Report No. 21306-DR Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment Poverty in a High-Growth Economy (1 986-2000) (In Two Volumes) Volume II: Background Papers December 17, 2001 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Document of the World Bank Dominican Republic Currency Equivalents (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2000) Currency Unit = Dominican Peso US$1 = DR$16.53 Government Fiscal Year January I - December 31 Weiebts and Measures Metric System Abbreviations and Acronvms BARD Banco Agricola de la Repuiblica Dominicana CAS Country Assistance Strategy CAASD State-owned utility in Santo Domingo (provides water and sanitation services) CB Central Bank CDE National Electricity Corporation CDF Country Development Framework CEA State Sugar Council CESDEM Centro de Estudios Sociales y Demograficos CIANI Centros Infantiles de Atenci6n Integral COAAROM State-owned utility in La Romana (provides water and sanitation services) CONANI Consejo Nacional para la Niflez CONAU Consejo Nacional de Asuntos Urbanos CORAAMOCA State-owned utility in Moca (provides water and sanitation services) CORAASAN State-owned utility in Santiago (provides water and sanitation services) CREP Comisi6n de Reforma de la Empresa Publica DASA Despradel y Asociados DIAPE Direcci6n de Informaci6n, Analisis y Programaci6n Estrategica de la Presidencia DN National District ECD Early Childhood Development ENDESA Encuesta Demografica y de Salud ENGIH Encuesta Nacional de Gastos e Ingresos de los Hogares FEyD Fundaci6n Economia y Desarrollo FTZ Free Trade Zones GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product ICRISAT Intemational Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics IDB Inter-American Development Bank IDDI Dominican Institute of Integral Development IDSS Dominican Social Security Institute IEPD Instituto de Estudios de Poblaci6n y Desarrollo ILO Intemational Labor Organization IMF lntemational Monetary Fund INAPA Instituto Nacional de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado INESPRE National Institute for Price Stabilization INVI Instituto Nacional de Vivienda JAD Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LSMS Living Standards Measurement Survey MECOVI Programa para el Mejoramiento de las Encuestas y la Medicion de las Condiciones de Vida en America Latina y el Caribe NGO Non-Govemment Organization OMSA Oficina Metropolitana de Servicios Autobuses ONAPLAN National Planning Office ONAPRES National Budget Office ONE National Statistical Office PUCMM Pontificia Universidad Catolica Madre y Maestra PNMRE National State Modemization and Reform Program PNUD United Nations Development Program PROALTO Program "Alimentos para Todos" PROMESE Programa de Medicamentos Esenciales SEEC Secretaria de Estado de Educacion SESPAS Secretariat of Public Health and Social Assistance SBI Banking Sector Superintendent WTO World Trade Organization Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Sector Director: Emesto May Task Manager: Philippe Auffret PREFACE This report is the outcome of a collaborative process by the Government of the Dominican Republic and the World. Bank. The process involved continuous cooperation and several missions by World Bank staff and consultants to the DR. A first draft of the report was delivered to the Dominican authorities in February 2001. Several rounds of discussions were held during the rest of 2001. As a consequence, the report does not incorporate the economic developments that took place after February 2001. The report is available on the World Bank's website www.worldbank.org. The Poverty Assessment was written by Philippe Auffret with inputs from Ms. Jacqueline Mora-Baez, and based on the background work prepared over a one year period by a team comprising Mr. Tarsicio Castafieda (Social Policies); Mr. Soumya Chattopadhyay, Ms. Marianne Fay, Mr. Jose Luis Guasch, and Ms. Rosanna Nitti (Urban Slums); Mr. Ram6n L6pez (Rural Poverty); Ms. Rita Mena (Institutions); Ms. Jacqueline Mora-Baez (Determinants of Poverty); Mr. Maurice Schiff (Macroeconomics and Rural Poverty); Mr. Marco Scuriatti (Haitian Migration); and Mr. Edgar Victoria Yeb (Social Policies). Social Assessments were prepared for this report by Padre Pedro Ruquoy of the Centro Puente; Mr. David Luther and Mr. Ram6n Seiffe (among others) of the Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral, Inc. (IDDI); and Padre Hip6lito Cabral of the Parroquia San Juan Bautista, Arquidiocesis de Santo Domingo. Mr. John Panzer and Mr. Norbert Schady were peer reviewers. Ms. Stephanie Larson supplied additional inputs and edited the report. Ms. Pilar Hache translated Volume I into Spanish. Ms. Aline Brito, Ms. Judith Santiago and Ms. Maria Ivanova Reyes also assisted in the preparation of the report. The report also benefited from comments from Mr. Philip Young and Mr. Alessandro Giustiniani (IMF), and colleagues in LAC, including Ms. Ana-Maria Arriagada, Ms. Maria Correia, Ms. Francoise Delannoy, Ms. Maria Donoso Clark, Mr. William Experton, Mr. Marco Mantovanelli, Ms. Pia Peeters, Mr. Thakoor Persaud, Mr. Guillermo Perry, Mr. Alberto Rodriguez, Ms. Susana Sanchez, Mr. Hermann von Gersdorff, and Mr. Quentin Wodon. Mr. Ali Khadr, Lead Economist during the preparation of the report, and Mr. Norman Hicks, Poverty Reduction Sector Manager, provided much support and guidance throughout the process. The Poverty Assessment contains a significant amount of original research for which we are indebted to Mr. Hector Ml. Valdez Albizu, former Governor of the Central Bank, entity which kindly made the 1998 ENGIH available to us. In addition, the 1986 and 1992 surveys were graciously provided by the Fundaci6n Economia y Desarrollo (FEyD). The report also benefited from discussions with Dominican counterparts. We want to thank Padre Hip6lito Cabral for having arranged our stay in La Zurza, where we were provided with first-hand accounts of urban poverty through extensive discussions with Ana Luisa, Fabio, Jesius, Ram6n and their families, among others. Comments on preliminary versions of the report were provided by the working group on poverty (part of the Comprehensive Development Framework) headed by Ms. Ramonina Brea (PUCMM), and also provided in the course of several presentations, including one to Vice-President Milagros Ortiz-Bosch (also Secretary of Education) and the Seminar on Rural Poverty, organized by the Instituto Interamericano de Desarrollo Social (INDES), the Inter-American Bank and the Instituto Tecnol6gico de Santo Domingo (INTEC). Invaluable comments were also provided by Padre Jose Luis Aleman and Ms. Ramonina Brea (PUCMM); Ms. Tonia Marek (IDB); members of the Central Bank, including: Ms. Mercedes Carrasco, Ms. Dilia Cruz de Sanchez, Ms. Dolores Escobar, Mr. Julio Estrella, Mr. Luis Nufiez, Ms. Ana Beatriz Rodriguez, Mr. Luis Reyes Abreu, and Mr. Luis Reyes Santos; members of the National Planning Office (ONAPLAN), including: Mr. Fernando Mangual, Mr. Antonio Morillo, and Mr. Ranulfo Rodriguez, as well as Rafael Calder6n (Technical Secretary of the Presidency); Mr. Pelegrin Castillo (Deputy - National Congress); Mr. Fernando Duran (Executive Director of DIAPE, Presidencia de la Republica); Mr. Carlos Despradel (DASA, Economic and Financial Consultants); Ms. Mariel Fiat (Health Sector Reform); Mr. Hugo Guiliani Cury (Consejo Asesor del Presidente de la Reputblica); Mr. Jose Lois Malkum (Executive Coordinator of the Executive Commission for Health Sector Reform); and Mr. Manuel Vargas Payano (Director of the Plan Presidencial de Lucha contra la Pobreza). We want to thank Monseffor Agripino Nuffez Collado (Rector of PUCI\IM), Mr. Radhames Mejia (Vice- Rector of PUCMM) and Ms. Ramonina Brea (Director of CUEPS-PUCMM) for their invaluable support in the publication and dissemination of this report. Lastly, we want to address special thanks to Mr. Frank Guerrero Prats (Governor of the Central Bank), Mr. Rafael Calder6n (Technical Secretary of the Presidency) and Mr. Jaime Alvarez (Adviser to the Executive Director), who made the publication of the Poverty Report possible. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Papers Table of Contents iii Section 1: Measure and Evolution of Poverty (1986-1998) 1 by Philippe Auffret A. Introduction 1 B. The Limitations of Poverty Rates as Policy Goals 2 C. Methodology 5 C.1. Definition of Poverty Lines 5 C.2. Definition of Welfare 8 C.2.i. Revenues 8 C.3. Poverty Estimates and Standard Errors 11 Annex 1: Poverty Measures: Measurement Issues 13 Section 2: Causes of Poverty Reduction in the Dominican Republic: Growth and Income Distribution 15 by Jacqueline Mora-Bdez A. Introduction 15 B. Methodology 15 C. Some Results 19 C. 1. The Leading Role of Growth in Poverty Alleviation in the DR 19 C.2. Comparison across Regions and Household Head Education 20 C.3. Growth Elasticity of Poverty 22 D. Some Simulations 23 Section 3: The Anatomy of a Slum - the Ozama Barrios in Santo Domingo 25 by Marianne Fay, J. Luis Guasch, Rosanna Nitti and Soumya Chattopadhyay A. Introduction 25 B. The Anatomy of the Ozama Barrios 26 B.1. History 26 B.2. Characteristics of Households 26 B.3. Integration in the City 27 B.4. Employment 27 B.5. Income and Expenditures 27 B.6. Housing 28 B.7. Household Location and Segmentation 29 B.8. Flooding and Location of Households 30 B.9. Health 31 C. Infrastructure Services 31 C.1. Electricity 31 C.2. Water 34 C.3. Sanitation 35 C.4. Solid Waste 36 C.5. Contamination 36 C.6. Violence and Social Problems 37 C.7. Community Organization 38 D. Conclusion 38 Section 4: Rural Poverty in the Dominican Republic: Market Failures, Government Failures and New Policies 41 by Ramon L6pez A. Introduction 41 B. Conceptual Framework 42 C. Rural Poverty and Sources of Income for the Poor: an Overview 43 D. Assets of the Poor and Asset Productivity 44 E. Government Intervention and Market Failures 48 E. 1. Land Reform 48 E.2. Land and Other Assets: Titling Policies 49 E.3. Rural Credit Policies 50 E.4. Privatization of the Sugar Industry 51 E.5. Other Public Interventions in Agriculture 52 E.6. Investments in Education 53 F. Policies 54 F. 1. Specific Policy Recommendations 55 Annex 1: Regression Tables 58 Section 5: The Effects of Macroeconomic Policies on Rural Poverty in the Dominican Republic 61 by Maurice Schiff A. Introduction 61 B. Agriculture and Rural Poverty 62 C. Effects of Macroeconomic and Trade Policies 64 C. I. Macroeconomic Policies 64 C.2. Trade Policy 68 C.2.i. General Trade Reforms 68 C.2.ii. Agricultural Trade Reforms 69 C.2.iii.FTAs 70 D. Haitian Immigration 72 E. Investing in the Poor 74 F. Hispaniola 76 G. Policy Recommendations 77 Section 6: A Review of the Haitian Immigrant Population in the Dominican Republic 81 by Marco Scuriatti A. Presence, Status and Socioeconomic Conditions of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic 81 B. Push and Pull Factors behind the Haitian Migration to the DR 85 C. Policies Implemented by Dominican Authorities and the Role of NGOs in Resolving the Haitian Immigration Issue 88 D. Conclusions and Recommendations 89 Section 7: Managing Social Risks in the Dominican Republic 95 by Tarsicio Castanieda and Edgar A. Victoria Yeb A. Executive Summary 95 B. Introduction 98 iv C. An Overview of Social Indicators and Social Spending in the Dominican Republic in the Latin American Context 101 C.1. Social Indicators 101 C.2. The Size of Social Spending in the Dominican Republic 102 C.3. Inadequate Composition of Social Spending 103 C.4. Inequity of Social Spending 104 C.5. Conclusion 105 D. Conceptual Framework 106 D.1. Addressing Key At-Risk Groups 111 E. Analysis of Existing Safety Net Programs in the Dominican Republic 111 E.1. Ages 0-5: Early Childhood Development 111 E.2. Ages 6-13: Primary Education 114 E.3. Ages 14-24: Secondary and Higher Education 115 E.4. Ages 25-64: Employment 118 E.5. General Population Risks 124 E.6. Summary of Risks and Possible Social Protection Strategies 127 E.7. How to Design and Implement the Social Protection Strategy 130 Annex 1: Programas Sociales en la Repuzblica Dominicana, 1999 135 Section 8: Institutional Aspects of Social Programs 143 by Rita Mena A. Introduction 143 B. Ages 0-5: Early Child Development 143 B. 1. CONANI/Centros Infantiles de Atencion Integral (CL4NI) 144 B.2. SESPAS/Direcci6n General de Protecci6n al MenorlPublic Day-Care for Children 145 B.3. SEEC/Initial Education 146 B.4. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group 147 C. Ages 6-13: Basic Education 149 C. 1. CONANI/Ayzudame a Ser Nino Program (PASN) 149 C.2. SEEC 150 C.2.i. Basic Education 150 C.2.ii. Scholarships for Children to Study in Private Schools 151 C.2.iii. Scholarships for Teachers 151 C.2.iv. Instituto de Bienestar Estudiantil/Desayuno Escolar Program 152 C.2.v. Urbano Marginal Program 152 C.2.vi. Fronterizo Program 153 C.2.vii.Transferencia de Fondos Program 153 C.3. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group 153 D. Ages 14-24: Secondary and Higher Education 154 D. 1. Presidencia de la Repzublica/Direccion General de Promoci6n de la Juventud 154 D. l .i. Programa Nacional de Becas 154 D. 1 .ii. Program of Housing for Students/Pension Homes (casa-pensi6n) 154 D.2. SEEC 155 D.2.i. Secondary Education 155 D.2.ii. Technical-Professional Education 156 D.2.iii. Basic Education for Adults 156 D.2.iv. SET/Quisqueya Joven Program 157 D.3. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group 157 E. Ages 25-64: Employment 158 v E. 1. Employment 25-64 158 E. I .i. Secretaria de la Mujer/Programa de Cooperativas de Producci6n para Mujeres 158 E. l.ii. DGPJ/Production and Employment for Youngsters 158 E. l.iii.SET/Bolsas de Empleo Program 159 E.2. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group 159 F. Ages over 65 159 F. 1. Pension System 159 F.1.i. IDSS 159 F.l.ii. FJPEP 160 F. 1.iii. ISSFAPOL 161 F. 1.iv. Other Laws 161 F.1 .v. Private Pension Funds 161 F.l.vi. Some Final Issues and Comments 161 G. Programs Oriented to the General Population 162 G. 1. Food Assistance 162 G. l .i. Presidency of the Republic 163 G.l1.ii. INESPRE/PROALTO 165 G. l.iii.Final Comments and Options for Food Assistance Programs 165 G.2. Housing 166 G.2.i. INVI 166 G.2.ii. Programa ComunidadDigna 168 G.2.iii.Oficina Supervisora de Obras del Estado 168 G.2.iv. Some Final Comments and Options for this Sector 168 G.3. Water and Sanitation 169 G.3.i. Pro-Comunidad 169 G.3.ii. Final Comments 169 G.4. Health 169 G.4.i. SESPAS 169 G.4.ii. Presidency/PROMESE: Programs of Basic Medications 170 vi Measure and Evolution of Poverty (1986-1998) Philippe Auffret ' 1. This paper analyzes the evolution of poverty in the Dominican Republic (DR) between 1986 and 1998.2 A. Introduction 2. Poverty assessments in the DR have been carried out irregularly, often by private institutions, in an isolated and ad-hoc fashion (Table 1). The National Statistical Office (ONE) is the public entity officially in charge of conducting surveys and monitoring most economic indicators. However, the absence of adequate resources and a clear mandate to monitor poverty have led the ONE to conduct only two household surveys limited to the city of Santo Domingo in 1941 and 1969 in conjunction with the Central Bank. Faced with a lack of systematic recollection of information by the ONE, the Central Bank and private institutions have taken a more active role in measuring welfare in the DR. The Central Bank has implemented three household surveys in 1977, 1984 and 1998. The most recent Tercera Encuesta Nacional de Gastos e Ingresos de los Hogares (ENGIH 1998) represents by far the most complete household survey available to date. Private institutions have also carried out several household surveys which have been used to assess welfare in the DR. In 1986, Tufts University conducted an Income-Consumption Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso- Consumo). In 1989, the Central Bank conducted a household survey with the objective of assessing social expenditures, financed by the UNDP. In 1992, a non-profit Dominican economics research institute, the Fundacion Economia y Desarrollo (FEyD) developed an Income and Expenditure Survey (Encuesta de Ingresos y Gastos), financed by USAID. Also, the Institute for Population and Development Studies (IEPD) (Instituto de Estudios de Poblacion y Desarrollo) and the Center for Social and Demographic Studies (CESDEM) (Centro de Estudios Sociales y Demograficos) conducted demographic and health surveys (Encuesta Demografica y de Salud) in 1991 (ENDESA- 91) and 1996 (ENDESA-96), respectively. Of these two surveys, the ENDESA-96 includes an income module and has been used to assess welfare. In addition, the assessments of welfare have not been designed to feed into the policy formulation process, and monitoring and policy follow-up is weak. 'I want to thank Edgar Victoria Yeb who has provided valuable research assistance. 2 Approximately 500,000 Haitian-Dominicans are not included in the analysis since they remain largely unaccounted for in the household surveys. Table 1: Surveys Used to Assess Poverty in the Dominican Republic Year Institution Survey Coverage 1941 National Statistical Office (ONE) Encuesta de Hogares Santo Domingo 1969 Central Bank (CB) and ONE Encuesta de Ingresos y Gaslos Familiares Santo Domingo 1976-77 CB Primera Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y National Gastos de las Familias (ENIGF 1977) 1984 CB Segunda Encuesta Nacio'wal de Ingresosy National Nov Gastos de las Familias (ENIGF 1984) (1,566 households) 1986 Tufts University Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Consumo National Jan-Nov (1,404 households) 1989 CB Encuesta de Gastos Sociales National March (799 households) 1991 Instituto de Estudios de Poblacion y Encuesta Demografica y de Salud National July-Nov Desarrollo (IEPD) (ENDESA 91) (7,144 households) 1992 Fundacion Economiay Desarrollo Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos National July-Aug (FEyD) (1,198 households) 1993 ONE Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda National (all households) 1996 Centro de Estudios Sociales y Encuesta Demografica y de Salud National Sept-Dec Demograficos (CESDEM) (ENDESA 96) (8,831 households) 1998 CB Tercera Encuesta Nacional de Gastos e National Oct 97-Sept 98 Ingresos de losHogares (ENGIH 1998) (4,810 households) 3. The annex contains a description of how we used the 1986 Tufts University survey, the 1992 FEyD survey and the 1998 ENGIH survey to compare poverty and welfare changes of the Dominican population between 1986 and 1998. Differences across surveys make it a challenging task. Working with household survey data requires many, often-cumbersome steps to gather data and verify consistency before the actual empirical investigations can begin. The difficulty is even greater when one wants to compare artificially created variables (normative food and consumption baskets) across surveys. For poverty analysis, these variables are central to first derive poverty lines and then compare poverty indicators over both time and space. We start with a short background section on poverty comparison that stresses the importance of defining welfare in a consistent manner when conducting comparisons over time. We then describe how we aggregate expenditures from the 1992 and 1998 surveys (expenditures are not available from the 1986 survey), paying particular attention to the comparability between these two surveys. Then, we turn to the same issues on the revenue side (the four surveys include data on revenues). We next explain how we derive poverty and extreme poverty lines for 1992 and how we construct comparable poverty lines for 1986 and 1998. Finally, we derive poverty measures using data from the four surveys. The ultimate objective of the annex is to assess the impact of the remarkable economic growth that has prevailed since 1992 on the poorest segments of the population. B. The Limitations of Poverty Rates as Policy Goals 4. Differences in methodologies (including the definition of poverty lines) and questionnaires have made comparisons across surveys and across time a very challenging task. Despite this fact, the public debate, which is political by nature, has often assumed poverty levels to be comparable and has essentially focused on levels and evolution of poverty rates. Table 2 indicates the poverty rate and extreme poverty rates derived from the analysis of the surveys. 5. Although setting poverty reduction goals based on poverty indicators is important and commendable, policy makers need to be aware of the often quite fragile nature of such poverty estimates (Box 1). First, poverty is multidimensional and has a niuch broader meaning than that which can be derived from the conventional poverty indicators based on income or consumption. Income and consumption are only means of attaining better lives, and not ends in themselves. Lower 2 malnutrition in children, better health of the population, more safety, longer lives, lower maternal and infant mortality rates, higher literacy, less hunger, less discrimination in work and social life, and more active participation in the political and social affairs of communities and the country characterize better and less poor societies. Several other dimensions might not be linked to measures of income- and consumption-based poverty: crime and violence might affect large parts of the population, discrimination in the job market can exist against certain groups in society, or children might be malnourished even though they grow up in rather affluent households. Table 2: Previous Studies of Poverty in the Dominican Republic, 1984-2000 Poverty Rate by Survey (Extreme Poverty Rate appears in parentheses) Unit of Survey Method 1984 1986 1989 1991 1992 1993 1996 1998 Source Analysis Used for the Analysis 1. NATIONAL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Del Rosario, G. Household"' 1984 CB Poverty line 60.0 (1993) ' _ _ (20.0) _ _ Swindale, A. Population" 1986 Tufts University Poverty line 33.3 (1986) ___u_s_______ 19 9 C (17.3) _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ Psacharopoulos Household 1989 B Poverty line 24.1 (1989) _ Central Bank Population"7 1989 CB Poverty line 29.8 (1989) (20.2) Gamez, S. Household"r 1984 CB Poverty line 39.2 51.7 (1993) (11.8) (24.5) __________________1989 GB _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Dauhajre, et al. Population 1986 Tufts University. Poverty line 18.3 24.5 20.6 (1994) 1989 CB (10.5) (13.7) (9.0) 1992 FEyD I I ONAPLAN Household 1991 ENDESA Multivariate 54.8 59.6 55.7 51.8 1993 National Census Analysis (19.7) (19.8) (18.5) (14.6) 1996 ENDESA 1998 CB Central Bank Household4' 1998 CB Poverty line 31.7 21.5 (1999) World Bank Population 1986 Tufts University Poverty Line 37.5 33.9 28.6 (2001) 1992 FEyD (8.8) (7.3) (5.1) 1998 CB ______ _ Uirban___ Del Rosario, G. 56.0 (11.0) Swindale, A. 23.7 (11.0) Central Bank 27.8 Gamez, S. Same as National 27.4 49.1 (5.2) (23.I) ___ Dauhajre, et al 11.7 23.3 10.9 (7.1) (12.7) (5.0) Central Bank 19.5 15.1 (1999) World Bank 28.5 19.3 20.5 (2001) _ (6.1) (4.1) 27_ 2.7 RURAL ___ ___ . Del Rosario, G. 64.0 (29.0) _ Swindale, A. 43.5 (24.3) Central Bank 33.9 ______ ______ (20.1) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ Gamez, S. Same as National 51.6 58.6 (187) (28.3) Dauhajre, et al 24.5 27.4 29.8 (14.1) (16.3) (12.3) _________ Central Bank 44.9 32.6 (1999) World Bank 47.3 49.0 42.1 (2001) (11.6) (10.6) _ (9.0) No adjustment factors were used. 1' Adjustment factor = 1.379. 3' Adjustment factors of 1.5152 and 1.158 in 1986 and 1989 respectively. "Adjustment factors of 1.08 in 1992 and 1.00 in 1998. 3 6. Second, the determination of poverty rates based on income or consumption levels depend on assumptions which have a certain degree of arbitrariness and can therefore be called into question. The determination of consumption and income and the choice of poverty lines depend on numerous assumptions, which, if changed only slightly, can produce very different poverty rates. For example, measures of consumption or income do not carry any information about the goods that are offered. An increase in real income merely reflects a widening in command over marketed goods and services. Also, poverty lines based on nutrient intake assume that households know about nutrition and balanced diets, which may also be questionable. Box 1: Poverty Measures: Conceptual Issues The notion of the poverty line is at the heart of all discourse on poverty. Poverty lines are a critical threshold of consumption, income or more generally access to goods and services below which individuals are declared to be poor. The poverty line then represents a minimum level of "acceptable" economic participation in a given society at a given point in time. For instance, poverty lines can be defined on minimum nutrient levels that make up an adequate diet expanded for the costs of other requirements such as rent and clothing. This is the approach we followed in this report. Alternatively, poverty lines can be defined as the prevailing legally decreed minimum wage in a country or some norms, say, 60 percent, of the mean income of a country. There are however, some fundamental concerns that surround poverty measurement. First, should we declare a person to be poor when his actual, observed consumption basket falls below certain pre specified thresholds or when his expenditure (or overall income) falls below the minimum required to obtain these consumption standards? For example, nutrition levels may not ambiguously rise with income and canned food may become quite popular at certain levels of income, even though their nutritive value is questionable. The elasticity of food consumption with respect to income may not correspond to the nutrient elasticity. Indeed, income represents the capacity to consume but not consumption itself. Second, although there is something absolute about the notion of poverty (in all societies people need adequate levels of food, clothing and shelter), there are variations in what might be considered "adequate". Access to higher levels of education or alcoholic beverages may be deemed a "basic need" in some societies while they may not be in others. Third, poverty is a transient measure and people do often experience significant fluctuations in their income and consumption. Measures of "structural" or chronic poverty must be therefore complemented by a study of "temporary" poverty. The distinction between the two types of poverty is very important, as the policies to combat temporary (as opposed to chronic) poverty may be very different. For this reason, expenditures are often thought to be a more reliable way to assess chronic poverty because income fluctuates more across time. An International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) study in India found that only about 12 percent of households were never poor during the nine years under consideration while, at the other extreme, 44 percent were poor for six or more years, and 19 percent were poor in every year. The surveys currently available in the DR do not allow for checking this proposition, as they do not follow the same household for various years. The survey expected to be conducted by the Central Bank in the future may provide this opportunity. Fourth, poverty measures fail to account for intra-household allocation of expenditures. Most surveys provide household-level data. However, this does not recognize that the allocation of expenditures within the household is often significantly skewed. Among potential victims are the women and the elderly. There is some evidence that such discrimination grows sharply with the overall destitution of the household. Also, a second set of concerns arise from the fact that larger households typically have more children. Some correction for the presence of children is desirable, because they consume less than adults. The construction of adult equivalence scales - conversion factors that express the consumption of children as a fraction of a representative adult - get around this problem. There are conceptual questions regarding the construction of such scales which led us to decide to use per-capita expenditure (or income), although this practice can certainly be improved. Finally, there are fixed costs in setting up and running a household and smaller households cannot spread these fixed costs over several household members. Source: Ray, 1998, pp.250-256. 