to impede the success leaders accountable for the global norms to which of governance reform efforts across countries and they agreed. If we look at the previous cases dis- sectors: (1) securing political will and identifying cussed, very few global campaigns have actually led best approaches for reaching out to decision to transformational change. For example, EITI’s makers, (2) gaining support of public sector middle- progress in implementation has been slow. While managers who often are the strongest opponents of more countries have recently attained candidate sta- change, (3) building broad coalitions with influen- tus, and the publishing of �nancial information tial actors favoring change and tackling powerful from the extractive industries is spreading, only vested interests, (4) transforming indifferent or hostile Liberia and Nigeria have signed the EITI into law. public opinion into support for reform efforts, and (5) instigating citizen demand for accountability to Although TI has done a tremendous job in put- sustain governance reform. ting corruption (a previously taboo subject) on the global agenda, the 2010 Corruption Perceptions In- These challenges resonate with several of the dex shows a rather bleak picture of corruption campaigns reviewed in this report. A major chal- around the world. With more than half of the 178 lenge for the PWYP coalition, for example, is over- indexed countries scoring below 5 on a 10-point coming vested interests among governments and scale (10 being “very clean�), corruption remains a companies. Also, the coalition constantly faces the major impediment to development (TI 2010). challenge of keeping transparency a priority on both Consequently, TI has switched its focus and is now the domestic and business agendas (van Oranje and advocating for stricter implementation and moni- Parham 2009). Securing political will is also a chal- 18 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS lenge for the landmine campaign because many sig- more responsive to easily understood mes- natories of the landmines treaty have yet to ful�ll sages with a strong political angle, whilst their obligations and/or sign up to the treaty. Politi- politicians are more responsive to technical cal will is also a challenge for the EITI. Although solution-oriented reports� (p. 24). more countries are expected to reach compliant sta- 5. Networks—As previously discussed, networks tus in the near future, a challenge is to keep coun- can play a crucial role in the norm diffusion tries committed to the EITI’s rigorous and long-term process, strengthen advocacy, and increase validation process that continues well beyond com- the campaign’s legitimacy at a national and pliant status. global level by feeding information upstream. Pitt, Loehr, and Malviya (2005) say that The political economy environment is fluid “links with influential individuals can help to and continuously changing. Thus, to make an im- ‘open windows’ or increase a campaign’s pro- pact, campaigns must stay abreast of changes and �le� (p. 8). Moreover, networks can play a cru- adjust strategies accordingly. Pitt, Loehr, and cial role in the assessment of the political Malviya (2005) point out that although campaigns economy environment and can inform domes- are usually successful in influencing the national tic strategies accordingly. Also, in the event agenda, they also need to form effective strategies that communication channels between the to encourage implementation and monitoring. To public and the government are closed, the mobilize political will that aims to change policies boomerang effect with external network mem- and ensure implementation, the authors provide bers putting pressure on the state can be used. �ve crucial factors for consideration: 1. Political context—An assessment of the politi- As noted, these recommendations are similar cal environment should be made in advance. and relevant to the �ndings of this report. The un- To have maximum impact, campaigners derlying principle for any campaign to succeed is a should look for points of entry and adapt to a solid understanding of challenges in the domestic continuously changing environment. political economy environment. Following is a 2. Complexity of policy processes—Campaigns closer review of elements crucial for campaigns to should take the complexity of policy making succeed, and why they are important. into consideration when planning campaigns and ensure that strategies address the differ- Using Political Economy Analysis ent stages of the process. Political economy analysis can help identify domes- 3. Relevant and credible evidence—Evidence can tic environment opportunities and threats to gover- have a great influence on the policy process nance reform; it can also provide alternative solu- and can strengthen arguments for reform. tions (Fritz, Kaiser, Levy 2009). Based on such Pitt, Loehr, and Malviya (2005) point out analysis, reform advocates and campaigners can de- that “both research-based evidence and policy- velop new approaches for action and use political advocacy research can be relevant and credi- economy as a basis to build public and political sup- ble, but need to be utilized appropriately de- port for the norms they are advocating. pending on the crux of the campaign and assessed at an early stage� (p. 24). There are several approaches to political econ- 4. Effective communication of evidence—How evi- omy analysis. A problem-driven approach, for ex- dence is presented and communicated is es- ample, focuses on particular challenges or opportu- sential to the success of a campaign. Messages nities to reform. It entails three levels: (1) identify should be carefully tailored for each audience. the problem, opportunity, or vulnerability to be tack- As the authors suggest, the “general public is led; (2) carve out weaknesses in institutional and 19 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS governance structures; and (3) identify political ated by policy networks that are discussed and de- economy drivers impeding change or entry point bated. Whether the problem will be given promi- for change (Fritz, Kaiser, and Levy 2009). Another nence and priority on the decision-making agenda political economy approach is the journalistic is determined in the politics stream. It depends on inquiry-based model. This bottom-up approach to several factors: public opinion, pressure-group cam- political economy analysis gathers information paigns, and administrative or legislative turnover. through preliminary research and interviews with When the three streams intersect, a narrow