Policy Research Working Paper 10925 The Division of Revenues from Unexpected Demand Shocks Paulo Bastos Natalia P. Monteiro Odd Rune Straume Development Economics Development Research Group September 2024 Policy Research Working Paper 10925 Abstract This paper exploits gaps between observed and recently in the form of higher overtime payment and base wage forecasted Gross Domestic Product growth in export desti- increases. The findings also show that there are significant nations to estimate the effects of unexpected demand shocks increases in bonus-related pay in firms managed by high- on worker compensation. Using employer-employee panel skilled managers, and the unequal average distribution of data, the paper finds that the revenues from these demand unexpected revenues is also mainly driven by wage effects in shocks are partly transmitted to workers in the form of the same subset of firms. This suggests that the way in which higher average wages, especially close to the top of the with- revenues from unexpected demand shocks are transmitted in-firm wage distribution. These wage responses occur both to workers is significantly related to managerial capabilities. This paper is a product of the Development Research Group, Development Economics. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The authors may be contacted at pbastos@worldbank.org. The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Produced by the Research Support Team The Division of Revenues from Unexpected Demand Shocks∗ Paulo Bastos† Natalia P. Monteiro‡ Odd Rune Straume§ Keywords: Unexpected demand shocks, firm performance, wages, rent sharing, managers. JEL Classification: J2, J6, F16, F66 ∗ This paper is financed by National Funds of the FCT – Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology within the project UIDB/03182/2020. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank, or those of the governments they represent. We remain responsible for any errors. † Development Research Group, World Bank; CEPR; and REM/UECE, pbastos@worldbank.org. ‡ Department of Economics/NIPE, University of Minho, n.monteiro@eeg.uminho.pt § Department of Economics/NIPE, University of Minho, o.r.straume@eeg.uminho.pt 1 Introduction Understanding the mechanisms by which firm-level revenue shocks impact wage setting is impor- tant for explaining the drivers of wage differentials and wage premia across firms and workers, how firms adjust their wage policies to absorb shocks, as well as the role played by wage rigidities in the international transmission of business cycles. Naturally, appreciation is growing in a num- ber of fields—macroeconomics, labor, industrial organization, as well as international trade—for careful empirical work seeking to improve our understanding of these mechanisms.1 However, research has faced two important challenges. First, it has been difficult to quantify in a sys- tematic but precise way the unexpected component of demand shocks at the firm-level, while distinguishing it from anticipated changes in market conditions. This distinction is important for establishing a causal link between changes in demand and changes in wages. Second, study- ing the mechanisms by which these unexpected demand shocks impact wage setting requires detailed information on the components of worker compensation. In this paper, we estimate the effects of unexpected demand shocks on the components of worker compensation. We also explore if and how the wage effects of such shocks are related to managerial skill. We propose a new methodology to identify the unexpected component of demand shocks at the firm-level, exploiting forecast errors in the GDP growth of export markets. In each destination, the unexpected component of demand shocks is measured as the difference between the GDP growth actually observed and recent forecasts of the International Monetary Fund. We then aggregate these shocks at the firm-year level, weighting by the initial share of destinations in firms’ total sales. Since firms initially served different destinations to a varying degree, they were differentially exposed to these unexpected demand shocks across markets. We show that these unexpected shocks tend to be uncorrelated with initial firm attributes, and account for firm fixed effects throughout the estimation. The empirical analysis draws on an unusually rich collection of data sets for the population of private sector firms operating in Portugal during 2006-2018. We combine a yearly firm census with information on export transactions and employer-employee panel data. We also use an auxiliary data set from a management survey for 2016, covering a subset of these firms, in order to establish a correlation between managerial skill and observable management practices. The employer-employee data allow us to distinguish between effects on each of the various components of worker compensation, including base wages, overtime pay, and other regular and 1 Recent contributions to this literature, reviewed in more detail below, include Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018), Kline, Petkova, Williams, and Zidar (2019), Aghion, Akcigit, Hyytinen, and Toivanen (2018), Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2021), and Fr´ ıas, Kaplan, Verhoogen, and Alfaro-Serrano (2024). 1 irregular components of compensation. In addition, the information on schooling and detailed occupation makes it possible to examine heterogeneity in the wage effects of revenue shocks across workers in different positions of the wage distribution, and how these effects are shaped by the skills of top executives. In the empirical analysis, we find that unexpected demand shocks have a significant impact on sales, employment, investment and average wages. Using employer-employee panel data, we find that firm revenue windfalls, in the form of unexpected demand shocks, are partly transmitted to workers in the form of higher average wages, but in a highly unequal way, with most of the wage increases occurring close to the top of the within-firm wage distribution. Interestingly, firm adjustments are much larger for negative demand shocks. More specifically, a demand increase leads to higher sales, exports, investment, employment and wages when actual demand falls short of expectations, while we do not find similar statistically significant responses to demand increases above the expected level. This suggests the presence of short-run capacity constraints that make output harder to adjust upwards than downwards, and our results are consistent with firms setting short-run capacity according to expected demand. Although parts of the aforementioned wage increases consist of increased overtime payments in exchange for more hours worked, we also find that unexpected demand shocks lead to signifi- cant increases in base wages and other wage components. This suggests that that firms tend to share the unexpected changes in revenue with their workers, which is inconsistent with perfectly competitive labor markets, and also suggests that firms have some degree of product market power. Our analysis reveals indications of several different channels of rent sharing. First, we find that increases in base wages are much stronger for firms with firm-level (as opposed to more centralized) wage agreements, which we take as an indication of collective bargaining power. Sec- ond, we also find somewhat stronger and more significant wage effects for longer-tenured workers, which might be caused by hiring or training costs that give individual bargaining power to this type of workers. Finally, we also find evidence of explicit profit-sharing arrangements whereby revenue windfalls are transmitted to workers through increases in performance-based payments. However, this seems to occur only in firms with high-skilled managers. This category of firms is also found to be the main driver of the aforementioned unequal rent distribution across workers within the firm, thus highlighting the importance of managerial skill. In addition to the literature mentioned above, this paper relates to several strands of existing research. A large body of literature seeks to quantify and explain wage differentials across firms.2 2 Influential contributions include, among many others, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (henceforth AKM), Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2015) and Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, and von Wachter (2019). 2 In a recent review of this literature, Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018) conclude that more research is needed applying (quasi)-experimental research designs that convincingly tease out the mechanisms through which firm shocks are transmitted to workers. A few recent papers have contributed to fill this gap. Exploiting an unexpected devaluation of the Mexican currency, ıas, Kaplan, Verhoogen, and Alfaro-Serrano (2024) carefully estimate how differential export Fr´ shocks across firms impact wage premia and worker composition.3 The results reveal that exports have a significant positive effect on wage premia, and that the effect on wage premia accounts for essentially all of the medium-term effect of exporting on plant-average wages.4 Kline, Petkova, Williams, and Zidar (2019) estimate the effects of innovation on rent-sharing using employer-employee data and rich patent information for the United States. Under the identifying assumption that the U.S. Patent Office’s initial decision on a patent application is as good as random (conditional on observable attributes of the application and the firm), the authors find that each patent-induced additional dollar of operating surplus yields a 29-cent rise in a firm’s wage bill. Also focusing on patents, but using Finish data and a matching estimator, Aghion, Akcigit, Hyytinen, and Toivanen (2018) find that patents are positively associated with earnings of the co-workers of inventors. Our paper makes several contributions to this literature. First, the employer-employee data we use make it possible to examine effects of unexpected demand shocks on the various com- ponents of worker compensation (bases wages, overtime and other components of pay). Recent work by Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2021) convincingly argues that this distinction is im- portant for examining and understanding the extent of wage rigidity over the business cycle.5 Second, we exploit the role of top managers’ skills—which we show are correlated with manage- ment practices observed in data—in shaping these effects. Although a growing body of evidence reveals that manager attributes are important for management practices and firm performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bastos and Monteiro, 2011; Bender, Bloom, Card, Van-Reenen, and Wolter, 2018), there is little evidence on whether and how managers matter for how exogenous firm shocks are transmitted to workers. Finally, the 3 The broader literature on firm and labor market responses to exchange rate movements includes Revenga (1992), Bertrand (2004), Verhoogen (2008), Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2012), Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) and Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen (2018), among others. Most closely related to this paper, Araujo and Paz (2014) and Macis and Schivardi (2016) use unexpected devaluations of the Italian and Brazilian currencies, respectively, to examine effects on rent sharing and workforce composition. 4 A related strand of work examines the relationship between exports and wages, but does not exploit quasi- experimental variation in exports, including Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2007), Munch and Skaksen (2008), Baumgarten (2013), Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2013), Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2017). 5 Using administrative payroll data from the largest U.S. payroll processing company, they provide descriptive evidence that firms use base wages to cyclically adjust the marginal cost of their workers, although about one third of workers receive no base wage change year over year. 3 methodology we propose for identifying firm-level demand shocks has some advantages relative to the shocks previously exploited. Although exchange rate movements and innovations leading to patents are difficult to forecast, variation over time is likely to reflect in part economic funda- mentals and policy choices. These developments can be monitored and analyzed by firms, which may therefore partly respond in anticipation.6 Identifying the effects of unexpected exchange rate movements is further complicated by the fact that they are subject to incomplete pass- through, which may be influenced by the currency in which trade transactions are denominated and vary across firms and markets (Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings, 2014; Gopinath, Boz, Diez, Gourinchas, and Plagborg-Moller, 2020).7 Unexpected GDP shocks in destinations are arguably less subject to this concern.8 Our paper further speaks to a recent strand of work highlighting the role of internationally active firms in the international transmission of business cycles. Using French firm-level data, di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2018) show that trade linkages with a foreign country are associated with a significantly higher correlation between a firm and that foreign country, which has significant macro implications. In related work, di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2020) document that larger French firms are significantly more sensitive to foreign GDP growth. Using a quantitative model, they find that this granularity accounts for 40 to 85% of the impact of foreign fluctuations on French GDP. Focusing on exporting firms, we contribute to this litera- ture by estimating the response of firm-level sales, employment, investment and wages to both expected and unexpected fluctuations in foreign GDP growth. In addition, we use employer- employee data to estimate how each of these shocks impacts the different components of worker compensation within and across heterogeneous exporters. As Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2021) emphasize, measuring this nominal wage adjustment in micro data is key for disciplining macroeconomic theories of nominal wage rigidity.9 6 Since there are no official forecasts for bilateral exchange rates, it is often difficult to isolate the unexpected component of exchange rate shocks. 7 Furthermore, exchange rate movements may impact not only firm revenues in export destinations, but also the prices of materials, components and technologies sourced from those markets (which may complement or replace workers). It has been difficult to fully distinguish between these effects. Unexpected demand shocks in destinations are arguably more likely to impact firm performance primarily through exports. 8 In an important contribution, Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2014) examine effects of offshoring and external demand shocks on wages, using employer-employee data from Denmark. Identification of demand shocks exploits variation in firm-specific weighted averages of imports of particular goods by the firm’s trading partners, using the firm’s initial shares as weights. We innovate by isolating the unexpected (and idiosyncratic) component of demand shocks in destinations. In addition, we separately identify effects on the different components of pay, show that wage gains accrue mainly to top earners, and to firms initially led by highly skilled top executives. 