Doing Development Differently (DDD): A Pilot for Politically Savvy, Locally Tailored and Adaptive Delivery in Nigeria DELIVERY CASE STUDY Halimatou Hima/World Bank THE NIGERIA FADAMA NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT SERIES HOW TO BUILD A PILOT INTO A NATIONAL PROGRAM THROUGH LEARNING AND ADAPTATION MARCH 2016 The Nigeria Fadama National Development Series: How to Build a Pilot Into a National Program Through Learning and Adaptation Cover: Halimatou Hima, Fadama User Group (FUG) This case study was written by Halimatou Hima, Claudio Santibanez, Sabrina Roshan, and Roland Lomme as part of the Delivery Case Studies produced by the World Bank’s Nigeria Country Team. It was drafted under the supervision of Katherine Bain and Adetunji Oredipe. The Delivery Case Studies series—part of the Doing Development Differently initiative—aims to generate knowledge on what works in Nigeria and why. The authors are grateful to Indira Konjhodzic for comments and support on earlier drafts. They also acknowledge the invaluable feedback from the Fadama team in Abuja, as well as editorial support from Amanda Green. This case study does not represent the views of the World Bank’s board of directors, and any errors are those of the authors alone. Contents   Contents Executive Summary v Introduction v Tracing the Design and Implementation Process v Program Achievements v Lessons Learned vi Introduction 1 Development Challenge: Reducing Poverty and Improving the Livelihoods of Rural Dwellers by Building Local Capacity to Fulfill the Country’s Agricultural Potential 1 Post-Independence Poverty Reduction in Nigeria 1 Nigeria’s Agricultural Sector 1 The National Fadama Development Project Series: Piloting, Adapting, and Scaling 4 Case Study Research Framework 4 Delivery Challenge: Adapting Rural Development Interventions by Learning from Experience and Scaling Up Gradually 4 A Short Overview: 20 Years of Implementation and Adaptation 4 Delivering Sustainable Change in Nigeria’s Agricultural Sector 6 Tracing the Design and Implementation Process 7 Fadama I Design: Building a Pilot from Previous Experiences, Marginal Changes, and Continual Experimentation 7 Fadama I Implementation: An Experiment in Piloting and Learning 8 Fadama II Preparation: Adapting to Changing Social and Political Conditions, Responding to Growing Demands, and Incorporating International Best Practices 9 Fadama II Design: Tailoring the Community-Driven Development Approach to Rural Conditions in Nigeria and Introducing Institutional Capacity Building at the Local Level 11 Fadama II Implementation: A Learning Experience in Adopting Community-Driven Development and Creating Social and Economic Capital in Rural Areas 13 Fadama III Design: The Challenges of Replicating a Successful Formula Nationwide 16 Fadama III Implementation: Continued Progress Despite Stretched Capacity 17 Lessons Learned 19 The Way Forward 22 Annexes Annex A: Full Description of Fadama Project Life 23 Annex B: CDD Lessons and Fadama Responses 24 Bibliography 25 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Poverty Headcount Ratio (% of population) and GDP Growth (annual %) 2 Figure 2: Rural vs. Urban Poverty Levels: Nigeria, 1986 and 2004 2 Figure 3: Population and Agricultural Growth Rates: Nigeria, 1982–96 3 iii LIST OF Tables Table 1: Overview of the Fadama Project Series 5 Table 2: Learning and Adaptation over 20 Years of Fadama Project Implementation 7 iv Executive Summary   Executive Summary Introduction of government. Today, a large number of communities are responsible for their own local development planning and Over the last 20 years, poor rural farmers in Nigeria participate actively in identifying needed infrastructure have seen the benefits of community organization and supportive services. Fadama’s community groups are as a tool for local economic development under the joint stakeholders in many community assets. National Fadama Development Project series. They have witnessed improvements in rural areas that have This case study aims to show how learning and embraced a more inclusive and participatory model of adaptation have been important to the success of local economic decision making. Many communities the Fadama project, and how lessons learned can help have come together under the umbrella of new inform new operations in agricultural reform and rural institutional arrangements for addressing local issues. development more broadly. The case study explores These arrangements have visibly improved economic the following question: How did the Fadama project conditions, boosted agricultural incomes, and helped learn and adapt to changing circumstances, including reduce rural poverty. This transformation has taken place the social and political context, as it evolved from in challenging environments, where basic agriculture a pilot program to a successful national project? The remains the principal source of livelihoods and where chronological review looks at how the program’s success rural stakeholders have not traditionally participated in can be attributed to its capacity to build on existing cooperative local economic arrangements. knowledge of local conditions, to pilot and learn before scaling up, to incorporate and test global practices, and to In Nigeria, fadama is a Hausa name for irrigable build important new institutional structures at the local land—usually low-lying plains underlaid with the level. This case study also examines how the evolving shallow aquifers found along major river systems.1 institutional structure ultimately led to a change in the social contract among farmers, other stakeholders, and Beginning in 1990 with a pilot agricultural project different levels of government, resulting in a cultural (Fadama I) designed to bring basic irrigation and shift in the process of local development. This shift was productive support to farmers in selected Nigerian states, prompted in part by a transfer of global knowledge and the Fadama series has evolved through two subsequent adaptation of prevailing global practices. innovative and adaptive projects (Fadama II and III) that are now well established nationally. Fadama II, launched in 2003, introduced a groundbreaking community-driven development (CDD) model to Nigeria’s rural areas and Program Achievements helped institutionalize local stakeholder engagement in Fadama’s experiment in constructing social capital community decision making. In Fadama III, the program for development emerged from the lessons learned has expanded geographically and become a well-known through the implementation of various agricultural national brand of local agricultural development. and rural development projects over the years. The conscious process of learning and adaptation has supported efforts to overcome the challenges faced Tracing the Design and by rural communities. As the program has evolved, its Implementation Process objectives and implementation modalities have been refined and have now reached an advanced level of Nigeria’s experience with the Fadama project series sophistication: provides a wealth of knowledge on the challenges of delivering development at the local level. This case • Fadama is both highly decentralized (with funded study traces the evolution of the project’s design and projects designed by small groups of beneficiaries implementation to demonstrate its adaptive capacity for and selected on the basis of their intrinsic merit) and promoting local agriculture and rural income generation. supported by a dense pyramidal and multilayered Before Fadama, most rural projects in Nigeria were institutional structure. This structure involves multiple managed centrally, with decisions made at higher levels agents—formal (such as local governments) and 1 For more information, visit http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/07/28/fadama-iii-rural-agriculture-project-fast-becoming- a-household-name-in-nigeria. v informal (including traditional rulers)—and ensures the most important ingredients of its development close monitoring and effective checks and balances success. through inclusive and active participation among a • Embrace adaptive learning. Design of the Fadama wide range of stakeholders. project has embraced a model of trial, error, and • The program’s institutional framework has been adaptation. From piloting targeted small-scale deemed effective enough in strengthening community investments to introducing fundamentally local governance that it has been emulated and new mechanisms for community participation in mainstreamed to complement the efforts of local agricultural development, the project has been a governments (for example, through the establishment laboratory of experiments. This process of adaptive of Community Government Councils in Imo State). learning has encouraged innovation at every stage, • Fadama has reached beyond its initial targets (both enhancing project results and sustainability. assisting more farmers than expected and moving • Tailor best practices to local conditions. The outside the agricultural sector itself) to benefit Fadama series of projects is a clear example of how indirect beneficiaries (including through the creation country-level projects can benefit from international of local public assets) and marginalized groups (women, experience. The broad acceptance of the emerging youth, physically challenged people, and internally CDD model within Nigeria resulted in part from displaced people). It has tried to balance economic information gathered on how similar projects had return and social inclusion. Under Fadama  III, for succeeded in other environments, together with example, individual contributions have been waived careful tailoring to the Nigerian context and use of for vulnerable groups such as women, young people, existing institutional arrangements. and those who are physically challenged. • Build consensus and attention to process. In- • Fadama has not only generated income, as initially depth consultation with Nigerian counterparts intended, but also significantly enhanced social and communities facilitated the move away from capital, including through job creation. centrally led, top-down approaches toward a locally • The program has proved effective in micro-level led participatory approach. Of particular importance conflict prevention and resolution (within groups of in fostering community support were proactive beneficiaries and between those who are and are not efforts to involve traditional institutions; constant beneficiaries). It has recently extended its reach to the communication between the implementation team victims of insecurity in conflict-affected areas. and communities; and regular, targeted technical • Fadama has to some extent managed to garner assistance and logistical support. political support while fending off unwanted political • Promote participation to strengthen social capital. interference. An effective institutional structure at the local level • The program has been mobilized effectively for a rapid was critical to organizing community participation response to an emergency situation—specifically to and engagement. The core organizational element contribute to the recovery of livelihoods among of Fadama lay in the formation of stakeholder groups those victimized by political violence and insecurity according to their interests, a participatory process in northeastern Nigeria. that helped build social capital, local governance, and community decision-making capacity, thereby The Fadama project series stands out as a success enhancing the sustainability of outcomes. within a country portfolio that faces numerous • Foster inclusiveness. By recognizing indirect implementation challenges. It has come of age through beneficiaries (such as fishers, pastoralists, and hunters/ a long process of adaptation and innovation. This process gatherers) as legitimate users of shared resources such is expected to continue under additional financing for as scarce land and water, Fadama II developed a culture Fadama III, which focuses on developing key agricultural of inclusiveness and helped communities become value chain products with export potential, narrowly more sensitive to the needs of all stakeholders as targeting communities in six chosen states. In many ways, well as the impacts of their actions on others and the program has come full circle, once again piloting new the environment. approaches to test the model’s adaptability to more • Create organizational capacity through investments modern commercial agricultural development. in staff. The Fadama project series has invested heavily in capacity building, recruiting highly qualified staff from the private and public sectors, paying Lessons Learned them competitively, and deploying a large network of trained facilitators to provide ongoing training • Maintain presence and continuity. The team’s and technical assistance to participating community perseverance in devoting financial and, more groups around the country. important, advisory assistance at various levels over • Cultivate a culture of joint responsibility. Required the project’s 20-year time span has been one of counterpart contributions of cash, materials, or labor vi have improved group cohesion and introduced a contexts, strengthening local-level decision making system of oversight to ensure the integrity of the flow and reducing political interference. of funds at the community level. These institutional • Demonstrate results to inform adaptation, build   arrangements have helped create a culture of recognition, and strengthen demand. The most contribution, joint ownership, and commitment to important evidence developed by Fadama has been subprojects—essential elements of sustainability. that community projects can address rural conditions • Ensure sustainability through well-designed in Nigeria. The project’s effectiveness in generating incentives. The project’s financial incentives, together improved economic conditions and achieving with the central role of beneficiary contributions and greater community participation has widened public capital investments, have strengthened the continuity acceptance of the underlying model, and steady of community subprojects and isolated them from implementation progress has allowed communities political funding cycles. Because of the financial stakes to recognize the merits of the approach and to involved, local Fadama activities have continued even participate more actively in community development. when local government counterpart funds have been delayed or absent. For the World Bank, the Fadama project series has • Create institutional change by scaling up through demonstrated the importance of consensus building national-level standardization with local-level and local ownership, the utility of exposing national flexibility. Once rolled out at the national level, teams to international best practice, the need for heavy the project’s organizational structure became investment (of time and money) in project supervision, more standardized to facilitate cross-country and the importance of keeping promises early on to build management. Yet Fadama’s design has preserved the trust and obtain buy-in from communities. flexibility granted to communities in preparing and implementing their own development