MONITORING FOOD INSECURITY AND EMPLOYMENT IN YEMEN Results from the Yemen Mobile Phone Survey Monitoring Round I Data collected in August and September 2022 © 2023 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONS The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. 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Cover and interior design by Hanna Chang CONTENTS Acknowledgements......................................................................................................................3 Abbreviations................................................................................................................................3 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................4 1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................6 2 Methodology...........................................................................................................................8 2.1 Sampling, questionnaire, and fieldwork.............................................................................8 2.2 Sample description............................................................................................................9 3 Main findings........................................................................................................................12 3.1 Conflict induced displacement and return.......................................................................12 3.2 Employment and economic dependency at the household level....................................13 3.3 Employment in the Yemeni population............................................................................14 3.4 Household income sources.............................................................................................23 3.5 Food insecurity................................................................................................................25 3.6 Food assistance...............................................................................................................28 4 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................30 Annex A: Further Tables..............................................................................................................32 Annex B: Methodology..............................................................................................................33 Contents 1 FIGURES Figure 2.2.1: Relationship of respondents to main income earner, respondent gender, and area of control (results are weighted).....................................................................................................................................................10 Figure 2.2.2: Age and education among respondents (results are weighted)................................................................10 Figure 2.2.3: Place of residence (reported as percentage of respondents).................................................................... 11 Figure 3.1.1: Percentage of households that moved because of the conflict.................................................................13 Figure 3.2.1: Percentage of households with at least one household member working in the last month...................13 Figure 3.2.2: Average proportion of household members who are working..................................................................14 Figure 3.3.1: Percentage of respondents or MIE that worked the week before the survey..........................................14 Figure 3.3.2: Percentage of respondents or MIE that worked the week before the survey, by demographic characteristic........................................................................................................................................15 Figure 3.3.3: Employment characteristics of those who worked the week before the survey by gender of worker (%).... 16 Figure 3.3.4: Employment characteristics of those who worked the week before the survey by area of control (%)............................................................................................................................................................17 Figure 3.3.5: Sector of employment...............................................................................................................................18 Figure 3.3.6: Job tenure.................................................................................................................................................18 Figure 3.3.7: Job tenure by status in occupation............................................................................................................19 Figure 3.3.8: Regularity of wage payment – frequency of payment delay.....................................................................20 Figure 3.3.9: Job satisfaction..........................................................................................................................................21 Figure 3.3.10: Job satisfaction by status in occupation..................................................................................................21 Figure 3.3.11: Three main reasons for dissatisfaction with job.......................................................................................22 Figure 3.4.1: Sources of household income...................................................................................................................23 Figure 3.4.2: Is respondent’s income sufficient to cover household's expenses?.........................................................24 Figure 3.5.1: Distribution of households by food consumption groups (%)...................................................................25 Figure 3.5.2: Stacked food frequency of main food groups (median).............................................................................26 Figure 3.5.3: Food insecurity by selected labor market characteristics..........................................................................27 Figure 3.5.4: Food insecurity by economic activity.........................................................................................................27 Figure 3.6.1: Reception of food assistance....................................................................................................................28 Figure 3.6.2: Form of food assistance............................................................................................................................29 2 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was prepared by Romeo Gansey and Alia Aghajanian. We would like to thank Safa Almoayad for her contributions and Johannes Hoogeveen, Alan Fuchs, Jeffrey Tanner, Matthew Wai-Poi and Andras Bodor for their constructive comments. We are grateful to Aldo Morri for his careful edits and feedback. We would also like to thank Mindset for collecting the survey data. We are also grateful for the funding and support of the Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement. ABBREVIATIONS IRG Internationally Recognized Government GCC Gulf Cooperation Council WFP World Food Programme mVAM mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping HBS Household Budget Survey MIE Main income earners