63879 No. 129 / June 2010 HOW-TO NOTE: A Framework to Assess Administrative Decentralization Local governments need to be endowed with administrative autonomy to be able to respond to local needs effectively. The purpose of this note is to clarify components of a well-designed administrative decentralization system and to assist task teams and stakeholders to assess administrative decentralization effort in any given country. There are two main components of an administrative decentralization system (a) discretion allowed to the local government to direct the business of the local government and (b) mechanisms to hold the local government accountable for appropriate use of this discretion. Local governments1 need to be endowed with held accountable by other elected or non-elected administrative autonomy in order to be able to public officials, and social accountability where, respond to local needs effectively. The World public officials are answerable directly to the Bank (2008) identifies three broad powers as citizens. Figure 1 provides a graphical being crucial for local governments to be representation of these relationships. administratively autonomous: (a) to make, change and enforce regulatory decisions, (b) to The objective of this note is to explain the govern a procurement system and (c) to manage importance of each of these components. The human resources including recruitment and note also illustrates how these components performance management. The objective of this should be put into practice. Challenges and note is to present a framework2 that allows us to good practices in implementations in various evaluate the components of an administrative developing countries are highlighted. Detailed decentralization system in order to ascertain if checklists (Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4 in the the design of the system is able to fulfil its annex) are provided that can serve as tools in goals.3 According to this framework, the evaluating the decentralization reforms in any discretion allowed to local governments to country. Uganda, Philippines, India (Kerala perform fundamental functions must be checked state) and Rwanda are used as examples to through various mechanisms of accountability. elucidate the use of the checklists.4 The note also Two types of accountability are essential includes a blank questionnaire which the reader features of an effective decentralization system: can complete for any country under review public accountability, where local officials are (Tables A5, A6, A7 and A8 in the annex) 1 In this note, local governments comprise local council, the local executive and other committees established by the council or executive. Local council refers to local legislative assembly while local executive refers to the administrative unit of the local government including the bureaucracy that performs the functions prescribed by the local government. 2 The framework is adapted from World Bank (2008). 3 This note is part of the series of notes on decentralization. Other notes in the series define the framework for fiscal and 4 The choice of countries is based on the variety of political decentralization. decentralization structures found in these countries. 1 Figure 1: Accountability Relationships for Effective Decentralization Administrative Discretion Human resource management Regulation Procurement  Budget payroll  Land  Management of  Establishment control  Social services procurement contracts  Recruitment  Law and order  Comparative participation  Career management  Small businesses of community, bureaucracy and local elected officials  Performance management Administrative Accountability Public Accountability Social Accountability  Audit  Information provision  Theme specific bodies  Citizen oversight council  Administrative courts  User groups  Performance based financing 1. Discretion local governments in the case study countries Administrative discretion has three components: suggests that local governments in Rwanda, ability to regulate, discretion over procurement of Philippines and Kerala have regulatory goods and services, and management of human discretion in most areas that were mentioned resources. above. On the other hand, local governments in Uganda are more restricted in their ability to 1.1. Ability to regulate regulate. However, it should be noted that in As part of administrative autonomy, local certain sectors, for example health, greater governments need a minimum set of powers regulatory authority should be maintained at and capacities to initiate local laws and the central level. See Box 1 for more explanation. regulations on issues affecting their jurisdiction. In theory it is argued that the local governments In addition to the ability to regulate, local are more effective regulators because they are governments also need the authority to sanction better able to ascertain and aggregate their non-compliance to ensure enforcement of these constituents’ preferences than regional or central regulations, for example through administrative governments. This improves allocative penalty. Administrative penalty is applied efficiency. In a well-designed administrative through a locally issued ordinance and decentralized system, regulatory discretion of administered by a local governing body, such as the local government extends to the following a local council or a special committee. In the case areas: local economic development, land use study countries, however, we observe that none planning and management, zoning, and some of the local governments have the authority to aspects of public safety, public health, social sanction non-compliance except Rwanda. In protection, education, and environmental addition to the inability of the local government