SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT Institutions Global Department © 2025 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information, or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. 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Further permission required for reuse. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; Fax: 202-522-2625; E-mail: pubrights@ worldbank.org. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT A verified reproducibility package for this publication is available at http://reproducibility.worldbank.org, click here for direct access. Institutions Global Department A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abbreviations 7 Acknowledgments  9 Executive Summary 10 1. Introduction 16 2. Findings from Data Collection  19 2.1. South Sudan has a Dual Justice System and most South Sudanese use Customary Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution 20 a. By Law, Statutory and Customary Courts Operate in Parallel in Terms of Jurisdiction, Except for Criminal Cases 21 b. In Practice, Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Customary Courts’ Jurisdictional Rules Complicate their Application 25 2.2. Statutory Courts are Perceived to be Inaccessible 28 a. Access to Justice for the Poor 29 b. Access to Justice for Women 31 c. Access to Justice for Persons Facing Linguistic Barriers 33 d. Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities 34 f. Access to Legal Information 34 g. Quality of Judgments 36 2.3. Statutory Courts are Perceived to be Inefficient 39 a. Delays 47 b. Costs 52 3. Policy Implications 55 3.1. Building Mutually Beneficial and Reinforcing Linkages Between Statutory and Customary Justice 57 3.2. Strengthening Judicial Independence and Accountability  60 SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 5 3.3. Making Courts more Affordable and Accessible  61 a. Increase Geographical Accessibility of the Courts  61 b. Improve Affordability of Justice Services  62 c. Strengthen Access to Justice for Women  63 d. Ensure Access to Legal Information and Promote Legal Awareness  64 3.4. Enhancing Judicial Efficiency and Reducing Delays  66 a. Standardize and Streamline Court Processes  66 b. Improve Courtroom Infrastructure and Equipment  67 c. Address Staffing Shortages  68 Annex A. JUPITER Methodology and its Application to South Sudan  70 A.1. JUPITER Methodology  70 a. Questionnaire Design  70 b. Data Sources and Data Collection Process  72 c. Variables Categories  74 d. Variables Description  75 e. Data Management and Review  83 A.2. Application to South Sudan  84 a. Background research  84 b. Questionnaire Design and Identification of Stakeholders  85 c. Data Sources  86 Annex B – Data for South Sudan  89 B.1. Access to Justice Pillar  89 B.2. Efficiency Pillar  101 B.3. Quality Pillar  104 Bibliography  109 A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 6 FIGURES Figure ES1. Justice in South Sudan: Key Numbers 13 Figure 1. Hierarchy of the Statutory Courts in South Sudan 21 Figure 2. Structure of the Chieftainships 23 Figure 3. Hierarchy of Customary Courts in South Sudan 24 Figure 4. Judges Per Capita Per Region in South Sudan 28 Figure 5. Delays and Costs are Identified as Main Challenges in Accessing Statutory Courts 39 Figure 6. Distribution of Judges Per Staffing Level  41 Figure 7. Judiciary Share of Total Budget Compared with Other Sectors 44 Figure 8. Percentage Annual Budget Execution Rates by Midyear for Selected Agencies  45 Figure 9. South Sudan’s Judicial Budget is Lower Than in Other Economies in the Region (FY2020) 46 Figure 10. Main Causes of Delays as Identified by Court Users 47 Figure 11. The Supreme Court Saw a Steep Decline in Clearance Rates 49 Figure 12. Clearance Rates Are Higher in Lower Instance Courts 50 Figure 13. Clearance Rates in South Sudan are Significantly Lower than in Countries in the Region 51 Figure 14. Court Fees in South Sudan Tend to be Higher than in Other Countries in the Region 52 Figure 15. Attorney Fees in South Sudan are Lower than in Countries in the Region 54 TABLES Table 1. Preference for Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Criminal Cases (Percentages)  26 Table 2. Comparison of Judicial Base Pay with General Public Service Pay  43 SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 7 ABBREVIATIONS ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index CMG Community Mediation Groups CMIS Case Management Information System CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CSO Civil Society Organization FCS Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings FCV Fragility, Conflict, and Violence FIDA Federation of Women Lawyers of South Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan ICT Information and Communication Technologies IDP Internally Displaced Persons JCC Justice and Confidence Centers JRC Judicial Reform Committee JSC Judicial Service Commission JUPITER Justice Pillars Towards Evidence-based Reform MGCSW Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare of South Sudan MoFP Ministry of Finance and Planning of South Sudan MoJCA Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs of South Sudan NCAC National Constitutional Amendment Committee NGO Non-Governmental Organization R-ARCSS Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan RRA Risk and Resilience Assessment RJMEC Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission SGBV Sexual and Gender-based Violence SSBA South Sudan Bar Association SSLRC South Sudan Law Review Commission SSLS South Sudan Law Society TCRSS Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan WBG World Bank Group A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 8 SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 9 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study was developed under the Justice Pillars Towards Evidence-based Reform (JUPITER) Initiative by a team led by Erica Bosio (Senior Public Sector Specialist, Institutions Global Department) and Virginia Upegui Caro (Analyst, Institutions Global Department), main authors of the study. Extensive on-the-ground support and inputs were provided by David Santos Ruano (Senior Public Sector Specialist, South Sudan Country Team). Excellent research, data collection, and inputs were provided by Richard Odokomit Okot (Consultant) and Suren Chandra Tripathi (Young Professional). Additional support in the country office was provided by Akwero Lilyrose Mathew Mariano (Consultant). Reviewers of the study included Benjamin Ndazi Mtesigwa (Senior Governance Specialist), Charles Andrew Undeland (Country Manager for South Sudan), and Runyararo Gladys Senderayi (Senior Public Sector Specialist). Arturo Herrera Gutierrez (Global Director, Institutions Global Department), Manuel Antonio Vargas Madrigal, and Roby Senderowitsch (both Practice Managers) provided overall guidance on the study. Additional review and comments were provided by Adrienne Hathaway-Nuton (Senior Governance Specialist), Reinhard R. Haslinger (Senior Operations Officer), Samuel Ruben Alexander Garoni (Governance Specialist), and Katherine Elizabeth Wolff Siess (Consultant). Richard Crabbe (Consultant) provided editorial services and Na Kyoung Kang (Consultant) provided design services. The authors wish to thank representatives of the Judiciary of South Sudan, including Justices and Judges from the Supreme Court of South Sudan, the Court of Appeal of Upper Nile, the Court of Appeal of Greater Equatoria, the Chief Registrar, the Director for Human Resources, the Director General of Finance, and the clerks from the different court offices in Juba; the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA), including the Undersecretary of Justice, the Director for Legislation, Gazette, Publication and Printing, the Director for Contracts, Conventions, Treaties, and Legal Aid, the Acting Chief Registrar for the Directorate of Business Registrations, the Director for Training and Research, and the Counsel General of the Directorate of Civil Litigation and Legal Opinion; members of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC); the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC); the Judicial Reform Committee (JRC); the South Sudan Law Review Commission (SSLRC); the South Sudan Bar Association (SSBA); the South Sudan Law Society (SSLS); the Federation of Women Lawyers of South Sudan (FIDA); and Berberi’s Academy for Training and Learning. The authors also benefited from discussions with members of the Rule of Law Focal Points Network of South Sudan and key development partners, including the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL), and the Max Planck Foundation. Finally, this research would not have been possible without the support of hundreds of lawyers and court users who had afforded us their time to answer the JUPITER questionnaire. This study was made possible by the State and Peacebuilding Umbrella Progam 2.0 (SPF2.0) and by the Governance and Institutions Umbrella Program (G&I). The SPF2.0 is a global multi-donor fund administered by the World Bank that works with partners to address the drivers and impacts of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) and strengthen the resilience of countries and affected populations, communities, and institutions. The SPF2.0 is kindly supported by Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. G&I is a multi-donor trust fund established in 2022 with the generous support of the Chandler Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation. Since then, the UK Government’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), the European Union, the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), the Federal Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Austria, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) have also joined the program. To learn more, please visit www.worldbank.org/giup. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 10 ES. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The weak justice system in South Sudan is widely JUPITER uses qualitative and quantitative data to acknowledged as a primary driver of the country’s evaluate both de jure and de facto justice delivery fragility, as periods of war, internal conflict, and metrics, identifying gaps in the legal framework limited institutional resources have hindered and its implementation and creating comparable its effectiveness. This study arises from the metrics to benchmark against similar indicators and Government of South Sudan’s (GoSS) aspiration to other economies. The study focuses on the system’s enhance justice delivery for its citizens through a effectiveness in service delivery across three areas: practical, data-informed sequence of reforms and Access to Justice, Efficiency, and Quality. JUPITER capacity development actions. This report assesses aims to identify strengths and areas of improvement the state and performance of the justice system of in these key areas, serving as a basis for policy South Sudan through the JUPITER methodology. dialogue. Main Findings South Sudan has a dual legal system where personal, family, and customary land matters. customary laws and authorities are integrated into Customary courts do not have jurisdiction over the statutory justice system, each governed by criminal cases unless referred by a statutory court their respective jurisdictional rules. The statutory when there is a “customary interface.” This interface system, regulated by the Transitional Constitution has been difficult to interpret, and most disputes, of the Republic of South Sudan of 2011 (TCRSS) regardless of their subject matter, are handled by and the Judiciary Act of 2008, establishes county the customary system. courts in each county, one High Court in each of the ten states, three Courts of Appeal circuits at the Within this framework, the empirical analysis in this regional level, and a Supreme Court with national report yields three main findings that shed light on jurisdiction. The customary courts, managed by the path forward for the delivery of justice services traditional authorities and governed by the Local in South Sudan. These findings are documented Government Act of 2009, also have a hierarchy of using a large body of evidence collected in the appeals and are connected to the statutory courts process of developing this study, as well as through appeals from the highest customary court empirical evidence from several other studies on to the statutory county court of first grade. Statutory the justice system in South Sudan. Altogether, data courts handle all types of disputes, while customary from 10,839 interviews with users conducted over courts are traditionally limited to disputes involving 15 years support the analysis.1 1. The team conducted a comprehensive literature review of previous studies on the justice sector in South Sudan. These studies were used to complement the data collected for this study and to support some of the findings. Specific references are provided for each study from which data was extracted, including details on the number of people surveyed, the organization that conducted the study, and the publication reference. Additional details on the specific studies can be found in Annex A on the Methodology. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 11 A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 12 First, around 80 percent of civil and criminal cases their sustainability has largely depended on donor in South Sudan are resolved through customary funding. mechanisms. People prefer them due to their ease of access –both geographically and socioeconomically Despite legal provisions recognizing their equal – efficient proceedings, and the community’s trust standing in court proceedings, women tend to and familiarity with customary rules. Also, years face more barriers than men in accessing justice of conflict and difficulties in developing judicial in practice. Systemic issues such as financial infrastructure outside of Juba have hindered the constraints, social stigma, and a lack of knowledge establishment of statutory courts in rural areas, about their rights hinder their ability to effectively where customary and traditional authorities engage with the justice system. These challenges have prevailed. Customary justice actors provide are more pronounced for rural women, whose accessible and culturally attuned dispute resolution forum choices are often limited to the customary mechanisms at the local level. Engaging customary system, which is frequently seen as unfair to actors is important for justice sector interventions women. However, enhancing women’s participation to impact the highest number of citizens. However, in customary justice mechanisms has shown recognizing the possible risks and challenges promise. In counties like Torit and Wau, women’s associated with engaging with customary actors involvement in decision-making as Chiefs has led is important to address potential harmful and to more inclusive outcomes. This positive change discriminatory practices against minority and could also be extended to the statutory system, vulnerable groups. where women are underrepresented, holding only 24 percent of judicial positions. Therefore, Second, courts in South Sudan are largely the establishment of a specialized Sexual and inaccessible to the majority of citizens due to long Gender-based Violence (SGBV) Court in Juba is a distances to the nearest court and high costs. Data positive step toward addressing women’s specific collected during this study shows a general absence justice needs, which could eventually be expanded of formal justice institutions at the state level, in the future to areas outside of Juba to improve especially in rural areas. Many highly populated geographical accessibility. states outside of Central Equatoria, where the capital city of Juba is located, are underserved by Access to court services is also impacted by the statutory system. For instance, Unity State, limited access to legal information. Some laws with over one million residents, has no judges are available on the website of the Ministry of operating in the state. Warrap State has only four Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA), and judges for more than 2.5 million people, meaning the Supreme Court has begun recording some each judge serves about 527,897 people. Similarly, judgments. However, the overall lack of publicly Jonglei State has three judges for around one available and updated legal information can million residents, with each judge serving about undermine the transparency of the legal framework 515,603 people. The GoSS, in collaboration with and people’s knowledge about their rights. civil society organizations (CSOs), has made efforts to close the geographical gap in access to justice, Third, courts in South Sudan are characterized including the deployment of mobile courts and the by long resolution times. Most court users establishment of community dispute resolution interviewed during the study identified delays as centers. While these initiatives have increased the primary challenge in their interactions with the access to justice in the communities they serve, judicial system. This is especially the case at the SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 13 Supreme Court, where clearance rates dropped remain comparable to those of other high courts from 59 percent in 2021 to 14 percent in 2023, and in the region like Rwanda (68 percent) and Uganda a case takes on average six years to be resolved (75 percent). Meanwhile, the Juba County Court (Figure ES1). Lower courts perform significantly has shown a slight improvement in clearance rates, better. Even though clearance rates at the High increasing from 20 percent in 2021 to 25 percent Court of Central Equatoria State decreased from in 2023, though cases still take an average of three 80 percent in 2022 to 69 percent in 2023, these years to be resolved, which is longer than other primary courts in neighboring countries. >>> Figure ES1: Justice in South Sudan: Key Numbers Access Quality • 1 State (Unity) and 2 Administrative Areas (Ruweng and Pibor) do not • 0.11% of government expenditure have statutory courts was spent on courts in 2020, much lower than the regional average of • 25% of the claim value is paid by 1.72% users on average on court and attorney fees • 9% is what a Supreme Court Justice makes compared to a University • 24% of judges in South Sudan are Lecturer's wage female Justice in South Sudan Key numbers Efficiency Interaction with customary justice • 46% of court users interviewed identified delays as the main • 80% of disputes are estimated to be challenge in accessing justice resolved in the customary system • 6 years was the average resolution • 87% of people hold land based on time at the Supreme Court in 2023 customary tenure • 69% was the clearance rate at the High Court of Central Equatoria in 2023, making it the most efficient A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 14 These delays are mainly due to operational A key cross-cutting issue that emerged during inefficiencies. The current court infrastructure is data collection is the judiciary’s struggle to overwhelmed, with a low ratio of rooms to judges maintain independence, which hampers its and generally overcrowded courtrooms. Many court effectiveness in delivering justice and addressing offices lack essential equipment like computers, unethical practices. Crucial safeguards, such as printers, and stationery, and frequent power the independent appointment and removal of outages disrupt daily operations. Additionally, judges, security of tenure, and financial autonomy, courts in South Sudan lack a standardized case are insufficiently addressed by the current management system, sometimes leading to legal framework. For instance, the process for unreliable and inefficient registry processes. Court appointing judges often bypasses the Judicial users interviewed frequently reported issues Service Commission (JSC) and lacks transparency. related to inadequate file management, with Ambiguities in the rules regulating the removal of documents often lost or damaged, forcing them to judges have led to their dismissal without proper restart their processes altogether. disciplinary procedures. In terms of costs, justice seekers in South Sudan Additionally, the judiciary is underfunded, resulting face high court fees, attorney fees, and unofficial in significantly lower salaries for judges compared payments. The MoJCA has made efforts to provide to other civil servants. Inefficiencies in the justice legal aid in criminal cases, but there is currently system allow actors who engage in informal no comprehensive and structured government payments and unethical behaviors to act with framework for the provision of legal assistance. As impunity, as reflected by the prevalence of such a result, many individuals facing socioeconomic practices in the country. barriers receive limited support, relying primarily on local CSOs. Policy Implications Four policy implications follow from the main findings and challenges presented above. These policy implications align with current budgetary constraints, and focus on the need for proper sequencing, feasibility, and sustainability. They are designed to support the GoSS in its ongoing efforts to reform the justice system in the country. 1. Building mutually beneficial and reinforcing improving the effectiveness and operations linkages between statutory and customary of customary courts, ensuring more equitable justice: Customary justice is an essential part and transparent processes. Potential steps of dispute resolution in South Sudan and the to enhance these linkages and promote fairer most widely used mechanism for most citizens. processes within customary courts include: (i) Fostering stronger collaboration between the clarifying jurisdictional ambiguities in criminal two systems can enhance access to justice while cases and land disputes over demarcated land SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 15 and establishing clear guidelines and criteria mechanisms; (iv) establishing a coordination for referrals; (ii) collecting data on the volume framework with current legal aid providers; and types of disputes that are resolved through (v) broadening the market for legal services each system; (iii) considering strategies to to include paralegals; (vi) promoting gender- ensure the customary system’s compliance sensitive approaches to access to justice and with international and domestic human rights women’s equal participation in judicial decision- standards; and (iv) developing rules of conduct making; (vii) harmonizing the legal framework for customary justice actors and minimum to address conflicts and inconsistencies in standards for rights protection. the laws; (viii) ensuring public access to legal information by creating a regularly updated 2. Strengthening Judicial Independence and database of laws, regulations, and Supreme Accountability: While judicial independence Court decisions; and (ix) promoting legal is recognized in the TCRSS and the Revitalized awareness through communication campaigns Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in and outreach programs. South Sudan (R-ARCSS), there are aspects of the legal framework and its application that could 4. Enhancing Judicial Efficiency and Reducing be reviewed to provide stronger guarantees Delays: Most South Sudanese interviewed for the independence of the judiciary. These in this study identified delays as the primary include the rules related to the appointment challenge in their interactions with the courts. and removal of judges and strengthening the This issue can be addressed through short- and JSC’s role in the discipline and general oversight medium-term strategies, tailored to available of the judiciary. Raising awareness among court resources. In the short term, the judiciary can users about judicial accountability mechanisms start by standardizing and simplifying case can help to build public trust in the justice management and filing processes, which does system and serve to complement these efforts. not require a significant upfront investment. This effort will lay the foundation for developing 3. Making Courts More Affordable and a digitalized and automated case management Accessible: Courts in South Sudan are largely and filing system. In the medium term, the inaccessible to citizens, particularly outside of judiciary can consider investing in improved Juba, with barriers such as high costs, limited court infrastructure, new equipment, and legal aid, and a lack of updated legal information, additional personnel. all of which disproportionately affect women. Based on experience from other countries with similar challenges, these barriers could be addressed by: (i) deploying mobile courts to reach remote areas and implementing a phased infrastructure expansion program to build court facilities in underserved areas; (ii) establishing a uniform fee schedule that is publicly available to avoid arbitrary charges; (iii) expanding legal aid services beyond criminal cases by developing a legal aid policy with clear eligibility criteria, responsibilities of providers, and oversight A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 16 INTRODUCTION 1. INTRODUCTION South Sudan is navigating a transformative phase. There is urgency for reform in South Sudan, as the Following the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018, the weakness of the justice system has been highlighted country has embarked on implementing structural as a primary driver of the country’s fragility.3 South institutional reforms and is drafting its permanent Sudan’s history has been marked by periods of war, constitution. As South Sudan progresses through internal conflict, and power struggles, along with this period of transformation, establishing a robust macroeconomic pressures and limited institutional and independent judiciary is crucial for reinforcing resources. These factors have presented challenges rule-based governance, ensuring the separation of to establishing an effective judicial system, resulting powers, and creating pathways for peaceful conflict in chronic understaffing, poor infrastructure, limited resolution. The World Bank Group’s (WBG) Strategy reach outside the capital, political interference, for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence supports this and prevalent corruption.4 In parallel, customary vision, recognizing that resilient justice institutions justice mechanisms, which most South Sudanese transform the dynamics of fragility and conflict.2 use to resolve disputes, have been a source of 2. World Bank Group. 2020b. World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 3. World Bank Group. 2021b. South Sudan Risk and Resilience Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 4. Supra World Bank Group, 2021b, page 21. See also: Deng, D.K. 2021. South Sudan: Justice Landscape Assessment. Juba: Transitional Justice Working Group – South Sudan. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 17 INTRODUCTION resilience, particularly in rural areas where statutory (2) Efficiency, and (3) Quality. JUPITER aims to institutions have yet to be established.5 identify strengths and areas of improvement in key areas, serving as a basis for policy dialogue among Against this backdrop, the GoSS has an opportunity the GoSS, the Judiciary, the WBG, development to create an effective, inclusive, and independent partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the judiciary for South Sudanese citizens. The R-ARCSS justice sector. JUPITER’s standardized approach requires the GoSS to conduct key reforms during allows to benchmark South Sudan’s performance the transitional period, including reviewing judicial against other countries and similar indicators, and legislation, strengthening justice institutions, its successive application enables tracking and improving court infrastructure, reconstituting monitoring the impact of judicial reforms over time. the JSC, and establishing a Constitutional Court. However, the latest report from the Reconstituted This report used data from various sources to Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission ground its findings and policy implications. The (RJMEC), the body responsible for overseeing the team prepopulated the JUPITER data collection agreement’s implementation, highlights the need tool with information on relevant laws and policies to accelerate these critical reforms to reinforce the related to the justice system. To understand country’s stability.6 In September 2024, the Parties how these laws are applied in practice, the team to the R-ARCSS agreed to extend the transitional conducted interviews with officials and technical period by two years to allow the implementation of teams from key institutions, including the Judiciary outstanding tasks, including preparing for general of South Sudan and the MoJCA, which provide elections in December 2026.7 justice services; Judicial Reform Committee (JRC), National Constitutional Amendment Committee This report aims to provide evidence-based insights (NCAC), and South Sudan Law Review Commission and policy implications to support dialogue on (SSLRC), which focus on legal and constitutional how to enhance the independence, efficiency, and reform; RJMEC, which monitors the implementation accessibility of the justice system in South Sudan. It of the R-ARCSS; and international and civil society also supports the development of analytics under the organizations working in justice and rule of law, like WBG’s South Sudan Country Engagement strategy, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which focuses on building a solid foundation for South Sudan Law Society (SSLS), Federation of institutional development, and ongoing engagement Women Lawyers of South Sudan (FIDA), and the Max under the South Sudan Programmatic Governance Planck Foundation. Additionally, the team organized and Public Financial Management Technical a focus group discussion with advocates of the Assistance project (P180797).8 South Sudan Bar Association (SSBA) and surveyed court users in selected courts in Juba to gather their Using the JUPITER methodology, this report perceptions of the justice system, the challenges benchmarks the effectiveness of South Sudan’s they face, and the areas for improvement in judicial justice system in three areas: (1) Access to Justice, service delivery. 5. Supra World Bank Group, 2021b, page 24. 6. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). 2022. Evaluation Report on the Status of Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Juba, South Sudan. 7. RJMEC. 2024. “Statement by H.E. Amb. Maj Gen (rtd) Charles Tai Gituai, Interim Chairperson of RJMEC, 3rd Extraordinary RJMEC Meeting, 18 September 2024.” Juba, South Sudan. 8. World Bank Group. 2021a. Country Engagement Note for South Sudan for the Period FY21–FY23. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 18 INTRODUCTION The team also gathered administrative data from The study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the Court Registrar, the Supreme Court, the Court the main findings based on empirical and historical of Appeals of Greater Equatoria, the High Court evidence. Section 3 outlines various policy options of Central Equatoria, Juba County Court, and the for decision-makers to support access to justice in MoJCA. This included court locations, staffing South Sudan. Annex A provides a detailed overview information, caseload data, and financial reports. of the JUPITER methodology and its application The team complemented the data collected during to South Sudan, including a list of persons who this study with reports, studies, and data from other were interviewed for the assessment. Annex B institutions. Altogether, the data gathered during includes the questionnaire and the median coded this assessment, along with data from several responses from all respondents consulted by the previous studies referenced in this report, provide team in South Sudan. solid empirical evidence, including information from 10,839 interviews with users conducted over a span of 15 years – see Annex A for details on the methodology. Collecting data in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCS) is always challenging, as data is scarce, often unreliable, and usually not collected in a systematized way. In South Sudan, numerous challenges persist in collecting and standardizing court administrative information and other relevant data on the justice system, such as the exact location and number of courts, and the number of cases received and disposed. The JUPITER methodology attempts to address these challenges by resorting to information provided by the Chief Registrar on the number of judges and their duty stations, as well as manually registering data from physical docket books from the past three years for the courts covered in the study. Additionally, most disputes in the country are resolved through the customary system, which does not systematically collect data on the volume and types of cases brought to customary courts. This posed certain limitations to the data collection exercise, which the team managed by leveraging existing data and studies from other development partners, academics, and international organizations. With this in mind, the report highlights the importance of systematically collecting data in the justice system moving forward to better diagnose its performance, track improvements, and identify areas for reform. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 19 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION 2. FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Fieldwork and empirical analysis in South Sudan access to legal aid and legal information. Issues reveal three findings highlighting the path toward with the appointment and disciplinary procedure of improving access to justice in the country. First, the judges further affect perceptions of independence customary system is an integral part of the justice and accountability. Third, the statutory system system and the most widely used dispute resolution is seen as inefficient, with delays and high costs mechanism in South Sudan, but ambiguities in affecting court users. These findings collectively jurisdictional rules complicate the process for underscore the need to enhance the accessibility, justice seekers. Second, the statutory system is independence, and efficiency of the justice system perceived as inaccessible due to geographic and in South Sudan, as well as its interaction with the financial barriers, as well as a lack of comprehensive customary system. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 20 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION 2.1. South Sudan has a Dual Justice System and most South Sudanese use Customary Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution South Sudan has a dual legal system where After the conflict broke out between northern and customary laws and authorities are integrated into southern Sudan in 1955, the role of chiefs in dispute the justice system by law and practice. By law, resolution diminished as they struggled to enforce customary courts are part of the local governance their authority.15 structure and are connected to the statutory system via appeals to the county courts. Customary courts Since then, their power and authority have fluctuated handle “customary disputes,” typically involving as the rise of new state and central government personal, family, and customary land matters.9 authorities has reshaped their influence. In some However, they lack authority over criminal cases communities, especially with urban and younger unless referred by a statutory court when there is populations, their authority has diminished. a “customary interface.”10 In practice, the situation However, some Chiefs have gained power by is more nuanced, and interpreting this interface has integrating into the state administration and forming proven challenging. Years of conflict and ongoing ties with political and military figures.16 The internal difficulties in developing judicial infrastructure displacement of a large part of the population outside of Juba have hindered the establishment has also impacted the influence of traditional of statutory courts in rural areas, where customary authorities, particularly in inter-communal disputes, and traditional authorities have prevailed.11 where community outsiders do not see them as legitimate in resolving their conflicts.17 Indeed, customary justice has served as the primary means of dispute resolution in South Previous studies have identified a strong preference Sudan.12 Recognizing this reality, the Anglo-Egyptian for the customary system in South Sudan. The Condominium that ruled southern Sudan before Transitional Justice Working Group’s 2018 justice independence integrated customary justice through sector assessment indicated that customary courts a “Native Administration.”13 The Chiefs Courts adjudicate approximately 80 percent of civil and Ordinance of 1931 established a hierarchy of chiefs’ criminal cases.18 The predominant reliance on the courts under the British district commissioners, customary system has been linked to its ease of merging administrative and judicial functions.14 access, both geographically and socioeconomically, 9. Sections 99 to 102 of the Local Government Act, 2009.  