9 In concurrent work, Garin and Silv´ erio (2024) examine the effects of idiosyncratic demand shocks associated with the 2008 global recession on wage setting of Portuguese exporters, and find evidence of significant wage adjustments within firms. The methodology we propose for systematically isolating the unexpected component of macroeconomic demand shocks in destinations can be applied more generally to assess the effects of unforecasted (positive and negative) fluctuations in GDP growth. By design, our approach is arguably less likely to capture 4 Roadmap The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, before Section 3 presents the method for identifying the unexpected component of demand shocks at the firm- level. Section 4 describes the econometric model, while 5 reports the corresponding empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 2 Data The empirical analysis in this paper combines and examines several sources of panel data from Portugal spanning the period 2006-2018. We provide a brief description of each data source in this section and give further details in Appendix A.3. Employer-employee data: Quadros de Pessoal (QP) [Personnel Records] is a high-quality compulsory census run by the Ministry of Employment covering the population of firms with wage earners in manufacturing and services. Each firm is required by law to provide information on an annual basis about its characteristics and those of each individual that comprises its workforce. Firm-level information includes annual sales, number of employees, industry code, geographical location, date of constitution and share of capital that is foreign-owned. The set of worker characteristics includes wages (monthly base wage, overtime pay, and other components of pay), gender, age, schooling, date of starting, detailed occupation and hours worked. A worker may also be matched to the firm in which he is employed. Extensive checks have been performed to guarantee the accuracy of worker and firm data. After these checks, we kept for analysis full-time wage earners working at least 100 hours a month, and aged between 20 and 60 years old. Firm census: Using common unique firm identifiers, we supplement the firm-year data from QP with information from Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE) [Enterprise Integrated Accounts System], a yearly census of firms run by National Statistics Institute (INE). The main objective of SCIE is to characterize the economic and financial behaviour of firms. This data set includes information on total sales, investment, employment, value added, wage bill, industry, location, among several other variables. International trade statistics: We merge the above data sets with yearly data on firms’ ısticas do Com´ export transactions from Estat´ ercio Internacional (ECI) [Foreign Trade Statistics] from INE. This is the country’s official information source on imports and exports. It comprises common shocks associated with a single global recession (e.g. financial factors), which may plausibly have hetero- geneous impacts across firms. The focus of our analysis is also distinct in that we separately identify the effects of these unexpected shocks on the different components of pay, show that wage effects apply mainly to top earners, and to firms initially led by highly skilled top executives. This enable us to make further progress in identifying specific mechanisms whereby firm-specific unexpected demand shocks impact wage setting. 5 the export flows of virtually all exporting firms, and provides detailed information on the product exported, the destination market, and the value and quantity exported. Export values in these data are free-on-board, thus excluding any duties or shipping charges. erito ` Management practices survey: We further use data from Inqu´ aticas de Gest˜ as Pr´ ao (IPG) [Management Practices Survey] for 2016. IPG is a non-periodical survey conducted by INE, which collects information on the perceptions of top executives about the management practices of their firms. The 2016 survey was the first and only of its kind collected in Portugal. It seeks to evaluate the importance of management practices for firm productivity, as well as other key indicators that make it possible to evaluate differences in productivity between Portuguese firms. IPG employed a stratified sample of firms operating in Portugal covering the whole non-financial private sector in 2016, excluding micro firms (with fewer than five employees). The sample is representative by sector (20 sectors corresponding of aggregations of the 2-digit level of the CAE), firm size and age, as well as belonging (or not) to a conglomerate. The IPG survey includes questions seeking to evaluate management practices in three main areas: (1) Strategy, monitoring and information; (2) Human Resources; and (3) Management and social responsibility systems. We selected 18 variables that are closely related to those adopted in Bloom and Reenen (2007). Following their approach, our measure of management quality was constructed by z-scoring (normalizing to mean 0, standard deviation 1) the 18 individual questions in IPG, taking averages, and then z-scoring the average. This process yields a management practice score with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Actual and forecasted GDP growth: We further use yearly information on actual and recently forecasted GDP growth from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the Interna- tional Monetary Fund (IMF). WEO is usually published twice a year (in April and Septem- ber/October). It presents IMF staff economists’ analyses of global economic developments dur- ing the near and medium term. Every April and October, the WEO provides year-ahead and current-year GDP growth forecasts. We refer to the year for which the forecast is being made as the target year. Forecasts made in the Fall WEO before the target year are called year-ahead forecasts and those made during the Spring target year are called current-year forecasts. During our sample period, forecast data are available for 195 countries. As shown by An, Jalles, and Loungani (2018), IMF growth forecasts are virtually identical to other growth forecasts from the private sector, and can therefore be regarded as consensus forecasts from a wide variety of market analysts from both the official and private sectors. After merging these IMF data with ECI we were left with 174 destinations, which account for 99.7% of all exports in 2006. Table A2 reports the export shares to the main destinations in 2006, both in the full ECI data and in 6 the estimation sample. 3 Methodology for identifying unexpected revenue shocks In this section, we propose a new methodology to identify the unexpected component of demand shocks at the firm-level, which exploits forecast errors in the GDP growth of export markets. In each destination, the unexpected component of demand shocks is measured as the difference between the GDP growth actually observed and the current-year growth forecast for that country published in the Spring edition of the World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund. Specifically, the forecast error for a destination-year is defined as: F Edt = Gdt − F Gdt , (1) where F Edt denotes the forecast error for destination d in year t, Gdt denotes the GDP growth rate of destination d in year t and F Gdt denotes the current-year growth forecast for country d in year t. We then aggregate these destination-year forecast errors at the firm-year level, weighting by the share of destinations in total sales of firm i in the initial year: D W F Eit = sdi0 F Edt , (2) d=0 where sd0 is the share of exports to destination d in total sales of firm i in 2006 (the first year of our data) and D is the set of destinations for which data on growth forecasts are available. Since firms initially served different destinations to a varying degree, they were differentially exposed to these unexpected demand shocks across markets. Using the same weights, we also aggregate the forecast growth (WFG) at the firm-year level. By its construction, the weighted forecast error constitutes an unexpected shock in export demand and is therefore plausibly exogenous to the firm. However, one potential concern is that different firms might select themselves into different export environments in a way that make them differentially exposed to forecast errors. For example, growth-seeking firms might choose to operate more in export markets where the expected growth is higher but also more uncertain, thus exposing themselves to higher forecast errors. In order to check for any indica- tions of potential selection effects of this kind, we present a series of scatter plots showing the correlation between weighted forecast errors and each of a set of baseline firm characteristics (sales, exports, export share, employment, investments in tangible and intangible assets, value added, value added per worker and average worker pay) based on observations in 2006 (or in the 7 first year of observation in case of firms that entered the market later than 2006). These plots are displayed in Figure A1 in the Appendix and do not reveal any noticeable correlation between weighted forecast errors and any of the baseline firm characteristics. We take this as a reassuring indication that our methodology for defining unexpected demand shocks is not compromised by firm selection effects. 4 Econometric method We now describe the econometric strategy for examining the effects of unexpected demand shocks on firm performance and worker compensation. Our baseline specification is: ∆Yip = α∆W F Eip + β ∆W F Gip + ηXSi0 ∗ ιp + ζi + γjp + τrp + ip , (3) where Yip denotes the log of the outcome variable of interest in firm i in period p; W F Eip is the weighted forecast error in firm i in period p; W F Gip is the weighted forecast growth in firm i in period p; ηXSi0 ∗ ιp is the interaction between the initial export share of sales of firm i and a period dummy; ζi is a firm fixed effect; γjp denotes an industry-period effect; τrp denotes a region-period effect; and ip is the error term. ıas, Kaplan, Verhoogen, and Alfaro-Serrano (2024), we take 3-year period av- Following Fr´ erages of the corresponding firm-year variables. This makes it possible to obtain a measure of unobserved worker skills by estimating person effects (using AKM regressions) within each 3-year period, and to examine the medium-term effects of more permanent unexpected demand shocks. Furthermore, the period definition of all the independent variables is lagged one year compared to the period definition of the dependent variable Y .10 This enables us to capture potential lagged responses to unexpected shocks. Allowing for potentially lagged responses to more permanent unexpected shocks is especially important for wage determination, as wage negotiations tend to occur at a particular point in the calendar year. The ∆ operator denotes the linear change of a variable between each period p and period p − 1 throughout the paper. Since the firm-level weights in (2) are fixed in the initial period, variation over time in the forecast error and forecast growth stems only from variation over time in actual and forecasted GDP growth across destinations. This is therefore a shift-share or Bartik-type setting in which aggregate shocks are combined with measures of shock exposure. In our application, the sum of the exposure weights across destinations is different from 1 and 10 If period p is defined for the independent variables as the three years from t to t + 2, the dependent variable Yip measures the (log of the) outcome variable of interest averaged over the years t + 1 to t + 3. 8 varies across firms, which corresponds to the incomplete shift-share case described in Borusyak, Hull, and Jaravel (2022). We therefore adopt their proposed correction, by controlling for the interaction between this sum (the export share of sales of the firm in the initial period) and a period dummy in all our regressions, defined as XSi0 ∗ ιp . The firm fixed effects account for the role of any time-invariant (observable or unobservable) firm attribute. The industry-period effects absorb common shocks to all firms in an industry in each period, while the region-period effects capture the impacts of common shocks across firms operating in the same region in a given period. We report standard errors clustered by firm. Since the forecast error is defined as the difference between actual and forecasted GDP growth in export destinations, in order to isolate its effect on the dependent variable we need to control for the weighted forecast growth, which would be expected to have a direct impact on firm-level outcomes. Our identification assumption is that after controlling for the weighted forecast growth and these fixed effects, subsequent variations in weighted forecast errors are uncorrelated with firm-specific shocks to firm performance and worker compensation.11 5 Results 5.1 Summary statistics Before turning to the econometric analysis, we report descriptive statistics on several variables underlying our empirical strategy. Our firm-level baseline estimation sample is composed of manufacturing firms that exported in the initial year, and for which it is possible to link infor- mation from all the data sets described above (except the IPG survey, which is available only for a subset of firms in 2016). Table 1 reports summary statistics on firms from the estimation sample, both in levels and in changes. These statistics reveal that there exists considerable variation across firms and over time with regard to the weighted average of actual and forecast growth. Table A1 in the Appendix provides summary statistics on firms in the estimation sam- ple for each 3-year period considered in the econometric analysis. Once again, these descriptive statistics show considerable variation across firms in the main variables of interest, both within and across periods. In Table A2 in the Appendix we also show summary statistics for firm age, 11 Since isolating the effects of the weighted forecast error on firm-level exports and sales requires controlling for the weighted forecast growth, our empirical methodology is not amenable to an instrumental variable approach. If both variables were included in the first stage in order to predict changes in firm-level exports or sales, in the second stage we could only identify the total effect of both expected and unexpected GDP growth in export destinations on wage setting. We therefore adopt a more reduced-form approach in which both the weighted forecast errors and weighted forecast growth are regressed directly on wages, which allows us to isolate the effect of the unexpected component of demand shocks across destinations on wage setting. 9 location and corporate structure. Unsurprisingly, most of the observations (more than 90 per- cent) are recorded in the three most populous regions in Portugal (Norte, Centro and Lisboa), and the overall degree of domestic firm ownership is relatively high (almost 90 percent). Our data refer exclusively to economic activity that takes place in Portugal, which constitutes all economic activity for the vast majority of firms. There are some firms in our data that also have plants located abroad, but these are very few.12 [ Table 1 here ] Table A3 in the Appendix reports key moments on the distribution of export destinations of Portuguese manufacturing firms in 2006, both in the full customs data and in our estimation sample. The main export destinations are other EU member states that are part of the eurozone (Spain, Germany, France), but also include countries outside the eurozone and/or the EU, notably the United Kingdom, United States, Angola and Singapore. For all destinations, export shares in the estimation sample are remarkably similar to those in the full customs data. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows the variation of forecasted and actual GDP growth in each of the top 18 destinations for Portuguese exports. We observe significant variation across destinations with regard to both these variables. Since firms initially served different destinations to a varying degree, they were differentially exposed to these unexpected demand shocks across markets. Figure 1 shows that there exists significant variation across firms in the estimation sample with regard to weighted actual and forecast growth. The range of forecast and actual growth is often greater than 10 percentage points, which is considerably higher than the averages for both these variables. The range of forecast growth is especially wide (and considerably larger than that of actual growth) in the initial years of the sample period, but remains sizeable over the whole period. [ Figure 1 here ] 5.2 Average effects on firm performance and worker compensation We now turn to the main focus of the empirical analysis: the impacts of unexpected demand shocks on worker compensation. Table 2 reports the point estimates on the effects of the weighted forecast error and weighted forecast growth on various measures of firm performance and average labor costs, using data from SCIE. Columns (1) and (2) reveal that unexpected demand shocks 12 A total of 18 firms, four of which are foreign owned, have plants located outside Portugal. 10 in export destinations lead to increased exports and sales, with the former showing stronger responses than the latter. The stronger effects on exports would be expected given the source of variation we are exploiting: unforeseen growth shocks in export destinations. We take these results as reassuring confirmation that our strategy for identifying unexpected export shocks is valid. We also observe that the magnitude of the effects of the forecast error on both exports and sales is somewhat larger than that of the forecast growth. In Table A4 of the appendix, we split firm-level export values into averages export quantities (in kilograms) and average export prices per kilogram exported. The results reveal that the effect of the demand shock on exports is entirely a quantity effect, so our estimates should be interpreted with this evidence in mind. Columns (3) to (8) of Table 2 also show significant effects on investment (in both tangible and intangible assets), employment, value added, value added per worker, and average labor costs. For all these variables, the effects of the weighted forecast error are consistently stronger than those of the weighted forecast growth. [ Table 2 here ] In Table 3, we use the employer-employee data to examine the effects on the various compo- nents of worker compensation and on the skill composition of the workforce. Regarding worker compensation, the total monthly wage consists of three components: base wage, overtime pay, and other pay (e.g., various types of bonuses). We also have information on the number of hours worked per month, which allows us to calculate the total hourly wage. We report effects on firm-level averages of each of these variables. [ Table 3 here ] The estimates in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 indicate positive and significant effects of the forecast error on both monthly and hourly wages. Columns (3)-(4) show that this positive average effect is driven by significant increases in both base wages and overtime pay. The other pay coefficient in column (5) also has a sizeable positive point estimate, though the effect on this residual wage component is not statistically significant. In line with the employment responses documented in Table 2, column (6) shows a positive impact on total hours worked. We also investigate whether an unexpected demand shock has any effects on workers’ skill composition. We measure skill composition in two different ways: (i) the share of workers with a degree, and (ii) average person effects estimated through AKM models. The results are somewhat mixed. While the estimate in column (7) does not show any significant impact on the share of workers with a degree, the estimate in column (8) suggests a significantly negative 11 composition effect, indicating that a positive demand shock leads to a reduction in average worker skills. However, the estimation of person effects leads to a sizable reduction in the number of observations, and hence some caution is warranted in interpreting this result. Overall, our results suggest that firms respond to an unexpected demand shock partly by asking existing workers to work longer hours and partly by employing more workers.13 On average, workers benefit from such a shock in the form of higher wage payments. Whereas part of these wage increases accrue in the form of higher overtime payments, the positive and significant effects on average base wages, despite some indication of reduced average worker skills, suggest that the unexpected increase in revenue due to higher demand is partly transmitted to workers through permanent rises in their compensation. As previously explained, our identification strategy relies on creating a measure of the unex- pected component of demand shocks at the firm-level, in order to establish a causal link between changes in revenue and changes in wages. The importance of this strategy can be assessed by comparing our estimates in Tables 2 and 3 with the corresponding estimates from a regression ıvely) measure the demand shock by the actual GDP growth in export destinations. where we (na¨ Such estimates are presented in Tables A5 and A6, respectively, in the Appendix. We see that these estimates are consistently smaller in magnitude than the corresponding estimates in Table 2 and 3. Although an increase in actual GDP growth in export destinations has a significantly positive effect on sales, exports and employment, the magnitudes of these effects are between 38 and 66 percent smaller. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients for monthly, hourly and base wages are not only much smaller in magnitude, but they are also statistically insignificant. This suggests that an analysis using actual GDP growth instead of GDP forecast errors as the main explanatory variable would strongly underestimate the wage effects of changes in demand. 5.3 The division of revenues from unexpected demand shocks We proceed by examining whether the division of unexpected demand-induced revenues inside the firm accrues disproportionately to some groups of the workforce. In particular, we verify if the demand shocks benefit mainly the firms’ high earners, thereby contributing to increased intra-firm wage inequality, or if the increased revenues are more evenly distributed among the entire workforce. [ Table 4 here ] 13 The result in Column (5) in Table 2 shows that a positive demand shock has a significantly positive effect on the number of workers in the firm, whereas the result in Column (6) in Table 3 shows that such a demand shock also significantly increases the average number of hours worked per worker. 12 In Table 4 we show the estimated effects of unexpected demand shocks on the average monthly wages of high versus low earners within each firm, using three different earnings thresh- olds. Whereas the coefficients are statistically significant for both groups of workers, the magni- tudes of these estimates display a very clear and consistent pattern. First, the estimated effect is consistently larger for the high earners than for the rest of the workforce. Furthermore, the estimated wage effect for the high earners, and the difference in the effects for high and low earners, are both monotonically increasing in magnitude as we move the high earner threshold further towards the top end of the distribution. This suggests that, on average, the division of revenues from unexpected demand shocks is quite unequal and disproportionately benefitting the firms’ top earners. 5.4 The importance of heterogeneity in managerial skill We now examine if and how the distribution of rents generated by these unexpected shocks vary systematically with the skill-level of the firms’ top managers (measured at the beginning of the sample period), which proxies for the exogenous heterogeneity in firm capabilities that features in Melitz (2003)-type trade models. The underlying assumption (which we explore and discuss below) is that differences in managerial skill are systematically linked with the adoption of different management practices, which in turn affect worker behavior and effort. For manage- ment practices that are likely to interact with worker behavior (e.g., monitoring, goal setting, and incentive schemes), it seems reasonable to assume that the effects of such practices depend on the characteristics of the workforce. Thus, we would expect that the adoption of different management practices is systematically related to differences in both the skill composition of the firm’s workforce and the structure of its pay system. Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that the skills of top executives are important for management practices, employee selection and firm performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bastos and Monteiro, 2011; Bender, Bloom, Card, Van-Reenen, and Wolter, 2018). However, there is little evidence on whether and how managers matter for how revenues from exogenous demand shocks are transmitted to workers. 5.4.1 Measuring managerial practices and managerial skills Following Bender, Bloom, Card, Van-Reenen, and Wolter (2018), we first use the 2016 man- agement survey to compute firm-level management z-scores —an index of adoption of advanced management practices. We then link these data to the other data sets on workers and firms. This allows us to relate measured management quality to worker and firm observables, including 13 worker pay at previous employers in 2011-2016, which we use to estimate worker effects in order to infer ability. The worker effects allow us to measure the quality of workers’ skills at each firm as well as the relative quality of top managers versus other workers. Table A7 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics on worker and firm attributes for firms with management z-scores above and below the median. To proxy for worker ability, we consider estimates of individual effects from AKM models using data for the period 2011-2016. We use a similar approach to estimate managers’ ability. Furthermore, we consider a direct measure of firm management skills, namely the share of a firm’s managers holding a university degree. Managers are identified in two alternative ways. Our main approach is to identify managers directly by occupational category in the data (using the categories CEO and other top managers). Although allowing for more precise identification, the downside of this approach is a loss of observations due to missing data. We therefore complement it by an alternative identification strategy which is in line with previous literature (Juhn, McCue, Monti, and Pierce, 2018), namely to identify managers by their position in the firm’s wage distribution. In this vein, we classify the five percent highest earners in the firm as top managers.14 The set of firm-level attributes is composed of firm size, the share of foreign and state capital, firm age, the percentage of female employees, export status and export share. The summary statistics reported in Table A7 reveal that firms with higher management z-scores tend to be larger, to have a greater share of foreign and privately-owned capital, and are slightly more likely to be exporters and tend to employ a larger share of female workers. Turning to worker and manager attributes, the statistics reveal that firms with above-median z-scores tend to have a higher share of workers and managers with a degree, as well as larger average estimates of employee and managers’ ability (as revealed by person effects from AKM models). The relationship between z-scores and observable manager characteristics is further explored in Figure A3 in the Appendix. In this figure we show the distribution of z-scores across firms with high- and low-skilled managers, respectively, where the former (latter) are defined as firms with a share of managers with a degree above (below) the median. These distributions are shown when managers are identified according to occupational category (Panel A) and when managers are identified as the top five percent earners in the firm (Panel B). In both cases, we see that the z-score distribution of firms with high-skilled managers lies systematically to the right of the corresponding distribution of firms with low-skilled managers. This pattern is 14 We have also used a stricter threshold of one percent highest earners. The results are very similar and are available upon request. 14 generally consistent with the evidence in Bender, Bloom, Card, Van-Reenen, and Wolter (2018) for Germany, and suggests that observed skills of top executives are systematically associated with advanced management practices. 5.4.2 Managerial skill and the division of revenue shocks Having shown that management z-scores tend to be higher among firms with a greater share of highly-skilled top executives, we now examine whether and how managers matter for the distribution of exogenous shifts in revenue. To do so, we split our estimation sample according to whether the proportion of managers with a degree was above or below the median in 2006 (or in the first year of observation in case of firms that entered the market later than 2006).15 , 16 Tables A8 and A9 in the Appendix provide some summary statistics for each of the two subsamples, with the sample split based on a definition of top managers according to occupa- tional category in Table A8 and as the 5 percent highest earners in Table A9. In either case, we see that, on average, firms with high-skilled managers are larger, as measured by sales and employment, and also export and invest more, than firms with low-skilled managers. The for- mer category of firms also tend to employ more skilled workers and pay them better along all dimensions of worker compensation. When estimating (3) on each of the two subsamples, the results reported in Tables A10 and A11 in the Appendix show that the baseline results on the effects of unexpected demand shocks on firm performance generally apply to both subsamples. Regardless of the method used for identifying top managers, the forecast error has a significant effect on exports and sales for both categories of firms, which suggests that our strategy for identifying unexpected demand shocks is valid also for these more restricted subsamples. Having established the general validity of our identification strategy, our main objective in this part of the analysis is to re-estimate the results in Table 4 using the above explained sample partition, in order to examine whether and how the within-firm distribution of the revenues from unexpected demand shocks is related to managerial skills. The resulting estimates for the two alternative sample partitions are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. [ Table 5 and 6 here ] 15 When identifying managers by occupational category, the classification of firms as being managed by high- skilled vs low-skilled managers is made according to the first year in which a managerial occupation is observed. 16 Whether we identify managers by occupational category or by their position in the wage distribution, the share of managers with a degree is zero for more than half of the firms in our sample in 2006, and is thus zero also for the median firm. This implies that all firms in which no manager has a degree are classified as firms with low-skilled managers, whereas all firms in which at least one manager has a university degree are classified as firms with high-skilled managers. 