protection (World Bank, 2008). Our review of to ensure enforcement, the need for local governments to adhere to certain minimum 2 Box 1. Health: regulatory discretion to the local or the central government? Some services, for example, public health, do not present a very good case for decentralization of regulatory and service provision authority to the local level. Specifically, the regulatory authority should be decentralized cautiously for services that have the following two characteristics. First are services for which the non-excludable externalities (or spill-over effects) are spread over a large area (larger than the local government jurisdiction). The theoretical argument of internalization of externalities through decentralization is weak. The local government would ignore the larger externality effects of these services while deciding the quantity of these services to be provided at the margin. Therefore, if service provision and policy making authority is left completely to the local government, the government will under-provide these services while over-providing the services that are excludable and more visible. In the health sector, for example, it is argued that decentralization leads to over-allocation of resources for curative health and under allocation for preventive health services (World Bank, 2009). Second, if the provision of a service requires extensive technical expertise and knowledge, it should be regulated at the central level. For example, health case studies reviewed in ESW (2010) have argued that local preferences may not always conform to well-established and effective public health practices. Similarly, local governments may not have required expertise, for example skilled staff, to ensure adequate quality of health services. standards set by the national government can decentralization system, local governments also indirectly restrict the discretion of the local should have discretion in all these stages. government. Therefore, the benefits of prescribing minimum standards to ensure The review of study countries shows that local quality of the service provision should be governments in the Philippines and Kerala have weighed against the loss of local government’s the authority to engage in all kinds of discretion. procurement contracts. On the other hand, local governments in Uganda and Rwanda only have 1.2. Discretion to Procure and Administer Services partial authority to enter into procurement In addition to the regulatory authority, local contracts with private or other entities. government also needs discretion to procure Regarding the comparative participation of local goods and services from the private sector or councils, local executives and the central other entities to ensure efficient service delivery executive in the procurement process, we to citizens. Procurement contracts can take many observe that in Kerala and the Philippines, local forms including service or management councils are fully empowered to carry out the contracts, leases, concessions, joint ventures, and procurement processes without the involvement full or partial ownership. The procurement of central or local executive. On the other hand, process can be divided into the following in Uganda, the local executive is completely in phases: specifying goods and services to be charge of the procurement process while the procured, designing the contract, selecting local council does not play a substantial role. suppliers, appraising technical and financial One phase of procurement in which the central qualification of the bidders, managing the bid executive almost always participates is the process, finalizing the bid process and contract appraisal of the technical and financial management. Decentralization laws should qualifications of the bidders. The rationale for provide clear guidance on the roles of different government participation in this particular branches and levels of government in all of the phase of the procurement, its challenges and above mentioned steps of procurement possible ways of including citizens in the processes. In a well-designed administrative process are discussed in Box 2. 3 Box 2. Central government intervention in technical appraisals and execution of projects Central government or central and provincial bureaucracy almost always participate in the appraisal of the technical and financial qualifications of the bidders. The intervention is justifiable as a variety of expertise is required for different projects and it is very difficult for the local government to acquire such varied specialized expertise. For example, acquiring medical equipment for local health centers requires the services of a health professional while acquiring materials for road construction requires the services of a civil engineer. The participation of higher levels of government ensures that the crucial skill needs are met. This necessity, however, compromises the ability of the local government to act according to the preferences of its constituents and requires innovative approaches that involve citizens in the process despite its technical nature. Kerala presents an example of an innovative structure that retains community participation while fulfilling the requirement of technical expertise. In Kerala, procurement is mostly carried out by beneficiary committees along with experts belonging to a Voluntary Technical Corps (VTC), a body of volunteer experts created to appraise projects and plans of local bodies. VTC is organized at the level of each local government and has a non-official as its chairperson. Panchayat secretary or officer from the town-planning department is the convener of the VTC. The beneficiaries of the development project are called for a gram sabha meeting where the project is explained to them. They are encouraged to form a 10-15 member committee to execute the procurement process for the project on the basis of the design and the estimates prepared by the panchayat and approved by the VTC. Whenever beneficiary committee volunteers are willing to undertake a project, they are given preference over contractors (World Bank 2004). However, experience suggests that the government engineers may not cooperate with beneficiary committees especially when they are not supported by the VTC or elected representatives. This reduces the effectiveness of citizen participation. 