plans. The Despite the Fadama project’s widely recognized internalization of Fadama delivery mechanisms has success, challenges remain in ensuring the institutional had a lasting institutional effect. and financial sustainability of the experiment. • Improve local governance through decentralized Community development has been supported by ad implementation arrangements. The considerable hoc institutional mechanisms and resource mobilization. decision-making and implementation autonomy Some beneficiaries have had to flee areas affected by the granted to states under Fadama has been exceptional insurgency in the northeast, losing assets created under among federal-level projects in Nigeria and has the project. Insecurity therefore needs to be factored enabled an autonomous and highly accountable into the project’s risk management framework. Following local governance structure through opportunities the closure of the Fadama project series, expected at the for capacity building at the subnational level and end of 2017, formal institutions will need to take over stronger links between communities and their local the “inducement” (Mansuri and Rao 2013) of community governments. development and give communities access to the • Introduce flexibility as a means of reducing political financing they need to grow further. Political structures interference. Fadama’s flexible delivery mechanisms have not been altered by the Fadama project, which have allowed solutions to be tailored to diverse local remains vulnerable to political capture or neglect. vii Introduction   Introduction Development Challenge: Reducing commensurate with its vast resource-rich territory. It was Poverty and Improving the home to more than 250 ethnic groups, who lived mostly in poor rural areas. Their future depended on a more Livelihoods of Rural Dwellers vibrant agricultural sector. by Building Local Capacity to Fulfill the Country’s Agricultural The early post-independence experience, however, Potential marked by a succession of ineffective governments, slowly eroded Nigerians’ aspirations that institutions Amina Isa meticulously records in her books how many could deliver, particularly for poor people.3 A series of bags of shea nuts were sold, how many mudu2 of shea failed political attempts followed by military rule, as butter were processed, and how many jars of hair well as rampant corruption, privileged structures, and pomade were packaged. She later checks the bags of noninclusive cultural norms, hindered the development shea nuts behind a door marked “Storage Room.” She potential of Nigeria’s economy. Erratic political transitions explains that this excess production will be sold when affected policy continuity and precluded long-term the market prices improve. Next to the Storage Room reform. Inconsistent policies eventually had sharply is the “Packaging Centre,” where the jars of pomade are negative effects on poverty levels. kept before being sent across town and to other parts of Nigeria. “Women love our products,” she says. “The hair Overall, efforts by early governments to reduce poverty pomade is a best-seller, and so is the all-natural soap.” did not bear fruit. Relative poverty actually worsened in the 1980s, even in the midst of economic growth. By 1992, 62 Shortly afterward, Amina records and calculates how percent of the population was living below the poverty line much her Fadama User Group (FUG) made that week: ($1.25 a day), and 80 percent on less than $2 a day (figure 1).4 they sold five bags of shea butter for N30,000 each and about 12 jars of pomade for N500 each. One-tenth of The challenges were even greater in trying to address living that revenue will be saved for future investments, loans standards in rural areas, where the incidence of poverty to FUG members, and emergencies in the community. was almost twice as high as in urban areas (figure 2). More Amina is treasurer of the Tswata Mukote FUG Fadama III than 70 percent of Nigeria’s poor population lived in in Kutigi, Niger State. Like her mother and grandmother, rural areas. Despite the massive resources committed to she is in the shea butter business. However, Amina now alleviating rural poverty (Aderonmu 2010), gains were slow. processes more shea butter in less time with the use of machinery, and she has made a recognizable design for the pomade jars she is selling to an expanding customer Nigeria’s Agricultural Sector base. These innovations have led to tangible changes During the early post-independence period, agriculture in her life: she has raised her income, managed to send remained the main source of livelihood for 80 percent her children to school, and even saved enough to start of rural dwellers, who relied mostly on staples and second-generation businesses, selling palm oil, melon, subsistence farming. Proceeds from agriculture and kuli-kuli (a peanut-based snack). accounted for over two-thirds of rural economic activity. Yet agricultural production and incomes were volatile Post-Independence Poverty Reduction because farmers used traditional cultivation methods in Nigeria and rudimentary practices and tools. Rural households were vulnerable to economic shocks and had few Nigeria’s independence in 1960 brought with it high means to manage risks. Production depended heavily expectations, including for the expansion of agriculture. on intermittent and erratic rainfall, particularly in the In 1959 a West African Review article referred to Nigeria as drier north. Land degradation was significant, and less “Africa’s Giant in the Sun” (Baxter 1959). As Africa’s largest than 1 percent of cropland was irrigated. Meanwhile, nation, Nigeria had considerable development potential farmers faced poor access to markets, limited availability 2 A mudu is a unit of measurement that amounts to approximately 1.5 kilograms of shea nuts. 3 Several studies have pointed to corruption as the main determinant of citizens’ distrust in government (Iroghama 2012). 4 All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. 1 Figure 1:  Poverty Headcount Ratio (% of population) and GDP Growth (annual %) 90 40 86.4 85 84.5 83.1 80.4 30 80 77.0 20 75 70 68.5 68 10 65 63.1 61.9 0 60 53.9 –10 55 50 –20 1986 1992 1996 2004 2010 Population with less than $1.25 a day Population with less than $2 a day GDP Growth (annual %) Source: World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org.products/wdi. Figure 2:  Rural vs. Urban Poverty Levels: Nigeria, 1986 and 2004 80 73.4 64.2 60 52.2 49.5 43 40 31.7 20 0 1986 2004 Population living below the national poverty line Rural population living below the national rural poverty line Urban population living below the national urban poverty line Source: World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org.products/wdi. of credit, and deficient infrastructure. The difficulty and decline was exacerbated by low budgetary provisions high cost of transporting produce to market significantly for the operation and maintenance of storage facilities, increased postharvest losses. input distribution systems, and processing facilities, and for road maintenance in farming areas. In addition, the Despite its importance, the agricultural sector remained agricultural sector—which employed nearly 70 percent stagnant. Insufficient investment during the petroleum- of the economically active population—lacked access driven development of the last few decades reduced to financial services. As a result, growth in agricultural agricultural productivity and competitiveness. 5 This production did not keep pace with booming population 5 The oil sector has played an increasingly significant role in the Nigerian economy since the 1980s, and in some ways Nigeria exemplifies the consequences of the resource curse (see Lewis and Watts 2015). 2 Figure 3:  Population and Agricultural Growth Rates: Nigeria, 1982–96   20 15 10 5 0 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 –5 –10 Agriculture, value added (annual % growth) Population growth rate Source: World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org.products/wdi. growth (figure 3), leaving many Nigerians to face poverty better understanding of the most effective methods for and food insecurity. In fact, agricultural productivity dealing with particular climate and soil conditions. For decreased steadily for most of the post-independence example, the evidence from implementation revealed period.6 Even today, the country is a net importer of that improvements in production were significantly some key products and cereals. If Nigeria were to increase better in the northern states of Kano, Bauchi, and Sokoto, yields to levels comparable to those in other countries, particularly in fadama areas (World Bank 1995). it could more than double its agricultural production. An impact evaluation of the ADPs found that Many targeted interventions were launched to address interventions in fadama areas generated much better the challenges in Nigeria’s agricultural sector. These outcomes than in other regions (World Bank 1995). Such attempts focused initially on infrastructure investments, lands are especially suitable for irrigated crop production production support, credits, and market access. A few and fishing, and traditionally provide feed and water of these attempts approached rural development in an for livestock. Early successes in the fadama areas thus integrated, multisectoral manner. Later, in the 1970s and created the knowledge base needed to compare the 1980s, the World Bank supported a series of agricultural relative effectiveness of activities in distinct regions development projects (ADPs) in Nigeria. Those projects and to compare the results with those from other were designed, as in many other countries, primarily to World Bank–financed projects that aimed to increase encourage increases in production through either the output along valley bottom areas of West Africa (World expansion of arable lands or more effective use of inputs. Bank 1995). Land irrigation and supportive infrastructure, along with credit, were the main tools used. Responsibility for The World Bank’s 1989 Nigeria Strategy for Agricultural managing the ADPs and the overall support system resided Growth built on these initial findings. It identified the mainly with the Department of Rural Development in the replication of already successful low-cost, privately Ministry of Agriculture. owned, small-scale irrigation as the most important source of growth for agriculture in the north (World The mixed experience with ADPs during that period offered Bank 1989). The ADPs’ achievements in northern areas lessons for subsequent interventions, especially for the stemmed in large part from developing small-scale Fadama projects. The varying results and accumulated irrigation through the extraction of shallow groundwater knowledge obtained from the ADPs contributed to a with low-cost petrol-driven pumps. It was estimated that 6 Agricultural productivity is defined in general terms as the ratio of the value of total farm outputs to the value of total inputs used in farm production (Olayide and Heady 1982). 3 investments in small tube wells and pumps could expand and transform the design of delivery mechanisms in the unexploited potential of the fadama flood plains by response to changing circumstances. The chronological roughly 1 million hectares (World Bank 1989). review looks at how the program’s success can be attributed to its capacity to build on existing knowledge The National Fadama Development Project of local conditions, to pilot and learn before scaling up, Series: Piloting, Adapting, and Scaling to incorporate and test global practices, and to build important new institutional structures at the local level. It was on the basis of the findings just noted that the first The case study examines how the evolving institutional National Fadama Development Project (Fadama I) was structure ultimately led to a change in the social contract conceived. Against the backdrop of falling agricultural among farmers, other stakeholders, and different levels productivity, erratic political transitions, inconsistent of government, resulting in a cultural shift in the process policies, and a general inability to address poverty, of local development. This shift was prompted in part particularly among farmers in rural areas, there was a by a transfer of global knowledge and adaptation of sense that new approaches were needed. Beginning with prevailing global practices. a pilot project launched in 1992 by the federal government of Nigeria, with support from the World Bank, this intervention evolved into two additional innovative Delivery Challenge: Adapting and adaptive projects (Fadama II and Fadama III) and is now well established nationally, with broad support (see Rural Development Interventions annex A). by Learning from Experience and Scaling Up Gradually As discussed shortly in greater detail, Fadama I focused Although many evaluations have been conducted of on developing small-scale irrigation and included a Nigeria’s experience with the Fadama project series component to help farmers organize into beneficiary (Ibeawuchi and Nwachuckwu 2010; Kudi et al. 2008; farmer groups—Fadama Users Associations (FUAs)to Nkonya et al. 2008; World Bank 2000, 2010, 2014), one support irrigation management, cost recovery, and important element has not received much attention: access to credit, marketing, and other services. Fadama II the process of learning and adaptation to address aimed to strengthen the capacity of Fadama Community development challenges that emerged during the Associations (FCAs) and their constituent Fadama User implementation and regional expansion of the three Groups and to provide financing directly to communities Fadama projects. Yet the projects’ experimentations with for small-scale infrastructure and asset acquisition. various types of support to rural communities has yielded “Before Fadama II, the government decided what the a wealth of knowledge on the results, both positive and communities needed. With Fadama, there has been a negative, of different delivery mechanisms. As such, the paradigm shift from top down to bottom up.” 7 Fadama III Fadama project series serves as an important test case supports sustainable increases in the incomes of users of on the adaptation of interventions through learning, with rural land and water resources in Nigeria. important lessons for future rural sector interventions. Case Study Research Framework A Short Overview: 20 Years of This case study aims to show how learning and adaptation Implementation and Adaptation within the Fadama projects bolstered their success, and A brief overview of the National Fadama Development how lessons learned can help inform new operations in Project series shows how the design and objectives of agricultural reform and rural development more broadly. each project evolved over time (table 1). The series began In doing so, it explores the following question: How with a regional pilot, extending to 12 states in the second did the Fadama program learn and adapt to changing phase before being rolled out nationally in its third phase. circumstances, including the social and political context, The process of scaling up Fadama occurred through three as it evolved from a pilot program to a successful separate investment projects during this period. Fadama I national project? The hypothesis is that for a project to (1992–99) piloted new responses to lessons learned under have continued success it must adapt its design based previous ADPs in seven arid northern states. Fadama II on lessons learned from previous engagements, from (2003–09) fundamentally changed the project’s delivery targeted pilot interventions, and from global experiences. model, moving from a more traditional top-down approach to a more inclusive bottom-up model that The case study traces the evolution of the Fadama cultivated community ownership and participation. project series to highlight its capacity to learn, adapt, 7 Interview with the Lagos State project coordinator, January 2015. 