15 In the case where managers are identified according to occupational category (Table 5), the results are quite striking. In firms with high-skilled managers, we find a strong and significant effect of an unexpected demand shock on the wages of the top earners in the firm, but no significant effect on the wages of the remaining workforce (with point estimates much closer to zero). Thus, for this subset of firms, the wage effects appear to be even much more unequal than what is reported in Table 4 using the full sample of firms. For the remaining subset of firms, however, the picture is very different. In firms with low-skilled managers, there are no indications of the top earners benefiting more from an unexpected demand shock than the remaining workers in the firm. In fact, all the point estimates are negative, and more so for the top earners, though none of these effects are statistically significant. If we instead identify managers by their position in the wage distribution (Table 6), the point estimates are once more much larger for high earners than for the remaining workforce in firms with high-skilled managers, while these differences are much smaller in firms with low-skilled managers. However, the main difference from Table 5 is that the wage effects in the former category of firms are now much less precisely estimated and thus not significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, when seen in conjunction, the results in Tables 5 and 6 give some indications that the distribution of revenues from unexpected demand shocks is related to managerial skills, with the overall unequal distribution of rents seemingly being driven by firms with high-skilled managers, where unexpected demand shocks to a much larger extent benefits workers close to the top end of the earnings distribution. In order to further explore the role of managerial skill in the division of the revenues from unexpected demand shocks, we decompose the total wage effects reported in Tables 5 and 6, showing the effects on each wage component for different types of workers (top earners versus the remaining workers) across the two categories of firms (managed by high-skilled versus low- skilled managers). These results are displayed in Table 7 (where managers defined according to occupational category) and Table 8 (where managers are defined as the top five percent earners). We show these results for the intermediate wage distribution threshold (top 15 percent earners versus the rest of the workforce), but the estimates are fairly similar if we use different thresholds. [ Table 7 and 8 here ] Although there are some differences in the estimates depending on the strategy for identify- ing top managers, the results in Tables 7 and 8 suggest once more that managerial skill might play a key role for the way in which revenues from unanticipated demand shocks are transmitted to workers. In firms with high-skilled managers, there is little or no evidence that rents are dis- 16 tributed via increases in base wages. Instead, wage increases apparently occur through increases in overtime and/or other pay. In particular, an increase in other pay, which includes various types of bonuses, is a consistent finding for this category of firms, regardless of how managers are identified. In contrast, there is no indication that this type of pay increases plays an important role in firms with low-skilled managers. For these firms, the significant wage increases seem to come in the form of either overtime payment or higher base wages. Overall, these results suggest that high-skilled managers to some extent adopt different remuneration schemes for workers than what low-skilled managers do, and that the way in which revenue windfalls are distributed to workers is therefore partly related to managerial skill. 5.5 Discussion The main result of our analysis is that revenues from unexpected demand shocks are partly transmitted to workers in the form of higher average wages, but seemingly in a highly unequal way, with most of the wage increases occurring close to the top of the within-firm wage distri- bution. A first basic observation is that this result is inconsistent with the notion of perfectly competitive labor markets. If firms are wage takers in a market where wages reflect workers’ skills, unexpected firm-specific demand shocks would affect wages only if they lead to changes in the skill composition of the firm’s workforce. Since we find no evidence of an increase in average worker skills in response to a demand shock (on the contrary, we find some indications of the opposite), our results suggest that wages to some extent reflect some kind of rent sharing between firms and their workers. The evidence of rent sharing in wage determination found in our analysis adds to an already sizeable empirical rent-sharing literature (see Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018), for an overview). The exact mechanisms by which rents are shared with workers are potentially numerous, though, and not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, rent sharing could be a result of worker bargaining power, either collectively or individually. Collective bargaining power results from the presence and influence of trade unions in wage determination, while individual bargaining power could result from labor market frictions created by hiring and/or training costs, which create rents that can be captured by incumbent workers (see, e.g., Kline, Petkova, Williams, and Zidar (2019)). Second, rent sharing could also be the result of explicit profit- sharing arrangements, for example in the form of performance-based pay contracts, which may be used to increase productivity (Lazear, 1986, 2000). Third, wage determination might partly result from firms’ incentives to induce the desired amount of effort from its workers, in line with the fair wage hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1990). If workers’ notion of a fair wage 17 is based on an internal reference which reflects the firm’s ability to pay, such as revenues per worker, the revenue windfall from an unexpected demand shock would be partly transmitted to workers through an increase in what is considered to be a fair wage.17 Fourth, rent sharing could be due to firms having some monopsony power in the labor market, for example because of market concentration on the demand side or heterogeneous job preferences on the supply side (Manning, 2021). If each firm faces an upward sloping labor supply curve, the revenues from an unexpected demand shock will be (partly) transmitted to workers in the form of higher wages via higher labor demand. We would argue that each of the above suggested mechanisms is plausible in our context, despite the importance of industry-level collective bargaining in Portugal. Although trade union density is very low, a high share of wage contracts are determined by collective agreements at industry level, which might suggest that there is limited room for wage adjustments in response to firm-specific shocks.18 However, it is worth emphasizing that wage determination in Portugal is characterized by a two-tiered wage setting system where firm-specific arrangements result in a mark-up, often of considerable magnitude, on top of the bargained wage floor.19 Thus, although the presence of collective bargaining might result in some downward wage rigidity, the two-tiered wage setting system still leaves considerable room for firm-specific adjustments to firm-specific shocks. The different suggested mechanisms are also, to some extent, related to different wage com- ponents. In particular, explicit profit-sharing agreements in the form of performance-based pay would be captured by the wage component labeled other pay, which includes various types of bonus payments. In our analysis we do find some evidence that this is a relevant mechanism for rent sharing, but also that the existence of this mechanism crucially relies on managerial skill. More specifically, the previously discussed results in Table 7 and 8 suggest that firms with high-skilled managers to a larger extent adopt performance-based payment schemes and that this is a significant channel for rent distribution in such firms. In the following we exploit our data to look for indications of the relevance of some of the other rent sharing mechanisms mentioned above, and which are not necessarily related to managerial skill. In particular, we examine whether our results could be explained by individual 17 For fair wage models based on a firm-internal point of reference, see, e.g., Danthine and Kurman (2006), Bastos, Monteiro, and Straume (2009) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009). 18 Portugal and Vilares (2013) report a union coverage rate of more than 90 percent despite a union density rate of only 11 percent. 19 See Cardoso and Portugal (2005) and Bastos, Monteiro, and Straume (2009). In the latter study, using data for the period 1991 to 2000, wages are found to be more than 25 percent higher than the bargained wage floor, on average. 18 or collective bargaining power. If rent sharing is caused by hiring or training costs that gives individual bargaining power to longer-tenured workers, we would expect that the wage effects of a demand shock are stronger for such workers than for newly hired workers. This hypothesis is explored in Table 9, where we show the decomposed wage effects across these two categories of workers, and where we have classified newly hired workers as workers with less than four years of tenure in the firm.20 [ Table 9 ] The results in Table 9 show that the wage effects (which all have positive point estimates) tend to be statistically significant for longer-tenured workers but not for the newly hired ones, and the point estimate for the base wage increase is also larger in magnitude for longer-tenured workers. These results give some support to the hypothesis that rent sharing is related to worker tenure. An alternative hypothesis is that rent sharing is caused by collective bargaining power. This hypothesis can be pursued by exploiting some heterogeneity in the type of wage agreements that exist in our data. Whereas most of the collective wage agreements in Portugal are made at industry or sectorial level, as previously mentioned, there is also a small prevalence of firm-level wage agreements. If trade unions are able to extract some of the rents related to firm-specific demand shocks, we would expect that the resulting wage effects are stronger for workers whose wage contracts are bargained at firm level, all else equal. We explore this hypothesis in Table 10, where we show the estimated wage effects for workers with firm-specific collective agreements relative to workers whose wage contracts result from collective bargaining at a more centralized level.21 [ Table 10 here ] Interestingly, despite a very low number of observations in the group of firms with firm- specific collective agreements, we see that the effect of a demand shock on base wages is statis- tically significant and much larger in magnitude for this category of firms than for firms whose wages are bargained at a more centralized level, which we take as an indication of collective bar- gaining power. It is also worth noticing the large and significant effect of an unexpected demand shock on other pay in firms with firm-level wage agreements, which, besides indicating collective bargaining power, suggests that performance-based pay is imbedded in the wage contracts in this type of firms. 20 A similar definition is used by Kline, Petkova, Williams, and Zidar (2019). 21 According to our classification, firms with firm-level wage agreements are those in which at least 50 percent of the workers have this type of wage contracts. 19 5.6 Extensions We now extend our main analysis by exploring two different aspects of the demand shocks that might be potentially relevant, namely the persistence and the sign of the shocks. In doing so, we restrict attention to our main results presented in Tables 2 and 3. 5.6.1 Persistent versus transitory shocks How strongly firms respond to a demand shock will likely depend on the persistence of the shock, particularly in the presence of non-trivial adjustment costs. We explore the importance of shock persistence by estimating a version of (3) where we interact the forecast error and forecast growth variables with dummy variables indicating whether a given firm-period observation is classified as a persistent shock or not. We define a persistent shock as a firm-period observation for which the three yearly forecast errors satisfy the following two conditions: (i) the forecast error has the same sign in at least two consecutive years, and (ii) the sign of the errors referred to in (i) is equal to the sign of the 3-year period average. [ Table 11 and 12 here ] The results are presented in Tables 11 and 12 and show a very clear and consistent pattern. Unexpected demand shocks have significantly positive effects on sales, exports, investments, employment and wages only when these shocks are persistent (according to our definition). The importance of shock persistence is particularly pronounced for the wage effects, as we find that persistent demand shocks have significantly positive effects on monthly, hourly and base wages, with coefficient estimates that are markedly larger in magnitude than the baseline estimates reported in Table 3. Overall, these results are quite intuitive, and the consistency between the results in Table 11 and Table 12 is reassuring. 5.6.2 Positive versus negative demand shocks We also explore whether firms respond differently to positive and negative demand shocks, as defined by the sign of the 3-year period average of the forecast error. We do so by estimating a version of (3) where we interact the forecast error and forecast growth variables with dummy variables indicating whether the 3-year period average of the forecast error is positive or negative. The resulting coefficient estimates are displayed in Tables 13 and 14. [ Table 13 and 14 here ] 20 These results show a quite consistent pattern, as most of the statistically significant effects are due to variations in the negative demand shocks. In other words, variations in demand have statistically significant effects on sales, exports, investments, employment and wages only if actual demand falls short of expectations. On the other hand, variations in demand above the expected level have few significant effects on our dependent variables. These results strongly sug- gest the presence of short-run capacity constraints that make it harder to adjust output upwards than downwards. One plausible interpretation is that firms set their short-run capacity levels according to expected demand, which allows for short-run adjustments to demand fluctuations below, but not above, the forecasted level. 5.7 Robustness In the following we present some robustness checks to the baseline estimates, once more focusing on the results in Tables 2 and 3. 5.7.1 Alternative forecast error weights In our main analysis we have identified the unexpected demand shocks by creating a weighted forecast error variable where destination-year forecast errors at the firm-year level are weighted by the share of destinations in total sales (in the initial year). By using weights that are based on total sales, we implicitly assume that export-related demand shocks have a larger impact on more export-intensive firms, all else equal. Although this seems like a highly reasonable assumption, our approach might be less appropriate if firms make separate strategic decisions (regarding wage contracts, hiring decisions, investment, etc.) for the export-oriented part of the business. Thus, as a robustness check, we have redone our baseline analysis using alternative forecast error weights, where destination-year forecast errors are weighted by the share of destinations in total exports (again in the initial year). The results from these alternative estimations are presented in Tables A12 and A13 in the Appendix. Although there are some differences compared with the baseline results in Tables 2 and 3, these new estimates paint the same overall picture. An unexpected positive demand shock leads to significantly higher sales, exports and employment, and it leads to a significant increase in both monthly and hourly wages. The main difference from the baseline results is the magnitude of these effects, which are generally smaller when using the alternative forecast error weights. These differences in magnitudes are consistent with our original rationale for basing the forecast error weights on total sales. If export-related demand shocks have larger effects on more export- intensive firms, such differences will be downplayed when basing the forecast error weights on 21 total exports instead of total sales, thus reducing the magnitude of the estimated effects of the shocks. 