Acknowledgements & Abbreviations 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report highlights the lived experience of Yemeni households when it comes to livelihoods and food insecurity. As Yemen has been grappling with multiple crises and the repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, multiple challenges - including shrinking access to income, disruptions in imports, and further currency depreciation - have exacerbated the precarious living conditions of Yemenis. This report briefly describes the results of a phone survey completed in August and September of 2022, showing the precarity of living conditions and livelihood options across the country, but highlighting worse conditions amongst parts of the population. Employment conditions and food security are worse off in rural areas, amongst the displaced and in the areas under Houthi control. Those working in elementary occupations and in the construction, manufacturing or agriculture sectors are also worse off. Amid a devastating and protracted conflict, with limited information on the living conditions in Yemen, a phone survey was carried out to monitor food insecurity and livelihoods. The survey, implemented in August and September 2022, seeks to provide a snapshot of the situation for Yemeni households. The survey draws on a probability sample of 1,297 respondents, 623 of whom are based in rural areas, while 480 and 193 are living in urban and semi-urban areas respectively. Most of the respondents are male (1,045 men vs. 252 women). The results suggest that almost one-quarter (23 percent) of Yemeni households are currently displaced due to the conflict, with differences by area of residence. For example, relatively more displaced households are based in semi-urban and urban areas compared to rural areas. Some (16 percent) of the households that were once displaced have returned to their pre-conflict places of residence. But the prevalence of return from displacement differs depending on area of residence and area of control. 4 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Most (69 percent) main income earners (MIE) of the household worked the week before the survey, with a small gap between men and women. The proportion of MIEs currently in the public sector in areas under Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) rule is higher than in areas under Houthi control (18 vs 9 percent). Agriculture and wholesale or retail trade are the most common economic activities (26 percent and 22 percent, respectively). A large share of MIEs who declared having worked are elementary-occupation workers (46 percent). MIEs from displaced households face higher likelihood of having occasional jobs compared to those from households not currently displaced. The nature of job tenure hints at precarity in the labor market and job tenure tends to be more secure in areas under IRG rule than in areas under Houthi control. Overall, employment is dominated by wage workers. Most Yemeni households (89 percent) rely on labor income (wage, sales, and profit from business). Wage income is the single most important source of household income (68 percent) followed by sales of crops or animal products (13 percent). There are some differences in income source by area of control and area of residence. Despite it being the main income source, income from work does not help to meet the household’s needs of 91 percent of MIEs. Notably, 37 percent of respondents from IRG areas report that income is not enough to cover their needs at all, compared to 34 percent in Houthi areas. This is likely to reflect the decreased purchasing power caused by currency depreciation and inflation in IRG areas. Approximately 25 percent of Yemeni households have poor food consumption scores, and another 25 percent have borderline food consumption scores. Households with a poor food consumption score tend to experience unbalanced diet composed mainly of staple starches, where milk, animal protein, and pulses are nearly absent. Households under Houthi control are markedly worse off than those under IRG rule. Households where the respondents or MIE are not working are more likely to have poor food consumption scores. Furthermore, households whose respondents or MIE are working in the trade sector are the best off in terms of food consumption, while households with respondents or MIE working in construction are the least likely to experience acceptable food consumption. Around 55 percent of households received food assistance, mostly in kind. Households with poor food security are more likely to receive food assistance, however there is little difference in aid assistance between households with borderline and acceptable food consumption scores, indicating the need for better targeting. Additionally, households in IRG areas were more likely to report receiving assistance despite having more favorable employment and food security outcomes. Executive Summary 5 1 INTRODUCTION Since the onset of conflict in 2015, Yemen has endured protracted humanitarian, social, and economic crises that have devastated the lives and wellbeing of millions of Yemenis. To date, 23.4 million are in need of humanitarian assistance, and many more continue to be displaced.1 Amidst the conflict, Yemen has seen large-scale disruptions in the provision of basic services and economic activities. Significant restrictions were imposed on essential imports, while the bifurcation of national institutions has put stress on payment of public sector salaries—particularly in areas outside the control of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further exacerbates these conditions as Yemen is reliant on imports for wheat and grain. Nonetheless, Yemen’s GDP saw some growth in 2022 after two years of recession, mostly driven by the oil sector. 2 The Yemeni context of acute crises due to protracted and brutal conflict somewhat overshadows the prominence of the COVID-19 pandemic.3 But COVID-19 and associated restrictions measures had undoubtedly exacerbated the stress on livelihoods. Food access and availability had been seriously constrained, while the flow of remittances from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries decreased in proportions ranging between 20 and 70 percent depending on the country. 4 1 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 (April 2022) 2 Yemen Macro Poverty Outlook 2023 3 https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1085732?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI1d6gwfOj-wIVDq7ICh20Mw4UEAAYAiAAEgKKkPD_BwE 4  ood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Yemen: Agricultural livelihoods and food security in the context of F COVID-19. 