policy local actors who informally discuss the views of the window emerges in which a policy has the opportu- government and challenges to reform. Inquiries in- nity to be adopted. (Zahariadis 2007) clude areas such as understanding of the overall po- litical environment, identifying key stakeholders Norm entrepreneurs can play an important role and vested interests, determining the role of civil in influencing the different streams by bringing society, and assessing the media environment. (Lal awareness to speci�c problems, taking part in prob- 2008) lem de�nition, promoting solutions, generating re- search and evidence to support a speci�c policy, and A sound analysis of the political economy envi- mobilizing public opinion. Several of the global ronment is critical in tackling implementation chal- policy networks and multistakeholder initiatives lenges to reform. Campaigns can use information (previously discussed) operate and are influential gathered from political economy analysis to better on policy making at the national level. position the cause or norm and can coordinate strate- gies and tactics accordingly. To influence policy, in- The EITI and the PWYP, for example, were ternal and external strategies should be flexible crucial partners in the work that led to the signing enough to accommodate changes in the political of the LEITI Act in 2009. The campaign bene�ted economy environment. Thus, assessment of the en- greatly from political buy-in early in the process vironment should not only be conducted in the pre- with President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s strong com- planning stage, but throughout the campaign process. mitment to �ght corruption from the moment she took of�ce in 2006, her ability to communicate the complexity of corruption to multiple stakeholders, Understanding the Complexity of and her capacity to get them engaged in the Policy Making process. There was also an opportunity to tackle the For norms to successfully take root, campaigners corruption problem after the country’s civil war. ought to understand the complexity of the policy- Nevertheless, domestic challenges and dynamics in making process. The multiple streams framework is the three streams—problems, policies, and politics one of several frameworks that illustrate this com- —had to be tackled to get the bill signed into law. plexity and possible entry points for influence. Today, the EITI and PWYP continue to play an ac- tive role in overseeing implementation and moni- Policies in the multiple streams framework “are toring in Liberia. made by national governments under conditions of ambiguity,� in which ambiguity is referred to as “a state of having many ways of thinking about the same Building Effective Coalitions circumstances or phenomena� (Zahariadis 2007, Building effective coalitions is another crucial aspect 66). The framework identi�es three independent that has proved essential in producing transforma- streams, each with its own dynamics: problems, tional change. One of the ultimate success factors policies, and politics. The problems stream involves of Britain’s antislavery campaign, for example, was concerns that arise through different indicators and based on the effective coalitions formed with the events from both inside and outside the govern- Quakers. These coalitions founded the mass cam- ment. The problem is de�ned in the policies stream paign to abolish slave trade (Krznaric 2007). Also, through a set of competing ideas/solutions gener- the international women’s movement would have 20 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS faced dif�culty in influencing policy were it not for cordingly. To effect change, transnational coalitions the broad-based coalitions formed (Chen 1995). In must forge strong ties with change agents at the do- the landmines case, the coalitions built between mestic level. Keck and Sikkink (1998) stress that and among NGOs and governments were essential “foreign and international actors alone rarely suc- for the campaign’s success. ceed in changing embedded practices because they do not understand how to frame debates in con- Coalitions are de�ned as “collaborative, means- vincing and accessible ways for the domestic audi- oriented arrangements that permit distinct organi- ence� (p. 66). Moreover, involving influential lead- zational entities to pool resources in order to effect ers is crucial for reasons of coalition legitimacy and change� (Tarrow 2006, 164). Tarrow points out that credibility to tackle powerful vested interests. coalitions are frequently formed to address short- term threats and opportunities; they continue only In dealing with opposition, which can lead to when these persist. He identi�es �ve crucial factors counterreform or blocking coalitions, consensus to build effective coalitions: building can be an effective approach in which “par- ties seek to make mutually advantageous trades—of- 1. framing—coalition members’ ability to �nd a fering their “votes� in exchange for a modi�cation common approach to framing issues; of what is being proposed or for a promise of support 2. trust—an environment in which members on other issues� (Susskind 2006, 269). While dia- can rely on one another; logue is important to increase understanding about 3. credible commitments—each member’s ability an issue and respect for different viewpoints, it will to stay committed, which may depend on re- not necessarily lead to policy change. Instead, sources and changes in his or her domestic Susskind argues that “carefully structured consensus environment; building efforts can produce fairer, more ef�cient, 4. management of difference—the coalitions’ abil- wiser and more stable results . . . � (p. 270). Further- ity to resolve tensions among members in more, it maximizes the value of the agreement to all reaching consensus on goals, tactics, and parties involved, leaves everyone in a better pos- structure; and, ition to handle future agreements, reduces transac- 5. selective incentives—motivational factors tion costs, and increases credibility and trust among prompting for members to cooperate, such as the public (Susskind 2006). joint political influence (p. 165). The use of threats has proved to be less effec- Building effective and sustainable coalitions is tive because it undermines legitimacy and can foster challenging; and when it involves transnational ac- blocking coalitions. Susskind (2006) points out that tors, the challenge may become even more cumber- governments can strengthen their legitimacy and some because of cultural and language differences. reduce long-term costs