REVISITING FIVE FACTS ABOUT SHOCKS IN THE SAHEL By Stephanie Brunelin, Daniel Valderrama, Moritz Meyer, and German Andres Gallegos1 SASPP Policy Note Series POLICY NOTE 2 (SECOND EDITION) | MAY 2025 SASPP Policy Note Series 2 May 2025 MAIN TAKEAWAYS The Sahel region faces significant challenges due to the prevalence of overlapping shocks that impact on the lives of its inhabitants. Approximately 60 percent of individuals in the Sahel are exposed to shocks, which are equally likely to be idiosyncratic—such as illness and death within households—or covariate, affecting entire communities. Among covariate shocks, climate-related events are more common than conflicts. Although conflict-related shocks impact a smaller portion of the population (6.5 percent), they are more geographically concentrated. Climate shocks are predominantly drought-related, with 28 percent of the population being affected by these events. Idiosyncratic shocks are varied, with illness and death of household members affecting 16 percent and 12 percent of the population, respectively. Poorer households are more vulnerable to climate and conflict shocks, which are more prevalent among the poor compared to idiosyncratic shocks. In addition to being more exposed, poor households are significantly less resilient to these shocks than their non-poor counterparts, making them more likely to resort to harmful coping strategies. In response to both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, about one-quarter of households are compelled to adopt negative coping mechanisms, which undermine both their current and future well-being. Poorer households are particularly prone to adopting these harmful strategies, highlighting the need for adaptive social protection systems. These systems can help strengthen households’ resilience before a shock occurs and can quickly expand to protect households from climate and other shocks when they happen. 1 BACKGROUND The Sahel region is increasingly burdened by a combination where traditional coping mechanisms are strained, reinforcing of conflict, climate-related, and idiosyncratic shocks that the urgency for robust adaptive social protection systems. together deepen poverty and instability. Since 2020, the region has faced a surge in violent extremism and insecurity, Nearly five years have passed since the last comprehensive particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where armed groups assessment of household exposure to shocks in the Sahel.2,3 and political instability have displaced millions and disrupted A new round of harmonized household surveys conducted in livelihoods. At the same time, the impacts of climate change have 2021–2022 provides an opportunity to revisit and reassess the intensified, with rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, and key findings from that earlier analysis. This study applies a consistent severe flooding becoming more frequent, further threatening methodology to the updated data in order to examine how patterns agricultural production and access to water. These systemic of vulnerability and exposure to shocks have evolved over time. pressures are compounded by household-level, or idiosyncratic, The goal is to inform ongoing efforts to strengthen adaptive social shocks—such as illness, job loss, or livestock deaths—that protection systems across the region. The updated analysis is disproportionately affect the poorest and most vulnerable. structured around five key facts that capture the most relevant Together, these intersecting risks create a volatile environment insights from the new data. SASPP Policy Note Series 3 May 2025 FACT 1: IN THE SAHEL, SIX OUT OF TEN PEOPLE ARE REPEATEDLY EXPOSED TO BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL SHOCKS. About 60 percent of Sahelian households have already need for country-specific strategies to reduce vulnerability and weathered at least one major shock—be it a personal hardship, strengthen household resilience. a climate-related shock, or a conflict shock (see Figure 1a). In addition to the high prevalence of exposure to a single Despite the similarity between the prevalence of idiosyncratic shock, many of these shocks overlap in the same household. and climate shocks, the types of idiosyncratic shocks are more Approximately 43 percent of all households suffer shocks from diverse than the types of climate shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks only one category; 15 percent suffer shocks from two; and 1.6 include a large variety of shocks which affect individual households, percent suffer shocks from all three categories.4,5 Idiosyncratic including illness of a household member, death, and theft of assets.7 and climate shocks are particularly prevalent, with each type of Figure 2a presents the most common idiosyncratic shocks that are these shocks affecting about one third of the population. On the reported and demonstrates that the actual shocks that happen to contrary, conflict shocks are less prevalent, with approximately households vary significantly. Illness and death of a household 6.5 percent of population reporting that they were directly member are the two most prevalent types of idiosyncratic shocks impacted by violence (Figure 1b).6 affecting around 15 percent of the population each. There is important variation in terms of the exposure to major In contrast, climate shocks are much more concentrated in their shocks across the five countries. Senegal and Niger stand cause: droughts (Figure 2b). Most climate shocks are adverse out, with over half of its households reporting no exposure to consequences arising from droughts—within those affected shocks—suggesting relatively greater stability or resilience. by climate shocks—nearly 3 out of 4 people have experienced In contrast, Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso display significantly a drought. Droughts are also the single most prevalent shock higher levels of vulnerability, with around 65 percent or more of captured by the harmonized household survey, with 28 percent households affected by at least one type of shock. Overall, while of households being adversely affected. A significant share of the regional Sahel average indicates moderate exposure levels, households also experienced floods, but very few households this masks sharp differences across countries, emphasizing the report adverse consequences from either fires or landslides. FIGURE 1. Share of the people hurt by shocks common to the Sahel region in the previous three years 1a. The share of population by the number of major 1b. Share of population affected shocks to which the household is exposed by common shocks No Shock One Shock Type Two Shock Types Three Shock Types Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict 100% 60% %06 Percentage of population Share of the population tcilfnoC etamilC citarcnysoidI 80% noitalupop eht fo erahS 40% %04 60% 40% 20% %02 20% 0% 0% %0 Sahel Senegal Niger Mali Burkina Chad Chad Senegal Niger Mali Burkina Sahel lehaS ilaM osaF anikruB regiN lageneS dahC Faso Faso Notes: Figure reports the number of major shock categories to which households are exposed, and also reports the share of the households that reported to be adversely affected by each type of shock in the three years before the survey. The figures report average for the total population of the region, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. The data source is the West African Monetary Union Harmonized Household Surveys conducted between 2021 and 2022. SASPP Policy Note Series 4 May 2025 FIGURE 2. Share of population affected by common shocks in the previous three years 2a. Exposure to most common idiosyncratic shocks 2b. Exposure to weather shocks 18% 30% Share of the population Share of the population 12% 20% 6% 10% 0% 0% Illness Death Theft Other Drought Flood Fire Landslide Idiosyncratic Notes: Figure reports the share of the population that reported to be adversely affected by each type of shock in the three years before the survey. The figures report population weighted averages over Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal using data from the West African Monetary Union Harmonized Household Surveys conducted between 2021 and 2022. There population suffering from landslide is close to zero percent. FACT 2: CONFLICT SHOCKS ARE LESS PREVALENT THAN OTHER SHOCKS, BUT THEY TEND TO BE MORE REGIONALLY CONCENTRATED THAN WEATHER AND OTHER TYPES OF SHOCKS Conflicts in the Sahel tend to be geographically localized, In contrast to conflict, idiosyncratic and climate shocks are impacting a high share of the population in conflict-affected more evenly spread across regions. Figure 3b presents the areas. As shown in Figure 3a, the share of the population that is share of the population in each region that were adversely affected adversely impacted by conflict shocks at the sub-national level by a weather shock in the three years before the survey. Nearly all varies widely across each country. Furthermore, in Mali, there regions in each country have been significantly affected. Given the are regions in which conflict is much more prevalent than other greater uniformity of weather and climate shocks in all countries major shocks. Considering the high proportion of the population in the region than other major covariate shocks, adaptive social negatively impacted by conflicts in regions affected by fragility, protection systems that are responsive to droughts would require social protection systems that can rapidly adapt to conflict shocks greater geographic coverage than those that are responsive to are particularly important for Sahel countries. other major covariate shocks that are more localized, like conflict. The economic impacts of conflict are difficult to ascertain, Figure 3c presents the proportion of the population in each but conflicts can negatively affect households living outside region affected by an idiosyncratic shock. This share ranges of conflict-affected areas. Conflict has been shown to have from 10 percent in Gao (Mali) to 80 percent in Moyen-Chari (Chad). numerous impacts, including causing declines in aggregate and In addition, two out of the four regions exhibit exposure rates below individual employment outcomes, causing declines in governance 35 percent, while one out of four regions reached an exposure and access to basic services, and causing markets to function rate between 30 and 50 percent. This uneven