2021 6 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Understanding how households are coping and responding to the humanitarian and economic crises is a difficult task in Yemen. Despite large investments in data collection, very little data about Yemen and its population is publicly available. Data collection through face-to-face surveys encounters challenges in terms of obtaining approvals from security agencies, often resulting in data that is not shared across institutions. Moreover, access to some areas of the country remains limited. Against this backdrop, there is a clear consensus to understand current living conditions and means to livelihoods in Yemen. In the absence of traditional welfare surveys that provide monetary measures of poverty, phone survey data can document lived experiences on a regular basis, providing invaluable information on people’s welfare, especially in a country where reliable data is scarce. The current report draws on data from a phone survey fielded in August and September 2022 to understand food insecurity and livelihood options for Yemenis. The report is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology, while Section 3 presents the results. The report ends with some concluding notes in Section 4. Introduction 7 2 METHODOLOGY 2.1 Sampling, questionnaire, and fieldwork The survey draws on a probability sample of 1,297 adult Yemenis (18 years of age and older) with mobile phones, targeted across 21 governorates based on the latest population projections.5 Interviews were conducted over the phone in August and September 2022, using a questionnaire consisting of four sections mainly focusing on labor market experiences and food insecurity. Although the survey was implemented over the phone, it is expected to have adequate coverage of the target population, as mobile phone ownership was widespread in Yemen prior to the start of the conflict. According to the Household Budget survey of 2014, 81 percent of households owned a mobile phone.6 While there is no recent national level data on mobile phone ownership, representative data of areas under IRG control show that mobile phone ownership increased from 84 percent in 2014 to 92 percent in 2021 (Yemen Human Development Survey 2021). Additionally, a study comparing the number of mobile phones households owned in the World Food Programme (WFP) mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (mVAM) phone survey finds a similar number to that of the last nationally representative survey, the 2014 Household Budget Survey (HBS), except for some governorates where the number of mobile phones declined due to significant population migration.7 5 Socotra island is excluded because of the small population size. 6  his was lower in rural areas at 75 percent, and for some governorates: Saada (52 percent), Abyan (57 percent) and Al Hodeidah T (64 percent). 7 T  andon, Sharad, and Tara Vishwanath. 2021. “How Well Is Humanitarian Assistance Targeted in Fragile Environments? Evidence from the Announcement of a Food Emergency in Yemen. ” Food Policy 102 (July): 102071. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.foodpol.2021.102071. 8 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen To adjust for the initial survey design and distortions introduced by not achieving target sample sizes, household and individual survey weights were constructed using the 2017 population estimates by governorate. Furthermore, to gain a better sense of the context in the “hard-to-reach” governorates, the survey conducted follow up qualitative interviews with some respondents, which will be analyzed in a forthcoming report titled Voices from Yemen (World Bank, 2023). 2.2 Sample description Survey responses are provided by an adult household member. The completed sample includes 1,045 male and 252 female respondents.8 After weighting the observations, around 56 percent of respondents are main income earners (MIE), 49 percent are female, 69 percent lived under the control of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) (Figure 2.2.1), and 66 percent are aged between age 25 and 59 (Figure 2.2.2). MIE are mostly male (92.5 percent, not shown), and most respondents presenting themselves as spouses of the main income earners are female (89.9 percent, not shown). Approximately, 27 percent of respondents have lower than first level or elementary education, while 19 percent achieved tertiary education (Figure 2.2.2). Around 51 percent of respondents live in rural areas, and respectively 37 and 13 are in urban and semi-urban areas (Figure 2.2.3). To gather as much information on working conditions as possible, the main income earner was interviewed, or responses were provided on behalf of the main income earner (proxy respondent). While this enables us to gain an in depth understanding of labor conditions, it does not allow for the calculation of representative labor force participation or employment rates. All results presented in this report are produced by the authors from collected data and are weighted to be as representative as possible, unless otherwise specified. In this report, results are usually disaggregated by gender, area of control, area of residence and displacement status. It is worth noting that women were less likely to consent to an interview, and that the women interviewed are likely to represent a biased sample of Yemenis. 8 Table A1 in the Annex presents both weighted and unweighted tabulations of selected characteristics. Methodology 9 Figure 2.2.1: Relationship of respondents to main income earner, respondent gender, and area of control (results are weighted) Relationship of respondents to Gender of respondents Area of control main income earner 81 69 56 34 49 51 31 30 17 19 17 15 10 12 8 1 Houthi-controlled Internationally All Male Female Male Female areas Recognized Government Note: Area of control is determined by merging district-level control data from The International Crisis Group. Figure 2.2.2: Age and education among respondents (results are weighted) Age of respondents (years) Education of respondents 34 32 28 Higher education 19 High school 32 Elementary/primary 23 or pre-high school 7 Lower than first level 27 18–24 25–35 35–59 60+ 10 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure 2.2.3: Place of residence (reported as percentage of respondents) 13% 37% 51% Urban Rural Semi-urban Methodology 11 3 MAIN FINDINGS 3.1 Conflict induced displacement and return Forced population movements still affect all segments of the population. The survey asked respondents whether their households have ever been forced or obliged to flee from somewhere else, as well as the reasons for their displacement. Around 23 percent of Yemeni households are currently displaced due to the conflict, while 16 percent that were once displaced have returned to their pre-conflict place of residence. Figure 3.1 shows that the proportion of displaced households9 is the same under each area of control, but there are relatively more households that had returned to the pre-conflict place of residence under IRG rule (21 percent) than under Houthi control (14 percent). Relatively more households are displaced in semi-urban areas than in either urban or rural areas. For the subsequent sections, we explore differences in livelihood options and food security based on the household’s displacement status. 9 Displaced households are households that have been forced to flee for security reasons and that have not yet returned to their pre-conflict place of residence. 