4 Table 1:  Overview of the Fadama Project Series Fadama (1992–99)—Fadama Building on Local Innovations from the Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs)   • Project (ID: P002148) approved for a loan of $67.5 million in March 1992, effective in February 1993, closed in March 1999, and fully disbursed in September 1999 • Approach: Top-down, building on the ADPs with a heavy emphasis on infrastructure investment • Scope: Fadama I focused on fadama areas in seven core states (Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara) and invested heavily in small-scale infrastructure • Results: Objectives substantially achieved • Political context: Military rule Fadama II (2003–09)—Bottom-Up Approach: Power to Fadama Users • Project (ID: P063622) approved on a credit in the amount of $69.9 million in December 2003, reviewed in June 2007, and closed in December 2009 • Approach: Bottom-up, building on Fadama I with the incorporation of local development plans (LDPs) for a more inclusive model • Scope: Fadama II was implemented in 11 states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Imo, Kaduna, Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, and Taraba) and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), with the African Development Bank covering six additional states (Borno, Katsina, Kogi, Kwara, Plateau, and Jigawa), bringing the total to 18 • Results: Objectives substantially achieved • Political context: End of military rule and transition to democratic rule Fadama III (2008–17)—Scaling Fadama Nationwide • Project (ID: P096572) approved in July 2008 in the amount of $250 million, effective and still ongoing; scheduled to close in December 2017 • Approach: Bottom-up, building on Fadama II with the incorporation of the Fadama Users’ Equity Fund (FUEF) for a more sustainable model • Scope: All 36 states and the FCT • Results: On track to achieving project targets • Political context: Democratic rule Fadama AF (2013–17)—Focusing on Select Crops and Increasing Production along the Value Chain • Project (ID: P130788) approved for a loan in the amount of $200 million in June 2013, with an expected closing date of December 2017 • Approach: Focusing on agricultural development in key value chain products (cassava, rice, sorghum, and horticulture) with export potential • Scope: Six chosen states (Anambra, Enugu, Kano, Kogi, Lagos, and Niger) • Results: Ongoing—too early to assess • Political context: First democratic transition from the ruling party to the opposition Finally, Fadama III (2008–17) branched out to cover all 36 The second observation is the continuity in the project’s of Nigeria’s states, as well as the Federal Capital Territory main objectives. In all three phases, the principal aim has (FCT). Additional financing (2013–17) for Fadama III was been to raise farmers’ incomes, with the secondary goals recently approved to extend the program once again, of helping to alleviate food insecurity and poverty. this time as another pilot of new approaches. Third is the project’s continued success in achieving its The first key observation from table 1 is the project’s objectives. Evaluations and reviews have shown that, in longevity. For more than two decades, the Fadama project most cases, the projects exceeded their goals in improving series has channeled consistent support and involvement the income-generating capacity of beneficiaries (World to Nigerian communities and worked persistently to Bank 2000, 2010, 2014). Under Fadama I, for example, learn and adapt. These were key ingredients in ensuring financial return per hectare increased by 65 percent sustainability and growth. for vegetables and by almost 500 percent for rice 5 paddies, with 90 percent of farmers acknowledging arrangements to strengthen citizens’ engagement in increases in income during the project period. These community affairs by promoting inclusion and increasing accomplishments are particularly noteworthy when the participation of all affected stakeholders in local placed in the context of the operational challenges posed planning and economic decision making. Experience with by Nigeria’s substantial size, large population, and diverse different approaches to rural development had revealed interests. Fadama’s successes have been preserved even the importance of empowering communities to have a after its expansion into a national program in response to greater voice in defining their economic future—to own growing demand from excluded communities. their development. Finally, it is important to note the number of innovations The process of addressing an evolving development introduced by the project. Adaptations of the project’s challenge needed to be adaptive, capable of learning design occurred primarily in response to the issues and from past experience, and able to adjust to new demands that emerged during the implementation of conditions. The nature of interventions evolved with previous phases. Most significant was the introduction changing circumstances—social, political, economic, and of a new development model that relied on the direct international—and responded to emerging demands. involvement and participation of local stakeholders in As discussed in more detail shortly, it was the process defining project activities, which allowed the flexibility of experimenting with different ways to address the needed to tailor solutions to specific local conditions. development challenge that exposed the importance The new approach supported rural communities in of adaptability and innovation. The key lessons from strengthening local associations and promoting their Fadama are about the evolution in delivery mechanisms engagement in planning and decision making as a means to address rural poverty and foster agricultural and rural of more directly satisfying each community’s particular development. needs. The process-mapping exercise described in the next Delivering Sustainable Change in Nigeria’s section attempts to show how the Fadama projects Agricultural Sector have evolved and to identify the factors responsible for their continued success in adapting to changing Underlying the approach of all three Fadama projects circumstances. The chronological review describes has been the well-established critical importance of the critical junctures at which major changes were local agriculture in broadening economic opportunity triggered, as well as the lessons that shaped reforms. It for the majority of the population. Yet the challenges explains how subsequent designs built on accumulated of promoting rural development and poverty reduction experience and how lessons—even those that extend beyond simply expanding Nigeria’s agricultural emerged from unexpected outcomes or shortcomings potential. It became increasingly evident over the years, in implementation—were continually internalized particularly as the Fadama project series evolved, that and codified in studies and evaluations that helped local agricultural development required institutional strengthen the program’s design over time. 6 Tracing the Design and   Tracing the Design and Implementation Process Implementation Process The Fadama project series evolved from a pilot built on the foundations of knowledge and experience intervention under Fadama I, to adaptation in Fadama II gained from the previous ADPs. A senior adviser at the and III, to scaling up in Fadama III (table 2). This sequence of Ministry of Agriculture explained that a study conducted learning, adaptation, and expansion allowed Fadama to be in the early 1990s was critical to shaping the design of scaled up gradually from a successful pilot into a national the Fadama project: “The study found that during the dry program. This section traces the process of project design, season, farmers were idle. That same study showed that implementation, lessons learned, and adaptation. most of the country could farm around the year. That was how the idea of Fadama started germinating.”8 As one Fadama I Design: Building a participant in the design of Fadama I noted, “Fadama was a natural continuity of what was working with the ADPs.”9 Pilot from Previous Experiences, At its core, the design and organizational structure of Marginal Changes, and Continual Fadama I echoed those of the ADPs in fadama areas. A Experimentation senior adviser at the Ministry of Agriculture observed, The Fadama project’s emphasis on learning and adaptation “Fadama I was initially an expansion of the pilot enclave began with the initial design of Fadama I (1992–99), which projects developed under the ADPs in three states. It Table 2:  Learning and Adaptation over 20 Years of Fadama Project Implementation Piloting: Adaptation: Past Experiences: Fadama I Fadama II Scaling: Piloting: Agriculture Started in Started in Fadama III Fadama III AF Development ➞ 7 States ➞ 18 States ➞ Cover All States ➞ Covers 6 States Projects (1992–99) (2003–09) (2008–ongoing) (2013–ongoing) • Observation: • Observation: • Observation: • Learning: Need • Learning: Focus Exceptional Conflicts Demands from for a more on crops with outcomes in between communities sustainable export potential fadama areas fadama area • Learning: model that in line with • Learning: users intensified Need a more builds on the government’s Recommendations • Learning: Adopt inclusive model social and Agricultural for greater a contextually to respond financial capital Transformation investments tailored to conflicts in in communities Agenda in small-scale community- some fadama • Adaptation: • Adaptation: irrigation driven communities Institute the Focus on six • Adaptation: Start development • Adaptation: Fadama Users’ states and select Fadama in six core (CDD) approach Adopt a CDD Equity Fund crops with states with the through local approach using (FUEF) account comparative greatest potential development LDPs to create saving advantage in for productivity plans (LDPs) banks for production in growth • Adaptation: Fadama User the selected Expand Fadama; Groups (FUGs) states create and and FCAs strengthen the Fadama Community Associations (FCAs) 8 Interview with a senior adviser at the Ministry of Agriculture, January 2015. 9 Interview with the project’s task team leader (TTL), April 2015. 7 was gradually scaled to statewide projects before going a pioneering effort to increase beneficiary participation. It nationwide.”10 To replicate and improve on the results of introduced, through the FUAs,12 a mechanism to organize the ADPs, Fadama I focused on fadama regions in seven local farmers, strengthen their involvement in community core states (Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, decision making, and give them a more direct financial and Zamfara) where fadama investments had shown interest in public investments. The aim was to build their considerable promise. collective capacity to participate in activities related to the drilling, construction, and maintenance of fadama It was crucial for the success of Fadama I to start with infrastructure, along with contributing to cost recovery small-scale pilots, test the approach, monitor and learn and monitoring the available water resources. To enhance before expanding the program. The concept of piloting their use and sustainability, the organizational structure first was not widely applied in Nigeria at the time of and participation mechanisms of the FUAs were built the project’s launch. Most projects were designed on existing associative forums, and a key role was given to deliver broadly across the country and to address to the engineering departments that provided technical national needs. Yet the federation struggled to balance support to farmers. the needs of its diverse population, characterized by conflicting interests and religious and ethnic views. The Another weakness of the ADPs was their poor cost pilot concept faced difficult political pressures at first recovery performance, which jeopardized their because it focused on only a few states and localities. sustainability. To address this issue, and because initial A former national project coordinator pointed to three investments were heavily subsidized, Fadama I became factors that made the pilot approach possible under the first World Bank–supported project in Nigeria to insist Fadama I: (1)  design—Fadama I was intended to meet on full operational cost recovery for beneficiaries (World the irrigation needs of Nigeria’s drier northern states; Bank 2000). Under the project, farmers were allowed (2) geographic scopethe challenges addressed by to repay the full cost of equipment made available to the project were limited to the northern part of the them over a period of about five years. The awareness country and would not have attracted much interest created among policy makers and farmers of the viability in the rainfall-rich south; and (3) an inbuilt flexibilityit of full cost recovery under Fadama I proved useful for provided for the possibility of expanding the Fadama the design of future projects, and the experience gained project beyond the traditional fadama areas of northern by organizing communities became important to the Nigeria, helping to create awareness of the potential sustainability of the projects. for intensified crop production during the dry season in every part of the country. During the last two years The lack of reliable, detailed evaluative data from the ADPs of Fadama I, the project was extended to other states prompted recognition of the need for better information under a centrally coordinated facility at the federal level, systems to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of allowing each state to benefit from funding of between interventions and management practices. The design $0.2 million and $1 million.11 of Fadama I incorporated a component on collecting the relevant information, providing advisory services to The design of Fadama I focused on what worked under project participants, and carrying out studies on many the ADPs. The main capital investment activities of the aspects of the program. This information system became Fadama project series have been the construction of tube an incubator for the advancement of knowledge about wells, installation of pumps, construction of new small- agricultural development in the fadama regions and for scale infrastructure, simplification of drilling technology, the promotion, through clear information on results, of and upgrading of irrigation technology. The ADPs had best practices among beneficiaries. This occurred, for revealed that these interventions were the most effective example, in the wider application of improved irrigation in reducing the dependency of agricultural production technologies sponsored by the project. on the intermittent and erratic rainfall patterns in the fadama regional areas. Fadama I Implementation: An The project’s design also addressed some of the identified Experiment in Piloting and Learning weaknesses of the ADPs. The most evident lesson was the need to encourage local beneficiaries, including the Targeted development pilots have the benefit of private sector and farmers’ organizations, to take a more generating outcomes that are specific to local conditions, active role in local projects. In response, Fadama I launched thereby building a knowledge base for learning. 