5.7.2 Controlling for industry-by-region period effects We have also estimated a more restrictive empirical specification where we control for industry- by-region period effects in order to take into account that labor markets might be segmented by industry and region. The results from these estimations are reported in Tables A14 and A15 in the Appendix. They show that all estimates are very similar in terms of both precision and magnitude. Thus, our main results are highly robust to this more restrictive empirical specification. 5.7.3 Lagged responses We also explore if and how our baseline results depend on the decision to include a time lag on the independent variables. In our baseline analysis, the period definition of all the independent variables is lagged one year compared to the period definition of the dependent variable, which allows us to capture lagged responses to demand shocks. However, the length of the adjustment period might differ across different types of variables. For example, while it is reasonable to assume that wage adjustments and investment responses might take some time, sales and export adjustments might happen much faster. In order to investigate this further, we have re-estimated the effects of demand shocks on the various firm performance measures using a model without any time lags. The results are reported in Table A16 in the Appendix. For several of the variables, such as sales, exports and employment, the estimated effects with lags (Table 2) and without lags (Table A16) are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. On the other hand, the effect on investments ceases to be statistically significant in a model without time lags. Furthermore, the effect on average wages is also smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated. These results are consistent with our conjecture that wage and investment responses to a demand shock are likely to take longer time, on average, than adjustments on other variables. 5.7.4 Excluding the years of the global financial crisis A final worry is that our results might be excessively driven by firms’ exceptional adjustments to policies during years of large global recessions, in particular the 2007-2008 global financial crisis which occured during the first of our four 3-year periods (see Table A1). In order to address this potential worry, we have re-estimated our main results (as reported in Table 2 and 3) on a smaller sample where we exclude the first period (2007-2009). These results are 22 reported in Table A17 and A18 in the Appendix. Despite losing more than one third of our observations, unexpected demand shocks still have a significantly positive effect on sales and exports, with coefficient magnitudes that are very similar for exports and even larger for sales. Furthermore, we find significantly positive effects on monthly and hourly wages that are larger than our baseline estimates. Overall, these results suggest that our results are not particularly driven by exceptional adjustments during the global financial crisis. 6 Conclusion In this paper, we examined the effects of unexpected demand shocks on worker compensation. We proposed a new methodology to identify the unexpected component of demand shocks at the firm-level, exploiting errors in the official forecasts in the GDP growth of export markets. In each destination, the unexpected component of demand shocks was measured as the difference between the GDP growth actually observed and recent forecasts published in the World Eco- nomic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund. We then aggregated these shocks at the firm-year level, weighting by the initial share of destinations in firms’ total sales. Since firms initially served different destinations to a varying degree, they were differentially exposed to these unexpected demand shocks across markets. In the empirical analysis, we found that unexpected demand shocks have significant effects on sales, employment, investment and average wages. Using employer-employee panel data, we reported evidence that revenues from unexpected demand shocks are partly transmitted to workers in the form of higher average wages, but in a highly unequal way, with most of the wage increases occurring close to the top of the within-firm wage distribution. These wage increases, which include an increase in average base wages, occur despite some evidence that the skill composition of the workforce is negatively affected by unexpected demand shocks. These results suggest that wages to some extent reflect rent sharing between firms and their workers, and our analysis indicates several different channels through which such rent sharing occurs. One channel is collective bargaining power, which is corroborated by our finding that positive base wage responses to demand shocks are much stronger in firms with firm-level wage agreements than in firms that are subject to more centralized bargaining schemes. 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First Evidence from German Linked Employer-Employee Data,” Journal of International Economics, 72(1), 52–74. 25 Song, J., D. J. Price, F. Guvenen, N. Bloom, and T. von Wachter (2019): “Firming Up Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(1), 1–50. Verhoogen, E. (2008): “Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2), 489–530. 26 Figure 1: Weighted actual and forecast GDP growth, firm-level data 30 20 percentage points 10 0 -10 2006 2010 2014 2018 Notes: Figure depicts means and ranges of weighted actual GDP growth (in gray) and forecast GDP growth (in black) at the firm-level, using the estimation sample. Means are displayed in lines, while ranges are shown in bars. 27 Table 1: Summary statistics, estimation sample, 2007-2018 Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max Levels Changes Weighted forecast error -0.0576 0.7014 -14.3957 5.9409 0.1257 0.9272 -4.8760 14.4744 Weighted forecast growth 0.4503 1.4551 -2.8063 25.8987 -0.3424 1.7559 -24.6233 8.0253 log sales 14.9961 1.5749 7.9455 22.9203 -0.0742 0.4380 -6.4713 3.3672 log exports 12.6600 2.6719 0.0180 22.1646 -0.0878 1.3947 -14.8877 11.7114 log (1 + fixed tangible assets) 10.3196 3.4960 0.0000 20.2001 -0.5649 3.1132 -15.6905 15.1426 log (1+ intangible assets) 3.2776 4.4074 0.0000 19.5609 -0.0477 4.2399 -17.1895 16.5090 log employment 3.2396 1.3249 0.0000 10.1227 -0.0136 0.3178 -4.0431 3.1974 log value added 13.5306 1.5294 2.7091 20.9644 -0.0676 0.5215 -9.1936 4.4144 log value added per worker 10.2976 0.7017 1.0996 18.4347 -0.0540 0.4551 -9.0113 4.1573 log avg worker pay 9.6312 0.4456 6.8120 12.9764 0.0064 0.2032 -2.4518 3.3622 log monthly wage 7.0310 0.4080 6.1200 10.1300 0.0183 0.1920 -2.0650 3.1720 28 log hourly wage 1.8790 0.4110 0.9570 5.0310 0.0161 0.1920 -2.0900 3.1690 log monthly base wage 6.8110 0.3740 6.1200 9.9280 0.0139 0.1450 -1.5260 2.5270 log (1 + overtime pay) 0.7320 1.4420 0.0000 8.1080 0.0235 1.0080 -8.1080 7.4550 log (1+ other pay) 5.0070 1.2980 0.0000 9.9510 0.1200 1.1350 -8.3480 8.0050 log total hours 8.0160 1.4070 4.9130 14.6700 -0.0049 0.4130 -5.0790 5.8480 share with a degree 0.1470 0.1890 0.0000 1.0000 0.0164 0.0943 -1.0000 1.0000 N (obs.) 44398 22199 Notes: Table reports summary statistics on the firm-level data from the estimation sample for 2007-2018, both in levels and in changes. Levels refer to variables averaged over 3-year periods, changes refer to variation between 3-year periods. Table 2: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker Weighted forecast error 0.0701*** 0.1189*** 0.1224* 0.1224* 0.0226*** 0.0574*** 0.0329*** 0.0130*** (0.0098) (0.0188) (0.0669) (0.0645) (0.0053) (0.0097) (0.0088) (0.0045) Weighted forecast growth 0.0320*** 0.0785*** 0.0500 0.0585 0.0092*** 0.0248*** 0.0138** 0.0048* (0.0054) (0.0123) (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0026) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 29 Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 Adj. R2 0.0719 0.0707 0.0157 0.0131 0.0535 0.0345 0.0142 0.0306 RSS 1580 22750 129170 291606 858 2582 2378 465 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 3: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation and worker composition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log log hourly log log (1 + log (1+ log total share with person FE monthly wage monthly overtime other pay) hours a degree wage base wage pay) Weighted forecast error 0.0090** 0.0085** 0.0060* 0.0328** 0.0210 0.0314*** 0.0028 -0.0423** (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0144) (0.0186) (0.0066) (0.0019) (0.0167) Weighted forecast growth 0.0033 0.0030 -0.0001 0.0304*** 0.0143 0.0108*** 0.0002 -0.0131 (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0104) (0.0130) (0.0041) (0.0013) (0.0105) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 30 N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 12631 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 6012 Adj. R2 0.0210 0.0229 0.0556 0.0222 0.00951 0.0601 0.0231 0.0490 RSS 472 471 249 15012 16665 1711 105.3 1546 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm- level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 4: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation: high vs low earners (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dep. variable: log monthly wage High vs. low earners high low high low high low Definition 5% 95% 15% 85% 25% 75% Weighted forecast error 0.0172** 0.0073** 0.0128** 0.0063** 0.0098* 0.0051* (0.0068) (0.0030) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0055) (0.0029) Weighted forecast growth 0.0062 0.0015 0.0037 0.0014 0.0021 0.0008 (0.0043) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0021) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 31 N (obs.) 20888 20888 20888 20888 20888 20888 N (firms) 8745 8745 8745 8745 8745 8745 Adj. R2 0.00868 0.0193 0.0110 0.0214 0.0127 0.0223 RSS 1602 293 1106 272 908 258 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 5: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation, high vs low earners, according to managerial skill (managers defined by occupational category) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dep. variable: log monthly wage High vs. low earners high low high low high low Definition 5% 95% 15% 85% 25% 75% A. Firms with high-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0435*** 0.0057 0.0359** 0.0067 0.0288** 0.0044 (0.0159) (0.0068) (0.0139) (0.0061) (0.0133) (0.0061) Weighted forecast growth 0.0191** 0.0011 0.0130* 0.0009 0.0088 -0.0009 (0.0083) (0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0052) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 32 Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 N (firms) 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 Adj. R2 0.0242 0.0366 0.0276 0.0440 0.0293 0.0433 RSS 447 80 292 71 236 66 B. Firms with low-skilled managers Weighted forecast error -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0147 -0.0044 -0.0139 -0.0041 (0.0131) (0.0065) (0.0111) (0.0065) (0.0106) (0.0065) Weighted forecast growth 0.0040 -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0028 (0.0094) (0.0040) (0.0080) (0.0039) (0.0077) (0.0039) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 N (firms) 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 Adj. R2 0.0383 0.0376 0.0314 0.0419 0.0326 0.0466 RSS 406 72 276 66 224 63 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 6: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation, high vs low earners, according to managerial skill (managers defined as top 5% earners) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dep. variable: log monthly wage High vs. low earners high low high low high low Definition 5% 95% 15% 85% 25% 75% A. Firms with high-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0191 -0.0006 0.0129 -0.0011 0.0049 -0.0027 (0.0128) (0.0051) (0.0107) (0.0047) (0.0098) (0.0047) Weighted forecast growth 0.0084 -0.0016 0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0041 (0.0076) (0.0032) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0035) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 33 Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 N (firms) 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 Adj. R2 0.0213 0.0374 0.0225 0.0407 0.0259 0.0415 RSS 72 123 466 113 377 106 B. Firms with low-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0154* 0.0105*** 0.0121* 0.0095** 0.0118* 0.0086** (0.0080) (0.0037) (0.0073) (0.0038) (0.0069) (0.0037) Weighted forecast growth 0.0062 0.0037 0.0050 0.0038 0.0051 0.0039 (0.0051) (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0027) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 N (firms) 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 Adj. R2 0.0200 0.0250 0.0219 0.0262 0.0262 0.0277 RSS 845 165 619 154 511 145 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 7: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on different wage components, high vs low earners, according to managerial skill (defined by occupational category) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dep. variable: log base wage log overtime pay log other pay High versus low earners high low high low high low Definition 15% 85% 15% 85% 15% 85% A. Firms with high-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0087 -0.0026 0.0292 -0.0093 0.0927 0.0820** (0.0120) (0.0051) (0.0397) (0.0456) (0.0638) (0.0386) Weighted forecast growth -0.0035 -0.0059* 0.0198 0.0096 -0.0220 0.0257 (0.0058) (0.0036) (0.0270) (0.0301) (0.0514) (0.0224) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 N (firms) 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 34 Adj. R2 0.0629 0.0886 0.0590 0.0684 0.0271 0.0229 RSS 148 38 6480 4630 6604 3038 B. Firms with low-skilled managers Weighted forecast error -0.0072 -0.0020 0.1208*** 0.0357 -0.0407 0.0263 (0.0083) (0.0051) (0.0389) (0.0360) (0.0579) (0.0450) Weighted forecast growth -0.0089 -0.0026 0.1016*** 0.0362 -0.0006 -0.0101 (0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0297) (0.0262) (0.0476) (0.0282) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 N (firms) 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 Adj. R2 0.0572 0.0894 0.0419 0.0357 0.0294 0.0298 RSS 191 35 5114 4063 7719 3410 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 8: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on different wage components, high vs low earners, according to managerial skill (defined as top 5% earners) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dep. variable: log base wage log overtime pay log other pay High versus low earners high low high low high low Definition 15% 85% 15% 85% 15% 85% A. Firms with high-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0011 -0.0042 0.1185*** 0.0539* 0.0681 0.0608** (0.0084) (0.0038) (0.0342) (0.0296) (0.0478) (0.0298) Weighted forecast growth -0.0040 -0.0046* 0.0719*** 0.0636*** -0.0294 -0.0025 (0.0044) (0.0025) (0.0239) (0.0212) (0.0386) (0.0177) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 N (firms) 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 35 Adj. R2 0.0323 0.0808 0.0361 0.0404 0.0215 0.0280 RSS 272 59 10771 7595 11250 5042 B. Firms with low-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0109* 0.0097*** 0.0301 0.0308 -0.0175 0.0067 (0.0062) (0.0028) (0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0368) (0.0286) Weighted forecast growth 0.0012 0.0049** 0.0299* 0.0154 0.0088 0.0038 (0.0039) (0.0021) (0.0164) (0.0145) (0.0262) (0.0181) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 N (firms) 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 Adj. R2 0.0377 0.0719 0.0265 0.0217 0.0164 0.0185 RSS 423 85 8736 6446 15292 8820 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 9: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation: longer-tenured vs newly hired workers (1) (2) (3) (4) Dep. variable: log monthly log monthly log (1 + log (1+ other wage base wage overtime pay) pay) A. Newly hired workers (less than 4 years) Weighted forecast error 0.0091 0.0058 0.0234 0.0233 (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0207) (0.0252) Weighted forecast growth 0.0004 -0.0019 0.0331** -0.0140 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0148) (0.0174) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 18700 18700 18700 18700 N (firms) 8149 8149 8149 8149 36 Adj. R2 0.0139 0.0248 0.0277 0.0105 RSS 920 811 15993 16824 B. Longer-tenured workers (at least 4 years) Weighted forecast error 0.0094** 0.0075** 0.0430*** 0.0099 (0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0159) (0.0232) Weighted forecast growth 0.0036 -0.0001 0.0331*** 0.0110 (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0113) (0.0153) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 21418 21418 21418 21418 N (firms) 9019 9019 9019 9019 Adj. R2 0.0331 0.0618 0.0228 0.0088 RSS 582 306 14946 17485 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 10: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation: firm-level vs more centralised wage agreements (1) (2) (3) (4) Dep. variable: log monthly log monthly log (1 + log (1+ other wage base wage overtime pay) pay) A. Firm-level wage agreements Weighted forecast error 0.3924*** 0.2185** -0.6267 0.6367** (0.1029) (0.0823) (1.2591) (0.3091) Weighted forecast growth 0.0722* 0.0429 -0.8687 0.1116 (0.0410) (0.0429) (0.6234) (0.0994) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 137 137 137 137 N (firms) 55 55 55 55 37 Adj. R2 0.734 0.521 0.564 0.767 RSS 0.476 0.385 35.030 4.906 B. More centralized wage agreements Weighted forecast error 0.0087** 0.0060* 0.0337** 0.0202 (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0144) (0.0186) Weighted forecast growth 0.0032 -0.0001 0.0311*** 0.0139 (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0104) (0.0130) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22062 22062 22062 22062 N (firms) 9256 9256 9256 9256 Adj. R2 0.0209 0.0552 0.0209 0.00951 RSS 469 247 14892 16628 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 11: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance: persistent versus transitory demand shocks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker assets) assets) worker pay Weighted forecast error - transitory shocks 0.0154 0.1101 -0.0924 0.0618 0.0038 0.0436** 0.0360* 0.0049 (0.0153) (0.0835) (0.1346) (0.1712) (0.0120) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0081) - persistent shocks 0.0880*** 0.1136*** 0.1829** 0.1232 0.0290*** 0.0625*** 0.0322*** 0.0159*** (0.0130) (0.0226) (0.0902) (0.0805) (0.0067) (0.0126) (0.0112) (0.0061) Weighted forecast growth - transitory shocks 0.0191* 0.0989** 0.0256 0.0961 0.0039 0.0198 0.0135 0.0021 (0.0098) (0.0470) (0.0812) (0.1034) (0.0075) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0054) - persistent shocks 0.0391*** 0.0750*** 0.0722 0.0555 0.0118*** 0.0269*** 0.0136** 0.0060** (0.0065) (0.0132) (0.0533) (0.0511) (0.0032) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0030) 38 Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 Adj. R2 0.0734 0.0707 0.0160 0.0131 0.0538 0.0344 0.0141 0.0307 RSS 1577 22748 129122 291592 858 2581 2378 465 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 12: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation and worker composition: persistent versus transitory demand shocks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log log hourly log log (1 + log (1+ log total share with person FE monthly wage monthly overtime other pay) hours a degree wage base wage pay) Weighted forecast error - transitory shocks 0.0100 0.0107 -0.0010 0.0328 0.0516 -0.0134 0.0068 -0.0555** (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0060) (0.0370) (0.0448) (0.0154) (0.0047) (0.0245) - persistent shocks 0.0115** 0.0108** 0.0113** 0.0204 0.0011 0.0466*** 0.0037 -0.0374 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0169) (0.0209) (0.0081) (0.0026) (0.0230) Weighted forecast growth - transitory shocks -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.0099*** 0.0645*** 0.0485* -0.0013 -0.0046 -0.0114 (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0223) (0.0279) (0.0107) (0.0030) (0.0155) - persistent shocks 0.0048* 0.0044 0.0025 0.0234** 0.0048 0.0168*** 0.0009 -0.0130 39 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0111) (0.0136) (0.0042) (0.0014) (0.0126) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 12631 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 6012 Adj. R2 0.0213 0.0233 0.0565 0.0224 0.00960 0.0610 0.0243 0.0489 RSS 472.1 471.2 248.3 15008 16662 1709 105.2 1546 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 13: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance: positive versus negative demand shocks Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker Weighted forecast error - positive shocks 0.0250 0.1333 0.1059 0.0257 0.0061 0.0516** 0.0427* 0.0040 (0.0217) (0.1216) (0.1546) (0.1784) (0.0142) (0.0217) (0.0225) (0.0082) - negative shocks 0.0826*** 0.1077*** 0.1128 0.1758** 0.0273*** 0.0580*** 0.0291*** 0.0155*** (0.0126) (0.0301) (0.0858) (0.0835) (0.0067) (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0058) Weighted forecast growth - positive shocks 0.0321*** 0.1030*** 0.0977 -0.0308 0.0090* 0.0278*** 0.0174** 0.0046 (0.0076) (0.0273) (0.0654) (0.0830) (0.0053) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0036) - negative shocks 0.0379*** 0.0709*** 0.0409 0.0921* 0.0114*** 0.0248*** 0.0117* 0.0060* (0.0068) (0.0209) (0.0554) (0.0552) (0.0037) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0032) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 40 Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 Adj. R2 0.0729 0.0708 0.0157 0.0132 0.0537 0.0344 0.0141 0.0307 RSS 1578 22747 129156 291569 858 2581 2378 465 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table 14: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation and worker composition: positive versus negative demand shocks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log log log log (1 + log (1+ log total share person monthly hourly monthly overtime other hours with a FE wage wage base pay) pay) degree wage Weighted forecast error - positive shocks -0.0013 -0.0014 0.0073 0.0338 -0.0528 0.0138 0.0113** -0.0244 (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0061) (0.0394) (0.0455) (0.0153) (0.0052) (0.0240) - negative shocks 0.0119** 0.0115** 0.0059 0.0233 0.0434* 0.0371*** 0.0007 -0.0530** (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0045) (0.0179) (0.0244) (0.0086) (0.0027) (0.0223) Weighted forecast growth - positive shocks 0.0031 0.0020 -0.0009 0.0614*** 0.0077 0.0081 -0.0006 -0.0016 (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0211) (0.0214) (0.0063) (0.0018) (0.0129) - negative shocks 0.0047 0.0045 -0.0001 0.0230* 0.0255 0.0137*** -0.0007 -0.0204* 41 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0120) (0.0157) (0.0051) (0.0016) (0.0123) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 12631 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 6012 Adj. R2 0.0211 0.0230 0.0555 0.0225 0.00970 0.0601 0.0237 0.0491 RSS 472.2 471.4 248.5 15007 16660 1711 105.3 1545 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. A.1 Appendix Tables Table A1: Summary statistics, estimation sample, by 3-year period Period 1 [2007-2009] 2 [2010-2012] Change = Period 2-Period 1 Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max Weighted forecast error -0.3020 1.4650 -14.4000 2.0080 0.0091 0.2960 -4.0890 3.7550 0.3120 1.4220 -4.8760 14.4700 Weighted forecast growth 1.3210 2.7770 -0.0472 25.9000 0.0802 0.5990 -2.4560 6.6090 -1.2410 2.4300 -24.6200 1.2220 log sales 14.7600 1.5290 9.5800 22.5800 14.6700 1.5990 7.7600 22.7100 -0.0855 0.4570 -6.4190 3.0240 log exports 12.2400 2.6250 1.4820 21.1100 12.2500 2.6930 -0.0954 21.6800 0.0079 1.5010 -11.1900 11.7100 log (1 + fixed tangible assets) 10.6700 2.9090 0.0000 19.5900 9.7280 3.6330 0.0000 20.0100 -0.9450 3.0800 -15.4400 14.1300 log (1+ intangible assets) 3.0630 4.3820 0.0000 19.2000 2.9920 4.1930 0.0000 19.3600 -0.0709 4.5440 -16.9900 14.6000 log employment 3.1970 1.3110 0.0000 9.8830 3.1540 1.3190 0.0000 9.8710 -0.0428 0.3240 -3.6020 3.1970 log value added 13.2900 1.4850 7.2170 20.6800 13.2000 1.5480 4.9890 20.7100 -0.0926 0.5200 -5.7110 4.1800 42 log value added per worker 10.1000 0.6900 5.4250 18.2000 10.0500 0.7340 3.8900 17.6300 -0.0500 0.4660 -4.5160 3.9600 log avg worker pay 9.6130 0.4640 7.2320 12.5900 9.6250 0.4550 6.8120 12.9800 0.0114 0.2190 -2.3320 2.6010 log monthly wage 7.0070 0.4310 6.1200 9.3610 7.0120 0.4090 6.2110 10.0300 0.0041 0.2190 -2.0650 2.2160 log hourly wage 1.8590 0.4340 0.9570 4.2860 1.8590 0.4130 1.0580 4.9270 -0.0002 0.2190 -2.0900 2.2160 log monthly base wage 6.7910 0.3930 6.1200 8.7350 6.8080 0.3790 6.1890 9.9280 0.0167 0.1660 -1.4970 2.5270 log (1 + overtime pay) 0.7040 1.4570 0.0000 6.9490 0.6460 1.3770 0.0000 7.4550 -0.0581 1.0650 -6.0660 7.4550 log (1+ other pay) 4.7670 1.6530 0.0000 9.2720 4.9070 1.2970 0.0000 9.0240 0.1400 1.4410 -8.3480 8.0050 log total hours 7.9270 1.3880 4.9130 14.4500 7.9410 1.4050 4.9900 14.3900 0.0134 0.4670 -5.0790 5.8480 share with a degree 0.1230 0.1790 0.0000 1.0000 0.1380 0.1870 0.0000 1.0000 0.0149 0.1010 -1.0000 1.0000 N (obs.) 8540 8540 8540 Notes: Table reports summary statistics on the firm-level data from the estimation sample for 2007-2009 and 2010-2012, both in levels and in changes. Levels refer to variables averaged over 3-year periods,, changes refer to variation between 3-year periods. Table A1: Summary statistics, estimation sample, by 3-year period (cont.) Period 2 [2010-2012] 3 [2013-2015] Change = Period 3-Period 2 Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max Weighted forecast error 0.0122 0.2880 -4.0890 2.9260 -0.0342 0.1990 -2.9710 1.8380 -0.0464 0.2710 -4.8010 3.6580 Weighted forecast growth 0.0856 0.5980 -2.4560 6.6090 0.2950 0.8830 -2.5010 7.8300 0.2090 0.5020 -1.7510 8.0250 log sales 14.8500 1.5450 10.0100 22.7100 14.8300 1.6000 9.3500 22.7900 -0.0140 0.4320 -4.2830 3.3480 log exports 12.5500 2.6210 -0.0954 21.6800 12.6100 2.6650 2.2330 22.0300 0.0677 1.3110 -11.8600 11.6600 log (1 + fixed tangible assets) 10.2200 3.2060 0.0000 20.0100 9.8400 3.7510 0.0000 19.4400 -0.3790 3.0750 -14.8500 14.0800 log (1+ intangible assets) 3.2670 4.2940 0.0000 19.3600 3.1830 4.2890 0.0000 19.4200 -0.0843 3.8950 -16.6600 15.6600 log employment 3.2560 1.3060 0.0000 9.8710 3.2220 1.3360 0.0000 9.9950 -0.0341 0.3280 -4.0430 2.2580 log value added 13.3700 1.4820 8.7560 20.7100 13.3500 1.5830 2.5690 20.7700 -0.0228 0.5550 -9.1430 4.4620 log value added per worker 10.1200 0.6660 6.4220 17.6300 10.1400 0.7440 0.9600 17.1000 0.0109 0.4770 -8.9610 4.2060 log avg worker pay 9.6470 0.4400 7.3630 12.9800 9.6210 0.4440 7.3900 12.7000 -0.0263 0.1950 -1.7050 3.3620 43 log monthly wage 7.0250 0.4010 6.2190 10.0300 7.0380 0.4070 6.2160 10.0800 0.0133 0.1720 -1.4040 1.6640 log hourly wage 1.8720 0.4040 1.0650 4.9270 1.8850 0.4100 1.0620 4.9500 0.0130 0.1720 -1.4040 1.6600 log monthly base wage 6.8180 0.3750 6.2190 9.9280 6.8050 0.3730 6.2160 9.3350 -0.0131 0.1270 -1.1400 1.8780 log (1 + overtime pay) 0.7030 1.4200 0.0000 7.4550 0.6960 1.3820 0.0000 8.1080 -0.0074 0.9650 -5.9080 5.3940 log (1+ other pay) 4.9740 1.1960 0.0000 8.5260 5.1390 1.1600 0.0000 9.8650 0.1650 0.9510 -6.1760 6.5540 log total hours 8.0550 1.3870 5.0240 14.3900 8.0080 1.4240 5.0240 14.5300 -0.0475 0.4010 -4.8830 2.9790 share with a degree 0.1420 0.1860 0.0000 1.0000 0.1590 0.1960 0.0000 1.0000 0.0167 0.0914 -1.0000 1.0000 N (obs.) 7192 7192 7192 Notes: Table reports summary statistics on the firm-level data from the estimation sample for 2010-2012 and 2013-2015, both in levels and in changes. Levels refer to variables averaged over 3-year periods,, changes refer to variation between 3-year periods. Table A1: Summary statistics, estimation sample, by 3-year period (cont.) Period 3 [2013-2015] 4 [2016-2018] Change = Period 4-Period 3 Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max Weighted forecast error -0.0278 0.1930 -2.9710 1.8380 0.0438 0.3900 -4.3230 5.9410 0.0716 0.3410 -3.5240 5.2380 Weighted forecast growth 0.2930 0.8560 -2.5010 7.8300 0.5240 0.7050 -2.8060 5.3000 0.2310 0.8780 -5.8550 3.6170 log sales 14.9600 1.5520 10.5100 22.7900 15.0400 1.6210 9.4850 22.6300 0.0811 0.4130 -5.4650 3.4850 log exports 12.8500 2.5660 2.2260 22.0300 12.6600 2.8330 -0.0180 21.8600 -0.1800 1.3190 -14.7800 10.8700 log (1 + fixed tangible assets) 3.30200 1.3210 0.0000 9.9950 3.3500 1.3530 0.0000 10.1200 -0.0515 3.0070 -13.3400 15.1200 log (1+ intangible assets) 10.3200 3.3110 0.0000 19.4400 10.270 3.8890 0.0000 19.6600 0.1070 3.9120 -15.6600 16.4700 log employment 3.4100 4.3440 0.0000 17.9100 3.5160 4.5290 0.0000 18.5900 0.0478 0.2890 -3.3040 2.7730 log value added 13.4900 1.5000 7.8800 20.7700 13.6200 1.5700 7.0810 20.9300 0.1230 0.4730 -4.9180 3.2530 log value added per worker 10.2000 0.6630 6.2700 17.1000 10.2700 0.6990 5.0820 18.1100 0.0751 0.4140 -4.6490 3.2410 log avg worker pay 9.6260 0.4320 6.9720 11.9200 9.6630 0.4270 7.2660 12.0800 0.0362 0.1850 -2.4520 2.3920 44 log monthly wage 7.0390 0.3990 6.2160 10.0800 7.0820 0.3880 6.2960 10.1300 0.0425 0.1700 -1.5260 3.1720 log hourly wage 1.8850 0.4020 1.0620 4.9500 1.9260 0.3910 1.1430 5.0310 0.0409 0.1700 -1.5260 3.1690 log monthly base wage 6.8040 0.3640 6.1940 9.3350 6.8450 0.3520 6.2960 9.0150 0.0404 0.1260 -1.5260 1.1890 log (1 + overtime pay) 0.7600 1.4300 0.0000 8.1080 0.9260 1.5840 0.0000 6.7380 0.1660 0.9600 -8.1080 5.9510 log (1+ other pay) 5.1570 1.1360 0.0000 9.8650 5.2000 1.0920 0.0000 9.9510 0.0431 0.8160 -6.7460 6.7280 log total hours 8.0980 1.4010 5.0240 14.5300 8.1170 1.4280 5.0240 14.6700 0.0182 0.3420 -3.4450 2.6390 share with a degree 0.1580 0.1890 0.0000 1.0000 0.1760 0.1980 0.0000 1.0000 0.0181 0.0888 -1.0000 1.0000 N (obs.) 6467 6467 6467 Notes: Table reports summary statistics on the firm-level data from the estimation sample for 2013-2015 and 2016-2018, both in levels and in changes. Levels refer to variables averaged over 3-year periods,, changes refer to variation between 3-year periods. Table A2: Summary statistics on firm age, location and corporate structure, yearly data Regions - Nuts 2 Variables Mean Min Max N (obs.) N (firms) Norte firm age 25.0 0 262 46124 4001 # of plants abroad 0.004 0 22 46124 4001 % of foreign capital 7.3 0 100 46124 4001 43% 43% Algarve firm age 22.9 0 74 1256 115 # of plants abroad 0 0 0 1256 115 % of foreign capital 6.1 0 100 1256 115 1% 1% Centro firm age 25.6 0 166 24988 2166 # of plants abroad 0.0001 0 3 24988 2166 % of foreign capital 8.6 0 100 24988 2166 23% 23% Lisboa firm age 26.7 0 235 30324 2771 45 # of plants abroad 0.01 0 28 30324 2771 % of foreign capital 18.3 0 100 30324 2771 28% 30% Alentejo firm age 23.4 0 102 4902 456 # of plants abroad 0.0 0 0 4902 456 % of foreign capital 13.2 0 100 4902 456 5% 5% Azores firm age 31.5 0 105 354 30 # of plants abroad 0 0 0 354 30 % of foreign capital 4.1 0 100 354 30 0.3% 0.3% Madeira firm age 43.9 4 98 480 43 # of plants abroad 0.02 0 4 480 43 % of foreign capital 10.2 0 100 480 43 0.4% 0.5% Total firm age 25.6 0 262 108428 9306 # of plants abroad 0.005 0 28 108428 9306 % of foreign capital 10.9 0 100 108428 9306 100% 100% Table A3: Main export markets, ranked according to export shares in 2006 Export share Export Estimation rank All exports sample Spain 1 0.2818 0.2741 Germany 2 0.1307 0.1384 France 3 0.1307 0.1322 United Kingdom 4 0.0676 0.0650 United States 5 0.0633 0.0681 Netherlands 6 0.0356 0.0344 Angola 7 0.0356 0.0315 Italy 8 0.0346 0.0350 Belgium 9 0.0303 0.0303 Singapore 10 0.0215 0.0243 Sweden 11 0.0114 0.0117 Switzerland 12 0.0079 0.0075 Brazil 13 0.0075 0.0076 Finland 14 0.0074 0.0078 Denmark 15 0.0069 0.0067 China 16 0.0063 0.0070 Poland 17 0.0060 0.0064 Turkey 18 0.0056 0.0060 Cape Verde 19 0.0054 0.0050 Austria 20 0.0054 0.0054 Ireland 21 0.0051 0.0050 Morocco 22 0.0048 0.0046 Canada 23 0.0046 0.0046 Mexico 24 0.0040 0.0042 Czech Republic 25 0.0037 0.0038 Greece 26 0.0036 0.0035 Hungary 27 0.0034 0.0036 Norway 28 0.0033 0.0030 Japan 29 0.0032 0.0034 Russian Federation 30 0.0029 0.0029 Malaysia 31 0.0026 0.0029 Hong Kong 32 0.0024 0.0024 South Africa 33 0.0022 0.0023 Romania 34 0.0022 0.0022 Israel 35 0.0021 0.0021 Mozambique 36 0.0021 0.0020 Australia 37 0.0020 0.0021 Algeria 38 0.0019 0.0019 Chile 39 0.0016 0.0018 Tunisia 40 0.0016 0.0016 Notes: Table reports the share of exports to each of the top 40 destinations in 2006, both in the full customs data and in the estimation sample. 