12 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure 3.1.1: Percentage of households that moved because of the conflict 16% 14% 21% 21% 10% 20% 21% 23% 23% 23% 24% 27% 69% 62% 64% 57% 55% 53% Houthis IRG Urban Rural Semi-urban ALL AREA OF CONTROL RESIDENCE Never displaced Currently displaced due to conflict Returned home after being displaced 3.2 Employment and economic dependency at the household level Most households (84 percent) have at least one working member aged 15 years or above. This proportion is lower among households that are not displaced compared with the displaced ones. The proportion of households with at least one working member aged 15 years or above is similar in areas under IRG or Houthi control, even though households tend to be slightly larger in areas under Houthi control (8.2 vs 7.4 members). Figure 3.2.1: Percentage of households with at least one household member working in the last month 84 86 85 84 84 87 79 All Male Female Houthis IRG Not Displaced (resp) (resp) displaced Main findings 13 Many household members aged 15 and above were working the month before the survey. The share of household members aged 15 and above who were working relative to the total household size stands at 25 percent. For an average household of eight members, this indicates that two adults are currently working. This proportion is similar by area of control and household displacement status. Figure 3.2.2: Average proportion of household members who are working 25 25 23 24 26 24 24 All Male Female Houthis IRG Not Displaced (resp) (resp) displaced 3.3 Employment in the Yemeni population Many adult Yemenis are engaged in the labor market. Around 69 percent of respondents/main income earners (MIE) worked the week before the survey (Figure 3.3.1). While some were not working in the last week due to illness or being on leave, the majority of main income earners who said they had a job over the last year but were not working in the last week did so because their employer did not currently need their services. This is reflective of the temporary nature of work. Respondents/MIEs from areas under IRG rule are slightly more likely to work than those from areas under Houthi (Ansar Allah) control (71 vs. 69 percent, respectively). But there is a larger difference in the likelihood to work based on the displacement status, with 66 percent of displaced MIEs working in the last week vs 70 percent of non-displaced MIEs. Figure 3.3.1: Percentage of respondents or MIE that worked the week before the survey 69 69 71 70 70 69 66 Houthis IRG Not displaced Displaced Did not receive Received ALL AREA OF CONTROL DISPLACEMENT STATUS RECEPTION OF ASSISTANCE 14 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Active work in the last week is relatively lower amongst older groups and the least educated. Female respondents/MIEs are slightly less likely to work the week before the survey than male respondents/MIEs (68 vs 71 percent).10 The likelihood of working the week before the survey decreases with age, ranging from 54 percent (60 years and over) to 76 percent (18-24 years). There is an educational aspect in likelihood to work, whereby the least educated report lower proportions of having worked (58 percent) compared to the better educated (76 percent). Figure 3.3.2: Percentage of respondents or MIE that worked the week before the survey, by demographic characteristic 76 74 76 71 72 71 69 69 65 58 54 Male Female 18–24 25–34 35–59 60+ Lower than first level Elementary/primary High school ALL GENDER AGE EDUCATION Higher education Around two-thirds (67 percent) of workers are wage workers. Male workers are more likely to work as wage workers than female workers, who are more likely to be unpaid family members or work for their own account. While the relative proportion of female workers that are self-employed is 36 percent, this proportion is 27 percent among male workers. The proportion of unpaid family workers is higher among female workers (Figure 3.3.3.a). Clarification is needed here: while the tabulation is based on the gender of the respondent, the employment variable is based 10  on information from respondents or MIE. This should not heavily affect the results, as there are 84 MIE working among 916 workers in the sample. Main findings 15 Figure 3.3.3: Employment characteristics of those who worked the week before the survey by gender of worker (%) a. Type of worker b. Economic activity c. Status in occupation 3% 1% 6% 13% 11% 18% 10% 7% 16% 30% 27% 36% 6% 4% 5% 5% 6% 10% 6% 5% 11% 6% 7% 7% 5% 14% 12% 8% 8% 71% 12% 9% 67% 17% 11% 9% 6% 16% 58% 12% 18% 25% 12% 22% 49% 46% 41% 15% 28% 26% 23% Male Female Male Female Male Female GENDER GENDER GENDER ALL OF WORKER ALL OF WORKER ALL OF WORKER Unpaid family member Other services Other Own-account worker/employer Manufacturing and mining Associate professional and clerical workers Wage worker Professional, scientific, and technical activities Skilled workers Construction Manager Public administration Professional Trade, transportation, Service and sale workers and accommodation Elementary occupations Agriculture Agriculture is the most common economic activity (26 percent), followed by wholesale and retail trade, transportation and accommodation (22 percent). Around 28 percent of male workers and 23 percent of female workers work in agriculture. There are relatively more women in public administration than men (18 vs 9 percent). Around 14 percent of male workers are active in construction compared to 6 percent among female workers (Figure 3.3.3.b). Employment typically entails elementary occupations (46 percent); while professionals (9 percent) and managers (7 percent) represent thin shares of workers. Around 49 percent of male workers are in elementary- occupations compared with 41 percent among female workers (Figure 3.3.3.c). 16 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure 3.3.4: Employment characteristics of those who worked the week before the survey by area of control (%) a. Type of worker b. Economic activity c. Status in occupation 3% 3% 3% 13% 14% 12% 10% 10% 10% 30% 32% 26% 5% 5% 5% 5% 3% 8% 6% 6% 6% 11% 11% 11% 7% 6% 9% 12% 8% 71% 12% 9% 14% 67% 11% 65% 16% 9% 16% 12% 18% 14% 22% 22% 49% 46% 21% 41% 29% 26% 19% Houthis IRG Houthis IRG Houthis IRG ALL AREA OF CONTROL ALL AREA OF CONTROL ALL AREA OF CONTROL Unpaid family member Other services Other Own-account worker/employer Manufacturing and mining Associate professional and clerical workers Wage worker Professional, scientific, and technical activities Skilled workers Construction Manager Public administration Professional Trade, transportation, Service and sale workers and accommodation Elementary occupations Agriculture Wage work is more frequent in areas under IRG than Houthi control. Approximately 32 percent of workers in areas under Houthi control are self-employed, while this proportion amounts to 26 percent in areas under IRG control. Wholesale trade is the most common economic activity in IRG-controlled areas, compared to agriculture in Houthi-controlled areas. The proportion of workers currently in the public sector in areas under IRG control is two times that of workers in public administration in areas under Houthi control (18 vs 9 percent, respectively). While the public sector force was historically concentrated in Sanaa, public sector workers have