10. Section 98(1) of the Local Government Act, 2009.  11. Deng, D. K. 2013. Challenges of accountability: An assessment of dispute resolution processes in rural South Sudan. Juba: South Sudan Law Society. Page 21. 12. Supra Deng, 2013, page 11. 13. Hessbruegge, J.A. 2012. “Customary Law and Authority in a State under Construction: The Case of South Sudan.” African Journal of Legal Studies 5: 295–311. Page 301. 14. Leonardi, C., L.B. Moro, M. Santschi, and D.H. Isser. 2010. Local Justice in Southern Sudan. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Page 19. 15. Santschi, M. 2010. “Between community and government. Traditional authorities in post-conflict Southern Sudan.” Tsantsa 15: 108–111. Page 109. 16. Almeida, B., and J. Ubink. 2024. Land and Justice Pathways in South Sudan - Research Report. Leiden, The Netherlands: Van Vollnhoven Institute for Law, Governance and Society. 17. Justin, P.H., and M. Leeuwen. 2016. “The politics of displacement-related land conflict in Yei River County, South Sudan.” Journal of Modern African Studies 54(3): 419- 442. 18. Supra Deng, 2021. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 21 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION efficient proceedings, and the community’s trust a. By Law, Statutory and Customary Courts and familiarity with customary rules.19 Customary Operate in Parallel in Terms of Jurisdiction, dispute resolution does not usually require complex Except for Criminal Cases procedures, allowing for faster case resolution. This system also focuses on restoring societal bonds and By law, the Transitional Constitution is the maintaining community harmony. The flexibility of foundation of South Sudan’s dual legal system, customary courts is especially valued in multiethnic recognizing both statutory and customary courts environments, where rigid statutory laws may for dispute resolution according to their respective be less effective.20 However, these pathways are jurisdictional rules. Three main laws regulate often patriarchal and may undermine the rights of the statutory justice system: the Transitional women, youths, and other vulnerable groups.21 To Constitution of 2011, the Judiciary Act of 2008, and understand the connection between the statutory the Judicial Service Council Act of 2008. These laws and the customary system in more detail, the next outline the hierarchy and jurisdiction of the statutory sections will explore their interaction, both in law courts, establishing county courts in each county, and in practice. one High Court in each of the ten states, three Courts of Appeal circuits at the regional level, and a Supreme Court with national jurisdiction (Figure 1). >>> Figure 1: Hierarchy of the Statutory Courts in South Sudan Highest Court of the Nation, located in Juba • Competence to perform judicial review and resolve constitutional disputes • Court of review and cassation for criminal, civil, and administrative cases • Criminal jurisdiction over high-level officials Supreme Court • Appeals from the Courts of Appeal Appeal Three Courts of Appeal located in Juba, Malakal and Wau • They hear appeals from High Courts • Review decisions from administrative authorities Courts of Appeal Appeal Highest Judicial Authority at the State Level • Hear appeals from County Courts • Original jurisdiction over commercial matters and personal law for foreigners High Courts Appeal Judicial Authority at the County Level • First Grade: Any suit regardless of value County Courts • Second grade: Cases with a value not exceeding SSP1,000 Source: Authors’ elaboration based on relevant provisions of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, Judiciary Act, 2008, and the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 19. As highlighted by Deng (2013), customary courts are “are able to process cases fairly quickly and at relatively low cost, they are geographically accessible to rural populations and, since their decisions are often based on local norms, they are culturally familiar to rural populations.” Supra Deng, 2013, page 23. 20. Supra Leonardi and others, 2010, pages 35 and 39. 21 Supra Deng, 2021, page 20. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 22 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION The Supreme Court is the highest court for any At the lowest level of the statutory system, County litigation or prosecution under national and state Courts are divided into First Grade and Second Grade. law, including both statutory and customary law.22 First Grade Judges can hear any case regardless of By constitutional mandate, it requires at least eleven its value, while Second Grade Judges handle cases judges, including the Chief Justice and Deputy with a value not exceeding SSP1,000.29 In 2007, Chief Justice.23 The Court usually sits in panels of when the Code of Civil Procedure was passed, this three, except when acting as a Constitutional Panel, competence threshold was equivalent to USD 221. which includes at least nine members.24 According However, it has since deteriorated to USD 2.38, to the Judiciary Act of 2008, panels include the rendering it ineffective in limiting jurisdiction due Constitutional Panel for issues related to the to the lack of regular updates to fee schedule rates constitutionality of laws and jurisdictional conflicts, to account for current macroeconomic conditions. the Criminal Panel for appeals and confirmations in The Judiciary Act also allows for the establishment criminal matters, and the Civil Panel for appeals in of Payam Courts at the sub-county level to handle civil, commercial, and other matters. claims up to SSP500.30 Although the Constitution does not explicitly recognize Payam Courts, it Below the Supreme Court are the Courts of Appeal allows for the creation of other courts or tribunals divided into three circuits, located in Juba, Malakal, as needed, suggesting that these courts could and Wau.25 Each Court of Appeal has four justices, be consistent with the Constitution.31 However, including its President, and operates in panels of no Payam Courts have been established in South three, led by the most senior judge. These courts Sudan in practice. hear appeals against decisions made by High Courts and administrative authorities.26 High Courts, in In the customary system, dispute resolution is turn, are the highest judicial authority at the state handled by traditional authorities recognized under level and should be established in each state’s the Local Government Act of 2009. These traditional capital.27 Each High Court has three judges and authorities are community bodies that administer conducts trials with a single judge or a panel of three customary law and justice through customary for appellate matters. They have original jurisdiction courts.32 The primary unit of governance in this over cases involving companies, trademarks, other system is the Chiefdom, based on lineage and clans commercial matters, and personal law cases for in rural areas within each County, and Town Council, foreigners. High Courts also hear appeals from in urban areas. Chiefdoms are further divided County Court decisions and review administrative into three types of chieftainships: Paramount decisions by state or county authorities.28 Chieftainship, Head Chieftainship, and Executive Chieftainship (Figure 2).33 22. Article 126(1) of the TCRSS. 23. Article 125 of the TCRSS. Section 10 of the Judiciary Act (2008) provides for a different number of judges at the Supreme Court, establishing that it shall be comprised of seven judges. However, the Constitution supersedes the Judiciary Act, as it is considered the supreme law of the land and the laws of the nation shall conform to it, according to Article 3 of the TCRSS. 24. Article 126(3) of the TCRSS. 25. Information obtained from the Judiciary of South Sudan, List of Justices and Judges from the Judiciary of South Sudan as of June 1, 2024. 26. Sections 12 and 13 of the Judiciary Act, 2008, and Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 27. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, 2008. 28. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 29. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 30. Section 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 31. Article 123 of the TCRSS. 32. Section 112 of the Local Government Act, 2009. 33. Section 115 of the Local Government Act, 2009. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 23 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION >>> Figure 2: Structure of the Chieftainships Category Criteria for its establishment Composition It comprises the Paramount Consists of five to six Chief as head and all the Paramount Chieftainship Head Chieftainships Head Chiefs of the Chieftainships Chieftainships It comprises the Head Chief Consists of five to six Head Chieftainship as head and all the Executive Executive Chieftainships Chiefs of the Chieftainships Is established where there It comprises the Executive are 5 to 6 Sub-Chieftainships Executive Chieftainship Chief as head and the Sub- with a population of 6.250 Chiefs of Chieftainship to 9000 people Source: Local Government Act, 2009. Customary courts handle “customary disputes,” at the Payam level. “B” Courts are presided over typically involving personal, family, and customary by Chiefs and led by the Head Chief, handling more land matters.34 The Local Government Act defines complex cases such as major marriage disputes, their hierarchy, subject-matter jurisdiction, and divorce, inheritance, children’s and women’s rights, appeal rules. These courts are chaired by Chiefs at and customary land disputes. the various levels of chieftaincies and are integrated into the statutory court system through appeals to “C” Courts are established in every County and are the county courts.35 presided over by Head Chiefs, led by the Paramount Chief. They hear appeals from “B” Courts, cross- In this structure, “A” Courts are established in each cultural civil suits, and customary criminal cases village or “Boma” and are presided over by Sub- referred by statutory courts. In urban areas, Chiefs, led by the Executive Chief. These courts Town Bench Courts handle administrative cases, handle family disputes, marriage suits, traditional customary civil suits, and public order cases. feuds, and local administrative cases as the first Appeals from “C” Courts and Town Bench Courts go level of customary courts. Appeals from “A” Courts to the County Court of First Grade, as illustrated in go to “B” Courts, the intermediate customary courts Figure 3.36 34. Sections 99 to 102 of the Local Government Act, 2009. Section 100(4)(f) particularly refers to the customary courts’ competence over “customary land disputes.” According to the Land Rights Act (2009), customary land rights mean rights conferred by or derived from customs or customary laws and practices. 35. SupraLeonardi and others, 2010, page 27. 36 Sections 99 to 102 of the Local Government Act, 2009. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 24 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION >>> Figure 3: Hierarchy of Customary Courts in South Sudan Judiciary: County Court Judge of First Grade "C" Courts Appeal Appeal Competence to decide: • Cross-cultural civil suits. • Criminal cases of customary nature referred by a competent Statutory Court. County-level Appeal Competence to decide: "B" Courts • Major customary civil suits of marriage. • Divorce. • Inheritance. Town Bench Courts • Child rights and care. Payam • Women rights. Competence to decide: • Customary land disputes. • Administrative cases. Appeal • Customary civil suits. • Rates, excise and other "A" Courts Competence to decide: service provision • Family disputes. related disputes. • Traditional feuds. • Marriage suits. Boma • Local administrative cases. Urban Rural Source: Local Government Act, 2009.  Note: The courts in green are customary law courts, while the yellow court is a statutory court. Decisions by “C” Courts and Town Bench Courts can be appealed to the statutory County Court Judge of First Grade, while decisions by “B” and “A” Courts are appealed within the hierarchy of Customary Courts. Each county establishes a Customary Law Council Commissioner, Mayor, or Town Clerk, depending to oversee the selection, recruitment, training, and on the Chief’s position. The County Commissioner, discipline of staff in the customary court system.37 Mayor, or Town Clerk also oversee the election or Section 104 of the Local Government Act grants selection of Chiefs and can remove them for gross immunity from criminal proceedings to members misconduct, incompetence, or incapacitation, based and chairpersons of customary courts during their on the Customary Law Council’s recommendation.38 term, which can only be waived by the County 37. Sections 96 and 106 of the Local Government Act, 2009. According to Section 94, the Council must include all Head Chiefs of the “B” Courts within the county, the Council Secretary, three community elders, three women, and one youth representative, and is chaired by the County Paramount Chief. 38. Sections 105 and 106 of the Local Government Act, 2009. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 25 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION In terms of their operation, most customary courts between different pathways of justice tend to be hold proceedings under large trees. Both parties are unclear, most justice seekers, particularly the most allowed to speak, and court members can question marginalized, struggle to navigate them to achieve and comment before the Chairperson makes the fair results. final decision. Since proceedings are mostly oral, evidence is usually in the form of witness testimony. Customary authorities handle a wide range of Some courts keep records, but this depends on criminal cases, despite lacking legal authority the literacy of court personnel and the availability when not referred by a statutory court.44 For of writing materials.39 The public nature of example, a 2016 study in Yambio and Nzara in proceedings in customary courts tends to enhance Western Equatoria found that customary courts accountability, as traditional leaders who advocate handle cases of theft, assault, and murder, among for unfair decisions risk losing their credibility in the others. In Yambio, 26 percent of cases dealt with by community.40 customary authorities were criminal, and in Nzara it was 54 percent.45 The limited presence of judges and police in rural areas plays a significant role in b. In Practice, Ambiguities in the Interpretation the reliance on Chiefs to resolve criminal cases.46 of Customary Courts’ Jurisdictional Rules In fact, the state of Western Equatoria is one of the Complicate their Application most underserved by the statutory system, with only one first-grade county judge in Yambio County.47 The law establishes that customary courts cannot decide criminal cases unless they have a customary A 2013 study found similar results, indicating interface. In such instances, “C” Courts are that the preponderance of customary justice authorized to handle criminal matters when referred has remained largely unchanged.48 In a survey by a competent statutory court.41 In practice, this conducted in six counties, complainants indicated rule has proven challenging to apply consistently. their preference for more informal mechanisms to Indeed, customary law does not distinguish address sexual crimes, such as rape. Chiefs and the between criminal and civil jurisdictions, as it aims community (family, friends, and neighbors) were the to resolve disputes in all their dimensions.42 It also preferred dispute resolution avenue in 19 percent of emphasizes restoration over punishment, focusing rape cases, followed by the police at 17.7 percent on maintaining community harmony rather than and local government officials at 16.5 percent. providing individual retribution.43 As the interactions Statutory court judges were sought in only 5.1 39. Supra Leonardi and others, 2010. 40. Mennen, T. 2012. Customary Law and Land Rights in South Sudan. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. Page 11. 41. Sections 98(2) and 99(7) of the Local Government Act, 2009. 42. Hessbruegge, 2012, page 306. 43. Mennen, T. 2016. Study on the Harmonization of Customary Laws and the National Legal System in South Sudan. New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Page 9. 44. Supra Deng, 2013, page 21. 45. Braak, B. 2016. Exploring Primary Justice in South Sudan – Challenges, concerns, and elements that work. The Netherlands: Universiteit Leiden and Cordaid. Page 33. 46. Supra Deng, 2013, page 31. 47. Judiciary of South Sudan, List of Justices and Judges from the Judiciary of South Sudan as of June 1, 2024. 48. In March and April 2012, with the assistance of the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), a household survey was undertaken to gauge people’s perceptions and experiences with the justice system in rural areas of South Sudan. The goal of the survey was to gather baseline information about people’s experiences with the justice system, their perceptions of how well the system served them based on such experiences and their opinions about justice. The NBS developed a sample of 1,520 randomly selected households in six counties (Akobo, Budi, Ikotos, Nasir, Pibor, and Renk). See Deng, 2013. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 26 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION percent of rape cases.49 For homicide and physical the second choice, with 19.4 percent seeking their assault, complainants preferred local administrative help for homicide and 18.3 percent for assault. The authorities over courts but also frequently turned use of statutory courts was negligible, with only 4.1 to Chiefs. In homicide cases, 25.2 percent of percent going to court for homicide and 3.8 percent respondents went to local government officials, and for assault (Table 1).50 19.9 percent did so for assault cases. Chiefs were >>> Table 1: Preference for Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Criminal Cases (Percentages) Homicide Physical Assault Rape Local Government Official 25.2 19.9 16.5 Chief 19.4 18.3 19 Police 14.8 12.9 17.7 Clan headman 9.9 9.2 8.9 Other family/friends/neighbors 7.2 12.7 19 Civil Society 7 9.2 6.3 Self-help 4.3 6.7 0 Legal Advisor 4.1 5.4 3.8 Statutory court judge 4.1 3.8 5.1 Other 1.7 1.8 0 Prosecutor 1.2 0 1.3 Perpetrator 0 0 2.5 Do not know 1.2 0.2 0 Source: Deng, 2013, pages 71,74 and 75. Note: The study surveyed 1,520 randomly selected households across the counties of Renk, Nasir, Akobo, Pibor, Budi, and Ikotos. Participants were asked about their preferred complaint mechanisms for resolving various types of disputes, and a list of 21 options was provided for selection. The complaint mechanisms presented here are those chosen for the three types of complaints shown in the table. Figures represent the percentage of respondents that chose the specific mechanism per each type of dispute. 49. Supra Deng, 2013, page 71. 50. Supra Deng, 2013, page 75. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 27 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Citizens with disputes over demarcated land in sixty CMGs in Torit, Wau, Yei, and Minle. Through South Sudan are also affected by ambiguities in mediation and legal awareness campaigns, these jurisdictional rules. About 87 percent of people CMGs played an important role in addressing in the country hold land based on customary disputes related to demarcated land, supported tenure.51 In principle, the Local Government Act by lawyers and trained community members who gives customary “B” Courts the authority to decide provided their services for free. However, the CMGs on customary land cases, but in practice, they lack were discontinued due to a lack of funding.54 jurisdiction over demarcated land disputes. A recent 2024 report by Leiden University researchers found Aside from subject-matter jurisdiction, personal that statutory courts recognize this prohibition, jurisdiction is also an important aspect to consider even without specific legislation.52 For example, in when clarifying the competence of customary 2016, the President of the High Court of Eastern courts, especially in disputes involving members Equatoria instructed customary courts not to handle of different communities or displaced individuals. demarcated land cases, a rule also followed in Wau In inter-communal disputes, the decision often County in Western Bahr al Ghazal. This creates requires understanding and harmonizing the a significant gap for these types of cases in areas traditional practices of different communities, and where statutory courts are not present.53 customary courts are trying to adapt. For instance, courts in Juba and Bentiu have established cross- Even when these cases reached the courts, the communal panels of six to eight Chiefs who consult study found that claimants with documentation had to decide cases.55 These solutions are especially higher chances of winning in statutory courts than relevant given that there are around two million those relying on traditional methods of proving land internally displaced persons (IDPs) in South Sudan ownership, such as witnesses and landmarks. To as of April 2023.56 This approach ensures that the address this gap, local CSOs like the SSLS created diverse legal traditions of various communities are Community Mediation Groups (CMGs), establishing integrated into the decision-making process. 51. Ubink, J., and B. Almeida. 2023. “Local Self-Governance and the State in South Sudan: Studying Gender Tenure Relations in Times of Uncertainty.” Politics and Governance 11(2): 357–367. Page 360. See also Mennen, 2016, page 16. 52. Supra Almeida and Ubink, 2024. 53. Supra Almedia and Ubink, 2024, page 21. 54. Supra Almeida and Ubink, 2024, pages 25 and 26. 55. The study was conducted in the regions of Juba, Rumbek, Bentiu, and Yambo. See Mennen, T. 2010. “Yambio: Legal Pluralism and Customary Justice Reform in Southern Sudan.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2: 218–252. Page 227. 56. International Organization for Migration - IOM. Global Data Institute Displacement Tracking Matrix. South Sudan. Switzerland: IOM. Consulted on September 26, 2024. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 28 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION 2.2. Statutory Courts are Perceived to be Inaccessible South Sudanese reliance on the customary system areas, undermines the operation of statutory is primarily due to its ease of access compared courts, particularly outside of urban centers. Data to the statutory system and its cultural relevance on the number of judges provided by the Judiciary in local communities. In contrast, statutory shows that most states outside of Central Equatoria courts tend to be geographically and financially are severely underserved by the statutory system, inaccessible and take longer to resolve disputes including many of the most populated states than customary means. Geographical accessibility (Figure 4). For example, Unity State, with over one is frequently cited as a significant barrier to million residents, has no judges operating in the accessing the statutory system in South Sudan. state. Warrap has only five judges for more than 2.5 million people, meaning each judge serves The chronic shortage of financial and human about 527,897 people. Similarly, Jonglei has two resources, along with security concerns in certain judges for around one million residents, with each judge serving about 515,603 people. >>> Figure 4: Judges Per Capita Per Region in South Sudan ¯ NUMBER OF INHABITANTS 660,000 PER JUDGE 22,000 0 25 1 00 200 Kil om eters WILAYAH (STATE) BOUNDARIES INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES UPPER NILE RUWENG NORTHERN BAHR AL GHAZAL UNITY WARRAP WESTERN BAHR JONGLEI AL GHAZAL LAKES PIBOR IBRD 48384 | MARCH 2025 This map was produced by the WESTERN EQUATORIA Cartography Unit of the World Bank Group. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any EASTERN other information shown on this CENTRAL EQUATORIA map do not imply, on the part of EQUATORIA the World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorse- ment or acceptance of such boundaries. Source: Data was extracted from the List of Justices and Judges from the Judiciary of South Sudan as of June 1, 2024, provided by the Judiciary; and South Sudan Subnational Population Estimates of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Note: This map was produced by the Cartography Unit of the World Bank Group. The darkest colors on the map indicate areas with fewer judges relative to the population, meaning that a single judge must serve a larger number of inhabitants. Conversely, the lightest colors indicate areas with more judges relative to the population, meaning that a single judge serves fewer inhabitants. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 29 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION For this reason, 73 percent of experts interviewed by UNDP established five mobile courts in 2022 in the team believe that courts are significantly more collaboration with the Judiciary, the MoJCA, the accessible in urban regions than rural areas.57 The National Police Service, and legal aid organizations. highest ratio of judges to population, in fact, is seen These courts provided justice to 246 claimants in Central Equatoria, where the capital city of Juba is and over 250 detainees in Mundri, Tambura, Abyei, located. Lawyers noted that “Some counties or even Malakal, and Bentiu counties. Of the 246 cases states have no courts of law;” “Most of the courts are handled, 223 were resolved, resulting in a 91 percent situated in urban areas;” and “People in rural areas reduction in the case backlog in these locations.63 have difficulties traveling to urban areas to access While these donor efforts are valuable for temporarily formal courts due to distance, lack of transportation, expanding the reach of the statutory justice system financial constraints, and lack of accommodation in remote areas, without a sustainable plan for in cities.”58 This last observation is consistent with human and financial resources, they risk becoming interviews conducted with court users, who reported untenable in the long term. an average travel time of one hour to reach the nearest court, with some experiencing travel times of up to two and a half hours. One user even mentioned a. Access to Justice for the Poor taking a two-hour flight to Juba from Unity State, which currently lacks statutory courts.59 Both court users and lawyers perceive that courts in South Sudan are out of reach for those lacking To tackle the issue of geographical accessibility, financial resources. JUPITER benchmarks access UNMISS and UNDP have supported the establishment to justice for poor individuals by examining whether of mobile courts to provide justice services in areas the legal system has mechanisms to support with limited presence of statutory courts. These have them. In this respect, experts interviewed noted included general mobile courts, special courts for that courts are more accessible to individuals inter-communal violence,60 and circuit courts that from higher socioeconomic classes.64 Many of the deploy local judges to different areas within their interventions echoed this sentiment: “People who jurisdiction. Since 2021, UNMISS has supported the are financially better [off] have more advantage deployment of mobile courts in eight states.61 The in accessing the courts because every procedure mission has also facilitated the deployment of Joint requires money;” “Justice to some extent is Special Mobile Courts to address cattle migration- commercialized in this country, there is a lot of related conflicts in the border areas of Western bribery and corruption that impedes access to Bahr al Ghazal and Warrap States. In 2024, UNMISS justice to a person from low socioeconomic class;” also supported three mobile courts in Unity State and “Persons of lower socioeconomic classes are to tackle sexual and gender-based violence-related suffering and struggling with court fees.”65 offenses.62 57. Respondents were asked to characterize the accessibility of the courts in the country to people in urban regions as compared to those in rural regions. (JUPITER Data Collection Tool, question 13). 58. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. 59. Interviews with court users, June 2024.  60. These incorporate Chiefs as special advisors to the judge. 61. According to information shared by UNMISS in July 2024, these mobile courts were deployed to the counties of Bentiu, Bor, Gette, Koch, Kuanja, Juba, Makuok, Malakal, Mapel, Maridi, Mayom, Raja, Renk, Rocrocdong, Tonj Town, Torit, Warbet, Wau, and Yei. 62. Interview with UNMISS, July 2024. 63. UNDP. 2022. Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening Programme in South Sudan. Juba, South Sudan. 64. Respondents were asked to characterize the accessibility of the courts of the country for persons of different socioeconomic classes. (JUPITER Data Collection Tool, question 29). 65. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 30 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION The inaccessibility of the courts for poor persons is fee.”72 However, this law does not provide any exacerbated by the absence of government-funded details regarding eligibility thresholds, the process legal aid in civil cases. For the purposes of this for securing assistance, and the duties of the report, legal aid is defined as the “free provision of advocates acting as legal aid providers. Even so, the assistance to people who are unable to afford legal new leadership of the SSBA seeks to prioritize the representation and can include representation provision of legal aid and has already established in court, legal advice before the proceedings, a Legal Aid Secretariat responsible for conducting payment of court fees, payment of technical assessments of legal needs in the prisons. Still, it experts, enforcement fees, and even travel costs.”66 has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy for its Although the Constitution guarantees the right to implementation, especially in civil cases.73 legal aid when an person cannot afford a lawyer,67 the implementing legislation remains fragmented, In practice, MoJCA faces challenges in providing with unclear rules regarding the mandate, criteria, legal aid services due to financial and operational and procedure for providing legal aid. In fact, constraints. Legal aid is not separately accounted there is no specific policy that comprehensively for in the institution’s budget, and the Ministry regulates legal aid in South Sudan.68 Due to this recognizes that improper funding impacts its ability legal vacuum, experts interviewed by the team to offer these services.74 Additionally, there is lack of mentioned that “most people are not aware of legal clarity regarding the staff’s specific responsibilities aid” and that “legal aid is mostly not understood by regarding legal aid, as legal advisors have a broad both advocates and judicial officers.”69 range of duties, including advising the Government on legal issues, recommending law reforms, and By law, the Constitution mandates public attorneys other tasks beyond legal aid.75 Also, the Ministry’s and MoJCA’s legal advisors to provide legal aid.70 roster of legal counsels includes 230 officials, This mandate is also included in the Ministry’s with 225 based in Juba alone and one each in Organization Act of 2008, which requires the Eastern Equatoria State, Unity State, and the Abyei Minister of Justice to provide legal services to Administrative Area. While staffing shortages the public, including “legal advice and legal do not seem to be the primary issue in Juba, the aid.”71 Despite the law not distinguishing between limited personnel may affect the availability of criminal and civil cases, the MoJCA indicated legal aid services in other regions. that it only considers applications for legal aid in criminal cases. Responsibility for legal assistance Given these limitations, several CSOs have stepped in civil cases is delegated to the Bar Council under in to support financially disadvantaged individuals. the Advocates Act of 2013, which provides legal For instance, the SSLS has a memorandum of assistance upon request from a person proven understanding with the MoJCA to provide pro- to be a “pauper and unable to pay an advocate’s bono legal aid, offering services to low-income 66. Bosio, E., and V. Upegui Caro. 2023. Improving Access to Justice in Liberia – A 2023 JUPITER Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 67. Article 19.7 of the TCRSS. 68. Interview with the Department of Legal Aid of the MoJCA, June 2024. 69. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. 70. Article 135.3 of the TCRSS. 71. Section 25(K) of the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development Organization Act, 2008. 72. Section 31(2) of the Advocates Act, 2013. 73. Meeting with South Sudan Bar Association, June 6, 2024. 74. Interview with the Department of Legal Aid of the MoJCA, June 2024. 75. Section 42(2) of the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development Organization Act, 2008. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 31 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION clients and detainees through legal aid clinics in valuable opportunity to improve coordination and Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Upper Nile, oversight in providing legal aid services, addressing and Western Bahr al Ghazal. The SSLS is funding its the current issue of fragmented responsibilities operations through international donors, but it is among different institutions involved in the struggling to continue its services for its 300 active legal aid process. Additionally, developing a legal aid cases without sustainable financing from comprehensive legal aid policy would clarify the GoSS.76 FIDA also provides legal aid, specifically the responsibilities of providers, strengthen the for women and children. It has a memorandum of monitoring and assessment of services, establish understanding with the Ministry of Gender, Child, more precise eligibility criteria, and expand legal and Social Welfare (MGCSW) to assist victims of aid to encompass noncriminal cases. sexual and gender-based violence and finances its operations through international donors without The law offers fee waivers for low-income financial support from the government.77 litigants to help pursue cases in court. Rule 6 of the Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure Act of Since 2020, UNDP has partnered with several CSOs 2007 regulates cases filed by a “pauper,” defined to establish Justice and Confidence Centers (JCCs) as someone who cannot afford the prescribed in five states, focusing on supporting vulnerable court fees.81 To apply as a pauper, the applicant groups in South Sudan, including women and girls, must submit a list of their property with estimated the elderly, IDPs, and returnees.78 The consortium values, a certificate signed by two witnesses employed various strategies, such as setting up verifying their financial status, and their complaint. help desks at police stations, utilizing mobile The court may also require the applicant to take legal clinics, recruiting and training community an oath or affirmation about their inability to pay volunteers, and strengthening connections the fees. If the court is not convinced, it may with Special Protection Units. This initiative has reject the fee waiver application. In practice, it is supported 7,872 beneficiaries through two grants. unclear how often these waivers are granted, as An ODI study found that the JCCs reduced costs as the judiciary does not collect data on this. they scaled up, with unit costs dropping from USD 77.9 in 2021 to USD 36.2 while nearly doubling the number of beneficiaries. Despite their success, b. Access to Justice for Women these initiatives still rely heavily on donor funding, posing challenges for long-term sustainability.79 The Constitution and laws of South Sudan guarantee equal access to justice for women. Article 16 of the To provide legal aid services more effectively and TCRSS affirms that women “shall be accorded full sustainably, the MoJCA is considering transforming and equal dignity of the person with men.” Article the directorate of legal aid into an independent 122.5(a) further states that “justice shall be done to body under its supervision, and developing a all irrespective of their social, political or economic comprehensive legal aid policy.80 This offers a status, gender, religion or beliefs.” Additionally, 76. Interview with the South Sudan Law Society, June 2024. 