WATER P-NOTES ISSUE 43 AprIl 2010 55273 Making a Large Irrigation Scheme Work: A Case Study from Mali L ocated in the heart of Mali, the Office du Niger age annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters. (ON) is one of the oldest and largest irrigation Its population of an estimated 11 million in 2002 schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa. The French, who is growing by 2.4 percent a year. Mali is also one began the scheme in 1932, planned on develop- of the world's poorest countries, with 64 percent ing about 1,000,000 hectares (ha) over a period of of the population living below the poverty line; life 50 years. The scheme did not provide the expected expectancy at birth is 43 years, and 57 percent of resources for cotton and rice farming, and a major its people are illiterate. source of exploitation of farmers. Change began in Economically, Mali is vulnerable. It has a gross the 1980's with Government/donor led reforms that domestic product (GDP) of US$240 per head. The resulted in dissolving the monopoly power of ON and country derives 43 percent of its GDP from agri- increasing citizen participation in its management. culture; harvests depend on rainfall, because less This report provides the context and details on than 100,000 hectares can be irrigated. Rainfall is how the government of Mali became committed to highly variable, and droughts are frequent. Three reform of the Office du Niger (ON), an irrigated commodities (cotton, gold and livestock) earn more rice scheme. The government's decision is presented than 90 percent of Mali's foreign exchange. as the outcome of a series of small power shifts Mali was colonized by France from the 1880s triggered by pro-reform players. Reform advocates until 1960. After independence, it was ruled by a played a key role, and identified opportunities and one-party political system, followed by military con- applied their skills to tilt the power balance between trol from 1968 until 1991, when a popular uprising agency and farmers to further goals of sustainabil- led to a multiparty democracy and restored civil- ity and partnership. Initial steps for reform had a ian government. Since the early 1990's, Mali has significant impact, as they raised yields and farmer reduced its macroeconomic imbalances and liberal- incomes in a single season. Coalitions grew into ized its economy. partnership institutions that became effective enough for government to consolidate them into a legal and financial framework. This case study serves as an illustration of how the World Bank and other donors Creation and expansion of an can help governments turn public irrigation systems irrigated rice scheme into financially sustainable operations. The Office du Niger (ON) or Niger Authority was created by the French colonial authorities in 1932 Background for gravity irrigation on a million hectares along the Niger River. The ON refers to both the 60,000 Mali is located in West Africa. Half of its 1.24 mil- hectare scheme and the organization that manages lion square kilometers of land is arid, with aver- it. The project is located in the middle of Mali on This note reports key messages from Making a Large Irrigation Scheme Work, a Directions in Develop- ment publication by Djibril Aw and Geert Diemer, World Bank 2005. Readers may download the com- plete document from www.worldbank.org/water. WATER P-NOTES land fed by the Niger River. The initial infrastructure cumscribed by its stakeholder coalition. A stalemate was built by forced labor and land was cultivated ensued in 1982 when donors required government by involuntary settlers. Settlers were forced to grow commitment to reform to release funding. One cotton to supply the French textile industry, but cot- donor, the Netherlands, proposed a compromise ton crops failed through no fault of growers, and that allowed for a combination of physical and insti- settlers became heavily in debt. Rice cultivation was tutional improvements on a single secondary canal. permitted to feed the settlers and alleviate food The small reform steps were introduced along insecurity in the region. with physical improvements. Reform steps included: By the time Mali became independent in short- and medium-term credit for all farmers; a 1960, over 45,000 hectares had been developed. new system of management of the credit process After independence, all managers of the ON were through village associations; and a new mechanism Malian; they expanded the scheme, but they did not for canal operation and maintenance that intro- change the management institutions. The govern- duced village associations as partners. Results from ment inherited a top-down management structure; this trial process were conclusive--yields more than operation and maintenance of intake and canals; doubled, and when the government requested donor and monopolies in crop processing and marketing assistance in extending the rehabilitated area, some of farm output. power shifted from agency staff to farmers. The government and the ON formed a Through the introduction and spread of solid coalition that did not include farmers. The technologies that helped shape new institutions arrangement supported the government in provid- and forged a stakeholder coalition of organized ing a reliable rice supply for urban constituents; farmers, who gradually replaced the agency staff the government also guaranteed salaries for ON as the most powerful group of stakeholders. The agency personnel and absorbed agency's losses. farmers gained further independence from the ON In 1969, with increased demand for rice, the gov- in 1984 and 1986 when they started to use small ernment determined rice would be the only crop threshers and hulling machines, and did not have in the irrigated area. To expand the scheme, the to rely on the agency to have their rice threshed government approached the World Bank and other and milled. Another bilateral donor negotiated donors for assistance. This became the beginning farmer-friendly land-tenure rules and created of reforms, although that was not the government's transparent and user-accountable institutions. original intention. Through innovations and pressure, the staff in the donor projects obtained the government's verbal agreement to reform; the commitment to reform was confirmed with a Bank loan that mandated How farmers became partners reform of the ON. After a situation analysis, the World Bank and bilat- eral donors concluded that expansion of the irriga- tion scheme would be economically unjustified until Consolidation of reforms the scheme became financially sustainable. The key to becoming financially viable was the involvement