not been paid in recent years and this result indicates that many have found other jobs in the private sector. The share of elementary-occupation workers is larger in areas under Houthi control (Figure 3.3.4). The public sector—once a major and an attractive employer—only employs 11 percent of workers, as most workers (87 percent) are active in the private sector (Figure 3.3.5). Main findings 17 Figure 3.3.5: Sector of employment 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 11% 7% 19% 9% 15% 90% 89% 87% 81% 83% Male Female Houthis IRG ALL GENDER OF WORKER AREA OF CONTROL Private sector Public sector/government Other The nature of job tenure indicates a precarity in the labor market. Around 33 percent of wage workers have a permanent job and 14 percent say their job is occasional (Figure 3.3.7). For around 52 percent, the job is either temporary or seasonal. The relative share of employees with a permanent job is larger among female workers (43 for women versus 29 percent for men); and relatively more men tend to be temporary workers compared to women, and around 18 percent of male wage workers are occasional workers compared to 4 percent of female wage workers. This can be explained by the fact that women in Yemen are only likely to work if jobs are secure and stable. Figure 3.3.6: Job tenure11 14% 18% 4% 18% 7% 12% 24% 21% 25% 33% 26% 23% 28% 22% 33% 27% 30% 19% 28% 24% 24% 43% 40% 33% 34% 29% 29% 29% Male Female Houthis IRG Not displaced Displaced ALL GENDER OF WORKER AREA OF CONTROL DISPLACEMENT STATUS Permanent Temporary Seasonal Occasional 11 Note that temporary work refers to a job with a fixed time period, while occasional work depends on the demand for that work and is more piecemeal. 18 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Job tenure tends to be more secure in IRG than Houthi-controlled areas. While 40 percent of wage workers under IRG control have permanent jobs, 29 percent of employees under Houthi control have a permanent job. Similarly, the proportion of employees under IRG rule is 33 percent compared to 24 under Houthi control. Around 18 percent of wage workers under Houthi control have elementary occupations, while this proportion stands at 7 percent under IRG rule. Respondents or MIE from displaced households face a higher likelihood of having occasional jobs compared to households not currently displaced. For each of the more secure job categories (permanent, temporary, and seasonal), the relative shares among the displaced households are lower than among their not-displaced counterparts. Figure 3.3.7: Job tenure by status in occupation 6% 2% 6% 1% 8% 21% 14% 25% 10% 14% 9% 43% 24% 24% 16% 16% 31% 24% 68% 70% 38% 59% 36% 25% 50% 23% 24% 12% Skilled Elementary Service and Professional Manager Associate Other workers occupations sale workers professional and clerical workers Permanent Temporary Seasonal Occasional Job tenure varies greatly by occupation status. Skilled and elementary-occupation workers are the least likely to have permanent jobs, while managers and associate professionals report the highest likelihoods of holding permanent jobs. Around 21 percent of elementary-occupation workers are occasionally working compared to 2 percent among managers. For both skilled and elementary-occupation workers, jobs are often seasonal (43 and 31 percent, respectively). Main findings 19 Almost half of wage workers experience a delay in their wage payments. Around 29 percent of respondents or MIEs had their wage payment delayed less than six times over the year before the survey, while 6 percent experienced delays ranging between 6 and 11 times. For 15 percent, delays occurred every month. Male workers are slightly more likely to incur payment delays than female workers. Wage payment delays are slightly less common in areas under IRG rule than in areas under Houthi control (51 vs 48 percent). However, when delays occurred, they tend to be less often in IRG-controlled areas. Figure 3.3.8: Regularity of wage payment – frequency of payment delay 15% 12% 22% 15% 14% 6% 7% 3% 7% 29% 31% 4% 31% 28% 26% 49% 50% 48% 48% 51% Male Female Houthis IRG ALL GENDER OF WORKER AREA OF CONTROL Never Sometimes Often Always A slim majority of workers are satisfied with their job (Figure 3.3.9), and 18 percent report being dissatisfied. However, feedback from the survey team demonstrated that the question on job satisfaction was not culturally appropriate and results overestimate how satisfied workers are. Nonetheless, results are included here to compare outcomes across groups and when applicable the reasons for dissatisfaction are important. The proportion of satisfied workers is slightly higher among male workers and among workers living under IRG rule; respectively, 20 and 14 percent of workers are dissatisfied in areas under Houthi and IRG rules. 20 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure 3.3.9: Job satisfaction 18% 17% 20% 20% 14% 26% 30% 27% 30% 26% 54% 56% 54% 56% 50% Male Female Houthis IRG ALL GENDER OF WORKER AREA OF CONTROL Satisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied Dissatisfied There is a clear relationship between job satisfaction and occupation status. Workers at the top of the occupational pyramid (managers and professionals) are more likely to be satisfied compared to those at the bottom of the occupational pyramid (elementary-occupation workers). While dissatisfaction with job does not follow the same pattern, it is, nonetheless, apparent from Figure 3.3.10 that elementary-occupation workers are more likely to be dissatisfied that any other occupational category (except the residual category). Figure 3.3.10: Job satisfaction by status in occupation 7% 15% 6% 18% 12% 22% 26% 24% 30% 22% 32% 21% 32% 20% 69% 64% 63% 61% 56% 54% 46% Manager Professional Associate Service and Skilled workers Elementary Other professional sale workers occupations and clerical workers Satisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied Dissatisfied Main findings 21 Low pay appears to be the biggest reason of job dissatisfaction. The survey asks dissatisfied respondents about the reasons for their dissatisfaction. Figure 3.3.11 presents the three most common reasons. Respectively, 77 and 23 percent of dissatisfied workers complain about low pay and too little work, while 17 percent of these workers report that their dissatisfaction stems from having “too much work”. The proportion being dissatisfied because of low pay varies slightly by gender and area of control. In particular, unsatisfied workers in Houthi-controlled areas are more likely to cite “too little work” rather than “too much work” as the reason for their dissatisfaction, but “low pay” is still the main reason cited. Figure 3.3.11: Three main reasons for dissatisfaction with job 78 79 77 76 76 28 23 23 22 21 17 19 16 13 6 Male Female Houthis IRG ALL GENDER OF WORKER AREA OF CONTROL Pay is too low Too little work Too much work Note: The categories are not mutually exclusive; hence, they may sum up to over 100. 