79959 Nigeria: Ekiti SABER Country Report TEACHERS 2012 Policy Goals Status 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers There are clear expectations for what teachers and students are supposed to do, but teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their duties. 2. Attracting the best into teaching While compensation and entry requirements may attract competitive candidates, working conditions may make the profession less attractive. 3. Preparing teachers with useful training and experience There are minimum standards for entering teachers, and they receive guided professional practice to help strengthen their abilities. 4. Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs There are no incentives to attract teachers to hard-to-staff schools or attract candidates to subjects with teacher shortages. This may result in a lack of quality teachers in some schools and subjects. 5. Leading teachers with strong principals Entry requirements for school leadership exist; however, principals are not provided with performance-based incentives and their decision-making authority could be strengthened. 6. Monitoring teaching and learning There are some student achievement data to inform teaching and teacher performance evaluations are regularly conducted, but the use of student achievement data could be strengthened. 7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction Professional development is not integrated into the teaching career to help strengthen teacher skills over time. 8. Motivating teachers to perform There are some performance-related incentives in place and sanctions for low- performance but few mechanisms to hold teachers accountable. THE WORLD BANK COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 The Importance of Teacher Policies Overview of SABER-Teachers Research suggests that teacher quality is the main SABER-Teachers collects data on 10 core teacher policy school-based predictor of student achievement and that areas in order to offer a comprehensive overview of several consecutive years of outstanding teaching can teacher policies in each education system. These policy offset the learning deficits of disadvantaged students areas are listed in Box 1. It is important to highlight that (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Nye et al, 2004; Park and SABER-Teachers’ main focus is on the policies formally Hannum, 2001; Rivkin et al, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; adopted by education systems. While in some cases the Sanders, 1998; Sanders and Rivers 1996; and Vignoles et data collected also address how the teacher policy goals al, 2000). However, it is not yet clear exactly which are achieved in practice, the nature of our data teacher policies can raise teacher effectiveness collection approach (based on interviews with key (Goldhaber, 2002 and Rivkin et al, 2005). Thus, devising informants and official document review) do not allow effective policies to improve teaching quality remains a for a thorough assessment of policy implementation. challenge. Therefore, complementary research will be useful in most settings. There is increasing interest across the globe to attract, retain, develop and motivate great teachers. While the Box 1: Key Teacher Policy Areas World Bank has ample experience in supporting teacher policy reforms in developing countries, until recently Teacher Policy Dimensions there was no systematic effort to offer data and analysis • Requirements to enter and remain in that can provide policy guidance on teacher policies. teaching A new tool, Systems Approach for Better Education • Initial teacher preparation Results (SABER)–Teachers, fills this gap by collecting, • Recruitment and employment analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating • Teachers’ workload and autonomy comprehensive information on teacher policies in • Professional development primary and secondary education across a range of • Compensation (salary and non-salary different education systems. 1 In this report, we discuss benefits) the findings from the application of SABER-Teachers in • Retirement rules and benefits Ekiti, Nigeria. Our goal is to enable policymakers to • Monitoring and evaluation of teacher quality learn about how other countries address the same • Teacher representation and voice policy challenges related to teacher management and • School leadership thus how to make well-informed policy choices that will lead to improved learning outcomes. 2 To analyze these data and offer informed policy 1 guidance, SABER-Teachers analyzes progress on eight In order to offer guidance to policy makers in client teacher policy goals. SABER-Teachers used three countries on how to raise education quality, the Education criteria to select these teacher policy goals. They are: (i) Unit at the World Bank’s Human Development Department has launched System Assessment and Benchmarking for linked to performance through evidence provided by Education Results (SABER), an initiative that seeks to collect research and studies; (ii) a high priority for resource information about different education systems’ policy allocation; and (iii) actionable. The eight teacher policy domains, analyze it to identify common challenges and goals are presented in Figure 1. promising solutions, and make it widely available to inform countries’ decisions on where and how to invest in order to improve education quality. SABER - Teachers is one such policy domain. 2 The focus of the initiative is the design of teacher policies as opposed to their implementation on the ground. A number of complementary activities will be looking at implementation in a sample of countries as this will involve a different methodological approach and will require more financial and human resources. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 2 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 teacher policy goals and the evidence supporting this Figure 1: Teacher Policy Goals selection, please see Vegas et al (2010). Findings in Nigeria SABER-Teachers collected policy data for Nigeria’s Anambra, Bauchi, and Ekiti states. Table 1 presents the extent to which each education system has progressed in the eight SABER-Teachers policy goals. Our analysis indicates that each teacher policy system has relative strengths and weaknesses. However, across the three systems, we observed some general patterns, which we highlight in this section. Table 1: Levels of Development of Teacher Policies in Nigeria Anambra Bauchi Ekiti 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers 2. Attracting the best The eight teacher policy goals exclude other objectives into teaching that countries might want to pursue to increase the 3. Preparing teachers effectiveness of teachers. These were excluded because with useful training there is to date insufficient empirical basis on which to and experience make specific policy recommendations, either because 4. Matching teachers' evidence on policy interventions in that area remains skills with students' needs unclear or because the top-performing education 5. Leading teachers systems take very different approaches to reach these with strong principals objectives. 3 For a more detailed report on the eight 6. Monitoring teaching and learning 7. Supporting 3 For example, SABER-Teachers collects information on teachers to improve teacher organizations (as part of the policy area of “teacher instruction representation and voice�) and will make it publicly available. 8. Motivating Yet no clear trend has emerged regarding whether (and if so, teachers to perform how) governments should engage with these organizations in Setting clear expectations for teachers: All education policy formulation or consultation. To be sure, many studies systems in these states are Established in this policy have looked at the impact of unionization on schools’ goal, which means they have: (i) explicitly defined productivity (Argys and Reese, 1995; Eberts and Stone, 1986; and Hoxby 1996), student learning (Kingdon and Teal, 2008; standards for what students should know and be able to Kleiner and Petree, 1988; Kurth, 1987; Register and Grimes, do, as well as curricula to guide teaching and learning; 1991; and Steelman et al, 2000), teachers’ wages (Ballou and (ii) officially stipulated tasks for teachers; and (iii) Podgursky, 2002; Baugh and Stone, 1982; Bee and Dolton, delineated official time allocations that enable teachers 1995; and Dolton and Robson, 1996), working conditions to fulfill their duties. (Eberts, 1984; Murillo et al, 2002; and Zegarra and Ravina, 2003) and education policy (Goldschmidt and Stuart, 1986 Attracting the best into teaching: With the exception of and Woodbury, 1985). But even top-performing countries Bauchi, the other states are Established in this policy differ widely in how much they engage, to what extent they goal, which means they have: (i) entry requirements regulate, and how they organize teachers’ unions. Data that allow screening of talented individuals; (ii) collected by SABER-Teachers will offer guidance on how to attractive pay and benefits; (iii) appealing working approach these issues in the future. conditions; and (iv) attractive career opportunities SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 3 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 within the teaching profession. In Bauchi, there is an Findings in Ekiti, Nigeria opportunity to strengthen its policies in this domain. Preparing teachers with useful training and 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers experience: In this policy goal, all systems are Established, which means they have developed: (i) minimum standards for pre-service training programs; Setting clear expectations for teachers is important for (ii) requirements for classroom experience for all several reasons. First, expectations for student and teachers; and (iii) induction or mentoring programs to teacher performance influence how potential entrants help smooth the transition from training into teaching. perceive the profession. The clearer these expectations, Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs: This the more likely an education system is to get the type of policy goal remains a challenge in all states. Anambra is teacher it seeks. Second, expectations guide teachers’ Emerging in this policy goal, while Bauchi and Ekiti are work. The more specific they are, the better teachers lagging behind. Top-performing education systems have can organize their time and resources to meet them. established incentives to attract teachers to work in Finally, expectations can help align the goals of different hard-to-staff schools and/or to teach certain subjects key aspects of the profession (e.g., pre-service training, such as math and science. professional development and teacher appraisals). The more institutionalized these expectations are, the more Leading teachers with strong principals: All education likely all of these aspects will be working towards a systems in these states are Established in this policy common purpose and thus the more likely it will be goal, which means they have: (i) introduced achieved. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers requirements to become a principal and attract education systems can use to reach this goal: talented candidates; (ii) established incentives for  Are there clear expectations for what students principals to perform well; (iii) provided autonomy to should know and be able to do? principals to make decisions related to instruction or  Are there clear expectations for what teachers are personnel management for their schools. supposed to do? Monitoring teaching and learning: In this policy goal, all  Do teachers have enough time to fulfill their duties? states are Emerging, which indicates an opportunity to In Ekiti, there are clear expectations for what teachers strengthen its policies in this domain. High-performing and students are supposed to do, but teachers may education systems have established student learning not have enough time to fulfill their duties. assessment systems and teacher performance appraisal Expectations for what students should know and be mechanisms—factors that have been shown to enhance able to do are clear. Nigeria has a national curriculum, student learning outcomes. which sets the contents in detail, informing teachers of