distribution may poorly.8 Importantly, some settings have demonstrated that each of reflect differences in livelihood structures, resilience mechanisms, these impacts can affect even households that do not live in close or local risk profiles. Regions with higher exposure rates may be proximity to violence.9 Given these issues, it could be difficult for more reliant on vulnerable sectors such as rainfed agriculture or households to give an accurate assessment as to the impact of livestock. These disparities highlight the importance of tailoring violence and insecurity on their well-being, and more investigation risk mitigation strategies and social protection policies to the into the consequences of conflict-related shocks on the region is specific needs and vulnerabilities of each region. needed. SASPP Policy Note Series 5 May 2025 FIGURE 3A. Share of people affected by conflict shocks by subregion in the previous three years FIGURE 3B. Share of people affected by weather shocks by subregion in the previous three years © World Bank / Famara Dieng SASPP Policy Note Series 6 May 2025 FIGURE 3C. Share of people affected by idiosyncratic shocks by subregion in the previous three years Notes: Figures report the share of the population in each region that reported to be adversely affected by a conflict, weather and idiosyncratic shock in the three years before the survey. The data source is the West African Monetary Union Harmonized Household Surveys conducted between 2021 and 2022. In Chad, information is aggregated for the Borkou and Tibesti subregions and the Ennedi-Est and Ennedi-Ouest subregions. FACT 3: ONE QUARTER OF SHOCK AFFECTED HOUSEHOLDS ARE FORCED TO RESORT TO A VARIETY OF NEGATIVE COPING STRATEGIES THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO ESCAPE A CYCLE OF POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY The main coping mechanism of one quarter of households important coping mechanism, which is similar to what Bruneli et al affected by shocks is likely to have severe negative (2020) did for the country level statistics.11 Figure 5a demonstrates consequences to the long-term welfare of households, that households adopted a broad range of negative coping particularly affecting children’s health, nutritional status and strategies. A significant share of households reduced current education. In addition to reporting the types of adverse shocks access to food, education, and health care, and a significant share with which households have coped in the previous three years, engaged in strategies that likely sacrificed future consumption and the household surveys further report the types of coping strategies access to basic services (e.g., increasing credit, selling productive on which households relied for the subset of shocks that affected assets, etc.). Importantly, the share of shock-affected households households in the previous 12 months.10 Households are asked that relied on types of negative coping strategies was significantly to list up to three coping mechanisms for each shock in order larger than the small share that were able to rely on government of importance. The statistics of this section focus on the most or NGO support (figure 5a).12 SASPP Policy Note Series 7 May 2025 FIGURE 5. Types of coping strategies used by households affected in the previous twelve months 5a. Comparison of coping strategies (share of 5b. Share of population experiencing shocks that rely population) on negative coping strategies 30% 30% Share of the population Share of the population 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict Sacrifice Current Access to Food and Basic Services Sacrifice Future Consumption Other Negative Coping Strategies Government/NGO Support Notes: Figure reports the share of the population experiencing negative income shocks that rely on negative coping strategies by the different types of shocks. Negative coping strategies are defined as (i) sacrificing current access to food and basic services, (iii) sacrificing future consumption and (iii) other negative coping strategies. The figures report averages over Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal using data from the West African Monetary Union Harmonized Household Surveys conducted between 2021 and 2022. © Scott Wallace / World Bank SASPP Policy Note Series 8 May 2025 Overall, a high share of the population relied on negative coping resorted to negative coping strategies. Similarly, 24 percent and strategies to deal with shocks in the region. Approximately 27 percent of households that experienced climate or conflict 18 percent of households exposed to an idiosyncratic shock shock, respectively, employed negative coping mechanisms. FIGURE 6. Share of shock-affected population most relying on negative coping strategies by consumption quintile 6a. Sahel region 6b. Idiosyncratic shocks by consumption quintile by country 40% 60% Share of the population 30% Share of the population 40% 20% 20% 10% 0% 0% Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict Burkina Mali Niger Senegal Chad Faso Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 6c. Climate shocks by consumption quintile by country 6d. Conflict shocks by consumption quintile by country13 