7. Third, there are technical difficulties in measuring poverty and its evolution. In developing countries household income is difficult to measure because, among other things, a number of activities, products and services remain unrecorded. Many rural transactions are not recorded in cash and the volume of illegal transactions can be large. Also, the questionnaires of the various surveys do not use a consistent and common methodology, which make their comparison difficult. Finally, surveys are based on samples or subsets of households, which are designed to reproduce the whole population. However, by nature, these samples can never be exact. This is particularly true in the DR 4 where a large number of Haitian immigrants have an undefined legal status, fear deportation and Dominican officials, and consequently remain unaccounted for in most surveys. Hence, poverty rates calculated from these sample surveys necessarily carry margins of error, which have never been accounted for in previous analyses of poverty in the DR. C Methodology 8. The main objective of this section is to establish a consistent methodology to analyze the evolution of poverty in the DR since 1986. We use three household surveys to conduct our analysis: the 1986 Tufts University survey, the 1992 FEyD survey and the 1998 ENGIH survey. We could not use other surveys for various reasons: the 1984 ENIGF survey uses a different methodology, the 1989 Central Bank survey focuses exclusively on social expenditure while the 1991 ENDESA survey does not include information on revenues and the 1996 ENDESA has not been structured to analyze revenues. Also, data from previous surveys is not available. C1. Definition of Poverty Lines 9. We construct poverty lines using the cost of basic needs method.3 Under this method, we first define an extreme poverty line. The extreme poverty line is defined as the cost of a normative food basket which individuals need to meet their energy requirement of 2,161 calories per diem. Obviously, many food bundles can provide this requirement. However, some food bundles while providing the necessary calorie intake do not contain the necessary nutrient complement for a healthy life. Indeed, the nutrients we consume are conventionally divided into five categories: proteins, carbohydrates, fat, vitamins, and minerals; and a person cannot make up for deficiencies in one by consuming more of another. For example, supplementation of dietary energy does not improve children's health if their diets continue to have insufficient quantities of minerals and essential amino acids. What is required is a balanced diet where the various nutrients appear in their required quantities. Admittedly, an individual can spend more on food and still suffer from a deficiency in any one nutrient. However, an individual who cannot afford this basic food basket is unlikely to simultaneously meet the nutrient and calorie intakes required by the body for internal functions, but also in order to do work. Consequently, the food basket that we consider is that developed by the Fundaci6n Economia y Desarrollo in its 1992 analysis of poverty in the DR (Table 1.3). Based on the 1992 survey, the daily per-capita caloric intake of the first quartile of the population (i.e., the poorest 25 percent of the population) was 1,766 calories. Since the daily per-capita caloric intake of the first quartile is below the energy requirement of 2,161 calories per diem, it is necessary to expand their intake of 1,766 calories to the required 2,161 calories by using a factor of 1.22 (i.e., 1.22=2,161/1,766) in order to calculate the normative food basket and hence, calculate an extreme poverty line. We then estimate the cost of the food basket in 1992 using prices derived from the survey itself. This cost is DR$252.1 per month. 3There are alternative ways to measure poverty. The National Planning Office (ONAPLAN) derives higher poverty rates based on a multivariate analysis. 5 Table 3: Normative Food Basket, Prices, and Extreme Poverty Lines by Period Daily per- Calories Daily Daily required Daily required Nominal price per pound of Monthly cost of capita per pound per-capita per-capita caloric per-capita food components normative food basket consumption caloric intake intake consumption (DR$) (DR$) (Pound) (1992 Survey) (Quartile 1) (Pound) 1992 Survey) (Quartile 1) (Quartile I) (I) (II) (III) = (I)x(II) (IV) (III)xl .22 (V)=(I)xl.22 (VI) (Vil) = (V)x(VI) 1992 1992 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 Common rice 0.283 1586.7 449.7 550.2 0.347 0.49 4.04 5.74 5.2 42.6 60.5 Quality rice 0.076 1668.1 126.8 155.1 0.093 0.54 4.40 6.25 1.5 12.4 17.7 Red beans 0.058 1514.9 88.3 108.1 0.071 1.73 7.87 14.41 3.8 17.1 31.3 Otherbeans 0.016 1496.5 24.5 30.0 0.020 2.31 10.53 19.28 1.4 6.4 11.8 Green 0.312 407.5 127.2 155.6 0.382 0.19 1.43 2.80 2.2 16.6 32.5 plantain Yucca 0.134 410.9 54.9 67.2 0.163 0.29 1.34 4.09 1.4 6.7 20.3 Green banana 0.250 470.8 117.7 144.0 0.306 0.13 1.00 1.95 1.2 9.3 18.1 Chicken 0.083 814.7 67.6 82.7 0.102 1.98 8.62 14.33 6.1 26.6 44.3 Beef 0.016 431.0 6.7 8.2 0.019 2.53 14.65 19.08 1.5 8.5 11.1 Pork 0.010 407.2 3.9 4.8 0.012 3.02 14.97 20.55 1.1 5.4 7.4 Sausage 0.007 1393.9 9.9 12.1 0.009 '2.81 23.07 25.05 0.7 6.1 6.6 Dry fish 0.007 685.3 5.0 6.1 0.009 3.23 20.07 29.14 0.9 5.5 7.9 Liquid milk 0.141 637.0 89.5 109.5 0.172 0.33 2.16 3.21 1.7 11.3 16.8 Egg (unit) 0.186 71.4 13.2 16.2 0.227 0.22 1.01 1.10 1.5 7.0 7.6 Bread 0.023 1305.8 29.8 36.4 0.028 0.70 7.41 13.98 0.6 6.3 11.9 Pasta 0.027 2322.4 63.2 77.3 0.033 0.61 6.86 8.75 0.6 6.9 8.9 Vegetable oil 0.063 4036.5 253.9 310.7 0.077 1.94 9.34 11.84 4.5 21.9 27.7 Sugar 0.065 1798.0 116.7 142.8 0.079 0.31 3.03 4.72 0.7 7.3 11.4 Others 2 _ 117.6 143.9 _ 4.5 28.2 42.5 Total 1,766.0 2,161.0 41.3 252.1 396.2 "UNDP (1989) estimated a daily per-capita energy requirement of 2,161 calories for an average person in the tropics. Based on the 1992 survey, the daily per-capita caloric intake of the first quartile of the population (i.e., the poorest 25 percent of the population) was 1,766 calories. Since the daily per-capita caloric intake of the first quartile is below the energy requirement of 2,161 calories per diem, it is necessary to expand their intake of 1,766 calories to the required 2,161 calories in order to calculate the normative food basket and hence, calculate an extreme poverty line. Columns (IV) and (V) represent the per- capita caloric intake and consumption of the first quartile's food basket after expansion (1.22=2,161/1,766). 2 Others consists of 30 other food items (see Dauhajre et al (1994), p. 126). Their prices in 1986 and 1998 were calculated by deflating the 1992 price by the January-September 1986 and July-August 1992 food, beverages and tobacco inflation rate. In 1998, we inflated the 1992 value with the July-September 1992 and October 1997-September 1998 food consumer price variation. Note: We used the price variation of his near substitute if the value of one product was not available Source: World Bank calculations, based on Dauhajre et al (1994) and Central Bank (1986, 1998). 10. The second step consists of the construction of a normative consumption basket in 1992, which incorporates the estimation of a reasonable allowance for non-food consumption including rent.4 This allowance is determined following a methodology based on the actual non-food expenditures for households with per capita consumption near the extreme poverty line5 (Table 4). The monthly cost of this normative consumption basket was DR$554.4 in 1992. 4The 1986 and 1992 surveys do not contain the necessary information to adjust for the fact that some households own their house and consequently do not pay rent. We erred on the conservative side and included rent in the basic consumption basket. This may lead to some overvaluation of poverty to the extent that some poor households own their house and do not have to pay a rent. 5In practice, the average expenditure on non-food items was computed by taking average expenditures on non-food items for households with food consumption equal to the food poverty line plus or minus 10 percent. 6 Table 4: Normative Food Basket, Prices, and Povertv Lines by Period 1986 1992 1998 Item Aggregate Percentage Aggregate Percentage Aggregate Percentage Consumption Consumption Consumption (DR$) (DR$) (DR$) Food basket (Extreme poverty line) 41.3 38.4 252.1 44.9 396.2 45.7 Beverages andtobacco 2.3 2.1 14.4 2.6 21.7 2.5 Transportation 8.2 7.6 34.5 6.1 51.9 6.0 Water, electricity and oil 1.2 1.2 5.3 0.9 7.9 0.9 Personal cleaning and services 5.8 5.4 31.4 5.6 47.2 5.4 Education 2.8 2.6 12.9 2.3 19.4 2.2 Health 5.8 5.4 26.3 4.7 39.6 4.6 Clothing and shoes 6.2 5.7 33.6 6.0 50.5 5.8 Entertainment and culture 4.5 4.2 20.3 3.6 30.5 3.5 Rent 2 24.4 22.7 102.4 19.4 168.0 19.4 Furniture and domestic appliances v 5.0 4.6 21.1 4.0 34.7 4.0 Poverty line (DR$) 107.5 100.0 554.4 100.0 867.7 100.0 Memo: Poverty line (DR$) 107.5 554.4 867.7 Extreme poverty line (DR$) 41.3 252.1 396.2 Poverty line (US$) 37.2 43.3 58.2 Extreme poverty line (US$) 14.3 19.7 26.6 Includes financial services. 2' Derived for 1986 and 1992 using the 1998 share of total consumption. Source: World Bank calculations. 11. The third step consists of computing poverty lines and extreme poverty lines in 1986 and 1998 (Tables 3 and 4). These poverty lines are computed using the normative food and consumption baskets for the year 1992 while deflating their costs in other years using commodity prices as provided preferably by the surveys (1992, 1998) or by prices available from the Central Bank (1986). We obtain an extreme poverty line and poverty line of DR$396.2 and DR$867.7, respectively, in 1998. To put these poverty lines into the current context, this definition leads to an extreme poverty line of DR$483 at end-2000 and a poverty line of DR$1,080. 12. Our definition of normative food and consumption baskets fixed in time may be challenged on several grounds. It could be argued that using a common food bundle for the whole country is inadequate. However, the DR is a fairly small and homogenous country and while it is correct that households may reach their nutritional requirements with different bundles, differences in food consumption patterns across areas are limited. It could also be argued that prices vary by area and that using a fixed food bundle does not allow for substitution effects. However, this effect is also limited in the DR where prices are fairly homogenous across regions due to limited transportation costs. 6 It could also be argued that the composition of the food basket consumed by the population changes with time. As an economy develops, new kinds of food become available, people substitute some kind of food for others and may well also modify their taste. However, different from some practices, we decided to keep the normative food bundle used to define the poverty lines constant over time. We do so for several reasons. First, this approach relies on the argument that ideally we want to fix a certain welfare level (associated with a fixed basket of goods) over time (Francke, 1997). Also, in international practice, this seems to be the preferred way of performing welfare comparisons in time (Ferreira and Litchfield, 1998; MacIsaac and Hentschel, 1996; Ravallion, 1994). Second, changes in the composition of the basic food basket are likely to evolve slowly with time: technologies take time to develop and tastes do not change overnight. By defining the food 6 The Central Bank used to publish price indices differentiating between municipal areas from 1976 to 1993. In 1984, the Central Bank constructed a national consumer price index. From 1984 to 1993, the Central Bank published price indices based on the two baskets developed in 1976 and 1984. In the 1998 survey, the Central Bank constructed three consumer baskets corresponding to the three following regions: national district, urban and rural areas outside the national district. Since February 1999, the Central Bank has been collecting information on these three indices. However, Dauhajre et al (1994) stated that prices in rural areas exceeded those in urban area by about 4 percent. 7 basket in the year 1992, which lies in the middle of the period under study 1986-1998, we limit the chance that it would vary drastically. Third, poverty lines are easier to interpret when the food bundle remains unchanged. Indeed, the extreme poverty rate represents the percentage of individuals who cannot afford the normative food basket while the poverty rate represents the percentage of individuals who cannot afford the normative consumption basket. Defining a different basket for each year would make this interpretation impossible. C.2. Definition of Welfare 13. The next step consists of defining a monetary measure of welfare.7 The fact that the surveys have different questionnaires makes it a challenging task. We analyze the difficulties met in defining comparable indicators on the revenue side. Since welfare ultimately derives from consumption, we would have liked to use a monetary measure based on consumption expenditures. However, an expenditure variable is only available for 1992 and 1998. In addition, this variable is not comparable in the two surveys. Unlike expenditures, there is an income variable in each survey. C2.L Revenues 14. The three surveys have similar questions related to income. We did not have access to the questionnaire of the 1986 survey. However, the methodology used for the 1986 survey was also used in 1992 to ensure comparability, which leads us to believe that revenue aggregates in 1986 and 1992 are comparable. Tables 5 and 6 contain a detailed description of the item included in the revenue aggregates. 7Annex I defines and analyzes the measures of poverty used in the paper. 8 Table 5: Definition of Revenue Aggregates 1992 Item Tufts 1986 and FEyD 1992 " World Bank Family business net Net income (total income minus input expenses) Included income provided for a business in which participate the majority of the fatnily members excluding agricultural activity (F604) Remittances from outside Direct receipts, as payment or gifts (F6 10) Included the DR Remittances from within Direct receipts, as payment or gifts (F612) Included the DR Rent receipts Direct receipts from house rent, rooms, land, and Included equipment (F614) Self employment income Includes business owner and independent non- Included agricultural worker (F602/4/10) Public employment income Average monthly wages (F602/4/6), excluding fringe Included benefits Private employment Average monthly wages (F602/4/7), excluding fringe Included income benefits Non agricultural Average monthly wages (F602/4/9), excluding fringe Included employment income benefits Agricultural employment Direct payments for farm work (F602/4/8), excluding Included income farm owner Pension income and fringe Direct transfers from both govemment and private Included benefits institution (F606). Included fringe benefits and other income from social security Interests and insurance Interest and insurance receipts (F608) Included receipts Agricultural and livestock Income from agricultural output sales (F631/8) plus Included net income auto consumption (F630/02) plus income from livestock production sales (F623; F625) minus: Materials for harvest (E501/A), chemical fertilizers (E501/B), agricultural tools (E501/H), land preparation (E501/G), other agricultural expenses (E501/C), debt payments, formal and informal loans, (E501/D), land maintenance (E501/E), harvest expenses (E501/F), agricultural machinery rental (E501/1), livestock expenditures (E501/J), agricultural acquisitions (E501/K) and other expenditures (E501/L) Transfers Food donations received (C305/9) Included Other income Any other income perceived (F619) plus other Included income from any occupation (F602/4/13) "Dauhajre et. al (1994, p.131) stated that the 1992 questionnaire followed the guidelines of the 1986 Tufts University survey, in order to ensure the comparability. Note: Numbers in parenthesis refer to the following (xy/z): x conresponds to the questionnaire section, y is the question number, and z corresponds to a specific item inside a question. 9 Table 6: Definition of Revenue Aggregates 1998 Item ENGIH 1998 World Bank Rent receipts (domestic) Direct receipts from house rent, rooms, land, and Included equipment (9/7-1341,1351,1361,1371,1381) Rent receipts (extemal) Direct receipts from house rent, rooms, land, and Included equipment (9/13-2442,2452,2462,2472,2482) _ Self employment income Included (9/3-0801) Included (domestic) Self employment income Included (9/11-2102) Included (external) Employer contributions Included (9/1-0501) Included Remuneration in-kind Includes food and beverages (9/1-0411), Food Included prepared (9/1-0421), Transport (9/1-0431), Gasoline (9/1-0441), Other (9/1-0451) Employment income Includes wages and salaries from main, secondary Included (domestic) and other occupations (9/1 -0101), Other remuneration in cash (9/1-0301) minus taxes and deductions (9/1- 0601) Employment income Includes wages and salaries from main, secondary Included (external) and other occupations (9/12-2012) Fringe benefits Included overtime (9/1-0211), Fees (9/1-0221), Included Bonds (9/1-0231), Representation expenditures (9/1- 0241), Other (9/1-0251) Interests and insurance Interest receipts (9/ 7-1311,1321,1332); Insurance Included receipts (domestic) receipts (9/ 7-1421,1431,1441,1451,1461); Interests and insurance Interest receipts (9/13-2412,2422,2432); Insurance Included receipts (extemal) receipts (9/14-2542,25522562); Transfers (domestic) Includes Public transfers (9/ 6-1151), Pensions (9/ 6- Excluding public transfers 1111,1121,1131,1141), Free Transportation (9/ 6- in health and education 1201), Food donations (9/ 6-1191), Private sector transfers (9/ 6-1161), Non-governmental institutions transfers (9/ 6-1171), Inter-household transfers (9/ 6- 1181), Other transfers (9/6-1211,1221) Transfers (extemal) Includes Public transfers (9/12-2252), Pensions (9/12- Included 2212,2222,2232,2242), Free Transportation (9/12- 2282), Food donations (9/12-2272), Private sector transfers (9/12-2262), Other transfers (9/12- 2292,2302) Other income Includes inheritance domestic (9/9-1502), inheritance Included from abroad (9/14-2512), other income (9/9-1532), other income from abroad (9/14-2582), severance from abroad (9/14-2532), severance (9/9-1522), dividend (9/8-1471), dividends from abroad (9/14- 2572) _- 15. To make the income data comparable across surveys, revenues are corrected for differences in sampling stratification and made consistent with national accounts. First, the sampling frame differs across surveys. For example, 1,404 households were interviewed in 1986 while 4,810 households were interviewed in 1998 (Table 1). Each household represented in the survey is taken as a representative household and is multiplied by a coefficient (the expansion factor) so that the expanded sample is representative of the whole population. Expansion factors are themselves derived from census data: the 1981 census for the 1986 and 1992 surveys and the 1993 census for 1998 survey. Second, we use adjustment factors so that the income derived from the surveys matches the national accounts (Table 10).8 S National accounts in 1998 relied on the outcome of the 1998 survey, which was made consistent with the national accounts so that the 1998 adjustment factor is one. For more details, see Carrasco, Mercedes and Carmen J Reyes, 1999, "Proyecto Metodologico de la Republica Dominicana para la elaboracion de la Cuenta de Ilogares a partir de la Encuesta de Gastos e Ingresos de los Hogares 10 Table 7: Ad ustment Factors Used in Surveys Year Survey Monthly average Monthly average Ratio Adjustment per capita income"' per capita private Factors (survey) consumption (national accounts) (1_________i) ~ ~ ~ (2) (3) = (2)/(1) (4) = (3)/0.89 Jan-Nov 86 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Consumo DR$132.6 DR$182.8 1.38 1.55 July-Aug 92 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos DR$1,078.6 DR$1,128.4 1.05 1.18 ct 97-Sep 98 Tercera Encuesta Nacional de Gastos e DR$2,158.1 DR$1,916.2 0.89 1.00 Ineresos de los Hoeares (ENGIH) Excluding public transfers. 2/ The 1998 ENGIH is compatible with the national accounts. Hence the adjustment factor is set to 1.00 and other ratios are derived accordingly. Source: World Bank calculations. C.3. Poverty Estimates and Standard Errors 16. We are now in a position to analyze poverty and its evolution over time. An individual is defined as extremely poor if the per capita revenue corresponding to his/her household is not enough to purchase the basic normative food basket while he/she is defined as poor if the per capita revenue corresponding to his/her household is not enough to purchase the basic normative consumption basket. Consequently, those defined as extremely poor in 1998 are those individuals whose monthly revenues are below DR$396.2, while those individuals whose monthly revenues are below DR$867.7 in 1998 are defined as poor. Under the same definition, at end-2000, a family of five who earns less than DR$5,400 per month is defined as poor, while the same family would be defined as extremely poor if it eams less than DR$2,465 per month. Table 8: Po verty: Statistics and Standard Errorst' Area Headcount ratio Poverty gap ratio Income gap ratio Poverty severity ratio 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 1986 1 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 National 37.5 33.9 28.6 43.0 34.4 33.3 8.4 5.1 1.6 9.2 5.6 4.4 (2.5) (0.6) (1.2) (1.6) (0.5) (0.9) (1.0) (0.2) (0.1) (1.0) (0.2) (0.3) Urban zone 28.5 19.3 20.5 38.5 32.1 30.7 4.9 2.1 0.9 6.3 3.0 2.7 (3.0) (0.7) (1.4) (2.4) (0.9) (1.1) (0.8) (0.1) (0.1) (1.0) (0.2) (0.3) Rural zone 47.3 49.0 42.1 46.0 35.4 35.5 13.8 10.9 4.1 12.4 8.2 7.2 (4.2) (0.9) (2.1) (1.9) (0.5) (1.3) (2.6) (0.4) (0.5) (1.9) (0.3) (0.6) Standard errors shown in parentheses. Source: World Bank calculations. 17. All measures of poverty show an improvement in the 1990s. Tables 8 and 9 record poverty and extreme poverty by headcount ratio, poverty gap ratio, income gap ratio and severity ratio by area, including the estimated standard errors that take into account stratification and clustering of sample design. Based on the analysis of the surveys, poverty measured by the headcount ratio decreased from 37.5 percent in 1986 to 33.9 in 1992 for the period before declining to 28.6 percent in 1998. Graph 1 analyzes the evolution of the headcount ratio, including the standard errors that take into account stratification and clustering of sample design. The three columns indicate the range in which we are 95 percent confident that the true rates lie. Consequently, it cannot be concluded at a conventional level of confidence that poverty declined between 1986 and 1992. However, it can be concluded with reasonable confidence that poverty declined from 1992 to 1998. Poverty reduction has been lower in rural areas, decreasing by 5.2 percent over the period 1986-98, compared to a reduction of 8.0 percent in urban areas. All other poverty measures improved over the period 1986-92 and further improved during the period 1992-98. This outcome seems to indicate that the remarkable post-1991 economic growth (GDP growth averaged 6.4 percent during the period 1992-99) has trickled down to the poorest segments of the population. 11 Table 9: Extreme Poverty: Statistics and Standard Errors" Area Headcount ratio Pove gap ratio Income gap ratio Poverty severity index 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 National 8.8 7.3 5.1 37.9 25.3 23.3 0.6 0.41 0.2 1.8 0.7 2.3 (1.3) (0.3) (0.5) (2.9) (0.9) (1.5) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.2) Urban zone 6.1 4.1 2.7 48.6 30.6 23.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.9 0.6 1.3 (1.2) (0.3) (0.4) (3.8) (2.1) (2.3) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.5) (0.1) (0.2) Ruralzone 11.6 10.6 9.0 31.9 23.2 23.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.8 0.9 3.9 ,,________ (2.5) (0.6) (1.2) (3.1) (0.9) (2.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.6) (0.1) (0.4) Standard effors shown in parentheses. Sorce: World Bank calculations. Graph 1: Poverty Rates and Their Margins of Error 37.3 r.1 X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3. 33.9 _ _ _ _ _ _ 32.5 ~~~~~~32.7 31.0 .26 *9U 192 19I Graph 2: Distribution of Income Expressed in Multiples of the Poverty Line i00 90 so 70 soo 30 20 l0 0 02 P1 04 PL 06 P. I 91. 2 P. 49P1. P 3 1. 09. 20 PL 30 PL M..Y p.v.o I.- - -f P-- Urn) 12 Annex 1 Poverty Measures: Measurement Issues 1. With the conceptual issues in mind, we assume that we are able to define a poverty line, which is an income (or expenditure) threshold that is regarded as minimally necessary for "adequate" participation in economic life. People below this threshold are defined to be poor. 2. Consider an economy with n individuals where y, denotes the income of individual i. Let p be the poverty line. The question we ask is how can we measure poverty? 3. Headcount ratio. One natural measure is simply to count the number of people below the poverty line, which is the headcount (HC). If we are interested in the relative incidence of poverty, we might divide the number of poor by the population that is the headcount ratio (HR). HR = HC n 4. An obvious problem with the headcount ratio is that it fails to capture the extent to which individual income (or expenditure) falls below the poverty line. 5. Importantly, the use of the headcount as a measure of poverty systematically biases policy in favor of individuals who are very close to the poverty line. Since these people are the less expensive to get out of poverty, a government whose only objective is to reduce poverty may focus on them exclusively. 6. Poverty gap ratio. The poverty gap ratio corrects for this drawback and captures more directly the acuteness of poverty. The poverty gap ratio (PGR) is defined as the ratio of the income (or extra consumption) necessary to bring all poor people to the poverty line to the total income of the poor if they were all brought at the poverty level. Thus, the poverty gap ratio is defined by E (P Yi) PGR =Y p HC p 7. Income gap ratio. Another way to partially offset this bias, and take into account the extent of poverty, is to use a measure of shortfall from the poverty line as a percentage of total income. The income gap ratio is defined as the ratio of the income (or extra consumption) necessary to bring all poor people to the poverty line to total income. The reason for dividing by total income is that the ratio is an indication of how large the poverty gap is with respect to resources that potentially may be used to close the gap. In this sense, the income gap ratio is not really a measure of poverty itself, but a measure of the resources required to eradicate it. The income gap ratio (IGR) is defined by E (P - Y IGR = Y I