22 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen 3.4 Household income sources Most Yemeni households (89 percent) rely on labor income (wage, sales, and profit from business). Wage income is the single most important source of household income. For 68 percent of households, wage is the first income source, followed by sales of crops, animal products, or household goods (13 percent). Around 8 percent of households rely on profit from non-household enterprises as their main source of income. Remittances and support from family or friends are the first income source for less than 4 percent of households. This finding might reflect the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, which reduced remittances flow from GCC countries to a trickle. For many households (77 percent), income comes from a single source (figure not shown). However, this could also be explained by the fact that income sources were not prompted to the respondents, who might not consider remittances, or even aid, as an “income source”. Future rounds of the survey will be more explicit in this line of inquiry. Relatively more households under IRG control report wages as their main income source than under Houthi’s control (72 vs 66 percent). This is unsurprising since public sector salaries continue to be paid in IRG areas. Displaced households are more reliant on wage income than non-displaced households. While wages remain the main income source for rural households, it is relatively less important as a main income source compared to urban and semi-urban areas. Sales of crops or animal products represent the main income source for 17 and 15 percent of households in rural and semi-urban areas, respectively, compared with 6 percent of households in urban areas. Figure 3.4.1: Sources of household income12 7% 7% 9% 7% 10% 5% 10% 8% 8% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 6% 7% 15% 8% 8% 7% 10% 7% 14% 10% 15% 13% 14% 9% 10% 6% 7% 9% 7% 17% 72% 71% 73% 72% 68% 66% 67% 68% 69% 63% Houthis IRG Not Displaced Did not Received Urban Rural Semi-urban displaced receive DISPLACEMENT RECEPTION OF ALL AREA OF CONTROL STATUS ASSISTANCE RESIDENCE Wages Support from family/friends Sales of crops/animal products or household goods Remittances Profit from non-household based enterprise Other 12 Respondents are not prompted when asked about the main source of income, which could be why some sources such as remittances or aid are underreported. Main findings 23 Only 9 percent of workers report that their income is sufficient to cover their household’s expenses. For 35 percent of respondents or MIE, their income does not at all help to meet their household’s needs, while for 30 percent, income helps to cover less than half of household’s expenses. There are some differences in the way workers’ income helps to cover household’s needs by gender of the respondent or MIE and authority. Notably, 37 percent of respondents from IRG areas report that income is not enough to cover their needs, compared to 34 percent in Houthi areas. This is likely to reflect the decreased purchasing power caused by currency depreciation and inflation in IRG areas. Figure 3.4.2: Is respondent’s income sufficient to cover household's expenses? 9% 8% 13% 9% 9% 4% 5% 1% 4% 4% 22% 26% 13% 22% 21% 29% 30% 31% 28% 31% 45% 35% 34% 37% 30% Male Female Houthis IRG ALL GENDER OF WORKER AREA OF CONTROL Not at all More than half of household expenses Less than half of household expenses It is enough to cover expenses Around half of household expenses 24 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Box 3.5.1: Measuring food insecurity in Yemen This survey measures food security using the food 3.5 Food insecurity consumption score, which measures the frequency and diversity of household food consumption. More Yemen is considered to be one of the most food insecure nutritionally-dense foods, such as meat and leafy countries in the World,13 a finding also reflected in the phone vegetables, receive a higher weight in the score. The survey. Approximately, 25 percent of households have poor continuous score ranges from zero to 112 and is used to divide households into three different groups: poor food food consumption scores, and another 25 percent have security score (FCS<=28), borderline score (2842). Sometimes poor and (50 percent) of sample households have adequate food borderline are grouped together. consumption. Households under Houthi control are more likely to experience poor food consumption compared with As Yemen faces a severe food security crisis, a number of agencies monitor this score regularly. It is considered to those under IRG rule (28 vs 18 percent). Food insecurity is be sensitive to small changes in context and household more acute in rural areas than in semi-urban and urban experiences. Along with the reduced coping strategy areas. Displaced households face a higher likelihood of poor index (rCSI)—also collected through WFP phone surveys— food consumption (30 percent) relative to non-displaced additional data from face-to-face annual food security households (23 percent), and households receiving assessment and subject matter experts, this information food assistance are more likely to experience poor food is used to determine the Integrated Food Security Phase classification (IPC) of each district in Yemen. As of consumption compared to households that received no December 2022, 17 million people, over 53 percent of the food assistance. This finding indicates that food assistance, population, were likely to have experienced acute food while reaching the right target, is insufficient. insecurity (IPC phase 3) or worse. Figure 3.5.1: Distribution of households by food consumption groups (%) 50% 48% 55% 52% 43% 52% 48% 57% 44% 52% 27% 26% 25% 25% 24% 26% 25% 26% 24% 24% 28% 30% 28% 30% 25% 23% 22% 24% 18% 19% Houthis IRG Not Displaced Did not Received Urban Rural Semi-urban displaced receive DISPLACEMENT RECEPTION OF ALL AREA OF CONTROL STATUS ASSISTANCE RESIDENCE Poor Borderline Acceptable  emen: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Snapshot – Acute food insecurity: January – December 2023; Acute 13 Y malnutrition: October 2022- September 2023 Main findings 25 Households with a poor food consumption score experience an unbalanced diet composed mainly of staple starches (Figure 3.5.2). Milk, animal protein, and pulses are nearly absent from the diet of households with a poor food consumption score (below 28). Staple starches (including potatoes, rice, bread, wheat, flour, pasta and other grains) are consumed at all levels of the food consumption score. Consumption of high-protein content food is more frequent for households with an adequate food consumption score (above 42), while fruits are not typically present in the diet of households with a poor consumption score. Even for households with high food consumption scores, their consumption of fruits and vegetables is infrequent. Figure 3.5.2: Stacked food frequency of main food groups (median) 120 Poor Adequate oil sugar 100 Median food group score (weighted) milk 80 60 meat fruit 40 vegetables pulse 20 staple 0 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 110 115 Household food consumption score Note: Red and black lines indicate poor and borderline food security thresholds respectively. Households where the MIE was not working the week before the survey are more likely to have poor food consumption scores. Only 37 percent of these households report adequate food consumption compared to 56 percent for households where the respondent or the main income earner was working. Households whose MIE is an elementary-occupation worker have the highest risk of reporting poor or borderline food consumption compared to other occupations. Adequate food consumption is more common among households whose MIE is a manager or skilled worker. 