1.3. Discretion to manage human resources Local governments rarely have discretion in Human resources form a crucial link in bringing management of personnel working within their government closer to people by aligning public purview. In some countries, such as Pakistan, a sector activities and decisions with popular majority of the personnel that performs local preferences. Local government discretion over government functions continues to be hired by human resources and employment policies should the central or provincial government. Local ideally cover pay policy autonomy (setting overall governments, on the other hand, are allowed to wage rates as well as local hardship and remote hire additional staff on a contract basis. In other allowances), budget transparency (paying staff countries, such as Burkina Faso, functionaries from one’s own budget), budget and are transferred to the local government but establishment control (controlling staff numbers operational control is retained by the central and authority to remove surplus staff), recruitment government. These practices create different autonomy (recognition as the formal employer), types of personnel working simultaneously career management control (vertical and under local government jurisdiction. Failure of horizontal mobility, including transfers to other the legal framework to clearly define the units within the local government system), and responsibilities and accountability channels of performance management (directing and different types of personnel compounds supervising activities and tasks, conducting confusion and reduces efficiency. Many evaluations, and exercising the ability to discipline countries, such as Guinea, also face the problem and fire). of insufficient staff. Box 3 explains the challenges of increasing the discretion of local However, decentralization of the human government in managing human resources. resource management is a complex process. 4 2. Accountability investigations of the use of administrative discretion by lower level bureaucrats. These Accountability is not an automatic outcome of methods are important as a first step to uncover increased discretion of local governments. Specific information about misadministration by local mechanisms should be designed to ensure that governments. citizens and higher officials are able and willing to hold local governments accountable for their Accountability through specially designed discretion. The notion of administrative independent bodies emerged as a mechanism in accountability can be divided into public response to increased complexities of accountability and social accountability. administrative processes and new government challenges that require specific expertise. 2.1. Public Accountability Examples of these bodies include independent The public sector generally relies on four auditors (external auditors) who scrutinize the mechanisms to improve administrative use of public funds for signs of misuse, accountability. These mechanisms are ombudsmen who hear citizens’ complaints accountability structures within bureaucratic about local governments’ regulatory decisions hierarchies, specially designed independent bodies, and actions, or theme-specific bodies (such as administrative courts, and performance based the anti-corruption commissions, environmental financing. review boards, or commissions for sustainable development) that address compliance issues Accountability structures in the bureaucratic with sector-based standards set by the national hierarchy imply that the local government staff is government. accountable to higher administrative officers, public audit officers, supervisors, and legislative Administrative courts with local expertise address bodies. These entities may instigate local conflicts that may arise between local government and citizens from the potential Box 3. Challenges of decentralizing human resource management One of the major arguments in favor of retaining the management of human resources at the central government is the need to enforce national minimum standards for the qualifications of staff which for some services, like health and education, are particularly important. The public choice literature elucidates additional reasons for the reluctance of central governments to devolve authority in the management of human resources. The literature identifies the potential redistribution of power that results from devolving human resource policies to the local government as a crucial reason. Granting administrative autonomy to local governments in recruitment and management of staff means reallocation of jobs and consequently power, geographically and institutionally. Therefore bureaucracies, the power holders in the status quo prior to decentralization, tend to resist reforms as they stand to lose prestige. This resistance is particularly marked in situations where bureaucracies maintain strong links with the central executive and possess political allegiances. In addition to these considerations, personnel that are being devolved to the local level are also usually concerned about their job security and prospects for career enhancement in a local