2 . At a = 2, the measure P2 is the poverty severity index, which is just about insensitive to the principle. 13. The FTG family of poverty measures also satisfies a convenient decomposability property since these poverty measures can be decomposed into contributions from different subgroups which is informative when monitoring changes in poverty. If the aggregate poverty measure can be written as a weighted average of the poverty measures for the rural and urban sectors, or for household by age, or by occupation of the head, then changes over time can be similarly decomposed thus helping to identify groups that are particularly at risk, as well as sometimes pointing to the underlying mechanisms. In particular, if sectors are denoted by s, and then there are S of them, we can write n= 1 . Y (i -Yp > = In, n s=l P, p P )= where n , is the number of people in sector s and p S is the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke index for poverty within the sector. Consequently, changes in aggregate poverty can be assigned to changes in sectoral policy measures or to changes in the proportion of people in each sector. 9 This is called the weak transfers principle because it restricts consideration of transfers to those occurring between poor people. 14 Causes of Poverty Reduction in the Dominican Republic: Growth and Income Distribution Jacqueline Mora-Bdez A. Introduction 1. During the period 1986 - 1998 the Dominican Republic (DR) evidenced a significant improvement in its poverty indicators. The poverty headcount index (HCI), as measured by the percent of population below the poverty line, declined from 37.5 percent in 1986 to 33.9 in 1992 and further to 28.6 percent in 1998. This significant improvements in poverty indicators for the period 1992 - 1998 might be reflecting the huge economic growth experienced after the stabilization plan in 1991, as GDP growth averaged 5.9 percent for the period (7.7 percent for the period 1996 - 1998). 2. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the marginal impact of both growth and changes in income distribution on poverty reduction in the DR. Based on these estimations the paper will make some simulations of future poverty alleviation under altemative growth scenarios. The paper is organized as follows. Section B discusses the methodological issues related to the decomposition of poverty reduction between "growth effect" and "distribution effect". Section C summarizes the results obtained using this methodology in the case of the Dominican Republic for the periods 1986 - 1992 and 1992 - 1998. Elasticities of poverty to growth are also shown in this section, as well as an intemational comparison of these elasticities. In Section D, using the previous findings, simulations of poverty reduction under different growth and migration scenarios are conducted. B. Methodology 3. One can identify two proximate causes of a change in poverty: a change in mean income level at given inequality, and a change in the inequality of income around the mean; the former can be thought of as the "growth effect on poverty" while the latter as a "distributional effect". Definition: An economy is defined by a vector = (w , . ..... WN) where w1 represents the income of person i (w. > o) and N is the number of individuals. Individuals are ranked so that Vi < j,wi < wj. We assume that WN > 0 i.e., there is at least one individual whose income is strictly positive. Define , as mean income: N N (1) Definition: Given an economy w, the Lorenz vector L= (xI, X2 ........... XN) is defined by: .Wk Vi E [1,N], Xi = N ZWk k=1 15 Note 1: ViE[1,N-1] O< xi <1 and XN =1 Note 2: Given a Lorenz vector L, the "traditional" Lorenz curve is the function: L: [0,1] J [0,1] x L(x) such that: Vi E- [O, N - 11N1sx < N I L(x) =x, + (Nx-i)(+,-X) Proposition: The function: F: RN >RN+' w - (L L) is a one-to-one differentiable function. Proof Given (, L), there is a unique economy w such that F(w)= (u, L). This economy is defmed by w, = N * , * xl and Vi E [2, NJ w; = N*,u *(x, - xi-) De nition: A poverty measure P is a function: P: R N >R w Prw) Define z as the poverty line (an income below which people are considered poor), a commonly used set of poverty measures, that are function of per capita income, are the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indexes: 1 .-Jx P . = j (,Zi N j1 zJ Where q is the number of poor (or the number of individuals) whose income is below the poverty line z l and a is a positive parameter such that the higher a the more the measure penalize the poorer individuals or the higher sensitiveness of the measure to income distribution. Head Count ratio (a = 0): Percentage of population living in poverty (or with incomes below the poverty line). HCI =-. E ) N i=tZ J HCI = E- 'We still assume individuals are ranked from lower to higher income. 16 Formally: q= p, and I1 if wj w (t') < wj (t'). We also assume that Vi, w1 (t) is a differentiable function of time.2 We also take the convention that for any variable x, x' represents the value of x at time t'. Definition: Economic growth between time t and t' is defined as: y = /1/1 (3) Case 1: P(w) is differentiable. Then P = P o F- is also differentiable and discrete changes in poverty measures can be approximated through a first order Taylor expansion: P(W)= ) dt + -u, L) d (t'-t) + (u, L) (t-t) + (t'-t) g (t'-t) (4) a/I dt &x dt where SO(t'-t) ,, 0' The first term to the right reflects the first-order changes in poverty that are produced by a change in mean income keeping the Lorenz vector constant ( aP (XX L). d . (t'-t) is defined as the "Lorenz ap dt neutral" effect of economic growth on poverty) while the other first-order terms reflect the changes in poverty due to changes in the Lorenz vector at the same income level ( , E L i . (t'-t) is defined as the "growth neutral" distributional effect of economic growth a ax, dt on poverty. The remaining expression (t'-t)- Q(t'-t) encompasses all the second and higher time effects including the effects of possible acceleration or deceleration of growth and Lorenz changes on poverty. Obviously, instantaneous changes in time like dl and di are not observable. However, these dt dt expressions can also be approximated through first-order Taylor expansions: '= +dH ttt + (tt H(-)with C('t dt x= + dr . (t'-t) + (t'-t). * g (t'-t) with 6,(t'_t) 0 xi=idt Substituting these expressions in (4) leads to: - ap - N-l ap - P(w') = P(w') +- (p. L) * (u'-p) + - (u, L)* (x, , ) + (t'-t) * e(t'-t) (5) ap ~~~~ax, where s(t'-t) = co (t'-t) - C(, L) * , (t'-t) - E - (,u, L) *, (t'-t) and eQ'-t)-,-,-> 0 2 Similar analysis could be conducted by assuming that w, (t) is a stochastic function of time. 18 We want to know when the approximation (4) is exact on an interval of time [t,t"] or equivalently when e(t'-t) = 0 ( Vt' £[t, t ] ). Case 2: P(w) is not differentiable. Poverty measures that are based on a poverty line generally are not differentiable. In order to compute changes in poverty, equation (5) can be expressed as equation 6: (6): P(w')-P(w)=P (p',L')-P (,u,L)=P (,u',L')-P*(,u,L')+P*(,u,L')-P*(p,L)+ R ~~~~~~~~~Residual "Lorenz- neutral" 'Growth-neutral Growth effect Lorenz effect" where R =P (p', L')-P (,L')-P (p',L) +P (p,L)_ AP,(,u, L')-AP,*(u, L) -A2P*(p,L) is of second-order of time when changes in mean income and Lorenz-vector are first-order. Lorenz-neutral growth effect (LNGE) or "growth effect" and growth-neutral Lorenz effect (GNLE) or "distribution effect", can be computed as follows: LNGE = P[y * w]- P(w) GNLE P= PL' - P(W) (7) As we show below, increases in mean income are very important in poverty alleviation. Thus, it would also be interesting to have a measure of poverty sensitivity to growth or the elasticity of poverty to mean income, given a certain Lorenz vector. dP,/b Define: = d as the Lorenz neutral- elasticity of poverty to mean income, or the relative change of poverty due to a relative change in mean income given a Lorenz vector. We can approximate this elasticity using equation (7): P .w-PW I 17LNG = v C. Some Results Cl. The Leading Role of Growth in Poverty Alleviation in the DR 4. In this section, we use the 1986, 1992 and 1998 surveys to estimate the contribution of growth and changes in income distribution on poverty for the periods 1986 - 1992, and 1992 - 1998. Using the decomposition formulas developed in Section I,' we estimated the contributions of growth and changes in distribution to poverty changes3 (Table 1). 3The poverty measures used are the three FGT poverty ratios. 19 5. Economic growth has been the overreaching force driving poverty reduction in all periods analyzed. Table 1 gives estimates of contributions of growth and equity to poverty alleviation (LNGE and GNLE). For the period 1986 - 92 the "growth effect" by itself reduced the HCI by 6.7 percentage points, while the worsening of income distribution increased HCI by 4.6 percentage points. Both, the economic recovery of the period 1992 - 98 and a better income distribution explained the significant reduction experienced by all poverty measures during this period. In fact, the distribution effect accounted for 28 percent of the total reduction on HCI (1.5 from 5.3). However, for the whole period 1986 - 98 the deterioration of income distribution had an adverse impact on poverty alleviation, while higher mean income (growth) was the major source of poverty reduction. For example, if no changes in income distribution had taken place during the period 1986 - 98, the poverty headcount would have declined at least 9.3 points instead of 8.9 points. As Table I shows, acceleration effects (residual) are also considerable. The instrumental role of growth in reducing poverty is observed for all poverty measures. Table 1: Decomposition o Changes in Poverty Measures Growth effect Distribution effect Residual Total Headcount index (P0) 1986-92 -6.7 4.6 -1.5 -3.6 1992-98 -3.3 -1.5 -0.5 -5.3 1986-98 -9.3 3.9 -3.5 -8.9 Poverty gap index (PI) 1986-92 -3.8 0.1 -0.8 -4.5 1992-98 -1.7 0.0 -0.6 -2.1 1986-98 -5.3 -0.6 -0.7 -6.6 Poveny severity index (P2) 1986-92 -2.3 -I -0.3 -3.6 1992-98 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 -1.2 1986-98 -3.2 -1.4 -0.2 -4.8 Source: World Bank calculations. C.2. Comparison Across Regions and Household Head Education 7. The previous desegregation can be conducted along different regions and education of household head (Tables 2 and 3). Since poverty is highly concentrated in rural areas, we would like to conduct the previous analysis along different regions. Also, it would be interesting to determine whether the contributions of growth and equity to poverty changes vary with the level of the household head's education. 8. While the leading role of growth on poverty alleviation is homogenous for all regions and all poverty measures, the impact of changes in the distribution of income varies widely among regions and across periods. For the period 1986 - 92, the head-count index increased in rural areas. As Table 2 illustrates, this increase was explained by a less equitable income distribution. The growth of average income by itself would have reduced the poverty headcount by 6.7 percentage points in rural areas. However, this average growth income was smaller (possibly negative) for households in rural areas (distribution effect increased poverty by 9.4 percent) suggesting that the crises of the late 80's mainly affected this group of households. In urban areas, the "distribution effect" explained 65 percent of poverty reduction, while the growth effect explained 84 percent (-0.6 and -7.7 of -9.2, respectively). Conversely, for the period 1992 - 98 the "distribution effect" reduced poverty in rural areas and increased poverty in urban areas. While "growth effect" by itself reduced poverty by 2.9 percentage points in urban areas, changes in income distribution increased poverty by 5.1 percentage points, which traduced in an overall increased in HCI in this area. This situation could be explained by the income deterioration of poor households in urban areas resulting from greater migration from rural to 20 urban areas. In fact, the proportion of rural population to total population in 1992 was 0.49 while in 1998 it decreased to 0.37. Also, since changes in income distribution explained around 43 percent of HCI reduction in rural areas (-3.0 of -7.0), it appears that those migrants were mainly low-income individuals from rural areas. Table 2: Decomposition of Changes in Headcount Index by Area 1986-92 1992-98 1986-98 Growth Distribution Residual Total Growth Distribution Residual Total Growth Distribution Residual Total effect effect effect effect effect effect Urban -7.7 -0.6 -1.0 -9.2 -2.9 5.1 -0.9 1.3 -10.2 4.0 -1.7 -8.0 Rural -5.6 9.4 -2.1 1.8 -3.7 -3.0 -0.3 -7.0 -8.3 9.0 -6.0 -5.2 Total -6.7 4.6 -1.5 -3.6 -3.3 -1.5 -0.57 -5.3 -9.3 3.9 -3.5 -8.9 9. The empirical evidence seems to indicate that less educated heads of household are more negatively affected during economic crisis and highly benefit from economic expansions. Heads of household who had attained a tertiary level of education were more successful in leaving poverty conditions during the 1986 - 92 period. While growth effect by itself reduced poverty in all groups shown in Table 3, the "distribution effect" had a positive impact (reduced poverty) on poverty alleviation only in households with a highly educated head. Indeed, while almost 50 percent of the reduction of poverty in these households was explained by the "distribution effect", it increased poverty by 10.8 percentage points in those households with a non-educated head. This situation reflects that the small economic growth observed during 1986 - 92 was concentrated on highly educated head of households while the remaining group absorbed the negative economic shocks. An interesting result illustrated in Table 3, is that distribution effect on poverty reduction held significant importance for non-educated heads of household for the period 1992 - 98, while distribution effect is very small or negative (i.e., an increase in poverty) for them. Table 3: Decomposition of Changes in Po verty by Education Attainment 1986-92 1992-98 1986-98 Growth Distribution Residual Total Growth Distribution Residual Total Growth Distribution Residual Total _ effect effect effect effect effect effect None -7.7 10.8 -1.6 1.5 4.1 -6.3 -0.1 -10.4 -11.0 4.6 -2.5 -8.9 Primary -6.6 5.9 -2.3 -3.0 -3.2 0.9 -1.2 -3.4 -9.3 8.0 -5.2 -6.5 Secondary -2.8 12.4 -3.1 6.5 -2.6 -0.7 -0.6 -4.0 -4.0 13.0 -6.5 2.5 Tertiary -2.5 -2.5 -0.9 -5.9 -1.7 -3.2 1.1 -3.8 -2.5 -5.9 -1.3 -9.6 Total -6.7 4.6 -1.5 -3.6 -3.3 -1.5 -0.57 -5.3 -9.3 3.9 -3.5 -8.9 10. Tables 2 and 3 show the desegregation of poverty alleviation for the entire period 1986 - 1998. As these tables show, the impact of growth on poverty alleviation has been of critical importance for more vulnerable groups (less educated heads of household and rural households), while the worsening of income distribution has offset part of these gains. Only in those households whose heads had a high level of education did the GNLE help to explain poverty alleviation. These results reflect the fact that those with a high level of education have been more capable of both protecting themselves during economic crisis and benefiting from growth than those with less education. 21 C3. Growth Elasticity of Poverty 11. The results obtained in the previous section indicate that during the period 1986 - 1998 distributional-neutral growth was the leading source of poverty alleviation in the Dominican Republic. We would like to measure how sensitive poverty measures are to growth by calculating the elasticities of poverty to mean income, keeping the income distribution unchanged (LNG elasticity) for all the periods analyzed. Column 2 of Table 4 gives LNG elasticity of poverty (i7LvG ). The table 4 shows that this elasticity has decreased dramatically from the period 1986-92 to 1992-98. Table 4: Elasticity of Poverty to Distrib tion Neutral Growth Poverty measure and period Elasticity Headcount index (PO) 1986-92 -2.71 1992-98 -0.38 Poverty gap index (PI) 1986-92 --3.63 1992-98 -0.57 Poverty severity index (P2) 1986-92 -3.87 1992-98 -0.64 Source: World Bank calculations. 12. The elasticity of poverty measured to distribution neutral has decreased over the periods considered (Table 4). Each additional one percent of income growth reduced the poverty headcount by 1.17 percent over the period 1986 - 92 while it reduced it by 0.72 percent over the period 1992 - 98. It seems that the strong post-1992 growth has been accompanied by a deceleration of the momentum of poverty alleviation. Poverty gap and poverty severity indexes have higher growth elasticities than the headcount index. Each additional one percent of income growth reduced the poverty gap and poverty severity index by more than 1 percent over the period 1992-98. 13. The elasticity of poverty to distribution neutral growth in the DR is comparable to that of other Latin American countries (Table 5). For all the countries considered (excluding Argentina during the period 1974 - 80) there was a negative relationship between income and poverty. However, poverty elasticities vary across countries from 0.38 in Colombia over the period 1978 - 91 to 8.54 in Argentina for the period 1994 - 96. T'he elasticity of the DR can be compared to that of Chile around 1990. However, the elasticity of the DR has been declining from the period 1986 - 92 to 1992 - 98, while it has been increasing in Chile and Colombia. Interestingly, based on Argentina's experience, elasticities of poverty to distribution neutral growth are much higher (in absolute terms) during economic recessions. This could indicate that the gains in terms of poverty reduction obtained during a long period of economic growth could be easily reversed as the result of a temporary recession. This again underlines the importance of maintaining high economic growth for poverty alleviation as all gains in terms of poverty can be rapidly reversed during a recession. 22 Table 5: Elasticity of Headcount Index to Distribution Neutral Growth in Latin American Countries Average Country Period per-capita GDP growth Elasticity (percentage) Argentina 1974-80 1.00 1.00 1980-86 -1.92 -5.53 1986-91 -0.87 -6.36 1991-94 7.05 -1.22 1994-96 -0.93 -8.54 Bolivia 1990-94 1.40 -2.30 Colombia 1978-91 1.40 -0.38 1991-95 3.85 -0.73 Chile 1987-90 4.95 -1.15 1990-92 7.33 -1.35 1992-94 3.54 -2.20 Dominican Republic 1986-92 3.24 -2.72 1992-98 5.79 -0.38 Source: Ganuza, Taylor, and Moely "Politica Macroecon6mica y Pobreza en America Latina y el Caribe" and World Bank calculations. D. Some Simulations 14. Using the elasticities calculated in the preceding sections, we could illustrate how important continued growth is for poverty reduction. Simulations on how changes in inequality can reduce or increase the benefits of economic growth in terms of poverty can also be done. We make these simulations using the household survey 1998 as the basic tool. These simulations are very simple because they do not take into consideration other changes, for example mobility across sectors. The simulations show, however, that growth and pattern of distribution of income gains matter for poverty reduction. 15. Maintaining sustained economic growth is key to reduce poverty (Table 6). Poverty headcount ratio including Haitians and those of Haitian descent living in the DR was 31.1 percent in 1998. Based on the previous elasticities, we made projections of poverty measures into the future. We estimate the poverty rates, which would prevail in 2003 under different growth rate and Haitian migration scenarios, under the assumption that migration from Haiti continues. The reduction in poverty is very sensitive to economic growth. The simulations indicate that sustaining a 7 percent per-capita growth over the period 1998-03 would reduce the poverty rate substantially from 31.1 percent in 1998 to 17.5 percent in 2003 under the assumption that the current flow of Haitian migrants continues. If economic growth slows down to 3 percent over the period 1999-2003, the poverty rate would turn out to be 23.7 percent instead. This underlines the instrumental role of growth in reducing poverty. Eventually, migration from Haiti (estimated at 12,000 per annum) somewhat mitigates the impact of growth on poverty reduction. Table 6: Projected Reduction in Poverty Headcount Index under Alternative Growth Scenarios, (Percent, Five ear simulation) Per capita 2003 growth assumption 1998 No Haitian migration Haitian migration 3.0 31.1 24.9 25.2 5.0 31.1 21.3 21.5 7.0 31.1 17.5 17.7 Source: World Bank calculations. 23 The Anatomy of a Slum - the Ozama Barrios in Santo Domingo Marianne Fay, J. Luis Guasch, Rosanna Nitti and Soumya Chattopadhyay' A. Introduction 1. As part of the background work for both the Dominican Republic Poverty Report and the Infrastructure Country Framework Report, a survey was conducted in 9 of the 19 barrios of Santo Domingo that are classified as poor. These 9 barrios are contiguous, located in the heart of the city along the banks of the Isabela and Ozama rivers, from La Zurza in the north to La Cienaga in the south. They are collectively known as the RESURE area after a planned but never executed slum upgrading government project, and accounts for about 40% of Santo Domingo's poor residents, or 15% of the country's urban poor. 2. The area is particularly vulnerable to flooding and landslides during the rainy season, but it is the argument of this paper that for many of its residents, this hazard is offset by its very desirable central location which allows easy access to work and amenities.2 In fact, the market value of the land, if it could be developed and sold, is estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars.3 3. The paper is organized as follows. First, it reviews the results of the survey to provide an anatomy of the area and demonstrates that the area is in fact a collection of several worlds, segmented by vulnerability to floods and landslides. Housing markets function well with price and rents reflecting safety of location with respect to natural disasters but also with respect to health risks. It also shows that this is a well-settled neighborhood with some highly desirable characteristics and explains why individuals continue living in the more flood prone areas despite the risks. 4. The second section examines infrastructure services, and shows that access is reasonable in terms of coverage, very poor in terms of quality, and generally obtained illegally. Data from focus groups and interviews sheds some lights on the workings of the informal provision of services. Both the survey and the focus groups results point to poor quality of services as being a major issue in terms of public safety and health and for its economic costs. 5. The final section draws policy implications. The main recommendation is that the priority intervention is to improve public health and reduce flooding through better drainage and solid waste collection. Another is that there are opportunities for formalizing access to infrastructure (and improve quality of service) if alternative contracting can be designed through a dialogue between the neighborhood and the formal service providers. l The paper is based on information collected through a survey of 2,703 households conducted in the fall of 2000 by IDDI, a Dominican Republic NGO. The survey was designed by M. Fay, T. Persaud and A. Chong. The focus groups were conducted by Rosanna Nitti and Alexandre Kolev in the context of preparation for a separate paper. The authors are grateful to Thakoor Persaud for his many inputs and to David Luther, director of IDDI, for his help in working in the Ozama barrios. 2 Note that inner city slums have quite distinct problems than new informal settlements emerging on the outskirts of the city. They have fewer problems of physical isolation and distance from work. Social exclusion can still be a serious issue - residents of slums often report having to give a false address when applying for employment; social services and the police seldom enters such slums. Infrastructure access is generally better in inner city slums since they can tap into existing networks, although quality and reliability of service can still be poor. Finally, they are likely to be more heterogeneous with respect to the income and social class of the residents. 3The market value of land in Santo Domingo is DR$ 3,000/m2 in good central locations. 25 B. The Anatomy of the Ozama Barrios B.1. History 6. The 9 barrios were mostly settled in the late 1970s and early 1980s by rural migrants and others displaced from other parts of the city. Today it is home to 11% of the city's population - 300,000 people crowded in less than 1.6% of the city. Densities are very high, averaging 750 residents per Ha. (reaching highs of 1,000 in some places) as opposed to about 100 residents per Ha. for Santo Domingo as a whole. 7. Except for a section in the extreme south, the land is owned by one family which has been in an ongoing court battle for decades. About three decades ago, the area was at the outer edge of the city. With the growth of the city, it has become potentially prime property. 8. Several attempts by Government to upgrade the area and reduce its density have failed. In 1986, for example, about 2,500 families were relocated from six areas which were subsequently upgraded. Most relocated families sold their units and moved away, while new families moved into the upgraded areas after the authorities left. Edicts from the authorities notwithstanding, many areas which have been declared non-inhabitable (e.g., Domingo Savio) continue to be densely populated. B.2. Characteristics of Households 9. At present, a majority of current residents were born in the neighborhood, and more than half of them (56%) live below the poverty line of DR$ 1,080 per person per month.4 About 18% are below the extreme poverty line of DR$493. The median income is DR$ 1,063 but average per capita income is higher, at DR$ 1,655 indicating a significant variation in income in the area. 10. A majority of households (60%) are headed by males; the average age of the head of household is 44 years. About 56% migrated from rural areas, with only 12% originally from the Distrito Nacional. Most claimed to be Dominican born in the DR (98%) but as many as 10% of them did not have a cedula (identification card). Those without a cedula supposedly cannot open a bank account or hold a formal sector job and their children cannot get a birth certificate nor attend school. However, judging from the survey, average and median income of households headed by those without a cedula is about the same as for the sample as a whole, and their children attend school at about the same rate and have the same literacy rate. 11. Households, with an average of 4.38 persons, are smaller than the national mean of five. They are almost entirely composed of family members. Average age is 25.1 years (median of 21 years.) The dependency ratio is 78%, substantially higher than the national average of 60%. 