26 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure 3.5.3: Food insecurity by selected labor market characteristics 37% 56% 59% 50% 58% 55% 67% 48% 51% 32% 22% 26% 24% 22% 28% 25% 22% 32% 24% 28% 26% 25% 22% 19% 20% 14% 10% Did not work Worked Manager Professional Associate Service Skilled Elementary Other professional and and sale workers occupations clerical workers workers WORKING STAUS STATUS IN OCCUPATION Poor Borderline Acceptable Households whose MIE are working in the trade sector are the best off in terms of food consumption, while households with respondents or MIE working in construction are the least likely to experience acceptable food consumption. These households are also more likely to have borderline food consumption than any other group of households. Households with the MIE working in manufacturing or agriculture also see high levels of food insecurity. Figure 3.5.4: Food insecurity by economic activity 50% 47% 41% 66% 48% 57% 46% 36% 20% 28% 22% 24% 26% 32% 21% 32% 26% 23% 23% 18% 13% Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Trade, Professional, Public Other services and mining transportation, scientific, administration and and technical accommodation activities Poor Borderline Acceptable Main findings 27 3.6 Food assistance A majority (55 percent) of households received food assistance, an indication of the importance of this support. Relatively more households in areas under IRG control report receiving assistance than those under Houthi control (60 vs 53 percent), despite employment conditions being better in IRG areas. Displaced households with worse food security are more likely to receive food assistance (68 percent) compared to non-displaced households (52 percent). Households in rural areas, also with worse food security, are more likely to receive food assistance than those in either urban or semi-urban areas (Figure 3.6.1). Households with poor food consumption are more likely to receive food assistance (61 percent), which indicates good targeting of assistance programs (while potentially indicating that the support is inadequate), but there is little difference in aid reception between those with borderline and acceptable scores. This indicates that food assistance can be better targeted to those with unacceptable food consumption. Figure 3.6.1: Reception of food assistance 68 60 59 61 55 56 53 52 53 52 50 Houthis IRG Not Displaced Urban Rural Semi- Poor Borderline Acceptable displaced urban DISPLACEMENT ALL AREA OF CONTROL STATUS RESIDENCE FOOD CONSUMPTION SCORE Most food assistance received is provided “in kind” (89 percent).14 The proportion of households reporting in-kind food assistance varies little by area of control, displacement status, or place or residence. Reception of food assistance in the form of vouchers is rather uncommon (5 percent). 14 In-kind assistance in Yemen usually consists of food baskets. 28 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure 3.6.2: Form of food assistance 89 90 88 90 90 89 90 86 11 12 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 8 5 5 6 5 3 3 Houthis IRG Not Displaced Urban Rural Semi-urban displaced DISPLACEMENT ALL AREA OF CONTROL STATUS RESIDENCE In-kind Cash Vouchers Note: The categories are not mutually exclusive; hence they may sum up to over 100. Main findings 29 4 CONCLUSION In this report we have shed light on the experience of Yemenis regarding livelihoods, displacement and food security using data from a phone survey fielded in August and September of 2022. Most households (84 percent) have at least one member aged 15 years or above who was working the month before the survey. While most main income earners (69 percent) worked the week before the survey, the type of work remains precarious. Around 46 percent of workers are in elementary-occupations and only 33 percent of workers have a permanent job. Wage workers dominate the labor market, accounting for 67 percent of the workforce. Agriculture and (wholesale and retail) trade provide livelihoods for many (48 percent). The public sector, once a major employer in Yemen, now only employs 11 percent of workers, and wages are often delayed for the remaining public workers. Most households rely on wages and on a single source for household income. Household vulnerability is compounded by frequent delays in wage payment and low levels of wages relative to household needs. Forced population movements still affect segments of the population. Around 23 percent of Yemeni households are currently displaced due to the conflict and are more likely to face precarious working conditions and higher food insecurity. 30 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Food insecurity represents an important challenge to welfare. Around 50 percent of households experience inadequate food consumption. A relatively large proportion of households live on an unbalanced diet composed mainly of staples. Inequalities in food security are significant, with households in IRG-controlled areas better off. This also correlates with better employment conditions and livelihood opportunities reported in IRG areas compared to Houthi-controlled areas, although household income is less likely to cover all household needs in IRG areas. Food assistance plays an important role in protecting a large segment of the population. Households with poor food insecurity are more likely to receive assistance, however there is little difference in aid assistance between households with borderline and acceptable food consumption scores, indicating the need for better targeting. Additionally, more households in IRG areas report receiving aid despite worse conditions in Houthi-controlled areas. In-kind assistance is the most reported form of food assistance, with vouchers uncommon in Yemen. The dataset used to prepare this report fills a crucial data gap and is intended to become a public good for those interested in understanding welfare and livelihood in Yemen. It represents only the first round of a potentially regular data collection exercise, which will provide much needed information on the living conditions of Yemenis. Conclusion 31 ANNEX A: FURTHER TABLES Table A1: Weighted and unweighted distributions of selected characteristics Unweighted Weighted All Male Female All Male Female AREA OF CONTROL Houthi-controlled areas 68.2 68.0 69.0 69.3 70.9 67.5 Internationally recognized government 31.8 32.0 31.0 30.7 29.1 32.5 (IRG) GENDER Male 80.6 100.0 0.0 51.4 100.0 0.0 Female 19.4 0.0 100.0 48.6 0.0 100.0 Age (mean) 35.1 35.1 34.8 34.5 35.4 33.5 Percent currently displaced due to 20.2 19.7 22.2 22.7 21.7 26.4 conflict Household size (mean) 9.9 10.0 9.4 7.9 8.1 7.5 Number of observations 1,297 1,045 252 1,297 1,045 