Supporting teachers to improve instruction: With the required subject content that should be taught to exception of Ekiti, the other states are Established in students at different grades. In addition, expectations this policy goal, which means teachers are provided for what teachers are supposed to do are explicitly laid with performance data to help them improve teaching out in legal regulations and teachers are guided by practices, and these data are also used by principals to performance goals. Similar to top-performing education develop professional development plans for teachers. In systems, Ekiti’s school year consists of 800 hours or Ekiti, there is an opportunity to strengthen its policies in more at both the primary and the secondary level. this domain. However in Ekiti, teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their duties. There is no statutory definition of Motivating teachers to perform: With the exception of working time for either primary or secondary school Anambra, the other states are Established in this policy teachers. In contrast, top-performing education goal, which means there are minimum mechanisms to systems not only define working time, but also hold teachers accountable as well as rewards and recognize that lesson planning, grading, and other sanctions for high- and low-performing teachers, administrative tasks may take place outside of the respectively. In Anambra, there is an opportunity to number of hours spent at school. Primary and strengthen its policies in this domain. secondary school teachers working time is between 1000 to 1520 hours per year. In comparison, working SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 4 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 time in most successful systems ranges between 1,520 appealing, but could be strengthened. There is an and 1,650 hours in both levels, and in the highest- established process to screen applicants to pre-service performing, it is 1,650 hours or more. In Ekiti, the teacher training, and there are requirements to become number of hours that teachers are expected to devote either a primary or secondary school teacher. However, to teaching is 80% to 100% of their working time. it is unknown how many primary school teachers meet Again, most successful education systems with data these requirements. For secondary school teachers, make teaching hours 30 to 50% (primary) of working 90% or more meet the requirements to enter teaching. hours, suggesting that they build in time for other tasks In Ekiti, data are unavailable for how many applicants that teachers need to carry out, such as administrative enter pre-service teacher training programs, indicating duties and grading assignments, among others. that the competitiveness of entering teacher training is unknown. In addition, data on what models of pre- 2. Attracting the Best into Teaching service teacher training (concurrent, consecutive, or alternative) are unavailable. Pay and benefits are appealing for talented candidates, with highly Getting talented people to go into teaching is essential competitive starting salaries (80% or more of GDP per for several reasons (Guarino, Santibáñez & Daley capita). Teachers in Ekiti are generally paid on time, and 2006). First, more able individuals make better teachers pay changes considerably over a teacher’s career. (Boyd, et al. 2008). The better the quality of the Teachers do not receive monetary bonuses for teaching teaching force, the more likely an education system is a specific subject, geographic area, grade, or student to have effective teachers. Second, top candidates population, and pay does not take into account maximize the impact of teacher training (whether performance evaluations. Teachers are entitled to both traditional or abridged). If the quality of student retirement and health benefits. teachers is too low, training is likely to focus more on While there are attractive career opportunities, making up for their deficits in knowledge and skills and working conditions could be made more appealing for less on turning them into effective teachers. Finally, talented candidates. There are no standards for luring top talent into teaching has a “multiplier� effect: infrastructure, hygiene, and sanitation of schools. if teaching attracts qualified people, competitive However, pupil-teacher ratio are aligned with top- candidates who had not considered teaching might be performing systems, with less than 25 students primary drawn to it. SABER - Teachers considers four policy and secondary school students per teacher. Attractive levers education systems can use to reach this goal: 4 career opportunities exist; at the school level, upon the  Are entry requirements set up to attract talented decision of either, principals, school owners or candidates? municipal authorities, teachers can take on leadership  Are pay and benefits appealing for talented positions. In addition, teachers can apply for both candidates? principal posts and academic posts, such as, academic  Are working conditions appealing for talented lead-teachers, master teachers and heads of candidates? departments.  Are there attractive career opportunities? In Ekiti, entry requirements are set up to attract 3. Preparing Teachers with Useful talented applicants and pay and benefits are Training and Experience 4 One issue that is not included in this list because of lack of clear guidance from available evidence on how to tackle it is Equipping teachers with the skills they need to that of the “flexibility� of the profession. Several studies find succeed in a classroom is crucial. First, few (if any) that some women prefer to teach because they can take leaves of absence to take care of their families without individuals are born effective teachers. Teachers needs incurring wage penalties when they come back (Flyer & Rosen subject matter knowledge, classroom management 1997; Stinebrickner 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b). Yet, it is skills and lots of practice in order to be successful in a unclear that education system want to attract these classroom. In addition, preparation puts all teachers on candidates any more than other groups. an equal footing, giving them a common framework to SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 5 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 work and improve their practice. SABER - Teachers teachers tend to gravitate towards schools with better considers three policy levers education systems can use working conditions, which often serve better off to reach this goal: 5 students (Boyd, et al. 2005a; Hanushek, et al. 2004b).  