12. Literacy at 81% is close to the national average of 83%. Students account for 63% of the population aged between 5 and 29 years and most (81%) attend public educational institutions. Fifteen percent of those five years and older have never attended school, while 63% have no more than a primary education. About 18% had partial or full secondary education while 4% had a university diploma. 13. Poor households are more frequently headed by females (51% as opposed to 26% for non-poor households) and larger (5 persons on average.) They have a lower literacy rate (80% as opposed to 84% for the non-poor). 4They account for 50.5% of households. 26 B.3. Integration in the City 14. The zone is well integrated to the city as 69% of employed residents work outside the area. It lies in a desirable central location, close to jobs and key services reported time to reach key services, such as schools, health centers, etc is 10-17 minutes.. Average time to work is less than half an hour (-26 min.) - short for a city as congested as Santo Domingo - and average expenditure on commute is a low DR$8.7 (' US$ 0.55) for a one-way trip. The majority (47%) take the bus to work while another 24% walk. Mode of transportation to work % Average time taken to reach nearest: In minutes Public transport 46.80 Public Transport 10.70 Walk 23.72 Police Station 10.97 Work at home 9.58 Primary school 11.22 Motorcycle 8.34 Public Center 15.35 Car 8.15 Supermarket 17.36 Bicycle 2.93 Taxi 0.32 B.4. Employment Occupation of individuals who did not earn money the previous week % Homemakers 41 Student 35 Looking for work 11 Other 7 Invalid 3 Retired 2 Living off rents I 15. About 46% of respondents aged 10 years and older reported having earned money in the past week. The majority (56%) report being salaried, while 41% have their own business. Self employment is less prevalent among the poor than among the non-poor (36% vs 45%.) Consequently daily payment, which is typical of the self employed, is less frequent among the poor than the non-poor (26% vs 36%), while monthly wage payment is more frequent (41% vs. 3 2%). 16. Among those 10 years and older and unemployed, only 11% had been actively looking for employment even though 51 % reported being willing to work for payment. The unemployed were mostly homemakers (41%) or students (34%). B.S. Income and Expenditures 17. Income is mostly derived from work, although 24% of households report receiving remittances, and about 17% pension benefits. Average monthly earnings from work (per worker) is DR$ 4,220, not enough to support the average family above the poverty line. Average remittances received in the prior 27 year was DR$10,459 but this is based on only 26 responses as most households were unwilling or unable to answer the question. 18. Expenditures are dominated by food, followed by education. The composition of expenditures is not significantly different between poor and non-poor, though absolute amounts are. Monthly per capita expenditure items Poor Non-poor DR$ % DR$ % Food 622 71 887 66 Education 93 11 147 11 Medical bills 64 7 93 7 Other 55 6 101 7 Telephone 28 3 51 4 Entertainment 17 2 68 5 Total 878 100 1,347 100 B.6. Housing 19. Home ownership is high (58%). Curiously it is higher among the poor (59.5%). Home owners typically bought their house 7 years after first arriving in the neighborhood. As to renters, they have been in the area for an average of 16 years (11 prior to moving to their current house) suggesting that their inability to buy may be due to poverty trap issues rather than to their recent arrival. It may also be due to a thinning market or rising prices as owners have been in the area on average since 1975 and renters since 1985. 20. Rentals and "lent houses" are about 36% and 6%, respectively. Monthly average rent was DR$747 (US$ 46.3). Homeowners' estimate of the average monthly rental value of their house was DR$ 1,186 (US$ 73.5). Whether this reflects the fact that owner-occupied houses are larger and of better quality, or an inflated view of what the market offers, is unclear. 21. Access to credit is clearly very limited since only 0.6% of households said they were in the process of paying for the house they bought. Half (51%) of homeowners claim to have a title for their house (note that there cannot be a title to the land since it is embroiled in a legal dispute between the government and the family that was expropriated.) Of those without titles, 88% thought the importance of a title is due to the security it confers while only 10% thought it important for access to formal credit. Less than half of those without titles answered a question about the amount they would be willing to pay to obtain a title. Whether this is because they are not willing to pay or because they had never thought about how much a title may be worth to them is unclear. Those who did volunteer an atnount, were on average willing to pay the equivalent of I to 2 months of putative rent for the title rights. This is a very low amount, which suggests that either people are secure in their tenure or that a title would not improve security by much. 22. On average, households have been in the same house for 13 years. However 61.2% of the households have taken about 8-9 years since they first moved into the area to move to their current house. 23. Overall, there are an estimated 55,000 - 65,000 housing units in the neighborhood. Most are small (41% are single room, another 39% have two rooms), single-storeyed, multi-use space with concrete 28 block walls, cement floors and corrugated zinc sheets roofs.5 About one-fifth of houses have wooden walls. Size varies, but averages approximately 25-30 square meters. Few (40%) are along a road passable for vehicles; only 69% of the "streets" were paved. B. 7. Household Location and Segmentation 24. The neighborhood is in fact a collection of several worlds, segmented according to desirability of the location. The safer locations (consolidated housing on secure raised ground or on downhill slopes not prone to landslide) have the households that have been in the area and in their house the longest (table below). While there isn't much difference in home ownership across location, those in safe consolidated areas are nearly twice as likely to formally own the house (i.e. have a title). Rents reflect location safety and are almost twice as high in the consolidated area as are near the river or around cainadas (rents are also affected by availability of service such as water etc.) House Location Areas prone to flooding or landslide Areas safe from natural disasters By river Downhill y ca Downhill Consolidated Whole sample landslide risk Bycfaa safe Average monthly rent in DR$ 525 609 469 655 907 748 % of houses in that location that flood 45 6 22 7 9 13 Year of arrival in area (avg.) 1984 1981 1980 1978 1977 1978 Year of arrival to currenthouse (avg) 1993 1990 1988 1987 1986 1987 % who own house w/ or w/o title 60 56 60 61 57 58 % who own house with title 19 19 23 30 34 30 Median income 933 967 1000 1046 1125 1063 Mean income 1,472 1,380 1,832 1,680 1,619 1,655 % households under the poverty line 57 55 53 51 48 50.5 % of poor households that are homeowners 70 58 58 61 59 60 25. The area is segmented in terms of income - though not very strongly. The proportion of households below the poverty line varies from a high of 57 % near the river to a low of 48% in the consolidated areas. Median income increases clearly with desirability of location, though the pattern is less clear for mean income. Those who live closest to the waterfront and along the eleven main drainage systems and gullies (canadas) or in areas prone to landslides are the poorest. 26. Safety concerns are reflected in the average rent, which is twice as high in the consolidated area as near the river or around canladas. And the safety is not just with respect to flooding: the frequency of reported cases of dengue, malaria and diarrhea is much also higher near the river and along the caniada (see below, the section on health issues.) 27. Focus group discussions shed some light on the dynamics of household mobility. Newcomers to the barrio mainly rent in the upper areas of the settlement, where rented units are the most densely populated form of accommodation (sometimes hosting several families in the same room.) and where there are specialized host houses for immigrants. 5 Most houses are single storeyed houses (74.4%) with cement floors (94%), and cement/concrete/brick walls (71%) and zinc roofs (97%.). Only 3% of houses have dirt floors. 29 Box 1: Waiting to be Resettled -- Information from Focus Groups The 11 men and women interviewed in the focus group of the lower area of La, Zurza had been there for an average of 20 years -- only one had been in the area for less than 10 years and one for more than 35 years. They all reported renting in the upper area before saving enough money to buy their curTent houses. Some "bought" the land and later on built, others bought the house. Both land and houses were acquired through informal contracts, generally verbal ones, in the presence of witnesses. The land had been acquired from a family controlling its illegal market (the same family which controls the largest share of the informal supply of electricity in the barrio). Interviewed people reported that now the "settlement is fiull" and, even if there are still some open spaces, new comers are not allowed to settle. No one is willing to sell in this area because as victims of various hurricanes and flooding, they believe they will eventually be allocated govemment flats. Some interviewees have been waiting for up to 23 years, during which time five government housing schemes have been implemented, but reportedly allocated to middle-class families linked to the ruling party of the day. The community is very strict about keeping newcomers (i.e. potential competitors for flats) out. In some instances they will also stop community members from improving their houses, because this would cost them the qualification for the govemment scheme (a family was reported to keep a very damaged house in the lower area of the barrio and rent accommodation in the upper area). Another problem which reduces mobility is the low value of houses - reportedly only 15 to 20,000 DR$, while in the upper area a plot of land would cost about 40-50,OOODR$ and a house 200 to 500,OOODR$. Selling their hoiise in the lower :reac woulld not yieldl enoll0h to RIlowv them to re-locRte elewhere in the harrio 28. Communities in the lower area live in the hope of being allocated government flats. For this reason, they control the local housing/land market and prevent the settlement of newcomers (Box 1). Their capacity to get organized and control the allocation of land could be very useful when planning the development of this area, as these communities could help in the process of vacating the land and ensure that no newcomers occupy it again. B.8. Flooding and Location of Households 29. About 13% of respondents said their houses flood when it rains, mostly from the street or canladas rather than from the river. The risk of flooding varies tremendously however, according to household location, from a high of 45% for houses located near the river to a low of 6 or 7% for houses located on hills but not close to a cainada. 30. Most (75%) of houses that flood when it rains are the ones located near the cafiada or in the consolidated areas. Households located near the river only account for 14% of houses that flood when it rains. This implies the higher impact intervention to help with flooding issues in Ozama would not be to remove individuals from the bank of the river, but rather to ensure that the canadas run well and that the streets do not turn into torrents in the rainy season. 30 House Location By river By caflada Downhill with landslide risk Downhill safe Consolidated Whole sample Houses thatflood As a % of houses in that location 45% 22% 6% 7% 9% 13% As a % of all houses that flood 14% 37% 3% 8% 38% 100% Source offlooding': River 84% 30% 10% 4% 23% 33% Street 16% 41% 30% 69% 83% 55% Carlada 50% 81% 30% 24% 31% 52% Memo: Households in this location 4% 21% 6% 16% 53% 100% " Sources are not mutually exclusive - that is a house can be vulnerable to flooding from the river, as well as from the streets and from caiiadas. B.9. Health 31. Health conditions are poor. About half of households (48%) reported that at least one member of the household had suffered a disease or injury in the previous three months that required medical attention. In most cases (82%), the sick were treated at public health care institutions. Incidence of diseases across household locations in the past five years By calada By river Downhill with Downhill safe Consolidated landslide risk Dengue 39 32 25 24 22 Malaria 37 42 20 29 17 Hepatitis 47 46 36 36 31 TB 48 39 38 38 32 32. Waterborne diseases are a major issue in the neighborhood. Medical centers and dispensaries in the slum report a high incidence of water-borne diseases (e.g. diarrhea, ameba) and skin diseases (which could be avoided with an increase in water supply). According to the survey, a quarter of households with children under 5 years of age reported cases of diarrhea in the last 30 days - from a high of 37% by the river to a low of 22% in the consolidated areas. Similarly, the frequency of dengue, malaria, hepatitis and tuberculosis is much higher among households located near the river and along the cainada, than elsewhere. 33. This again suggests that priority interventions in the neighborhood would address water, sanitation and solid waste issues since these are key interventions in the fight against dengue, malaria, diarrhea and hepatitis. Note also that this is likely to have positive externalities for the entire city. C Infrastructure Services 34. Access to infrastructure services is reasonable in terms of coverage, very poor in terms of quality, and generally obtained illegally. The poor quality is an issue in terms of public safety and health, but also for its direct economic impact, and imposes a heavy cost on the neighborhood. C.1. Electricity 35. Judging from the survey, service access for electricity is almost universal (98%), although largely through illegal connections (77%). About 21% report paying for the service. Among them, about three 31 quarters report paying the electricity company, 15% did not specify who they paid and about 11% claimed to pay some other person(s.) Average payment amount is DR$232 per month, which varies from a low of DR$69 among the riverside residents to a high of DR$252 for those living in the more settled areas. 36. The main problem reported in interviews is the low reliability of the service, namely the frequent cuts in the supply and their unpredictability. For example, medical centers and clinics have to rely on generators (when available) to guarantee a constant supply of energy. Women using refrigeration for income-generating activities (e.g. making and selling ice-creams) often loose their food stock due to prolonged black-outs. Teachers reported low performance by students who cannot study in the evening for lack of electricity. The general opinion in the barrios is that recently the (formal) service has worsened (one comment from a community leader in Guachupita was: "before we had only cuts, now we have cuts and high electricity bills"). 37. Safety is a major issue: a fifth of households reported knowing of fires caused by electricity in the neighborhood, while more than a quarter cited fatal accidents due to electrical causes. While some of the informal providers have formal training from technical institutes, others are self-taught. Yet, special skills are needed, above all to handle the high-tension cable and reduce the voltage 10 times to bring it to 220 Volts. This is dangerous work and accidents on the job are not rare. 38. Electrocution is a danger during the floods, especially for people living in houses made of corrugated iron sheets. Focus groups mentioned this was particularly problematic because people fear leaving their house during flooding for fear of thefts, and some had died as a result. Having the main switch to cut the power off in the dwelling is a solution, informal electricity providers reported that some of their clients did not see the need for one and where reluctant to pay the (modest) sum to have it installed. The informal providers believed they could enforce the use of a switch if all of them agreed. Informal providers report switching the main transformer off as a safety measure before and during major hurricanes.6 39. Market structure - Informal providers.7 In La Zurza (12,000 households), five informal providers control electricity provision, sharing the same transformer. This is mostly a father-to-son business, with one of the five still controlling the largest share of the market because his father used to have a monopoly in the area. The five providers estimate that "the market is fully covered" and are not willing to accept any new competitor. 40. Both the Junta de Vecinos and the CBO denied any knowledge of informal providers. Yet, the informal providers report having to inform the Junta de Vecinos when working in the barrio, because they have to go around with ladders and they could look suspicious. 41. Providers report charging 150 DR$ (- 1OUSD) as installation fee and a flat-fare monthly fee, determined by the number of appliances in the house - which is only checked at the time of the installation. Clients pay an additional I OODR$ for the switches and wires. fee Providers report charging between DR$35 and DR$75 for the monthly flat fee, but the users report higher rates - around DR$ 1 00).8 When people cannot pay, the informal providers will wait for two months before cutting the power 6 It was reported that in about one week after the hurricane, the electricity was back in the main system, but it took two extra weeks to get all the connections back in the barrio (wires were stolen and they had to be bought again). 7This is based on interviews and focus groups conducted in la Zurza, one of the 9 barrios that constitute the overall area. 8 Only one interviewed group in the barrio openly admitted to pay for electricity obtained informally - women in a focus group from the lower area of La Zurza. The difference in reported charges could be due to the fact that the informal provider did not want to disclose how much money he was actually making in the presence of other community members (a community leader was present during the interview). 32 supply. The poorest living in the lower area are reported to be extremely regular in their payments "because they really need the service and give priority to it". 42. In the informal provider's view, the main problem people have with the formal provider is the high tariffs that it charges. It is the informal provider's understanding that the meters overcharge users because "even with one fridge, television, radio, fan, iron and two light bulbs the bill should not be more than DR$250/month, while the meter would charge up to DR$3,000". In addition, people complain because the formal provider do not come quickly when there is need for repair (unreliable). On the contrary, the informal provider answers calls very quickly and efficiently. If the user has a problem with the installation, the service is free of charge, while there is a charge for any other general problem. 43. Formal provider. The formal provider (distributor) of electricity is AES, which covers the western area of the Dominican Republic. The company finds it difficult to work in the slum which it judges dangerous, or in neighboring barrios where people "adopt similar attitudes". 9 Another problem is the limited physical access which creates problems for the transport of poles. The company uses electricians from the barrio to carry out repairs in the area, but believes that it is difficult to compete with the informal providers, since the latter do not charge monthly fees. In these neighborhoods, when they install meters, 40% of users stay with the meter, 60% go back to illegal. 44. According to AES, in the whole of La Cienaga, out of 13-15,000 households only the priest has two meters and pays the bills. In La Zurza only 2% of the population pay, in all the other barrios less than 1%. The reason for the discrepancy between this information and the result of the survey (which suggests that about 15% of the population across the 9 barrios pay AES) is unclear. At any rate, all agree that few households pay the formal provider. 45. Based on the 38 general meters that monitor consumption in the area, AES estimates average consumption to be equivalent to 250DR$/month, but it believes that people are not willing to pay more than 100DR$/month. The company feels that people are used to have free electricity supply and are unwilling to pay. The company also found that users typically underestimate their consumption, and don't know how to control consumption. It is a particular problem in poor neighborhoods where people often use old appliances. 46. Possible solutions. Currently, AES has decided to focus on the formal market, postponing the problem in the barrios later on. They profess a willingness to negotiate with the communities and to establish partnerships with NGOs and CBOs but fear the population may not be open to it. 47. AES's plan - not yet discussed with the communities-- is to put in place a collective, pre-paid system. Monthly meetings would be held with the Junta de Vecinos to discuss how much is consumed. If less than 70% of consumption is paid for, there would be regular cuts in the electricity supply to make up for the missing amount. If more is paid, the extra energy will stay in the barrio (e.g. used for public lighting). 48. To summarize, the formal provider appears to have incomplete and sometimes erroneous information on how the electricity supply is actually organized in the barrios. Its strategies are based on the assumption that people are not willing to pay or that communities are not ready to negotiate. 9 AES officials report that in Los Manguitos (one of the 9 barrios) it reached an agreement with residents, but eventually the slum dwellers did not want to pay and bumt two transformers. The priest called the company for a meeting, but once there, the company representatives, the superintendent and the notary were kidnapped and released only after the electricity service was resumed. 33 C.2. Water House Location Access to Water river 37.76% downhill landslide 46.75% downhill safe 53.54% cafilada 66.67% consolidated 67.59% Whole sample 62.83% 49. A majority (63%) of households have indoor water, but this varies considerably, from a low of 38% for households located near the river to a high of 67% for households near canadas and in consolidated areas. 50. About 40% of households report paying for the connection, half to the water company (CAASD), half to NGOs or other informal provider. Most (85%) of those who pay CAASD are located in the consolidated areas or along the caniadas. 51. The lowest monthly expenditure is for those who rely on their own tap, rather than a neighbor or a public one. Vendors and bottled water are a source of even higher expenditure. 52. Very few houses are connected through the water company (CAAS) and the vast majority of household connections are illegal. Vendors are of two types - those who carry bottled water and those who, with water hoses and an electric pump bring water directly to the dwellings, where they fill containers. The structure of informal connections was hard to pinpoint possibly because there are many different systems (community-managed provision, provision by organized groups of families, possibly organized informal providers not willing to be interviewed). Women in a focus group and one CBO member reported that informal connections are free and installed/maintained by the community or groups of houses. Connections were reportedly easy to obtain given pipes and a plumber but only for those with the right slope and stability of soil. Water Source Used for drinking Other uses Monthly avg. expenditure Own indoor tap 44% 63% DR$ 97 Neighbor's tap 29% 35% DR$ 160 Public tap 6% 6% DR$ 147 Bottled Water 33% 1% DR$ 180 Water from vendor 1% 1% DR$ 160 Frompublicwell 0.11% 0.41% -- From River/Stream 0.11% 0.04% -- From rain 0.45% 0.86% -- From other sources 0.23% 0.11% -- 53. Quality of service is a major issue. Frequency of service is poor -- only 60% of households report getting water every day. Most importantly, contamination is a major problem. A third of households report relying on bottled water for drinking, even though 98% of households rely on piped water for other uses (either through their own tap, a neighbor's, or a public one.) 54. In interviews, people were aware of the health problems related to the contamination of drinking water by sewerage and garbage. They reported that plumbers are not well trained and the connections to the main water pipe are often poorly made and badly sealed. In addition, water pipes run through garbage and dirty side roads. To cope with this problem, families who can afford to do so boil the water or buy drinkable bottled water, others use chlorine tablets (this was reported mainly by women in living in the lower area of La Zurza). Some families simply take chances and use the water untreated. 34 55. Lack of water supply in the schools is not seen as a factor reducing attendance, as children generally bring their own water from home. Box 2: Interviews with Water Users and Providers Water user. The interviewed reported paying 25DR$/day to the door-to-door distributor for water which is not potable. Boiling it would be too expensive. Instead he spends an extra 20DR$/day to buy 4 gallons of bottled drinking water. This is an high expenditure if compared to the 1,000DR$/month rent that he pays. Door-to-door water vendor (Capotillo). The vendor (a young boy) uses a tricycle to carry 4 containers of 4 gallons each. He charges 25DR$/load (all the 4 containers) when delivering the water directly with the tricycle and 40DR$ when he has to carry the containers by hand (this in the lower area). There are 5 water providers like him in the area. The boy works in the morning and goes to school in the aftemoon. He makes about 200DR$/day and spend 20DR$/day for the rent of the tricycle. The tariffs are set by the market competition. Customers pay regularly when receiving the water. Informal water provider. The interviewed informal provider owns hoses and 2 pumps which he uses to pump water to individual houses. The charge is 20DR$/hr or 4DR$ for a four-gallon container. He reported that in La Zurza there are 6 providers like him, all of whom obtain water from public taps or pipes. They control all the water sources (the door-to-door vendors buy from them) and agree on a common set of tariffs. The water provider interviewed serves 25 families/day as an average, but he does not have fixed customers. His radius of action depends on the length of the hose, which is 1,300 feet. In periods of high demand, he works around the clock and people will keep the drums outside their houses to be filled during the night. When interviewed, the provider reported that recently his work has been affected by the instability of the electricity supply -- all his customers ask for water when the electricity is available. He employs one assistant to supervise the water distribution and provides an average two hours of water supply/family. The provider pumps the water from a government manhole next to his house. When the government installed it, he helped in the works and learnt how to operate it. He was left in charge of the water source and, since the government never came back, he started bringing water to the neighbors and charging for the service. In this way, he managed to put together enough money to buy electric pumps and hoses. Start-up capital for this business is about DR$ 8,000, which acts as a barrier to entry. C.3. Sanitation Sources of contamination % In the neighborhood/area: From garbage 71% From stagnant water 58% Around the house: From garbage accumulation 46% From cahada 41% From residual/sewage water 40% From stagnant water 40% From proximity to latrine 28% From heavy traffic 11% From overflow of latrine 8% From industrial pollution 4% From industrial noise 3% Other 7% 56. Very few households (12%) are connected to the sewer system. Most houses have pit latrines. Many rely on a septic tank (39%) although that is limited to the upper areas with road access. Many latrines directly discharge into the cafiadas. In the lower area, people use the river at night, or dig single- use pits. People interviewed in the lower area along the river bank reported having common latrines shared by various families and discharging the sewerage directly in the river. The most common sanitation system in this area is the use of plastic bags later disposed in the river. 