46 Table A4: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on average export price and quantity (1) (2) (3) (4) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log avg. log avg. export export price quantity Weighted forecast error 0.0701*** 0.1189*** 0.1220*** -0.0033 (0.0098) (0.0188) (0.0224) (0.0118) Weighted forecast growth 0.0320*** 0.0785*** 0.0799*** -0.0017 (0.0054) (0.0123) (0.0133) (0.0081) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y 47 Firm FE Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22194 22194 N (firms) 9306 9306 9305 9305 Adj. R2 0.0719 0.0707 0.0524 0.0307 RSS 1580 22750 30458 7803 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3- year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A5: Effects of actual GPD growth on firm performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker assets) assets) worker pay Actual GDP growth 0.0274*** 0.0737*** 0.0412 0.0507 0.0076*** 0.0208*** 0.0115** 0.0038 (0.0051) (0.0128) (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0029) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0025) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 48 Adj. R2 0.0642 0.0702 0.0154 0.0130 0.0517 0.0309 0.0129 0.0294 RSS 1593 22765 129217 291643 860 2591 2381 465 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm- level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A6: Effects of actual GDP growth on worker compensation and worker composition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log log log log (1 + log (1+ log total share person monthly hourly monthly overtime other hours with a FE wage wage base pay) pay) degree wage Actual GDP growth 0.0027 0.0024 -0.0009 0.0302*** 0.0140 0.0083** -0.0001 -0.0140 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0103) (0.0136) (0.0040) (0.0013) (0.0106) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 12631 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 6012 Adj. R2 0.0205 0.0224 0.0544 0.0223 0.00954 0.0580 0.0225 0.0481 49 RSS 472.6 471.7 248.9 15012 16665 1715 105.4 1547 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A7: Summary statistics, firms in the management survey data, 2016 Firms with Z-score below the median Firms with Z-score above the median mean sd min max mean sd min max log sales 16.6200 1.4080 12.6600 21.5200 17.3600 1.4470 13.5600 22.4700 Foreign capital 0.2050 0.4040 0.0000 1.0000 0.3320 0.4710 0.0000 1.0000 Public capital 0.0423 0.2010 0.0000 1.0000 0.0174 0.1310 0.0000 1.0000 Export status 0.6980 0.4600 0.0000 1.0000 0.7080 0.4550 0.0000 1.0000 Exports to sales ratio 0.2940 0.3690 0.0000 1.0000 0.2910 0.3650 0.0000 1.0000 % of female employees 0.3700 0.2690 0.0000 0.9960 0.3930 0.2360 0.0000 0.9860 Firm age 25.5900 27.2800 0.0000 516 26.7100 20.0000 0.0000 126 % of employees with a degree 0.1290 0.1600 0.0000 1.0000 0.1990 0.2020 0.0000 0.9100 Mean employee ability 0.1070 0.2530 -0.6400 1.2520 0.2080 0.2780 -0.4710 1.5570 Managers defined as top 5% earners - Mean managerial ability 0.8560 0.4400 -0.2680 4.8400 1.0460 0.4180 -0.1780 4.5260 - % of managers with a degree 0.4520 0.3150 0.0000 1.0000 0.5440 0.2850 0.0000 1.0000 50 log employment 5.1190 1.0650 1.0990 9.1120 5.4650 1.0920 1.9460 10.0600 % of employees for which FE were computed ˆ3 0.4630 0.2400 0.0004 1.0000 0.5320 0.2220 0.0002 1.0000 Standardized management Z-score -0.7920 0.5760 -3.3850 -0.0539 0.7910 0.6450 -0.0526 3.0360 N (firms) 804 805 Managers defined by occupation - Mean managerial ability 1.0140 0.4660 -0.5190 2.8980 1.1380 0.4060 -0.5850 2.7700   - % of managers with a degree 0.6040 0.3510 0.0000 1.0000 0.6520 0.3110 0.0000 1.0000 N (firms) 668 736 Notes: Employee ability is the mean level of individual fixed effect measured over the period 2010-2015. Managerial ability is the mean employee ability for managers in 2010-2015. Table A8: Summary statistics, firms with high versus low skill managers (managers defined by occupational category) Firms with low-skilled managers Firms with high-skilled managers mean sd min max mean sd min max log sales 15.2392 1.3766 7.9455 21.5164 15.9567 1.6213 10.3172 22.9203 log exports 12.9804 2.5652 0.0954 19.5555 13.5086 2.8389 0.0180 22.1646 log( 1+ inv. fixed tangible assets) 10.6522 3.2207 0.0000 19.4539 11.5118 3.1866 0.0000 20.2001 log( 1+ inv. fixed intangible assets) 3.5559 4.3950 0.0000 18.6151 4.8535 4.9971 0.0000 19.5609 log employment 3.5067 1.1391 0.0000 9.4395 4.0070 1.3435 0.5108 10.1227 log value added 13.7798 1.2767 6.4979 20.2622 14.4962 1.5512 9.3873 20.9644 log value added per worker 10.2770 0.6418 5.3993 14.4470 10.4961 0.7127 5.8780 13.5628 log avg. worker pay 9.6330 0.3999 6.8120 12.7015 9.8288 0.4432 8.2351 11.9219 log monthly wage 7.0557 0.3564 6.2554 10.0248 7.2477 0.4170 6.2681 10.1296 log hourly wage 1.9011 0.3593 1.1021 4.8688 2.0944 0.4232 1.1148 5.0310 log monthly base wage 6.8320 0.3295 6.2235 8.3699 7.0037 0.3898 6.2419 9.3352 log(1+overtime pay) 0.7378 1.4194 0.0000 6.6701 1.2556 1.6925 0.0000 6.7379 51 log(1+ other pay) 5.1262 1.0779 0.0000 9.9509 5.4021 1.0331 0.0000 9.8650 log (total hours) 8.3564 1.1483 5.3967 14.3386 8.8685 1.3667 5.4410 14.6728 share with a degree 0.1204 0.1369 0.0000 1.0000 0.2536 0.2031 0.0000 1.0000 N (obs.) 6478 6226 Table A9: Summary statistics, firms with high versus low skill managers (defined as top 5% earners) Firms with low-skilled managers Firms with high-skilled managers mean sd min max mean sd min max log sales 14.4641 1.2188 7.9455 21.7779 15.8413 1.5780 10.3172 22.9203 log exports 12.1594 2.5059 0.0180 18.5216 13.4258 2.7964 1.7021 22.1646 log( 1+ inv. fixed tangible assets) 9.4902 3.5715 0.0000 17.8895 11.2998 3.3141 0.0000 20.2001 log( 1+ inv. fixed intangible assets) 2.4499 3.7693 0.0000 14.3087 4.6124 4.9016 0.0000 19.5609 log employment 2.8634 0.9711 0.0000 7.0809 3.9677 1.3144 0.0000 10.1227 log value added 13.0230 1.1438 2.7091 18.1752 14.3942 1.5083 7.9996 20.9644 log value added per worker 10.1659 0.6637 1.0996 13.4763 10.4322 0.7207 5.8780 14.7964 log avg. worker pay 9.5459 0.3912 7.2659 11.9219 9.7800 0.4437 6.8120 12.7015 log monthly wage 6.9459 0.3410 6.2406 9.5171 7.1940 0.4126 6.2681 10.1296 log hourly wage 1.7913 0.3421 1.0873 4.4107 2.0406 0.4182 1.1148 5.0310 log monthly base wage 6.7299 0.3104 6.2158 9.3352 6.9534 0.3830 6.2158 9.0152 log (1+overtime pay) 0.4867 1.2264 0.0000 7.0398 1.1605 1.6626 0.0000 6.3360 52 log (1+ other pay) 4.9664 1.1485 0.0000 8.9536 5.3330 1.0432 0.0000 9.9509 log (total hours) 7.6359 1.0209 5.3471 11.8676 8.8101 1.3519 5.4410 14.6728 share with a degree 0.0996 0.1405 0.0000 1.0000 0.2259 0.2022 0.0000 1.0000 N (obs.) 11585 9299 Table A10: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance, according to managerial skill (managers defined by occupational category) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker A. Firms with high-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0525*** 0.1222*** 0.0946 0.0681 0.0226* 0.0621*** 0.0340** -0.0027 (0.0183) (0.0444) (0.1344) (0.2065) (0.0132) (0.0202) (0.0149) (0.0103) Weighted forecast growth 0.0247** 0.0893*** 0.0547 0.0654 0.0163** 0.0322*** 0.0140 -0.0056 (0.0102) (0.0215) (0.0990) (0.1364) (0.0068) (0.0117) (0.0099) (0.0048) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 6226 53 N (firms) 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 2739 Adj. R2 0.137 0.114 0.0416 0.0427 0.0989 0.0551 0.0360 0.0340 RSS 337 6584 21270 94029 180 582 506 88 B. Firms with low-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0842*** 0.1236*** 0.2620** -0.0282 0.0386*** 0.0692*** 0.0286* 0.0008 (0.0176) (0.0259) (0.1028) (0.1443) (0.0097) (0.0187) (0.0173) (0.0101) Weighted forecast growth 0.0380*** 0.0841*** 0.0415 -0.0532 0.0132** 0.0318*** 0.0174** -0.0020 (0.0096) (0.0183) (0.0703) (0.1007) (0.0062) (0.0098) (0.0080) (0.0047) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm Fes Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 6478 N (firms) 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 Adj. R2 0.0834 0.104 0.0541 0.0333 0.0657 0.0631 0.0428 0.0529 RSS 299 4978 24619 83059 154 453 394 87 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A11: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance, according to managerial skill (managers defined as top 5% earners) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker A. Firms with high-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0431*** 0.1114*** 0.1502* 0.0821 0.0180** 0.0541*** 0.0311*** -0.0010 (0.0134) (0.0308) (0.0901) (0.1372) (0.0090) (0.0146) (0.0120) (0.0088) Weighted forecast growth 0.0186** 0.0840*** 0.1046* 0.0485 0.0127** 0.0250*** 0.0095 -0.0022 (0.0081) (0.0181) (0.0631) (0.0957) (0.0050) (0.0092) (0.0080) (0.0038) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 54 N (obs.) 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 9299 N (firms) 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682 Adj. R2 0.131 0.0746 0.0369 0.0245 0.0955 0.0697 0.0377 0.0259 RSS 593 10155 36528 138899 324 1002 888 169 B. Firms with low-skilled managers Weighted forecast error 0.0746*** 0.1326*** 0.1357* 0.1380** 0.0280*** 0.0568*** 0.0259** 0.0023 (0.0166) (0.0277) (0.0777) (0.0688) (0.0067) (0.0136) (0.0123) (0.0048) Weighted forecast growth 0.0581*** 0.1236*** 0.0907* 0.0946** 0.0166*** 0.0420*** 0.0234*** 0.0019 (0.0089) (0.0172) (0.0497) (0.0432) (0.0038) (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0028) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 11585 N (firms) 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 5063 Adj. R2 0.0837 0.0426 0.0282 0.00731 0.0496 0.0602 0.0249 0.0467 RSS 1886 19845 113872 175840 899 2699 2122 390 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A12: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance using shares of total exports in the forecast error weights (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker Weighted forecast error 0.0120*** 0.0556*** 0.0540*** -0.0409* 0.0041*** 0.0104*** 0.0148*** 0.0021* (0.0023) (0.0078) (0.0186) (0.0225) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0011) Weighted forecast growth 0.0069*** 0.0410*** 0.0294** -0.0272 0.0010 0.0062*** 0.0074*** 0.0016** (0.0015) (0.0054) (0.0136) (0.0166) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0008) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 55 Adj. R2 0.0633 0.0734 0.0161 0.0131 0.0522 0.0140 0.0325 0.0295 RSS 1595 22684 129128 291603 859 2378 2587 465 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A13: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation using shares of total exports in the forecast error weights (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log log hourly log log (1 + log (1+ log total share with person FE monthly wage monthly overtime other pay) hours a degree wage base wage pay) Weighted forecast error 0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0017** 0.0076 0.0100 0.0045** 0.0006 -0.0075 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0049) (0.0064) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.0046) Weighted forecast growth 0.0017** 0.0016** 0.0005 0.0045 0.0064 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0033) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 56 N (obs.) 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 22199 12631 N (firms) 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 9306 6012 Adj. R2 0.0209 0.0228 0.0549 0.0219 0.00961 0.0583 0.0230 0.0493 RSS 472 472 249 15018 16663 1715 105 1545 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the averages of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at firm- level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A14: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance, period-industry-region effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker Weighted forecast error 0.0698*** 0.1184*** 0.1175* 0.1386** 0.0219*** 0.0560*** 0.0322*** 0.0120*** (0.0100) (0.0192) (0.0675) (0.0654) (0.0054) (0.0098) (0.0089) (0.0046) Weighted forecast growth 0.0316*** 0.0772*** 0.0555 0.0773* 0.0089*** 0.0238*** 0.0130** 0.0046* (0.0055) (0.0126) (0.0459) (0.0460) (0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0026) Period x industry x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 57 N (firms) 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 Adj. R2 0.0871 0.0824 0.0194 0.0240 0.0747 0.0470 0.0311 0.0447 RSS 1507 21822 125415 281259 817 2485 2272 446 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A15: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation and worker composition, period-industry-region effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log log log log (1 + log (1+ log total share with person FE monthly hourly monthly overtime other pay) hours a degree wage wage base wage pay) Weighted forecast error 0.0092** 0.0087** 0.0062* 0.0330** 0.0240 0.0312*** 0.0027 -0.0437** (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0144) (0.0187) (0.0066) (0.0020) (0.0171) Weighted forecast growth 0.0034 0.0031 0.0001 0.0303*** 0.0155 0.0110*** 0.0000 -0.0128 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0104) (0.0131) (0.0041) (0.0013) (0.0108) Period x industry x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 58 N (obs.) 21904 21904 21904 21904 21904 21904 21904 12399 N (firms) 9196 9196 9196 9196 9196 9196 9196 5919 Adj. R2 0.0369 0.0387 0.0704 0.0383 0.0240 0.0794 0.0183 0.0701 RSS 452 451 235 14292 16099 1588 101 1457 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm- level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A16: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance, no lagged variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker Weighted forecast error 0.0698*** 0.1184*** 0.1175* 0.1386** 0.0219*** 0.0560*** 0.0322*** 0.0120*** (0.0100) (0.0192) (0.0675) (0.0654) (0.0054) (0.0098) (0.0089) (0.0046) Weighted forecast growth 0.0316*** 0.0772*** 0.0555 0.0773* 0.0089*** 0.0238*** 0.0130** 0.0046* (0.0055) (0.0126) (0.0459) (0.0460) (0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0026) Period x industry x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 21957 N (firms) 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 59 Adj. R2 0.0871 0.0824 0.0194 0.0240 0.0747 0.0470 0.0311 0.0447 RSS 1507 21822 125415 281259 817 2485 2272 446 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A17: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on firm performance, excluding the 2007-2009 period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log log log log (1 + log (1+ log total share with person FE monthly hourly monthly overtime other pay) hours a degree wage wage base wage pay) Weighted forecast error 0.0092** 0.0087** 0.0062* 0.0330** 0.0240 0.0312*** 0.0027 -0.0437** (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0144) (0.0187) (0.0066) (0.0020) (0.0171) Weighted forecast growth 0.0034 0.0031 0.0001 0.0303*** 0.0155 0.0110*** 0.0000 -0.0128 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0104) (0.0131) (0.0041) (0.0013) (0.0108) Period x industry x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 21904 21904 21904 21904 21904 21904 21904 12399 60 N (firms) 9196 9196 9196 9196 9196 9196 9196 5919 Adj. R2 0.0369 0.0387 0.0704 0.0383 0.0240 0.0794 0.0183 0.0701 RSS 452 451 235 14292 16099 1588 101 1457 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm- level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. Table A18: Effects of forecast errors and forecast growth on worker compensation and worker composition, excluding the 2007-2009 period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Dep. variable: log sales log exports log (1+ inv. log (1+ inv. log log value log value log avg. fixed tangible intangible employment added added per worker pay assets) assets) worker Weighted forecast error 0.0831*** 0.0962*** 0.0873 0.0766 0.0207*** 0.0765*** 0.0557*** 0.0084* (0.0091) (0.0156) (0.0607) (0.0612) (0.0053) (0.0099) (0.0096) (0.0045) Weighted forecast growth 0.0399*** 0.0554*** 0.0350 0.0381 0.0050* 0.0306*** 0.0239*** -0.0006 (0.0057) (0.0107) (0.0402) (0.0434) (0.0029) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0026) Period x region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Period x export share Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N (obs.) 22186 22186 22186 22186 22186 22186 22186 22186 61 N (firms) 9302 9302 9302 9302 9302 9302 9302 9302 Adj. R2 0.0832 0.0638 0.0216 0.0120 0.0771 0.0535 0.0249 0.0935 RSS 1558 22374 113374 285624 846 2714 2472 501 Notes: In each column, the dependent variable is the change between the average of each 3-year period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *10% level of significance, **5% level of significance, ***1% level of significance. A.2 Appendix Figures Figure A1: Correlations between weighted forecast errors and initial firm characteristics Notes: Figure depicts correlations between weighted forecast errors and firm attributes in 2006. 