Are there minimum standards for pre-service Second, it is a way of ensuring teachers are distributed teaching training programs? efficiently—i.e., to minimize the number of surplus  Are individuals required to have classroom teachers at a given grade, subject or geographic area. experience to be allowed to teach? Finally, ensuring teachers are a good match for their  Do teachers have a smooth transition from pre- school can also increase their effectiveness and reduce service training into their first job? turnover rates (Boyd, et al. 2002, 2005b; Jackson 2010). 6 SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers In Ekiti, there are minimum standards for pre-service education systems can use to reach this goal: training, individuals are required to have classroom  Are there incentives for teachers to work at hard- experience, and beginning teachers are required to to-staff schools? participate in an induction or mentoring program.  Are there incentives for teachers to teach critical There is an accreditation process for pre-service teacher shortage subjects? training programs, and specifications on subject content have been established. In the specifications for initial In Ekiti, teachers are not provided with monetary teacher training, primary and secondary school teachers incentives to work in hard-to-staff schools; critical devote more hours to subject matter than pedagogy, shortage subjects have been identified, but no these findings align with policies of successful systems. incentives exist. Teachers working in hard-to-staff Primary and secondary school teachers are required to schools, such as those serving students from have 7 to 11 months of practical professional disadvantaged populations, are not entitled to receive experience. In comparison, most successful school either bonuses or a better compensation packages. In systems have mandatory classroom experience of at addition, teaching experience is used in making transfer least a year and often longer, for both primary and decisions; using seniority as a basis for approving secondary school teachers. In Ekiti, beginning teachers transfer requests may motivate the most seasoned and are required to participate in an induction or mentoring potentially best teachers to leave hard-to-staff schools. program of at least a year to help smooth their In several countries, the practice of allocating teacher transition from training into the classroom. positions based on seniority has resulted in higher turnover rates in hard-to-staff schools, as well as a 4. Matching Teachers’ Skills with larger proportion of teacher entrants, who may not be Students’ Needs as effective as more experienced teachers. Ekiti has identified critical shortage subjects, but not created monetary incentives for teachers to focus on them. Ensuring that teachers work in schools where their 5. Leading Teachers with Strong skills are most needed is important for promoting Principals equity and efficiency. First, it is a way of ensuring all students in an education system have an equal opportunity to learn: without purposeful incentives, The quality of school heads is second only to classroom 5 One aspect not included in this framework because no data teaching as a predictor of student learning (Eberts & on this indicator was collected is that of teacher certification. 6 Although the definition of teacher certification varies by Much research has been devoted to the issue of turnover. country (and sometimes, within one country), studies have Several studies have noted that it is not always the most found that a certification status is generally associated with effective teachers who leave (Boyd, et al. 2007; Hanushek, et higher teacher effectiveness (Darling-Hammond 1999a, al. 2005; West & Chingos 2008). Yet, these studies also 1999b; Darling-Hammond, Barnett & Thorenson 2001; E. J. concede that there is still considerable room for schools to Fuller 1999; Goldhaber & Brewer 2000; Hawk, Coble & enact targeted policies aimed at retaining only the most Swanson 1985). effective performers. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 6 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 Stone 1988; Leithwood, et al. 2006). Quality principals can then be shared among the teaching staff to improve attract and retain quality teachers (Boyd, et al. 2009a; school performance. Second, identifying low- Ingersoll 2001a, 2001b; Papa Jr., Lankford & Wyckoff performing teachers and students is necessary to 2002). Also, capable principals can spearhead much- support them in a timely manner. Education systems needed change at the school level, so having strong need to be able to know when to provide struggling leaders is important not only to ensure acceptable classrooms with adequate support to improve. Finally, levels of performance but also to drive improvements. such information is useful for accountability purposes. Finally, good principals can facilitate teachers’ work and SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers continuous improvement. The more capable a principal education systems can use to reach this goal: is, the more he or she can support teachers, create a  Is there enough student achievement data to sense of community, make teachers feel valued and inform teaching? ease their anxiety about external pressures (Mulford  Is there enough teacher performance data to 2003). SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers inform teaching? education systems can use to reach this goal: In Ekiti, there are some student achievement data to  Are requirements to become a principal set up to inform teaching and teacher performance evaluations attract talented candidates? are regularly conducted, but the use of student  Do principals have incentives