35 57. Used water is, for the most part (83%), thrown into the street, caniada or patio. 58. The lack of an appropriate sanitation system is clearly perceived as a health hazard by the people in the settlement: it is mentioned as a source of contamination around the house by about 40% of households (rising to 74% for households located near the river or caniadas.) C.4. Solid Waste 59. Solid waste is the most frequently reported source of contamination both for the neighborhood as a whole and around the house. Overall 46% of households mentioned it as a problem, a figure that increases to more than 80% for houses located near the river or canadas. Solid waste is a primary cause of blocked drainage systems and flooding. 60. Only 66% of households report having a collection service. A full 96% of interviewed households report placing their waste in bags and garbage cans, but this is of limited use in the absence of collection. Municipal CBO Private All river 13% 3% 3% 20% downhill landslide 30% 1% 11% 42% downhill safe 29% 10% 14% 52% cailada 38% 4% 19% 60% consolidated 61% 6% 15% 82% All 47% 5% 14% 66% 61. Collection varies tremendously according to household location, from a low of 20% by the river to a high of 82%. Most (47%) are served by the municipality, 14% paid an individual to do it, others did it themselves (22%). Less than 5% relied on a community organized effort (CBO). For those with a municipal service, 92% report getting garbage pickup service at least once a week, but municipal service is mostly in the consolidated areas (see box below for a description of a community based effort.) All in all, improving collection efficiency and coverage is an urgent priority for the neighborhood. 62. Accumulation of garbage both in the barrio and in the market area is due both to insufficient collection, but also to the lack of understanding of residents. The importance of the latter was confirmed when visiting the transit camp for the victims of the 1998 hurricane. It is littered with garbage, despite twice daily collection by the Municipal Corporation. C.5. Contamination 63. An environmental problem plagues the Ozama and Isabela waterfront. Solid waste and upstream industrial plants and agricultural activities are sources of considerable pollution. Among those who live close to the river, 96% say garbage accumulation is a problem, and a quarter to a third identify industrial waste and slaughterhouse overruns as problems. Overall, residents complain of odors, discolored water in the river and skin problems for those who bathe in the river. The abundance of vegetation growing in the river is also caused by industrial and agricultural activities, coupled with non-treated sewage. As a result, the water-flow is seldom efficient and contributes to the quick flooding of the area when it rains. Contamination also fosters water-born diseases. 36 Box 3: Community Based Solid Waste Management In La Zurza, the coordination committee of CBOs (Coodezurza) is managing a community based garbage collection Program, which has been successfully replicated in other slums both in the Ozama area and the rest of the city. The program was started in mid 1995 as an answer to a clear need expressed by the families in the barrio. Its design was based on the results of a survey conducted by volunteers among 2,400 households which collected information on pollution, type and causes of diseases, amount of garbage produced, income of the household, willingness to participate in the program and to pay. Initially the program provided door-to-door collection of garbage to 900 families for a flat tariff of DR$5/month. This generated insufficient resources so the tariff was increased to DR$10/month for business and wealthier families. Today the program covers 2,400 families in the barrio, serviced by 12 garbage collectors and 6 fee collectors, for a daily collection, Monday to Saturday. Families can choose amongst three types of payment: weekly, fortnight and monthly, depending on the contract they choose. There is a 10% surcharge for late payments. The choice of the payment option depends on the household's income cycle (the weekly option is generally chosen by the self-employed in the informal sector who earn a daily wage, while the fortnightly option is chosen mainly by people working in the private, formal sector and the monthly option by those having monthly salaries, typically working for the government). There is flexibility for the few cases when people are behind in their payments because they are too poor. Clients owning shops and business are reported to pay better and more regularly. Not all families in the serviced area participate. Non-participating families bring their garbage to the municipal collection point outside the barrio or just throw it in the caiiadas. They are reported to not participate because of a "lack of education and understanding of the importance of garbage collection" and because they expect free service from the government. The program operates only in the upper areas of La Zurza. Reportedly this is because families in the lower areas are less motivated given the proximity of the river and because "there is no motivation to start contracts with families who soon are going to move [to government flats.]" Further, the difficult physical access to the area would complicate service provision. Women interviewed in the lower areas confirmed their lack of interest in joining the program given the proximity of the already polluted river and the fact that "anyway garbage keeps coming down from the upper areas carried in the caiiadas." They also reported that they have never been contacted from the CBOs in the upper area with regard to this issue, suggesting a segmentation between the two areas. The money collected is used to pay the employees, to run information campaign and to organize learning exchanges with other communities. The initial capital to start the activity came from donors in Germany through the NGO IDDI, the government contributed through the Port Authority, and more recently the Embassy of Canada made a contribution to help scale up the initiative. Every two months Coodezurza carries out a rapid survey to monitor the progress of the program. Two years after starting the program, the committee also conducted a survey to monitor the decrease in diseases like diphtheria, dengue, diarrhea and yellow fever. The survey registered good improvements in health (copies of the reports are available), even if this outcome could be related to a combination of garbage collection and concurrent health programs and distribution of medicines. As to road-cleaning in the barrio, it is carried out every 15 days as part of a volunteer community effort. Also the cafiadas are cleaned every 15 days and the municipality provides the hardware (tools/equipment like spades and similar). C. 6. Violence and Social Problems % of households that reported the problem as "serious" or "very serious" Drugs 94% Alcohol 90% Street violence 84% Domestic violence 62% Prostitution 61% 64. About 8% of households report that, in the previous year, at least one member of their households has been victim of an assault and 7% that their house had been burglarized. Drugs and alcohol were reported as the more serious social issues followed by street violence, domestic violence and prostitution. 37 C. 7. Community Organization 65. According to the survey, 19.5% of households reported belonging to a community organization, and 14% reported that the head of the household contributed to some work that had benefited the neighborhood - mostly through the Church or an NGO. Less than one percent of households reported receiving any help (food, money, schooling, clothing, health, or housing) from NGOs. 66. This result is hard to reconcile with the view of the 9 barrios that emerges from interviews and focus groups - a solidly organized society with clear rules which are enforced, andjuntas de vecinos and CBOs that are well known and well informed. This highlights the importance and complementarity of the two approaches (survey and focus groups/interviews). D. Conclusion 67. The area is clearly a well organized area with its own social and economic structures, and with strong community organization (though this may vary somewhat across location.) Any policy intervention should therefore build upon this structure and adapt to it. They will also need to incorporate the strong differences and priorities across locations. 68. In the short term, the higher impact intervention in Ozama is to improve drainage and solid waste management. The sources of flooding most cited are the street and gullies rather than the river, and drainage improvement, i.e., ensuring that the gullies flow well and the streets do not turn into torrents during the rainy season, should be given top priority. These interventions will also have a strong impact on public health as they will reduce the incidence of dengue, malaria, and other waterbome diseases - which will improve public health in the entire city. Another urgent public health issue is to improve water and sanitation access and quality. 69. Concerning electricity and water services, there is a clear willingness to pay, particularly for good quality service. It is possible therefore that steps could be taken to improve quality of service - possibly through formalization. 70. In the long term, an integral strategy needs to be defined in order to improve the conditions in low lying areas including (i) the design of an integrated upgrading pilot project, (ii) a review of the national housing framework, (iii) cleaning of the Ozama river and rehabilitation of its banks to prevent new settlements, and (iv) enforcement of the environmental law to prevent further contamination of the river. 71. An "integrated upgrading" pilot project could be implemented following similar experiences in other countries (i.e., Brazil, El Salvador, La Paz, Ecuador, Mexico, etc.). This implies helping the communities, NGOs, etc., list their main concerns, prioritize these demands, price them and adjust to the amount of resources available. After interactive discussions, similar experiences in other countries indicate that the results are generally focused on land tenure issues, schools, security, jobs, streets, transport, basic utility services, etc. The residents who live in hazardous areas, those who are in sites where new paths have to be placed, etc., are relocated according to mutually-agreed conditions. Generally, if there are available plots in the community, these are used for such relocations. In the Ozama 38 area, there is a need to "go upward" by building duplexes or other such solutions (not large multifamily apartments'°) where each fanily would still have its own unit and responsibilities. 10 The project RESURE contemplates resettlement of families in large multi-family units. International experience show that middle and upper-income groups tend to be comfortable with such arrangements while low-income ones generally have various problems. In Colombia and Ecuador, for example, low-income groups find such units difficult to maintain, primarily because of the level of mutual cooperation required, difficulty of enforcing obligations (financial and others) when a member refuses or is unable to pay his or her share and the tendency for the residents not to know each other or feel responsible for common areas. If there are renters and owners, the situation becomes more complicated because renters generally are more transient. In the US, after the public housing rental units began to have problems, HUD sold many of them to the tenants for $1 on condition that they form a cooperative and became owners/occupiers. The administrative, maintenance, financial and other costs were too much for many of them and such housing is systematically being demolished today. On the technical side, simple 2-4 unit cluster (multi- level with shared walls, ducts, etc.) is less expensive than a large unit. Water service in a tall unit is also a problem (low pressure) and maintaining the pipes, sewerage and other facilities in large buildings is not an easy or cheap task. In Ozama, the density is already high and if the small duplexes or cluster units are properly designed and located, the existing population could be absorbed without having the very large multifamily units which could attract larger number of outsiders and increase the need for streets, services and other social infrastructure and superstructures. 39 Rural Poverty in Dominican Republic: Market Failures, Government Failures and New Policies Ramon Lopez' A. Introduction 1. As in most developing countries, poverty in the Dominican Republic (DR) is deeper and more widespread in rural than in urban areas. The majority of the poor still live in rural areas. It is difficult, therefore, to achieve effective poverty reduction without dealing with rural poverty. One option, of course, is to focus antipoverty efforts in the urban centers and to rely on accelerated rural-urban migration to reduce rural poverty as well. The advantage of this approach is that it is probably cheaper to reach the poor in the urban centers than in rural areas where people are more geographically scattered allowing for less economies of scale in social and economic programs designed to reduce poverty. Additionally, in most countries (and DR is no exception to this) economic growth naturally tends to concentrate in urban areas. This may considerably facilitate urban poverty reduction with less need for expensive government antipoverty programs. By contrast, rural activities tend to lag behind during the economic growth process and, hence, rural poverty reduction may be much more dependent on ad-hoc antipoverty programs than urban poverty amelioration. 2. There are, however, at least three significant drawbacks associated with an urban-focused poverty reduction strategy: (1) rural-urban migration, even if promoted through government policies, is a relatively gradual process and thus poverty may fall at a slow pace over time; (2) most of the people that can migrate are usually younger and generally less poor than those that remain in rural areas. That is, the poorest people in the rural areas are generally those that face the greatest difficulties in benefiting from migrating;2 (3) rapid rural-urban migration usually entails large costs to the cities to provide essential services to the growing urban population. The problems associated with rapid population growth in cities are well-documented. 3. Additionally, there are considerable externalities caused by rapid urban population growth in terms of increased crime, pollution and congestion (as is so evident in Santo Domingo). These problems are usually related to the speed of urban growth. That is, the key problem is that the provision of urban infrastructure, social services and other public goods may not be able to keep pace with fast urban population growth. If such growth is moderate many of the negative externalities of urban growth may be substantially ameliorated. 4. Thus, an antipoverty strategy cannot rely mostly on urban growth, rural-urban migration, and the provision of urban antipoverty programs. A minimum degree of balance in the allocation of antipoverty efforts between rural and urban areas is necessary. Rapid urban economic growth and urban poverty reduction policies, a reasonable rate of rural-urban migration complemented by poverty reduction efforts in rural areas focused especially on those that find most difficulties in benefiting out of migration (rural children, the least educated, and the old), are probably most effective in reducing the overall rate of poverty. 5. The fact that poverty is much worse in rural than urban areas and the dilemma of the optimal rural-urban balance of antipoverty strategies are not unique to DR. Most LDCs (Less Developed Countries) face the same situation. The case of the DR is, however, more complicated l This report was prepared by Ram6n L6pez (Consultant, University of Maryland at College Park), with the assistance of Edgar Victoria (World Bank, LCCDO), under the supervision of Philippe Auffiret (World Bank, LCCDO), who provided detailed comments and suggestions for this report. 2 Remittances, however, may play an important role in increasing the income of those that remain in rural areas. But in many instances the poorest families cannot afford sending even some of their members to urban centers. 41 and less common because of the highly porous nature of its border with Haiti. This has led to rapid immigration of mostly unskilled workers from Haiti (for political and economic reasons). Though Haitian immigration is in large part due to severe political instability and extreme poverty in Haiti (e.g., the migration "pushing forces"), "pulling forces" associated with much better political and economic conditions in the DR, are also important. Thus, immigration from Haiti is likely to be responsive to the prevailing wage conditions for unskilled workers in the DR. That is, the supply of unskilled labor in the DR is elastic. This is likely to reduce the trickle down effect of economic growth. Unskilled wages become less responsive to the increased labor demand associated with growth and, therefore, most of the poor may obtain limited benefits out of the growth process. At the same time social programs targeting the poor may become more expensive if they also benefit Haitians. In this case more Haitians would migrate, as they know that they can benefit from these programs. Thus, to prevent diluting social programs the government may target Dominican families. This may be considered unethical but one may argue that a poor country like the Dominican Republic has no moral responsibility to reduce poverty among Haitians. This moral duty falls on Haiti's richer neighbors and on Haitian elite. 6. Thus, at this level of generality we can conclude that: (i) A poverty reduction strategy should have a rural-urban balance devoting significant efforts to deal with the rural problem; (ii) because of its peculiar inability to control immigration of unskilled workers from a relatively large and extremely poor country, the DR can expect less from economic growth as an instrument of poverty reduction than most other countries. This implies that reduction of the scope and intensity of poverty depends mostly on coherent policies and programs explicitly targeting the poor. More importantly, this also implies that the value of education as an antipoverty mechanism is magnified: By improving skills, the domestic labor force can become complements to rather than substitutes for unskilled Haitian immigrants. Thus, immigration of unskilled workers may become a positive factor to raise the (marginal) productivities and wages of skilled domestic workers and, hence, potentially becoming a factor that helps to reduce poverty of semiskilled workers.4 7. The purpose of this study is to analyze key constraints affecting the income of the rural poor and to analyze the impact of existing policies and programs on the rural poor. The basic idea is to derive lessons to improve policies and programs to benefit the rural poor. We first present a general conceptual framework followed by a very brief descriptive analysis of rural poverty in the DR. Certain key observations about the importance of various factors as determinants of the income of the rural poor are provided next. The following section discusses policies and programs affecting the rural poor. We conclude with recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of such policies and programs to reduce rural poverty. B. Conceptual Framework 8. Why are the poor poor? First because they have little assets (both human and non-human) and second because the productivity of their assets is low. The low levels and quality of assets affecting the majority of the rural population in the DR and elsewhere in Latin America have of 3 Comparing the per capita incomes of 1992 obtained from FEyD survey with the values obtained from the 1998 Central Bank survey of income and expenditures we find that real per capita income of the lowest quintile increased 39 percent compared with a real increase of 47 percent for the per capita income of all households. That is, the income of the poor shows an elasticity of 0.83 with respect to average income. This is lower than the comparable average elasticity calculated by Dollar (2000) for several countries, which is equal to 1. 4 Immigration of unskilled labor is likely to reduce the marginal productivity of unskilled workers and, hence, to put downward pressure on unskilled wages. Increased supply of unskilled workers, however, raises the marginal productivity of other factors of production and, hence, their market values. As skilled labor is effectively one of these other factors, it is reasonable to expect that the value of skilled workers increase with immigration of unskilled workers. 42 course historical roots. The vast majority of the rural population have little or no access to land, their physical capital is minimal and their human capital, including education and health, is low and of poor quality. This is in part a result of a tremendous concentration of land in the hands of very few, the low priority given by governments to investment in human capital in the allocation of public investments and a double bias in the allocation of the meager public resources devoted to education and health care: a pro-urban, anti rural bias, and a pro higher education, anti basic and secondary education bias. 9. The low productivity of the assets owned by the poor is generally the result of market failures and incompleteness, and government failures. Market failures commonly affect the rural capital, land and labor markets. The poor are generally denied access to credit because they are poor, are discriminated against in labor markets and have difficulties in entering land markets. Land markets may not operate for the poor because the non-poor obtain higher returns to land ownership due to the fact that land ownership give them political influences, access to cheaper credit and allow them to obtain tax benefits (land ownership is usually a good tax shelter mechanism in most of Latin America). By contrast, the poor only obtain the agricultural benefits of the land, therefore, they are unable to compete in the land markets with wealthier producers that use land as an instrument to obtain artificial benefits arising from market and government failures. The market failures are many times made worse by government failures: Government intervention is usually dominated by political interest groups, bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption. The repeated failure of subsidized public credit is just one example of this. 10. With generalized market imperfections and an inefficient and corrupt public sector the poor have few options. One of them is the strength of another more difficult to define but not less important asset: social capital. Community organizations can become an important instrument to overcome market and government imperfection. With external support from NGOs, international organizations, churches and other non-profit organizations, the poor can achieve a degree of communal organization that could allow them to overcome disadvantages in credit markets as well as commercialization of their products and inputs. Moreover, they may be able to become part of the political lobby game that could pressure for a greater share of public resources and for greater redistribution of assets in their favor. This, in conjunction with pressures from influential external agents (hopefully the World Bank among them) could become an important instrument to correct policies that are deleterious for the poor and to reduce public corruption and correct perverse allocations of public resources. C. Rural Poverty and Sources of Income for the Poor: An Overview 11. Table 1 provides a perspective on the importance of rural poverty in Dominican Republic. More than 50 percent of the poor in the DR live in rural areas and almost 60 percent of the extreme poor are rural. While in the urban sector only 15 percent of the population is below the poverty line, in the rural sector 30 percent of the population is poor (Table 1). 12. According to recent surveys (DR-Poverty Report, 2000), less than 30 percent of the total rural income is directly generated from agricultural activities. It is estimated that another 15 percent originates in rural manufacturing and service activities that are highly dependent on agriculture. The rest comes largely from non-agricultural employment and non-employment sources. The agricultural sector provides direct employment to about 42.0 percent of the rural population and another 8-10 percent is employed in subsectors that are directly dependent on agriculture production. That is, about half of the rural income and employment are originated in activities that are not directly related to agriculture. There are 128,000 micro enterprises in the rural sector participating in non-agricultural activities that provide employment to about 30.0 percent of the employed rural population (Fondomicro, 1998). Thus, though agriculture is a key 43 activity for the rural population, the available data suggest that other activities including tourism, small manufacturing, industry and commerce are surprisingly important as a source of employment and income. Table 1: Rural versus Urban Poverty Population (million) Poor (million) Extreme Poor (million) Distrito Nacional 2.5 0.23 (9 percent) 0.05 (2 percent) Rural " 2.7 0.81 (30 percent) 0.24 (9 percent) Urbanl 2.9 0.50 (17 percent) 0.12 (4 percent) Total 8.1 1.54 (19 percent) 0.41 (5 percent) 'Excluding the Disirito Nacional. Notes: Figures in brackets correspond to percentages of total population in each category. 