government. Human resource management at the local level limits inter-regional mobility, sometimes reduces the pay scale, and can affect working conditions of the staff. Other than resistance from bureaucracy, the central government may also want to retain control over financial flows and human resources to the local government for political reasons. Central authorities may see decentralization as an opportunity to appoint a dependable and proven individual who will “tow the party line” and design and implement reforms according to national political interests rather than local ones. This encourages devolution rather than decentralization in management of human resources. Moreover, jobs are an efficient medium for distribution of patronage. For example, the ruling party in Ethiopia plays a major role in the recruitment and management of local staff to the extent that local government cabinet members and administrators are selected from party lists (World Bank 2009). 5 misuse of local governments’ regulatory and oversight councils, and user groups of local administrative discretion. They ensure services. compliance with national laws, regulations, and standards. In order to be able to ensure Providing information to citizens: Making accountability of the local government, a court information available to the public is a pre- system should also have the authority to issue requisite of any social accountability initiative. binding decisions on legal compliance by local The decentralization laws of all the case study governments. In France, for example, countries require local governments to administrative tribunals are the court of first disseminate information regarding service instance with “full jurisdiction” over disputes delivery processes. Uganda and Rwanda, for related to local government actions. example, introduced report cards in selected Administrative courts have been set up in districts. These report cards provide Kerela and Rwanda. However, they are not communities information about the status of accessible to the citizens. service delivery in their own district relative to other districts and national government Performance based financing is another mechanism standards. Community meetings are also a by which central or regional government can common mechanism to publicize and hold local governments accountable. According disseminate information on local performance. to this mechanism, central or provincial Media have also become a significant channel governments make the financing of specific local for information dissemination. Complementary government project dependent on fulfilment of to the dissemination of information is the certain pre-determined criteria. For example, in availability of formal structures for registering Chile, funding to local health systems is not grievances and feedback. Kerala, Philippines automatic and is distributed by regional health and Rwanda provide formal structures for services after their evaluation. Similarly, in registering citizen grievances while no such Uganda, under the Local Development Grant provisions are present in Uganda. program, only the local governments that meet certain minimum governance criteria (for Citizen oversight of procurement processes: example adequate financial management Procurement processes provide a potent capacity) can access funds for capital opportunity for corruption of local development projects. The top twenty percent of governments. Citizen involvement in the the districts in terms of (administrative) process, therefore, can be helpful in mitigating performance receive a twenty percent increase this risk. Citizen groups in many countries have in funds for the next budget year, while poor devised different methods to oversee the performers are penalized by twenty percent for procurement process. For example, in the the next year’s budget. There are indications that Philippines, the Local Government Code Uganda’s local development grant mechanism, requires the establishment of special bodies in and similar mechanisms like it around the which accredited nongovernmental and world, have met with significant success and has community-based organizations have a role in improved planning, financial management, the pre-qualification, bid, and award of local accountability and transparency in development contracts. In Argentina, the Municipality of projects (World Bank 2010). Morón, assisted by the local chapter of Transparency International, introduced two 2.2. Social Accountability mechanisms to monitor the contracting of the Social administrative accountability includes waste collection service which had been widely monitoring the quality of public services and criticized for alleged corruption during the procurement processes. Some mechanisms for previous administration (Yilmaz, Beris and instituting social accountability are as follows: Serrano-Berthet 2008). Also see Box 2 which information provision to citizens, citizen illustrates the citizen oversight mechanism for procurement in Kerala. 