In 1991, a new government came to power in Mali of settlers as partners in scheme management, in that, after initial hesitation, followed through on the addition to a grant of land-tenure security. Without commitment to reforms. With the political support significant reform measures, farmers lacked incen- of the organized farmers, the new government was tives to raise yields. Furthermore, agency monopo- convinced it could take on the entrenched ON, lies needed to be abolished, management costs cut, now weakened by lost political leverage and social and water delivery made more efficient. standing. Further, the farmers proved that they were a new political force when they threatened to march The government agreed to improvements con- on the capital if the government did not stop the cerning water delivery, expressed an interest in infra- illegal rice imports that were depressing rice prices. structure rehabilitation, and opposed all suggestions The government's decision to consolidate the irriga- concerning reform. The government had little politi- tion reforms squared with its policy to further liberal- cal room for maneuvering, as its actions were cir- ize the economy with the help of donors. 2 ISSUE 43 · APRIL 2010 Figure 1. Dynamics of Performance Contract Negotiations Farmer Delegates seek a limited budget for the Office du Niger and low water fees. They work with the Malian government and the ON to obtain donor funds for investment in canal improvement and extension. The ON wants more budgeted Donors want to limit the ON funding, tasks, and personnel budget and work with the and works with the government to government and the ON to obtain obtain high water fees and with the high water fees. government and delegates to obtain maximum donor investment. Under the new political scenario, reforms were · Increased incomes of established farmers; quickly consolidated. With the political support · Accommodation of newcomers; from organized farmers, and the financial support of donors, the government appointed a reform unit · Liberation of women from daily chores of directly under the prime minister's office, overrid- pounding grains and creation of openings for ing sector ministries. The reform unit established a women to farm and trade; and timetable that set the pace for reform and brokered · Supported household shifts from subsistence cul- compromises between the ON employees' union, tivation to cash crops and commercial services. farmers, ministries, and donors. Reforms aimed to: downsize ON staff; fine-tune new institutions; estab- The success of reforms further solidified the new lish land-tenure security for farmers; and initiate institutional framework. User funding of operation full-cost recovery and joint management by elected and maintenance reinforced market discipline in farmers' representatives and agency staff. credit, extension, and economic partnerships. The reforms appear sustainable. One effective innovation was the creation of three-party performance contracts valid for three years that institutionalized a new balance of power between the government, the ON, and organized Lessons on irrigation reform for farmers. The contracts allowed the three parties other countries to negotiate, monitor, and assess one another's contributions and performance. The framework for Irrigation reform has posed challenges in other partnership combined farmer monitoring of the use developing countries, so that the process that Mali of water service fees with agency administration and went through is typical of irrigation reform else- government authority for compliance; that fact that where. Often, there is a lack of interest of focus in contract negotiations recurred on a regular basis the accountability and performance of the public allowed for continual adjustments of rules to meet irrigation sector, even when it drains finances from emerging realities, such as the need to include a such services as health, education and road build- younger generation of farmers. ing. Without strong, widespread support for imple- The reforms led to sharp increases in yields, menting reform, governments may find it politically copping intensity and incomes. The reforms reduced unfeasible to initiate reforms in a sector fiercely poverty through: opposed to change. 3 WATER P-NOTES Table 1. Water fee Collection and Infrastructure Maintenance (Current Terms), 1992­93 through 1995­96 Expenditures on Infrastructure Maintenance (CFAF million) Share part of Water-fee Fee rate, Fees From From Expenditures proceeds used Class 1 Fees Collected: Collection Water National from Water for Maintenance Year (CFAF/ha) (CFAF million) rate (%) Fees Budget Total Fees works 1992­93 28,000 823 80.0 1993­94 28,000 1,032 95.4 430 533 963 0.45 0.42 1994­95 32,000 1,216 97.7 553 562 1,115 0.50 0.45 1995­96 40,000 1,684 95.9 807 546 1,353 0.60 0.48 ha: hectares Source: Authors, from ON Data. The ON case demonstrates that governments The experience in Mali illustrates that govern- can trigger a change process by granting farm- ments can adopt a testing phase to broaden the ers small gains that are achievable and politically arena for support of irrigation reforms and reduce feasible. The changes proposed by donors were resistance to implementation. By encouraging farm- the result of careful analysis, aimed at long-term ers, national management institutes, NGOs, and sustainability. In the ON, the initial shifts concerned other secondary stakeholders, as well as the irriga- water, credit, and dialogue on the operation of the tion department itself, it is possible to test solutions canal. A new government created an opportunity that include modern management perspectives and for further reform, and reform advocates shaped practices. In addition, governments can monitor the a new intervention (mobile threshers and hulling political feasibility of the test output, and preempt or machines run by village associations) to meet the reduce resistance through analysis of and planning goals of reformers and the government. The long- for the political feasibility of implementation. term presence of field staff committed to farmer welfare, with good access to decision makers, also proved essential to on-going reform. The Water Sector Board Practitioner Notes (P-Notes) series is published by the Water Sector Board of the Sustainable Development Network of the Water World Bank Group. P-Notes are available online at www.worldbank. Sector org/water. P-Notes are a synopsis of larger World Bank documents in Board the water sector. 4 THE WORLD BANK | 1818 H Street, NW | Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org/water | whelpdesk@worldbank.org