13. More importantly, according to the 1992 FEyD survey, agriculture is only slightly more important as a source of income for the rural poor than for the non-poor. The contribution of agriculture to the income of the households in the poorest quintile is 31 percent compared to 24 percent of non-agricultural employment sources (the rest include other sources such as remittances, pensions, etc.). For households in the second poorest quintile agricultural income falls to only 19 percent while non-agricultural (employment) income is 43 percent. Thus, even for the rural poor non-agricultural income sources (including transfers) are surprisingly large. An important implication of this is that a strategy to promote faster growth and poverty reduction in the rural sector should not focus only on promoting growth of the agricultural sector. There is a variety of other productive activities (some related to agriculture and others not) that can make a sizable contribution to expand rural household employment and income. D. Assets of the Poor and Asset Productivity 14. Several features concerning government intervention and market failures affect the volume of assets available to the rural poor and their distribution. Here we analyze some of the major factors affecting levels and productivities of various assets that are important for poor rural households. 15. Land distribution. Less than 50 percent of the rural population has access to land. Among those that own land, its distribution is extremely skewed. About 40 percent of the households that have access to land own less than 1.2 hectare and 74 percent own less than 3.1 hectares. That is, up to three quarters of the households that own land can be considered minifundistas, in the sense that they do not have the minimum scale to permit them to become non-poor. At the other extreme 700 producers control a vast portion of the total agricultural land of the country. The largest 50 producers control on average more than 1,000 hectares each. The largest 700 producers (0.3 percent of all producers) occupy more than 15 percent of the total agricultural land area of the country. Additionally, according to JAD (Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana) another 15-20 percent of the total agricultural land is still owned by the government. 16. According to recent case studies in Latin America, increasing access to productive land increases rural household income significantly with per capita income-land elasticities ranging between 0.07 and 0.30 (L6pez and Valdes, 2000). That is, a 10 percent increase of the land 5 If we use the 1998 Central Bank survey of income and expenditures, we obtain that agriculture is even less important as a source of income. For example, while the 1992 survey shows that about 55 percent of the rural households derive income from agriculture, the 1998 survey shows that only 34 percent of the rural households obtain part of their income from agriculture. It appears, however, that the 1998 survey is quite deficient in its coverage of agricultural income. For this reason the analysis in the text relies in the 1992 survey. 44 available to the typical small holder can increase total household income between 0.7 percent and 3 percent. A recent study by Kihmi (1999) shows estimates for the DR that fall within this range, with an income-land elasticity of 0.15. This implies that if land availability of the typical poor landed household, which owns less than I ha. of land is increased to 2 has., its per capita income could increase by 15 percent. Thus, land redistribution could play a sizable role in diminishing poverty among poor rural households. 17. Land titles. According to recent surveys (FEyD, 1992), a high proportion of the land is occupied without legal titles. Only about 40 percent of the land used by private farmers is legally titled. Among the beneficiaries of the land reform only 20 percent of them have received permanent legal titles. It is important to emphasize that though poor small holders occupy a significant part of the untitled land, relatively few big landlords occupy a large proportion of the untitled land. Much of the untitled land currently used by big farmers has been obtained via simple occupation of public lands and at times usurpation of land from poor rural communities and individual producers using legal and illegal means. 18. Lack of land titling may have two negative effects on the productivity of land and on other farmers' assets: (i) farmers may not be able to use their land for collateral purposes to obtain credit in the formal sector, thus forcing them to seek credit from informal sources at much higher rates or to go through the production process with little or no liquidity. In either case, one can expect that asset productivity will be affected and, consequently, that farm income will be negatively affected; (ii) lack of titles reduces tenure security increasing the risks of losing entitlement and being evicted. This reduces the incentives of farmers to invest in land-attached capital goods (such as tree planting, irrigation, infrastructure, etc.) because in case of eviction, such investment would be lost. This implies under investment in land-attached capital, reducing an important mechanism to increase the productivity of land and family labor. 19. Empirical analyses have shown that land titling induces higher income levels among farmers that satisfy certain conditions: A minimum farm size (about 5 has. of good soil quality), a minimum level of education, located near markets and roads (L6pez, 1998). That is, farmers that benefit out of titles are generally non-poor, mostly medium size and large farmers. The poor minifundistas gain very little if anything out of land titles. Legal titles do little to allow them access to credit and they usually do not have savings to invest in land-attached investment anyway. This evidence suggests that while land titling can be an effective instrument to increase agricultural productivity, the poor do not obtain direct benefits. Poor small farmers and landless may indirectly benefit if commercial farmers are able to increase labor hiring as a consequence of the increased productivity caused by land titles. 20. Social capital: Community organizations. Poor household producers are heavily affected not only by market failures, but also by political failures. Their enterprises are small and thus their scale of operations as sellers of goods, purchasers of inputs, size of loans demanded, etc., is also small. This significantly restricts their direct access to markets and facilitates their exploitation by intermediaries. Transaction costs of such small-scale operations become critically important. Transaction costs are usually fixed meaning that as the scale of operation is small, per unit transaction costs can be very large.6 This may force poor households to be self-sufficient in various inputs (including liquidity) and/or to be forced to pay large premiums on their purchases and to receive less reward for the outputs and services that they produce. Market failures affect poor households much more frequently than non-poor and the impact of market failures tend to 6 See de Janvry et al. (1991) and Sadoulet et al. (1996) for the pervasive effects of transaction costs among the rural poor. 45 be much more devastating for poor than non-poor households. That is, we have a vicious circle: Poverty causes disadvantages in markets that further reduce the income of the poor; because they are poor, they cannot overcome market obstacles that make them poorer. 21. Political failures are related to the fact that poor households, because of their small individual economic weights, have little political voice and are less able to influence government policies than non-poor individuals and firms. This at least in part explains why governments in Latin America and in the DR in particular spend so little in antipoverty programs, education and health care while at the same time spend millions of dollars in subsidizing medium and large farmers. The latter of which can cause serious economic inefficiency. The rural sector receives only a small share of total social spending and rural social programs are the least developed (Castafieda and Victoria), despite the fact that the number of poor and the depth of poverty is higher in rural than in urban areas. The lower visibility and lower political clout of the rural poor than the urban poor is likely to be an important factor in explaining this latter phenomenon. The key issue is that government policies are not driven by the quest for efficiency and fairness. They are instead driven by political-economy considerations where economic and political interest groups play a crucial role. Thus we have another vicious circle: The poor, especially the rural poor, have little political leverage because they are poor. This causes public resources to be deviated against programs that benefit the poor and thus made them poorer. 22. One important mechanism to overcome market and political failures affecting the poor is their organization into local, regional and national entities. Community organization is at an early stage in the DR, but incipient local organizations are beginning to emerge with dramatic effects on the livelihood of their members.' These organizations can play an important role in allowing the poor to set up their own economic priorities, reduce transaction costs by allowing them to form "packages" in the credit insurance input and output markets, significantly improving their terms of trade. At the same time these organizations can become an important vehicle to exert political power at local and even national levels to be able to obtain a greater share of public resources. 23. An important aspect is, however, that these organizations rarely developed without external efforts and/or immediate economic incentives. NGOs and international organizations can play a vital role in this respect. The allocation of resources to the poor based on a demand basis (rather than the conventional supply-dominated form) usually becomes a great incentive for the poor to organize themselves. A program sponsored by the World Bank in the Sierra of Peru (PRONAMACHS) is a good example: funds were made available to poor communities on a competitive grant or loans basis. Each community in the Peruvian Sierra presents a project for what they want to achieve, including items such as improving social infrastructure, local roads, tree planting, small irrigation, technical assistance, etc. The communities need to contribute 100 percent of the non-specialized labor that the project requires and those that obtain the grants or loans have to do their own contracting with the private sector. It appears that as a result of this program, there has been a significant revival of community organizations in the Peruvian Sierra. To a large extent, the basic principle on which the organization of Foundation for Development of San Jose de Ocoa, directed by Father Quinn acts is similar. There is an association of communities represented in a council. The Father and the council members obtain financial and physical resources from international agencies, NGO's and governments. These resources are allocated to specific projects that the communities represented in the present council. 7 The experience of church organization in various poor rural areas is especially relevant in this respect. 46 24. Human capital. The level of schooling of the rural population in DR is extremely low. According to the 1998 survey (Central Bank), 25 percent of the rural household heads have no schooling at all and 62 percent have I to 6 years of schooling. That is, 87 percent of the rural household heads have no secondary education. Among the rural poor (e.g., among the lowest 2 quintiles) more than 88 percent of the adult population have less than 6 years of schooling. Thus, the majority of the rural population and almost all the rural poor are unskilled workers. That is, they are forced to directly compete with the unskilled immigrants from Haiti. This explains in part why economic growth has apparently had little impact on rural poverty over the last few years. 25. Expanding the skills of the rural poor is essential to increase their wages, particularly in view of the fact that they face great competition from immigrant Haitian workers that are unskilled. As indicated before, increased demand for unskilled workers is not likely to raise unskilled wages or even employment among local workers as the supply of unskilled workers can be regarded as almost infinitely elastic. The problem is, however, that according to several studies the impact of education in rural income is quite small (L6pez and Valdes, 2000). For the DR, the study by Kihmi (1999) found that increased schooling from 1 to 8 years has a modest effect on income among rural households while any further expansion of schooling has an insignificant effect on rural household income. In contrast, the impact of education in urban areas is much stronger, highly significant and becoming on the margin larger for post secondary education. It appears that education has little value on farming and some modest value in non- farm rural activities (L6pez and Valdes, 2000). A reason for this might be that rural activities, in contrast with the urban activities, are not particularly intensive in (and demanding of) high skills. The main value of schooling in rural areas is to facilitate migration to urban areas where the returns to education can be much larger. 26. Financial capital: Access to credit. Very few producers in the DR have access to formal credit. According to the 1992 survey, less than 20 percent of producers that own land received any credit. Most of those that received credit were medium- and large-size farmers. In fact, the average farm size of those that received credit either from public or private sources was about 8 has., while those that did not have any credit had an average of only 2.4 has. per family. About 25 percent of the farmers that reported having received credit in the FEyD survey had access to public credit (from Banco Agricola). That is, public credit reached only about 5 percent of all households in the survey that own land. Interestingly, those that received public credit were on average larger farmers than those that obtained credit in the private sector: The average farm size of those reporting receiving public credit was 8.6 has compared to 7.5 has of those that received credit from the private sector! 27. Among the rural non-farm micro enterprises, the proportion that receive credit is approximately the same as that of farmers, 20 percent (Fondomicro). According to Fondomicro, enterprises have even less access to credit from public sources than farmers; less than 3 percent of them received credit from public sources. Also as with farmers, 60 percent of the non-farm micro enterprises have no legal title of the premises of the enterprise. Thus, lack of credit appears to be a major constraint affecting poor farmers and non-farm micro enterprises that prevent their capitalization, increased employment and ultimately to alleviate their poverty. 28. Insurance. Households in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes. Recent hurricanes such as David in 1978 and especially Georges in 1998 have caused massive damages to crops, livestock and housing. There is no documentation of the impact of the latest hurricane on rural poverty. However, given the extent of the damage, and the almost total absence of insurance, its impact on the depth and scope of rural poverty must be substantial. Due to significant cost to insurance companies associated with processing insurance contracts, and other 47 transaction costs, it is unlikely that many among the rural poor could have access to private crop and housing insurance. These high fixed costs tend to discourage private insurers from becoming involved with the usually small insurance contracts that the poor require.8 Moreover, currently the public sector does not provide any sort of insurance availability despite the fact that a rural insurance market is clearly missing. A less ambitious goal could be to develop a minimum safety net against major hurricanes that could help facing at least part of the major effects of hurricanes on housing of the poor and part of rural infrastructure. 29. One possibility is to establish an autonomous hurricane insurance fund. This fund would be financed out of a special levy on agricultural commodities that are currently most protected. This insurance fund would be administered independently from the central government by an agency that would be jointly administered by farmers, peasants, other rural organizations, and government. The idea would be to use the accumulated fund in case of major hurricanes mostly to rebuild rural housing, rural basic infrastructure and productive facilities. This fund would entail to some extent a redistribution of income from mostly large producers that benefits from protected crops to the poor. If the levy is charged per unit of sales (rather than produced) of protected crops this redistributive purpose would be more pronounced by excluding crops produced for subsistence. E. Government Intervention and Market Failures E.1. Land Reform 30. About 150,000 has. of land have been redistributed by the land reform, benefiting approximately 100,000 families. The land redistribution process has slowed recently. For the year 2000, it is estimated that less than 6,000 has. of land will be redistributed to approximately 3,000 families. Land reform officers estimate that the land reform process can be closed within the next five years. 31. There are two main sources of land for redistribution: (i) public lands, and (ii) lands occupied by large producers that do not have legal titles. How much land is still in the hands of the state is not clear. Estimates vary between 80,000 and 200,000 has. of these lands is already leased to the companies that acquired the sugar interests and about 10,000 has. of irrigated, high quality public lands are currently used in the production of banana and cotton. These lands are located in areas where there is widespread and extreme levels of poverty near the border with Haiti. The three companies that benefited from the privatization of the sugar industry are paying apparently a very low fee for the lease of the lands. It is estimated that about 80,000 has. of public lands are located in areas that could be easily incorporated into the land reform. These lands include soils of moderate to good quality and are located in areas where there is a high concentration of peasants that are either landless or near so. 32. Part of the lands currently occupied by large producers can also continue to feed the land redistribution process. There are compelling reasons to use some of these lands to feed the land reform: (1) The tremendous concentration of the land in the hands of very few producers; (2) more importantly, the fact that many of these lands have been acquired through obscure means and have indeed been usurped from the public sector or from poor peasant communities. A significant part of land in the hands of some of the large producers do not have legal titles and, hence, this could facilitate negotiations for surrendering a portion of these lands in exchange for a a Additionally, problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are more difficult to mitigate when insurers have to deal with a large number of small contracts compared to the case of few large contracts. The problems faced by farmers to get insurance against big risks are well known (Stiglitz, 1987). 48 legal recognition of ownership of those that are not surrendered; (3) a large part of the lands used by large producers is freely irrigated thanks to major public investments. In the past, producers have accepted supplying part of their lands to the land reform in exchange for permanent water rights; (4) finally, according to the existing law, the maximum amount of land allowed per person is 66 has. There are many producers that occupy land areas that are 10 or 20 times greater than the maximum allowed by the law. 33. It is estimated that about 200 families control about 600,000 has. of land and about 50 percent of all the arable land of the country. This extreme concentration could considerably facilitate a negotiation process between the land reform agency, peasants associations and the landlord families. A transfer of a significant portion of these lands either directly from landlords to peasants, or through the existing land reformn mechanisms in exchange for permanent legal land and water right titles for the lands remaining in the hands of the large producers could be possible. That is why the land titling project under preparation needs to be closely integrated with the land reform process. Perhaps another 60-80,000 has. of arable land could be incorporated to the land reform through these means. 34. Hence, the land reform process can be completed within the next 5-6 years with a redistribution of 140-160,000 has thus doubling the total land so far redistributed. This could benefit another 80,000 peasant families or a total population of nearly 400,000 peoples (about 15 percent of the total rural population and nearly half of the rural poor). 35. Access to land can play a vital role in reducing poverty among the peasants that receive land. However, most of the beneficiaries of the land reform so far have remained in conditions of poverty. The main reason is the absence of complementary support in terms of credit, technical assistance, basic infrastructure and lack of tenure security affecting the beneficiaries of the land reform. Next, we look at these issues as they have affected poor peasants in general including the land reform beneficiaries. E.2. Land and OtherAssets: Titling Policies 36. According to recent surveys, less than 40 percent of the agricultural land has legal titles. The low rate of legalized titles has prompted the government, with the support of the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB)- Interamerican Agency for Development (IAD), to promote a rather massive titling project that is currently under study. It is estimated that the cost of a comprehensive land titling project could reach US$20 million. Right now, the demand for land titles is not very high due in large part to the small availability of credit for the rural sector and because of the high costs and fees involved in acquiring land titles. The few producers that potentially have access to credit are sufficiently rich to use other assets as collateral. As discussed before, evidence from other countries (L6pez, 1998) shows that for small producers, it is unlikely that obtaining legal titles will make much of a difference. 37. A titling project could still have beneficial effects by activating the land markets and by increasing incentives to medium and large farmers to increase land-attached investments that greater tenure security may induce. However, as shown before, most of these benefits will accrue to non-poor farmers. Poor peasants may only indirectly benefit out of the increased employment and economic efficiency that increased investments and a more fluid land market may bring about. 38. Apart from not directly benefiting poor peasants, a massive titling process also has other risks. Such a major investment funded with public monies may become an instrument to legalize and legitimize the appropriation of large amounts of public and communal land by a handful of 49 large producers. A poorly designed titling process could thus become an obstacle to further redistribution of land from large landlords to peasants. This is particularly serious given the fact that a significant part of the land controlled by the richest agrarian families was in part obtained through illicit means. For this reason it is very important that the process of titling be closely synchronized with that of land reform. Legalizing ownership of the vast amounts of land controlled by large producers still not subject to titles should be an opportunity for negotiating transfers of part of these lands to the land reform. Additionally, commercial fanners should fully pay for the cost of titling their lands. 39. The lack of titles is a problem and affects not only the farming sector, but also the rural non-farm enterprises. In 1998 less than 40 percent of the rural non-farm microenterprises had legal titles on the premises where the firm operates. Thus, given the importance of this sector in the rural economy as a source of income and employment for the rural population, it is important to extend the titling process beyond farmers and to cover microenterprises in rural areas. E.3. Rural Credit Policies 40. The main instrument to affect rural credit used by the government is the provision of subsidized credit. Less than 5 percent of the farmers surveyed (FEyD) had access to subsidized credit from the state bank Banco Agricola de la Repzublica Dominicana (BARD). Most of those that were able to obtain credit were not small farmers. The average land area of those that received credit was more than 8 has., while the average farm size in the sample was 2.4 has. 41. The credit situation of the non-farm rural sector is only slightly better. According to recent estimates out of a total of 128,000 rural non-farm microenterprises, less than 21,000 had access to credit (Fondomicro, 1998). Less than 4,000 (about 3 percent) microenterprises received any form of public credit. Thus, the problem of lack of credit affects not only poor farmers but also, and with about the same intensity, poor non-farm peoples working in microenterprises. Further, it appears that the priorities of the public sector credit programs are heavily biased towards the farm sector, particularly medium size farmers. 42. Practically all the public (subsidized) rural credit is directed to medium and large sized farmers and also to some large agroprocessors. According to data provided by BARD (by far the main supplier of public credit to the rural sector), the total value of credit in the year 1999 was about US$150 million. Of this, about US$100 million was directed to farmers holding between 6.5 has. and 16 has. That is, two thirds of the total subsidized credit from BARD benefited medium size farmers, not small farmers. Only about US$30 million in subsidized credit was directed to farmers owing less than I ha. of land; that is, only 20 percent of the credit from BARD was directed to really poor farmers. Out of an estimated 80,000 peasants owning less than I ha. each, less than 3,000 received the benefits of publicly subsidized credit. Thus, most of the public subsidized credit is allocated to non-poor farmers while only a small fraction of the poor peasants receive any public credit support at all. 43. The current annual rate of interest charged for public credit is 18 percent, about 6-8 percentage points below commercial rates. Public credit is quite substantial and could potentially play a significant role in reducing rural poverty if it were truly directed to small farmers. It is estimated that there are about 100,000 poor farmers (with which their families comprise about 500,000 people or about 55 percent of the rural poor) that own less than 2.5 has. This means that if directed exclusively to small farmers, the existing volume of subsidized public credit could reach 50 percent of the poor farmers with average loans of approximately US$3,000. 