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 60% 100% 100% Share of the population population 80% 80% population 40% 60% 60% Share of the Share of 40% 40% 20% 20% 20% 0% 0% 0% Burkina Mali Niger Senegal Chad Burkina Burkina Faso Mali Niger Niger Senegal Senegal Chad Chad Faso Faso Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Notes: Figure reports the share of shock-affected population that most rely on negative coping strategies to cope with shocks. The prevalence is separately reported by consumption quintiles, where Q1 is the poorest quintile and Q5 is the richest quintile. Quintiles are defined using consumption within each country. For example, the Q1 households in Senegal refer to the 20 percent of the population within Senegal that is the poorest, and many Q1 households there might be better off than higher quintiles in other countries. The figures report averages over Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal using data from the West African Monetary Union Harmonized Household Surveys conducted between 2021 and 2022. SASPP Policy Note Series 9 May 2025 Moreover, the poorest and worst-off households tended to However, it is difficult to identify the severity of coping rely more heavily on negative coping strategies. In addition to strategies of either conflict-affected households or poor and reporting the strategies used by households to cope with each vulnerable households. Many of the worst-off and conflict- type of shock, households also ranked the degree to which they affected households might have fewer coping strategies available relied on each coping strategy. Figure 6 reports the share of to them. Productive assets might have already been sold off or households exposed to each type of shock that most relied on lost due to violence, poor households might not be able to borrow negative coping strategies by consumption per capita quintile. money to bolster current consumption, and poor households For each type of shock, the richest quintile was less likely to rely might already have taken their children out of school and skip on negative coping strategies. Combined, these results suggest needed medical care. Thus, the lack of reliance on such strategies that the poorest households are even more adversely affected is not necessarily indicative of the degree to which conflict shocks by the most common shocks faced in the region than richer might be hurting households, or the degree to which all shocks households.14, 15 are affecting poor and vulnerable households. FACT 4: WEATHER SHOCKS ARE MORE CONCENTRATED AMONGST THE POOREST HOUSEHOLDS THAN OTHER SHOCKS TO WHICH THE REGION IS SUSCEPTIBLE The poorest households are more likely to be affected by Similarly, the poorest households are disproportionately climate shocks than the richest households. Approximately affected by conflict shocks (Figure 7c). On average, households four out of ten of all the poorest households have experienced a in the first quintile experienced three times as many conflict shocks climate shock in the previous three years, while only one-quarter of as those in the fifth quintile. As discussed, conflict shocks are not the richest households have been adversely affected by a weather only geographically concentrated, but violence also affects more shock (Figure 7). As demonstrated by the large share of climate the poor and most vulnerable households in each country. This shocks that are droughts reported in Figure 2, these patterns could be driven by violence being more common in rural areas, are driven by differences in exposure to droughts at different where many of the poorest households live, due to fewer state points of the welfare distribution. This is consistent with the fact presence and economic opportunities. However, this economic that most of the poorest households in the Sahel are working in gradient holds true even when comparing urban and rural areas agriculture and are residing in rural areas. This disparity between separately. richer and poorer households varies substantially by country. For instance, in Burkina Faso and Mali, the poorest households were By contrast, idiosyncratic shocks are equally likely to twice and nearly three times as likely, respectively, to experience impact richer and poorer households (Figure 7d). Overall, a climate shock in the previous three year than the households in the relationship between household welfare and exposure to the richest quintile. In Chad, however, this gap was narrower.16 This idiosyncratic shocks varies considerably across countries. In implies that adaptive social protection systems that are responsive Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, wealthier households (Q5) appear to climate shocks—droughts in particular—ought to be more to be more affected than poorer ones. In contrast, in Niger, the concentrated amongst poor households than systems that are exposure to idiosyncratic shocks is relatively uniform across all responsive to other pervasive shocks in the region.17 consumption levels. Senegal presents a different pattern, with the middle quintile (Q3) reporting the highest exposure, and no clear gradient between welfare and shock incidence. SASPP Policy Note Series 10 May 2025 FIGURE 7. Impact of shocks by consumption in the previous three years 7a. Impact of shocks by consumption quintile in the 7b. Impact of climate shocks by consumption quintile region by country Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 50% 60% 70% 60% ofpopulation 40% population Share of the population 50% 40% 30% 40% of the Share Share 30% 20% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict Burkina Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mali Niger Niger Senegal Senegal Chad Faso Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 7c. Impact of idiosyncratic shocks by consumption 7d. Impact of conflict shocks by consumption quintile quintile by country by country Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 60% 60% 60% 100% 20% 50% ofpopulation population 80% population population population 40% 40% 40% 60% of of of the the Share 30% 10% Share Share Share Share of 40% 20% 20% 20% 20% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Burkina Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mali Niger Niger Senegal Senegal Chad Burkina Burkina Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mali Niger Niger Senegal Senegal Chad Faso Faso Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Notes: Figure reports the share of the population that reported to be adversely affected by each type of shock in the previous twelve months before the survey. The prevalence of each shock is separately reported by consumption quintiles, where Q1 is the poorest quintile and Q5 is the richest quintile. Quintiles are defined using consumption within each country. For example, the Q1 households in Senegal refer to the 20 percent of the population within Senegal that is the poorest, and many Q1 households there might be better off than higher quintiles in other countries. The figures report averages over Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal using data from the West African Monetary Union Harmonized Household Surveys conducted between 2021 and 2022. SASPP Policy Note Series 11 May 2025 FACT 5: THE POPULATION IN SENEGAL IS LESS LIKELY TO BE EXPOSED TO CLIMATE SHOCKS AND IS ALSO LESS LIKELY TO RELY ON NEGATIVE COPING STRATEGIES THAN THE REST OF THE REGION Senegal has a different exposure and resiliency to risks that In Senegal, floods and droughts appear to pose a relatively commonly affect the region. Figure 8a reports the share of similar level of risk, with 9.0 percent of the population exposed the population experiencing shocks separately for Senegal and to floods and 7 percent to droughts. This balanced exposure the rest of the region; and figure 8b reports the share of shock- contrasts with the broader regional pattern, where droughts affected households that rely on negative coping strategies are by far the dominant climate-related shock. On average, separately for Senegal and the rest of the region. The difference 28 percent of the population across the Sahel is exposed to between Senegal and the rest of the region is the lower exposure droughts with Mali and Burkina Faso experiencing exposure to covariate—weather and conflict—shocks that are the focus of levels of 38 and 44 percent, respectively. While Senegal’s adaptive social protection systems. In terms of coping strategies, flood exposure is in line with the regional average, its drought the country shows slightly lower reliance on depletive coping exposure is markedly lower, making it an outlier in a region strategies in the case of climate shocks with respect to the rest where drought is typically the primary concern. This unique risk of the region. The statistics on Senegal regarding the reliance on profile suggests that in Senegal, climate resilience strategies negative coping strategies for the case of conflict shocks should should give equal weight to managing both droughts and floods, be taken with a grain of salt given the low incidence of these type compared to the rest of Sahel where droughts are by far the most of shocks in the country. important channel. FIGURE 8. Comparison between Senegal and the rest of the Sahel 8a. Share of population exposed to negative shocks 8b. Share of shock-affected population relying on in the previous 3 years negative coping strategies in the previous twelve months 60% 60% 50% 50% Share of the population Share of the population 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict None Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict Rest of Sahel Senegal Rest of Sahel Senegal Notes: Figure reports the share of the population exposed to negative shocks and reports the share of shock-affected households that rely on negative coping strategies by the different types of shocks. The figures report averages over Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal using data from the West African Monetary Union Harmonized Household Surveys conducted between 2021 and 2022 SASPP Policy Note Series 12 May 2025 2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS The high incidence of shocks in the Sahel underscores the At the same time, the findings point to a need for improved need to strengthen adaptive social protection (ASP) systems. targeting strategies within ASP systems. The majority of the The findings from this study further emphasize the importance population in the Sahel is either poor or at risk of falling into poverty of ASP mechanisms that can respond effectively to weather from a single shock. This highlights the importance of designing and climate-related shocks. Compared to other types of shocks ASP systems that prioritize the poorest households while also common in the region, weather and climate shocks are not only maintaining the flexibility to support non-poor but vulnerable more prevalent but also more geographically widespread and groups, when they are affected by shocks. Because different disproportionately concentrated among poorer households. As shocks affect populations in different ways, ASP programs should climate change continues to intensify, the frequency and severity develop targeted approaches that reflect these variations— of these shocks are expected to rise, making ASP systems potentially combining household-level poverty targeting with increasingly critical for long-term resilience. geographic and categorical targeting methods. The evidence also suggests that ASP systems must offer a Finally, to design more comprehensive and responsive ASP broad range of support. Effective ASP programs should both (i) systems, more work is needed to fully understand the impacts build household resilience in anticipation of climate-related risks of shocks across the region. This study relies on self-reported and (ii) scale rapidly to provide assistance when shocks occur. For data on shock incidence, which may not capture the broader or example, resilience-building measures such as financial support indirect effects of certain events. For instance, droughts in rural and training in climate-smart agricultural practices—like water areas can drive up food prices in urban centers, and conflict may management and soil conservation—can help reduce farmers’ disrupt supply chains and reduce food access even in areas not vulnerability to drought. Meanwhile, timely ex-post responses directly affected by violence. Integrating household survey data such as emergency support can help households avoid harmful with external data sources on conflict and weather shocks, and coping strategies in the wake of a shock. increasing the collection of high-frequency data, will help reveal the full scope of these impacts and ensure that ASP systems can effectively reach all affected households. © Daniella Van Leggelo-Padilla / World Bank SASPP Policy Note Series 13 May 2025 REFERENCES Almoayad, S., E. Favari, S. Halabi, S. Krishnaswamy, A. Music, and S. Tandon. 2020. “Active Conflict and Access to Education: Evidence from a Series of Conflict-Related Shocks in Yemen.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9330, Washington D.C. Blattman, C. and E. Miguel. 2010. ``Civil War.’’ Journal of Economic Literature 48, 3-57. D’Souza, A. and D. Jolliffe. 2013. ``Conflict, food price shocks, and food insecurity: The experience of Afghan households.’’ Food Policy 42, 32-47. Justino, P. 2012. ``Violent Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation.’’ In Elgar Handbook of Civil War and Fragile States eds. G.K. Brown and A. Langer. Edward Elgar Publisher, Cheltenham, U.K. Martin-Shields, C. and W. Stojetz. 2019. ``Food Security and Conflict: Empirical Challenges and Future Opportunities for Research and Policy Making on Food Security and Conflict.’’ World Development 119, 150-164. Tandon, S. 2019. “When Rebels Attack: Quantifying the Impacts of Capturing Territory from the Government.” World Bank Economic Review 33 (2), 328-352. Tandon, S. and T. Vishwanath. 2020. “The Evolution of Poor Food Access Over the Course of the Conflict in Yemen.” World Development 130, 104922. Verwimp, P., P. Justino, and T. Bruck. 2019. ``The Microeconomics of Violent Conflict.’’ Journal of Development Economics 141, 102297 ENDNOTES 1 Special thanks to Gabriela Inchauste, Aissatou Ouedraogo, Aline Coudouel, Claudia Santa Maria Ruiz, Estefania Hernandez, and Simon Chaves for their valuable comments and contributions to this note. 2 Brunelin, Stephanie, Aissatou Ouedraogo, and Sharad Tandon. “Five facts about shocks in the Sahel.” Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Policy Brief 1 (2020). 3 Jonathan William Lain; Stephanie Brunelin; Sharad Alan Tandon. Anticipating Large and Widespread Seasonal Deprivation in the Sahel (English). SASPP Policy Note Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. 4 It is further important to note that Figure 1 summarizes the share of population by the number of broad shock categories experienced, which each contain a number of different shocks. Thus, a households can in principle be exposed to more than three shocks in the previous three years. 5 The significant share of the population that did not report experiencing any adverse shocks in the three years before the survey survives excluding better-off regions in the region. For example, even when excluding Senegal, the share of the population of the rest of the Sahel that reported no negative shocks was 37 percent; and when restricting the sample to only rural households in the entire Sahel aside from Senegal, the share that reported no negative shocks was 34 percent. 6 As demonstrated in Figure 1a, approximately one-quarter of the population is exposed to more than one major shock category. Thus, the shares of the population sum to more than one. 7 See Annex 1 for more details about shocks included in each category 8 For a survey of the literature, see Blattman and Miguel (2010), Justino (2012), or Verwimp et al. (2019). 9 For examples, see D’Souza and Jolliffe (2013), Martin-Shields and Stojetz (2018), Tandon (2019), Tandon and Vishwanath (2020), and Almoayad et al. (2020). 10 Notably, this question has changed since the EHCVM 2018, where households were asked about their coping mechanisms for all shocks experienced over the previous three years, rather than just those suffered in the past 12 months. As a result, statistics presented in this study on coping mechanisms may not be directly comparable with previous studies. 11 This study focuses on reproducing Bruneli et al. (2020) at the country level by analyzing only the top coping mechanism employed for each shock experienced by a household. It is important to notice that the regional-level statistics for the Sahel reported in Bruneli et al (2020) did not follow this approach. 12 For a complete list of coping strategies, see Table A2 in the Data Appendix. 13 Country level statistics on coping strategies for conflict shocks should be taken with a grain of salt due to small sample bias, in Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal. Which according to figure 2 have much smaller fraction of the population suffering from shocks. 14 The figure does not demonstrate that the reliance on negative coping strategies is stronger for each quintile. For example, the bottom four quintiles have essentially an indistinguishable reliance on negative coping strategies from each other. However, the top quintile has significantly less reliance than other households. 15 The higher reliance on negative coping strategies of the poorest households relative to the richest households only is evidence with the coping strategy that is most heavily relied upon. When looking at the second- and third-most-relied on strategies, there is no difference based on consumption quintile. 16 It is difficult to identify the reason for these differences across countries, and more thorough investigation is needed. 17 It is difficult to identify whether the climate shocks contributed to poor consumption, whether climate shocks tended to strike those that already had poor consumption, or a combination of both. SASPP Policy Note Series 14 May 2025 DATA APPENDIX The first wave of the West African Economic and Monetary Union of these factors might vary for different points of the welfare (WAEMU) harmonized household survey was launched during distribution and for different household characteristics. the lean season in September 2018, and a second wave was completed in 2019 after the lean season had ended. All SASPP The shock module asks households if they have been negatively countries aside from Mauritania participated in the WAEMU affected by each of 21 different types of shocks over the three years survey, which includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and prior to the survey time. Importantly, these shocks include conflict Senegal. The surveys are nationally-representative, and can shocks and a variety of shocks that can be related to climate, further report estimates at the rural/urban and regional (Admin 1) including droughts, floods, fires, and landslides. Additionally, levels. However, the sampling frame did not include refugees and the list of shocks includes a variety of idiosyncratic shocks, such internally displaced populations that are living in camps. as illness of family members, death of family members, theft of assets, and so on. For simplicity, the above report groups these The surveys are multi-purpose household surveys which include a shocks into three groups- climate shocks, conflict shocks, and detailed household roster and detailed modules on consumption, idiosyncratic shocks. Additionally, certain shocks from the list have employment, education, health, exposure to shocks, and social been omitted that might be secondary effects of some of the other safety nets. The combination of the shock module along with all shocks listed. For example, high food prices and changes in input the other detailed modules allows one to investigate the degree or output prices for businesses can be related to droughts. These to which shocks impact the population, the types of strategies types of shocks have been excluded from the analysis above so as that households used to cope with these shocks, and how each to not magnify the impacts of some but not all shocks. However, all results are qualitatively identical if these shocks are included. TABLE A1. Definition of shocks Survey Shock Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict None Code 101 Serious illness or accident of a household member X 102 Death of a household member X 103 Divorce, separation X 104 Drought/erratic rainfall X 105 Flooding X 106 Fires X 107 High rate of crop diseases X 108 High rate of animal diseases X 109 Significant decline in agricultural commodity prices X 110 High prices of agricultural inputs X 111 High food prices X 112 End of regular transfers from