252 32 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen ANNEX B: METHODOLOGY The survey used random digit dialing, relying on the range of valid numbers, with up to three attempts when a phone number was not reached—that is, the call unanswered, not picked up, picked up but unable to complete the interview at that time. A total of 1,297 respondents completed the interview resulting in a response rate of around 28 percent, indicating the difficulty of completing phone interviews. Sampling Design We used sample quotas were to obtain a diverse set of individuals across the governorates of Abyan, Aden, Al- Baida, Al-Dhale, Al-Hodeida, Al-Jawf, Al-Maharh, Al-Mahweet, Amran, Dhamar, Hadramout, Hajja, Ibb, Laheg, Mareb, Remah, Saadah, and Sanaa City. The following table presents the sample distribution by governorate. Table B.1: Target and achieved sample by governorate Governorate Target sample (N) Achieved sample (N) Achievement rate (%) Ibb 73 113 154.8 Abyan 84 39 46.4 Alamana 63 124 196.8 Albayda 73 58 79.5 Aljawf 84 13 15.5 AlHudeida 73 79 108.2 Aldaleh 84 48 57.1 Almahwit 52 35 67.3 Almahra 63 8 12.7 Taiz 63 75 119.0 Hajja 63 83 131.7 Hadramout 73 85 116.4 Thamar 73 104 142.5 Rima 84 25 29.8 Shabwa 84 27 32.1 Saada 73 61 83.6 Sanaa 63 86 136.5 Aden 63 83 131.7 Amran 63 77 122.2 Lahj 73 49 67.1 Marib 73 25 34.2 Total 1,497 1,297 86.6 Annex 33 Individual-Level The individual-level selection probabilities were modeled as if based on a stratified sampling design, where the governorates serve as the strata; 2017 projected population counts at the governorate level were available and based on the 2004 census. Hence, an individual’s selection probability was taken to be the ratio of the number of sampled individuals from the corresponding stratum and the projected governorate population size. The following histogram presents the corresponding sample design weights, which are taken to be the inverse of the modeled selection probabilities. Figure B.1: Individual level design weights Household-Level Household-level selection probabilities were modeled as if they were proportional to the household size, since any respondent residing in the corresponding household could have reported on household-level characteristics. In some cases, sample respondents reported extremely large and unrealistic household sizes. As this may be due to observational error, the set of household size observations were Winsorized at the 90th percentile, which was found to be ten for these observations. The selection probability for the sample respondents was taken to be proportional to the resulting observations. The following histogram presents the corresponding scaled sample design weights, which are the reciprocal of the modeled selection probabilities. 34 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure B.2: Household level design weights Sample Calibration For both the individual-level and household-level weights, we used a raking ratio calibration scheme to obtain the calibrated weights.15 We used the R programming language (R Core Team, 2016) with the aid of the “survey” package (Lumley, 2020, 2004) to calculate the calibrated weights.16 Individual-Level ■ Sample calibration for individual-level weights were based on 2017 gender and age projected counts by governorate. ■ The age variable was discretized into the following categories: 18-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+. ■ The following tables give the projected population distribution by count and percentage, along with the sample distribution by count and percentage.  ee Deville, J.-C., Särndal, C.-E., and Sautory, O. (1993). Generalized Raking Procedures in Survey Sampling. Journal of the 15 S American Statistical Association, 88, p.1013-1020 and Deville, J.-C. and Särndal, C.-E. (1992). Calibration Estimators in Survey Sampling. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 87 , p.376-382 for information relating to the calibration procedure.  Core Team (2016). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 16 R Austria. Lumley, T. (2020). “survey: analysis of complex survey samples”. R package version 4.0. Lumley, T. (2004). Analysis of complex survey samples. Journal of Statistical Software 9 (1), p. 1-19. Annex 35 Table B.2: Population count by gender Gender Males Females Population Count (Percentage) 6,976,999 (50.52%) 6,832,529 (49.48%) Sample Count (Percentage) 1,045 (80.57%) 252 (19.43%) Table B.3: Population count by age group Age 18-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Population Count 3,794,334 2,442,054 1,933,798 1,484,834 1,880,523 1,205,706 1,068,279 (Percentage) (27.48%) (17.68%) (14.00%) (10.75%) (13.62%) (8.73%) (7.74%) Sample Count 293 201 209 176 259 94 65 (Percentage) (22.59%) (15.50%) (16.11%) (13.60%) (19.97%) (7.25%) (5.01%) As suggested by Battaglia et al. (2004),17 population and sample cell counts should be no smaller than 5 percent. The 60+ sample cell count is near the extremum, and hence for sample calibration purposes we collapsed the 60+ and 50-59 categories. The following histogram presents the distribution of the calibrated weights.  attaglia, M. P 17 B ., Izrael, D., Hoaglin, D. C., and Frankel, M. R. (2004). Tips and tricks for raking survey data (aka sample balancing). Abt Associates. 36 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen Figure B.3: Individual level calibrated weights In some cases, responses from those individuals receiving the largest weights may be driving/skewing the distribution of the estimates. To mitigate such influence, Battaglia et al. (2004) suggest trimming the sample weights at five times the mean of the weights. The following histogram presents the distribution of the weights trimmed at this value. Figure B.4: Individual level trimmed weights Annex 37 Household-Level Post-stratification for the household-level weights were based on household counts by governorate ■  estimated from the 2014 Household Budget Survey. ■ As suggested by Battaglia et al. (2004), population and sample cell counts should be no smaller than 5 percent. Hence, the governorate areas were collapsed in the following manner to give cell counts above the suggested threshold. Governorate(s) Sample Count Sample Percentage Abyan, Al-Baida, and Al-Dhale 145 0.1118 Aden and Laheg 132 0.1018 Al-Hodeida 79 0.0609 Al-Jawf, Mareb, Saadah 99 0.0763 Al-Maharh, Hadramout, and Shabwah 120 0.0925 Al-Mahweet and Hajja 118 0.0910 Amran 77 0.0594 Dhamar and Remah 129 0.0995 Ibb 113 0.0871 Sanaa City 86 0.0663 Sanaa Region 124 0.0956 Taiz 75 0.0578 38 Monitoring food insecurity and employment in Yemen The following histogram presents the distribution of the calibrated weights. Figure B.5: Household level post-stratified weights In some cases, the responses from those individuals receiving the largest weights may be driving/skewing the distribution of the estimates. To mitigate such influence, Battaglia et al. (2004) suggest trimming the sample weights at five times the mean of the weights. The following histogram presents the distribution of the weights trimmed at this value. Figure B.6: Household level trimmed weights Annex 39 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 www.worldbank.org