50 44. Is public intervention in the rural credit market justified? The main potential justification lies in possible market failures. One may argue that the fact that so few farmers and rural microenterprises receive any credit might be an indication of the existence of market failure. It is possible that a source of market failure could be the lack of legal titles affecting farmers' land and microenterprises' assets. In this case, the desirable intervention would be to promote the provision of legal titles to land and assets owned by farmers and rural businesses. It is possible, however, that credit market imperfections originate in other factors as well, and affect poor farmers and small rural enterprises considerably. 45. As discussed earlier, studies elsewhere have concluded that access to credit by poor farmers is affected very little by whether or not they have land titles. The factors limiting their access to credit are more related to greater perceived risks by financial institutions of their economic activities and the existence of relatively large fixed costs (in relation to loan size) for financial institutions associated with loan processing. Additionally, there might be large political costs as well as image problems for financial institutions that enforce collateral clauses in case of default by poor farmers and small non-farm entrepreneurs. Thus, even if poor farmers and micro enterprises do have legal titles, their land and assets may not be easily accepted as collateral by financial institutions. There is, therefore, an apparent justification for a degree of intervention in the credit market but directed exclusively to poor farmers and small enterprises owned by the poor. Additionally, though the above would justify interventions that increase access to credit by the poor, the case for direct interest rate subsidies is not clear at all. Public intervention should be directed toward improving the efficiency of the poor in their links with the financial sector. The use of public credit as a social instrument through subsidies has been shown repeatedly to be ineffective and wasteful. Subsidized credit rarely reaches the poor. The recent experience of DR with public subsidized credit does not appear to be an exception. 46. The fact that there is a need for intervention does not mean that the public sector should directly undertake such an endeavor. In fact, there are substantial political risks associated with public sector inefficiency, yielding to political interests and corruption which suggest that a rural credit program should rely in strengthening financial intermediaries specialized in microfinance for the poor, including certain NGOs. The increased financial efficiency that this would induce could significantly increase the income of poor rural households by reducing the liquidity constraints that they face. E.4. Privatization of the Sugar Industry 47. The government has recently privatized the sugar industry. The government gave four foreign and Dominican firms a controlling interest of the industry including factories and land. The government apparently received no financial revenues for the transfer but retained a minority interest in the industry. Moreover, the state sugar land was leased for 30 years to these firms for a very small rent. The main benefit to the state of the operation is that it will save large sums of money (up to US$40 million in certain years) that were used to maintain the industry in operation. It is expected that the foreign firms will capitalize the industry. As part of cost saving measures, it is also expected that the new firms will dramatically cut back production. According to estimates by the JAD, sugarcane production can be reduced by 50 percent. 48. From the point of view of rural poverty, there are two aspects of the privatization of the sugar sector that are important: (i) the leasing of the state sugar lands and; (ii) the production and employment cut backs as part of cost reduction measures to generate profits. The first measure signified that fewer state lands are going to be available for distribution to sugar cane peasants. This is particularly worrisome because in most sugar production areas there is a high concentration of an extremely poor population that could have benefited significantly by 51 increasing their access to land. Moreover, the commercial sugar cane producers have, with the complicity of public officials, exploited poor Haitian workers and even those of Haitian descent born in the DR. The geographic mobility of Haitians and their descendents has been restricted so that their dependence on the sugarcane employers is extreme. It is possible that the leasing of state lands could worsen the conditions of sugar workers, especially Haitians. 49. The expected dramatic reduction of sugar production will make the situation of sugar workers even more precarious. It is estimated that employment in the industry is going to be reduced by 40-60 percent within the next 2 years. Small farmers producing sugar cane will be dramatically affected. It is expected that 10,000 small farmers will have to stop producing sugar cane. As a result, it is essential to find alternative uses for these lands. 50. The sugar areas, particularly the Bateyes, are the poorest in the country. Moreover, government social services of any type are practically non-existent and the conditions of housing are lacking tremendously. Also, this is one of the areas with the least availability of schools and medical facilities. As indicated above, the direct consequences of the privatization of the industry are likely to worsen the situation of some 300,000 people in these areas because sources of employment are going to be dramatically reduced. Of course the main benefit of privatization is going to be the large government savings by eliminating the need for subsidies to the industry. An important question is whether part of these savings is going to be used to assist the poor in the sugar industry that will suffer the brunt of the social costs of privatization. Clearly, it is advisable to invest part of these resources in improving social services in the area and in assisting farmers to find alternative uses for the sugarcane lands.9 Additionally, the government could step up efforts to prevent illegal acts against Haitians and their descendants. The government could also exert pressure on the transnational firms that now control the industry and compel them to ameliorate the exploitative conditions of the work force. The fact that these companies are large and some of them owned by developed country investors may facilitate using denunciation as an instrument to improve working conditions. E.5. Other Public Interventions in Agricalture 51. Apart from the provision of credit, the government heavily supports certain areas of agricultural production. One of the most costly is the price support scheme that benefit producers of rice, poultry, dairy, beans, corn, onions and garlic. The Instituto Nacional de Estabilizaci6n de Precios (INESPRE) engages heavily in supporting agricultural market prices through purchases and import controls. In 1997, public expenditures in agriculture were more than 1 percent of GDP and about 9 percent of the agricultural GDP. Of this, it is estimated that about 40 percent (that is, 0.4 percent of GDP) is devoted to support the prices of the above commodities. That is, the government spends more than US$60 million per annum in supporting the prices of agricultural commodities (this does not include the indirect costs due to the protectionist trade policies that complement direct price supports). Needless to say, the vast majority of these expenditures benefit large producers and only a very small part of them goes to poor producers. 52. Apart from price interventions that demand high financial costs, the government provides a number of services to producers in areas that the private sector could easily provide. The government owns a large number of tractors and other agricultural machinery that is used to provide subsidized services to producers for land preparation. The approximately 300 tractors and other equipment owned by the state are estimated to be worth about US$18 million. 9 These measures would mostly compensate part of the income losses in the sugar producing areas due to the cut backs in sugar production. Therefore, one may not expect increased immigration from Haiti as a consequence of such measures. 52 Additionally, the government sells subsidized seeds to farmers. The financial operation of these services is estimated to cost the state more than US$6 million annually. There is no justification for intervention in areas where there is no reason to expect market failure. Indeed government involvement in these activities crowds out the private sector with no benefits for the poor. 53. The meager attention to agricultural research, extension and related activities (e.g., animal and crop sanitary activities) contrast with the large expenditures in the activities mentioned above. In fact, the total expenditures in agricultural research, extension and animal and crop sanitary protection reaches less than 0.025 percent of GDP and about 0.2 percent of agriculture GDP. That is, less than US$5 million per annum are devoted to these important programs. This certainly reflects a serious problem of resource allocation: large sums of resources are directed to transfers, mostly to large producers, and to the provision of services that crowd-out the private sector while little is devoted to the provision of services such as agricultural research and extension where there may be serious limitations in the market sector to provide them. E. 6. Investments in Education 54. The government has not made education a priority vis-a-vis other activities. This is reflected in the fact that total public expenditures in education is extremely low by international standards, reaching only 2.6 percent of GDP in 1999. This is lower than in most countries in Latin America.'0 By contrast, expenditures in directly productive sectors including agriculture, energy, manufacturing, etc., reaches 3.4 percent of GDP; one of the highest in Latin America. The problem is not only one of low public allocation to education, but it also entails a biased allocation of the education budget itself. In 1999, about 13.5 percent of the budget was allocated to university education while about 8.4 percent was allocated to secondary education. The cost per student attending a university was US$502 compared with US$170 and US$115 spent per student in high and primary school, respectively (World Bank, 2000). The high levels of university expenditure constitute a bias against the poor and against the rural sector. By contrast, the share of secondary education expenditures is extremely low compared to other Latin American countries where it reaches 22 percent. 55. The low public allocations to education has been in large part responsible for the low schooling attendance, especially to secondary education and low quality of education. This situation has caused a low level of skills in the labor force that are forced to compete with unskilled Haitian labor. This massive lack of skills is an important factor that contributes to a slow impact of growth and also on poverty reduction. This is reflected in education indicators, as well. The country's rate of illiteracy (for population age 15 and above) was 17 percent in 1998, and less than 7.3 percent of the population aged 20 and above has completed secondary education. Table 2 compares education attainment in the rural sector vis-a-vis the country as a whole. The education indicators in rural areas are much worse than in the country overall. Illiteracy in rural areas is almost twice the national level and the proportion of the population that completed secondary school is only 4 percent in rural areas compared to 7 percent in the entire country. All education indicators are much worse among the poorer segments of the population both in urban and rural areas. 10 The region's average is 3.8 percent of GDP. 53 Table 2: Education Attainment: National versus Rural Sectors (population age 20 and above, except illiteracy that is 15 and above) Indicator National Rural Illiteracy 17 percent 30 percent Some secondary education 18 percent 10 percent Completed secondary educationor equivalent 7 percent 4 percent vocational training Source: Banco Central, ENGIH, 1997-98. 56. The low levels of completion of secondary education is particularly worrisome given the fact that recent analyses for the DR have shown that education only provides significant values for those completing high school and college (World Bank). For people that complete high school, the rates of return on education have been estimated to be 7.5 percent. For people completing college it is estimated at 29.9 percent in 1998 (Tables A. 1 and A.2). 57. Three major factors seem to play a vital role in affecting levels of educational attainment: Family income, family educational background, and geographic location. This result has been found in many countries around the world and in the DR as well (see Table A.3). The high income effect on education demand suggests that demand factors play a critical role in educational achievement: The poor cannot afford to send their children to school especially once they reach an age that allow them to contribute to their family's income. Similarly, the uneducated poor do not appreciate the value of educating their children and thus are reluctant to send them to school even if the returns on education are very high. These can be regarded as parent-children externalities in the sense that parents who decide on their children's schooling attendance tend to undervalue the future returns of schooling for their children compared to the current costs of education (including, of course, their opportunity costs as contributor to current family income). 58. The strong effect of geographical location factors suggests, however, that apart from demand factors, there may also exist constraints on the supply of education. After controlling for other factors, families living in rural areas are dramatically less likely to send their children to school than those who live in non-rural contexts (Table A.3). It is possible that this is due to the more reduced availability of schools in rural areas given the natural geographic dispersion of the rural population. 59. The implication is that an increased public sector allocation to education should emphasize programs that increase the demand for education and at the same time address bottlenecks in the provision of schools in certain areas. Increasing demand for schooling needs to deal with the parent-children externalities. Parents should be allowed to benefit more from their children attending schools. School feeding programs are a step in that direction. In other countries (e.g., Brazil, Chile), social payments to parents having children in school age are made conditional on their children attending school. Additionally, improving the quality of teachers and school facilities constitute another factor that increases the demand for education. F. Policies 60. To summarize, I provide a list of policy options that follow from the previous analysis. It is clear, however, that the policy environment is endogenous, that is in large part the result of interplay of political and economic interest groups. The existing economic priorities and policies are clearly biased against the poor, especially the rural poor, which are the least visible, and those with the least political clout. Policies have favored large interest groups such as medium and large size farmers, large corporations, etc. It appears that the state in the DR has been particularly 54 vulnerable to economic pressure groups in the design of policies. Additionally, the implementation of the few policies and programs that could favor the poor has been generally inefficient. Thus, I view these policy recommendations, if adopted by the Bank, as part of the political game where the Bank could use its clout to align itself with domestic forces in favor of changes such as the ones proposed. Additionally, a key component of the agenda for the Bank, NGOs and other international sources is to support the emergence of new organizations of the poor and to continue strengthening existing ones as a means to increase the political leverage of the poor. A major implication of recognizing the endogenous nature of policy design is that paying lip service to desirable policies is not enough. Measures to increase the political power of the poor are essential. Without this, real change in the anti-poor policy biases is unlikely to take place. 61. Given that the government's policy priorities are likely to change only very gradually and given the lack of efficiency of most govemment programs that purport to benefit the poor, a general recommendation is that an antipoverty program should rely as little as possible on the government and that international assistance should be oriented as much as possible to local organizations of the poor. F.1. Specific Policy Recommendations (i) Land redistribution. Given the extreme concentration of agricultural land in the DR, significantly reducing rural poverty over a reasonably short period is virtually impossible without additional land redistribution. The large land areas still in public hands could be redistributed to small peasants and landless workers. Additionally, part of lands currently occupied by large producers could also be redistributed. Lands currently used by large landlords is of recent occupation and many large producers are benefiting from irrigation projects financed by public resources could facilitate agreements of land transfers in exchange for permanent land and water right titles. It is estimated that about 160,000 hectares of public and private lands could be redistributed benefiting up to 100,000 peasants. (ii) Land titling. It is essential to clear the legal status of some 40 percent of private lands that still do not have titles. However, it is also important to synchronize the process of land titling with land redistribution. This could allow the transfer of vast amounts of land from a few landlords to peasants and thus to reduce the enormous inequity in land access. At the same time, legal recognition of land rights could help to revitalize the land market and also help to reduce credit market imperfections. Although these measures are not likely to have a direct impact on poor peasants, they could indirectly benefit them because improvements in the rural market could increase rural employment. (iii) Legal titles to small non-farm enterprises' assets. Legal recognition of asset ownership for the vast number of microenterprises and land titling are of equal importance. Such a provision could facilitate their access to credit and even more importantly, promote the development of trade in assets of microenterprises that could decrease the employment effect of high turnover from which microenterprises suffer. (iv) Insurance against natural disasters. One possibility is to establish an autonomous hurricane insurance fund. This fund would be financed out of a special levy on agricultural commodities that are currently most protected. This insurance fund would be managed independently for the central government by an agency that would be jointly administered by farmers, peasants, other rural organizations, and government. The idea would be to use the accumulated fund in case of major hurricanes mostly to rebuild rural housing, rural basic infrastructure and productive facilities. This fund would entail to some extent a redistribution of 55 income from mostly large producers that benefit from protected crops to the poor. If the levy is charged per unit of sales (rather than produced) of protected crops, this redistributive measure would be even more pronounced by excluding crops produced for subsistence. (v) Rural credit. Public subsidized credit is not making a significant contribution to alleviate rural poverty. Most of the credit subsidies do not benefit poor farmers. The existence of a subsidy component in public credit implies that significant rents are up for grab. This causes excess demand for credit largely originated in non-poor farmers that could have access (albeit at a higher cost) to commercial credit. This causes political pressures from the non-poor to pocket such subsidies. This also makes the public credit institutions vulnerable to corruption. Though credit market failures do exist, it is not appropriate to use subsidized public credit as a mechanism to deal with such failures. It appears that the main source of market failure is the fact that poor farmers are denied access to formal credit. The subsidy component of public credit should be eliminated and the emphasis should shift to assure adequate supply of unsubsidized credit to the poor. The elimination of subsidies would increase the lending capacity of the BARD and at the same time wipe out excess demand for public credit from the non-poor that have access to commercial sources. This will facilitate a reallocation of an increased volume of public credit to the real poor. With the current resources used to provide public credit, it would be possible to reach 50,000 poor farmers with loans of the order of up to US$3,000 per producer. That is, a well-targeted unsubsidized public credit could benefit up to one half of all poor farmers. (vi) Elimination of price supports. The government can save millions of dollars if they stop intervening in agricultural price "stabilization" schemes. Price supports generally benefit large producers and have little impact on the poor. (vii) Stop intervening in markets that do not suffer failures. The provision by the public sector of agricultural mechanization services, seeds and other services is not justified. These are highly expensive activities that crow out private providers and reduce efficiency. Significant budgetary savings can be achieved by privatizing these activities. (viii) Reallocation of public expenditures. By implementing recommendations (iv) to (vi) above, it is estimated that the government could save about US$50 million per annum. Additionally, privatization of other state industries in the rural sector, most prominently the sugar industry, is expected to allow the government to save another US$40-50 million annually. Part of these resources should be devoted to expand social programs and education in rural areas. In particular, these resources should be devoted to dramatically increase the currently limited rural coverage of the school feeding programs. Additionally, a significant expansion of preschool programs could also be emphasized. Direct subsidies to poor rural families on the basis of school attendance by their children could be provided as a way to reduce school dropouts, a major problem affecting the children of the poor. (ix) Promoting social capital. As was indicated before, there is a dramatic dearth of social and productive services (including technical assistance) to poor rural producers including both agricultural and non-agricultural producers. At the same time, there is little hope that the government can effectively implement certain programs to ameliorate this situation. One alternative is the promotion of local social organizations already beginning to develop in rural areas. One way of promoting them is to use the competitive grant approach discussed above. This is a way of reaching communities directly that could lead to allocations of resources based on the demand by local communities. The development of rural social capital of the poor is likely to alleviate market failures affecting the poor and also strengthen their political voice. 56 BIBLIOGRAPHY Castafieda, T. and E. Victoria. 2000. "Dominican Republic: Managing Social Risks," World Bank, Santo Domingo, DR. De Janvry, A., M. Fafehamps and E. Sadoulet. 1991. "Peasant Household Behavior with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained". The Economic Journal, 101: 1400-17. Fondomicro. Microempresas, Globalizaci6n y Servicios Financieros. 1998-1999. Santo Domingo, DR. Kimhi, A. 1999. "The Determinants of Farm Income in Dominican Republic," unpublished, World Bank. L6pez, R. and A. Valdes, 2000. Rural Poverty in Latin America: Analytics. New Empirical Evidence and Policy. MacMillan Press Ltd. (London) and St. Martin's Press (New York). L6pez, R. 1998. "Land Titles and Farm Productivity in Honduras," Dept. of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland at College Park. Sadoulet, E., A. de Janvry and C. Benjamin, 1996. "Household Behavior with Imperfect Labor Markets," Dept. of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Stiglitz, J. 1987. "Some Theoretical Aspects of Agricultural Policies," The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 43-60. 57 Annex 1: Regression Tables Table A.1. Effect of Education on Wage Rate Dependent variable is logarithm of wages (LWAGE) Explanatory Variable 1992 1998 Constant 6.41 9.02 (19.40) (56.88) Primary incomplete 0.20 (3.20) Primary complete 0.26 0.47 (2.59) (5.70) Secondary incomplete 0.43 (5.86) Secondary complete 0.50 0.66 (4.35) (8.34) College incomplete 0.82 (9.62) College complete 1.28 1.57 (9.042 (19.98 Post college 1.96 (12.52) Age 0.06 (8.01) Age squared -0.001 (-9.00) Dumzone (urban = 1) 0.22 ___ ___ __ ___ __ ___ ___ __ ___ _ _ = 0 1(6.02) R2= 0. I R =0.39 F= 18.10 F=95.51 N = 725 N =1812 / The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. Source: World Bank, 2000. Table A.2.: Annual Rates of Return to Education, 1992 and 1998 (percent) 1992 1998 Primary complete 3.6 10.0 Secondary complete 5.6 5.5 University complete 20.4 24.0 Source: World Bank, 2000. 58 Table A.3.: Determinants of Education Attainment in the DR, 1992 Ordered Probit regression' Parameters Estimate t-value Female 0.371 3.979 Family size -0.057 -3.121 Birth order 0.165 3.801 Father with primary schooling 0.419 2.919 Father with intermediate schooling 0.666 2.989 Father with secondary schooling 0.944 2.671 Father with higher schooling 1.187 3.501 Mother with primary schooling 0.337 2.771 Mother with intermediate schooling 1.068 5.701 Mother with secondary schooling 0.938 4.326 Mother with higher schooling 1.075 2.393 Rural -0.400 -3.563 Income per capita 0.177 3.781 Has land -0.257 -1.507 Has title to some of the land -0.270 -1.497 Has income from remittances from outside the DR 0.002 0.018 Santo Domingo area 0.246 2.144 Number of observations 692 Source: World Bank estimates based on FEyD survey (1992). 59 The Effect of Macroeconomic Policies on Rural Poverty in the Dominican Republic Maurice Schiff' A. Introduction The topic of this chapter is the analysis of the effect of macroeconomic and trade policies on rural poverty. A number of points should be made at the outset, as these will affect the analysis. 1. First, there are three ways of reducing poverty. The first is to raise the return on the assets that the poor possess; the second is to increase the quality of these assets; and the third is to increase their quantity. The latter entails the provision of additional assets, including education, health, electricity, transport, infrastructure, and more. As will become clear later in the report, macroeconomic and trade policies are unlikely to significantly raise the return on the assets of unskilled labor, and thus are unlikely to have a significant impact in reducing rural poverty. Reducing poverty will thus require investing real resources in the rural poor in order to increase the quantity and/or quality of the assets they possess. However, this is easier said than done. For various reasons, including a culture of private appropriation of public goods, the Dominican Republic (DR) has--compared to the rest of Latin America--a low quantity and quality of public services, especially in rural areas. 