6 Citizens’ user groups: Community-managed user change and enforce laws that pertain to local groups oversee the delivery of specific services goods and services, to enter into different kinds in order to enable citizens to interact more of contracts with the private sector and other effectively with the local government entities to procure goods and services necessary administration for service provision. Usually for local governance, and finally, to manage these are multi-stakeholder councils formed by human resources that are employed to perform different combinations of users, civil society the function of local governance. This discretion, organizations, government, and private sector however, should be matched with the representatives. Some examples of user group accountability mechanisms to allow higher committees are school management committees, levels of government as well as the citizens to water user groups and health facility boards. hold the local government responsible for its use Complementary to the user groups is the citizen of this discretion. Our review suggests that the charter -- a pact between the community and local governments in all of our case study service providers that spells out expectations countries have reasonable discretion in and roles, allowing the citizens to demand procuring goods and services. However, they accountability. The charters specify the expected are severely restricted in other areas of standards of the services, identify who is governance. responsible, and outline the procedures for the redress of complaints. An example of a Local governments in most of our case study comprehensive charter is the Citizens’ Charter countries have discretion to legislate in the areas in the Municipality of Mumbai, India. Rwanda pertaining to the provision of local goods and has also established an innovative accountability services but they lack sanction power. This mechanism. It is outlined in Box 4. diminishes their ability to enforce laws. Similarly, local governments do not have 3. Conclusion sufficient discretion to manage staff primarily because a majority of the staff working under Administrative decentralization entails that local local government jurisdiction continue to be government possesses the discretion to make, Box 4. An innovation in administrative social accountability Rwanda has instituted a system of monitoring and evaluation based on the custom of Imihigo. Traditionally imihigo was a public pledge made in front of local leaders to perform a brave act or other public spirited accomplishment. Since 2006, all district mayors have entered into imihigos, which are formalized as a performance contract proclaimed publicly and signed between the district mayor and the President of Rwanda. In this contract, the former commits to carry out the measures outlined in his annual development plan, and the latter to support the district with the requisite financial, technical and human resources to facilitate the achievement of these goals. At the same time, the mayor signs another performance contract with lower levels of government with the same objective as a guarantee for downward accountability. The government has also put in place a number of processes and mechanisms to ensure that targets outlined in Imihigo are achieved. First, on a monthly basis, the district leadership and their chief technicians hold Imihigo assessment meetings and agree on corrective actions for activities that are off track. Second, every three months, the district executive committee presents a progress report to the district council. After its approval, it is presented to the public on public accountability day. Third, provincial leadership, on a quarterly basis, assesses physical and documentary progress of district Imihigo and ranks the district according to performance criteria previously agreed upon. These are then made public in the presence of central government officials led by the Prime Minster. Finally, once a year, during a national forum called the National Dialogue Meeting, presided over by the President of the Republic of Rwanda, mayors present the Imihigo performance report to the nation. Generally speaking, Imihigo constitutes an efficient accountability mechanism and an incentive for local government leaders to implement the decentralization policies and to meet local and national development in targets. It has also entrenched the spirit of competition 7 Rwandan communities where each local government seeks to perform better than its neighbors on targeted development activities, leading to better overall results. hired at the central or provincial level. References: Decentralization leads to geographical and World Bank. 2004. World Development Report of institutional redistribution of power which 2004: Making Services Work for Poor negatively affects the career enhancement People. Washington, D.C. opportunities of the staff that are to be devolved to the local level. Therefore, it is not surprising World Bank. 2008. “Local Government that bureaucracies tend to resist decentralization Discretion and Accountability: A Local reforms. Governance Framework.” Economic and Sector Work Report No. 40153. Decentralization laws in most of our study Washington, D.C. countries also do not adequately incorporate accountability even for the functions for which World Bank. 2009. “Local Government local governments have discretion. Discretion and Accountability: Administrative courts, the most important Application of a Local Governance instrument of accountability, are either absent or Framework.” Economic and Sector are not accessible to large portions of the Work Report No. 49059-GLB, Social population. Social accountability mechanisms Development Department, World Bank, such as information dissemination to the Washington, D.C. community and monitoring of public service delivery and procurement through user groups Yilmaz, S. and Y. Beris. 