to perform well? achievement data could be strengthened. In 1996 and  Can principals make key decisions to improve 2003, Ekiti participated in the Monitoring of Learning teaching? Achievement (MLA), an international assessment of In Ekiti, entry requirements for school leadership exist; student learning. Unlike top-performing systems, Ekiti however, principals are not provided with does not conduct regular national or sub-national performance-based incentives and their decision- assessments of student learning. However, teacher making authority could be strengthened. Clear performance evaluations are regularly conducted. requirements and selection processes exist to become a Participation in both internal and external evaluations is school principal. Principals must have completed an mandatory for all public school teachers. Internal educational level of at least the ISCED 5B, a minimum of evaluations occur regularly (daily, weekly, termly), while 15 years of professional teaching experience, a external evaluations occur at least once a year. minimum of 5 years of professional administrative Evaluations in Ekiiti rely on 5 or more sources and use at experience, satisfactory performance in a supervised least 3 out of the following criteria to assess teaching: internship, and participated in an induction or teacher knowledge, classroom practices, student mentoring program. In Ekiti, principal pay is highly background and student learning. In Ekiti, less than 5% competitive: principals are paid 140% or more of GDP of teachers failed their last round of external per capita, but there are no performance-based evaluations. Further, it is possible to track teachers over incentives. While principals must participate in regular time. performance evaluations, they are not allowed to receive monetary bonuses based on their performance 7. Supporting Teachers to Improve on the job. In addition, principals are required to Instruction provide guidance to teachers and decide on the distribution of time during school hours, but they do not have a say or decide on teacher hiring, firing, dismissals, or promotions. Helping teachers be more effective in the classroom is vital. First, all teachers can improve—regardless of how 6. Monitoring Teaching and Learning effective they are at one point in time. Therefore, support mechanisms are necessary to help teachers reach their potential and perform at their best. Second, changes in classroom assignments and/or student Assessing how well teachers are teaching and whether populations can pose new challenges to teachers. Thus, students are learning is essential to devise strategies during periods of transitions, teachers will need for improving teaching and learning. First, teacher and additional help to sustain their performance. Finally, student evaluations help identify good practices, which SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 7 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 support mechanisms can go a long way in preventing  Are there rewards for high-performing teachers? burnout and reducing turnover. Even motivated  Are there sanctions for low-performing teachers? teachers may choose to leave if they are consistently There are some performance-related incentives in ineffective, do not know how to improve and receive place and sanctions for low-performance, but little support. SABER - Teachers considers two policy mechanisms to hold teachers accountable could be levers education systems can use to reach this goal: strengthened. There are requirements for primary and  Is teacher performance data used to improve secondary school teachers to remain in the profession, teaching? and teachers can be dismissed for misconduct or child  Is there professional development to improve abuse. Teacher absenteeism is taken into account in practice? performance evaluations, and may result in penalties In Ekiti, teacher performance data from evaluations such as salary deductions and/or dismissal. In addition, are used to inform classroom practice, but professional there are some rewards for high-performing teachers, development content and requirements could be including: monetary bonuses, better chances of strengthened. The schools conduct teacher promotion, and more public recognition. The performance evaluations and use these results to percentage of a teacher’s salary affected by inform teachers as to how they can develop their performance is unknown, and there are some sanctions instructional practices. Under-performing teachers, as in place for low-performing teachers. Performance on judged on the evaluation results, may be assigned a the job is used to decide whether to grant an open- supervisor or professional development. Further, ended appointment, and there is a mandatory professional development exists, but it is unknown probationary period. In Ekiti, there are pay cuts for low- whether it is required and professional development is performing teachers and unsatisfactory performance on not used in a focused approach to improve instruction. an evaluation may result in dismissal. Professional development includes 5 or more types of activities other than courses and workshops or education conferences and seminars. However, the content of professional development for both primary Improving Teacher Policies: Priorities for and secondary school teachers is unknown. Further, individual teachers are responsible for paying for their Ekiti, Nigeria professional development. Overall, Ekiti has achieved acceptable levels of development in five of the eight core SABER-Teacher 8. Motivating Teachers to Perform policy goals. This indicates that Ekiti has succeeded in setting clear expectations for teachers, attracting the best into teaching, preparing teachers with useful Incentives help education systems signal priorities. The training and experience, leading teachers with strong more aligned incentives are with the behaviors and principals, and motivating teachers to perform. Yet, outcomes they expect from teachers, the more likely Ekiti has room to improve in the goals of matching they will obtain them. Incentives are also a way of teachers’ skills with students needs, monitoring recognizing