10 Interview with a senior adviser at the Ministry of Agriculture, January 2015. 11 Interview with the project’s TTL, April 2015. 12 The farmers groups were referred to as FUAs (Fadama Users Associations) under Fadama I, and FUGs (Fadama User Groups) under Fadama II and III. An FCA (Fadama Community Association) is a consortium of several (usually 10–15) FUGs. 8 Implementation of Fadama I produced a wealth of Lessons learned during implementation of Fadama I understanding about the effectiveness of the project’s influenced the design of Fadama II. First, it became design and spawned unexpected developments, many clear that strong beneficiary involvement in the design   with identifiable shortcomings, that informed the next and implementation of projects increased the sense of phase of the project. ownership, including responsibility for maintenance of infrastructure. Moreover, the experiment revealed that Among the positive developments during farmers wanted greater flexibility to select components implementation was farmers’ widespread acceptance and investments that suited conditions in their area. The of the project’s technology as most suitable for their centralized, top-down approach to rural development small-scale operations. The result was their enthusiastic had undermined community ownership and participation, participation in the project. With proactive assistance hindering sustainability (World Bank 2000). According to from the project implementation unit, about 9,239 FUAs one task team leader (TTL), “In some communities, we were formed—138 percent of the project’s target of built roads that did not end up being used . . . . We did 6,693. These groups quickly recognized the power of not consult the community on what they wanted the association and mutual support, particularly in shaping investment to go to.”13 decisions at the local level and increasing farmers’ control of irrigation management. Their buy-in was demonstrated Second, community-based facilitators were trained for by farmers’ contributions of nearly half of total local implementation support and close supervision. These project financing costs (49 percent), compared with facilitators were recruited from fadama communities, 22 percent from state governments, 9 percent from the thus mitigating the risk of “supply-driven/demand- federal government, and 20 percent from the World Bank driven” development in many community-based (World Bank 2000, Annex Table 8b). The operational plans programs whereby facilitators assume the preferences prepared by implementing agencies helped to expand of community members, who in turn tell facilitators acceptance of the model by improving FUAs’ capacity what they think facilitators want to hear (Mansuri and to manage fadama development. This included direct Rao 2013). procurement of their wells and pumps from suppliers and continual monitoring of local projects, including Third, procurement arrangements were revised. These environmental effects. Greater involvement of the private changes gave farmers greater responsibility for procuring sector, local government councils, and nongovernmental their own inputs and taking charge of their investments, organizations (NGOs) in project implementation raised freeing up the implementing agencies to focus more on their stakes in the project and improved the chances of providing technical assistance, training FUAs, and handling sustainability. Finally, the profitability of fadama farming credit operations. became more widely known and created demand for expanding the program. Finally, it was evident that greater attention needed to be paid to downstream marketing of local products. Other important factors adversely affected project Crop losses were high under Fadama I because of the implementation. Some factors were under the lack of marketing infrastructure and other value-added government’s control, including delays in the release interventions such as storage facilities and processing. of counterpart funds; delays in project implementation Improving these services was deemed a critical step in due to management shortcomings in the responsible boosting agricultural income. government agencies; negligence in upholding procurement standards; and scarcity of key inputs that were centrally controlled such as fuel for irrigation Fadama II Preparation: Adapting purposes. Some factors were outside the control to Changing Social and Political of implementing agencies, including inadequate involvement of farmers, local authorities, and NGOs Conditions, Responding to Growing in project implementation; contract and service Demands, and Incorporating delivery delays on the part of some suppliers; and, International Best Practices more important, intercommunity conflicts between The lessons learned through implementation of pastoralists and farmers. These conflicts arose because Fadama I, together with developing global best practices, Fadama I helped extend the farming season by several prompted a broader and more extended debate over months each year, thereby precluding herders from using the future direction of the Fadama project. This debate traditional grazing lands. 13 Interview with World Bank senior agriculture specialist, January 2015. 9 took place at a time of profound social and political and private sector service providers, including NGOs, change in Nigeria. The end of military rule ushered in a and staff of public agencies at all levels of government. period of democratically elected government, which in Preparation of Fadama II aimed to ensure that indirect turn fostered a greater desire for citizen participation beneficiaries were recognized as legitimate users of in the nation’s social, political, and economic affairs at shared resources such as scarce land and water. Broader all levels of society, including in rural areas. At the same participation could help different resource user groups time, development assistance was beginning to engage learn to respect each other’s rights and to consider the communities more fully in the decisions that affected impact of their individual decisions on others. their economic development. These two major trends fundamentally altered the project’s delivery philosophy. This being said, the government’s original concept for Fadama II did not fully address some of the most basic The demand to scale up the project was locally led lessons of the previous project. Despite its reformist and supported by many leaders at different levels of mindset, the government initially intended to use the government, including at the federal level. Farmers existing organizational structure of the ADPs, allowing and citizens in a wide variety of communities saw the them to continue to serve as the project’s institutional benefits being derived from the Fadama project. As one home. This continuation of a top-down, supply-driven TTL noted, “The high financial returns for participating approach did not address the growing demands among farmers raised their desire to invest further in fadama communities for a greater say in local decision making. development and also attracted other farmers to the Equally important, it ran counter to the position of project” (World Bank 2000, v). This strong demonstration the development partners, including the World Bank, effect built the Fadama project’s reputation as a valuable who felt that lessons from CDD programs in other development intervention. Communities in many states, countries could help the Fadama project overcome supported by local and regional government leaders, some of the challenges encountered in the first phase. wanted the Fadama project to expand to their areas. International experience had demonstrated the positive There was general support, even at the federal and state impact of CDD projects in rural areas and their ability to levels, to extend Fadama to a second phase and expand it manage conflicting local interests, and the international into more states. There was no agreement, however, on development community was becoming increasingly how to capitalize on the lessons learned under Fadama I interested in CDD as a new paradigm for ensuring by adjusting to a community-driven development community-level participation in local service delivery. (CDD) model. Therefore, considerable time, debate, and persuasion were needed to reconcile the contrasting Nigeria was testing the CDD approach in social activities views on the future of Fadama. As a result, preparation such as school building under the World Bank–supported of Fadama II stretched over almost two years before the Community Based Poverty Reduction Project (CPRP), project’s eventual approval in late 2003. the first Nigerian government–funded CDD project. In addition, the government had created a new public The government saw the Fadama project as an important agency to partner with communities in providing tool, not only for economic support but also for social education, health, and water services at the local level. inclusion. Government leaders’ direct and active Many stakeholders, including the World Bank team, felt participation in the preparation process for Fadama II these developments could assist in improving the design sent a strong signal of political support to implementers of Fadama II. and communities alike. As noted by one participant, “The Ministry of Agriculture at both the central and Those involved in the preparation of Fadama II were state levels played a pivotal role during preparation and deeply concerned about the local conflicts that had implementation” (World Bank 2010, 20). The government arisen in many Fadama I areas. As noted earlier, preexisting endorsed scaling up the project to cover 11 core states and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers became more the FCT initially, and then a total of 18 states, including pronounced under Fadama I (World Bank 2010; Okeke the FCT. The project was expected to reach about 3 2014), leading to deadly confrontations and presenting million beneficiary households in fadama communities, serious security concerns. According to one official at including direct users of fadama resources and the National Fadama Coordination Office (NFCO), the nonusers who benefited from improved infrastructure, focus on crop farmers under Fadama I, to the exclusion other productive investments, and institution-building of livestock and fishery farmers, exacerbated existing interventions in targeted fadama communities. The tensions: “Immediately after Fadama I, we realized that fadama population was heterogeneous, comprising not many more segments of rural stakeholders needed to only farmers, but also fishers, pastoralists, and hunters/ be targeted; social inclusiveness became a necessity.”14 gatherers. Other indirect beneficiaries included public Furthermore, the growing relative prosperity of some 14 Interview with a project coordinator at the NFCO, January 2015. 10 members of fadama communities gave rise to tensions Together, the philosophical shift to a bottom-up and feelings of exclusion, and many excluded communities model, the extended consultations, and the focus on resented Fadama. As a result, many participants in the international knowledge exchange extended the time   preparation of Fadama II felt strongly that the design required to prepare the project. The lengthy preparation of the new project needed to address these issues by process eventually resulted in an agreement to change promoting inclusion. They argued that participation could the project’s design and institutional arrangements. ameliorate the conflicts through searches for better local The acceptance of a CDD approach that would engage solutions to existing challenges. beneficiaries and stakeholders in planning and consensus building marked a major shift for World Bank–financed Incorporation of CDD principles into the project met with rural projects in Nigeria. resistance, however. National government leaders were pessimistic about the applicability of such an approach in a country emerging from 30 years of military rule and still Fadama II Design: Tailoring the divided. Local government leaders doubted that villagers Community-Driven Development could manage complex project cycles. A senior NFCO Approach to Rural Conditions adviser recognized that “the whole idea of CDD, which started with Fadama II in Nigeria, was absolutely [unheard in Nigeria and Introducing of]. We were not used to this kind of approach.” Institutional Capacity Building at the Local Level Preparation of Fadama II included broad consultations Once the CDD-based concept design was accepted, the with a wide range of stakeholders. These consultations challenge became to adapt the model to the Nigerian allowed participants to develop a better sense of context. This was particularly important with regard the communities’ aspirations (World Bank 2010). They to the institutional and governance arrangements that helped create awareness and build consensus, eventually had to be created to implement a new, decentralized garnering the endorsement of the communities for delivery model that transferred responsibility for day- design changes that incorporated CDD approaches and to-day implementation to the local level, relying heavily introduced new methods of local planning and consensus on the collective actions of local communities. The new building. Factors such as regular communication and decision-making structure needed to consider Nigeria’s involvement of traditional institutions helped to cement unique local associative and administrative structures, the buy-in of recipient communities. particularly the roles of local governments and farmers’ associations. Preparation of Fadama II also incorporated a process of learning from the experience of other countries. During The main transformation was the creation of Fadama this time, a team of 22 Fadama officials participated in Community Associations at the local level. Each study tours to Sri Lanka and India as part of a South- FCA was charged with preparing and agreeing on a South Knowledge Exchange program (WBI 2011). The local development plan (LDP) to guide the project’s experience of Sri Lanka offered ideas on possible investment decisions at the local level. The communities institutional arrangements, the role of women and were empowered with the financial resources and the youth, and infrastructure cluster models (WBI 2011). In training and technical support needed to properly use assessing India’s program, the Fadama team gained a public funds. Meanwhile, the federal, state, and local better understanding of how farmers collaborated and governments retained important roles in reviewing and designed their own institutional mechanisms, how farmer approving the LDPs. groups achieved economies of scale, how stakeholders formed private-public partnerships, and how project Integrating the use of LDPs as drivers of inclusive project implementers built ownership at all levels (WBI 2011). As management was one of the key innovations in the such, this exchange program allowed the Fadama team design of Fadama II. As a member of the National Fadama to tailor the best elements of other successful CDD Coordination Office noted, “The introduction of the implementation mechanisms to the context in Nigeria. LDP concept was a homegrown Nigerian innovation in State officials began to map out how best to structure local planning.”15 This design feature tailored the CDD a locally tailored CDD approach that would employ local approach to Nigerian conditions, while retaining basic facilitators for close supervision and develop training community-centered principles. The LDPs reflected the materials that were appropriate for farmers’ levels of FCAs’ joint agreements on how to finance and carry out education. 15 Interview with a member of the NFCO, January 2015. 11 the identified subprojects. Introduction of the LDPs accountability. Each FUG member participated in one constituted a “culture change in the sense that the planning of its subcommittees as a means of strengthening of community development activities followed an involvement in decision making and avoiding elite inclusive and participatory process, whereby all potential capture—a concern highlighted in the literature on Fadama resource users—farmers, pastoralists, hunters, CDD (Rao and Ibáñez 2003). The politically savvy design fisher folks, traders, agro-processors—participated in of Fadama II created an informal system of mutually collective decision making on setting the priorities for beneficial exchanges between Fadama participants and their community and how the funds from the project the local elite. According to the independent Project could be utilized to meet their collectively-identified Performance Assessment Report for Fadama II, “a more needs (in the form of subprojects)” (World Bank 2010, elongated engagement and sensitization period was 3–4). The establishment of the LDPs as a participatory needed at the village level to mitigate risks of elite mechanism increased the likelihood of internalizing capture and undue influence by traditional authorities community needs, perspectives, and ownership.16 and village elites” (World Bank 2014, xiv). Initial training conducted under Fadama II may have prepared The institutional arrangements established under participants to engage with local elites while managing Fadama II helped to strengthen communities’ existing expectations. In some communities in Kutigi, Niger social capital by enhancing collaboration and cooperation State, where it is customary for local elites to fund the among different groups to ensure inclusiveness and FUGs’ counterpart contribution, communities have accountability while avoiding the potential for conflict. reduced their subprojects’ susceptibility to elite capture The structure was multilayered. Just as in Fadama I, by sending strong signals about the consequences of community groups—now called Fadama User Groups— breaching the informal contract. For example, a powerful were the fundamental organizational unit. Formed on wealthy contractor involved with some of the FUGs was the basis of economic interests, they remained the taken to court for trying to divert funds intended for closest representatives of the beneficiaries. Because the project.17 In many instances, FUGs had the ability to of the tendency under Fadama I for FUGs to work supervise providers’ compliance with service contracts. independently, even if they were in the same community, The Implementation Completion and Results Report Fadama II introduced formal arrangements to bring the for Fadama II concluded that “the LDP preparation FUGs together and improve communications. The FUGs process has integrated the principles of transparency were placed with other contiguous communities under and inclusion and significantly improved group cohesion” the umbrella of broader Fadama Community Associations. (World Bank 2010, 17). The FCAs were, in essence, a federation of FUGs within a wider regional area. They served to share knowledge Fadama II further strengthened direct support for more systematically, to identify the most important community organization, building on pilots under subprojects for the community at large, and to devise a Fadama  I. With the shift to a more decentralized, more coordinated approach to implementation activities, participatory approach, communities needed significant especially funding requests. FCA members oversaw the financial and technical advisory assistance. In response, process of collective bargaining around the development about 20 percent of the project’s financial resources was of an LDP and were responsible for its final preparation allocated to create a network of 480 facilitators (40 per and presentation. state covered by the project), whose main responsibility was to provide direct capacity building assistance to Membership of the FUGs was broadened to include both the FUGs and FCAs. The training provided by these stakeholders other than farmers, thereby promoting facilitators proved to be an integral part of the success greater participation. In addition, quotas were introduced of the Fadama project. The facilitators helped the FUGs to ensure the inclusion of segments of the community, craft more robust LDPs and the FCAs identified their such as women and youth, who had not traditionally priorities through inclusive participatory planning (World been involved in community-level decision-making Bank 2003). They engaged in social mobilization, group processes. Each FUG was composed of 20 members, formation, sensitization, and training on inclusive decision including at least five farmers, five women, and five youth making and participatory local development planning. committee members. They also helped create partnerships among community organizations, service providers, and local governments. By enabling the participation of representative members The facilitators were so important to the project’s success of the community, the FUG structure enhanced that they were maintained despite initial plans to phase 16 Interview with the project’s TTL, April 2015. 17 Rao and Ibáñez (2003) refer to this type of control as “benevolent capture,” whereby “elite control can be an effective part of the cooperative infrastructure when power is used to facilitate collective action toward the public good” (Mansuri and Rao 2013, 75). 12 them out after the FUGs and FCAs received the first government: “Greater involvement of local government round of training.18 was necessary to bring people closer to their government and the government closer to their people.”20 (This was   The design of Fadama II gave local governments an viewed as a missing element of Fadama I.) Because of this important role to play in reviewing community requests opportunity, local governments became more invested for project support. The Local Fadama Desk (LFD), which in supporting the FUGs and FCAs in their area, and more was placed in the local government council and reported accountable to them as well. This closer collaboration to the Local Development Committee, was tasked with eased administrative processes for the FUGs and FCAs, ensuring that there was no duplication of projects increased their access to bank financing (“a letter from within that local government and recommending the local government that says ‘Fadama’ is rarely rejected projects to be approved at the local government level. by local banks”),21 and helped the government to better The Local Fadama Desk Officers (LFDOs) coordinated tailor its interventions in the communities. According to with facilitators and advisory service providers, who were the State Fadama Coordination Office (SFCO) project always in direct communication with the community manager in Niger State, Fadama interventions in many groups. The desk officers thus served as key brokers instances brought attention to the particular challenges among the FUGs, FCAs, and local government. The that communities faced: “Government noticed things Niger State Project Coordinator defined the LFD as “the because of Fadama.”22 secretariat for Fadama in each local government.”19 This arrangement granted Fadama a certain level of legitimacy The design of Fadama II allowed for adaptation that because local governments saw the project as an integral would better respond to needs on the ground by ensuring part of its system and the communities recognized it as adequate counterpart capacity and better feedback and a legal entity. monitoring loops. For example, when early supervision missions found that the FUGs needed capacity The governance structure of Fadama II was designed to strengthening to adequately prepare and implement introduce incentives for participants at different levels, their LDPs, the project’s design was adapted to include with the goal of enhancing stakeholder commitment a new demand-responsive advisory service, a greater to the project and thus improving its sustainability. At number of community-based facilitators (40 per state, the community level, measures were taken to induce up from the original 20), and the pilot asset acquisition joint ownership of assets. Participants were required component discussed earlier. At midterm, the project’s to contribute financially to purchase or build assets, monitoring and evaluation system was overhauled to be and there was an associated ownership structure for more responsive and allow for quicker problem detection the assets. Under Fadama II’s pilot asset acquisition and adaptation. A management information system was component, it was possible for the FUGs and FCAs to adopted at each LFD. own tangible assets. This component, which proved critical for the project’s beneficiaries, aimed to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and productive capacity Fadama II Implementation: A Learning of the FUGs and FCAs, thereby enhancing their ability Experience in Adopting Community- to generate income. By showing visible improvements in the accumulation of assets, the project could build Driven Development and Creating ownership and commitment. Social and Economic Capital in Rural Areas Local governments also had a financial stake in Fadama Fadama II generated a wide range of lessons on projects. Drawing on lessons from the first phase, introducing CDD approaches in Nigeria (box 1). In a Fadama II required financial contributions from local broad sense, the project showed that community- governments, particularly in financing local infrastructure. based approaches could flourish in diverse localities and The communities themselves covered 10 percent of the strengthen their social capital. During the design phase, it cost of infrastructure (such as rural roads, markets, and was unclear whether communities possessed the social boreholes), whereas local governments contributed capital and capacity needed to empower farmers, but 90 percent. One traditional local authority found that this these elements were transformed during Fadama  II. model not only improved ownership, but also created a Participation in the FUGs (12,570) and FCAs (1,470) platform for interactions between citizens and their local across the project’s 12 states exceeded expectations 18 Interview with the project’s TTL, January 2015. 19 Interview with the Niger State project coordinator, January 2015. 20 Interview with a traditional local authority in Kutigi, Niger State, January 2015. 21 Interview with an SFCO officer, Niger State, January 2015. 22 Interview with a project manager at the SFCO, Niger State, January 2015. 13 Box 1:  Fadama’s Use of CDD Principles Fadama II and III applied CDD principles to transform how local rural communities secured sustainable income generation. The literature identifies as enabling conditions for CDD (annex B) the existence of strong political commitment at the top (ensuring that power shifts from top-down to bottom-up) and a well-designed decentralization process (across political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions). These conditions are supported by an empowered and active civil society, mechanisms for democratic accountability to citizens, free media, and relatively strong NGOs (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector 2010; Mansuri and Rao 2013; Mukherji 2013). It could be argued that such conditions have been present, at different levels and with more or less intensity, throughout evolution of the Fadama series. By 2001, the World Bank had identified some key principles for supporting effective and sustainable CDD initiatives (Dongier et al. 2002; Wong 2012). These included (1) building participatory mechanisms for community control and stakeholder involvement; (2) investing in building the capacity of community-based organizations; (3) facilitating community access to information (to mitigate the risk of manipulation by external interested parties); (4) developing simple rules and strong incentives, supported by monitoring and evaluation; (5) maintaining flexibility in design; (6) ensuring social and gender inclusion; (7) designing for scaling up; and (8) investing in an exit strategy (Dongier et al. 2002). Fadama’s interpretation of participatory interventions deserves further analysis, which could contribute to the extensive literature on CDD effectiveness. For example, the principle of investing in capacity building of community- based organizations, together with the findings of Mansuri and Rao (2004, 2013) that induced participatory interventions work best when supported by a responsive state, show Fadama to be a midway or hybrid solution, with strong institutions at the central level replicating the structure in a uniform manner throughout the states while community-level entities (FUGs and FCAs) provide an autonomous space for deciding—with a constrained level of flexibility—the initiatives in which to invest. This hybrid solution includes the introduction of sustainable solutions at the community level, such as the Fadama Users’ Equity Fund (FUEF), while acknowledging the need for a permanent state role in co-financing this program because communities do not possess the financial capacity to fully self-sustain all aspects of the project. Local governments thus need to set aside and secure budget resources for recurrent spending activities such as infrastructure maintenance. The Fadama project series has tailored CDD principles on creating a decentralized participatory structure by establishing the FUGs and FCAs to improve social cohesion and develop social capital within communities. Mansuri and Rao (2013) confirm the need for serious and sustained engagement in building local capacity as a condition for creating social capital. Fadama’s FUGs and FCAs have managed at different community levels (within a village and in a cluster of villages, respectively) to improve the stock of social capital and foster more effective communication with local government. (World Bank 2010, 38–39). The Project Performance observations have shown that social capital expanded Assessment Report for Fadama II found the model to under Fadama II on two levels: (1) within the community; be more effective in rural areas than in periurban areas, and (2) in the interface between communities and in part because of the tighter social cohesion in rural their local government through the Local Fadama communities, which tend to be smaller and sustain Development Committee (LFDC). Toward the end of greater interaction among community members. “This Fadama II, more than 1,300 LDPs had been approved finding coincides with the empowerment literature and 1,246 were being implemented (World Bank 2010, that generally finds that social cohesion is an integral 12, 39). Because of differences in capacities at the local ingredient to successful social capital formation and level, performances varied across regions, with LDP associated welfare gains” (World Bank 2014, 11). implementation rates ranging from a low of 67 percent in Kebbi to a high of 98 percent in Bauchi. Reflecting the Social cohesion within communities grew under high degree of social cohesion, conflicts among Fadama Fadama  II. Empowering communities to take charge users declined by more than 75 percent from the baseline of their own development agenda required strong during the project. In the end, then, Fadama II’s method institutional arrangements for participation and ongoing of social organization, conflict avoidance, and conflict support for local groups. Program evaluations and field resolution exceeded expectations. 14 The participatory process of LDP preparation and acquisition across a large segment of beneficiaries, implementation introduced in Fadama II helped expand including women. Participation in the project increased social capital, strengthen local governance, and build the value of individual productive assets by 49 percent   community decision-making capacity. Through this and that of group-owned productive assets by 590 process, Fadama II transformed the paradigm from percent (World Bank 2010, 17). The greater impact on a culture of dependence, whereby farmers played a jointly owned productive assets reflects the project’s passive role in their own development, to one of active policy of supporting group acquisition of productive involvementfrom identification to implementation of assetsthe dramatic increase was due in large part subprojects. According to program evaluations, the LDPs to cash transfers from the 70 percent matching fund expanded social capital at four levels: (1) institutionalizing for the FUGs. The national Fadama project coordinator through the LFDC community participation in local noted that this was a critical step in gaining communities’ government decisions on the use of public resources; trust: “Users can easily identify with direct ownership (2)  strengthening communities’ capacities to select, of tangible assets, the impact of which was direct and prioritize, and implement investment decisions; increased their income.”24 (3) creating partnerships among community organizations, service providers, and local governments; and (4) fostering It was the overall economic gains made by beneficiaries citizenship through increased awareness of the social and their satisfaction with the delivery model that responsibilities of citizens, their representatives, and contributed most to the growing acceptance of public authorities in community matters and field the Fadama project. Fadama II proved that the new implementing agencies. The chairman of one FUG in participatory model could also sustainably increase the Adamawa claims that Fadama granted him an identity: incomes of Fadama users. Survey data indicated that “Before Fadama, nobody knew me. Now everyone beneficiary incomes rose by 63 percent, surpassing the calls me Fadama.”23 Community participation in the project’s original goal of increasing the average real development process built a new culture of governance, income of 50 percent of targeted beneficiaries by at including principles of transparency, accountability, and least 20 percent. The successes achieved during Fadama II democratic decision making. convinced many more community members to join, with the understanding that Fadama was their project and The support provided by project facilitators was critical it was up to them to take charge of it: “Even with the in helping rural communities become more inclusive. poverty level, farmers were able to squeeze and raise The presence and assistance of the facilitators were some financial resources to enable them to pay for the instrumental in building communities’ organizational beneficiary contribution and access a lot of the facilities capacities and helping them become more sensitive to that were available under the Fadama II project.”25 the needs of all stakeholders. For example, the facilitators coached communities in designing development plans Implementation success sparked the interest of several that gave priority to the less privileged in society, including development partners in supporting Fadama II. The poor people and youth. The implementation structure African Development Bank was already implementing ensured constant communication among the facilitators, a project similar to Fadama II in six states, bringing the the implementation team, and the communities. The total number of states benefitting from the project to facilitators received regular, targeted technical assistance 18.26 In 2006 the Global Environment Fund financed the and logistical support from the World Bank. A senior Critical Ecosystem Component of Fadama II to enhance adviser at the NFCO found the close project supervision in six states the productivity of fadama areas and the and prolonged community discussions to be critical to livelihood systems they supported through sustainable communities’ acceptance of the CDD concept. In this land use and water management. The government way, the project developed a critical mass of highly of Japan supported Fadama II with a Population and trained personnel who could be redeployed by the Human Resources Development grant of $1 million and relevant government agencies. later provided an additional $828,000 for preparation of Fadama III (World Bank and Government of Japan 2005). The financial arrangements under Fadama II helped These partners were motivated by the strong project generate stakeholder interest and commitment. The management unit backed by a high level of political project had a significant impact on productive asset support at the federal and state levels, by the quality 23 Interview with a Fadama participant, Adamawa, May 2015. 24 Interview with the project’s TTL, April 2015. 25 Interview with an NFCO adviser, January 2015. 26 The six states financed by the African Development Bank were five noncore Fadama I states—Borno, Katsina, Kogi, Kwara, and Plateau—and one core Fadama I state, Jigawa (African Development Fund 2003). 15 of the project team, and by the results achieved under they were often unable to avoid undue influence by the Fadama I.27 local traditional authorities or village elites. In many cases, Fadama benefits appeared to have been enjoyed more Implementation of Fadama II showed that a delivery by group leaders and active members than by inactive model based on stakeholder empowerment could address members, or more by elite group members than by the challenges of poor rural communities. The project’s nonelite members. Fadama members with preexisting success in achieving the same types of objectives set out strong interpersonal networks seemed to have more under the previous pilot, but under a new model, pointed voice in the choice of assets and greater control over to the effectiveness of the CDD approach in this case. their use. The project’s midterm review observed that, Steady progress allowed communities to recognize the in some cases, there was collusion between advisory merits of the approach and to participate more actively. service providers and FUG/FCA officials, compromising The model’s success became widely known, leading to the independent recruitment of providers and potentially widespread demand for further expansion based on the signifying a degree of elite capture in the project and project’s attractive new forms of community ownership, risks over time to fostering sustainable enterprises. There social inclusion, and collective decision making. Once were also cases in which local leaders joined FUGs for the again, the demonstration effects of a pilot that had financial incentives. Membership allowed them to receive been scaled up generated interest among excluded loans from the group in order to engage in independent communities. social and economic enterprises (such as weddings or other businesses) and to cater to emergencies. In addition, A few shortcomings in the implementation of Fadama II local leaders benefitted from revenues generated by provided lessons for the design of the third phase. To be FUGs and by the social capital developed through the effective, support to communities had to be sustained project. and continual. Efforts to empower communities to take charge of their own development were more successful in The financial incentives, particularly the large subsidies areas that enjoyed constant support, whereas results were provided for rural infrastructure investments, contributed less satisfactory in areas where program activities ceased to low levels of maintenance in many projects. An impact with the end of financing. Evaluations found that the assessment conducted by the International Food Policy capacity to participate in local development planning in Research Institute (IFPRI) found that the high subsidy a socially inclusive and accountable manner deteriorated offered to communities for rural infrastructure (10 rather quickly in Fadama II villages that received support percent community, 90 percent project) may have from only one project cycle (World Bank 2014). Although encouraged the construction of public goods that could the project was successful in supporting 95 percent of not be maintained over the medium to long run for lack all FCAs in implementing their LDPs, a random sample of funds (IFPRI 2010). The experience of Fadama II thus a few years later showed that the majority of those showed that high matching grants relative to counterpart plans had not been updated, even though they could contributions discouraged proper planning and affected have gained access to additional financing. With few the sustainability of the subprojects. exceptions, interviews with local government officials revealed that the participatory and negotiated decision making promoted by Fadama declined with the reduction Fadama III Design: The Challenges of advisory support. Villagers expressed disappointment of Replicating a Successful about the lack of continued access to facilitated negotiation for the provision of local goods and services. Formula Nationwide The conflict training and mediation module piloted by The success in applying the decentralized development the project was appreciated by stakeholders, but was model under Fadama II generated further demand ultimately found to be unsustainable in the absence of among communities, political leaders, and development the project architecture and support system. Similarly, partners for its expansion—this time to the national the maintenance of public infrastructure faced challenges level. The project’s proven track record had broadened without technical assistance. its recognition, and Fadama had become something of a brand that conveyed the benefits of greater community The role of the facilitators offset, but could not fully organization and participation in local development. prevent, the potential for local elite capture of the The calls for expansion culminated in the approval of project. The facilitators were expected to encourage Fadama III in 2008 and its eventual rollout nationally, inclusive and participatory decision making amid complex covering all 36 states and the FCT. The project continued social relations in new environments, all while cobbling to finance investments in productive community together a village’s first LDP. With many responsibilities, infrastructure to increase agricultural productivity and 27 Interview with the TTL, April 2015. 16 diversify sources of livelihood, with the same focus on that traditional leaders jointly vouch for newly elected building the capacity of community organizations to ones. Moreover, some local government chairmen are strengthen social capital. The project’s overall objectives clearing all FUG payments to ascertain their regularity,   were recast, however, to focus more on rural poverty and with the consent of the communities. on promoting socially inclusive and the environmentally sustainable management of natural resources, reflecting Within the uniform institutional structure, the design of the importance placed on these issues by development Fadama III grants participating communities considerable practitioners. flexibility to develop their own plans and choose their own local subprojects. Communities remain empowered The expansion was a challenge for both application to make decisions at the local level, and FUGs are and implementation of the model. The magnitude of still responsible for identifying, preparing, executing, the model’s expansion was significant. It anticipated supervising, operating, and maintaining their subprojects. the creation of about 111,000 FUGs, each comprising Fadama III has enhanced flexibility by expanding the 20 households. The project was thus expected to benefit types of products and investments that are eligible for about 2.2 million households (16 million members) directly financing under the project, thereby giving communities and perhaps another 2 million indirectly. These were large more choices in addressing local needs. numbers across a vast area, including communities with widely varying capacities for organization, participation, Through the Fadama Users’ Equity Fund, Fadama III has and implementation. The number of participating local introduced an important innovation in the project’s governments was to reach 560, with the establishment financial arrangements: a revolving asset maintenance of 7,400 FCAs. fund. The objective of this fund is to strengthen the commitment to maintaining local subprojects. The fund is Previous experience had revealed the considerable financed and owned by the FUGs, and it is funded primarily diversity in organizational capacity among communities from annual FUG contributions. This second-generation and the general institutional weaknesses in some states. fund is to be invested by FUGs at the community level, To deal with this challenge, Fadama III adopted a common according to priorities and mechanisms they define as approach to project implementation as a means of the sole owners of the fund. The revolving nature of the bringing all states (including those with capacity gaps) fund ensures the continued circulation of financial capital “up to speed with implementation.”28 A detailed project in the community or investment in physical capital, implementation manual was developed, and a shortened depending on the decisions made by the FUGs. The fund version was translated into local languages. Similarly, the constitutes the basis for developing a sustainable savings institutional structure was replicated uniformly across and loan scheme. It has strengthened financial literacy states. The participatory approach was to be carried out among FUG members, assisted by the facilitators, who under the same set of arrangements at the local level, help to manage the fund and identify opportunities to with the organization of FUGs according to economic improve the sustainability of subprojects. interest groups and the creation of umbrella FCAs. The LDPs remained the core mechanism for community participation, and local government participation was Fadama III Implementation: structured in the same way, based on the establishment Continued Progress Despite of LFDs and the role of LFDCs serving as clearinghouses for LDPs. Stretched Capacity Although implementation of Fadama III is still under way, Although consistent across the country, this the results achieved thus far provide a basis for preliminary implementation framework has been adapted in response observations about its sustainability. The project is on to lessons learned at local and state levels. In Adamawa, track to achieve its main target of a 40 percent increase FUGs are allowed to make in-kind contributions to in the average real incomes of 75 percent of Fadama user the FUEFby, for example, purchasing assets such as households. As of September 2014, the average income livestockrather than through bank deposits. This of Fadama beneficiaries had increased by 19 percent adaptation was made in response to the scarcity of bank nationwide (48 percent for female beneficiaries and branches at the local government level and to address 36 percent among the poorest third of beneficiaries). the Islamic prohibition of usury (and, accordingly, the Yields of major crops have increased substantially. To receipt of bank interest). Some LFDs have also added date, more than 4,700 LDPs covering about 60,000 fiduciary requirements to prevent fraud and corruption subprojects have been prepared and approved. As a result at the community level. After the case of a fraudulent of the capacity building given to beneficiaries, most of FUG chairman, for example, the FUG began to require the LDPs are on track to be fully implemented. With 28 Interview with an officer at the NFCO, January 2015. 17 ongoing technical assistance, project implementation small-scale business owners. Recently, it was mobilized has been satisfactory along all parameters. in an emergency situation to contribute to efforts to restore the livelihoods of a few thousand internally Implementation of Fadama III continues to generate displaced people in the northeast who were victimized useful lessons for future initiatives. These lessons relate by the Boko Haram insurgency.30 mostly to the challenge of scaling up the program to the national level amid uneven performances Building on this solid foundation, the Ministry of among communities. Because the program has been Agriculture has supported extending the project’s life mainstreamed across local governments but not scaled through an additional financing operation for Fadama III. up financially, the nationwide rollout has significantly The next phase will focus on agricultural development stretched the program’s capacity and diluted available in key value chain products with export potential, resources across a much larger number of beneficiaries. narrowly targeting eligible communities in six chosen Although there was some effort to reinforce the capacity states. In many ways, the additional financing will allow of beneficiaries who had received support under another pilot to test the model’s adaptability to more previous phases, Fadama III purposefully selected new modern agricultural development. The objective of the villages that had not been treated under the second additional financing operation differs slightly from that of phase. This left many of the beneficiaries of Fadama II its predecessors, aiming to promote income generation disappointed. Again, the implementation capacity of new by turning smallholder agriculture into profitable and communities has been built gradually, taking advantage competitive business-oriented ventures that supply of assistance from facilitators to reinforce a continual local, regional, and international markets.31 With the learning process that recognizes the importance of implementation arrangements remaining the same, the institutional capacity building. The uneven performance project is attempting to apply community engagement of communities under Fadama III resulted in part from and participation to the process of tailoring local differences in organizational capacity, but also from production to more demanding markets. One innovation variations in agricultural conditions. This was not a in this context is the inclusion of more specialized significant factor in earlier phases, as most of the states assistance from agronomists and other experts who participating in Fadama I and II were located in the humid can help organize marketing and distribution at the and dry savannah zones. The homogeneity of agricultural production cluster level. conditions in earlier phases limited the project’s ability to determine whether activities could be replicated The model continues to evolve and has now come elsewhere. Fadama III is compensating for the different full circle to a new process of experimentation, which agricultural outcomes by focusing more broadly on rural highlights the importance of ensuring the sustainability development activities and on poverty reduction. The of the institutional structure at the national level. With project is also devoting greater attention and support the focus narrowing again, both regionally and on certain to resource users across the fadama value chain, from product categories, the next phase will offer another production to marketing. opportunity to test the resilience and adaptability of the CDD approach in Nigeria’s agricultural sector. The Fadama III is now a well-established project that has project’s ability to improve the economic well-being “come of age”29 and gained wide acceptance as an of beneficiaries has been well established, but as this effective intervention. In 2011 the minister of agriculture review has noted, a key element of its success has been identified Fadama as the best-performing agricultural the institutional structure of community engagement project in his ministry’s portfolio, a clear outlier. The that was created in fadama areas. Without continued project has taken thousands of rural dwellers out of support for preserving and strengthening this institutional extreme poverty, building a strong national brand and arrangement, it is not clear whether the successes of the transitioning previously disenfranchised farmers into Fadama project series can be sustained. 29 Comments from the project TTL, June 2015. 30 Close to 2 million people are deemed internally displaced in Nigeria as a result of the insurgency. 31 Interview with an agricultural specialist at the World Bank, January 2015. 18 Lessons Learned   Lessons Learned Implementation of the Fadama project series has level projects can benefit from international experience, yielded lessons that can usefully inform the design and in this case with CDD projects. The broad acceptance implementation of future operations, as well as other of the model within Nigeria resulted in part from CDD programs in Nigeria. The benefit of the Fadama information on how similar projects had succeeded in experience is that it has been iterative, allowing a process other environments. Just as important, however, was the of learning from predecessor projects and adaptation careful manner in which the design of CDD approaches to new challenges. Nigeria’s sustained involvement with under Fadama was tailored to the Nigerian context and community-based agriculture development has left a built on local conditions, particularly with regard to the clear track record from which to extract key observations existing institutional arrangements. The LDPs, which and the lessons learned that follow. became the main mechanism for decision making on local-level investments, were a homegrown approach to Maintain presence and continuity. Implementation of community development planning and, as a result, were the Fadama project spans 20 years. The project has grown successfully taken up under the umbrella of the Fadama considerably, building significant experience among local project. The project’s success in tailoring best practices communities, political leaders, development practitioners, to local conditions was evident in the strong demand for and the international development community. The project expansion among excluded communities. project team’s perseverance in providing financial and, more important, advisory assistance at various levels Build consensus and attention to process. The process has been one of the most important ingredients of the of building consensus and promoting the acceptance of project’s development success. new approaches required considerable engagement with counterparts. To ensure the successful introduction of Embrace adaptive learning. Design of the Fadama projects a CDD model for agricultural development in Nigeria, embraced a model of trial, error, and adaptation. Each the project team had to move beyond national-level phase of the project served as a test of new approaches agreement to build a consensus among Nigerian under specific conditions, which could then be expanded counterparts and communities. The use of study tours once positive results were well established. From piloting to expose decision makers to emerging trends in CDD, targeted small-scale community investments in fadama as well as the project team’s investment in a thorough areas to introducing fundamentally new mechanisms for consultation process, facilitated the move away from community participation in agricultural development, centrally led, top-down approaches toward locally led the project has been a laboratory of experiments. Each participatory approaches. A senior adviser at the NFCO phase of the project has addressed weaknesses identified found the project’s collaborative consensus-building under previous phases. The local conflicts sparked by approach to be critical to communities’ acceptance of the extension of the agricultural season under Fadama I, the CDD concept: for example, prompted the introduction of greater community participation in local decision making. The The perseverance of the implementation team observation that large matching grants under Fadama II enabled the achievement and the success; when tended to discourage maintenance of subprojects led you are introducing a new concept or a new idea to the introduction of new financial arrangements in to anybody, it is very difficult for that person to Fadama III to promote greater attention to preserving comprehend immediately what you are talking community investments. This process of adaptive about, particularly when you are asking for a change learning encouraged innovation at every stage, enhancing in attitude. The trust between the beneficiaries project results and sustainability. The demonstration and the drivers of the process (the government effects of each phrase of the project strengthened on one side and the Bank on another) had to be demand for wider application of the model. Projects established through a lot of advocacy channels: the that build on existing initiatives, start out as pilots, and use of traditional institutions, shakers and movers expand carefully with attention to the local context can of the communities, and some pressure groups therefore be transformational. when necessary to sensitize and mobilize these farmers to come to terms [with] what CDD is all Tailor best practices to local conditions. The Fadama about, its processes, [and] the roles they, farmers, project series offers a clear example of how country- are expected to play in getting the job done.32 32 Interview with an NFCO adviser, January 2015. 19 Of particular importance in fostering community support Cultivate a culture of joint responsibility. Fadama’s were proactive efforts to involve traditional institutions; institutional arrangements and capacity building helped constant communication between the implementation create a culture of contribution, joint ownership, and team and the communities; and regular, targeted technical commitment to subprojects—essential elements of assistance and logistical support. sustainability. The required counterpart contributions (of cash, materials, or labor) have improved group Promote participation to strengthen social capital. cohesion and introduced a system of oversight to An effective institutional structure at the local level ensure the integrity of funds flow at the community was critical to organizing community participation and level. In addition, technical assistance has strengthened engagement. The core organizational element of Fadama the FCAs’ operational capacities, supporting their active lay in the formation of stakeholder groups according to participation in project management, monitoring, and their interests. This systematic approach was important evaluation. The adoption of joint responsibility has been in demonstrating the benefits of collective action uneven in view of the time, effort, and cultural change and empowering farmers to participate in community involved. Still, this approach has gradually increased decision making. This participatory process helped build awareness of the importance of joint participation and social capital, local governance, and community decision- contributions. making capacity, thereby enhancing the sustainability of outcomes. Through its socially inclusive and participatory Ensure sustainability through well-designed approach, Fadama is recognized as an effective incentives. The project’s financial incentives, together instrument for bringing distinct local groups together to with the central role of beneficiary contributions and work toward common goals. This collaboration occurred capital investments, have strengthened the continuity primarily through the preparation and implementation of of community subprojects and isolated them from LDPs, but the presence of facilitators in each community political funding cycles. According to a senior adviser was equally important in building the communities’ at the Ministry of Agriculture, “The strategy embedded organizational capacity. in Fadama II was to support the beneficiaries through matching grants, so government counterpart funds were Foster inclusiveness. By recognizing indirect beneficiaries not required for that.”33 Because of the financial stakes (such as fishers, pastoralists, and hunters/gatherers) as involved, local Fadama activities continued even when legitimate users of shared resources, Fadama II developed local government counterpart funds were delayed or a culture of inclusiveness and helped communities absent. “Counterpart funds did not affect the project become more sensitive to the needs of all stakeholders. delivery at the field level. That is why Fadama has The project’s consultative approach and rules of succeeded, despite the fact that most of the states engagement helped the various user groups learn to are defaulting in counterpart funds.”34 Although lack of consider the impacts of their actions on others and funding has impeded the functioning of Fadama desk the environment, thereby addressing the initial flare-up offices, local governments can contribute in various ways, of local conflicts and strengthening conflict resolution including complementing Fadama investments to ensure mechanisms over the longer term. their sustainability. Create organizational capacity through investments Create institutional change by scaling up through in staff. The Fadama project invested heavily in capacity national-level standardization with local-level building among project stakeholders in all participating flexibility. Once rolled out at the national level, states. First, Fadama attracted highly qualified staff the project’s organizational structure became more from both the private and public sectors. Staff were standardized to facilitate cross-country management. selected on a competitive basis and paid according to Yet Fadama’s design has preserved the flexibility granted their background and level of experience, fostering long- to communities in preparing and implementing their term commitment to the project and helping to preserve own development plans. This approach has had a lasting institutional memory. Second, Fadama deployed a large institutional effect. Many states have introduced a network of trained facilitators throughout the country “Fadama-style” arrangement whereby local governments to provide continual training and technical assistance have adopted participatory planning and provided to participating community groups. The facilitators additional funding for LDPs beyond the resources also extended support to the relevant government provided by the project. Other state governments, agencies. This support structure helped narrow gaps in such as Bauchi, have institutionalized Fadama through implementation capacity across states. their budget process to ensure support for the program 33 Interview with a senior adviser at the Ministry of Agriculture, January 2015. 