2008. “Good and other monitoring committees, while Governance and the Emergence of a successful in Rwanda and Kerela, are not well- New Accountability Agenda.” in P. developed in other countries. Gabor (ed.), Finding Money: Public Accountability and Service Efficiency through Fiscal Transparency. OSI/LGI Books, Budapest 8 Annex: Checklists for Administrative Discretion and Accountability Table A1: Legislative jurisdiction and legislative authority – country examples India (Kerala) Philippines Rwanda Uganda Does local government have authority to legislate in the following areas? public safety none complete complete partial land zoning complete complete complete complete land acquisition complete complete partial land conservancy complete complete complete partial land assignment and use complete complete complete complete building permits complete complete complete complete building and construction regulation complete complete complete complete social protection complete none complete partial environmental protection partial complete complete partial cultural and entertainment activities complete complete complete complete local tourism none partial crime prevention none partial complete partial fire-fighting services complete partial complete complete billboards and the display of complete complete complete advertisements in public places cemeteries, funeral parlours and complete complete complete complete crematoria cleaning complete complete complete complete facilitates for the accommodation, care and complete burial of animals local sport facilities complete complete markets complete complete complete complete traffic and parking complete complete complete complete crisis management e.g. following flood, partial partial earthquake, storms maintenance of public property complete complete complete complete regulation of local businesses none  barbers none  local restaurants and other food complete complete none complete consumption  retail complete none complete  animal husbandry and livestock complete complete complete complete  agriculture complete partial complete Note: Legislative authority is partial if there is an ex-ante involvement of executive or higher levels of government (for example, if local council cannot make laws without consultation with the bureaucracy). However, only if ex post intervention is observed (for example, the authority of the executive to over-ride local council’s decisions) then de jure legislative authority is totally in control of the local government. 9 Table A2: Discretion over procurement – country examples Do local governments have discretion to enter into following procurement contracts? Types of Contracts India (Kerala) Philippines Rwanda Uganda service contracts complete complete complete partial management contracts complete complete complete partial lease complete complete partial concessions complete complete partial joint venture leases complete complete partial full or partial ownership complete complete partial Who participates in the following phases of procurement process? identifying needs, specification of the local council, local council local council local executive goods and services community local council, local executive appraising options of bidders local council local council community local council, local executive design and specification of the contract local council local council community local council, local executive supplier selection local council local council community technical and financial qualification of local council, local council, local executive local council bidders community community bid process management, evaluation of local council, local executive local council local council bids community local council, local executive bid finalization process local council local council community local council, local executive contract management local council local council community 10 Table A3: Discretion for the management of human resources – country examples Do local governments have discretion in the following aspects of management of human resources? Budget Payroll India (Kerala) Philippines Rwanda Uganda authority to dismiss surplus staff complete complete partial determine the wage envelop partial partial none Establishment Control controlling overall staff numbers partial complete partial controlling staff numbers in individual partial complete partial local offices and facilities Recruitment recognized as a formal employer partial partial complete partial authority to hire partial complete complete partial independent merit-based recruitment partial partial complete partial mechanism Career Management promotion partial complete partial horizontal mobility within the local partial partial none government transfers within local government partial partial none Performance Management direct and supervise activities and tasks partial partial complete partial conduct evaluations partial partial partial offer financial rewards none partial partial discipline and fire underperforming staff complete partial complete partial pay policy none partial none set overall wage rates none partial none set local incentives, salary top-ups none partial none 11 Table A4: Administrative accountability approaches – country examples India (Kerala) Philippines Rwanda Uganda Who performs the audit of the following? provincial, local executive, local, ex-post audit of accounts national independent provincial, or ex post audit of individual government provincial, d local executive, local, l projects national independent provincial, or ex ante audit and evaluation of the d l local council local council government’s budget proposal ex ante audit and evaluation of individual local council local council government projects right of the auditor to issue opinions and recommendations on government local council ( / ) right of the auditor to advocate alternative propositions At what level of the government are the following accountability bodies managed? anti-corruption regional, local not prescribed local or central local or central environment regional, local government government central local or central sustainable development regional, local government government disciplinary committee for the oversight of central local or central regional the conduct of local officials government government local or central local ; local or central service delivery oversight local government community government monitoring committee for day-to-day local or central local local business government Social accountability: information provision and citizen participation Are there provisions in the code for Yes Yes Yes Yes information availability? Is there any structured community No No No Yes participation in procurement monitoring? Is there any structured community participation in service provision No No No Yes h h ? Is there any formal structure for registering Yes Yes Yes No grievances and feedback? 