by engaging in collaborative To avoid a coalition breakdown, Pitt, Loehr, and and participatory approaches based on consensus Malviya (2005) recommend that clear objectives and building. Moreover, access to “good information� is terms of the coalition be made at the beginning, that crucial in producing collaborative efforts and to priorities be negotiated and addressed among coalition tackling tensions that arise among parties in the re- members, and that who is accountable to whom be form process (Varenik 2008). decided. Tarrow (2006) identi�es campaign coalitions as Mobilizing Public Opinion the most effective strategy for transnational collab- In development, issues tend to default on techno- oration. Characteristics of these include high in- cratic solutions, not participation. Building public volvement, long-term commitment, policy issue support and mobilizing public opinion, however, are speci�c, flexibility in responding to a changing en- critical for reforms to succeed. In Adam Hochs- vironment, and their ability to adjust tactics ac- child’s research on Britain’s antislavery campaign, 21 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS mass mobilization to shift public opinion about Conclusions slave trade was one of the key success factors to the abolishment of slavery (Krznaric 2007). The aim of For global norms to successfully diffuse, implemen- the strategy was to make people question slave tation and monitoring must be considered equally trade and bring the issue to the forefront of public important to global agenda setting. The failure to discourse. To this effect, a horri�c image from a not include these components in campaigns is often slave ship was widely distributed and displayed in prompted by a lack of adequate strategies and/or public places—an image that had a tremendous im- resources. Raising awareness alone, however, is not pact on the public who had long been far removed suf�cient to achieve transformational change. In from the true facts about slavery. Moreover, instead governance reform, the implementation and en- of promoting unrest among slaves, the abolitionists forcement of norms are possibly the most dif�cult focused on engaging the public and getting their part of the process because these must overcome support before lobbying parliament. In the landmines challenges in the political economy environment campaign, strong visual images from the ground were and pass through complex policy-making processes. used to provoke attention in the global media and While there are common challenges to implemen- build public support. tation, speci�c contextual challenges can be identi- �ed through political economy analysis, which will The use of relevant and credible evidence is strengthen strategies for impact. Strategies must crucial in building both public and political also be flexible enough to reflect an ever-changing support. Also, how evidence is communicated can political landscape and public opinion. The en- be a determining factor. In this regard, Susskind gagement with public of�cials and the public is an (2006) suggests a few techniques that can be effec- ongoing process. tive, including “cost-bene�t analysis, risk assessment, and environmental impact assessment� (p. 275). Moreover, for global norms to transplant, long- Also, Varenik (2008) points out that data and term commitment as well as cooperation among a analysis can strengthen the justi�cation for reform broad range of highly involved stakeholders is cru- and provide incentives in doing so. He suggests that cial. The responsibility and ownership of global norm advocates should focus on crafting different mes- diffusion ought to extend to the broader public, not sages and ensuring that they are timely to gain sup- be limited to a few elite actors. A strong backing port. The messenger is imperative to the success of from nonstate actors is necessary to drive change the campaign. In the landmines case, for example, processes toward implementation, but nonstate ac- all coalition members were experts with practical tors are so often left out or not considered equal experience from the ground contributing to the partners among other stakeholders. Domestic actors credibility of the evidence presented. Moreover, can play a crucial role in building support and mo- the campaign used compelling spokespeople, in- bilizing public opinion by carrying out credible and cluding those directly affected by landmines. High- relevant campaigns based on sound analysis of the level people and celebrities can also be effective in political economy environment. Besides, establish- brining attention to issues, such as the late Princess ing partnerships with local actors can be crucial for Diana’s devotion to ban landmines. The bottom line monitoring implementation. To this end, global is that for any reform effort to succeed, campaigns campaign coalitions ought to engage and empower must strive to get the public opinion on their side. domestic actors as equal partners in advocating for transformational change. 22 GLOBAL NO RMS: CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND LIMITS Note ———. 2009b. “EITI Countries.� http://eiti.org/imple- mentingcountries. Accessed May 7, 2010. 1. 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Zahariadis, N. 2007. “The Multiple Streams Frame- TI (Transparency International). n.d. “About Trans- work: Structure, Limitations, Prospects.� In Theo- parency International.� http://www.transparency.o ries of the Policy Process, ed. P. A. Sabatier, 2nd ed., rg/about_us. Accessed March 28, 2010. 65–92. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 25 The Communication for Governance & Accountabil- ity Program (CommGAP) seeks to promote good and accountable governance through the use of innova- tive communication approaches and techniques that strengthen the constitutive elements of the public sphere: engaged citizenries, vibrant civil societies, plu- ral and independent media systems, and open govern- ment institutions. Communication links these elements, forming a framework for national dialogue through which informed public opinion is shaped about key issues of public concern. CommGAP posits that sound analysis and understanding of the structural and pro- cess aspects of communication and their interrelation- ships make critical contributions to governance reform. CommGAP is funded through a multi-donor trust fund. The founding donor of this trust fund is the UK’s De- partment for International Development (DFID). Web site: http://www.worldbank.org/commgap Blog: http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere