WPS5809 Policy Research Working Paper 5809 School-Based Management, School Decision-Making and Education Outcomes in Indonesian Primary Schools Dandan Chen The World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region Education Sector Unit September 2011 Policy Research Working Paper 5809 Abstract This paper examines the key aspects of the practices of the schools. The accountability system has remained school-based management in Indonesia, and its effect weak in Indonesia’s school system, which is reflected on education quality. Using a conceptual framework of by inadequate information flow to parents, as well as an accountability system of public service delivery, the seemingly low parental awareness of the need to hold paper explores the relations among Indonesian parents, schools accountable. The accountability arrangement school committees, schools, and government education of the Indonesian school system currently puts more supervisory bodies from three tenets: participation and emphasis on top-down supervision and monitoring by voice; autonomy; and accountability. government supervisory bodies. Using the data from a nationally representative survey The findings show that although the scope of school- of about 400 public primary schools in Indonesia, based management in Indonesia is limited, it has begun the paper finds that the level of parental participation to help schools make the right decisions on allocation and voice in school management is extremely low in of resources and hiring additional (non-civil servant) Indonesia. While the role of school committees is still teachers, and to create an enabling environment of limited to community relations, school facilities, and learning, including increasing teacher attendance rates. other administrative areas of school management, These aspects are found to have significantly positive school principals, together with teachers, are much effects on student learning outcomes. more empowered to assert professional control of This paper is a product of the Education Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dchen1@worldbank.org. The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Produced by the Research Support Team School-based Management, School Decision-Making and Education Outcomes in Indonesian Primary Schools Dandan Chen1 Key words: School-based management; Decentralization; Accountability; Learning outcome; School financing; School committee. (JEL: 1C, 14P). 1 Chen: Human Development Department, East Asia and Pacific Region (email: dchen1@worldbank.org). I thank Imam Setiawan for the excellent research assistance. Eduardo Velez Bustillo provided comments on an earlier draft of the paper. I. Introduction and conceptual framework Governments around the world are introducing a range of strategies aimed at improving the delivery of education services. One such strategy is to decentralize education decision making by increasing parental and community involvement in schools, which is commonly known as school-based management (SBM). The argument in favor of SBM is that decentralizing decision-making authority to parents and communities fosters demand and ensures that schools provide the social and economic benefits that best reflect the priorities and values of those local communities. An increasing number of developing countries are implementing SBM reforms aimed at empowering principals, teachers, and parents, or at strengthening their motivation, thereby enhancing their sense of ownership of the school. Many of these reforms have led to greater involvement of communities and parents and, in turn, have had a direct influence on educational quality. In particular, it has been found that increased participation, autonomy, and accountability are the three most important changes associated with improved quality of education and better learning outcomes. The 2004 World Development Report (WDR) ―Making Services Work for Poor People‖ (World Bank 2003) provides a conceptual framework for this phenomenon. The framework is presented as a three-cornered relationship between citizens, politicians, and service providers. The service provision and accountability relationships between these actors is complex, as even within each group of actors there are usually heterogeneous sub-groups, and the incentives and accountability relationships that work for one group may be different from those that work for other groups. When accountability fails, the failure can be tracked either to the long route between providers and users through policymakers, or to the short route between service providers and users directly. Sometimes improving the long route is a long-term process and, in some situations, may not be doable. In these cases, the WDR 2004 suggests strengthening the short route between providers and users (Figure 1). 2 Figure 1: An Accountability Framework Source: World Bank (2003). SBM is a direct reflection of this ―short-route‖ approach. What successful education systems share appears to be a working structure of accountability: clear objectives, adequate resources, and capable and motivated providers. Institutional reforms should aim at strengthening the system of accountability, not only relying on the improvement of some proximate determinants of success, such as curriculum design, pedagogical methods, textbooks, teacher training, school construction, or new information technologies. The 2004 WDR presented evidence that increasing school autonomy and accountability can help solve some of the most fundamental problems in education. According to existing evidence, while increasing resource flows and other support to the education sector is necessary, it is also critical to translate these resources into basic services that can reach the clients. Schools should be given some autonomy in using their inputs and be held accountable to the users for using these inputs efficiently. The literature that promotes the use of SBM generally points to three tenets for improving service delivery: (i) increasing client choice and participation (―voice‖); (ii) building effective and autonomous frontline providers and organizations (―management‖); and (iii) making information widely available, and using the information to strengthen the 3 rewards for delivering effective services and penalize those who fail to deliver (―compact‖). The worldwide evidence on school-based management is well summarized in ―Decentralized Decision-Making in Schools‖ (World Bank, 2009). The general finding is that SBM shows positive results on mainly reducing grade repetition and failure, and improving teacher attendance rates, contrasted with the mixed results in test scores. II. Indonesian context Indonesia is a very large country geographically, with more than 200,000 schools nationwide. Decentralizing service delivery is a natural response to concerns about the ability of central policymakers to respond to the needs of a large and diverse country. Since 2002, Indonesia has sought to address structural problems in the legal and legislative framework governing education service delivery. The government has formalized first SBM-principles with Decree No. 044/U/2002 (Ministry of Education, 2002) on the Education Board and School Committees (SC). The Decree defined the school committee as the community representative body at the school level with membership comprising parents, community leaders, education professionals, private sector, education associations, teachers, NGOs and village officials. It must comprise a minimum of nine members and the chairperson must come from outside the school. The idea of the school committee is based on the enlargement of the old style BP3 (Parents-Teachers Association) and aimed at accommodating wider participation from the parents and the community, empowering them in decision making, and holding schools accountable so as to improve education access and quality on the ground. The expectation was that SBM would lead to more efficient use of resources and improved student achievement. The Decree explicitly stipulates that SC objectives should include: (1) to accommodate aspirations of the community on operational policies and education sector programs at the education unit (school level); (2) to encourage more community roles in education provision at the school level; and (3) to facilitate the establishment of education service provision at the school level in a transparent and accountable manner. Education Law No. 20/2003 also defines the District Education Board as an independent body representing civil society at the district level with the aim of improving 4 education service delivery. The committee supports this improvement by: (1) providing advice to assist in determining the school program and policy; (2) providing support such as financial support, ideas, and activities for the implementation of the school program; (3) providing control over school programs for transparency and accountability; and (4) providing mediation and communication between the school and the community. Compared to international practices particularly in Latin America, the practice of SBM in Indonesian is very much limited in public schools. The majority of the teachers are public civil servants, whom the schools have no power to hire or fire. In theory, schools have only control over non-salary operational expenditures, even though the discretionary resources are commonly used to hire additional contract teachers. International partners have supported SBM in Indonesia for more than 10 years. The Ministry of National Education (MoNE) has even established a SBM Secretariat to integrate programs. The donor programs that can be broadly categorized as supporting SBM include: Creating Learning Communities for Children (CLCC) with UNICEF and UNESCO; Decentralized Basic Education Project (DBEP) with Asian Development Bank; Regional Education Development and Improvement Program (REDIP) with JICA; Managing Basic Education and Decentralized Basic Education (DBE) with USAID; and Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (AIBEP) with AusAID. There is a small but growing research literature devoted to school-based management in Indonesia. The evidence on school committees is based mainly on qualitative case studies across a range of provinces. The SMERU Institute studies from 2005 and 2008 focused on school committee participation in school management, as well as the school budgeting process that accompanies receiving the BOS block grants (RAPBS). They found school committees were often dominated by school principals, with the help of selected teachers. Committees generally concentrated in raising funds for the school to use on facilities, and rarely entered into areas related to teaching and learning. Participation within the committees was limited, and often dominated by the committee leader, who may be a respected figure in the community (such as a former school principal). However, these committees were seen as potentially effective communicators of complaints from parents about actions within the school, including disciplinary episodes. 5 A number of factors appear to contribute to the relatively weak position of the school committee vis-à-vis school personnel, especially the principal. The first is that committees are not perceived as having relevant expertise for entering into questions related to management, teaching and learning. Another factor was referred to as an institutional legitimacy issue, since the school principal receives his/her decree from the district office, while the school committee is appointed locally. Finally, with the introduction of the ―School Operational Assistance‖2 (Batuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS) grants, one of the main historical functions of the school committees—raising funds—has been reduced in importance (SMERU, 2005, 2008). The school’s use of the BOS grant money is another area of research. The main benefit from the program appears to be the supplanting of school-based fees, at least in rural areas (SMERU, 2008). This does not mean that local fees have been abolished, but the additional funds appear to be used to purchase the materials and inputs that were financed largely by parental fees before. This in turn has positive implications for participation, since the price of school has in effect been lowered. As for how schools use the grant money, the evidence is mixed. As mentioned in Sweeting et al. (2003-07), on the one hand there are instances of qualitative improvements, for example, through enhanced teacher training. But the evidence suggests a general emphasis on materials and physical infrastructure, rather than learning processes. Also, not every community has necessarily welcomed the BOS program. In some urban areas there is evidence of schools declining BOS in favor of maintaining a school fee system that generates more resources, although this puts more pressure on the poorest families. In other areas there are concerns about district-level diverting of the funds. Finally, there is the concern raised above that one side effect of the BOS program is that it indirectly weakens the position of the school committee given its historical role as local fundraiser. 2 Capitation grant to primary and junior secondary schools started in 2005, currently in the amount of about US$ 40 per pupil at primary level, and approximately US$ 60 at junior secondary level. 6 III. The SBM survey 2010 and a brief overview of the status of SBM in Indonesia In April 2010, the World Bank, in collaboration with the RAND Corporation and Survey Meter, carried out a sample survey of 400 public primary schools3 in Indonesia spreading over 54 districts. Interviews were carried out with 400 principals, 781 school committee members, 1,953 teachers, and 2,400 parents. In addition, 54 heads of district (Kabupaten) or municipality (Kota) education offices, 47 heads of sub-district (Kecamaten) education offices, 52 chairs of the district education board, and 54 of chief school inspectors in each district were also interviewed. Selected Grade 5 pupils in each surveyed school were tested in Indonesian language and mathematics4. Figure 2: Distribution of 54 sampled districts Consistent with national data, the average size of the sampled primary school is small, at 180 students on average per school. The student-teacher ratio is generally low, around 15:1. Schools’ discretionary resource envelopes, excluding public civil service teachers’ salaries that are directly paid to teachers, is also in general small, but varies from region to region. The survey aims at capturing the current practice of SBM in Indonesia, after nearly 10 years of its principles written into law. The survey has shown that in general the scope of SBM continues to be very limited in Indonesian public primary schools. In terms of the first key tenet of SBM - parental choice, participation, and voice, 90% 3 These are the public primary schools under the auspices of the Ministry of National Education, comprising about 90 percent of total primary schools in Indonesia. The other 10% mostly include private schools and the schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (mostly private schools). 4 The survey also included 54 public junior secondary schools, one in each sampled district. This paper focuses on the 400 public primary schools only. 7 surveyed parents did not actively choose schools, even though nearly 70% do have other choices in the same village (Figure 3). Figure 3: Parental choice of schools How many other schools applied? Is the school the only school in village? One other school applied 9% Yes 32% Two other Not applied any schools other school 1% 90% More than two other schools No 0% 68% Source: SBM Survey 2010, World Bank. Parental involvement in school affairs tends to be low. The limited involvement is mainly interactions with teachers or principals on issues related to their own children, or attending regular parents’ meetings with schools. Over 80% of the parents have neither provided any inputs to school, nor volunteered in school activities, such as serving as a committee member, helping classroom activities, or raising funds for schools (Figure 4). 8 Figure 4: Parental participation of school affairs 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Talked with Attended Talked with Helped with Provided Served on a Volunteered your child’s schoolwide your child’s fundraising input on how committee in the teacher meetings for principal the school (other than classroom parents budget will School (e.g., help be spent Committee) with classroom activities never once multiple times School management and autonomy is the second tenet of SBM. Even though Indonesia cancelled the school/university autonomy law in early 2010, the survey shows that in practice, school principals continue enjoying much freedom of decision-making at schools. They generally feel much empowered in influencing various aspects of educational management: student admission; school timetable; budget and planning; managing teachers; school facilities as well as teaching and learning materials including curriculum contents. They appear to have both ―administrative control‖ and ―professional control‖ of the school activities (Figure 5). 9 Figure 5: School principals’ influence on various school affairs During this school year (2009-2010), as principal how influential are you over the following aspects of your school? 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Setting Allocating Planning and Drafting the Planning Purchasing Determining Determining Choosing Determining Hiring and Setting the student BOS funds allocating the school’s school supplies and the content school textbooks lesson firing of non- school’s admission school work plan facility materials of teacher calendar and content and PNS vision, criteria budget professional instructional syllabi teachers mission, development materials and/or goals 1. not influential 2. little influential 3. quite influential 4. much influential In comparison, school committees largely feel less control of school decision- making. School committees report that their most influential area is community-school relations, following by planning for school facility improvement. Around half of the school committees in the survey responded that they had little or no influence on school vision and mission, budget allocation and work plan. Figure 6: School committee’s influence on various school affairs During this school year (2009-2010), how influential is SC over the following aspects of the school? 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Community- Planning to School vision, Allocation of School work Student School Teacher Teacher Curriculum School Textbook school improve mission, BOS funds plan enrollment budget performance hiring calendar choice relationship school facilty and/or goals and planning and or evaluation admissions allocation not influential 2.little influential 3.quite influential 4. much influential The least influenced areas by school committees fall under the ―professional control‖ side of the school: textbooks choice, school calendar, curriculum, and teacher management. 10 The dichotomy of principal vs. school committee on school management is to some extent understandable within the institutional context. With the ownership of the Indonesian public schools still falls under the government, and generally categorized as ―technical unit‖ in the government structure with assigned budget headings, the principal, as an appointed government employee, is responsible for this ―unit‖ and allocated public budget. With increased share of public funding at school level in recent years, it is natural to expect that the principal’s role is likely to be enlarged. The third tenet of SBM is transparency and accountability. Regarding information flow from schools to parents, the report card on individual child’s academic performance, mostly semester test results, is regularly sent to parents, and they are generally easy for parents to understand (Figure 7). Figure 7: School report card received by parents How often receive report card (2009-10) How understandable is report card 60 70 60 50 50 40 40 30 % % 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 Never Once Every Quarterly Monthly Weekly Very easy Somewhat easy Somewhat Very difficult semester difficult Beyond report cards on students’ performance at school, other information regarding school activities and management is not commonly communicated to parents. Only about 20% of the parents surveyed responded that they received some information on overall school performance5. Similarly quite low share of parents reported that they learned anything about school finance or were encouraged to volunteer in school activities. Only half of the parents interviewed actually received any information about school and student activities (Figure 8, left panel). 5 This is not well defined, a weakness of the survey. 11 Figure 8: Information flow to parents and parental satisfaction % of parents reporting school provided information in various areas 100.00% Parental satisfaction 100% 90.00% 90% 80.00% 80% 70.00% 70% 60.00% 60% 50.00% Very satisfied 50% 40.00% Satisfied 40% 30.00% Dissatisfied 30% 20.00% Very dissatisfied 20% 10.00% 10% 0.00% 0% School Donations/aids Opportunities for School and/or Overall, how satisfied are Overall, how satisfied are Overall, how satisfied are performance received by the parent involvement student activities you with The management you with The quality of you with Your child’s school in the school of this school education at this school teacher Paradoxically, with little interaction with schools, and infrequent information supplied by schools, a large majority of parents are either satisfied or very satisfied with school quality, management, and their children’s teachers (Figure 8, right panel). This appears to cast doubt on whether the accountability of schools to parents would work in Indonesia, where community harmony is highly valued, and a majority of parents are reserved and do not openly complain or express dissatisfaction. This doubt is somewhat verified by the responses of schools and districts on the pressure they felt for improving education quality. Of those surveyed, 68% of the principals and 63% of the district education officers responded that there was little to no pressure from parents to improve education. The school committees, district education boards (DEB), and school inspectors seem to view the pressure as slightly higher. However, they are in general on the ―giving‖ end, but not the ―receiving‖ end of the pressure, and thus may have biased views on the pressure that parents actually put on schools (Figure 9). 12 Figure 9: Pressure from parents to improve student performance: viewed by various stakeholders 43% 39% 63% 60% 56% 68% 57% 61% 37% 40% 44% 33% Principal District Sub-district District School SC chair education edu. Off. education inspector office board strong to very strong no to weak pressure The bottom-up pressure from parents seems weak in Indonesia’s public primary schools, but the top-down pressure from government supervisory bodies is slightly more significant. Figure 10 shows that schools are frequently visited by school inspectors from the district education office. Schools on average receive nearly 6 visits by the district school inspectors per year. This is somewhat verified by the district’s response that quarterly and monthly school visits are common by the districts. Figure 10: School visits by district Since the beginning of this school year (2009- Frequency of district visiting schools 2010), how many times have schools received (Reported by District education officer) monitoring visit by varies authorities , according to principal 45 40 5.8 35 30 2.6 25 % 1.5 20 15 0.2 10 School Committee District or sub- Other district or Education Board 5 member(s) district education sub-district member(s) 0 supervisor(s) education (pengawas) representative(s) 1.Never 2.Every 3.Every 4.Every 5.Every 6.Every year semester quarter month week What happened during and after the district’s visit to schools? Even though the visits are frequent, it seems that the key aspects of quality assurance and consequences are missing from these visits. For example, monitoring instruction inside classrooms is not commonly covered during these visits, and reviewing the school budget is also not a 13 routine task of the supervisors. This leads to the question of what the feedback given to principals and teachers is mostly based on, or whether the evaluations and feedback, together with other inspection areas (i.e. school facility and administrative procedures) are superficial. In addition, the consequences for poor performance rarely lead to any high-stake actions. The most common measure taken for a low-performing principal is a transfer to another school or placement with a mentor. Demotion and firing would only happen with more serious offenses (Figure 11). Figure 11: Top-down accountability Purpose of Dinas visit Whether measures are taken by Dinas for principal low (reported by Dinas) performance (reported by Dinas) 100% 100% 90% 90% 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% Provide Check Provide Review Review and Monitor Reassigned the Provided Gave Provided Demoted Fired the feedback on conditions of feedback on school discuss instruction in principal’s school teacher’s policies and school budget classroom principal to mentor notification training principal back principal performance buildings and performance procedures another school letter to teacher or facilities administrator 0 No 1 Yes 1.Yes 3.No In brief, Indonesia has joined the global trend of decentralization of educational decision-making. Schools are empowered to make decisions on administrative and technical matters. However, Indonesia does not seem to get the best from the current SBM practice. The level of parental participation, transparency, and accountability needs to be elevated to enable the country to reap the full benefit of SBM in improving the quality of education. IV. Estimating the effects of school decision-making This section provides empirical evidence on whether school level decision- making actually leads to improved education outcomes in Indonesia. The scope of school decision-making in the country is still limited, given that a majority of teachers are civil servants, who are assigned to schools. Therefore decision-making at the school level is limited to its relatively small discretionary resource envelope. But there are key areas in which schools can and have been making choices. We look into two of these areas: 14 hiring non-civil servant (contract) teachers, and allocating discretionary resources. We examine what factors are associated with school choices, and how these choices affect student learning outcomes at the school level. We follow an analytical framework as graphed in Figure 12. As depicted, school outcome is determined by three sets of factors: the school’s capacity to deliver results; the school’s drive and actions for results; as well as students’ family and community background. The school’s drive and actions for results are of particular interest in the context of SBM: they are affected by how much autonomy schools have, together with the extent to which schools are held accountable for their results. Figure 12: An analytical framework of school outcome Source: Author compilation. Schools can be held accountable by parents and communities (bottom-up accountability), as well by government supervisory bodies (top-down accountability). In Indonesia, the former is often regarded as through the school committee, and the latter, the district education office. The approach for empirical estimation is summarized in Table 1. 15 Table 1: Empirical approach to estimate school decision-making and its effects on school results Equations (1) (2) (3) (4) Outcome equation School decision/ intermediate outcome equation Dependent : Learning outcome -Resource use -Non-PNS hiring -Teacher attendance Explanatory: School level: Resources Resources Principal experiences Principal experiences Teacher qualification Teacher qualification Teacher experiences Teacher experiences Various training Various training Resource allocation Teacher hiring Teacher attendance Government level : Report requirement Meetings and visits Rewards and sanctions Community level: Report to parents and communities on results Multiple schools to choose from Pressures to schools Direct participation in school mgmt Parental resources parental education A two-step procedure is used to address the endogeneity of school decision variables when explaining the school outcome. As summarized in Table 1, the first step 16 estimates school decision equations of (1) school budget allocation for student activities, particularly in support of learning such as remedial learning activities; and (2) the number of non-civil service (―non-PNS‖) teachers hired by schools. We also include in the first step the estimation of one important intermediate outcome measure: teacher attendance rate. The predicted values of the first step dependent variables will serve as key variables to explain the school outcome: test scores of Indonesian language and math. While school capacity variables such as principal and teachers’ qualification and experiences enter both equations, the ―accountability‖ variables only affect school outcomes through influencing school decision-making, and thus they are excluded from the 2nd step estimation. In the meantime, parental educational background and resources are regarded as only affecting learning outcome directly. This is a reasonable assumption as highly educated or well-heeled parents can only be highly influential if they are involved in school activities in the first place. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation are presented in Annex 1. The sample includes 383 schools. 13 schools in the survey actually responded that they do not have school committees, and thus are excluded from the sample. Using discretionary funding for hiring non-civil service teachers seems to be a common phenomenon, even though the student-teacher ratio is very low at average of 15:1 for the sample. On average, 30% of the teachers in the surveyed schools are non-civil service teachers (Figure 13). Figure 13: STR and share of non-civil service teachers a. Student-teacher ratio b. Share of non-civil service teachers .15 .2 .15 .1 Fraction Fraction .1 .05 .05 0 0 0 10 20 30 40 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 STR share of non PNS teachers 17 Teacher absenteeism has been an issue in Indonesia. Chaudhury et al (2006) reported that 19% of Indonesian teachers were absent from work. Our survey relies on the principal’s estimate, and has a much better record of 6% absence rate. However, the variations remain large from school to school. We use the average test scores for Indonesian language and math to measure the school outcome. The test is administered to the Grade 5 students in surveyed schools, and designed based on the core curriculum requirements. Students generally fair better in language than in math. Language test score also shows smaller standard deviation than math score. Figure 14: Distribution of Indonesian language and math test score a. Indonesian language b. Math .15 .3 .2 .1 Fraction Fraction .1 .05 0 0 0 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80 100 average bahasa score average math schore The results of first step estimates are presented in Table 26. For schools’ direct spending on student activities, in addition to the significant effect of schools’ total budget and total enrollment, the result shows that the amount of spending is significantly affected by the influence of districts or subdistricts. Schools that reported districts/sub- district as ―very influential‖ over schools ―planning and budget allocation‖ allocated more funds directly to support student activities. In addition, schools that send parents information on BOS spending also spend more on their students directly. Schools with a committee chair with at least senior secondary education also tend to spend more on 6 Full results in Annex 2. 18 students. Somewhat consistent with the effect of the district/subdistrict’s influence, schools with more teachers trained at the district level during the previous year also allocate greater spending on students. The district/subdistrict’s influence is also shown in the school’s decision to hire non-civil service teachers. It seems that when there is more influence of districts on schools’ ―professional‖ aspect (i.e., selection of textbooks and other instructional materials), schools are more likely to hire additional non-civil servant teachers. Various school committee-related activities appear to have different effects on teacher hiring. Schools that report student performance to their school committees tend to hire more teachers. In the mean time, more active schools committees - as reflected by more frequently reporting of committee activities to parents; or more school committee meetings with parents and communities - seem to reduce the additional teacher hiring. Controlling for total enrollment, schools with fewer civil-service teachers do tend to hire more non-civil service teachers. This shows that hiring additional teachers does have a compensatory effect, equalizing the student-teacher ratio across schools. One interesting finding is that better teacher management and training is negatively associated with additional teacher hiring. The results in Table 3 show that the share of teachers in schools receiving evaluations from the principal, and the share of teachers receiving training on handling classroom discipline issues and general classroom management, have significant and negative effects on additional teacher hiring. This may reflect a quality-quantity trade-off of teachers. 19 Table 2:1st Step estimates: School decisions and intermediate outcome Expenditure on student Number of non-PNS Teacher attendance teachers rate bk08_as03E T_nonPNS Teacher_attend VARIABLES coef se coef se coef se Top down: Dummy, =1 if very influential district/sub district over planning and 4.201e+06** (2.078e+06) 0.0878 (0.460) 3.702 (3.675) _Ibk05_ao01a4 allocating school's budget Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential district/sub district over determining 1.647e+06 (2.357e+06) -0.336 (0.523) 7.359* (4.175) _Ibk05_ao01c3 the content of teacher professional development Dummy, =1 if very influential district/sub district over determining the -1.128e+06 (2.550e+06) -0.352 (0.566) 9.723** (4.518) _Ibk05_ao01c4 content of teacher professional development Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district over selecting textbooks -2.088e+06 (1.870e+06) 0.592 (0.415) -5.588* (3.312) _Ibk05_ao01d2 and instructional materials Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential district/sub district over selecting -1.340e+06 (1.719e+06) 0.680* (0.381) -2.998 (3.045) _Ibk05_ao01d3 textbooks and instructional materials Dummy, =1 if very influential district/sub district over selecting textbooks -1.403e+06 (2.052e+06) 0.868* (0.456) -6.011* (3.636) _Ibk05_ao01d4 and instructional materials Dummy, =1 if principal have attended a meeting with the district education 4.834e+06 (4.212e+06) 1.961** (0.935) -1.277 (7.462) bk05_ao03x office staff Bottom up: Dummy, =1 if the roles of school committee is to provide inputs in the 2.172e+06 (1.534e+06) -0.254 (0.340) 4.795* (2.718) _Ibk05_ks03a1 allocation of BOS funds Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school -706,430 (1.274e+06) 0.377 (0.283) - (2.256) bk05_pt07A performance 6.539*** Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about use of BOS 2.432e+06* (1.450e+06) 0.00623 (0.321) 0.712 (2.566) bk05_pt07B funds Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school 1.637e+06 (1.488e+06) -0.565* (0.330) 1.829 (2.637) bk05_pt07C committee activities Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on the school's -2.048e+06 (1.357e+06) -0.0605 (0.300) 4.061* (2.396) bk06_ks20A teachers and their performance Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on students and 2.029e+06 (1.770e+06) 0.713* (0.393) -4.641 (3.137) bk06_ks20B their performance age_chair Age of School committee Chairman -27,396 (57,469) -0.0109 (0.0128) 0.207** (0.102) Dummy, =1 if School Committee Chair has education senior secondary or 2.158e+06* (1.227e+06) -0.0288 (0.272) 4.001* (2.172) D_edu_chair above Dummy, =1 if School Committee held meetings with parents and/or -256,234 (1.333e+06) -0.515* (0.296) 3.624 (2.360) bk06_ks08xC community members School characteristics and capacity 0.0141*** (0.00243) 9.13e-10* (5.38e-10) 8.21e- (4.29e- School total budget bk08_as03R 09* 09) 20 Expenditure on student Number of non-PNS Teacher attendance teachers rate bk08_as03E T_nonPNS Teacher_attend VARIABLES coef se coef se coef se D_accredit Dummy, =1 if school is accredited -1.335e+06 (1.207e+06) 0.871*** (0.268) 2.312 (2.135) R_admission Ratio of application / admission -1.672e+06 (1.865e+06) -0.343 (0.414) 2.797 (3.305) T_enroll Total enrollment 38,275*** (6,037) 0.00757*** (0.00134) -0.0151 (0.0107) T_PNS Number of civil servant teachers 215,647 (179,504) -0.170*** (0.0398) 0.213 (0.318) Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from District or sub-district -899,001 (1.201e+06) -0.176 (0.267) 3.522* (2.128) bk05_pc08B education staff bk05_pc08C Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from Private foundations/donors -843,199 (3.343e+06) 1.179 (0.742) -14.25** (5.924) Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for involving parents and -2.383e+06 (1.518e+06) -0.119 (0.337) 6.273** (2.686) bk05_ao04G community members in supporting the school Dfemale Dummy, =1 if school principal is female -1.256e+06 (1.190e+06) -0.546** (0.263) 2.689 (2.101) age Principal’s age -152,927 (116,072) -0.0522** (0.0256) 0.710*** (0.205) bk09_pj03a Share of teachers receiving an oral performance evaluation from principal -21,276 (2.255e+06) -1.070** (0.500) 1.370 (3.995) bk09_pj03b Share of teachers receiving a written performance evaluation from principal 3.341e+06* (1.943e+06) 0.0514 (0.431) -1.043 (3.440) bk09_kg03xA Share of teachers receive training from national government -1.573e+06 (5.332e+06) -0.405 (1.184) 16.64* (9.447) bk09_kg03xB Share of teachers receiving training province government 5.262e+06 (3.418e+06) -0.0174 (0.758) -15.17** (6.047) Share of teachers receiving training from district or subdistrict Education -8.056e+06** (3.318e+06) -0.109 (0.736) -1.566 (5.878) bk09_kg03xC Office Share of teachers receiving training in: Handling classroom management -3.902e+06 (4.124e+06) -2.675*** (0.915) -5.592 (7.306) bk09_kg04A and discipline situations bk09_kg04B Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning lessons more effectively -608,698 (4.981e+06) -0.196 (1.105) 20.46** (8.816) Share of teachers receiving training in: Teaching your subject matter or -1.471e+06 (4.483e+06) 1.650* (0.995) -3.291 (7.938) bk09_kg04D grade level Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning for the allocation of BOS 4.733e+06 (4.499e+06) 0.224 (0.999) 15.51* (7.970) bk09_kg04H funds -1.952e+06 (9.688e+06) 5.305** (2.146) 42.88** (17.12) Constant 383 384 384 Observations R-squared 0.627 0.346 0.287 21 The teacher attendance rate also seems to be significantly affected by how much the district/subdistrict influences the schools. However, the results show that a district’s ―administrative influence‖ (i.e., influence on school planning and budgeting) has a positive effect, while its ―professional influence‖ (i.e., influence on textbook selection) seems to have a negative effect on teachers’ attendance rate. The school committee appears to have a significant effect on teacher attendance. We have found that schools with committees receiving teacher performance reports have significantly higher teacher attendance rates. An experienced and better educated school committee chair is also associated with better teacher attendance7. Table 3 presents the 2nd step estimates of school outcomes8. Predicted values are used to capture the effect of school decisions and intermediate outcomes. The results show that among the school decision and intermediate outcome variables, school spending on student activities, the number of non-civil service teachers, and the teacher attendance rate all have significant effects on math scores, controlling for other school and parent characteristics. In the meantime, only the teacher attendance rate shows a significant effect on language scores. Teacher quality and management stand out as important factors in test scores. Both the share of teachers receiving training from districts or other sources, and the share of teachers receiving performance evaluations from principals have a significant effect on test scores. One result that might be comforting is that the share of certified teachers is highly correlated with higher test scores, for both language and math. This at least shows that the on-going teacher certification process does identify good teachers. The results also shows that whether a school is a national standard school or an international standard school does not matter in terms of learning outcomes measured by test scores, and nor does the accreditation of a school. This may indicate the weakness of one of most important aspects of the school quality assurance system in Indonesia. 7 One puzzling result is that schools that send school performance report to parents seem to have lower teacher attendance. But again, ―school performance‖ is not well defined in the survey. 8 Full results of 2nd step estimates are in Annex 3. 22 Table 3: 2nd step estimates: School outcome Bahasa Indonesian Score Math Score Score_bin score_mth VARIABLES coef se coef se D_standard2 Dummy, =1 if school is of Pilot National Standard -2.793* (1.674) -0.386 (1.289) R_admission Ratio of application / admission 1.773 (1.497) 2.183* (1.151) T_enroll Total enrollment -0.0208** (0.00820) 0.0240*** (0.00630) bk05_kr07 Principal annual Income (Rp) 6.06e-07** (2.56e-07) 3.61e-07* (1.97e-07) Share of teachers receiving a written performance bk09_pj03b 3.028* (1.584) 1.127 (1.218) evaluation from principal Share of teachers receiving training from district or bk09_kg03xC 3.360 (2.682) 3.605* (2.062) subdistrict Education Office bk09_kg03xD Share of teachers receiving training from private foundation 5.258* (3.142) 5.873** (2.423) Share of teachers receiving training in: Assessing the bk09_kg04E 1.563 (3.653) 4.918* (2.819) performance of your students bk09_kr12 Share of teachers certified 6.739** (2.884) 5.276** (2.226) exp_hat Predicted value of school expenditure on students activities 1.91e-07 (1.16e-07) 2.35e-07*** (9.04e-08) nonPNS_hat Predicted value of non-PNS teachers 0.912 (0.616) 0.903* (0.478) T_attend_hat Predicted value of teacher attendance 0.130* (0.0733) 0.113** (0.0564) Dedu_parent Dummy, =1 if parental education at least senior secondary 8.387*** (1.847) 6.258*** (1.419) bk10_kr05 Parental annual income 1.57e-06*** (4.91e-07) 1.07e-07 (3.77e-07) Constant 17.08* (8.842) 4.352 (6.784) Observations 377 377 R-squared 0.425 0.368 23 V. Conclusions The global trend of school-based management follows the principle of decentralized decision-making, putting power in the hands of the frontline providers and parents to improve their schools, aiming at improving education beyond providing more classrooms, more teachers, and more textbooks. The idea behind decentralized decision making and management is that the frontline providers and clients know best what they want, and what goes on in schools and other public service provision facilities. This paper examines the key aspects of the practices of school-based management currently in Indonesia, and its effect on education quality. Using a conceptual framework of an accountability system of public service delivery, this paper explores the relations among parents, school committees, schools, and government education supervisory bodies from three tenets: participation and voice; autonomy; and accountability. The paper’s empirical approach allows a close examination of how these aspects affect school decision-making on key educational inputs, which significantly affect student learning outcomes. Using the data from a nationally representative survey of about 400 public primary schools in Indonesia, the paper finds that the level of parental participation and voice in school management is quite low in Indonesia. While the role of school committees is still limited to community relations, school facilities, and other administrative areas of schools, the school principal, together with teachers, is very much empowered to assert professional control of the school. The most important finding of this paper is that the accountability system is very weak in Indonesia’s school system, which is reflected in inadequate information flow to parents, as well as seemingly low parental awareness of holding schools accountable. The accountability arrangement of the Indonesian school system currently puts more emphasis on top-down supervision and monitoring. Even though the interactions between district or subdistrct education offices and schools are generally frequent, the lack of rewards and sanctions for good or bad performance also leaves the system weak. The empirical work of this paper shows that although the scope of school-based management in Indonesia is limited today, it has begun to help schools make the right decisions on allocation of resources and hiring additional (non-civil servant) teachers, and 24 to create an enabling environment for learning, including increasing the teacher attendance rate. All these aspects are found to have significantly positive effects on student learning outcomes. The results of this paper may also contribute to the rethinking of teacher management reforms in Indonesia. Hiring non-civil servant teachers by schools has been controversial as it is often perceived as inadequate spending and waste of resources given that the overall civil servant teachers are more than sufficient in numbers relative to the total number of students. In the meantime, an increasing number of non-civil service teachers are queuing to become civil service teachers, creating pressure on expanding the size of the civil service. The findings of this paper show that rather than in an ad hoc manner, schools do hire non-civil service teachers in compensation for the smaller numbers (relatively) of civil-service teachers at school. More importantly, non-civil service teachers contribute significantly to student learning. We argue that this contribution may not be because of the total number of teachers per se, as decreasing the student-pupil ratio from 20:1 (without non-civil service teachers) to 15:1 (with civil service teachers) cannot provide a convincing explanation of the improvement of learning outcomes based on a vast amount of international experience. Rather, non-civil service teachers may have very different characteristics from the current civil service teachers: they are generally younger, and many are fresh from college, and with updated knowledge. They may be also more motivated to earn ―job security‖. These hypotheses are yet to be tested. 25 References Abu-Duhou, I. (1999). School-based Management. Fundamentals of Educational Planning 62. Paris: UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning. Anderson, J. A. (2005). Accountability in Education. Education Policy Series. 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World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC: World Bank. 27 ——— (2007a). What Do We Know About School-Based Management? Washington, DC: World Bank. ______ (2007b). What Is School-Based Management? Washington, DC: World Bank. ______ (2009). Decentralized Decisin-Making in Schools: The Theory and Evidence on School-Based Management. Washington, DC. World Bank. 28 Annex 1: Sample Summary Statistics Variable Definition mean s.e. Dependent variables: bk08_as03E School budget allocation to student activities (school decision) 8.970e+06 (9.839e+06) T_nonPNS Total number of non-civil service teachers (school decision) 3.491 (2.284) Teacher_attend Teacher attendance rate (intermediate outcome) 94.93 (16.83) score_Bin Bahasa Indonesian test score (school outcome) 45.48 (9.801) score_mth Math test score (school outcome) 30.38 (6.807) Accountability: top down _Ibk05_ao01_2 Dummy, =1 if little influential the district/sub district over drafting the school's work plan 0.131 (0.337) _Ibk05_ao01_3 Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential 0.475 (0.500) _Ibk05_ao01_4 Dummy, =1 if very influential 0.261 (0.440) _Ibk05_ao01a2 Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district over planning and allocating school's budget 0.172 (0.378) _Ibk05_ao01a3 Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential 0.352 (0.478) _Ibk05_ao01a4 Dummy, =1 if very influential 0.191 (0.393) _Ibk05_ao01b2 Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district over assigning teachers to school 0.0836 (0.277) _Ibk05_ao01b3 Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential 0.324 (0.469) _Ibk05_ao01b4 Dummy, =1 if very influential 0.454 (0.499) _Ibk05_ao01c2 Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district over determining the content of teacher professional development 0.0888 (0.285) _Ibk05_ao01c3 Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential 0.501 (0.501) _Ibk05_ao01c4 Dummy, =1 if very influential 0.319 (0.467) _Ibk05_ao01d2 Dummy, =1 if little influential district/sub district over selecting textbooks and instructional materials 0.185 (0.389) _Ibk05_ao01d3 Dummy, =1 if somewhat influential 0.379 (0.486) _Ibk05_ao01d4 Dummy, =1 if very influential 0.222 (0.416) bk05_ao03x Dummy, =1 if principal have attended a meeting with the district education office staff 0.982 (0.134) Accountability: bottom up: _Ibk05_ks03_1 Dummy, =1 if the roles of school committee is to approve policies and make final decisions about how the school operates 0.770 (0.421) 29 Variable Definition mean s.e. _Ibk05_ks03a1 Dummy, =1 if the roles of school committee is to provide inputs in the allocation of BOS funds 0.846 (0.361) bk05_pt01A Number of times principal received monitoring visit by school Committee member 2.728 (3.645) bk05_pt01B Number of times principal received monitoring visit by district or sub-district education supervisor 5.778 (5.002) bk05_pt07A Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school performance 0.298 (0.458) bk05_pt07B Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about use of BOS funds 0.230 (0.421) bk05_pt07C Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school committee activities 0.225 (0.418) bk05_pt07D Dummy, =1 if school send all parents written information about school and/or student activities 0.517 (0.500) bk05_kt02A Dummy, =1 if there is pressure from parents to improve student performance in this school 0.606 (0.489) D_parent_schlmgmt Whether parents reps are on school management team 0.345 (0.476) D_satisfied_schl Share of parents satisfied or very satisfied on school quality 0.901 (0.152) D_satisfied_teacher Share of parents satisfied or very satisfied on teacher 0.932 (0.120) D_satisfied_mgmt Share parents satisfied or very satisfied on management 0.913 (0.146) D_multiple_schl Share of parents applied multiple schools 0.103 (0.171) bk10_kt01x Share of parents with multiple schools in village 0.276 (0.371) bk06_ks20A Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on the school's teachers and their performance 0.595 (0.491) bk06_ks20B Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on students and their performance 0.804 (0.397) bk06_ks20C Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on school's expenditures 0.640 (0.481) bk06_ks20D Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on curriculum, instruction and academic programs 0.488 (0.501) bk06_ks20E Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on extracurricular activities 0.663 (0.473) bk06_ks20F Dummy, =1 if School Committee received information on school's facilities 0.791 (0.407) age_chair Age of School committee Chairman 49.65 (9.616) D_edu_chair Dummy, =1 if School Committee Chair has education senior secondary or above 0.308 (0.462) bk06_ks08xC Dummy, =1 if School Committee held meetings with parents and/or community members 0.736 (0.441) School characteristics and capacity: bk08_as03R School total budget 2.858e+08 (3.015e+08) 0.0679 (0.252) 0.133 (0.340) 0.00522 (0.0722) 30 Variable Definition mean s.e. D_accredit Dummy, =1 if school is accredited 0.726 (0.447) R_admission Ratio of application / admission 1.103 (0.313) T_enroll Total enrollment 188.2 (133.7) T_PNS Number of civil servant teachers 8.974 (4.944) T_days Number of schools days in school year 2009-2010 239.3 (35.51) T_hours_mth Number of hours of math learning per week for grade 5 5.574 (1.230) T_hours_Bin Number of hours for Indonesian language learning per week for grade 5 for 5.574 (1.280) bk05_kr07 Principal annual Income (Rp) 4.135e+06 (1.837e+06) bk05_kr10a Years of being principal (at this school) 3.901 (3.866) bk05_kr10b Years being principal (at any school, including this school 7.862 (7.429) bk05_kr12 Dummy, =1 if principal is certified 0.522 (0.500) bk05_pc01 Dummy, =1 if school has a management team 0.590 (0.492) bk05_pc08A Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from province education staff in drafting the school work plan 0.209 (0.407) bk05_pc08B Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from District or sub-district education staff 0.645 (0.479) bk05_pc08C Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from Private foundations/donors 0.0261 (0.160) bk05_pc08D Dummy, =1 if school receives assistance from Others 0.117 (0.322) bk05_ao04A Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for developing school vision, mission, and/or goals 0.418 (0.494) bk05_ao04B Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for developing/revising school's work plan 0.501 (0.501) bk05_ao04C Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for guiding the development and evaluation ofthe school's curriculum 0.525 (0.500) bk05_ao04D Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for implement BOS program and use of BOS funds 0.721 (0.449) bk05_ao04E Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for Planning and managing school budgets and finances 0.522 (0.500) bk05_ao04F Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for supervising and evaluating teachers 0.501 (0.501) bk05_ao04G Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for involving parents and community members in supporting the school 0.321 (0.468) bk05_ao04H Dummy, =1 if Principal received training for working with the School Committee 0.462 (0.499) bk05_pt05B Frequency of principal meet with teachers to discuss student performance 4.303 (1.145) Dfemale Dummy, =1 if school principal is female 0.337 (0.473) age Principal’s age 51.08 (5.418) bk09_pj03a Share of teachers receiving an oral performance evaluation from principal 0.635 (0.245) bk09_pj03b Share of teachers receiving a written performance evaluation from principal 0.486 (0.289) bk09_kg03xA Share of teachers receive training from national government 0.0631 (0.109) bk09_kg03xB Share of teachers receiving training province government 0.152 (0.177) bk09_kg03xC Share of teachers receiving training from district or subdistrict Education Office 0.349 (0.263) 31 Variable Definition mean s.e. bk09_kg03xD Share of teachers receiving training from private foundation 0.123 (0.172) bk09_kg03xE Share of teachers receiving training from KKG or MGMP 0.0383 (0.0956) bk09_kg04A Share of teachers receiving training in: Handling classroom management and discipline situations 0.232 (0.208) bk09_kg04B Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning lessons more effectively 0.408 (0.268) bk09_kg04C Share of teachers receiving training in: Using a variety of instructional methods 0.398 (0.274) bk09_kg04D Share of teachers receiving training in: Teaching your subject matter or grade level 0.361 (0.260) bk09_kg04E Share of teachers receiving training in: Assessing the performance of your students 0.336 (0.244) bk09_kg04F Share of teachers receiving training in: Assessing school needs and setting school goals 0.203 (0.192) bk09_kg04G Share of teachers receiving training in: Preparing the school's work plan 0.211 (0.191) bk09_kg04H Share of teachers receiving training in: Planning for the allocation of BOS funds 0.141 (0.157) bk09_kr12 Share of teachers certified 0.134 (0.182) Parental background; Dedu_parent Dummy, =1 if parental education at least senior secondary 0.315 (0.275) bk10_kr05 Parental annual income 1.378e+06 (988,208) Observations 383 32 Annex 2. 1st Step estimates: School decisions and intermediate outcome (full results of Table 2) Expenditure on student Number of non-PNS teachers Teacher attendance rate bk08_as03E T_nonPNS Teacher_attend VARIABLES coef se coef se coef se Top down _Ibk05_ao01_2 787,390 (2.303e+06) 0.332 (0.511) 1.838 (4.078) _Ibk05_ao01_3 -243,974 (2.025e+06) 0.495 (0.450) -3.683 (3.588) _Ibk05_ao01_4 2.025e+06 (2.215e+06) -0.322 (0.491) 1.057 (3.921) _Ibk05_ao01a2 669,106 (1.945e+06) -0.326 (0.431) 1.295 (3.439) _Ibk05_ao01a3 -671,492 (1.771e+06) -0.126 (0.393) 2.251 (3.137) _Ibk05_ao01a4 4.201e+06** (2.078e+06) 0.0878 (0.460) 3.702 (3.675) _Ibk05_ao01b2 642,764 (2.382e+06) -0.159 (0.529) -0.698 (4.219) _Ibk05_ao01b3 1.506e+06 (1.888e+06) -0.00788 (0.419) -0.953 (3.346) _Ibk05_ao01b4 1.254e+06 (1.874e+06) 0.0188 (0.416) -1.636 (3.321) _Ibk05_ao01c2 647,193 (2.757e+06) -0.0428 (0.612) 0.466 (4.885) _Ibk05_ao01c3 1.647e+06 (2.357e+06) -0.336 (0.523) 7.359* (4.175) _Ibk05_ao01c4 -1.128e+06 (2.550e+06) -0.352 (0.566) 9.723** (4.518) _Ibk05_ao01d2 -2.088e+06 (1.870e+06) 0.592 (0.415) -5.588* (3.312) _Ibk05_ao01d3 -1.340e+06 (1.719e+06) 0.680* (0.381) -2.998 (3.045) _Ibk05_ao01d4 -1.403e+06 (2.052e+06) 0.868* (0.456) -6.011* (3.636) bk05_ao03x 4.834e+06 (4.212e+06) 1.961** (0.935) -1.277 (7.462) Bottom up: _Ibk05_ks03_1 524,778 (1.274e+06) -0.124 (0.283) -1.716 (2.255) _Ibk05_ks03a1 2.172e+06 (1.534e+06) -0.254 (0.340) 4.795* (2.718) bk05_pt01A 964.9 (160,086) 0.0441 (0.0355) -0.255 (0.284) bk05_pt01B -13,367 (109,077) -0.0321 (0.0242) 0.291 (0.193) bk05_pt07A -706,430 (1.274e+06) 0.377 (0.283) -6.539*** (2.256) bk05_pt07B 2.432e+06* (1.450e+06) 0.00623 (0.321) 0.712 (2.566) bk05_pt07C 1.637e+06 (1.488e+06) -0.565* (0.330) 1.829 (2.637) bk05_pt07D 430,782 (1.195e+06) 0.0874 (0.265) -1.919 (2.116) bk05_kt02A -22,930 (1.186e+06) 0.273 (0.263) 3.165 (2.102) D_parent_schlmgmt -1.176e+06 (1.450e+06) -0.0781 (0.322) -1.970 (2.569) D_satisfied_schl 6.999e+06 (5.510e+06) 1.589 (1.220) -15.21 (9.734) D_satisfied_teacher -3.527e+06 (6.643e+06) -1.267 (1.466) -8.321 (11.70) D_satisfied_mgmt -328,801 (4.930e+06) 0.413 (1.082) 8.663 (8.638) D_multiple_schl 587,110 (3.319e+06) -0.776 (0.737) -6.763 (5.881) bk10_kt01x 552,902 (1.584e+06) 0.0413 (0.351) -2.860 (2.805) bk06_ks20A -2.048e+06 (1.357e+06) -0.0605 (0.300) 4.061* (2.396) bk06_ks20B 2.029e+06 (1.770e+06) 0.713* (0.393) -4.641 (3.137) bk06_ks20C -1.175e+06 (1.285e+06) 0.151 (0.285) -2.067 (2.274) bk06_ks20D 442,438 (1.301e+06) -0.177 (0.288) 0.148 (2.301) bk06_ks20E 301,364 (1.516e+06) -0.00272 (0.333) 0.232 (2.658) bk06_ks20F 454,486 (1.751e+06) 0.231 (0.385) -2.556 (3.071) age_chair -27,396 (57,469) -0.0109 (0.0128) 0.207** (0.102) D_edu_chair 2.158e+06* (1.227e+06) -0.0288 (0.272) 4.001* (2.172) bk06_ks08xC -256,234 (1.333e+06) -0.515* (0.296) 3.624 (2.360) School characteristics and capacity: bk08_as03R 0.0141*** (0.00243) 9.13e-10* (5.38e-10) 8.21e-09* (4.29e-09) D_standard2 -631,119 (2.082e+06) -0.256 (0.454) 2.243 (3.625) D_standard3 1.778e+06 (1.627e+06) 0.0206 (0.361) 4.234 (2.882) 33 Expenditure on student Number of non-PNS teachers Teacher attendance rate bk08_as03E T_nonPNS Teacher_attend VARIABLES coef se coef se coef se D_standard4 8.393e+06 (7.523e+06) 2.012 (1.670) 9.017 (13.33) D_accredit -1.335e+06 (1.207e+06) 0.871*** (0.268) 2.312 (2.135) R_admission -1.672e+06 (1.865e+06) -0.343 (0.414) 2.797 (3.305) T_enroll 38,275*** (6,037) 0.00757*** (0.00134) -0.0151 (0.0107) T_PNS 215,647 (179,504) -0.170*** (0.0398) 0.213 (0.318) T_days 14,414 (16,341) -0.00536 (0.00363) 0.0360 (0.0290) T_hours_mth -662,914 (756,504) 0.178 (0.168) -0.554 (1.340) T_hours_Bin -37,975 (720,110) -0.0545 (0.160) 0.00336 (1.275) bk05_kr07 -0.254 (0.321) -1.06e-07 (7.13e-08) 2.80e-07 (5.69e-07) bk05_kr10a 185,117 (171,412) 0.0211 (0.0380) -0.110 (0.303) bk05_kr10b -135,374 (91,996) -0.00309 (0.0204) -0.117 (0.163) bk05_kr12 1.550e+06 (1.182e+06) 0.113 (0.262) 1.901 (2.092) bk05_pc01 -294,679 (1.411e+06) 0.342 (0.313) -0.711 (2.500) bk05_pc08A 1.208e+06 (1.386e+06) 0.171 (0.307) -2.395 (2.452) bk05_pc08B -899,001 (1.201e+06) -0.176 (0.267) 3.522* (2.128) bk05_pc08C -843,199 (3.343e+06) 1.179 (0.742) -14.25** (5.924) bk05_pc08D -877,643 (1.648e+06) 0.161 (0.364) -2.593 (2.905) bk05_ao04A -1.363e+06 (1.248e+06) -0.257 (0.277) 1.305 (2.209) bk05_ao04B 1.020e+06 (1.280e+06) 0.184 (0.284) -0.527 (2.267) bk05_ao04C 1.404e+06 (1.449e+06) 0.178 (0.321) -2.476 (2.564) bk05_ao04D -2.033e+06 (1.507e+06) -0.117 (0.335) -0.375 (2.671) bk05_ao04E 895,680 (1.437e+06) -0.156 (0.318) -0.880 (2.540) bk05_ao04F -403,219 (1.321e+06) 0.145 (0.293) -1.318 (2.339) bk05_ao04G -2.383e+06 (1.518e+06) -0.119 (0.337) 6.273** (2.686) bk05_ao04H 841,446 (1.405e+06) 0.168 (0.311) -2.637 (2.482) bk05_pt05B -56,911 (482,502) -0.0798 (0.107) 0.582 (0.855) Dfemale -1.256e+06 (1.190e+06) -0.546** (0.263) 2.689 (2.101) age -152,927 (116,072) -0.0522** (0.0256) 0.710*** (0.205) bk09_pj03a -21,276 (2.255e+06) -1.070** (0.500) 1.370 (3.995) bk09_pj03b 3.341e+06* (1.943e+06) 0.0514 (0.431) -1.043 (3.440) bk09_kg03xA -1.573e+06 (5.332e+06) -0.405 (1.184) 16.64* (9.447) bk09_kg03xB 5.262e+06 (3.418e+06) -0.0174 (0.758) -15.17** (6.047) bk09_kg03xC -8.056e+06** (3.318e+06) -0.109 (0.736) -1.566 (5.878) bk09_kg03xD -4.497e+06 (3.939e+06) -0.159 (0.873) 1.216 (6.971) bk09_kg03xE 7.402e+06 (6.085e+06) -0.206 (1.350) -6.187 (10.78) bk09_kg04A -3.902e+06 (4.124e+06) -2.675*** (0.915) -5.592 (7.306) bk09_kg04B -608,698 (4.981e+06) -0.196 (1.105) 20.46** (8.816) bk09_kg04C 4.044e+06 (4.796e+06) -0.0553 (1.065) -9.113 (8.497) bk09_kg04D -1.471e+06 (4.483e+06) 1.650* (0.995) -3.291 (7.938) bk09_kg04E -2.005e+06 (4.576e+06) -0.548 (1.016) 1.433 (8.107) bk09_kg04F 1.134e+06 (4.660e+06) 0.256 (1.034) 1.337 (8.254) bk09_kg04G 4.753e+06 (4.579e+06) 0.975 (1.017) -7.142 (8.113) bk09_kg04H 4.733e+06 (4.499e+06) 0.224 (0.999) 15.51* (7.970) bk09_kr12 3.019e+06 (3.349e+06) 0.254 (0.743) -5.410 (5.929) Constant -1.952e+06 (9.688e+06) 5.305** (2.146) 42.88** (17.12) Observations 383 384 384 R-squared 0.627 0.346 0.287 34 Annex 3: 2nd step estimates: School outcome (full results of Table 3) Bahasa Indonesian Score Math Score Score_bin score_mth VARIABLES coef se coef se unitbudget 1.41e-07 (1.35e-07) -5.12e-08 (1.04e-07) D_standard2 -2.793* (1.674) -0.386 (1.289) D_standard3 -1.699 (1.276) -1.540 (0.981) D_standard4 -5.524 (6.161) -5.062 (4.729) D_accredit -1.110 (1.107) -1.135 (0.852) R_admission 1.773 (1.497) 2.183* (1.151) T_enroll -0.0208** (0.00820) 0.0240*** (0.00630) T_PNS 0.255 (0.189) 0.0529 (0.148) T_days 0.000524 (0.0126) -0.00439 (0.00974) T_hours_mth 0.329 (0.283) T_hours_Bin -0.460 (0.344) bk05_kr07 6.06e-07** (2.56e-07) 3.61e-07* (1.97e-07) bk05_kr10a -0.0522 (0.131) 0.162 (0.100) bk05_kr10b 0.00402 (0.0730) -0.0457 (0.0561) bk05_kr12 0.413 (0.983) -0.105 (0.755) bk05_pc01 0.802 (0.879) -0.293 (0.679) bk05_pc08A -1.361 (1.114) -0.797 (0.858) bk05_pc08B 0.314 (0.996) -0.774 (0.765) bk05_pc08C -2.952 (2.765) -2.002 (2.128) bk05_pc08D 1.263 (1.275) -1.046 (0.981) bk05_ao04A -1.005 (1.005) 0.340 (0.773) bk05_ao04B 1.659 (1.012) 0.256 (0.781) bk05_ao04C -0.447 (1.132) 0.172 (0.867) bk05_ao04D 0.264 (1.166) 0.609 (0.898) bk05_ao04E -0.800 (1.150) 0.932 (0.882) bk05_ao04F 0.445 (1.031) -0.181 (0.793) bk05_ao04G -1.914 (1.271) -1.245 (0.977) bk05_ao04H 0.412 (1.137) -0.268 (0.874) bk05_pt05B 0.270 (0.378) -0.0357 (0.291) Dfemale 0.752 (0.969) 1.156 (0.747) age 0.0321 (0.105) 0.0849 (0.0806) bk09_pj03a -1.536 (1.867) 1.115 (1.435) bk09_pj03b 3.028* (1.584) 1.127 (1.218) bk09_kg03xA 2.693 (4.312) 4.482 (3.316) bk09_kg03xB -0.883 (3.014) 0.474 (2.317) bk09_kg03xC 3.360 (2.682) 3.605* (2.062) bk09_kg03xD 5.258* (3.142) 5.873** (2.423) bk09_kg03xE 7.926 (5.597) 2.963 (4.307) bk09_kg04A 3.844 (3.650) 2.107 (2.804) bk09_kg04B 4.328 (4.106) 1.093 (3.157) bk09_kg04C 1.503 (3.812) -0.985 (2.933) bk09_kg04D -4.693 (3.529) -2.666 (2.713) bk09_kg04E 1.563 (3.653) 4.918* (2.819) bk09_kg04F -1.062 (3.678) -2.848 (2.840) bk09_kg04G -5.829 (3.778) -2.912 (2.905) bk09_kg04H -0.861 (3.685) -2.497 (2.833) bk09_kr12 6.739** (2.884) 5.276** (2.226) exp_hat 1.91e-07 (1.16e-07) 2.35e-07*** (9.04e-08) nonPNS_hat 0.912 (0.616) 0.903* (0.478) T_attend_hat 0.130* (0.0733) 0.113** (0.0564) Dedu_parent 8.387*** (1.847) 6.258*** (1.419) bk10_kr05 1.57e-06*** (4.91e-07) 1.07e-07 (3.77e-07) Constant 17.08* (8.842) 4.352 (6.784) Observations 377 377 R-squared 0.425 0.368 35