77. Interview with FIDA, May 2024. 78. UNDP. 2022. “Call for Proposals from Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), legal aid including legal representation, legal awareness and legal advice, and psychosocial support to vulnerable groups including women, girls, and SGBV survivors in EE,WE, WBG, NBG, CE.” Juba, South Sudan. 79. Manuel, M., and C. Manuel. 2023. “‘Small is beautiful, but scale is necessary’: front-line justice services in lower-income countries with the potential to scale- up.” ODI Policy Brief. London: ODI. 80. Interview with the Department of Legal Aid of the MoJCA, June 2024. 81. Clauses 12 and 13 of Rule 6 of the Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 32 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Section 128 of the Code of Evidence Act of 2006 by statutory courts, are often handled by customary mandates that testimony or evidence presented courts.87 During the same study, 37.5 percent by a wife be given the same consideration in legal of respondents considered that the process of proceedings as that presented by a husband. resolving rape cases in customary courts was either very unfair or somewhat unfair.88 In many In practice, however, women face significant instances, male chiefs tend to favor men in their barriers to accessing justice. They have limited decisions and discourage women from advocating representation in decision-making bodies, with for their rights.89 While there are instances where only 24 percent of South Sudanese judges being chiefs assist women, this largely depends on the female.82 In Tanzania, 48 percent of new judicial individual chief’s personality.90 recruits are women, while in Kenya, 42 percent of superior court judges are female.83 Women Enhancing women’s participation in customary also face financial constraints that restrict their justice mechanisms could be an important step ability to cover court-related expenses and toward eliminating discrimination within these access adequate legal representation.84 Experts systems. A 2024 study by researchers from Leiden interviewed highlighted additional issues such as University revealed that women are increasingly social stigma, vulnerability, and a lack of education selected for chieftaincy positions, particularly about their rights, which further hinder women’s at the lower levels in counties such as Torit and ability to effectively seek and obtain justice.85 Wau. Many observed that women’s involvement in decision-making led to more inclusive outcomes. This finding aligns with previous studies indicating However, this is not a silver bullet, as some criticized that women frequently encounter barriers when the election of certain women who were perceived accessing the justice system, particularly in rural as proxies for powerful male chiefs, expressing a areas where formal courts are often inaccessible. desire to see more influential and independent A 2013 study conducted across six counties found women in these roles.91 Other effective initiatives that 25.3 percent of spousal neglect cases were have involved peer learning, where Chiefs visit brought to the immediate community, including other communities to observe different ways of family, friends, and neighbors. Around 15.7 percent resolving similar issues and enabling them to adopt of these cases were taken to the Chief and 15.3 new approaches.92 percent to the Clan Headman. Only 3.1 percent of spousal neglect cases involved a judge.86 Serious To probe these observations, the team consulted crimes such as rape, which should be adjudicated the legal framework and its practical application 82. Judiciary of South Sudan, List of Justices and Judges from the Judiciary of South Sudan as of June 1, 2024. 83. The Judiciary of Kenya. 2024. State of the Judiciary and the Administration of Justice, Annual Report 2022/23. Nairobi, Kenya; and Judiciary of Tanzania. 2024. Comprehensive Performance Report of the Judicial Functions – 2023. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 84. Interview with FIDA, May 2024. 85. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. 86. Supra Deng, 2013, pages 70 and 71. 87. According to Article 98 of the Local Government Act, a “Customary Law Court shall not have the competence to adjudicate on criminal cases except those criminal cases with a customary interface referred to it by a competent Statutory Court.” 88. Supra Deng, 2013, page 84. 89. In their recent study for Leiden University, Almeida and Ubink (2024) highlighted that “in many cases, male chiefs tend to favor men in their decisions and discourage women to fight for their rights.” Supra Almeida and Ubink, 2024, page 35. 90. Supra Almeida and Ubink, 2024, page 35. 91. Supra Almeida and Ubink, 2024, page 36. 92. Denney, L., and P. Domingo. 2023. “Taking people-centred justice to scale: the role of customary and informal justice in advancing people centred justice.” ODI Policy Brief. London: ODI. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 33 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION in the hypothetical case of a woman seeking is currently limited to the capital city, leaving rural civil remedies for sexual harassment in the women with restricted access to these services.98 workplace. By law, the Labor Act of 2017 prohibits Furthermore, the persistent lack of legal aid and sexual harassment in the workplace, providing support services for victims continues to present the possibility to resort to the courts in case of substantial barriers to justice for many women. violation of this prohibition.93 When discussing this hypothetical case with lawyers, however, it became evident that significant obstacles persist due to c. Access to Justice for Persons Facing Linguistic the stigma women associate with reporting such Barriers conduct and the fear that doing so may jeopardize their employment.94 Lawyers also pointed out that Experts and court users identified linguistic men, who predominantly hold positions of power barriers as a challenge to accessing justice in in the workplace, are more likely to be available South Sudan. Some noted that “Some judges and as witnesses in these cases.95 FIDA emphasized lawyers only speak Arabic,” and “Most documents the difficulties in proving cases of rape and sexual are in Arabic, which requires a translator or harassment, citing the strict evidentiary standards interpreter to read for you.”99 This challenge arises imposed by the courts as a major challenge.96 from both legal and practical factors. Legally, the Constitution designates English as the official Acknowledging these challenges, the Judiciary of working language of South Sudan,100 while the Code South Sudan recently established a specialized of Civil Procedure Act provides that both English Sexual and Gender-based Violence Court in and Arabic are the official languages of the courts, Juba, which is a positive step towards improving contravening the Constitution.101 In practice, many access to justice for women and ensuring the judges and lawyers who were trained in the Arabic accountability of perpetrators.97 According to civil and Sharia law traditions of northern Sudan a UNDP report, in 2022, the specialized Court before independence continue to operate primarily managed a total of 325 cases, which included 189 in Arabic.102 new cases filed during the year and 136 unresolved cases from 2021. Among these, 300 cases were To assist individuals facing linguistic barriers, brought forward by women and 25 by men. By the Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act end of the year, the Court had resolved 144 cases, states that “a Court may hear parties or witnesses with 122 favorable outcomes for complaints by who are ignorant of English and Arabic in any women and 22 for men. While acknowledging this other language through an interpreter on oath.” progress, it is important to note that the initiative Despite this provision, lawyers have indicated 93. Section 7 of the Labor Act (2017) provides that the affected party can submit a written complaint to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration if a dispute arising from this prohibition occurs. Should conciliation not resolve the issue, the dispute can then be appealed to the Labor Court for adjudication. 94. Respondents were asked how likely women were to bring a civil case for sexual harassment against their employer and how likely they were to win if the harassment was proven beyond reasonable doubt (JUPITER Data Collection Tool, questions 18 and 19). 95. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. 96. Interview with FIDA, May 2024. 97. UNDP. 2020. South Sudan’s Gender Based Violence Court Inaugurated During #16DaysofActivism. Juba, South Sudan. 98. Supra UNDP, 2022. 99. Interviews with court users, May-June 2024. 100. Article 6 of the TRCSS. 101. Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 102. Interview with Judges of Court of Appeal, May 2024. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 34 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION that translation and interpretation services are Regarding participation in legal proceedings, “Somewhat unlikely” to be provided by the courts Sections 114 and 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure due to a shortage of available personnel.103 Act require that individuals deemed “of unsound Additionally, the linguistic challenges extend mind” or unable to protect their interests due to beyond the Arabic-English differences, which could “mental or physical infirmity” must be represented be more easily solved through technological tools by a guardian ad litem. While the law allows these like online translation services. South Sudan’s 65 individuals to have a guardian in court, the right ethnic groups each have their distinct languages, to legal capacity includes broader guarantees, further complicating the provision of interpretation such as the ability to engage in transactions and services at the courts. Consequently, parties must manage legal relationships as independently often arrange and fund their interpreters, adding to as possible.106 Article 12 of the CRPD, as the already substantial costs of pursuing disputes interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of in the courts.104 Persons with Disabilities, requires governments to shift from substitute decision-making models like guardianship, conservatorship, and forced d. Access to Justice for Persons with Disabilities treatment, to supported decision-making. According to the Committee, this approach must JUPITER evaluated the accessibility of the courts respect the rights, will, and preferences of persons for persons with disabilities, both legally and in with disabilities and should not involve imposing a practice. Article 30 of the TCRSS mandates that decision-maker against their will. the government guarantee that persons with disabilities fully enjoy their rights and freedoms. In practice, most courts in South Sudan are not South Sudan ratified the Convention on the Rights equipped to meet the needs of persons with of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on February 5, disabilities. For instance, they lack accessible 2024. According to Article 13.1 of the CRPD, States infrastructure and do not provide braille or sign Parties must “ensure effective access to justice language interpretation during court proceedings. for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with For this reason, all lawyers interviewed during the others,” which includes providing procedural and assessment rated the implementation of policies age-appropriate accommodations to facilitate their supporting individuals with disabilities as either full participation in legal proceedings. In terms “Low” or “Very Low.”107 of policy, the MGCSW introduced the National Disability Action Plan in 2020, which includes provisions for developing a CRPD training program f. Access to Legal Information for the judiciary and integrating sign language and braille communication into court processes.105 To ensure fair and equitable outcomes, the law should be clear, easily accessible, predictable, and 103. Respondents were asked how likely people were to receive translation and interpretation services at the courts (JUPITER Data Collection Tool, question 17.2). 104. Interview with Judges of Court of Appeal, May 2024. 105. Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare of the Republic of South Sudan. 2020. National Disability Action Plan 2020. Juba, South Sudan. 106. United Nations, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 2014. “General Comment No. 1.” Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Eleventh Session. 107. Respondents were asked to assess the level of implementation of policies to support persons with disabilities during court proceedings (JUPITER Data Collection Tool, question 15). 108. Bedner, A. 2018. “The promise of a thick view.” In Christoper May and Adam Winchester (eds.). Handbook on the Rule of Law. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 35 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION uniformly applied by an independent judiciary.108 guidance on filing a claim or self-representation. This can only be achieved when legal information, The website contains a few paragraphs about the including court decisions, is publicly available provision of free legal aid, but the process, entities, to ensure adherence to the law and judicial and eligibility criteria are not clearly explained. precedent. However, South Sudan currently lacks a comprehensive and updated national repository The transparency of the legal framework in of all laws and regulations, which limits citizens’ South Sudan is further undermined by the fact understanding of the legal framework and can lead that most laws have not been harmonized with to inconsistencies in the application of the law.109 the TCRSS, the R-ARCSS, and newly enacted During the assessment, all lawyers interviewed by legislation. Many experts interviewed highlighted the team indicated that it was either “Difficult” or that these conflicting laws create opportunities “Somewhat Difficult” to stay abreast with changes for misinterpretation and arbitrary decisions.112 in the legal framework, as consolidated versions of To address this issue, the SSLRC was established laws and regulations are not available.110 to update and harmonize national laws, enhance legislative drafting capabilities, and engage the By law, the MoJCA is mandated to publish written public in legal reforms. However, the Commission laws in the Southern Sudan Gazette.111 In line with faces significant operational challenges, as it this mandate, the MoJCA has made some laws and lacks essential materials and internet access for regulations available on its official website, which is research, is understaffed, and its employees are public, free, and openly accessible. Nevertheless, poorly compensated, with some not receiving the website lacks timely updates, as evidenced by salaries for up to seven months.113 the fact that the last regulation published was in 2017, corresponding to the Labor Act. Since then, For access to judicial decisions, there is no legal numerous laws have been enacted in compliance mandate requiring them to be made publicly with the 2018 R-ARCSS, but these have not accessible. Parties involved in a case can request been posted on the platform. Furthermore, the copies of judgments or parts of the record by paying repository of laws is not a searchable database, a fee.114 The absence of publicly available court making it challenging to filter by type of legislation, decisions poses a significant challenge in South topic, keywords, or year of publication. This Sudan, as the country operates under a common limits its practicality for users seeking specific law system where judicial decisions establish information. legal precedents. This means that judges, citizens, and legal practitioners are deprived of a crucial Regarding access to court information, although component of the legal framework, potentially the MoJCA’s website provides some information compromising the accountability and transparency about the court hierarchy, it lacks details on of judicial decision-making. To address this issue, court locations, hours and days of operation, and the Max Planck Foundation has supported the 109. The most comprehensive repository available is the MoJCA’s website, which was updated until 2017. Additionally, laws pertaining to specific ministries or agencies can sometimes be found on their respective websites, such as the Ministry of Finance and Planning’s website. 110. Respondents were asked to assess how difficult it is to stay abreast of the legal framework (JUPITER Data Collection Tool, question 2). 111. The Southern Sudan Gazette is an official government publication that is used to communicate new laws, regulations, and policies to the public, according to the Interpretation of Laws and General Provisions Act of 2006. 112. This problem was highlighted by various stakeholders, including members of the JRC, the NCAC, and the RJMEC in June 2024. 113. Interview with member of the South Sudan Law Review Commission, June 2024. 114. Section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 36 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION judiciary in compiling written records of Supreme solely on law and evidence without external Court judgments for 2011 and 2012, and law pressures or interference. Research highlights reports for 2016 and 2017 are in the works. While several key mechanisms for safeguarding this is a positive step towards legal transparency, judicial independence, including transparent and the judiciary has yet to make the compendium independent processes for appointing, promoting, public.115 and removing judges; the length and security of tenure; and sufficient resources to support the A possible reason for the unavailability of judiciary’s effective functioning to avoid corrupt judicial decisions and the inaccessibility of court behavior.118 information is the low level of digitization within the courts. The JUPITER methodology examines Since its establishment, the Judiciary of South the use of information and communication Sudan has faced significant challenges in technologies (ICT) in court proceedings, finding maintaining its independence. The country scored that almost no courts have access to the Internet 25 out of 100 in the 2024 Africa Integrity Indicator and there are frequent electricity outages measuring the guarantee of judicial independence disrupting court operations. In addition, judges in practice.119 Previous studies have identified and clerical staff rarely have access to computers several contributing factors to this situation, to draft documents and enter case data.116 including undue pressure from the executive Consequently, users can accomplish very little branch and military on judicial officials, lack of online, as electronic filing, electronic service, human and financial resources, and inadequate and virtual hearings are generally not permitted. infrastructure and capacity.120 Another key aspect An exception to this was a recent virtual trial is the government’s control of the judiciary, as for a criminal case conducted in the county of highlighted in a recent report by Transparency Malakal in the state of Upper Nile, supported by International.121 In fact, the process for appointing UNMISS.117 and removing judges, although defined by the Constitution and law, often faces criticism due to its lack of transparency and the role played by the g. Quality of Judgments executive branch in this process.122 To enhance the quality of decisions made by In terms of judicial appointment, the TCRSS justice institutions in South Sudan, it is important empowers the President to appoint the Chief to ensure the full independence of the judiciary. Justice without JSC’s involvement. The President Indeed, judicial independence is fundamental also appoints the Deputy Chief Justice and other to rule-based governance and the separation of Justices of the Supreme Court and Courts of powers, allowing judges to make decisions based Appeal based on JSC recommendations. These 115. Interview with Max Planck Foundation, April 2024. 116. Respondents were asked what percentage of judges and staff drafting documents and entering case data use computers (JUPITER Data Collection Tool, question 94). 117. UNMISS. 2024. “First ever full virtual court takes place in South Sudan with support from UNMISS.” Juba, South Sudan. 118. Bosio, E. 2024. “A Survey of Judicial Effectiveness: The Last Quarter Century of Empirical Evidence.” The World Bank Research Observer. 119. Global Integrity and Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 2024. Africa Integrity Indicators. 120. International Commission of Jurists - ICJ. 2013. South Sudan: An Independent Judiciary in an Independent State? Geneva: International Commission of Jurists. 121. Harutyunyan, K. 2023. South Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption efforts. Transparency International and Chr. Michelsen Institute. 122. Supra International Commission of Jurists, 2013. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 37 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION appointments are required to be confirmed by a Consequently, judicial appointments are often two-thirds majority of all members of the National made by the Judiciary’s leadership without the Assembly.123 For lower courts, the Chief Justice recommendation of the JSC, as highlighted in appoints judges to the High Courts and County a report by Amnesty International.128 Lawyers Courts based on JSC recommendations.124 interviewed by the team echoed this finding, noting that recruitment prioritizes “loyalty rather than The Judiciary Act further provides that judicial experience.”129 For this reason, many experts appointees must be South Sudanese citizens of argue in favor of reconstituting the JSC to ensure sound mind and free from convictions involving its independence from the executive branch and dishonesty or moral turpitude.125 Appointees must the judicial leadership, enabling it to function more be at least 25 years old for County Courts, 35 for independently and effectively.130 the High Court and Court of Appeal, and 45 for the Supreme Court. Supreme Court candidates Regarding the discipline of judges, international need 15 years of experience from the MoJCA or best practices recommend that this responsibility private advocacy, or 18 years from academia, if be managed by an independent body, operating coming from outside the Judiciary. For the Court of under well-defined procedural rules and codes Appeal, High Court, and County Court, the required of conduct. Ideally, a preferable structure would experience ranges from 4 to 15 years, respectively, separate investigation from adjudication. Its depending on the candidate’s background in composition should aim for balance, avoiding private practice, the MoJCA, or academia.126 an overly corporatist nature while ensuring independence by excluding members from the In practice, while the criteria for eligibility for a executive or legislative branches. This could involve judicial position are set by law, the process for judges, along with members of the legal profession screening and selecting potential candidates and other independent appointees.131 is not clearly regulated. Although the TCRSS stipulates that appointments must be made In South Sudan, many of these criteria are reflected upon the recommendation of the JSC, neither the in the law. The Judiciary Act establishes Boards of Judiciary Act nor the Judicial Service Council Act Discipline to investigate and hear the defense of provide detailed procedures for the screening investigated judges. The findings of these Boards and recommendation process. The JSC has are submitted to the JSC for review, which has the not participated in the appointment of judicial authority to confirm, modify, dismiss, or return the officials since 2013, as it only convenes once recommendations made by the Board.132 These a year to approve the Judiciary’s budget.127 recommendations are then sent to the Chief 123. Article 133 of the TCRSS. 124. Section 21(3) of the Judiciary Act, 2008. 125. Section 20 of the Judiciary Act, 2008. 126. Sections 22 to 25 of the Judiciary Act, 2008. 127. Article 10(2) of the Judicial Service Council Act mandates the JSC to hold quarterly sessions, however, the Commission only meets once a year. Interview with the Chief Registrar of the Judiciary of South Sudan, June 2024. 128. Amnesty International. 2019. “‘Do you think we will prosecute ourselves?’ No prospects for accountability in South Sudan.” London: Amnesty International. Page 15. 129. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. 130. Interviews with members of the JRC and NCAC, June 2024. 131. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OCSE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2018. Note on International Standards and Good Practices of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Judges. Warsaw, Poland: OCSE. 132. Section 53 of the Judiciary Act, 2008 and Section 8(1)(d) of the Judicial Service Council Act, 2008. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 38 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Justice for final confirmation.133 Regarding the In terms of ethical standards, judges in South Sudan Board’s composition, however, the JSC includes must avoid any trade, employment, or business that members of the executive and legislative branches, conflicts with their judicial duties and undermines potentially compromising its independence. their independence. According to the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges must not be members In practice, ambiguities in the interpretation of the of a political party, hold elective office, or contest constitutional provision related to the dismissal of elections for clubs, societies, or other associations, judges have raised issues regarding the executive except in law-related societies or associations.137 branch’s role in removing judges.134 The TCRSS They must also refrain from practicing law and grants the President the power to remove justices engaging in financial and business dealings that and judges for “gross misconduct, incompetence interfere with their judicial duties or be involved and incapacity and upon the recommendation in transactions with lawyers or others likely to of the Judicial Service Commission.”135 The appear in court.138 The Code allows judges to write, ambiguous drafting of this provision has led to lecture, teach, and participate in activities related the arbitrary dismissal of judges without following to the law and the administration of justice. They a disciplinary procedure, as it can be interpreted may also engage in civic, charitable, educational, to mean that the President has the authority to cultural, and other social and recreational activities, remove judges without the recommendation provided these do not interfere with their judicial of the JCS. For instance, in 2017, the President responsibilities.139 dismissed 11 judges from office without obtaining a recommendation from the JSC, a decision that Experts highlighted that, in practice, judges very was subsequently challenged in the East African rarely engage in political activities or occupy Court of Justice. The regional court ruled that the temporary employment in political offices.140 Many President’s failure to adhere to the constitutional judges take on teaching roles at the country’s law requirement for a recommendation from the JSC schools and engage in research and publication and to follow the disciplinary process established activities, which is permitted under the Code of in the Judiciary Act prior to the dismissal of the Judicial Conduct. Lawyers interviewed by the judges constituted a violation of the TCRSS.136 team viewed this positively, as it enhances the judges’ capacity and keeps them current with developments in legal scholarship. However, they also pointed out that these activities may interfere with the judges’ performance, leading to delays in case resolution within the already lengthy disposition times in South Sudanese courts.141 133. Article 134 of the TCRSS. 134. East African Court of Justice. 2017. Justice Malek Mathiang Malek v Attorney General of the Republic of South Sudan and Secretary General of the East African Community. [2017]. Reference No. 9 of 2017. Arusha: East African Court of Justice. 135. Article 134.2 of the TCRSS. 136. Supra East African Court of Justice, Justice Malek v. Attorney General of the Republic of South Sudan, 2017. 137. Section 4.8 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 2017. 138. Section 4.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 2017. 139. Section 4.17 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 2017. 140. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. 141. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 39 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION 2.3. Statutory Courts are Perceived to be Inefficient Courts in South Sudan are frequently perceived with remarks like “This case is already going to five as inefficient. Eighty-seven percent of court users years because I can’t afford a lawyer;” “You can interviewed by the team reported that their cases follow up on a case for months without receiving took significantly longer than anticipated, while proper feedback;” “Frequent adjournments week 80 percent noted that costs were higher than after week are a major challenge;” and “If a client expected.142 Respondents highlighted issues such lacks money for facilitation, the court may delay as prolonged delays and escalating costs (Figure 5), proceedings.”143 >>> Figure 5: Delays and Costs are Identified as Main Challenges in Accessing Statutory Courts Delays 46% Costs and attorney fees 18% Language barriers 11% Not enough time with the judge 7% Unprofessional behavior and misconduct 6% Undue influence and corruption 4% Improper case management and handling of files 4% No challenges 4% Issues with the counterpart 1% 0 10 20 30 40 50 Respondents (%) Source: Interviews with court users, May-June 2024. Note: Authors’ calculations based on participants’ answers to the question “What has been the most challenging part of your interaction with the courts?” Respondents could not choose multiple answers. 142. Interviews with court users, May-June 2024. 143. Interviews with court users, May-June 2024. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 40 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION As evidenced in the analysis of judges’ geographical When asked about the reasons for this distribution in Section 2.2, staffing shortages are understaffing, experts indicated that it may frequently cited as a major contributing factor to be due to the absence of incentives to join the inefficiency within the judiciary. Currently, there judicial profession and the lack of promotions for are 116 judges across South Sudan.144 Of these, judges, leading to limited opportunities for new 61 are stationed in the state of Central Equatoria, recruits.148 Indeed, although the law stipulates with 60 in the capital city of Juba and one in Yei that judicial officials are eligible for promotion County. The distribution of judges in other regions every five years149, some judges have served for includes 14 judges in the state of Western Bahr al up to fifteen years without promotion.150 This Ghazal; 10 in Upper Nile; nine in Northern Bahr circumstance is evident in the current imbalance al Ghazal; five in Eastern Equatoria; five in Lakes; between First Grade and Second Grade County five in Warrap; two in Jonglei; one in Western judges, with 19 in the First Grade and 64 in the Equatoria; and one in Abyei. Notably, Unity State, Second Grade (Figure 6). This imbalance can as well as the administrative areas of Ruweng and impact the judiciary’s ability to manage incoming Pibor, currently have no judges assigned. caseloads effectively, as Second Grade judges have restricted jurisdiction under the Code of This underscores the understaffing of the judiciary, Civil Procedure Act. The delay in promotions especially outside of Juba. Due to these shortages, also undermines the goal of recognizing and county court judges are often given the powers of incentivizing high-performing judges, potentially high court judges, leading to the same case being deterring skilled and experienced individuals from heard in both the first instance and on appeal by the remaining in the judiciary. same presiding judge. This situation also means that the number of judges in certain locations falls short of the mandated requirements for specific panels. For instance, the Judiciary Act mandates that the Court of Appeal operate with a panel of at least three judges,145 yet Upper Nile state has only one Court of Appeal judge, who is currently stationed in Juba due to security issues.146 Similarly, the Supreme Court, which is constitutionally required to have at least eleven judges and needs a panel of nine judges for constitutional cases, currently has only six judges on the bench.147 144. The team obtained a list of justices and judges from the Judiciary of South Sudan. According to this document, there are 113 judges assigned to a specific court location, while two judges are suspended, and one judge is on leave without pay. 145. Section 13(2) of the Judiciary Act, 2008. 146. Interviews with Judges of Court of Appeal, May 2024. 147. Articles 125 and 126.3 of the TCRSS. 148. Interviews with judges of the Court of Appeal and with a member of the JRC, June 2024. 149. Section 40(3) of the Judiciary Act, 2008. 150. Interviews with Judges of Court of Appeal, May 2024.  SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 41 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION >>> Figure 6: Distribution of Judges Per Staffing Level Supreme Court 6 Courts of Appeal 7 High Courts 20 First Grade County Judges 19 Second Grade County Judges 64 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Number of judges Source: Judiciary of South Sudan, List of Justices and Judges from the Judiciary of South Sudan as of June 1, 2024. Additionally, the lack of adequate incentives and officials from reporting to work regularly and can also poor working conditions in the judiciary further pose security risks.154 Delays in salary payments are contribute to the system’s understaffing problem. a recurring issue, exacerbated by disruptions in oil Judges receive lower salaries compared to those exports due to the ongoing conflict in Sudan, which in similar professions and face challenging working has significantly impacted South Sudan’s primary conditions. In 2017, this dissatisfaction led to a revenue source and further strained government strike by judicial officials, some of whom were finances.155 subsequently dismissed by presidential order.151 The current infrastructure for court buildings is In terms of public sector salaries, South Sudan’s overwhelmed, with a low ratio of rooms to judges Budget Books present a multispine approach to and generally overcrowded courtrooms.152 Many setting pay scales, with a general public service court offices are missing essential equipment such pay scale and sector-specific pay scales (for as computers, printers, and stationery, and frequent example, education, justice), which is presented as power outages further disrupt operations. According a basis for budget formulation.156 This multispine to the World Bank Group, in 2022, only 8.4 percent approach supports judicial independence by of the population in South Sudan had access to enabling the Judiciary to set specialized service electricity.153 In rural areas, the absence of vehicles remuneration packages, a common practice in and poor road infrastructure often prevent judicial other countries such as Mauritania and the United 151. Supra Amnesty International, 2019, page 15. 152. Interview with Judges of Court of Appeal, May 2024. 153. World Bank Group. n.d. “Access to electricity (% of the population) – South Sudan.” Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 154. Interview with the Human Resources Department of the Judiciary of South Sudan, March 2024. 155. International Crisis Group. 2024. “South Sudan on Edge as Its Neighbour’s War Disrupts Oil Exports.” Brussels: International Crisis Group. 156. Ministry of Finance and Planning, Budget Book FY2022/3. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 42 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION States. A comparative mapping of base pay and Moreover, as the respective websites of the allowances for judicial positions with equivalently MoJCA, the Civil Service Commission, and the remunerated public service grades in Table 2, Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoFP) are not however, suggests a mismatch between base pay consistently maintained, the legislative framework rates and responsibilities: the base monthly income for public employment – and the pay scales and of a Justice of the Supreme Court corresponds allowance instructions in particular – are not with the equivalent expected base pay of a Ministry publicly available, and only partially disclosed Department Director. This mismatch is particularly through annual Budget Books accompanying the more pronounced at junior levels of the corps, with Appropriation Acts, on an inconsistent basis.158 the monthly base salary of a Second Grade Judge corresponding to the expected remuneration of a In any case, these allowances have helped align Computer Operator on the general public sector the total compensation of Supreme Court Justices, scale. Court of Appeal Justices, and High Court Judges with those in the “Leadership” Public Service Grade The Judiciary has tried to address low base Category. However, the impact is less significant salaries by using monthly allowances, which for junior judges. For example, a First Grade Judge comprise 51 percent of total compensation for and a Second Grade Judge earn similarly to IT judicial positions. This is higher than the 38 percent Officers and Chief Storekeepers, respectively in Higher Education and 13 percent in Public (Table 2). Finally, while senior judicial positions Administration. This low percentage of base pay now have compensation comparable to public in the wage contributes to a lack of transparency, service leadership roles, they still earn much less as discretionary non-pay benefits are often than those in the education sector, with a Supreme unaccounted for and managed in a decentralized Court Justice earning only about nine percent of a and often opaque manner.157 While these risks University Lecturer’s wage. are somewhat offset by the low absolute value of allowances received per position, there will be a need to review pay grading and nonwage incentives more holistically prior to raising base pay and allowance levels in view of the currency’s depreciation and current inflation rates. 157. Van Acker, W., and Z. Hasnain. 2019. “Wage Bill and Pay Reform: A First Glance and Look Forward.” Governance Notes No. 16. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 158. The Staffing Structure Tables by Grade in the FY2023/4 Budget Book only provide a headcount of workers by grade, whereas Budget Books for FY2019/20 – FY2022-3 provide the monthly base wage, housing allowance, and total other allowances at a granular level. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 43 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION >>> Table 2: Comparison of Judicial Base Pay with General Public Service Pay Value159 Public Service Employee Equivalences Pay element Position (Monthly) USD USD Grade Examples of Title or SSP Pay (Jul, 2022) (Oct, 2024) Category Post160 Grade 2 BP Director of Department Base Pay (BP) 10,800 $23.31 $2.83 Leadership Justice (99%) of Ministry of the Supreme Total Court Grade 1 TC Director General of Compensation 26,350 $56.88 $6.91 Leadership (165%) Directorate of Ministry (TC) Grade 6 BP Assistant Chief Base Pay 8,400 $18.13 $2.20 Super Grade Justice of (99%) Technical Officer the Court of Appeals Total Grade 1 TC Director of Department 19,050 $41.12 $4.99 Leadership Compensation (119%) of Ministry Head Staff Clerk/ Para- Grade 10 BP Head Accountant/ Base Pay 4,800 $10.36 $1.26 Professional & (74%) Chief Cashier/ Chief High Court Technical Storekeeper Judge Total Grade 3 TC First Deputy Director of 11,900 $25.69 $3.12 Leadership Compensation (98%) Department Senior Technician/ Grade 11 BP Senior Bookkeeper/ Base Pay 3,600 $7.77 $0.94 Skilled Worker (90%) Land Officer/ Head First Class Driver/ Head Mechanic Judge Administrative Total Grade 8 TC Inspector/ Technical 8,230 $17.77 $2.16 and Compensation (101%) Officer/ IT Officer Professional Para- Grade 12 BP Senior Clerk/ Computer Base Pay 3,000 $6.48 $0.79 Professional & (97%) Operator/ Secretary Technical Second Class Judge Head Staff Clerk/ Para- Total Grade 10 TC Head Accountant/ 6,385 $13.78 $1.67 Professional & Compensation (91%) Chief Cashier/ Chief Technical Storekeeper Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from Ministry of Finance and Planning, Budget Book FY2022/3 and Civil Service Act, 2011. 159. Given high geospatial variation and variation in exchange rate pricing between official and parallel exchange markets, South Sudanese Pound to United States Dollar exchange rates are taken as the overall market average rate from WBG (2024) “Microdata SSD_2023_RTFX_v01_M.” As the FY2023/4 budget tables do not present staffing by grade and pay consistently with prior years, the October 01, 2024, USD price equivalence of the FY2022/3 salaries used in the comparative analysis are presented to illustrate the rapid currency depreciation only; the Government may have since updated the scales but has not made this public as usually presented in annual budget documentation. 160. Civil Service Act, 2011. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 44 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION In FY2022/23, the Judiciary generated SSP 512 conditions and expanding service delivery million from court user fees, representing roughly for citizens will necessarily require additional a quarter of planned expenditure for the fiscal funds from the Consolidated Fund. Although the year. However, increasing judicial pay through budget share for the Judiciary has returned to these revenues could make justice services more pre-COVID levels, it remains a small portion of expensive and less accessible, especially given the government budget due to the prioritization the levels of economic hardship in the country. of other sectors, such as infrastructure, natural Moreover, addressing nonwage motivators of resources and rural development, and public judicial officials through improved working administration (Figure 7). >>> Figure 7: Judiciary Share of Total Budget Compared with Other Sectors 100% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.3% 2.4% 3.1% 4.4% 6.2% 6.7% 8.5% 90% 14.2% 22.2% 16.7% 9.9% 80% 8.8% 29.0% 70% 21.8% 10.5% 11.3% 16.7% 60% 15.7% 18.0% 50% 28.1% 40% 16.7% 30% 57.3% 63.3% 41.6% 20% 31.7% 33.6% 10% 0% 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23 2023/24 Judiciary Rule of Law (excl. Judiciary) Social Sector Agencies Security Agencies Public Administration Agencies Economic Sector Agencies Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning Website, Annual Budget Books FY2018/9 – FY2023/4. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 45 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Midyear budget execution reports also suggest that annual targets, and nonoil revenues amounted to the Judiciary spending is being deprioritized (Figure 325 percent of their annual forecast. This revenue- 8). The GoSS’ FY2023/24 midyear budget report161 side over-performance is partially mirrored in highlights revenue collection over-performance with spending, with 52 percent of the annual aggregate total revenues collected in Quarter 2 (Oct–Dec) of expenditure target reached by midyear.162 Despite the FY 2023/4 fiscal year amounting to 84.2 percent this over-performance at the aggregate level, only of the annual revenue target, of which oil revenues 12.3 percent of the Judiciary’s budget was executed collected by midyear amounted to 80 percent of during the same period. >>> Figure 8: Percentage Annual Budget Execution Rates by Midyear for Selected Agencies Judical Service Commission 0 South Sudan Law Review Commission 10 Judiciary of South Sudan 12.3 Bureau of Community Security & Small Arms Control 12.9 Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 20.9 South Sudan Human Rights Commission 22.5 Commission for Refugee Affairs 46.9 Police 70.7 Wildlife Conservation & Tourism 83.4 Fire Brigade 88.7 Ministry of Interior 90.5 Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs & Disaster Management 102.3 Prisons 107 Ministry of Environment & Forestry 123.1 South Sudan Broadcasting Cooporation 228.1 Ministry of Presidential Affairs 354.8 National Revenue Authority 379.1 Ministry of Transport 762 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 Percentage Budget Execution Rate Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning, Midyear Budget Execution Report FY2023/4 (as reported with no calculations by WBG Staff). Notes: The Y axis represents the agencies included in the Budget Book, while the X axis represents the percentage execution rate for each agency according to the Mid-year Budget Report FY2023/24. 161. Ministry of Finance and Planning, Second Quarter Revenue and Expenditure Report FY2023/4, page 3, Table 2, and Figures 1–6 for monthly actuals to budget comparisons by oil and non-oil revenue streams for July – December 2023, which all exceed estimated forecasts. 162. Ministry of Finance and Planning, Second Quarter Revenue and Expenditure Report FY2023/4, Tables A1 and A4. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 46 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Among the 88 budgetary agencies identified in the The de-prioritization of government spending on the MoFP report, 25 percent had execution rates above Judiciary in South Sudan becomes starkly apparent 50 percent of their annual approved budgets by when compared to judicial budget allocations in midyear, and 17 percent were within the 15 percent other countries. According to a WBG database on PEFA tolerance threshold. While 72 percent of the judicial budgets, South Sudan allocates the lowest sectoral Rule of Law spending target was met by percentage of its government expenditure to the midyear, the Judiciary’s under-execution highlights judiciary among countries in the region with similar its relative de-prioritization163 within Rule of Law income levels (Figure 9). Specifically, the Judiciary agencies compared to its executive counterpart in South Sudan received only 0.11 percent of (MoJCA) and closely interfaced institutions like the government expenditure in 2020. This is significantly Police and Prisons. This in-year de-prioritization is lower than the allocations in other countries: Liberia further evidenced in seven agencies having more (1.08 percent), Ghana (1.16 percent), Mozambique than exhausted their agency annual appropriations (1.25 percent), Mali (1.41 percent), Uganda (1.62 by midyear.164 percent),Kenya (2.18 percent), the Democratic Republic of Congo (3.26 percent), and Sierra Leone (3.40 percent).165 >>> Figure 9: South Sudan’s Judicial Budget is Lower Than in Other Economies in the Region (FY2020) 4 3 Percentage 2 1 0 South Sudan Liberia Ghana Mozambique Mali Uganda Kenya Congo (DRC) Sierra Leone Source: World Bank database, 2024. 163. Under-execution may be driven by other factors beyond the funds’ liquidity and cash rationing decisions made by the Treasury, including MDAs not meeting financial compliance requirements, their own administrative capacity to implement their budgets, and the credibility and reliability of their own budget proposals and costing estimates. 164. Agencies having exhausted their annual budget by midyear furthermore points to issues in both the credibility of agency annual budget submissions to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, as well as spending control failures given reported spending above authorized budget ceilings. 165. Bosio, E. 2024. Reforming Justice. Engaging with Countries on Judicial Budgets. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 47 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION a. Delays often lost or damaged, forcing them to restart their processes (Figure 10). Additionally, in the absence The limited resources of South Sudan’s statutory of a proper case tracking system, court users often courts significantly hinder their ability to resolve face repeated visits to the court due to misplaced cases in a timely manner. Ineffective case files and clerks’ inability to locate case records. This management practices further exacerbate results in an average wait time of approximately these constraints and undermine efficient case three hours per visit, with peaks of five hours processing. The Judiciary in South Sudan lacks a among court users interviewed by the team.166 systematized case management system, resulting This situation imposes opportunity costs on justice in unreliable and inefficient registry processes. seekers, as the time spent traveling to the court and Court users frequently report issues such as waiting for case updates represents time lost from inadequate file management, with documents work or other productive activities.167 >>> Figure 10: Main Causes of Delays as Identified by Court Users Staffing shortages and inadequate salaries 33% Corruption and unprofessional behavior 27% Improper case management and handling of files 16% Improper infrastructure and equipment 9% Issues with the counterpart 7% Cumbersome precedures 4% I don’t know 4% 0 10 20 30 40 Respondents (%) Source: Interviews with court users, May-June 2024. Note: Authors’ calculations based on participants’ answer to the question “In your view, what is the main reason for delays in courts”? Respondents could not choose multiple answers. 166. Interviews with court users, May–June 2024. 167. According to Gramatikov and others (2011), opportunity costs are defined as “non-monetary costs for which markets exist and whose shadow costs could be estimated.” These costs arise in forms other than money but can be converted into monetary values, such as the time spent resolving a dispute or the earnings lost due to the ongoing procedure. See Gramatikov, M. A., J. M. Barendrecht, and J. H. Verdonschot. 2011. “Measuring the costs and quality of paths to justice: Contours of a methodology.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3 (2): 349–379. Page 360. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 48 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Delays are exacerbated by the lack of proper cases nearly doubled the workload of the existing recording of caseload data, which impedes the two panels.168 Although the rate of resolved cases ability to monitor individual judges’ workloads remained steady in 2022, the growing backlog and track the number of pending cases per court. from the increased caseload adversely affected Currently, case recording is performed manually clearance rates, falling from 44 percent in 2022 by court clerks, who log individual case details to just 14 percent in 2023. Judges interviewed into physical docket books without tracking the cited the approval of appeal requests that were total number of cases that have been received backlogged from COVID-19 in the lower courts and disposed of. Electronic recording is nearly and court users’ increased knowledge of appeal nonexistent due to limited internet access in courts mechanisms as key reasons behind the surge in and the lack of computers for judges and clerical cases at the Supreme Court.169 staff. As a result, to verify information on incoming and disposed cases, the World Bank team had to Consequently, disposition times at the Supreme manually count the number of cases by hand with Court have quadrupled in the last three years, the help of the court clerk, obtaining caseload from 259 days in 2021, to 473 in 2022 and 2201 information from Juba County Court, the High Court in 2023. This corresponds to more than six years. of Central Equatoria State, the Court of Appeal of Comparatively, the highest courts of other countries Greater Equatoria and the Supreme Court. Based in the region have much higher clearance rates: on the data obtained, the team calculated the 43 percent in Uganda, 83 percent in Rwanda, 100 clearance rate, case turnover, and disposition times percent in Tanzania, and 127 percent in Kenya.170 for the courts at the different levels. The backlogs affecting the Supreme Court in South Sudan may also be attributed to the Court’s current The analysis of caseload data reveals a steep composition. With only six judges on the bench, decline in clearance rates at the Supreme Court the Court is below the constitutional requirement over the past three years (Figure 11). This trend of eleven judges. Expanding the Court’s capacity began in 2022, when the number of incoming cases by increasing the number of judges to meet the surged by 50 percent, increasing from 135 cases constitutional requirement could enhance the in 2021 to 202 cases in 2022. The Supreme Court clearance rate and help manage both the backlog operates in panels of three judges, and the rise in and the rising number of incoming cases. 168. Article 126.3 of the TCRSS stipulates that the Supreme Court is to make decisions in panels of three judges, except when functioning as a constitutional panel, which requires a minimum of nine judges. With the Supreme Court currently composed of six judges, this configuration allows for the formation of only two panels. 169. Follow-up interview with judges of the Court of Appeal, August 2024. 170. Clearance rates higher than 100 percent indicate that the court is clearing previous backlog by solving more cases than it receives. See: The Judiciary of Kenya. 2024. State of the Judiciary and the Administration of Justice, Annual Report 2022/23, Nairobi, Kenya; Judiciary of Rwanda. 2024. Performance of the Judiciary During the Year 2022-2023, Kigali, Rwanda; Judiciary of Tanzania. 2023. Comprehensive Performance Report of the Judicial Functions – 2022, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and The Judiciary of Uganda. 2023. Annual Performance Report FY 2022/2023, Kampala, Uganda. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 49 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION >>> Figure 11: The Supreme Court Saw a Steep Decline in Clearance Rates 250 70% 225 59% 202 60% 200 50% 44% 150 135 40% Number of cases Clearance rate 30% 100 88 79 20% 14% 50 32 10% 0 0% 2021 2022 2023 Incoming Resolved Clearance rate Source: Caseload data obtained by the team from the Judiciary of South Sudan, June 2024.  Clearance rates are higher in lower courts, but a The High Court of Central Equatoria also faces similar downward trend is evident in both the Court challenges, with a 53 percent increase in new of Appeal of Greater Equatoria and the High Court of cases from 437 in 2021 to 670 in 2023. As a result, Central Equatoria. At the Court of Appeal of Greater clearance rates declined from 80 percent in 2022 Equatoria, clearance rates dropped from 35 percent to 69 percent in 2023. Disposition times increased in 2022 to 26 percent in 2023. This decline nearly from 93 days in 2022 to 165 days in 2023 (Figure doubled disposition times, increasing from 676 days 12). Still, a clearance rate of 69 percent is relatively in 2022 to 1028 days in 2023. It may be attributed to consistent with that of High Courts in the region, with a 28 percent increase in incoming cases in the last 68 percent in Rwanda and 75 percent in Uganda.172 three years, which rose from 390 in 2021 to 500 in The presence of nine judges at the High Court of 2023. In comparison, Courts of Appeal in neighboring Central Equatoria, located in Juba, may contribute countries perform significantly better, with clearance to a more balanced distribution of the increased rates of 67 percent in Uganda, 70 percent in Kenya, 92 workload, mitigating the impact of the rising case percent in Rwanda, and 102 percent in Tanzania.171 volume. In contrast, the Court of Appeal of Greater Equatoria, which serves Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and Eastern Equatoria, operates with only three judges, highlighting the difficulties of facing an increased caseload with less human resources. 171. Supra Annual Reports for the Judiciary of Kenya, 2024; Judiciary of Rwanda, 2024; Judiciary of Tanzania, 2023; and Judiciary of Uganda, 2023. 172. Supra Annual Reports for the Judiciary of Kenya, 2024; Judiciary of Rwanda, 2024; and Judiciary of Uganda, 2023. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 50 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION >>> Figure 12: Clearance Rates Are Higher in Lower Instance Courts 1000 90% 78% 80% 900 860 80% 807 800 69% 70% 703 700 670 60% 612 600 Number of cases Clearance rate 50% 500 500 488 461 437 422 40% 390 35% 400 343 34% 26% 30% 300 26% 20% 25% 211 20% 200 172 175 148 132 131 100 10% 0 0% 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023 High Court of Court of Appeal Juba County Court Central Equatoria State of Greater Equatoria Incoming Resolved Clearance rate Source: Caseload data obtained by the team from the Judiciary of South Sudan, June 2024.  In contrast, the Juba County Court has seen a to 175 in 2023.Therefore, disposition times have decline in incoming cases, decreasing from 860 remained high, averaging around 1101 days in in 2021 to 703 in 2023. This reduction has led to 2023, or approximately three years, to reach a final a modest improvement in clearance rates, which decision.173 This performance contrasts sharply increased from 20 percent in 2021 to 26 percent with primary courts in other countries in the region, in 2022, and slightly decreased to 25 percent where clearance rates are significantly higher: 53 in 2023. Despite the decline in incoming cases, percent in Liberia, 90 percent in Rwanda, 97 percent the number of resolved cases has remained in Uganda, 98 percent in Kenya, and 99 percent in steady, marginally decreasing from 211 in 2022 Tanzania (Figure 13).174 173. Based on caseload data obtained by the team from the Judiciary of South Sudan, June 2024.  174. Judiciary Branch of Government of Liberia. 2023. Annual Report 2021–2022, Monrovia, Liberia. Also see supra Annual Reports for the Judiciary of Kenya, 2024; Judiciary of Rwanda, 2024; Judiciary of Tanzania, 2023; and Judiciary of Uganda, 2023. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 51 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION >>> Figure 13: Clearance Rates in South Sudan are Significantly Lower than in Countries in the Region175 140% 127% 120% 113% 99% 104% 98% 97% 102% 100% 100% 92% 90% 83% 80% Clearance rate 75% 69% 70% 68% 67% 60% 53% 43% 38% 40% 25% 26% 20% 14% 6% N/A 0% Primary Court High Court Court of Appeal Highest National Court Kenya Liberia Rwanda South Sudan Tanzania Uganda Source: Comparative clearance rates from the Highest National Court (Supreme Court or Highest Court of Appeal), Court of Appeal, High Court and Primary Court in Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, as reported in the Annual Reports of the Judiciary.176 Note: For comparative purposes, courts in each country were classified into four categories: Primary Courts (typically first instance or magistrate courts), High Courts (typically second instance courts or highest regional courts), Courts of Appeal, and the highest national court (highest court of appeal at the national level or supreme court). In Liberia, the justice system comprises Magistrate Courts (equivalent to Primary Courts), Circuit Courts (equivalent to High Courts), and the Supreme Court. It does not include Courts of Appeal, which is noted as “N/A” in the figure. As referenced earlier when analyzing the issue of limited revenue. These delays in remuneration can understaffing, court inefficiency can be attributed, lead to low motivation, high staff turnover, and the in part, to the low salaries and poor working loss of experienced personnel. Consequently, the conditions of judicial officials. A 2018 report by the quality of outputs can be compromised, and civil African Development Bank highlighted that civil servants may resort to illicit activities to sustain servants in the country frequently experienced their livelihoods.177 delays in the payment of their salaries because of 175. Comparator countries were selected based on two main criteria: (i) regional proximity, specifically countries within Sub-Saharan Africa, and (ii) the availability of recent public reports on the performance of their justice systems. Additionally, the team utilized data from the previous JUPITER assessment conducted in Liberia, which collected information on identical data points using the same methodology. 176. Supra Annual Reports for the Judiciary of Kenya, 2024; Judiciary of Rwanda, 2024; Judiciary of Liberia, 2023; Judiciary of Tanzania, 2023; and Judiciary of Uganda, 2023. 177. African Development Bank (AfDB). 2019. The Political Economy of South Sudan. Abidjan: AfDB. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 52 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION b. Costs team was unable to obtain even after several visits to the courts. Due to the lack of public availability Inefficiencies in the courts not only lead to of updated schedules, lawyers interviewed by delays but also increase the overall costs of legal the team considered that information about court proceedings. As disputes take longer to resolve, the fees was difficult to understand and highlighted accumulating costs contribute to higher expenses inconsistencies in its application.180 In addition, throughout the process. Costs related to court when information on fees is not publicly available, proceedings encompass three main components: it is easier to demand ad-hoc fees from litigants. court fees, attorney fees, and additional fees for When asked for an estimate, judges and advocates expediting case processing. mentioned that court fees tend to be around 10 percent of the claim amount, similar to In South Sudan, the court fee schedule published what previous studies have estimated.181 When on the MoJCA website was issued in 2007 and has compared to court fees levied in other countries, not been updated to reflect the country’s episodes South Sudan tends to be at the higher end of the of hyperinflation178 and the currency’s significant spectrum, markedly higher than Tanzania (4.3 depreciation.179 However, this is not the schedule percent), Uganda (6.7 percent), and Liberia (6.9 currently used to calculate court fees, which the percent) (Figure 14). >>> Figure 14: Court Fees in South Sudan Tend to be Higher than in Other Countries in the Region 14 13.3 11.6 12 10 Court fees (% of claim value) 10 8 6.7 6.9 6 4.3 4 2 0 Tanzania Uganda Liberia South Sudan Kenya Rwanda Source: Doing Business 2020, World Bank Group. Note: Costs are recorded as a percentage of claim value, assumed to be equivalent to 200 percent of income per capita or USD 5,000, whichever is greater. For court fees, the percentage includes all costs that the plaintiff must advance to the court.182 178. Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has faced episodes of hyperinflation, notably in 2015 when inflation soared to 346.1 percent, and more recently in 2024, with inflation rising to 120.6 percent. 179. According to an interview with Judges of the Court of Appeal in June 2024, the Chief Justice has already appointed a subcommittee to review and update the current fee schedule, which completed its review in April 2024, and submitted it to the Ministry of Finance and Planning for approval. 180. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. 181. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business indicator on “Enforcing Contracts,” court fees represent 10 percent of the value of the claim in South Sudan in 2020. See World Bank Group. 2020a. Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies. Washington, DC: World Bank. 182. World Bank Group. n.d. Doing Business. Enforcing Contracts Methodology. Washington, DC: World Bank. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 53 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION Many court users have also expressed concerns This finding is consistent with other recent about the overall financial burden due to the indicators of public sector corruption. The 2023 extended duration of proceedings and the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency accumulation of various administrative fees International scored South Sudan 13 out of 100 required at each step. The total cost of filing a claim points, placing it as the third worst-performing becomes substantial when factoring in expenses country globally, just ahead of Somalia and for transport, printing, photocopying, and other Venezuela. Transparency International also notes requirements. Each payment requires interactions that petty corruption is prevalent in the country, with court clerks, who often demand additional with citizens often facing demands for bribes payments beyond the official fees, which are hard when engaging with government institutions, to estimate due to the unavailability of information affecting their adequate access to public about how court fees are calculated and applied. services.187 Similarly, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s For example, one court user noted that while an Transformation Index (BTI) gives South Sudan official receipt might state a fee of SSP150, they are the lowest possible score of 1 out of 10 on its sometimes required to pay up to SSP2000.183 anti-corruption policies indicator.188 Reasonably, addressing corruption and implementing measures Unofficial fees are often also paid to judges to to prevent abuse of power is crucial for the people expedite or influence cases, a problem exacerbated of South Sudan. A recent survey revealed that 63.2 by the low compensation and delayed payments of percent of South Sudanese across various regions salaries.184 Users have reported various instances of consider that being able to hold the government these practices, noting: “People with connections accountable is essential, underscoring the critical influence judges with money and this delays the importance of this issue in their interaction with cases of the poor people;” “My documents got the state.189 lost and I am sure it was due to the money given to the judge;” “Some judges are friends with owners Attorney fees are also part of the costs incurred of law firms, who sometimes meet to discuss the by individuals and businesses to pursue claims in cases and influence decisions with friendship and statutory courts, which many court users identify money;” and “Delays in salaries for judges has as a challenge in their interaction with the courts. demotivated them hence they are demanding a lot Users highlighted that “If you do not have money of money.”185 According to the latest report from you will not get a lawyer;” “My challenge is that Bertelsmann Stiftung on South Sudan, there is a the judge is telling me to get a lawyer to help me widespread perception that political and military but I cannot afford that;” and “The issue is getting elites abuse their power to influence court cases, someone to help with the case if you do not have a including through direct bribery and intimidation.186 lawyer to follow the law in the court.”190 Lawyers 183. Interviews with court users, May–June 2024. 184. A report by the African Development Bank on the political economy of South Sudan found that the government’s failure to pay its staff due to limited revenue drives civil servants to seek income through illicit activities, including bribery. Supra African Development Bank, 2019. 185. Interviews with court users, May–June 2024. 186. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2024. Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index: South Sudan Country Report 2024. Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 187. Supra Harutyunyan, 2023. 188. Supra Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024. 189. Deng, D., S. Dawkins, C. Oringa, and J. Pospisil. 2022. “Policy Brief on security and governance: National survey on perceptions of peace in South Sudan.” The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh. This briefing note presents the headline findings about citizens’ perceptions of security and governance from a survey of South Sudanese in 2021–2022. The three-wave survey recorded the views of 8,843 people from 12 counties across nine states and special administrative areas, covering urban, rural and IDP camp environments. Respondents were asked questions about their daily experiences of safety, based on indicators of everyday peace developed through focus groups. They also shared their views on a wide range of governance topics, from power sharing to the implications of army unification. 190. Interviews with lawyers, June 2024. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 54 FINDINGS FROM DATA COLLECTION interviewed by the team mentioned that their requires an additional procedure to enforce the compensation varies as they charge a percentage decree.193 This challenge is exacerbated by the fact of the claim’s value. However, the law does not that court users have noted significant difficulties define a minimum or maximum rate to be paid to in presenting a claim without legal representation, lawyers, nor has it been established by the SSBA. as there are no publicly available lay documents or Previous studies suggest that attorney fees tend guides to facilitate self-representation. to be lower in South Sudan than those charged in countries in the region (Figure 15). Overall, the combination of official and unofficial costs makes the court process in South Sudan too To understand how this may impact potential expensive for most users. In fact, 80 percent of litigants, JUPITER examines the likelihood that court users interviewed by the team reported that the winning party will receive full reimbursement costs were higher than anticipated, and 18 percent of attorney fees. By law, the costs of the legal identified costs and access to representation as a process, which include attorney fees as well significant challenge they faced in their interactions as expenses for experts and witnesses, are to with the court.194 This makes the statutory courts be paid by the judgment debtor in the amount inaccessible for people who do not have enough determined by the court.192 In practice, however, money to overcome the financial burden related to practicing lawyers have highlighted that obtaining judicial proceedings. full reimbursement of fees is very difficult, as it >>> Figure 15: Attorney Fees in South Sudan are Lower than in Countries in the Region 30 28 27.5 25.1 25 Attorney fees (% of claim value) 20 15 15 15 10 10 5 0 Tanzania South Sudan Uganda Liberia Kenya Rwanda Source: Doing Business 2020, World Bank Group. Note: Costs are recorded as a percentage of claim value, assumed to be equivalent to 200 percent of income per capita or USD 5,000, whichever is greater. In terms of attorney fees, the percentage includes the average fees the plaintiff must advance to a local attorney to be represented in a case, regardless of final reimbursement.191 191. Supra World Bank Group, n.d., Doing Business. Enforcing Contracts Methodology. 192. Section 110(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 193. Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. 194. Interviews with court users, May–June 2024. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 55 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS After years of conflict and power struggles, the To guide these reforms, the R-ARCSS established parties to the R-ARCSS have laid the foundations the JRC to study and make recommendations on for a transition to a peaceful society founded on judicial reform for consideration of the GoSS. The “justice, equality, respect for human rights and the JRC submitted a draft report in February 2024. rule of law.”195 The Peace Agreement emphasizes Subsequently, the GoSS organized a workshop to the importance of establishing an independent and validate the findings and recommendations with effective judiciary, calling for a range of specific stakeholders, which took place in October 2024, reforms. These include structural constitutional and a final report was presented to the President of reforms, such as establishing a Constitutional South Sudan in December 2024.196 The JRC’s draft Court, and legal reforms, such as reviewing judicial report identified 88 recommendations, ranging legislation and reconstituting the JSC. Justice from large-scale reforms, such as establishing reform is often most effectively implemented specialized courts, to smaller interventions, like during periods of extraordinary politics, such as providing IT equipment to judges.197 Despite the transition from conflict. extensive and ambitious list of reforms, the draft report does not provide insights on prioritization or feasibility. 195. Preamble of the 2018 R-ARCCS. 196. See RJMEC. 2024. Implement JRC report expeditiously, RJMEC urges government. RJMEC official website; and Sudans Post. December 22, 2024. “President Kiir receives final report of Judiciary Committee,” Sudans Post website. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 56 POLICY IMPLICATIONS For instance, although there is evidence that First, policies need to correspond to current specialized courts may achieve greater efficiency, realities and realistic expectations of development higher-quality decisions in complex areas of the law, and reform, including from a budgetary perspective, and greater uniformity, they also have limitations in a rather than to an ideal image of the justice system resource-constrained environment like South Sudan traditionally tailored to high-income countries. that could factor into the prioritization.198 Creating Given the country’s current financial and capacity specialized courts may divert human and financial limitations, the recommendations will adopt a resources from courts of general jurisdiction, staggered approach, focusing on potential interim which is particularly important given South Sudan’s and medium-term measures to alleviate some of challenges in staffing and adequately funding its the most urgent constraints in access to justice general courts. With these resource limitations, while long-term solutions can be implemented. it may be prudent to prioritize other areas before Considering these limitations, it is crucial to ensure focusing on the establishment of specialized courts. the recommendations are realistic and actionable. Additionally, a feasibility study should be conducted For example, while establishing an independent to understand the specific needs and case types legal aid body could enhance the oversight and that would justify the creation of these courts. coordination of legal assistance services, it would entail significant upfront costs in terms of financial Complementing the JRC’s efforts and recognizing and human resources, which may not be feasible in that some reforms may require constitutional the short- to medium term. The same conclusion amendments beyond the scope of this report, applies to the introduction of electronic case JUPITER’s key objective is to provide empirical management, digitalization, and e-services, which evidence to assist the GoSS in identifying and are put on a future list, since, at present, courts are prioritizing legal and operational reforms to improve not ready to implement them, as they do not have the efficiency, accessibility, and transparency of standardized analog case management and filing the justice system in South Sudan. JUPITER’s processes. strength lies in its ability to provide data that supports more concrete and practical actions. Second, the concurrent usage of the formal and This is crucial because the proper sequencing customary justice systems in South Sudan, and the of reforms is essential to their success. Some reliance of most users on the customary system, reforms are propaedeutic to others—for example, suggest that policies for improving justice should implementing an electronic case management focus on both systems and the interplay between system requires first standardizing rules for manual them. While it is crucial to lay the foundations of a case management. Additionally, certain reforms strong statutory justice system, mutually beneficial may require building greater capacity and securing and regulated coexistence between the two more resources before they can be implemented. systems can widen access to justice for all citizens. The policy implications outlined below are grounded Neglecting the customary system – or, worse, trying in three guiding principles. to alienate it – can carry consequences, including creating vacuums, exacerbating the negative 197. The team had access to the draft report shared by members of the Judicial Reform Committee, but not the final version of the report. The draft report highlights specific issues such as political interference with the judicial appointment and removal process, poor working conditions for judges and staff, and insufficient training and capacity building for judicial personnel. 198. Gramckow, H.; and B. Walsh. 2013. “Developing specialized court services : International experiences and lessons learned.” Justice and Development Working Paper Series 24. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 57 POLICY IMPLICATIONS impact of pluralism, threatening the values of large Third, the policy implications build on earlier segments of the population, and placing undue interventions and attempt to address or circumvent pressure on justice seekers. In contrast, engaging some of the main reasons for their failures. Many with the customary system can legitimize its role locally led efforts and donor-supported programs, in alleviating court backlogs, as well as start a such as the CMGs and the JCCs, have improved process of socioeconomic transformation that access to justice and legal empowerment. leads to the elimination of harmful practices from However, these initiatives have struggled with the customary system.199 sustainability due to their dependence on external funding. The policy implications discussed below prioritize feasibility. 3.1. Building Mutually Beneficial and Reinforcing Linkages Between Statutory and Customary Justice Customary justice is an essential part of dispute and avoid corrupt behavior. When high discretion resolution in South Sudan. As explored in Section is vested in decision-makers—whether they be 2.1 of this report, the legal framework reflects this judges, police, or customary leaders—regarding reality, as customary rules are constitutionally where a certain case should be adjudicated, and recognized as a source of law, and customary there is material variation in the outcomes available authorities are integrated into the local governance from these different fora, this situation creates structure. In principle, the jurisdiction of inroads for corruption and abuse. By contrast, when customary authorities is clear in excluding criminal the interface is strong, predictable, and reliable, cases unless these have a “customary interface.” potential injustices and unfair decisions can be However, this has been difficult to interpret curtailed.200 Unclear rules of engagement can and apply consistently, presenting challenges, also enable predatory forum shopping, where the particularly for serious cases. Other areas where politically and economically powerful have more unclear boundaries between statutory and possibilities to take advantage of forum choices. customary systems have created gaps in access to justice include land cases involving demarcated Thus, building mutually beneficial linkages between land. In these cases, statutory authorities have statutory and customary justice in South Sudan precluded customary authorities from making could help close the justice gap in many ways. First, decisions, even without specific legal provisions. leveraging the prevalence of customary justice actors, especially in rural areas, brings dispute The existence of a clear interface between state resolution services to regions where statutory and nonstate justice can increase transparency courts are largely absent. Second, the current 199. Supra Bosio and Upegui, 2023. 200. Harper, E. 2011. Customary Justice: From Program Design to Impact Evaluation. Rome: International Development Law Organization, pages 79 and 89. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 58 POLICY IMPLICATIONS integration of customary courts into the statutory The documentation of customary rules is also system via appeals allows the former to address an important step in improving the functioning cases that are less complex, thereby helping to of the customary system and its relationship manage the caseload of statutory courts. Third, with the statutory system. Given the diversity of improving integration can help mitigate and prevent customary legal frameworks in South Sudan, this harmful practices, particularly against women. could help facilitate the resolution of inter-ethnic disputes and the review of decisions by statutory Given the notable prevalence of customary authorities who are not necessarily knowledgeable justice in South Sudan, improving the service and of customary law.203 Documentation, however, functioning of the system may be useful. This does not mean codification. It implies describing – could include strategies to enhance the fairness of not prescribing – key customary principles to guide outcomes, increase predictability, and promote the dispute resolution, which is essential to maintain alignment with human rights, such as the adoption the flexibility and focus on reconciliation that of standardized processes, the introduction of characterize customary justice. procedural safeguards, and the documentation of customary laws.201 Documentation efforts can include certain safeguards to prevent the crystallization of The standardization of processes involves discriminatory norms and power imbalances within introducing uniform practices, which, along with the customary justice system. As with codification, the establishment of procedural safeguards, documentation raises the question of whose version can enhance procedural fairness, transparency, of customary law should be considered. This risk and protect vulnerable populations from unfair may be mitigated by ensuring the participation outcomes. These measures may include creating of community members in the documentation codes of conduct for Chiefs, setting minimum process and by creating mechanisms for the standards for rights protection, establishing basic endorsement and periodic review of documented rules for evidence admissibility, and developing customary rules. Documenting customary law is protocols for record-keeping.202 Indeed, establishing also important to reduce the discretion that Chiefs some form of written records could help facilitate the have, which can often lead to harsher decisions review of customary decisions by statutory courts, for women and minorities, and to address other if needed, and create more transparency. These human rights concerns.204 records should include basic details sufficient for an outsider to review the facts and the decision in a dispute. Traditional and customary leaders could be trained in case recording and reporting with support from paralegals. 201. Supra Bosio and Upegui, 2023, pages 68 to 71. 202. International Development Law Organization (IDLO). 2019. “Practitioner Brief. Navigating Complex Pathways to Justice: Engagement with Customary and Informal Justice Systems.” Rome: IDLO. 203. Bosio, E., and P. McGrath. Forthcoming. Reforming Justice: Fostering Engagement Between Statutory Courts and Customary Law Systems. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 204. Supra Bosio and Upegui, 2023, page 71. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 59 POLICY IMPLICATIONS Potential steps to enhance the linkages between 3.1.3. Developing rules of conduct for customary statutory and customary justice and improve the justice actors and minimum standards of functioning of customary mechanisms include: rights protection. To potentially enhance the procedural and substantive fairness Clarifying 3.1.1. jurisdictional ambiguities. of customary decisions, Customary Law Consider clarifying the interpretation of Councils could consider developing the “customary interface” in criminal rules of conduct and standards for rights cases and the jurisdiction regarding protection in customary trials in line with land disputes over demarcated land and the Constitution. establish clear guidelines and criteria for referrals. In line with this, consider 3.1.4. Collecting data about the usage of the developing public information campaigns different dispute resolution mechanisms. on different pathways to justice, explaining Consistently collect data to diagnose the the process, requirements, advantages, volume and type of disputes that are solved and disadvantages of both the statutory through the statutory and the customary and customary systems. system to better understand justice seekers’ preferences and needs. To do so, 3.1.2. Ensuring the customary system’s compliance consider the establishment of protocols for with international and domestic human case recording in customary courts through rights standards. Identifying and eliminating the Customary Law Councils. harmful practices within customary systems is crucial for protecting human 3.1.5. Operationalizing the Customary Research rights and ensuring that these systems Center under the MoJCA. The MoJCA contribute to equitable and just outcomes created a Customary Research Center for all community members, particularly aimed to build the capacity of traditional vulnerable groups. Promoting opportunities leaders, conduct research on customary to raise awareness among customary law issues, and document customary rules. leaders and communities can help promote Although the Center has not resumed practices that are more attuned to human activities since 2009, it could be a good rights and the Constitution. This can platform to promote better linkages with be further enhanced by promoting the the customary system and promote participation of underrepresented groups in documentation of customary rules. decision-making. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 60 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3.2. Strengthening Judicial Independence and Accountability Judicial independence is essential for upholding Service Commission plays a crucial role in the rule of law and strengthening citizens’ trust the nomination of candidates for judicial in the judiciary. Independence is ensured not appointments in South Sudan. This role only through strong legislative and constitutional could be further enhanced by establishing guarantees, but also through their effective detailed regulations for the screening implementation in practice. As highlighted in and selection procedures of potential Section 2.2., subsection (g) of this report, although candidates by the JSC, as the necessary the principle of independence of the judiciary is institutional and procedural frameworks enshrined in the TCRSS and the R-ARCSS, there are have not yet been implemented. aspects of the legal framework and its application that could be reviewed to better safeguard the 3.2.2. Strengthening the role of the Judicial independence of judges. Service Commission in the Oversight of the Judiciary. The role of the JSC in the For instance, while the Constitution provides that discipline and general oversight of the the appointment of judges shall be done under judicial function can be strengthened by the recommendation of the JSC, the process for amending Section 48 of the Judiciary Act screening and selecting potential candidates is not to ensure that complaints against justices clearly delineated by law. For this reason, judges and judges are presented before the JSC. are often appointed without the JSC involvement Additionally, the JSC could adhere to the and without a transparent and objective recruiting regular quarterly meetings, and convene process. In addition, ambiguities in Article 134(2) more frequently as needed, in accordance of the TCRSS regulating the removal of judges with Article 10(2) of the Judicial Council have allowed their dismissal by presidential Act. decree without following proper disciplinary procedures, an issue that has been brought to the Another key area for strengthening the role East Africa Court of Justice. These two aspects of the JSC is its oversight over judicial wages affect crucial safeguards of judicial independence, and the regulation of allowances, which such as ensuring independent processes for the currently lack transparency. Establishing appointment and discipline of judges without an accountable and transparent judicial external interference and the security of judicial wage bill will be critical to secure increased tenure. financing for the sector and address pay-related demotivators. Furthermore, To strengthen the independence and accountability the JSC’s oversight capability will also of the Judiciary in South Sudan, the following be critical in ensuring that the judiciary actions could be considered: can systematically update both its revenue streams – starting with court fee 3.2.1. Ensuring the Effective Participation of schedules – and expenditures, including the Judicial Service Commission in the pay and allowance policy reviews, based Appointment of Judges. According to on prevailing macroeconomic and labor Article 133.2 of the TCRSS, the Judicial market conditions. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 61 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3.2.3. Raising Awareness About Mechanisms aware of unethical behavior. Informing for Judicial Accountability. Raising public users about the appropriate cases and awareness about the mechanisms to authorities for filing complaints could help receive complaints against judges can achieve this goal. empower citizens to act when they are 3.3. Making Courts more Affordable and Accessible Courts in South Sudan are largely inaccessible. process is often used to increase geographical Evidence presented in Section 2.2 indicates that access to justice. Mobile courts and mediation most areas outside Juba are severely underserved centers can be used in the short- to medium term by the statutory system, creating significant to address urgent needs in the most underserved justice gaps. Even when justice seekers reach a areas, while phased infrastructure programs can court premise, they encounter additional barriers be rolled out in the long term. that make the court process unsustainable due to the expenses involved in pursuing a case, 3.3.1. Mobile Courts. Consider deploying mobile including court fees, attorney fees, and unofficial courts to areas with a low number of courts fees. To exacerbate these issues, there is no and a high number of inhabitants, such as comprehensive government policy to provide legal in the states of Unity, Warrap, and Western aid services, leaving people facing socioeconomic Equatoria. Special attention can be given barriers with few options for support from local to areas with gaps in access to justice CSOs. Moreover, updated legal information is not within the customary system, particularly publicly available, affecting the transparency of the in regions with a higher prevalence of SGBV legal framework and hindering people’s knowledge and land disputes over demarcated land. about their rights. The following subsections will These mobile courts can also serve to raise delve into each of these issues and provide policy legal awareness and conduct outreach implications for the Government’s consideration. programs, informing citizens about the availability of mobile dispute resolution and providing legal assistance. It is important a. Increase Geographical Accessibility of the to consider the sustainability of these Courts initiatives by securing human and financial resources to maintain mobile services. For many citizens in South Sudan, particularly outside of Juba, courts are not geographically 3.3.2. Community Mediation Centers. Donors accessible. As highlighted in Section 2.2, some have supported successful initiatives that areas have no courts and certain states only have have significantly reduced the justice gap in courts in their respective capitals, making courts rural and underserved areas. Notably, the inaccessible for rural inhabitants. A two-step Community Mediation Groups established A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 62 POLICY IMPLICATIONS by SSLS to address land disputes, and the b. Improve Affordability of Justice Services Justice and Confidence Centers set up by a coalition of CSOs with UNDP support have The high costs associated with court procedures proven to be highly effective in addressing in South Sudan make justice inaccessible for many disputes at the local level. Expanding and citizens. According to the findings presented in scaling these initiatives could be considered Section 2.3, court fees are around 10 percent of the as part of the strategies to broaden the claim’s value, which is significantly higher than in reach of justice services. neighboring countries like Tanzania and Uganda.205 Additionally, the lack of publicly available fee 3.3.3. Phased Infrastructure Expansion Program. schedules creates opportunities for arbitrariness At a later stage, consider designing a phased in their application. Many court users also end infrastructure expansion program based up paying more than what is officially required to on a structured court mapping reform. expedite services. These reforms could enhance access to justice by expanding the court network The MoJCA does not have a comprehensive policy based on factors like population density, to deliver effectively on its mandate of providing transportation accessibility, administrative legal aid. There is no clarity or consistent criteria distribution, and telecommunication on eligibility thresholds, the available services, or and technological infrastructure, among the responsibilities of legal aid providers. Moreover, others. For example, Morrocco and Senegal the Ministry’s current budget does not include a developed new court maps in the last dedicated allocation for legal aid services, leading decade, increasing the judiciary’s presence CSOs like SSLS and FIDA to fill the gap, often relying in areas with growing population and on donor funding. To address these issues and commercial activity. To make these reforms enhance the affordability of justice services, several effective, it is helpful to design them with actions could be considered: clear objectives, reliable baseline data, and measurable criteria. In the case of South 3.3.4. Establishing a uniform fee schedule and Sudan, enhancing the collection of judicial making it publicly available. A subcommittee and administrative data, as discussed in appointed by the Chief Justice to review policy implication 3.4.1, is a key short-term and update the fee schedule completed step to provide the evidence to support court its review in April 2024. The revised fee mapping reforms. It would also be useful to schedule is pending approval of the MoFP. consider internal displacement caused by Once the fee schedule is approved, it should conflict and anticipated population growth, be widely disseminated on the MoJCA’s similar to the approach taken by Central website and at the different court locations African Republic. Additionally, investing to ensure transparency and prevent arbitrary early in developing human capital is key to charges. Given the characteristics of the ensure the efficient and effective operation economy in South Sudan, the fee schedule of an expanded court network. could also include a mechanism that allows for annual adjustments based on inflation and exchange rate. 205. See Figure 14 of this report. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 63 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3.3.5. Expanding legal aid services. Consider c. Strengthen Access to Justice for Women developing a comprehensive legal aid policy with clear eligibility criteria, expanding Women face particular barriers in accessing justice, legal services to include noncriminal cases. especially in FCS. During times of conflict and post- This policy can define the responsibilities conflict, women are more vulnerable to various of legal aid providers and establish robust forms of SGBV, which can be exacerbated by other oversight mechanisms. Also, ensuring that conflict dynamics, such as forced displacement. The legal aid services are clearly costed and breakdown of state and social structures designed budgeted within the MoJCA’s budget can to protect women’s rights during these periods help to guarantee dedicated allocations for hinders proper redressal and accountability. In these services. these contexts, women also face greater challenges in overcoming systemic barriers to accessing justice, 3.3.6. Establishing a comprehensive coordination such as financial and geographical constraints. framework with legal aid providers. By Women tend to have less access to economic comprehensively coordinating efforts with opportunities than their male counterparts and may CSOs like SSLS and FIDA, the MoJCA can depend financially on their relatives. Many are also ensure that more individuals receive the limited by household and childcare responsibilities legal aid they need. This initiative could or gender-related restrictions on movement, include conducting regular meetings among preventing them from spending the day in court. legal aid providers, sharing information and Additionally, in many FCS countries, the judiciary networks of collaborators, and conducting and legal profession are dominated by men, and joint training programs to enhance the women are underrepresented in decision-making capacity and reach of legal aid services. bodies. This can affect the fairness of outcomes and undermine women’s willingness to appear in court, 3.3.7. Broadening the market for legal services. as their views are not equally represented.207 Consider broadening the market of legal services beyond lawyers to include As explored in Section 2.2(b) of this report, paralegals, who can contribute to keeping many of these barriers are currently present in costs low and bridge the statutory and South Sudan. Systemic issues such as financial customary systems, as they often work constraints, social stigma, and a lack of knowledge with local communities. This can include about their rights hinder South Sudanese women’s (i) clearer definition of the roles and ability to effectively engage with the justice system. responsibilities of paralegals through a These challenges are more pronounced for rural specific regulatory framework, outlining women, who often have no choice but to resolve their scope of work and how they can disputes within the customary system, which is complement the work of licensed frequently seen as unfair to women. However, attorneys,206 and (ii) integrating paralegals enhancing women’s participation in customary into existing legal service models, justice mechanisms can be a promising strategy including community legal clinics and to promote fairer outcomes. In counties like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Torit and Wau, women’s involvement in decision- 206. Other countries’ experience suggests that paralegal licensing requirements should be optional to avoid reducing the number of community-based paralegals. See Dereymaeker, G. 2016. Formalizing the role of paralegals in Africa: A review of legislative and policy developments. Open Society Justice Initiative and Paralegal Advisory Service Institute. 207. Bosio, E. and A. Palacio Jaramillo. 2023. Increasing Access to Justice in Fragile Settings. Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions Insight – Governance. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 64 POLICY IMPLICATIONS making as Chiefs has indeed led to more inclusive implementing gender awareness outcomes. This positive change could also be programs within the judicial community extended to the statutory system, where women as part of legal and judicial capacity are underrepresented, holding only 24 percent building. These programs can be of judicial positions. To address some of these developed in collaboration with civil barriers, the Judiciary of South Sudan established society organizations that advocate for a specialized Sexual and Gender-based Violence women’s access to justice, such as FIDA, Court in Juba, which could eventually be expanded to ensure they are effective and aligned to rural areas to improve geographical accessibility. with women’s needs. Other opportunities to address gender-specific barriers and improve women’s access to justice 3.3.11. Promoting women’s leadership in decision- may include: making and their participation in legal reform processes. Ensure the effective 3.3.8. Strengthening gender-disaggregated involvement of women in decisions data collection. As part of the efforts that drive structural changes within the to strengthen and standardize data justice sector, and actively promote their collection in the judiciary, the government representation in judicial decision-making can consider institutionalizing gender- roles. Other countries have tried to achieve disaggregated data collection and analysis more gender balance by developing and to diagnose obstacles to women’s access implementing policies that prioritize to justice and understand the specific gender diversity and inclusion within the needs of women and girls. Judiciary, including by (i) setting specific targets for the recruitment and promotion 3.3.9. Incorporating special mechanisms and of women judges and support staff; gender-sensitive processes in the justice (ii) conducting targeted outreach and system. While the establishment of a recruitment campaigns to attract women specialized SGBV Court in Juba is a candidates; and (iii) establishing targeted commendable step toward improving mentorship and training programs to access to justice for women, it is important provide women with opportunities for to ensure that gender-sensitive measures skill-building, networking, and career are integrated throughout the entire justice advancement. value chain. This may include creating dedicated spaces in courtrooms to provide a safe and supportive environment for d. Ensure Access to Legal Information and women and girls, adopting evidentiary Promote Legal Awareness rules and procedures that are considerate of their unique challenges, and offering Access to clear and updated legal information is a counseling and support services to help cornerstone of legal empowerment. When citizens them navigate the legal process. are informed about their rights, the mechanisms to enforce them, and the services available to them, 3.3.10. Training judges, paralegals, and justice they are better equipped to effectively interact with providers on women’s rights and the justice system. As highlighted in Section 2.2, gender-sensitive processes. Consider subsection (f), addressing the lack of access to legal SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 65 POLICY IMPLICATIONS information in South Sudan is important to empower review new legislation for conflicts with its citizens and prevent gaps in information from existing laws that could be repealed. being exploited. Furthermore, strategies to address this issue could extend to harmonizing existing laws 3.3.13. Regulating the publication of laws and with the TCRSS, the R-ARCSS, and newly enacted regulations in more detail. Although the legislation. Many experts interviewed emphasized MoJCA’s Organization Act provides that that conflicting laws create opportunities for the Ministry shall publish “written laws.” it misinterpretation and arbitrary decisions, can be important to clarify (i) the venues undermining the transparency and fairness of the for publication beyond the gazette, to justice system. include a centralized and dedicated website, (ii) the timeframe to publish the A comprehensive strategy to address this issue updates of the laws, and (iii) a specific can include the harmonization of pre-constitutional requirement to integrate amendments to and newly enacted laws to ensure alignment with the published text of the law. constitutional provisions and the peace agreement; consistent publication of updated laws, regulations, 3.3.14. Establishing a requirement to make and court decisions; providing user-friendly legal decisions of the Supreme Court publicly resources about how the courts work, along with available. Decisions of the Supreme Court guides for self-representation; and implementing could be made more widely available by communication and outreach campaigns through legally requiring their publication. These various media channels to ensure accessibility can be published in the centralized system for people of all literacy levels and in different managed by the MoJCA. languages. Specific actions to consider to enhance access to legal information and legal awareness 3.3.15. Ensuring the update of the MoJCA’s include: website. Ensure timely updates of the website by providing the Ministry with 3.3.12. Harmonizing conflicting laws to have a the equipment required to comply with clear and transparent legal framework. this function, such as reliable access to To harmonize pre-constitutional and the internet, hardware equipment, and newly enacted laws with constitutional capacity building of the persons in charge provisions and the peace agreement, the of this function. At a later stage, consider MoJCA and the SSLRC can (i) conduct a updating the platform by facilitating comprehensive legal review to identify navigation through a search engine, inconsistencies and conflicts between allowing it to filter laws by year, subject laws; (ii) draft amendments or new matter, and/or keywords. legislation, when necessary, to address these conflicts and inconsistencies; (iii) 3.3.16. Establishing communication campaigns conduct capacity-building programs and outreach programs. Consider for lawmakers, legal practitioners, and implementing communication campaigns enforcement agencies to ensure effective that ensure the clarity and practicality knowledge and implementation of the of legal information. This can include harmonized laws; and (iv) implement a designing lay documents and guides mechanism to consistently and regularly that explain the most common types of A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 66 POLICY IMPLICATIONS cases and the mechanisms to resolve efforts would make legal information these disputes. Additionally, establishing more accessible and understandable, outreach campaigns could help reach empowering citizens to navigate the justice a wider audience through television, system more effectively. radio, and community gatherings. These 3.4. Enhancing Judicial Efficiency and Reducing Delays Most South Sudanese identified delays as the case developments. Courts in South Sudan do primary challenge in their interactions with the not currently use a standardized method to follow courts and many have spent years awaiting these stages, process cases and register files. the resolution of their disputes. According to Court users interviewed by the team highlighted findings presented in Section 2.3, these delays that court clerks frequently face issues tracking are primarily due to operational inefficiencies, their files, finding the record of their case, and even including inadequate courtrooms and equipment, losing some of the documentary evidence. frequent power outages, staffing shortages, lack of standardized case management, and poor filing To address this issue, the Judiciary of South Sudan infrastructure and processes. can adopt guidelines to support consistent filing processes and refine manual case management, To address these issues, in the short term, the building the foundations for automating Judiciary can start by standardizing and simplifying these processes with a future electronic case court and registry processes. In the medium term, management system. In doing so, the Judiciary can if additional resources are secured, the Judiciary leverage the role of the Chief Registrar, who holds can invest in improving court infrastructure, buying delegated powers from the Chief Justice to prepare equipment, and allocating additional human directives and circulars related to the regulation of resources to the courts. This approach combines court operations and performance. the immediate need to enhance operational efficiency with the need to plan and roll out 3.4.1. Possible steps to standardize and sustainable, long-term improvements. streamline these processes include: • Process mapping and standardization. a. Standardize and Streamline Court Processes Begin by mapping the process of resolving a court case to identify bottlenecks and areas Any court procedure relies on several sequential for simplification. Once mapped, develop stages to arrive at a decision, including registering detailed standard operating procedures that the case, filing the evidence exchanged by the outline each step, establish clear timelines, parties, assigning the case to a judge, tracking and assign responsibilities to ensure procedural stages, and notifying the parties of accountability. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 67 POLICY IMPLICATIONS • Implementing a case tracking and filing refinements based on the challenges and areas of system. Assign unique identifiers to each case improvement identified during the initial phase. upon registration to facilitate tracking and retrieval of files. Ensure that this identifier is Additionally, standardizing analog case used consistently across all documents and management, filing, and registration processes communications related to the case so that will lay the groundwork for future automation documents can be easily placed in the case and digitalization. Technology does not work in a file and retrieved. Implement a standardized vacuum, and if layered on top of complex processes, filing system, using color coding or labels, to it is likely to perpetuate the system’s inefficiencies. ensure uniform registration and storage. Addressing organizational complexities by mapping and streamlining procedures can help to rationalize • Staff training, monitoring, and evaluation. and reengineer these analog processes before digital Conduct training sessions for court clerks adoption. Moreover, adopting digital technologies in and staff on the new procedures, providing the justice sector involves significant upfront costs ongoing support to help them adapt to the for hardware and software, and it requires building new processes. Establish a monitoring and the necessary expertise within the Judiciary to evaluation system to assess compliance and manage these systems effectively without creating gather feedback for further improvements. premature load bearing. Therefore, standardizing and streamlining court processes is a crucial first • Active caseload monitoring and step to enable the successful future adoption of management. Based on the standardized digital technologies that, in turn, can help to improve rules, establish a data collection system the efficiency of the system in the short term. to monitor incoming and resolved cases to analyze judges’ workloads and allocate resources more efficiently. This could b. Improve Courtroom Infrastructure and be a simple Excel-based system at first Equipment while building the groundwork for a fully digitalized and automated system. In doing Court users, litigators, and members of the Judiciary so, it is important to build consensus on the have identified inadequate court infrastructure methodology and data to be collected. as a major challenge to the adequate provision of justice services. Courts frequently suffer from To ensure the smooth implementation of these power outages, affecting their normal operations.208 changes, it is important to engage all relevant Additionally, there are no appropriate storage stakeholders, including judges, lawyers, and facilities for archiving files and documentation court users. By clearly explaining the benefits and presented by the parties. Sometimes, even the court expected outcomes of these changes, it will be clerks lack basic equipment, such as chairs, desks, more likely to secure their support. Additionally, and writing supplies, to properly receive and attend the Judiciary could consider piloting the new to court users.209 Addressing this issue is crucial to processes in a select number of courts before a providing judges and staff with a conducive working nationwide rollout. This approach would allow for environment while ensuring users receive high- quality and efficient services. 208. Interview with Judges of Court of Appeal, May 2024. According to the World Bank’s indicators, as of 2022, only 8.4 percent of the population in South Sudan had access to electricity. See World Bank Group. “Access to electricity (% of the population) – South Sudan.” Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 209. Interviews with court users, May-June 2024. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 68 POLICY IMPLICATIONS Given the need to achieve a greater impact on c. Address Staffing Shortages court efficiency with limited resources, the GoSS could consider refurbishing and rehabilitating Staffing shortages significantly impact the efficient court premises in a phased manner. This approach functioning of courts in South Sudan. According to would prioritize areas with higher demand for court current administrative data from the Judiciary of services in the shorter term while creating a plan to South Sudan, only 116 judges serve a population rehabilitate court infrastructure in areas with lower of over 12 million. In comparison, neighboring demand in the medium term. In this process, the countries with similar income levels and fewer GoSS could consider: inhabitants, such as Liberia, have 393 judges for approximately 5.5 million inhabitants—nearly four 3.4.2. Rehabilitating courts in selected locations. times the number of judges in South Sudan.210 Consider remodeling and furnishing Moreover, the distribution of judges is inefficient courthouses in areas with higher demand not only in terms of the overall number but also in for judicial services. This can include their allocation across the most populated regions. leveraging the use of solar panels to avoid As highlighted in Section 2.2, some of the most disruptions caused by power shortages. densely populated areas, such as Warrap, Lakes, Court spaces can also be rehabilitated to and Jonglei, each have five or fewer judges serving accommodate all staff, procuring desks, the entire state. In Unity, which has a population chairs, and necessary equipment. exceeding 1 million, there are currently no judges assigned at all. 3.4.3. Constructing adequate filing rooms in court buildings. Consider constructing filing This situation leads to significant inefficiencies for rooms in courthouses, ensuring they are three main reasons. First, the limited number of adequately spaced to accommodate all judges means that a single judge must often review files in the courtroom, and integrate the a case both in the first instance and on appeal, new standardized filing guidelines. compromising not only the efficiency of the process but also the impartiality of the appeal. Additionally, 3.4.4. Deploying a structural court rehabilitation the current staffing distribution affects the legal plan. Consider developing a long-term quorum required for certain panels, such as the countrywide court rehabilitation plan to three-judge panel for appeals at the High Courts and refurbish courtrooms and filing rooms Courts of Appeals and the nine-judge constitutional in line with the Phased Infrastructure panel at the Supreme Court. Third, the analysis of Expansion Program mentioned in Policy caseload data reveals that there has been a surge in Implication 3.3.3. cases, especially at the Court of Appeal of Greater Equatoria and the Supreme Court, which these courts are unable to effectively address without the necessary human resources. 210. Number of judges in Liberia was extracted from supra Bosio and Upegui (2023), while the number of inhabitants was obtained from the World Bank Open Data Portal. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 69 POLICY IMPLICATIONS The lack of incentives to join the judicial profession Establishing a framework with objective criteria and may contribute to staffing shortages and inefficiency. a structured evaluation process for the promotion Judges and judicial staff often face poor working of judges could help create transparency and conditions, including significant delays in salary incentivize the retention of talent. Section 40(3) of payments and freezes on new hires and promotions. the Judiciary Act,211 which regulates the promotion Addressing these issues by ensuring timely salary of judicial officials, can be amended to provide payments and creating a robust incentive structure guidance to establish a more detailed process and for judicial officials could be important steps related performance metrics to ensure objectivity toward improving efficiency, attracting talent, and and transparency in this process. maintaining staff motivation. Once these conditions are improved and a clear system for monitoring caseloads is established, the Judiciary will be better equipped to assess the performance of judges based on data and evidence, within the framework of a structured evaluation process. 211. Currently, Section 40 of the Judiciary Act does not clearly define the process for the promotion of judges and vaguely outlines the criteria by referring to “judicial performance” and the “report of a direct superior authority on the conduct of the Judge.” A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 70 ANNEX A Annex A. JUPITER Methodology and its Application to South Sudan A.1.  JUPITER Methodology This section provides details on five aspects of the JUPITER methodology: questionnaire design (Section a), data sources and data collection process (Section b), variable categories (Section c), variables description (Section d), and data management and review (Section e). a. Questionnaire Design To collect the data, the team used a questionnaire with 152 questions and 81 sub questions, for a total of 233 questions. The questionnaire is divided into three parts, following the main determinants of judicial effectiveness: access, efficiency, and quality.212 The total universe of questions is referred to as the “Master Survey.” Between November 2022 and February 2023, the Master Survey was thoroughly peer-reviewed by 15 experts from the WBG and academia. Throughout the questionnaire, questions on the legal framework are matched with questions on its practical application. For example, Q.4 tests whether there is a legal requirement to make all judgments public, while Q. 6 tests what share of the court(s)’ judgments are in fact made public. For the purposes of this data collection exercise, the term “legal framework” refers to the body of instruments (laws, acts, regulations, etc.) that are of mandatory application. Guidelines, court circulars and internal court documents are not included if they are self-imposed by the courts or are for “recommended” use only. Questions by law are yes/no questions, with an additional field to provide a reference to the exact legal basis. Questions on the practice are of three types: yes/no, multiple choice, and quantitative. Multiple choice questions elicit the respondent’s opinion on how frequently an event takes place and provide the respondent with 4 answer options: (1) less than 25 percent of cases; (2) between 25 percent-50 percent of cases; (3) between 50 percent-75 percent of cases; and (4) more than 75 percent of cases. Q.25, for example, tests the level of implementation of policies facilitating equal access to justice for persons with disabilities and provides four answer options: less than 25 percent of courts; between 25 212. Supra Bosio, 2024. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 71 ANNEX A percent-50 percent of courts; between 50 percent-75 percent of courts; and more than 75 percent of courts have such policies in place. Quantitative questions are filled with administrative data provided by the court administrators. Administrative data was the preferred source of practice data, whenever feasible. Thus, Q.68 and Q.69, for example, test the number of incoming cases in first and second instance civil courts. JUPITER focuses on civil, commercial, and administrative justice, not on criminal justice and prosecution offices. In terms of institutional coverage, there are numerous state and nonstate actors involved in the provision of justice, and their functions vary widely across countries. To simplify matters, this version of JUPITER focuses on three institutions – the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, and Legal Aid Services (highlighted in red in Figure A1). Other institutions and services, such as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms or legal aid offered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or other organizations, are captured only for their effects on the key institutions’ performance. >>> Figure A1: Institutional focus of JUPITER Independent Judiciary Executive Legislative agencies Ministry of Legal Aid Institutions Justice Centers Courts State Parliament Law Ombudsman Justice Enforcement Functions: Drafting, Human Rights passing and Commission Other communicating Court- Ministries laws Annexed and Anti- ADR Regulatory corruption Agencies agency Customary law institutions Institutions Non-State (Customary, Religious and Traditional Courts) Civil society and private sector (ADR providers, Legal Aid NGOs, Bar Association, etc) Source: Bosio and Upegui, 2023. Note: Institutions highlighted in red correspond to the institutions covered by the assessment. Other institutions and services, such as ADR mechanisms or legal aid offered by NGOs or other organizations, are captured only for their effects on the key institutions’ performance. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 72 ANNEX A Given the recognition of customary law as a source of law and the prevalence of customary justice actors in resolving disputes in South Sudan, JUPITER incorporates the customary law aspects of dispute resolution in the country. The team relied on an extensive body of data and research from various sources to assess the effectiveness of the customary system. WBG’s work in the justice field shows large variations in the structures, internal processes, resource endowments, and country contexts, shaping each system’s effectiveness and the needs of the population it serves. Some differences are reflected in the traditional civil law vs. common law dichotomy, but other national characteristics of relevance include the relationship between the judiciary and other branches of government or whether judicial processes are based on an adversarial or inquisitorial system. The purpose of the JUPITER metrics is to establish whether there are ways for the government to improve effectiveness within the existing system, regardless of its tradition. In that sense, the focus on actual service delivery and implementation is an important mitigant when comparing different legal systems. To address challenges such as limited electricity and internet connectivity in South Sudan, a Microsoft Word questionnaire was adopted for the assessment and data collection. This format enabled the printing of the questionnaire and collecting data on paper. The data was then transcribed and coded into an Excel coding sheet for further analysis, as will be explained below in Section b. b. Data Sources and Data Collection Process Data collection is done through a combination of readings of the laws, administrative data, and interviews with government officials, judges, lawyers, and court users. The questions in the JUPITER questionnaire cannot be answered in their entirety by one category of legal professionals. Most questions are designed for lawyers with expertise in civil law, commercial law, administrative law, civil procedure, administrative procedure, and civil litigation. The remaining questions require the input of government officials, judges, and users. Questions requiring the input of the government include questions related to the Judiciary’s budget, for example. Questions requiring judges’ input relate to internal court processes, such as the availability of a case management system. Questions requiring the input of users include those related to individuals’ perception of the access, efficiency, and quality of the system. For this reason, questions from the Master Survey were divided into four shorter questionnaires, one per group of respondents—lawyers, government officials, judges, and users. Whenever possible, special care was placed on having at least two types of respondents for each question. Table A1 shows the total number of questions per respondent. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 73 ANNEX A >>> Table A1: Number of questions per respondent type Respondent Type Number of Questions Lawyers 137 Government (i.e., MOJ and MOF) 85 Judges and the Judiciary (e.g., Office of the Chief Justice) 127 Users 53 Information provided by the respondents is complemented with administrative data and an in-depth study of laws, regulations, and publicly available information. If answers by local experts differ, inquiries continue until the data are reconciled, including through locally-based WBG staff conducting interviews on the ground. The median is used to aggregate numeric answers. Datasets produced by other organizations may also be used to corroborate respondents’ answers and for analysis. The user questionnaire is complemented by twelve questions that are asked to randomly selected users during field visits to the courts. These questions include: 1. Who do you prefer to go to resolve a dispute? Why? 2. Did you seek or receive any legal advice? From whom? 3. Did you know where to find information about the courts or how to find legal assistance? 4. Did you seek/receive any legal aid? If yes, from whom? 5. Has the cost to process your case been lower, equal, or higher than what you expected? 6. What has been the most challenging part of your interaction with the court? 7. If you could change one thing in the functioning of the courts, what would it be? 8. Has the time taken to process your case been shorter, equal to or longer than you expected? 9. In your view, what is the main reason for delays in courts? 10. How do people with connections influence judges? 11. How long did it take you to come to the court today, i.e., how far did you have to travel? (Minutes) 12. How many hours did you spend at the court today (or last time if you just arrived)? (Minutes) A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 74 ANNEX A c. Variable Categories JUPITER has 373 datapoints, grouped in three pillars: access, efficiency, and quality (Figure A2). The Access to Justice Pillar measures whether individuals have equal access to the legal system. The Efficiency Pillar benchmarks the ability of courts to deliver justice in a timely and cost-effective manner. The Quality Pillar examines the quality of decisions in terms of inputs, such as the selection process of judges, and outputs, such as appeal rates and the consistency of decisions. Each pillar has five sub-pillars. The pillars and sub-pillars were determined based on an extensive literature review published in the pilot’s report “Improving Access to Justice in Liberia – A 2023 JUPITER Assessment” as Annex C. >>> Figure A2: JUPITER’s substantive focus GROWTH judge tion of Tran sp ifica s aren es al Pr o co iti ici Qual ox u tiv ud t cy im rt ac a-j ity tr Ex Eq u l (ge al ac ia nd ces dic er. s Ju pay ..) ACCESS QUALITY Legal l aid/cost Appeal/reversa rates JUPITER Con all sis Sm ms dec tency isio clai o ns f ce ran EFFICIENCY IC T ea te Cl ra ma ad cas ge of nag Cas ment Disposition elo e e time A EQUALITY Source: Bosio and Upegui, 2023. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 75 ANNEX A d. Variables Description The Access to Justice Pillar contains 103 questions, equivalent to 185 datapoints, and comprises five sub-pillars: (1) transparency; (2) proximity to court; (3) equal access; (4) legal aid and cost; and (5) small claims court and procedure (Table A2). Verbatim questions can be found in Annex B, Table B1. >>> Table A2: Access to Justice sub-pillars Sub-pillar Questions (#) Datapoints (#) Transparency 42 81 Proximity to court 3 4 Equal access 20 40 Legal aid and cost 28 42 Small claims court and procedure 10 18 TOTAL 103 185 The transparency sub-pillar measures the level of public knowledge about the judicial system and, specifically, the legal framework, previous judgments, and general information about the courts. For the purposes of this pillar, “public” means that documents can be accessed without a fee and not upon request, while “publicly available” means that documents are made public with an additional step, such as a request to an office, payment of a fee, etc. Transparency of the legal framework is benchmarked through practice questions on the availability of a centralized – operated, managed, and administered by a single government unit – and comprehensive website of all national laws and regulations in the country’s official language. If such a website exists, information is solicited on the percentage of laws and regulations available, the presence of draft bills, the integration of amendments and repeals, the timeliness of changes, the openness of the website, and its searchability. If such a website does not exist, information is solicited on whether laws and regulations are published in a manner that makes it possible to consult the latest consolidated version for free – for example, in a gazette, newspaper, ministries’ webpages, or through private providers. Respondents are also asked how difficult it is to stay abreast of the legal framework—it is considered difficult whenever consolidated versions of updated laws and regulations are either not available or very delayed, and easy when they are immediately available in most cases. They are also asked how consistent and precise the legal framework is—it is considered consistent and precise if laws are well drafted, do not create ambiguity that can be exploited by the parties, and conflicting laws are repealed in a timely manner. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 76 ANNEX A Transparency of court judgments has two questions by law, benchmarking whether there is a legal requirement to make all judgments public and who is responsible for the publication. The first mirroring practice question tests what share of all judgments is in fact public – online, or in a manner where anyone can access them without submitting a request or paying a fee – for first instance courts, appellate courts, the highest court, first instance administrative courts, and second instance administrative courts. The second mirroring practice question tests, for the same courts, what share of judgments is publicly available – online or otherwise, but access must be requested and/or paid, for example, through the purchase of the official gazette or by requesting a copy at the court – if judgments are not public. The last practice question tests whether judgments are made public or publicly available in a timely manner. Transparency of court information tests how easy it is to find information about the courts and their functioning – answer options are “mostly available” and “mostly unavailable” – and how accurate that information is, with answer options as “mostly accurate” and “mostly inaccurate.” Answers are sought for the following categories of court information: court location, court hours and days of operation, basic information on how to file a claim, basic information on common types of cases, lay documents and guides to enable self-representation, information on court fees, and information on legal aid. The proximity to courts sub-pillar benchmarks the availability and geographical distribution of first instance civil courts, including courts of general jurisdiction, specialized courts, and small claims courts, if different. Respondents are asked to confirm a list of courts prepared by the team through publicly available information and Google Maps. Further, the questionnaire investigates the perceived accessibility of these courts in terms of urban and rural divides. The respondents are asked to characterize the accessibility of the courts in their country to people in urban regions as compared to those in rural regions. This aspect is measured on a four-point scale, ranging from “equally accessible to people in all regions” to “much more accessible to people in urban regions than those in rural regions.” If the courts are found to be more accessible in urban regions than in rural regions, this could indicate a potential barrier to justice for rural populations, which may lack the same level of access to legal services. Respondents are encouraged to provide additional comments to elaborate on their selection, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of accessibility issues. The equal access sub-pillar measures the ability of all to have access to court services, including women, persons with disabilities, nonnative speakers facing linguistic barriers, and individuals from varying socioeconomic classes. For women, the questionnaire focuses on both the legal rights granted to them and their real-world implementation. Respondents are asked to confirm whether women have the same rights as men to file a claim with the court and whether their testimony carries the same evidentiary weight. The questionnaire also explores the practical realities of these legal provisions, such as potential societal stigma and the likelihood of women bringing forward and winning civil cases for sexual harassment. Respondents are also asked to rate the overall accessibility of courts for women. For persons with disabilities, the questionnaire examines their legal recognition and treatment within the court system. Respondents are asked about the legal provisions regarding their right to legal capacity, equal standing in courts and tribunals, and equal opportunities to testify. The questionnaire SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 77 ANNEX A also investigates whether courts are legally required to facilitate equal access for persons with disabilities and the level of implementation of such policies in practice. Respondents rate the overall accessibility of courts for persons with disabilities. For nonnative speakers, the questionnaire investigates legal requirements for translation and interpretation services in civil cases. Respondents are asked about the availability of these services for hearings and documents, the likelihood of people receiving these services, and whether they are provided free of charge for indigent people. Respondents rate the overall accessibility of courts for persons with linguistic barriers. In each of the above areas, the questions in the sub-pillar probe both the legal framework and its practical application, recognizing that equal access to justice is determined not only by law but also by other factors, such as the availability of resources. For people of different socioeconomic classes, the questionnaire asks respondents to characterize the accessibility of courts. This question aims to identify whether there are barriers in place that might disproportionately affect the poor, potentially compromising their ability to access justice. The legal aid and cost sub-pillar measures the availability of legal aid – defined as the free provision of assistance by the government in noncriminal cases to people who are unable to afford legal representation – and rules related to court fees. For the legal aid segment, the questionnaire examines whether a dedicated law on legal aid exists and if government-funded legal aid is available. Other legal aid providers, such as NGOs, bar associations, or universities, are also considered. The questionnaire seeks information about the regulation of legal aid, including criteria for eligibility, processes for securing it, and the duties of providers. Respondents are also asked about the authorities in charge of administering and monitoring legal aid services. The segment further explores the applications of government-funded legal aid, such as representation in court, legal advice before proceedings, and payment of court fees. It investigates the approval process for legal aid requests and the number of requests received and approved. It also investigates the evidentiary burden on those seeking legal aid, the availability of providers, and the likelihood of obtaining legal aid when eligible. Additionally, it probes the time standards and actual decision times for legal aid requests and the budget allocation for government-funded legal aid. The court fees segment of the questionnaire investigates whether court fees are set by law and if detailed information about these fees is readily available to the public. It asks whether court fees are retained by the Judiciary and if litigants are required to pay a court fee to initiate a proceeding. The questionnaire explores the likelihood of the winning party receiving full reimbursement of court fees and attorney fees, and whether court fees are set at a level that deters individuals and businesses from filing a claim. It also investigates the existence of a court fee waiver program with clear eligibility criteria and the likelihood of an eligible candidate obtaining such a waiver. It concludes by asking for the total number of fee waiver requests received and approved. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 78 ANNEX A The small claims court and procedure sub-pillar measures the process by which the judicial system handles claims below a legally established monetary value. The sub-pillar starts by inquiring whether there are small claims courts or divisions and/or a fast-track procedure for small claims. If such a system exists, it asks for the types of cases that fall under this court or the procedure’s jurisdiction. To understand the accessibility of the small claims system, further investigation is done on whether it is legally possible to file small claims orally or without legal representation. It also seeks to gauge the practical difficulty of using the small claims court or procedure without legal representation, asking respondents to rate the ease of use based on the average citizen’s background and education level. The availability of standardized templates to file small claims is also sought. To evaluate the efficiency of the small claims system, the sub-pillar inquires whether there is a legally established time standard for resolving small claims and what the average resolution time is in practice. The sub-pillar also addresses the cost-effectiveness of the small claims system. It asks if there is a dedicated fee schedule for small claims and whether the court fees are set at a level that might deter individuals and businesses from filing a claim. The Efficiency Pillar benchmarks 74 questions, equivalent to 99 datapoints, and comprises five sub- pillars: (1) clearance rates; (2) age of caseload; (3) disposition times; (4) case processing and case management; and (5) information and communications technology (ICT) (Table A3). Verbatim questions can be found in Annex B, Tables B2.1 and B2.2. >>> Table A3: Efficiency Subpillars Sub-pillar Questions (#) Datapoints (#) Clearance rate 30 30 Age of caseload 6 6 Disposition time 12 12 Case processing and case management 8 15 ICT 18 36 TOTAL 74 99 The clearance rate sub-pillar seeks administrative data on the number of incoming and resolved cases for the past three years, allowing for trend analysis and identifying any significant changes or anomalies. The number of judges is also sought to understand the resources available to the judiciary and provides context for the rest of the information collected. It also asks for the number of female judges to capture insights into gender representation within the judiciary. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 79 ANNEX A The age of caseload sub-pillar seeks administrative data on the number of cases that have been pending before the court for more than three years. Data is sought for the first instance civil courts, which are often the first point of contact for individuals seeking redress in civil matters; second instance civil courts, which are appellate courts for civil matters; highest court of general jurisdiction, typically the supreme court or the highest appellate court; first instance administrative courts, which deal with disputes involving public authorities or administrative acts; second instance administrative courts; and the highest court of administrative jurisdiction. The disposition time sub-pillar seeks administrative data on the number of pending cases at the end of the past three years for both civil and administrative courts at the first and second instances. Based on the data collected under the previous three pillars, the team calculates the following metrics, using the methodology set forth by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice – CEPEJ (Table A4). >>> Table A4: Metrics on court efficiency Term Definition Formula Relationship between the new cases and completed Resolved Cases Clearance Rate (CR) CR(%) = x 100 cases within a period. Incoming Cases Resolved Cases Relationship between the number of resolved cases and CTR = Case Turnover Ratio (CTR) Unsolved Cases the number of unresolved cases at the end of a period. at the end Measure of how quickly the judicial system (of the court) 365 Disposition Time (DT) DT (days) = turns over received cases. CTR Source: European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2018.  The case processing and case management sub-pillar measures case processing by referring to the handling of individual cases, while case management refers to the overall effort to control how cases in the aggregate move through the court system. Both can be accomplished manually, automatically, or with a combination of the two. The assignment of cases within the courts is a key aspect of case management, and its transparency is benchmarked through questions on legal provisions for the random assignment of cases, as well as on rules in place to prevent potential abuses of the system. The practice is also tested by trying to understand how the process is carried out, focusing on how often the assignment process is abused, as reported by users and NGOs, among others. The questionnaire also inquires on how easy it is for parties to influence the assignment of their cases. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 80 ANNEX A The Case Management Information System (CMIS) sub-pillar examines whether there is a single electronic CMIS used in all courts, or if multiple systems exist, and to what extent they are interoperable. In cases where no electronic system exists, the questionnaire seeks to understand if manual data collection at the court level tracks incoming and disposed cases. The extent of functionalities available to judges and lawyers through the CMIS is also probed. For judges, the questionnaire assesses the system’s capacity to automatically generate hearing schedules, send and receive notifications, track case status, manage case documents, view court orders and decisions, and assist in writing judgments. For lawyers, it assesses whether they can access forms, send and receive notifications, track case status, manage case documents, view court orders and decisions, and file documents with the court through the CMIS. The ICT sub-pillar refers to the use of information and communications technology during court proceedings. The questions in the sub-pillar explore the level of access to and use of technology among judges and court staff, the digital infrastructure available in courts, and the scope of electronic procedures permitted by law and practice. One of the key areas this sub-pillar examines is the percentage of judges and court staff who have and use computers for drafting documents and entering case data. It also evaluates the extent to which courts are equipped with internet and intranet facilities, highlighting the level of connectivity within and between courts’ systems. The sub-pillar delves into the legal provisions and practical utilization of electronic procedures. These include the electronic filing and service of initial complaints and the filing of requests for legal aid. For each of these procedures, the questionnaire identifies whether there is a legal requirement to follow up with a paper copy, and it assesses the percentage of cases or requests filed electronically in practice. The questionnaire also examines the treatment of small claim procedures, and the admissibility of evidence filed electronically. It assesses whether small claims can be filed electronically by law and what percentage of them are filed electronically in practice. It further investigates whether evidence filed electronically is legally admissible and the percentage of evidence filed electronically in practice. The potential usage of remote or virtual hearings is another important element of the ICT sub- pillar. The questionnaire identifies whether hearings can be conducted remotely by law and what percentage of hearings are conducted remotely in practice. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 81 ANNEX A The Quality Pillar contains 56 questions, equivalent to 89 datapoints, and comprises five sub-pillars: (1) qualification of judges; (2) extra-judicial activities; (3) judicial pay; (4) appeal rates and reversal rates; and (5) consistency of decisions (Table A5). Verbatim questions can be found in Annex B, Table B3. >>> Table A5: Quality Sub-pillars Sub-pillar Questions (#) Datapoints (#) Qualification of judges 17 21 Extra-judicial activities 11 25 Judicial pay 16 23 Appeal rates and reversal rates 4 4 Consistency of decisions 8 16 TOTAL 56 89 The sub-pillar on the qualification of judges examines the requirements to become a judge, as well as how these reflect on the quality of decisions. The sub-pillar considers the legal requirements for the appointment of judges. This can encompass a range of qualifications, such as the necessity of a law degree, a minimum number of years of experience in the legal field and passing a bar exam or a judge-specific examination. The questionnaire also identifies whether these legally established criteria are consistently followed in practice. To gauge the competence and integrity of judges, the sub-pillar asks respondents to evaluate the knowledgeability and honesty of judges across various courts. This includes first instance courts, appellate courts, the highest court, and first and second instance administrative courts. The responses provide insights into the perceived ability of judges to correctly apply the law and resist taking bribes or other incentives. This sub-pillar’s questions also focus on the quality of judge-rendered decisions. Respondents are asked to assess the quality of judgments across different court instances, considering factors such as grammatical errors, precise and consistent application of the legal framework, technical errors, assessment of evidence, and whether they address essential arguments. The extra-judicial activities sub-pillar refers to the employment of judges outside of the judiciary, which can be of political or nonpolitical nature. Political activity refers to any activity that is directed towards the success or failure of a political party, candidate for political office, or partisan political group. This may include employment in political offices, participating in political campaigns, volunteering on a political campaign, manifesting political opinions, and serving on an electoral commission. The sub-pillar addresses a range of concerns, including ethical oversight, temporary political employment, and other nonjudicial work activities. The questionnaire starts by ascertaining if an institution or body exists to provide opinions on ethical questions related to judges’ extra-judicial conduct. If such an institution exists, its composition is investigated to understand the diversity of perspectives within the body. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 82 ANNEX A A significant concern for judicial quality is the temporary employment of judges in political offices, and the questionnaire explores the safeguards in place to manage such situations. Beyond political offices, the sub-pillar investigates whether judges can combine their judicial work with other activities such as teaching, research, and publication, unremunerated membership in organizations, remunerated service on boards, and roles as arbitrators or mediators. If these activities are permitted, the questionnaire further investigates whether any safeguards are in place during such employment. Respondents are asked to evaluate how often judges engage in these activities and whether such engagement interferes with their judicial duties or undermines their independence, integrity, or impartiality. The judicial pay sub-pillar examines how judges’ pay compares to that of other professionals with comparable qualifications. It begins by asking if the law regulates judges’ remuneration by position or grade. If remuneration is not regulated by law, the questionnaire inquires who decides on it and what criteria are used. Next, the transparency of judicial salaries is explored. The questionnaire asks if the law mandates the publication of judicial salary schedules and if these schedules are, in fact, published in practice. To gather more detailed information on salary levels, the subpillar requests the yearly salary of a first-instance judge with 10 years of experience, the Minister of Justice, and a partner in a local law firm in the last year. These data points can provide a comparative perspective on judicial salaries within the wider context of professional compensation in the country. Furthermore, respondents are asked about variations in salary among judges in comparable positions. The subpillar concludes with questions about the budget of the largest first-instance civil court and the number of judges serving in it. Additionally, it requests specific salary figures for both male and female judges at the beginning of their career in first-instance courts, and for judges of the Supreme Court or highest appellate court. The appeal and reversal rates sub-pillar measures the percentage of first instance decisions that are appealed to a second instance court in both civil and administrative cases, and the percentage of decisions that are reversed on appeal (sometimes also referred to as abolishment rate), respectively. This rate could indicate the accuracy and quality of first-instance court decisions. The consistency of decisions sub-pillar measures to what extent similar cases are treated consistently. The first question investigates whether judicial decisions are a source of law. If they are, the subsequent question probes deeper into the mechanisms in place to maintain consistency in case law by asking whether only decisions from the highest court constitute such a source, to assess the role of the highest court in shaping the jurisprudence of the country. Whether there is a requirement for courts to state and motivate departures from previous case law, and how often this happens in practice, is sought next to reveal how much weight is given to previous decisions and the degree to which judges are required to justify deviations from established case law. The sub-pillar also explores the mechanisms available for the highest court to ensure consistency in case law across lower courts. These can vary from advisory opinions of general application to obligatory decisions relevant only to a specific case or to all courts. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 83 ANNEX A The questionnaire concludes by exploring whether there are legal sanctions for lower courts that do not decide consistently with case law and, if so, how frequently these sanctions are imposed. This provides an indication of the measures in place to ensure judicial consistency and the extent of their enforcement in practice. e. Data Management and Review Questionnaires were printed and handed personally to potential respondents from all categories. Once these are filled out by the respondent and sent back to the team, they are scanned and stored in a WBG shared folder. Personal respondent information includes first and last name, place of business and contact information. For users approached at the courts, the team records only their first name, age, and gender. Personal data is treated in compliance with WBG policies. Extensive follow-ups through email and phone calls are done once questionnaires are received, and a record of these follow-ups is saved in the shared folder. The team also saves a copy of all laws and regulations that are relevant to the questionnaire. The team follows the same protocol for storing data received from government officials regarding administrative data, budgets, and so on, other development partners, if applicable, and desk research. When data is collected through in-person interviews, the team drafts meeting minutes. Records are kept of every information received by respondents or collected independently by the team through desk research. Once all the data is received, each questionnaire is transcribed to Excel for data coding (“Master Coding Sheet”). Data coding is the process whereby the JUPITER team (i) compiles information received from experts, interviewees, laws, and other valid sources, (ii) files it in the Master Coding Sheet, (iii) verifies to validate information received, and (iv) processes it into a median answer. Follow-ups and information collected during in-person interviews are also incorporated in the Master Coding Sheet, alongside the relevant legal provisions and pertinent desk research. Numerical and practice estimates are coded using Excel formulas to calculate the median of all valid contributor responses. Legal or regulatory estimates are coded by the team’s review of the applicable legal instruments supported by the interpretation of local experts. The team has taken rigorous and systematic steps to ensure that coding is based on the composite review of multiple perspectives. Thus, the median answer to any question is not merely a matter of reporting what officials convey but relies on a juxtaposition of such claims with the accounts of many key witnesses and parties based on their viewpoints and roles as stakeholders within the system. Data is first coded by a WBG staff in the field, then validated by a WBG staff at headquarters (HQ) in Washington, DC, before it is finalized through a third round of review by the JUPITER Task Team Leader (TTL). This is an iterative process, where clarifications are requested at each level of review, requiring the relevant staff to provide additional information or further support a coding decision. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 84 ANNEX A A.2.  Application to South Sudan This section outlines the application of the JUPITER methodology, as detailed in Section 2 of the main text, to the assessment in South Sudan, covering the entire process from project initiation to the final report, including questionnaire design, data collection, and data analysis. South Sudan was chosen for this assessment due to two primary factors: (1) the GoSS’s interest in reforming justice and enhancing judicial service delivery, as articulated in the R-ARCSS; and (2) the WBG’s interest in collaborating with the GoSS on justice reform and access to justice initiatives. The background research for the report commenced in January 2024. Field research began in mid-March and concluded in June 2024. The phases of data coding, validation, and review were conducted from June to August 2024. Finally, the report was written between August and September 2024. The Decision Review meeting was held on November 18, 2024, where peer reviewer comments were reviewed and discussed. a. Background research JUPITER assessments begin with extensive background research on publicly available information. The team initiated the project by gaining a comprehensive understanding of South Sudan’s judicial landscape and justice system, including its history and evolution, its relationship with the government, society, and the customary system. The team tracked and researched all major indicators produced by international organizations, academia, survey organizations, and civil society organizations, which report the views and experiences of citizens, enterprises, lawyers, and experts. These indicators included major indices such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, Fragile States Index, and Freedom in the World Index. The criteria for the selection of such indicators were: • Perception Data – indicators that reflect the sentiments of stakeholders on the effectiveness of judicial services. • Primary Data – indicators that have sourced their own data through surveys, interviews, and other methods. Indicators that aggregate data from several other datasets or use secondary data were not considered. • Focus on civil law (not criminal law) and its system. • Currently active, revised periodically and consistently – only indicators that are currently active, have at least five published assessments, and have consistent calculation exercises with launched results have been considered. • Publicly available. • Focus on service delivery and benchmark areas that are relevant to JUPITER. • Focus on FCV countries, given South Sudan’s context. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 85 ANNEX A As part of the desk research, the team studied reports from organizations such as Amnesty International, HiiL, International Commission of Jurists, Norwegian Refugee Council, ODI, SSLS, Transparency International, UNDP, UNMISS, United States Institute of Peace, UN Women, and WBG. Specific insights from some of these studies were used for the report after consent and permissions from the authors (where data were used) and have been cited (where insights were referred to). b. Questionnaire Design and Identification of Stakeholders Through desk research, the JUPITER team at the WBG HQ, alongside a WBG Consultant in South Sudan who is familiar with the laws and judicial system, prepopulated the questionnaire with answers by law. This allowed the team to compile a list of documents and information to be further sought from the GoSS and the Judiciary. Once the questionnaire was ready for distribution, the team identified key stakeholders, including: • Institutional actors in the judicial branch of the government, such as judges from the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal of Upper Nile, Court of Appeal of Greater Equatoria, the Chief Registrar, the Director of Human Resources, the Director General of Finance, court clerks, and key staff members of the Judiciary. • Actors in the executive branch of the government, such as the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and all its relevant departments (Legal Aid, Civil Litigation, Training and Research, Legislation, and Business Registrations). • Independent Peace Agreement and Constitutional Bodies, such as JRC, NCAC, RJMEC, and SSLRC. • Professional associations of lawyers, such as the SSBA and FIDA. • Stakeholders influencing the judicial ecosystem in South Sudan, including CSOs such as SSLS and the Berberi’s Academy for Training and Learning. • External stakeholders, including several international development institutions like HiiL, Max Planck Foundation, UNDP, UNMISS, and the Rule of Law Focal Points Network for South Sudan. Future assessments will include interviews with stakeholders from the private sector, to understand their perspectives on judicial service delivery and its impact on the business and investment environment. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 86 ANNEX A c. Data Sources For the legal framework, laws and documents that were found relevant for the JUPITER assessment included: • Advocates Act, 2013. • Code of Civil Procedure Act, 2007. • Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 2008. • Code of Evidence Act, 2006. • Code of Judicial Conduct, 2017. • Constitution Making Process Act, 2022 • Judiciary Act, 2008. • Judicial Service Council Act, 2008. • Labor Act, 2017. • Land Rights Act, 2009. • Law Review Commission Bill, 2012. • Local Government Act, 2009. • Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development Organization Act, 2008. • National Disability Action Plan, 2020. • Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 2018 • Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011. • Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 2023-2026. To capture the application of the law in practice, the team collected data from a total of 133 experts, selected to include key sociodemographic differences—gender and socioeconomic status, in particular. Experts consulted by the team included: • Judges. • Lawyers. • Court Users across selected courts in Juba County and Central Equatoria State. • Court Administrators and Clerks. • Heads of key directorates of the Judiciary: Chief Registrar, Director for Human Resources, Director for Finance and Administration, and Presidents of the Court of Appeal of Greater Equatoria and Upper Nile. • Head of key directorates of the MoJCA: Administration and Finance, Legal Aid, Civil Litigation, Training and Research, Legislation, and Business Registrations. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 87 ANNEX A • Members and Chairpersons of key independent peace agreement and constitutional bodies: JRC, NCAC, RJMEC, and SSLRC. • FIDA. • SSBA. • SSLS. • Representatives of WBG development partners: HiiL, Max Planck Foundation, UNDP, and UNMISS. The WBG team also relied on administrative data to assess the practical application of the law. However, obtaining this data proved challenging due to scattered and often incomplete records. To gather the necessary information, the team made multiple visits to the courts, obtaining information such as the list of judges, the list of active courts, financial reports, salary schedules, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The team also collected data on the number of incoming, pending, and resolved cases for the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal of Greater Equatoria, the High Court of Eastern Equatoria, and selected County Courts in Juba. This data was not readily available and had to be counted manually with the assistance of clerks, who referred to the registry docket books. The team faced limitations in the data collection, not being able to obtain information on the rate of first instance decisions overturned on appeal, as this data is not collected by the courts. Additionally, the current fee schedule used by the courts was requested but not provided. To complement these data collection efforts, the team also used data produced by other parties. The total number of individuals whose views were incorporated in the final report is 10,839. All due permissions and consent were obtained while using these datasets, which are publicly available. These datasets included: • 154 respondents from the “Research report: Land and Justice Pathways in South Sudan” (2024), by the Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law, Governance and Society of Leiden University. • 8,843 people from 12 counties across 9 states for the “Policy Brief on Security and Governance: National Survey on Perceptions of Peace in South Sudan” (2022), by the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform of the University of Edinburgh. • 1,520 randomly selected households in six counties (Akobo, Budi, Ikotos, Nasir, Pibor, and Renk) in the study, “Challenges of Accountability: An Assessment of Dispute Resolution Processes in Rural South Sudan” (2013), by the South Sudan Law Society and Pact, with the assistance of the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics. • 100 interviews for the study, “Local Justice in Southern Sudan” (2010), by the United States Institute of Peace and the Rift Valley Institute. • 89 women interviewed in the context of the study, “Lessons from Yambio: Legal Pluralism and Customary Justice Reform in Southern Sudan” (2010), by Tiernan Mennen of the Open Society Justice Initiative. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 88 ANNEX A Some of these reports covered the whole country, others only certain regions. They were especially useful in providing additional insights into the customary system, as several had conducted interviews with Chiefs and users of the customary system. Data collected by the team were either in the form of a filled-out questionnaire or in the form of recorded meeting minutes that were then incorporated into a questionnaire. A focus group was organized with the SSBA, which was recorded and scripted. The team used the protocol for data storage and management detailed in “Section 2.5. Questionnaires,” extracting the information to Excel and coding it as described in the same section. The data analyzed in this report represents a snapshot of the development of the judicial system in South Sudan as of September 2024. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 89 ANNEX B Annex B. Data for South Sudan This Annex presents the aggregated data for South Sudan at the data point level. Questions by law are presented alongside their mirror in practice, whenever possible. B.1.  Access to Justice Pillar The Access to Justice Pillar contains 103 questions, equivalent to 185 datapoints, and comprises five sub-pillars: (1) transparency; (2) proximity to court; (3) equal access; (4) legal aid and cost; and (5) small claims court and procedure. The following table presents the findings related to each question. >>> Table B1: Access to Justice Legend: Q=Question; A=Answer; C=Comment; LB= Legal Basis. LAW PRACTICE Transparency Q1: Does a centralized and comprehensive website of all national laws and regulations (i.e., operated, managed, and administered by a single government unit) exist in the country’s official language(s)? A: No, laws are scattered across different websites. C: The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA) is mandated to publish written laws, according to Section 9(e) of the Ministry’s Organization Act.213 In compliance with this function, the Ministry has published some laws and regulations on its official website. With internet available, the website is public, free, and openly accessible for all. However, it does not have timely updates, as evidenced by the gaps in information available. The last regulation published was in 2017, corresponding to the Labor Act. 213. The Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development Organization Act of 2008 established the Ministry’s structure and functions. Following independence on July 9, 2011, the Ministry became known as the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 90 ANNEX B Sometimes, laws pertaining to specific ministries or agencies can be found on their respective websites, as observed, for example, on the Ministry of Finance and Planning’s website. If “No” to Q1, are laws and regulations published in a manner that makes it possible to consult the latest consolidated version for free? A: No. C: Although it is the statutory responsibility of the MoJCA to publish laws passed or amended, the Ministry has not done so consistently neither in print nor on their official website. Consolidated versions are not available on other websites either. Q2: How difficult is it to stay abreast of the legal framework? A: Difficult (consolidated versions of updated laws and regulations are either not available or very delayed; timely updates occur in less than 25% of cases). C: All the lawyers interviewed by the team found it “somewhat difficult” or “difficult” to keep up with changes in the legal framework. Q3: How consistent and precise is the legal framework (i.e., laws are well drafted, do not create ambiguity that can be exploited by the parties, and conflicting laws are repealed in a timely manner)? A: Somewhat inconsistent and imprecise (the above conditions are not met in most cases). C: During the interviews conducted by the team, experts from the Judicial Reform Committee (JRC), the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), and the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) identified the lack of harmonization of laws as a challenge to the clarity and consistency of the legal framework. Although laws are generally well-drafted, they often lack supporting implementing regulations. In addition, when new laws are enacted, delays in harmonization can lead to conflicting provisions in different laws. Indeed, several pre-independence laws, such as the Code of Civil Procedure Act of 2007, the Code of Criminal Procedure Act of 2008, the Judicial Service Council Act of 2008, and the Judiciary Act of 2008, have not been updated to align with the Transitional Constitution of 2011. Q6: What share of the court(s)’ judgments is public (i.e., online, or in a manner where anyone can access them without submitting a request or paying a fee)? • County Courts: N/A (not public). • High Courts: N/A (not public). • Courts of Appeal: N/A (not public). • Supreme Court: N/A (not public). SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 91 ANNEX B Q4: Is there a legal requirement to make all judgments Q7: If judgments are not public, what share is publicly public? available (i.e., online or otherwise, but access must be requested and/or paid, for example through purchase of A: No. the official gazette or by requesting a copy at the court)? LB: There is no legal requirement to make judgments public. However, copies of judgments or any part of the record can • County Courts: <25%. Access to judgements is limited be requested by any of the parties upon the payment of fees even upon request of the parties. (Section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act). • High Courts: <25%. Access to judgements is limited even upon request of the parties. • Courts of Appeal: <25%. Access to judgements is limited even upon request of the parties. • Supreme Court: <25%. Access to judgements is limited even upon request of the parties. Q8: Are judgments made public or publicly available in a timely manner? • County Courts: No. • High Courts: No. • Courts of Appeal: No. • Supreme Court: No. Q5: Who is responsible for the publication of judgments (including online, if applicable)? A: There is no legal requirement to make judgments public. C: The Max Planck Foundation has supported the Judiciary to prepare written records of Supreme Court judgments for the years 2011 and 2012. However, the Judiciary has not made the Compendiums public yet. Q9: How easy is it to find the following information? • Court location: Information is mostly unavailable. There is no publicly available list of court locations. • Court hours and days of operation: Information is mostly unavailable. Court users interviewed by the team mentioned that electric power outages alter the normal operation of the courts and impact working hours, making schedules unreliable. • Basic information on how to file a claim: Information is mostly unavailable. Court users emphasized the significant challenges of presenting a claim without adequate legal representation. • Basic information on common types of cases: Information is mostly unavailable (see previous answer). • Lay documents and guides that enable self-representation: Information is mostly unavailable. There are no publicly available lay documents or guides to allow self- representation. • Information on court fees: Information is mostly unavailable. More than half of the experts interviewed noted that information about court fees is not available and their application is unpredictable. • Information on legal aid: There is no publicly available information on legal aid. Sixty-seven percent of lawyers interviewed noted that information on legal aid is mostly unavailable and that most people are unaware of how to access such assistance. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 92 ANNEX B Q10: How accurate and up to date is the information? • Court location: N/A (information is not available). • Court hours and days of operation: N/A (information is not available). • Basic information on how to file a claim: N/A (information is not available). • Basic information on common types of cases: N/A (information is not available). • Lay documents and guides to enable self-representation: N/A (information is not available). • Information on court fees: Mostly inaccurate (more than 50%). The court fee schedule published on the MoJCA’s website is not the one currently in use. The current regulation applied to calculate fees is not made publicly available, either online or in the courts. In April 2024, the Judiciary prepared a revised fee schedule that is pending approval by the Ministry of Finance and Planning. • Information on legal aid: N/A (information is not available). Proximity to court Q11: Confirm list of courts (of general jurisdiction and specialized). A: According to data provided by the Judiciary of South Sudan in August 2024, there are 34 active courts in the country. These include 1 Supreme Court, 2 Courts of Appeal, 7 High Courts, 1 Specialized Gender-Based Violence Court, and 23 County Courts. Q12: Confirm list of small claim courts (if different from first instance courts). A: County Courts of the Second Grade can be categorized as small claim courts in South Sudan given their jurisdiction to hear suits below SP 1,000 (Section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure Act (2007)). Q13: How would you characterize the accessibility of the courts of your country to people in urban regions as compared to those in rural regions? A: Much more accessible to people in urban regions than those in rural regions. C: According to data provided by the Judiciary of South Sudan, most courts are in the states’ capitals. In certain regions, such as Unity State and the administrative areas of Ruweng and Pibor, there are no courts available even in the capitals. Lawyers interviewed during the assessment highlighted that people in rural areas face significant challenges in accessing formal courts due to geographic inaccessibility. These challenges are exacerbated by inadequate transportation, financial constraints, and the lack of accommodation in cities. On average, court users surveyed by the team in Juba said they had to travel 56 minutes to reach the nearest court, with some taking up to 150 minutes. One respondent mentioned having to take a two-hour flight from Unity State to access a statutory court. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 93 ANNEX B Equal access Q14: By law, do women have the same rights as men to file Q15: In practice, are women able to file a claim with the a claim with the court? court in the same way as a man (consider, for example, the stigma of being seen entering a court)? A: Yes. A: Vastly true. LB: Article 16 of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS) guarantees that women “shall be C: According to most lawyers surveyed by the team, women accorded full and equal dignity with men.” Additionally, can, in practice, file a claim with the court in the same Article 122(5)(a) stipulates that “justice shall be done to way as men. However, discussions with the Federation all, regardless of their social, political, or economic status, of Women Lawyers of South Sudan (FIDA) revealed that gender, religion, or beliefs.” women still face significant barriers to access justice. These barriers include financial constraints and a lack of access to adequate legal representation. In rural areas, where formal courts are scarce, women often resolve their disputes through the customary system. This system tends to uphold patriarchal values and lacks equal representation of women in decision-making processes. Q16: By law, does a woman’s testimony carry the same Q17: In practice, does a woman’s testimony carry the evidentiary weight in court as a man’s? same evidentiary weight in court as a man’s? A: Yes. A: Vastly true. LB: Article 16 of the TCRSS provides that women “shall be C: Once established, the testimony of a woman holds accorded full and equal dignity of the person with men”. the same evidentiary weight as that of a man in court Article 122.5(a) of the TCRSS further states that “justice proceedings. However, some lawyers have noted that men shall be done to all irrespective of their social, political or predominantly occupy positions of power in the workplace economic status, gender, religion or beliefs.” Additionally, and are thus more likely to have opportunities to serve Section 128 of the Code of Evidence Act (2006) ensures that as witnesses. FIDA also reported that women often face the testimony or evidence presented by a wife is treated with challenges in acting as witnesses due to language barriers, the same regard in legal proceedings as the one presented as non-native speakers, and that interpreters are seldom by the husband. provided to assist them. Q18: Civil remedies for sexual harassment. Q18: By law, there are civil remedies for sexual harassment in employment. In practice, how likely is a A: Under the Labor Act of 2017, sexual harassment in the workplace is expressly prohibited and deemed an offense woman to bring a civil case for sexual harassment against against an employee (Section 7(1)). Section 5 of the Act her employer? defines sexual harassment as “[d]eliberate sexual comments A: Unlikely (<25%). or gestures, or any conduct of a sexual nature that is unwanted, embarrassing, demeaning, or compromising.” C: Experts interviewed by the team observed that women If a dispute arises regarding this prohibition, as outlined often hesitate to report harassment due to fears of job in Section 7, the affected party can submit a written loss and the stigma associated with making such claims. complaint to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, Additionally, FIDA highlighted the difficulties in proving and Arbitration. Should conciliation not resolve the issue, cases of rape and sexual harassment, noting that the strict the dispute can then be appealed to the Labor Court for evidentiary standards applied in the courts pose significant adjudication. challenges. Q19: In practice, how likely is the woman to win the case once it is established that she was indeed harassed beyond reasonable doubt? A: Likely (>75%). C: Once harassment is clearly established, cases are generally adjudicated according to the law. FIDA reports that the establishment of a specialized Gender-Based Violence Court in Juba has improved women’s access to justice. However, this court currently serves only the capital region, limiting access for rural women. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 94 ANNEX B Q20: How would you characterize the accessibility of the courts of your country for women? A: A lot more accessible to men than women. C: In South Sudan, although the legal framework guarantees equal access to justice for women, substantial barriers impede their effective participation in practice. Social norms often discourage women from filing complaints, due to social stigma. Economic constraints also restrict their ability to cover court-related expenses. While specialized institutions like the Gender-Based Violence Court in Juba have improved access to justice, their services are limited to the capital, leaving women in rural areas with fewer options. The scarcity of legal aid and support services further exacerbates these challenges, making it difficult for many women to access justice. Q21 & 22: By law, are persons with disabilities (including intellectual disabilities) recognized the right to legal capacity (i.e., the power to engage in transactions and create, modify, or end legal relationships)? Are they recognized as having equal standing in courts and tribunals? A: No. LB: Article 14 of the TCRSS provides that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination.” Article 30 of the Constitution further guarantees the rights of persons with disabilities, including their equal participation in society and the enjoyment of rights and freedoms. However, regarding participation in legal proceedings, Sections 114 and 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act require that individuals deemed “of unsound mind” or unable to protect their interests due to “mental or physical infirmity” must be represented by a guardian ad litem. While the law allows these individuals to have a guardian in court, it is important to understand that the right to legal capacity includes broader guarantees, such as the ability to engage in transactions and manage legal relationships as independently as possible. Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), as interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, requires governments to shift from substitute decision- making models (like guardianship, conservatorship, and forced treatment) to supported decision-making. This approach must respect the rights, will, and preferences of persons with disabilities and should not involve imposing a decision-maker against their will. Q23: By law, are persons with disabilities granted legal capacity to testify on an equal basis in court? A: Yes. LB: Section 125(2) of the Code of Evidence Act (2006) determines that “[a] mentally disordered person or a lunatic is not incompetent to testify unless he or she is prevented by his or her condition from understanding the questions put to him or her and giving rational answers to them”. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 95 ANNEX B Q24: By law, are courts required to have policies in Q25: In practice, if such policies exist, what is their level of place facilitating equal access to justice for persons with implementation? (i.e., wheelchair accessibility; elevators disabilities, allowing them to participate on an equal accessibility; washrooms accessibility, alternative seating footing in court proceedings as parties, witnesses, victims, arrangements in courtrooms; sign language interpretation; etc.? tactile language interpretation; allowing guide dogs into courtrooms; screen readers; etc.) A: Yes. A: Very low level of implementation (< 25% of courts). LB: Article 30 of the TCRSS mandates that the government ensure persons with disabilities fully enjoy the rights and C: In practice, there are not many measures in place to freedoms outlined in the Constitution. Additionally, the support persons with disabilities in participating in court Government of South Sudan ratified the CPRD on February 5, proceedings. 2024. Article 13.1 of the CRPD provides that States Parties are required to “ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others,” including through procedural and age-appropriate accommodations to support their full participation in legal proceedings. Furthermore, the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare introduced the National Disability Action Plan in 2020, which calls for the development of a CRPD training program for the judiciary and the integration of sign language and braille communication in courts. Q 26: How would you characterize the accessibility of the courts of your country for persons with disabilities? A: A lot more accessible to persons without disabilities. C: Most courts in South Sudan lack special accommodations for persons with disabilities, such as wheelchair access or sign language interpretation services. Additionally, individuals with disabilities face other significant barriers to court access, including inadequate public transportation options and long distances between their residences and the courts. Q27: By law, is there a requirement to provide translation Q27.1: Are translation and interpretation services free of and interpretation services in civil cases for: charge for indigent people in civil cases? A & LB: A: No. • Hearings: Yes. Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure C: Given that the current fee schedule is not publicly available, Act (2007) determines that “a Court may hear parties it is unclear whether interpretation services are provided free or witnesses who are ignorant of English and Arabic in of charge or at a cost to the parties. However, interviews with any other language through an interpreter on oath”. It is litigants revealed that individuals typically must pay the court important to note that Article 6 of the TCRSS designates for these services. English as the official working language of South Sudan. Therefore, any references to Arabic are inconsistent with the Constitution. Q27.2: How likely are people to receive such services? • Documents: Yes. The law allows the translation of A: Somewhat unlikely (between 25% and 50%). documents that are presented as evidence (Section 171(3) C: Even though the law recognizes the need to provide of the Code of Evidence Act). interpretation services for people who do not speak English, this is somewhat unlikely to occur due to shortages in personnel and the availability of interpreters. Q.27.3: How likely are indigent people to receive such services? A: Somewhat likely (between 50% and 75%). C: Indigent individuals are somewhat more likely to receive interpretation services if they can provide strong evidence of their financial need. However, litigants interviewed by the team noted that the provision of these services varies from case to case and that the criteria are not applied consistently. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 96 ANNEX B Q28: How would you characterize the accessibility of the courts of your country for persons with linguistic barriers? A: A lot more accessible to persons without linguistic barriers. C: In South Sudan, courts mainly use Arabic and English, but the country has 64 ethnic groups, each with its own language. This makes it hard to provide adequate interpretation services. Experts noted that these language differences create significant difficulties for courts in supporting individuals who face language barriers during legal proceedings. Q29: How would you characterize the accessibility of the courts of your country for persons of different socio- economic classes? A: A lot more accessible to persons of higher socioeconomic classes. C: Court users interviewed identified costs and access to representation as major barriers to justice. South Sudan lacks a robust legal aid system to assist litigants with financial disadvantages, a topic that will be explored in more detail in the next section. Legal aid Q30: Is there a dedicated law on legal aid? Q31: Is government-funded legal aid available in your country? A: No. A: No. LB: The TCRSS guarantees that “[a]ny accused person has the right to defend himself or herself in person or C: The Directorate of Contracts, Conventions, Treaties, through a lawyer of his or her own choice or to have legal and Legal Aid (hereinafter, “Legal Aid Directorate”) of the aid assigned to him or her by the government where he or MoJCA stated that, currently, the Ministry lacks funding she cannot afford a lawyer to defend him or her in a serious and personnel to adequately provide legal aid to litigants offense” (Article 19.7). However, implementing legislation is facing financial disadvantages. To guarantee legal aid while scattered, and the criteria and procedure to provide legal aid securing a designated budget, the Ministry has signed a are unclear. memorandum of understanding with the South Sudan Law Society to provide legal aid on a pro-bono basis. The Ministry Section 31(2) of the Advocates Act (2013) mandates the Bar indicated that it only considers applications for legal aid in Council, an independent body managing and supervising criminal cases and not in civil cases. legal practice in South Sudan, to provide legal aid “[i]f any of the parties in a civil suit applied to the Council seeking legal aid and the Council is satisfied that he or she is a pauper and unable to pay an advocate’s fee”. A case approved by the Council for legal aid is allocated to a selected advocate member of the South Sudan Bar Association (SSBA). Q32: Are there other providers of legal aid (i.e., NGOs, bar associations, universities, etc.)? A: Yes. C: (i) South Sudan Law Society (SSLS). The SSLS has legal aid clinics to advise low-income clients and detainees. They have branch offices in Eastern Equatoria, Western Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Central Equatoria State. They also provide training to community paralegals and currently have a network of over 300 paralegals in the country. The organization receives funding from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, Norwegian People’s Aid, and the Government of the Netherlands. However, without financial contributions from the Government, the organization is struggling to continue providing services for its 300 active legal aid cases. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 97 ANNEX B (ii) Federation of Women Lawyers of South Sudan (FIDA). The organization provides legal aid for women and children. It has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Gender, Child, and Social Welfare to support victims of sexual and gender-based violence. Currently, it receives funding from UNDP, the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). (iii) South Sudan Bar Association. Q33: Which of the following aspects of legal aid are Q38: Which of the following best describes the legal regulated by law? requirement on the evidentiary burden over eligibility criteria? A: The law does not provide many details on the eligibility criteria and the procedure to grant legal aid. The Advocates A: Before the request is granted, the party intending to Act (2013) only mentions that it may be granted by proceed as a “pauper” must produce evidence of the lack of application of the claimant, demonstrating that he or she is a resources. “pauper” as admitted by the Bar Council. LB: Sections 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act and 31(2) of the Advocates Act. Q34: Is there a body or authority in charge of providing, administering, coordinating, and monitoring the quality of legal aid services? A: Yes. C: The MoJCA is responsible for providing legal aid in South Sudan. According to Article 135.3 of the Constitution, legal advisors under the Ministry are tasked with delivering legal aid. Additionally, the Ministry’s Organization Act stipulates that the Minister of Justice shall “provide legal services to the public, including legal advice and legal aid” (Section 25(k)). There is currently ongoing discussion within the Ministry about separating the Legal Aid Directorate from the Ministry to establish it as an independent body. Q35: By law, for which of the following actions can government-funded legal aid (vs. legal aid provided, for example, by NGOs) be used? A: Representation in court. LB: Article 19.7 of the TCRSS and Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act (2008). Q36: By law, who approves a request for legal aid? A: The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. LB: Article 19.7 of the TCRSS and Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act (2008). Q37. What is the total number of legal aid requests received, and requests approved for government-funded legal aid? A: Over the past three years, the number of cases approved for legal aid by the Ministry has been quite limited. Between 2021 and 2023, the Ministry received 1 applications for legal aid in a civil case, which was denied because it only provides legal aid in criminal cases. When asked about the low number of requests, the Legal Aid Directorate explained that most citizens are unaware of their right to legal aid. When they do apply, the Ministry often refers them to the South Sudan Law Society for assistance, as the MoJCA lacks sufficient funds to provide the service. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 98 ANNEX B Q39: Are there enough providers of government-funded legal aid? A: No. The Legal Aid Directorate of the MoJCA does not have the funding and capacity to effectively provide legal aid. Other institutions that provide these services on behalf of the government, such as the South Sudan Law Society, face challenges in sustaining their efforts due to limited financial support. The SSLS currently manages 300 legal aid cases, which are at risk of remaining unresolved if donor funding is discontinued. Q40: What are the chances of obtaining government- funded legal aid when eligible? A: Very low (less than 25% of eligible applicants). Q41: By law, is there a time standard for deciding on a Q42: In practice, what is the average decision time for legal aid request? government-funded legal aid requests (calendar days)? A: No. A: N/A, this data is not collected by the MoJCA. Q43: What is the total budget (in local currency) allocated Q44: What is the total amount (in local currency) spent on to government-funded legal aid as a percentage of the government-funded legal aid? national/judiciary/justice sector budget? A: N/A. A: Legal aid is not accounted for in the budget of the MoJCA. Q45: What is the annual income value (in local currency) to be eligible for full legal aid? A: N/A, not regulated. Court fees Q46: Are court fees set by law? Q47: Is clear and detailed information about the court fees applicable to various types of cases publicized widely? A: No. A: Seventy-three percent of lawyers interviewed reported LB: The current fee schedule used to calculate fees is not set that information about court fees is difficult to find and by law. understand, with inconsistencies in how the fee schedule is applied. The team requested a copy of the fee schedule currently in use in multiple court visits but did not manage to obtain it. According to information from the Judiciary, the Chief Justice recently appointed a sub-committee to review the fee schedule. This sub-committee completed its review in April 2024 and has submitted a revised fee schedule to the Ministry of Finance and Planning for approval before it can be implemented. Q48: Are court fees collected by the courts retained by the Judiciary? A: Yes, but only a percentage. Q49: By law, are litigants in general required to pay a court Q50: How likely is the winning party to get full fee to initiate a proceeding at a court of first instance? reimbursement of court fees? A: Yes, at the beginning of the procedure. A: Somewhat unlikely (between 25% and 50%). LB: Section 33(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure Act (2007) C: Costs, which include attorney fees and expenses on determines that “[a] suit is deemed to be instituted on the experts and witnesses, are payable by the judgment debtor date of payment of Court fees or, if the plaintiff is exempted in the amount determined by the Court (Section 110(3) of the from payment of fees by law or order of Court, on the date on Code of Civil Procedure Act). However, in practice, practicing which the plaint was allowed by the Court”. attorneys highlighted that it is very difficult to obtain full reimbursement of fees as it requires an additional procedure for the execution of the decree (Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act). SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 99 ANNEX B Q51: How likely is the winning party to get full reimbursement of attorney fees? A: See Q.50. Q52: Are court fees set at a level that deters individuals and businesses from filing a claim? A: No. Q53: Does the law establish a court fee waiver program Q54: How likely is it for an eligible candidate to obtain a with clear eligibility criteria? fee waiver? A: Yes. A: Likely (more than 75%). LB: Sections 12 and 13 of Rule 6 of the Code of Civil C: According to the Judiciary, any person who meets the Procedure Act (2007) regulate suits filed by a “pauper,” conditions for a pauper under the law is granted a fee waiver. defined as someone who lacks sufficient means to pay the prescribed fees for hearing the suit. To file as a pauper, the applicant must submit a list of their property along with its estimated value, a certificate signed by two witnesses confirming the applicant’s financial status, and the petitioner’s plaint. The Court may also require the plaintiff to make an oath or affirmation of their inability to pay the fees. If the Court is not convinced that the petitioner qualifies as a pauper, it will reject the application. Q55: What is the total number of fee waiver requests received and approved? A: N/A, the Judiciary does not keep a record of fee waivers received, approved, or rejected. Small claim court or procedure Q56 & 57: In South Sudan, are there small claims courts/ divisions and/or a fast-track procedure for small claims? If yes, what type of cases fall under the jurisdiction of this court/procedure? A: Yes, a court/division. LB: Due to their jurisdictional scope, County Courts of the Second Grade Judge can be considered small claim courts. They have original jurisdiction to try suits of value not exceeding SP1000 (Section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure Act). Q58: By law, is it possible to file small claims orally? A: No. Q59: By law, is it possible to file small claims without legal Q60: In practice, how easy is it to use the small claims representation? court/procedure without legal representation? A: Yes. A: Somewhat easy (people of most backgrounds can use it, but it would take some effort). LB: Section 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act (2007) determines that “[o]n the day fixed for hearing of the suit, the parties shall attend the Court in person or by their respective advocates”. Q61: Are there standardized templates available to file small claims? A: No. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 100 ANNEX B Q62: By law, is there a time standard for resolving small Q63: What is the average resolution time for small claims claims (calendar days)? (calendar days)? A: No. A: The average disposition time at the Juba County Court is 1101 days in 2023. LB: Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act (2007) stipulates that after a suit has been heard, the Court “shall either immediately or within a short and reasonable time, of which due notice shall be given, pronounce its judgment”. However, aside from this general reference to a “reasonable time,” there are no specific time standards established for resolving small claims. Q64: Is there a dedicated fee schedule for small claims? Q65: Are court fees in small claims set at a level that deters individuals and businesses from filing a claim? A: No. A: No. C: Eighteen percent of court users interviewed cited high costs and attorney fees as the main challenge in accessing justice. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 101 ANNEX B B.2.  Efficiency Pillar The Efficiency Pillar contains 74 questions, equivalent to 99 datapoints, and comprises five sub- pillars: (1) clearance rates; (2) age of caseload; (3) disposition time; (4) case processing and case management; and (5) information and communications technologies. The following table presents the findings related to each question, drawing comparisons between the legal requirements and how they are carried out in practice. >>> Table B2.1.: Clearance rate, age of caseload, and disposition time Number of judges 2024 2023 2022 Q66: Number of judges in South Sudan 116 - - Q67: Of which, female 28 - - Number of incoming cases 2023 2022 2021 Q68: Juba County Court 703 807 860 Q69: High Court of Central Equatoria State 670 612 437 Q70: Juba County Court (administrative jurisdiction) (same as q. 68) (same as q. 68) (same as q. 68) Q71: High Court of Central Equatoria State (same as q. 69) (same as q. 69) (same as q. 69) (administrative jurisdiction) Number of resolved cases 2023 2022 2021 Q72: Juba County Court 175 211 172 Q73: High Court of Central Equatoria State 461 488 343 Q74: Juba County Court (administrative jurisdiction) (same as q. 72) (same as q. 72) (same as q. 72) Q75: High Court of Central Equatoria State (same as q. 73) (same as q. 73) (same as q. 73) (administrative jurisdiction) Active cases older than 3 years Q76: County Courts This data is not collected by the judiciary Q77: High Courts This data is not collected by the judiciary Q78: Supreme Court This data is not collected by the judiciary Q79: County Courts (administrative jurisdiction) This data is not collected by the judiciary Q80: High Courts (administrative jurisdiction) This data is not collected by the judiciary Q81: Supreme Court (administrative jurisdiction) This data is not collected by the judiciary Number of pending cases214 2023 2022 2021 Q82: Juba County Court 528 596 688 Q83: High Court of Central Equatoria State 209 124 94 Q84: Juba County Court (administrative jurisdiction) (same as q. 82) (same as q. 82) (same as q. 82) Q85: High Court of Central Equatoria State (same as q. 83) (same as q. 83) (same as q. 83) (administrative jurisdiction) 214. The number of pending cases is not combined with the number of pending cases from previous years because the registry does not track cases that remain unresolved from previous years. Instead, caseload data is collected by counting each case presented and resolved in each court on an annual basis. Therefore, the pending cases for any given year only include the number of cases obtained by subtracting the resolved cases from the incoming cases of that specific year. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 102 ANNEX B >>> Table B2.2.: Case processing, case management, and ICT Legend: Q=Question; A=Answer; C=Comment; LB= Legal Basis. LAW PRACTICE Assignment of cases Q87: If the assignment of cases is not random, how is it carried out? A: In the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice assign cases to the decision panels. For the Court of Appeal, case assignments are made by the President of the Court of Appeal. In the High Courts, the President of the High Court oversees case assignments. At the County Courts level, the Resident Judge is responsible for assigning cases. Q88: How often is the assignment process abused (as reported, for example, by users, NGOs, etc.)? A: Often (between 50% and 75% of processes). C: Sixty-six percent of lawyers interviewed stated that the Q86: By law, how are cases assigned within the courts? process of assignment of cases was abused “often” or “very often.” Eighty-five percent of court users mentioned A: The law does not specify the process for assigning cases. that people with connections and financial resources often influence judges in their favor. Some noted that “When people pay judges money their cases are fastened affecting the process;” “Judges are paid money to delay the other cases for people who do not have money;” and “Most judges are influenced by money to slow procedures.” Q89: How easy is it for the parties to influence the assignment? A: Easy (between 50% and 75% of assigned cases). C: It is easy for the case assignment process to be abused. Delays in the payment of judges’ salaries and poor working conditions create a suitable environment for influencing their decisions through financial influence. Case Management Information System (CMIS) Q90: Is there a single electronic CMIS system used in all courts? A: No electronic system exists, but manual data collection at the court level tracks incoming and disposed cases. C: The court clerk records cases and transmits the files to the Resident Judge, who in turn will assign a judge. Q91: Which of the following functionalities are available to judges through the CMIS system? A: N/A, no CMIS is available. Q92: Which of the following functionalities are available to lawyers through the CMIS system? A: N/A, no CMIS is available. Q93: What is the CMIS deployment rate (in civil and/or commercial cases)? A: N/A, no CMIS is available. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 103 ANNEX B Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Q94: What percentage of judges and staff drafting documents and entering case data has and uses computers? A: Less than 25%. Q95: What percentage of courts has internet installed? A: Less than 25%. Q96: What percentage of courts has intranet installed? A: Less than 25%. Q97: By law, can the initial complaint be filed electronically through a dedicated platform? A: No. Q99: In practice, what is the percentage of cases filed LB: In South Sudan, a dedicated electronic platform for filing electronically? complaints has not yet been developed. A: N/A (complaint cannot be filed electronically). C: There is no platform that allows for the electronic filing of Q98: If “Yes” to Q.97, is the plaintiff required to follow-up complaints. with a paper copy? A: N/A (complaint cannot be filed electronically). Q100: By law, can the initial complaint be served Q101: In practice, what is the percentage of cases served electronically through a dedicated platform? electronically? A: No. A: N/A (complaint cannot be served electronically). C: All complaints are served in person through officials of the Court (Section 40(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure Act). Q102: By law, can a request for legal aid be filed electronically? Q104: In practice, what is the percentage of legal aid A: No. requests filed electronically? A: N/A (request cannot be filed electronically). Q103: If “Yes” to Q.102, is the applicant required to follow- C: There is no platform that allows for the electronic filing of up with a paper copy? these requests. A: N/A (request cannot be filed electronically). Q105: By law, can the initial complaint in a small claim Q107: In practice, what is the percentage of small claims procedure be filed electronically through a dedicated filed electronically? platform? A: N/A (complaint cannot be filed electronically). A: No. C: There is no platform that allows for the electronic filing of these claims. Q106: If “Yes” to Q.105, is the plaintiff required to follow- up with a paper copy? A: N/A (complaint cannot be filed electronically). Q108: By law, is evidence filed only electronically Q109: In practice, what is the percentage of evidence filed admissible? electronically? A: No. A: N/A (evidence filed electronically is not admissible). C: There is no process in place for the admission of evidence filed electronically. Q110: By law, can hearings be conducted remotely/ Q111: In practice, what is the percentage of hearings virtually? conducted remotely? A: No. A: Less than 25%. C: Hearings are done in court. There is no process in place for C: Hearings are usually not conducted remotely. Recently, conducting hearings remotely or virtually. South Sudan had its first virtual hearing conducted by a judge sitting in Juba, who connected with the defendant sitting at a conference room in the UNMISS Malakal field office. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 104 ANNEX B B.3.  Quality Pillar The Quality Pillar contains 56 questions, equivalent to 89 datapoints, and comprises five sub-pillars: (1) qualification of judges; (2) extra-judicial activities; (3) judicial pay; (4) appeal and reversal rates; and (5) consistency of decisions. The following table presents the findings related to each question, drawing comparisons between the legal requirements and how they are carried out in practice. >>> Table B3: Quality Legend: Q=Question; A=Answer; C=Comment; LB= Legal Basis. LAW PRACTICE Qualification of judges Q112: By law, which of the following criteria is used for the appointment of judges? A: Education requirement, minimum age, nationality, ethical standing, and years of experience. LB: The Constitution grants the President the authority to appoint the Chief Justice without the involvement of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). The President also appoints the Deputy Chief Justice and other Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal based on JSC recommendations, with these appointments requiring the approval of a two-thirds majority of all members of the Q113: How often are the criteria mandated by law for the National Assembly (Article 133 of TCRSS). For lower courts, appointment of judges followed in practice? the Chief Justice appoints judges to the High Courts and A: Followed very rarely (less than 25%). County Courts based on JSC recommendations (Section 21(3) of the Judiciary Act). C: More than half of the experts interviewed by the team considered that the requirements for the appointment of The Judiciary Act provides that a person appointed to a judges are followed “rarely” or “very rarely.” They highlight judicial position must be a South Sudanese citizen of sound that judges are appointed by the judicial leadership based on mind and must not have been convicted of an offense connections and not based on experience, which was also involving dishonesty or moral turpitude (Section 20 of the highlighted in a 2019 report by Amnesty International. Judiciary Act). Appointees must be at least 25 years old to serve at a County Court, 35 to serve at the High Court and Court of Appeal, and 45 to be a judge of the Supreme Court. In terms of experience, candidates for the Supreme Court need 15 years of experience from the MoJCA or private advocacy and 18 years from academia if coming from outside the Judiciary. For the Court of Appeal, High Court, and County Court, the required experience ranges from 4 to 15 years, depending on whether the candidate comes from private practice, the MoJCA, or academia (Sections 22 to 25 of the Judiciary Act). Q114: In your view, are judges competent (i.e., knowledgeable of the law and able to apply it correctly)? • County Courts: Somewhat competent. • Courts of Appeal: Very competent. • Supreme Court: Very competent. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 105 ANNEX B Q115: In your view, are judges honest (i.e., ability to resist taking bribes or other incentives in individual cases)? • County Courts: Somewhat dishonest. • Courts of Appeal: Somewhat honest. • Supreme Court: Somewhat honest. Q116: In your view, are judge-rendered decisions of high quality? [Judgments of bad quality are those that contain grammatical errors, imprecise or inconsistent application of the legal framework, technical errors requiring the parties’ rectification before enforcement, wrong assessment of the evidence, failure to address the most essential arguments, etc.] • County Courts: Somewhat not qualitative. • Courts of Appeal: Somewhat not qualitative. • Supreme Court: Very qualitative. Extra judicial activities Q117 & Q117.1: Does an institution/body exist to give opinion on ethical questions on the conduct of judges during extra-judicial activities? What is the composition of such body? A: Yes. LB: Article 134 of the TCRSS stipulates that the Chief Justice, with the approval of the JSC, is responsible for disciplining justices and judges. According to Section 53 of the Judiciary Act (2008), the Boards of Discipline are tasked with investigating and hearing the defense of a justice or judge. Their findings are then submitted to the JSC for review. Under Section 8(1)(d) of the Judicial Service Council Act (2008), the JSC has the authority to confirm, modify, dismiss, or return the Boards’ recommendations. The JSC is chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and includes the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Minister of Finance and Planning, the Chairperson of the Legislative Assembly’s Committee on Legislation and Legal Affairs, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Juba, the President of the SSBA, and two senior justices of the Supreme Court (Section 9 of the Judiciary Service Council Act). Q118: Are any of the following safeguards relating to the temporary employment of judges in political offices (i.e., politicians, ministers, government officials, cabinet members, etc.) in place? A: Temporary employment is not allowed. Q119: How often do judges gain temporary employment in LB: Section 28 of the Judiciary Act (2008) mandates that political offices? justices and judges must refrain from engaging in trade or any form of employment or business that conflicts with A: Very rarely (less than 25%). their judicial duties and undermines the independence of C: Judges are not allowed to political positions. the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to refrain from being members of a political party, contest elections for clubs, societies, or other associations, or hold elective office, except in law-related societies or associations (Section 4.8 of the Code of Judicial Conduct). A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 106 ANNEX B Q120: How often does such temporary employment in political offices interfere with the judge’s present or future performance of judicial duties? A: Very often (more than 75%). C: Lawyers believe that although it is uncommon for judges to hold political office or be affiliated with a political party, such instances, when they do occur, can significantly interfere with their duties and lead to the politicization of the judiciary. Q121: How often does such temporary employment in political offices undermine the judge’s present or future independence, integrity, or impartiality? A: Very often (more than 75%). Q122: By law, can judges combine their work with any of the Q124: How often do judges combine their work with any of following? the activities listed in Q.122? A: By law, a judge is allowed to perform other activities as A: Very often (more than 75%). outlined below. C: In practice, many judges take on teaching roles at LB: According to Section 4.17 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the country’s law schools and engage in research and judges are permitted to write, lecture, teach, and participate publication activities. Lawyers interviewed by the team in activities related to the law and the administration of view this positively, as it enhances their capacity and keeps justice. They may also engage in civic, charitable, educational, them current with developments in legal scholarship and cultural, and other social and recreational activities, provided knowledge. these do not interfere with their judicial responsibilities. Q125: How often do such activities interfere with the judge’s present or future performance of judicial duties? A: Often (between 50% and 75%). Q123: By law, are there safeguards in place during C: Some lawyers suggested that these activities might delay contemporaneous employment for the activities listed in case resolutions, given the already lengthy disposition times the Q.122? and delays in South Sudan’s courts. A: Yes. Q126: How often do such activities undermine the judge’s LB: The Code of Judicial Conduct allows judges to participate present or future independence, integrity or impartiality? in the activities outlined in Q122 above, provided these do not interfere with their judicial responsibilities. A: Often (between 50% and 75%). C: Experts noted that, depending on the circumstances, temporary employment could create a conflict of interest for a judge handling a specific case. Judicial pay Q127: Does the law regulate the remuneration of judges by position/grade? A: No. C: Although Article 124(9) of the TCRSS stipulates that judicial salaries, benefits, tenure, and allowances must be governed by law, the necessary regulations have not yet been issued. Scales of salaries are established each year by the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the Chief Justice. Q128: By law, must judicial salary schedules be published? Q129: In practice, are judicial salary schedules published? A: No. A: No. Q130: By law, does remuneration depend on performance? A: No. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 107 ANNEX B Q131: In 2023, what was the yearly salary (in local currency) of a first-instance judge with 10 years of experience (including, as applicable, 13th salary, bonuses, etc.)? A: SSP 98,760 Q132: In 2023, what was the yearly salary (in local currency) of the Minister of Justice (including, as applicable, 13th salary, bonuses, etc.)? A: N/A. Q133: In 2023, what was the yearly salary (in local currency) of a partner in a local law-firm (including bonuses, as applicable)? A: N/A, lawyers in South Sudan mostly work on success fees and bonuses, making an estimate difficult. Q134: Are there significant variations in salary among judges in comparable positions? A: No. C: The salary scales determine a specific amount for each staffing level. Q135: In 2023, what was the budget (in local currency) of the largest first instance civil court? A: N/A. Q136: In 2023, how many judges did the court referred to in Q.135 have? A: N/A. Q137: Salary: First instance professional judge at the beginning of his career (yearly) A: SSP 76,620 Q138: Salary: First instance professional judge at the beginning of her career – Women (yearly) A: Same as Q137 Q139: Salary: Judge of Supreme Court or Highest Appellate Court (yearly) A: SSP 316,200 Q140: Salary: Judge of Supreme Court or Highest Appellate Court – Women (yearly) A: Same as Q140. Appeal rates and reversal rates Q141: Percentage of first instance decisions (civil cases) subject to appeal A: N/A, this data is not collected by the judiciary. Q142: Percentage of first instance decisions (administrative cases) subject to appeal A: N/A, this data is not collected by the judiciary. Q143: Percentage of first instance decisions (civil cases) overturned in appeal A: N/A, this data is not collected by the judiciary. Q144: Percentage of first instance decisions (administrative cases) overturned in appeal A: N/A, this data is not collected by the judiciary. A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT | SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN 108 ANNEX B Consistency of decisions Q145: Are judicial decisions a source of law? A: Yes. LB: Article 126.5 of the TCRSS stipulates that “decisions of the Supreme Court shall be final and binding.” Additionally, the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court with the authority of judicial review, allowing it to adjudicate the constitutionality of laws and invalidate or strike down any laws or provisions that conflict with the Constitution or the constitutions of the states (Article 126.2(d) of the TCRSS). Q146: If “Yes” to Q.145, are decisions from the highest/ supreme court the only source of law? A: Yes. Q148: In practice, how often is this departure stated and Q147: If “Yes” to Q.145, does departure from previous case explained? law need to be stated and motivated? A: Rarely (between 25% and 50%). A: No. C: Sixty-six percent of the lawyers interviewed indicated LB: N/A, not regulated by law. that departures from precedent are “rarely” or “very rarely” explicitly stated and explained. Q149: Can the highest/supreme court take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts on its own initiative? A: No. C: The Supreme Court can reverse a decision by lower courts on the grounds of inconsistency with case law if the decision is appealed before the Court and the latter has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Q150: Are there other mechanisms in place for the highest/ supreme court to ensure consistency of case-law? A: No. Q152: If so, in practice, how often are these sanctions applied? A: There are no sanctions that can be imposed on a judge for Q151: By law, are there sanctions when a lower court does an incorrect legal interpretation. not decide consistently with case law? A judge may face sanctions only for breaches of duty, A: No. professional ethics, criminal offenses, or acts of LB: N/A, not regulated by law. insubordination (Section 55 of the Judiciary Act). If the Supreme Court finds that a judge has misinterpreted the law, it may overturn the judge’s decision rather than impose a sanction. SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SOUTH SUDAN | A 2025 JUPITER ASSESSMENT 109 Bibliography Administrative data Judiciary Branch of Government of Liberia. 2023. Annual Report 2021 – 2022. Monrovia, Liberia. Judiciary of Kenya. 2020. Court Fees Assessment Schedule, Gazette Notice No. 10181. Nairobi, Kenya. Judiciary of Kenya. 2024. State of the Judiciary and the Administration of Justice, Annual Report 2022/23. Nairobi, Kenya Judiciary of Rwanda. 2024. Performance of the Judiciary During the Year 2022-2023. Kigali, Rwanda. Judiciary of Tanzania. 2018. The Judicature and Application of Laws Act, First Schedule. 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