12 Table A5: Legislative jurisdiction and legislative authority Country Does local government have the discretion to legislate in Discretion of the local government the following areas? Options: Complete, Partial, None public safety land zoning land acquisition land conservancy land assignment and use building permits building and construction regulation social protection environmental protection cultural and entertainment activities local tourism crime prevention fire-fighting services billboards and display of advertisements in public places cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria cleaning facilitates for the accommodation, care and burial of animals local sport facilities markets traffic and parking crisis management e.g. following flood, earthquake, storms maintenance of public property regulation of local businesses  barbers  local restaurants and other food consumption  retail  animal husbandry and livestock  agriculture Note: Legislative authority is partial if there is an ex-ante involvement of executive or higher levels of government (for example, if local council cannot make laws without consultation with the bureaucracy). However, only if ex post intervention is observed (for example, the authority of the executive to over-ride local council’s decisions) then de jure legislative authority is totally in control of the local government. 13 Table A6: Discretion over procurement Does local government have discretion to enter into following procurement contracts? Discretion of the local government Types of Contracts Options: Complete, Partial, None service contracts management contracts lease concessions joint venture leases full or partial ownership Who participates in the following phases of procurement process? Options: Local council, community, local executive, central or provincial governments identifying needs/ specification of the goods and services appraising options of bidders design and specification of the contract supplier selection technical and financial qualification of bidders bid process management/evaluation of bids bid finalization process contract management 14 A.7. Discretion over management of human resources Does local government have discretion in the following aspects of human resource management? Budget Payroll Discretion of the local government Options: Complete, Partial, None authority to dismiss surplus staff determine the wage envelop establishment control controlling overall staff numbers controlling staff numbers in individual local offices and facilities Recruitment Options: Complete, Partial, None recognized as a formal employer authority to hire independent merit-based recruitment mechanism Career Management Options: Complete, Partial, None promotion horizontal mobility within the local government transfers within local government Performance Management Options: Complete, Partial, None direct and supervise activities and tasks conduct evaluations offer financial rewards discipline and fire underperforming staff Pay Policy Options: Complete, Partial, None set overall wage rates set local incentives/salary top-ups 15 Table A8. Administrative accountability approaches Who performs the following audits? Options: Local executive, local council, independent auditors, provincial/national executive ex-post audit of accounts ex post audit of individual government projects ex ante audit and evaluation of the government’s budget proposal ex ante audit and evaluation of individual government projects right of the auditor to issue opinions and recommendations on government propositions (acceptance/rejection) Right of the auditor to advocate alternative propositions At what level of the government are the following accountability bodies managed? Options : regional government, local government, central government or community anti-corruption (7) environment (8) sustainable development (9) disciplinary committee for the oversight of the conduct of local officials (10) service delivery oversight (11) monitoring committee for day-to-day business (12) Social Accountability: Information provision and citizen participation Options: Yes, No Are there provisions in the code for information dissemination to the citizens? Is there any structured participation of the community in procurement monitoring? Is there any structured participation of the community in service provision monitoring, e.g. through user groups? Is there any formal structure for registering grievances and feedback? This note by prepared by Ghazia Aslam, Serdar Yilmaz and Asli Gurkan, as part of How-to Notes and Case-study learning series, is derived from SDV’s Economic and Sector Work Report (2009) on local governance and accountability. Empirical examples in the note are from World Bank (2009).The series is an attempt by the Governance and Accountability Team of the Social Development Department (SDV) to provide guidance on select approaches to improve governance and accountability in World Bank operations. The authors would like to thank Jamie Boex and Helene Grandvoinnet for their valuable comments. For questions and comments please contact ESW team members: Ghazia Aslam at gaslam@worldbank.org, Serdar Yilmaz at syilmaz@worldbank.org and Asli Gurkan at agurkan@worldbank.org. 16