62 Figure A2: Actual and forecasted GDP growth in top destinations Spain Germany France 4 4 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 % % % -2 -2 -2 -4 -4 -4 -6 -6 -6 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 UK United States Netherlands 4 4 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 % % % -2 -2 -2 -4 -4 -4 -6 -6 -6 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 Notes: Figure depicts actual GDP growth (gray bars) and forecast GDP growth (black bars) for the six most important export destinations in 2006. 63 Figure A2: Actual and forecasted GDP growth in top destinations (cont.) Italy Belgium Sweden 5 5 5 0 0 0 % % % -5 -5 -5 -10 -10 -10 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 Switzerland Finland Denmark 5 5 5 0 0 0 % % % -5 -5 -5 -10 -10 -10 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 Notes: Figure depicts actual GDP growth (gray bars) and forecast GDP growth (black bars) for the seventh to twelfth most important export destinations in 2006. 64 Figure A2: Actual and forecasted GDP growth in top destinations (cont.) Angola Singapore Brazil 30 30 30 20 20 20 % % % 10 10 10 0 0 0 -10 -10 -10 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 China Poland Turkey 30 30 30 20 20 20 % % % 10 10 10 0 0 0 -10 -10 -10 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 2006 2010 2014 2018 Notes: Figure depicts actual GDP growth (gray bars) and forecast GDP growth (black bars) for the thirteenth to eighteenth most important export destinations in 2006. 65 Figure A3: Z-score of firms with high and low-skilled managers, 2016 Panel A: Managers identified by occupational category .4 .3 .2 .1 0 -4 -2 0 2 4 kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2429 Panel B: Managers identified as top 5% earners .4 .3 .2 .1 0 -4 -2 0 2 4 kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2244 Notes: Figure depicts the distribution of standardised values of Z-scores of firms with high share of managers with a degree (in gray) versus firms with a low share of managers with a degree (in black). High versus low shares are defined as above versus below the median. In Panel A, managers are identified by occupational category, while in Panel B managers are identified as the top 5% earners. 66 A.3 Data sources and description In this Appendix, we provide further details about the data sets used in the empirical analysis. We combine and examine several sources of panel data from Portugal spanning the period 2006- 2018. Employer-employee data: Quadros de Pessoal (QP) [Personnel Records] is a compulsory census run by the Ministry of Employment covering the population of firms with wage earners in manufacturing and services. Each firm is required by law to provide information on an annual basis about its characteristics and those of each individual that comprises its workforce. Firm-level information includes annual sales, number of employees, industry code, geographical location, date of constitution and percentage of capital that is foreign-owned. The industry code is defined at the 5-digit level of the National Classification of Economic Activities (CAE). The set of worker characteristics includes wages (monthly base wage, overtime pay, and other regular and irregular components of pay), gender, age, schooling, date of starting, detailed occupation and hours worked. A worker may also be matched to the firm. An important feature of these data is that particular care is placed on the reliability of the information. Indeed, the data are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking the employer’s compliance with labour law. Moreover, Portuguese law makes it compulsory for firms to make this information available to every worker in a public place of the establishment. Extensive checks have been performed to guarantee the accuracy of worker and firm data. After these checks, we kept for analysis full-time wage earners working at least 100 hours a week, aged between 20 and 60 years old. Firm census: Using common unique firm identifiers, we supplement the firm-year data from QP with information from the Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE) [Enterprise Integrated Accounts System], a yearly census of firms run by National Statistics Institute (INE). Since 2006, the main source of the census is administrative data from Simplified Information on Enterprises, which consists of fiscal, accounting and statistical information provided by firms through a single form transmitted electronically through www.portaldasfinancas.gov.pt. By filing this form, firms fulfil four different legal obligations: the annual statement of fiscal and accounting information, the accounts registry, the provision of statistical information to INE, the provision of information of annual accounts data for statistical purposes to the Bank of Portugal, and the provision of statistical information to the General Directorate of Economic Activity of the Ministry of the Economy in the context of the legal regime for access and provision of activities of commerce, services and hospitality. The main objective of SCIE is to characterize the economic and financial behaviour of firms, through a set of relevant variables for 67 the corporate sector, as well as financial ratios, which are commonly used in the financial analysis of firms. This data set includes information on total sales, investment, total employment, wage bill, industry, location, among several other variables. International trade statistics: We merge the above data sets with yearly data on firms’ ısticas do Com´ export transactions from Estat´ ercio Internacional (ECI) [Foreign Trade Statistics] from INE. This is the country’s official information source on imports and exports. It comprises the export flows of virtually all exporting firms, and provides detailed information on the product exported, the destination market, and the value and quantity exported. These data are collected through two different systems. Information on trade with countries outside the EU (external trade) is obtained from the customs clearance system, which covers the universe of external trade transactions. The data on the transactions with other EU member States (internal trade) are collected through a separate survey called the Intrastat. In this case, the information providers are companies engaged in internal trade and registered in the VAT system whose value of annual shipments exceeds a given statistical threshold. This (legally binding) cut-off is defined by each member state so that as many of the smallest exporters as possible are exempted from submitting statistical declarations, while the quality standard of the statistics remains adequate. Exported products are classified according to the eight-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature (CN). This is the most detailed product classification system for foreign trade statistics in the EU. Export values in these data are free-on-board, thus excluding any duties or shipping charges. erito ` Management practices survey: We further use data from Inqu´ aticas de Gest˜ as Pr´ ao (IPG) [Management Practices Survey] for 2016. IPG is a non-periodical survey conducted by INE, which collects information on the perceptions of top managers about the management practices of their firms. The 2016 survey was the first and only of its kind collected in Portugal. It seeks to evaluate the importance of management practices for firm productivity, as well as other key indicators that make it possible to evaluate differences in productivity between Portuguese firms. IPG employed a stratified sample of firms operating in Portugal covering the whole non-financial private sector in 2016, excluding micro firms (with less than five employees). The sample is representative by sector (20 sectors corresponding of aggregations of the 2-digit level of the CAE), firm size and age, as well as belonging (or not) to a conglomerate. The IPG survey was an electronic survey targeted at managers, who are typically senior enough to have a good understanding of management practices. These protocols helped yield a 86.7% response rate. The survey includes questions that make it possible to evaluate management practices in three main areas: (1) Strategy, monitoring and information; (2) Human Resources; and (3) Management and social responsibility systems. We selected questions on 18 management 68 practices that are closely related to those adopted in Bloom and Reenen (2007). First, we classified the 18 practices into 4 categories: operational (2 practices), targets (4 practices), monitoring (10 practices) and incentives (2 practices). Following their approach, our measure of management quality was constructed by z-scoring (normalizing to mean 0, standard deviation 1) the 18 individual questions in IPG, averaging them, and then z-scoring the average. This process yields a management practice score with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Actual and forecasted GDP growth: We further use yearly information on actual and recently forecasted GDP growth from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the Interna- tional Monetary Fund (IMF). WEO is usually published twice a year (in April and Septem- ber/October). It presents IMF staff economists’ analyses of global economic developments during the near and medium term. The WEO database is created during the biannual WEO exercise, which begins in January and June of each year and results in the April and September/October WEO publication. Selected series from the publication, including actual and forecasted GDP growth are available in a database format at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/ world-economic-outlook-databases. Every April and October, the WEO provides year- ahead and current-year GDP growth forecasts. We refer to the year for which the forecast is being made as the target year. Forecasts made in the Fall WEO before the target year are called year-ahead forecasts and those made during the Spring target year are called current-year forecasts. During our sample period, forecast data are available for 195 countries. After merging these data with ECI we were left with 174 destinations, which account for 99.7% of all exports in 2006. Table A2 reports the export shares to the main destinations in 2006, both in the full ECI data and in the estimation sample. A.4 Variable definitions in the econometric analysis This section describes the variables used in the econometric analysis and the corresponding sources: Sales: Total value of sales (in Portugal and abroad) during the reference year. Source: SCIE. Exports : Export revenue of a firm during the reference year. Source: ECI. Investment in fixed tangible assets : Investment in fixed tangible assets during the reference year. Source: SCIE. Investment in intangible assets : Investment in intangible assets during the reference year. Source: SCIE. 69 Employment : Number of employees during the reference year. Source: SCIE. Value added : Value added created by a firm during the reference year evaluated at market prices. Source: SCIE. Share of foreign-owned capital : Share of capital that is foreign-owned in current year. Source: QP. Share of state-owned capital : Share of capital that is state-owned in current year. Source: QP. Firm age : Number of years passed since a firm was first registered in Portugal. Source: QP. Exporter : Indicator variable =1 if firms records some export revenue in reference year. Source: ECI. Export to sales ratio : Ratio between exports and total sales in reference year. Sources: ECI and SCIE. Number of destinations served : Number of different export destinations served by a firm during the reference year. Source: ECI. Weighted forecast error : Weighted difference between observed GDP growth in destinations and growth forecast for that destination in the Spring edition of the WEO of the IMF (weighs: share of exports to that destination in 2006). Sources: ECI and IMF. Weighted forecast growth : Weighted growth forecast for destinations in the Spring edition of the WEO of the IMF (weighs: share of exports to that destination in 2006). Sources: ECI and IMF. Avg. labor costs : Ratio between the wage bill (including wages, social security contributions, benefits, etc.) and the number of paid employees. It corresponds to the average gross earnings per paid worker. Source: SCIE. Avg. monthly wage : Average monthly wage. Source: QP. Avg. hourly wage : Average hourly wage. Source: QP. Avg. monthly base wage : Average monthly base wage. Source: QP. Avg. overtime pay : Average overtime pay. Source: QP. Avg. other pay : Average other components of pay. Source: QP. 70 Total hours : Total hours worked by employees at the firm. Source: QP. Share with a degree : Share of workers with higher education. Source: QP. Avg. person fixed effects : Average estimated person effect using AKM models. Source: QP. Mean employee ability : Average estimated person effect of non-managerial employees using AKM models. Source: QP. Mean manager ability : Average estimated person effects of top managers using AKM models. Source: QP. Share of female employees : Share of female employees in reference year. Source: QP. Share of high-skill managers : Share of workers with higher education. Managers defined as workers in top fifth percentile of wage distribution. Source: QP. Share of employees for which fixed effects were computed (raised to the power of 3) : Share of workers in connected firms. Source: QP. All monetary variables are in euros and have been deflated to constant 2018 prices using the Portuguese GDP deflator or the CPI Index (for wages) from INE. 71