other households X 113 Significant loss of non-farm household income (other than due to X accident or illness) 114 Bankruptcy of a non-farm household business X 115 Significant loss of wage income (other than due to ac-cident or X illness) 116 Loss of a member's salaried employment X 117 Theft of money, property, crops or livestock X 118 Farmer/Breeder Conflict X SASPP Policy Note Series 15 May 2025 Survey Shock Idiosyncratic Climate Conflict None Code 119 Armed conflict/Violence/Insecurity X 120 Locust attacks or other crop pests X 121 Landslide X 122 Other (to be specified) Source: World Bank based on Harmonized Household surveys 2021-2022 of countries in the Sahel region. The shock module further asks households the primary that may have been adopted over the last three years. For a strategies they used to cope with the negative shocks, allowing complete list of coping strategies, see Table A2. households to list up to three strategies used for each type of shock. The list of possible coping strategies includes 24 Using the detailed shock module, we report estimates pooled separate strategies. For simplicity, we have grouped these across all five countries and we report a portion of the results by into negative and non-negative strategies, and we identify country. In the estimates that pool observations across countries, the household as relying on a coping strategy regardless of more weight is given to countries that have larger populations. whether it was negative or not. Non-negative strategies include However, the populations of each country at the time of the the use of savings, help from friends or families, or support from household survey are roughly similar, with the smallest population the government. Negative coping strategies are grouped into of approximately 16 million in Senegal and the largest population three categories- strategies that impede access to food and vital in Niger of approximately 22 million. services, strategies that impede future consumption (e.g., relying on credit, selling productive assets, etc.), and other coping Importantly, the surveys were mostly unaffected by conflict strategies (e.g., migration, having their children get married, during the survey period. Only in northern Mali and in Chad and sending children to live with other families). Although were approximately enumeration areas replaced due to conflict households could list up to three strategies for each shock, and insecurity at the time that data collection was to take place. only the top-listed (first) strategy in each case was considered In Mali, approximately 30 enumeration areas were replaced for the analysis. In the 2022 household survey, responses were with enumeration areas from within the same strata; in Chad, 3 restricted to coping strategies used in the 12 months prior to enumeration areas were replaced. the interview, whereas the 2018 survey allowed for strategies TABLE A2. List of coping strategies Non-negative coping strategies • Use of your savings • Employed working members of the household took • Renting/pawning land • Help from family or friends additional jobs • Increased fishing activities • Government/State aid • Adult members (at least 15 years old) who are not in • Engaged in spiritual activities • Help from religious the labor force or unemployed have taken up jobs • Alternative strategy (to be specified) organizations or NGOs • Practice of off-season cultivation • No strategy Negative coping strategies Current access to food and basic services Future access to food and basic services Other negative coping strategies • Reduction in meals, quantities consumed, etc. • Obtaining a loan • Marry off children • Buying Cheaper Food • Sale of agricultural assets • Migration of household • Children under 15 were made to work • Sale of durable household goods members • Children were taken out of school • Sale of land/buildings/houses • Entrusting children to other • Reduction of health or education • Sale of food stocks households expenditure • Sale of livestock Source: World Bank based on Harmonized Household surveys 2021-2022 of countries in the Sahel region. SASPP Policy Note Series 16 May 2025 © 2025 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information, or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. 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ACKNOWLEGEMENTS Special thanks to Gabriela Inchauste, Aissatou Ouedraogo, Aline Coudouel, Claudia Santamaria Ruiz, Estefania Hernandez, and Simon Chaves for their valuable comments and contributions to this note. This work has been prepared in support of, and in close collaboration with, the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (SASPP), hosted at the World Bank. SASPP is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank that supports the strengthening of adaptive social protection systems in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal) to enhance the resilience of poor and vulnerable households and communities to the impacts of climate change. The program is supported by Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. CONCEPTION DE NOTES: ANDRES DE LA ROCHE / ADELAROCHEDESIGNS.COM For more information: saspp@worldbank.org www.worldbank.org/saspp