34 Interview with a senior adviser at the Ministry of Agriculture, January 2015. 20 after the project closes. Moreover, many state and local Demonstrate results to inform adaptation, build governments utilize the CDD mechanism as the basis recognition, and strengthen demand. The most for their local interventions, often through the same important evidence developed by Fadama has been   community members who have been empowered that community projects can address rural conditions through Fadama groups. Niger State, for example, has in Nigeria. The project’s effectiveness in generating developed a Ward Development Project that uses CDD improved economic conditions and achieving approaches to identify communities’ most pressing social greater community participation has widened public service needs. Imo State’s establishment of community acceptance of the underlying model and encouraged government councils, modeled on the FCAs, can be communities to participate more actively in their construed as an institutionalization of Fadama. These local development. The project has survived changes councils are composed of community representatives in government administration owing to wide (such as traditional rulers, women’s leaders, and youth recognition of its ability to deliver results across leaders) and government appointees (including a diverse communities. The lessons learned through government liaison officer). the project’s evolution and adaptation have become well ingrained and its results well established, making Improve local governance through decentralized Fadama a powerful brand for poverty reduction and implementation arrangements. The implementation rural development through CDD. arrangements established under Fadama gave states unprecedented autonomy in decision making and Recognize that heavy investments in supervision implementation. As noted by a Fadama TTL, “The design are required to support the implementation of such of the project gave clear responsibilities to the federal a project. The success of Fadama interventions has and state agencies. Project preparation benefitted from depended on a long, participatory process of consensus a wide level of sensitization that was able to delineate building followed by close, consistent, and long-term the roles of different stakeholders under the project.”35 supervision on the part of the project implementation As the Fadama project series moved to adopt a more team. Under Fadama I and II, this critical investment decentralized approach, the decision was made to place of time was backed up by the financial and human Fadama offices inside local governments and to work resources required for the World Bank to conduct with them as much as possible. Local councils often supervision effectively. During the design of Fadama III, used the better-equipped Fadama facilities for their it was clear that expanded supervision would be required administrative needs, creating stronger links between to support implementation across all 36 states and the the project and local governments. The LFDC also served FCT. The project’s supervision plan was well costed as a platform from which FUG members could voice their (at $250,000 for the World Bank and $400,000 for the opinions on the use of public funds in local governments. government) and consistently implemented. Specific roles and responsibilities for supervision were allocated Introduce flexibility as a means of reducing political at different levels of the project. According to the NFCO’s interference. Fadama’s flexible delivery mechanisms have national coordinator, “World Bank implementation allowed solutions to be tailored to diverse local contexts, assistance support to the states and to the project has strengthening local-level decision making and reducing been more regular; many of them do it three or four political interference. All stakeholders interviewed times a year and before it used to be once. There is for this case study praised the Fadama leadership no other project for which these site visits have been and management team’s flexibility in resolving issues more regular.”36 Following the program’s nationwide that arose during implementation. One Fadama state rollout under Fadama III, however, it seems that project coordinator attributed the project’s success in part to resources have been stretched a bit too thin, leading the lack of political interference, thereby giving project to a planned refocusing under the follow-on additional participants the freedom to operate unencumbered. financing operation. However, there were some instances in which the state offloaded some of its own responsibilities onto Fadama. Keep promises early in the project and build trust, which Over time, Fadama implementation arrangements seem are critical to obtaining buy-in from communities. to have become an interesting mix of local empowerment This approach was particularly important in the context within a strongly centralized country. In a recent mapping of introducing new approaches, fostering community exercise, stakeholders depicted a top-down system with participation, and supporting cultural change. “Imagine strong decision-making power at the bottom, the local what would have happened if communities went through level. the effort of making LDPs and then we tell them, there is 35 Interview with the project’s TTL, April 2015. 36 Interviews with the NFCO national coordinator, January 2015. 21 no money, wait—that would have killed the project.”37 In Fadama beneficiaries as shareholders to mitigate their addition, continuity within the task team helped create inability to access bank credit. Second, some officials feel a climate of trust and build on experience. that Fadama suffers from a tension between the goal of enhancing economic returns and that of social inclusion. Third, Fadama’s local-level institutional arrangements The Way Forward are still rather fragile and will require continued active support. State and local governments will need to take In many ways, Fadama has succeeded in “putting over the Fadama management framework (including agriculture back on the map.”38 In transitioning to a more facilitators) after the World Bank project closes, but market-oriented strategy, Fadama will find it important political sustainability remains uncertain because of the to keep in sight the mechanisms and lessons of the CDD enduring perception among some state and local political approach. According to one observer, “It would be a pity elites that community development could threaten their to lose that social mechanism built under Fadama.”39 New authority.41 In response, Fadama will have to embrace the initiatives should continue to ask, “to what extent do challenge of garnering the necessary political support interventions focus on the social and political as well?”40 while fending off undue political elite capture.42 Further work on Fadama will also need to address enduring Fadama has become what some might describe as an sustainability challenges. First, there is a continuing need “island of success” in a country portfolio that faces to enhance access to finance and markets to ensure the frequent implementation problems. Going forward, it is financial sustainability of community projects. The state hoped that the project’s long process of evolution and program coordinator for Imo State envisages establishing continued analysis of the project’s specific features and a farmer’s market to allow Fadama community results will help other project teams who are seeking beneficiaries to sell their products directly to consumers. innovative ways to deliver development results. He also envisages creating a microfinance institution with 37 Interviews with an officer at the NFCO, January 2015. 38 Interview with management at the World Bank Nigeria Country Office, January 2015. 39 Interview with a partner in the agricultural sector, April 2015. 40 Interview with a partner in the agricultural sector, April 2015. 41 Interview with a partner in the agricultural sector, April 2015. 42 Some facilitators advise FUGs that cannot afford to pay their contribution to ask local elected officials to pay it on their behalf. In so doing, they can gain active political support but risk the possibility that political officials will claim their share of expected returns to the detriment of the community. 22 Annex A: Full Description   Annex A: Full Description of Fadama Project Life of Fadama Project Life 1974: First ADPs 1976–77: Federal 1977–80: ADPs 1980: First- 1981–86: Second- started in Funtua, Department of Rural expanded to six generation “enclave” generation statewide Gusau, and Gombe Development, additional “enclave” ADPs in place in nine ADPS started in five established in Ministry projects: Lafia, states states: Baunchi, Kano, of Agriculture, placed Ayangba, Bida, IIorin, Sokoto, Kaduna, and in charge of ADPs Oyo North, and Ekiti South Borno North 1981–89: Other 1986–89: Third- 1990: Nationwide, 1992: National 1992: Fadama I subsector support generation multistate ADPs established in Agricultural begins, building on and follow-up projects ADPs launched (ADP every state, the last Technology Support lessons from ADPs. conducted I, ADP II, ADP III) one in the FCT Project (NATSP) Seven core states (Agricultural T.A., established covered Fertilizer Loan) 1999: Fadama I ends 2000: Extensive 2002: Wrap-up 2003: Fadama II 2003: African with remarkable stakeholder meeting of the starts in 12 states Development Bank results. At the same consultation occurs preparation missions with a focus on (AfDB) funds Fadama time, Nigeria on thwe form Fadama chaired by President community II in six additional undergoes a major II should take, with Obasanjo participation for a states, bringing the shift from military to the WB favoring a more inclusive model total to 18 democratic rule CDD approach Pilot Asset Acquisition 2006: Goal Fadama II achieves Local populations 2008: Fadama III (PAA) introduced to Environment Fund and even surpasses demand expansion starts and covers all enhance capabilites (GEF) funds the its project targets of Fadama to their 36 states and the of FCAs and FUGs Critical Ecosystem states FCT using Fadama II and facilitate asset Component to approach acquisition enhance livelihood systems Fadama III chosen as 2013: Fadama AF is part of the approved and will government's Agenda cover six states with a for Agricultural focus on a few crops Transformation with comparative advantage Note: ADP = agricultural development project; CDD = community-driven development; FCA = Fadama Community Association; FCT = Federal Capital Territory; FUG = Fadama User Group; WB = World Bank. 23 Annex B: CDD Lessons Annex B: CDD Lessons and Fadama Responses and Fadama Responses Lesson From International Experience with Induced Community-Driven Development (CDD) Approaches Fadama Response Risk to Be Mitigated 1.  “Civil society failure,” parochialism of communities Clustering communities; reaching out to vulnerable groups (such as women, youth, and the physically challenged) 2.  Risk of elite capture Institutionalizing participation of all community members within FUGs and FCAs; effective checks and balances (state coordination unit, facilitators); ability to garner political support while resisting undue interference (by helping officials enroll their constituency in accordance with project implementation manual) 3.  “Supply-driven, demand-driven development” Projects correspond to community capacity; community decisions informed by rapid rural diagnostic by facilitators; local development plans drafted by communities and only approved by Fadama Development Committee (participatory decision- making process) Bypassing/duplicating/undermining formal 4.  Close involvement of local governments in funding, institutions coaching communities, and vetting local development plans; counterpart funding from state government 5.  Financial sustainability Focus on productive activities; creation of local public goods/infrastructure taken over by local governments; promoting access to markets (creation of farmer’s markets) and finance (linking beneficiaries with local banks) Condition for Success 1.  Responsive state Long-standing engagement at federal and state levels; strong participation of local governments in Fadama implementation 2.  Conflict management/inclusion Participation of several stakeholders; inclusion of herders, fishers, and vulnerable groups among beneficiaries; micro-conflict management capacity within communities and in state coordination unit 3.  Impact-/results-based monitoring and evaluation Only inputs and activities systematically monitored, but surveys captured generated outcomes (such as social capital and return on investment) 4.  Exit strategy Promoting access to market and finance for beneficiaries; internalizing the Fadama institutional framework at state and local levels Note: ADP = agricultural development project; CDD = community-driven development; FCA = Fadama Community Association; FCT = Federal Capital Territory; FUG = Fadama User Group; WB = World Bank. 24 Bibliography   Bibliography Aderonmu, Jonathan A. 2010. “Local Government and ———. 2013. 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