teachers’ work. Teaching is a challenging job teaching and learning, and supporting teachers to and incentives can let teachers know the results they improve instruction. have achieved are valued so that they continue working hard to sustain them. In addition, some types of Matching Teachers’ Skills with Students’ incentives can influence the profile of the teaching Needs profession and make it more competitive, dynamic and There are two policy levers that governments can use to performance-driven. The presence of incentives can reach the goal of matching teachers’ skills with have affect the attractiveness of the teaching students’ needs: (1) establishing incentives for teachers profession. SABER - Teachers considers three policy to work at hard-to-staff schools; and (2) establishing levers education systems can use to reach this goal: incentives for teachers to teach critical shortage  Are there minimum mechanisms to hold teachers subjects. accountable? SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 8 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 Both Bauchi and Ekiti rate Latent in this policy goal, assessments, and instituting national or sub-national while Anambra is Emerging. In Anambra, teachers are assessments of students learning. entitled to incentives for working in hard-to-staff schools or for teaching critical shortage subject, but Supporting teachers to improve teachers do not have these incentives in either Bauchi instruction or Ekiti. One way in which education systems can foster There are two policy levers that are key to supporting a more equitable distribution of teachers is by using teachers to improve instruction: (1) providing teachers incentives; however, the evidence suggests that the with performance data to help them improve their design of these incentives programs matters. Ekiti teaching; and (2) providing professional development to might consider paying teachers more for working in improve practice. hard-to-staff schools and/or providing incentives to teachers to teach critical shortage subjects. In addition, Ekiti rates Emerging in this policy goal, while Anambra across these three education systems, teaching and Bauchi rate Established. In particular, there is an experience is used in deciding transfer priorities. Even in opportunity for Ekiti to strengthen its policies related to education systems with well-designed incentives to professional development content and requirements. attract teachers into hard-to-staff schools, the In Ekiti, there are no professional development distribution of teachers may still be inequitable if requirements for primary or secondary school teachers. experienced teachers (who can be more effective than All successful education systems with data either make novice teachers) are given priority in transfer professional development compulsory for all teachers assignments. 7 Thus, using seniority as a basis for or a requirement for promotion. In addition, top- approving transfer requests may motivate the most performing education systems generally require seasoned and potentially best teachers to leave hard- teachers to participate in 10 or more days of to-staff schools. professional development, which includes 5 or more non-traditional types of activities and focuses on 5 or Monitoring Teaching and Learning more aspects (other than school management and administration). Further, in Ekiti, teachers are There are two policy levers that are key to monitoring responsible for paying for their professional teaching and learning: (1) establishing student learning development; however, in Bauchi and many successful assessment systems; and (2) teacher performance education systems most of the costs of professional appraisal mechanisms. development are covered. Anambra and Ekiti have participated in selected international assessments of student learning. Ekiti participated in the Monitoring of Learning Achievement (MLA) in 1996 and 2003, and Anambra participated in the MLA in 2003. Making student achievement data available to teachers is key to inform their diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of their students and their lesson planning: the more information teachers have about the learning levels of their students, the better they can prepare to contribute to their students’ learning progress. Nigeria’s education systems could benefit from partaking in more frequent international 7 This is concerning given that research shows that it is the teachers with the best pre-service qualifications who are most likely to apply to transfer to other schools (Boyd, et al. 2009b) and that school accountability rankings make teachers want to transfer out of low-performing schools (Feng, Figlio & Sass 2010). SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 9 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 02-03-02. 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Woodbury, S. (1985). "The Scope of Bargaining and Bargaining Outcomes in Public Schools." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 38(2), 195-210. Xu, Z., Hannaway, J., & Taylor, C. (2007). "Making a Difference? The Effects of Teach for America in High School." National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research (CALDER), Urban Institute. Zegarra, E., & Ravina, R. (2003). "Teacher Unionization and the Quality of Education in Peru: An Empirical Evaluation Using Survey Data." Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 19 COUNTRY NAME ǀ DOMAIN NAME SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 www.worldbank.org/education/saber The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative collects data on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world and benchmarks them against practices associated with student learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results—from students, administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, detailed, objective snapshot of how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn. This report focuses specifically the area of teacher policies. This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. THE WORLD BANK SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 20