2. Second, in a small country such as the DR, rural poverty is not independent of urban poverty. This need not be the case in large countries where information and transportation costs are large, but for small countries such as the DR, the rural and urban unskilled labor markets are likely to be well integrated. Given such labor market integration, rural and urban poverty must be examined jointly. 3. Third, migration plays a fundamental role in the Dominican economy. There are three types of migration flows. First, there is Haitian immigration to the DR, essentially to the agricultural sectors such as sugar, coffee, cocoa and rice, but increasingly also to urban areas to work in construction and micro-enterprises ("comercio"). These immigration flows affect the standard of living of Dominicans, especially the poorest ones, and affect the impact of macroeconomic and trade policies. Second, there is rural-urban migration in the DR. As mentioned above, the integration of rural and urban labor markets through internal migration-- especially of Dominicans, though also of Haitians despite attempts to control it (see Section D)-- implies that both labor markets must be examined together. Third, Dominicans emigrate to the U.S. mainland (e.g., New York), Puerto Rico, and Europe. As is true for other developing countries, these migrants tend to be more skilled. They send remittances, thereby affecting the real exchange rate. 4. Fourth, given the Haitian immigration flows (and the fact that these are typically directed to the rural areas), how should one define the rural poor or the poor in general in the DR? Should it include only the Dominicans? Should it also include the 'Dominico-Haitianos' or children of Haitian immigrants who--according to the Constitution--are Dominican because they were born in the DR (though this may not be recognized in reality)? Or should it include all the poor, whether in the country legally or not? These are standard questions in studies of migration where welfare analysis starts by defining whether migrants should be thought of as belonging to the country of origin, the country of destination or as a separate group? This is not just an analytical issue but is an important policy question that confronts all governments in destination countries. l This paper was prepared by Maurice Schiff (DECRG, World Bank), with the assistance of Edgar Victoria Yeb (World Bank, LCCDO). Helpful discussions were made with Philippe Auffret, Task Manager (World Bank, LCCDO). 61 Decisions on the inclusion or exclusion of migrants in the system of distribution of social rights and entitlements typically reflect deeply held views on national and cultural identity (Rosenhek 1999). I plan to present the analysis first by excluding the Haitian immigrants and then by including them. 5. Fifth, a more general question is not just whether the welfare of the poor immigrants should be taken into account, but whether the welfare of the Haitian poor in general should be included? Of course, the government of the DR is not expected to follow policies in order to reduce poverty in Haiti. On the other hand, the World Bank is concerned with poverty in general and should prefer a policy in the DR if it also helps reduce poverty in Haiti (because of the migration link).2 Similarly, poverty in the DR may be helped by poverty-reducing policies in Haiti. Given these spillover effects, cooperative policies are likely to result in superior outcomes. This is where the World Bank could play an important role. 6. Note that information on immigrants is scarce since most are illegal. Consequently, the analysis of the effects of immigration will be qualitative. 7. The report is organized as follows. Section B provides some information on the agricultural sector and on the rural poor. Section C examines the effect of macroeconomic and trade policies on the various sectors and on poverty. Section D examines the implications of Haitian immigration for the analysis of poverty. Section E suggests ways to reduce poverty in the DR, and Section F examines the issue of poverty in Hispaniola. Section G provides policy recommendations. B. Agriculture and Rural Poverty 8. According to the DR Poverty Report (World Bank, 2000c), poverty was 28.6 percent in 1998, with the rate being 20.5 percent in urban areas, and twice as high in rural areas (42.1 percent). For extreme poverty, the level was 5.1 percent for the country, 2.7 percent for rest of urban areas and more than 3 times higher for rural areas (9.0 percent). Thus, the poverty gap between rural and urban is very large, and is even larger for extreme poverty. 9. The study also provides information on poverty by educational level. Classified by educational level, the poverty shares were 35.1 percent for people with no education, 16.2 percent for those with primary education, 8.7 percent for secondary education and 1.9 percent for higher education. Also, the share of population with primary education or less was 85.0 percent for the bottom two quintiles, 66.0 percent for the 4th quintile and 42.0 percent for the top one. For university education, the shares were 1.7 percent for the bottom two quintiles, 10.9 percent for the 4th quintile and 34.3 percent for the top one. Thus, there is obviously a strong connection between education and income, including for primary education. Thus, even at the primary level, universal education does not hold. And the rural poor have even less access to education and other public goods and services. 10. With respect to agricultural production, the UNDP calculated an index of food production, with base 100 in 1980. In 1996, the DR had a production index of 91, while other countries in the same human development category averaged 169 and the world averaged 132. Most Latin 2 World Bank has been sponsoring roundtables, in coordination with the Pontificia Universidad Catolica Madre y Maestra (PUCMM), which participate actively the civil society, and the political parties. In these roundtables, an important topic is the frontier development and the relations between the countries. 62 American countries were successful in raising per capita food production over time, the exceptions being--in addition to the DR--Cuba and Haiti. 11. Compared to 1960, per capita agricultural output fell for most product categories, the main exceptions being vegetables and poultry, both of which invested in new technologies and in human capital. Some sectors experienced dramatic declines, such as oil seeds (89.6 percent decline) and export crops (66.6 percent), due in part to a lack of agricultural research and extension, low credit availability and high interest rates. On the other hand, cereals (rice) increased 26.7 percent and vegetables 663.9 percent. Vegetables is a sector where capital- intensive and human-capital-intensive technology dominates. Conversely, rice producers have a strong political weight, which makes them a highly protected sector. And the poultry sector has increased per capita by 112.8 percent from 1960 to 1988 by introducing modem capital-intensive technology. 12. The high interest rate policy (discussed in Section C - see C.1.) and the inefficiency and lack of competitiveness of the banking sector imply that credit is very expensive. Currently, the lending market rate is between 26.0 and 30.0 percent, with inflation of about 5.5 percent. There are two public credit programs for agriculture3, though not large, provided especially after hurricane Georges (September 1998), with rates of 14.5 percent and 12.0 percent for food products (and cocoa plantation). However, small farmers have little or no access to subsidized credit and must mainly go to the informal market because, with high economic growth, the demand for credit is very high and lenders have no reason to lend to small farmers who have to go either to the Banco Agricola. According to FEyD, in 1992, the average farm size of those that received credit either from public or private sources was about 8.0 has, while those that did not have any credit had an average of only 2.4 has per family. About 25.0 percent of the farmers that reported having received credit in the FEyD survey had access to public credit or to the informal market. Why do not they organize in cooperatives? Community organization is at an early stage in the DR, but incipient local organizations are beginning to emerge with dramatic effects on the livelihood of their members An important aspect is, however, that these organizations rarely developed without external efforts and/or immediate economic incentives. NGOs and international organizations can play a vital role in this respect. 13. Processors (mills) or exporters may lend to farmers since they exercise control over their output. For instance, tomato processors--who can borrow from the banking system--finance tomato growers, act as intermediaries and probably earn some additional income because of monopoly power in providing credit. Then, lack of access to formal credit leads to interlinkages between the production and credit markets. The same is true in coffee, cocoa and tobacco where financing comes from exporters. Thus, taxpayer money is used to subsidize credit, which reaches the larger farmers, mills and exporters, but does not reach the most needy. 14. The incentive to invest in agriculture at those high interest rates is low. This is especially true of tree crops where the gestation period is long. Moreover, exports are taxed twice: first, because they must sell the foreign exchange to the Central Bank at the official exchange rate, and second they must pay a 5 percent tax (called exchange commission) for all transactions in dollars. 15. As is true for most developing countries, political power is concentrated in urban areas. Urban poverty is much more visible than rural poverty from the political viewpoint and authorities are likely to be more responsive to the demands of the urban poor. Thus, even though most of the poverty is in the rural areas, most public spending is in the urban areas. Between 3The Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana, and the Central Bank. 63 1987 and 1998, government spending on agriculture fell from 1.36 percent of GDP to 1.02 percent of GDP (or by 25.0 percent) while spending on irrigation fell from 1.27 percent of GDP to 0.02 percent (or by 98.0 percent). Rural infrastructure is generally in very bad shape, especially in areas where cyclone Georges and a large number of destructive storms hit. And despite promises to repair the damage on rural infrastructure, little has been done so far. 16. The perception in parts of the population is that the DR received sufficient foreign aid (e.g., wood products) following cyclone Georges not only to repair the existing damage but also to provide better housing for most of the poor. The problem seems to be that the government did not distribute the foreign aid to those to whom it was intended. Rather, some branch of the public sector (the military, according to various sources) sold the foreign aid supplies on the open market. This is another aspect of the culture of private appropriation of public goods. As long as these types of problems prevail, alleviating rural poverty is going to be that much harder. C Effects of Macroeconomic and Trade Policies 17. The analysis carried out in this section abstracts from Haitian immigration. More precisely, the analysis is based on the assumption that immigration flows from Haiti are unaffected by (exogenous to) the policies examined here. Under these (unrealistic) assumptions, macro and trade policies have a larger impact on poverty than they do in reality. Immigration response is examined in Sections D and E. C1. Macroeconomic Policies 18. A major concern expressed by many interlocutors is the evolution of the real exchange rate (RER). Economists and others in the private, public and academic sectors have expressed concern that appreciation of the RER had made tradable sectors less competitive, particularly agriculture. This may be true, but the RER is an endogenous variable and its effect on the various sectors of the economy (and on labor demand and poverty) cannot be determined unless the exogenous force that affected the RER is identified.4 And though the impact of these exogenous forces on the RER may be the same, their effect on the economy is likely to differ. To understand the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the economy and on poverty, we need to examine the source (and magnitude) of the shocks. 19. A study by Fundacion Siglo 21 of August 1999 shows RER calculations done by Ecocaribe according to which the RER appreciated by some 15.0 percent between 1991 and 1997 but only by 7.0 percent between 1991 and June 1999, implying a real depreciation of 8.0 percent in 1997-1999.5 This RER is defined as a PPP-adjusted RER, i.e., as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for the difference in inflation rates between the DR and the US. In addition to the actual RER, one can think of the "equilibrium" RER (ERER) as one that also takes into account any long-term or permanent shock to the economy that affect the Balance of Trade or the Current Account. These can include foreign, domestic, and some policy shocks. Thus, the ERER changes so as to maintain external balance over the long term. As we will see below, some policy shocks may affect the RER but not the ERER. 4 It makes no sense to ask what the effect of a change in the RER is because no endogenous variable can change unless shocked by some exogenous force. SThese numbers seem rather small in relation to the emphasis everyone in the DR has put on the appreciation of the RER as being an important problem. 64 20. The DR underwent a trade liberalization episode in the 1990s. This implies an increase in import demand and a higher (depreciated) ERER. Another potential reason for the depreciation of the ERER would be a worsening in the terms of trade. Oil prices have risen in the past year or so, implying a higher ERER. Based on these changes in trade policy and in terms of trade, the RER should rise as well. Note that the RER has increased some 8.0 percent in the last two years, though it is still 7.0 percent lower than in 1991. 21. On the other hand, the tourism sector and the FTZs have been booming and this implies a lower ERER. And increasing remittances from Dominican emigrants also implies a lower ERER. Comparing 1994 and 1998, in million US$, net exports of FTZs increased by 75.0 percent (from 805 to 1,400), remittances increased by 75.0 percent (from 757 to 1,326) and tourism revenues increased by 50.0 percent (from 1,429 to 2,142). Following the tourism and FTZ boom and increased remittances, the RER must have decreased (appreciated) in order to maintain external balance. Finally, the RER (though not the ERER) has appreciated due to the fiscal deficit and the associated Central Bank borrowing at very high real interest rates. 22. Though it may be a matter of concern for a specific sector (or sectors), the fact that the RER appreciates over time need not be of concern for the economy as a whole as long as the forces that result in the appreciation of the RER are expected to be long-lasting, i.e., if the appreciation in the RER is an equilibrium movement reflecting an appreciation of the ERER.6 The fact that some sectors suffer from the RER appreciation is simply a reflection of changing comparative advantage, from stagnating sectors--including agriculture--towards the booming sectors and the sectors where worker remittances are spent, such as construction. If the boom in the tourism and FTZ sectors is expected to be permanent, and if the same holds for worker remittances, then we can expect the booming sectors (tourism, FTZ and construction) to expand and the other ones to contract. This should not be seen as a problem. To the contrary. For instance, if the increase in remittances is permanent, it reduces the need to export (in order to buy imports) and this frees resources that can than be used to produce for domestic consumption rather than for foreign consumption through exports. 23. Of course, even if the economy as a whole does better, this need not be true for the poor. One concern from the viewpoint of poverty is if the contracting sectors are unskilled labor- intensive while the expanding sectors are not. If the comparative advantage were to shift towards more capital-intensive and human capital-intensive activities and away from unskilled labor- intensive ones, that might hurt unskilled labor. While it is true that agriculture is unskilled labor- intensive and is likely to contract, and tourism is more capital-intensive and is likely to expand, construction--which is also likely to expand--is unskilled labor-intensive as well.7 24. Thus, expansion of tourism and its impact on the ERER is likely to lower demand for unskilled rural labor, while increased remittances and the effect on construction activity is likely to raise demand for unskilled urban labor. The net effect on total unskilled labor demand is ambiguous a priori. However, since the allocation of labor demand will change, with a reduction in labor demand in rural areas and an increase in labor demand in urban areas, rural-urban migration will increase (with potential problems associated with it, such as congestion and pollution). 6 An appreciation of the RER is likely to be a problem if the forces that result in the appreciation are short-lived or if they are due to distortionary policies. 7A study by Escuder and Dauhajre, hijo (1997) finds that the construction boom favored mainly the first two deciles of the income distribution. 65 25. As mentioned earlier, the direction and size of the change in the RER is not sufficient to determine the impact on the poor. The nature of the shock--tourism boom, FTZs or remittances-- also matters. In the case of remittances, what matters is who are the recipients of the remittances and how they are spent. International migration is typically done by people who are not rich but who are also not poor. They tend to be rural (sometimes first spending a short period in urban areas), and more educated (high school or more) than those who remain in the rural areas or who migrate to the cities. Thus, the remittances tend to go to those who are somewhat better off in the rural areas, and they may worsen the rural income distribution. 26. On the other hand, domestic transfers as a result of rural-urban migration tend to go more to the rural poor because the rural-urban migrants are typically less educated and come from poorer families. Central Bank data show that the share of household income from domestic transfers falls from 14.8 percent in the 1st quintile, to 8.3 percent in the 2nd, to 6.4 percent in the 5th, while overseas remittances rise from 3.6 percent for the I st quintile, to 6.6 percent in the 2nd, and 9.3 percent in the 5th, The difference is especially large between the 1st and 2nd quintiles, with domestic transfers falling by 44.0 percent and overseas remittances rising by 45.0 percent. And domestic transfers are more than four times more important for the bottom quintile than for the top one (14.8 percent versus 3.6 percent), while overseas remittances are 2.7 times more important for the top quintile than for the bottom one. 27. The impact of remittances also depends on how they are spent. First, if remittances are spent mainly on tradables, then there is little or no effect on the RER. It is only if the remittances are spent on non-tradables than the RER appreciates. Normally, remittances will be spent partly on both, with RER appreciation depending on how much is spent on each. If the remittances mainly go to the rural areas and are spent in the rural areas (say, on rural housing), this will help raise demand for rural labor and reduce rural poverty and dampen the resulting amount of rural- urban migration. 28. So far, we have examined exogenous shocks (and a policy of trade liberalization), all of which seem to be beneficial for the economy as a whole (and ambiguous for the poor). What does not seem to be beneficial is the structure of government finances, which needs to be modernized. Given the central government's inability to borrow in the domestic market, it is unable to finance its needs, either because of some fiscal deficit (2 percent of GDP) or because of a temporary mismatch between revenues and expenditures. This financing is left to the Central Bank. High interest rates on Central Bank bonds are necessary to attract these funds. These are likely to come from Dominicans who decide to buy Central Bank paper rather than investing their money in productive domestic assets or abroad; or the funds may come from abroad, either from foreign investors or from remittances. 29. Insofar as the high interest rate offered by the Central Bank has attracted more foreign funds and/or has prevented domestic funds from leaving the country, it has resulted in an appreciation of the RER. This can be thought of as a sort of Dutch disease and has a negative impact on the tradable sectors. Moreover, the high interest rate offered by the Central Bank is taking funds away from the economy and is a tax on all economic activities, especially capital- intensive ones. 30. The Central Bank debt, at DR$6 billion, is now 12 times higher than in 1995, and interest payments on the debt are now DR$800 million and are all out of budget. The Central Bank declared a 45-day moratorium on payment on its bonds in February 21, 1999. Thus, it seems that the area of government finance needs structural reform to bring it in line with the modernization of the economy in general. 66 31. Of course, if the Central Bank financing and the out-of-budget payments were due to a highly productive public investment program, the higher interest rate might not be so damaging. However, figures in Table 5.1, (World Bank, 2000a) provide a different picture. They show that, as a percent of GDP, Current Expenditures rose continuously from 7.2 percent in 1995 to 11.1 percent in 1998, and Capital Expenditures fell continuously from 7.0 percent of GDP in 1995 to 5.1 percent in 1998. Table 1: Composition of Public penditures (Percent of GD:), 1995 - 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998 Current Expenditures 7.2 7.8 10.6 11.1 Current Expenditures Adjusted 6.0 6.5 9.1 n.a Wages 3.5 3.6 5.1 5.2 Transfers 1.9 2.5 3.3 3.5 Capital Expenditures 7.0 6.6 5.5 5.1 Investment 4.5 4.6 2.8 2.7 Capital Transfers 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.3 Amortization 0.7 0.7 1.6 0.8 Current Expenditures Adjusted equals total current expenditures minus wages for education. n.a.: Not available. Source: Based on ONAPRES 32. Note that the high interest rate policy lowers the incentive to raise agriculture's productivity by investing in new machines embodying higher technologies, and so lowers the incentive to raise labor productivity. Thus, the high cost of capital and the low cost of labor (which, as shown in Section D, is in large part due to illegal immigration) both prevent agriculture from modernizing and thereby depress labor productivity. 33. Academic, government and private-sector economists and other professionals have mentioned the existence of a culture of private appropriation of public goods. Micro-economic aspects of this culture are discussed in Section E. At the macro-level, one problem is that the budget passed by Congress has little relation to the budget actually executed. Also, a large share of the budget is under the direct control of the President's office. The new President-elect has spoken of solving the problem of corruption and spending more on the poor (Oxford Analytica Brief, May 22, 2000). This report reaches the same conclusions. With respect to corruption at the macro-level, resolving it will require institutional reforms concerning the oversight powers of Congress relating to the execution of the budget, and concerning the relation between the Central Bank and the Executive. 34. The Executive also finances part of its budget with internal debt accumulated through arrears in its payments to the private sector (such as private service providers) for services rendered. This practice also needs to be terminated if transparency in the budgetary process is to be achieved. 35. A World Bank report (2000a) reports some recent improvement. By budget category, the ratio of executed to approved budget for the Presidencia de la Repuiblica increased from 4.38 in 1994 to 5.49 in 1997 but fell to 2.04 in 1998, while for All Other Categories, the ratio increased from 0.62 in 1996 to 0.97 in 1997 and 0.93 in 1998 (Table 5.2). Thus, executed and approved budgets seem to be converging, which is good, but this ratio is still extremely high for the Presidencia de la Repuzblica and there is still a very long way to go until full convergence and full transparency is attained. 67 Table 2: Ratio of Exec uted to Approv d Budget by Institution and P ograms, 1994-98 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* Presidency 4.38 5.08 5.24 5.49 2.04 All other 0.54 0.56 0.62 0.97 0.93 Defense 0.89 0.53 0.56 0.82 1.03 Justice & Order 0.74 0.56 0.55 0.95 0.99 Education 1.00 0.93 0.88 1.20 1.06 Health 0.91 1.76 0.78 0.96 0.88 Agriculture 0.93 0.71 0.74 0.92 1.05 Transport 3.48 2.67 2.34 1.52 1.02 Urban Works 8.53 4.64 69.70 54.62 15.56 Electricity 0.75 1.73 2.46 4.31 1.03 * Preliminary Source: Based on ONAPRES. 36. Moreover, discretionary control of part of the budget by the Presidencia de la Repuiblica is bad budgetary practice. Table 5.3 shows that in the 1990s, as the share of the Presidencia de la Repzublica in the budget has varied, the shares of Education, Public Health and Social Assistance, and Agriculture have all systematically changed in the opposite direction. For instance, while the share of the Presidencia de la Reputblica fell from 52.3 percent in 1991-96 to 37.8 percent in 1997 and to (an estimated) 21.5 percent in 1998, the share of Education increased from 1991-96 to 1998 by 75 percent (from 7.9 to 13.8 percent), the share of Public Health and Social Assistance increased by 60.0 percent (from 5.7 to 9.1percent), and the share of Agriculture increased by close to 120.0 percent (from 3.5 to 7.6 percent). Table 3: Expenditures by Instituti n (as a Percent of Total E penditures), 1980-1998 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1996 1997 1998* Presidency 15.6 47.6 52.3 37.8 21.5 Finance 16.8 12.5 15.6 22.1 23.6 Education 12.5 7.7 7.9 10.6 13.8 Public Health & Social Assistance 8.7 6.2 5.7 7.1 9.1 Agriculture 13.0 6.3 3.5 4.1 7.6 Interior and Police 7.2 5.5 4.9 6.5 6.7 Armed Forces 11.1 6.6 5.3 6.2 6.2 Public Works and Communications 10.3 4.2 1.7 1.1 5.1 * Preliminary Source: Based on ONAPRES. C.2. Trade Policy 37. Trade reforms examined include general trade reform, those related to agriculture, and regional agreements. C.2.i. General TradeReforms 38. Tariff rates are bound at 40.0 percent at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The maximum rate is now 35.0 percent and there is a Tariff Reform Bill to reduce tariff rates to 20.0 percent, with the government (as of April 2000) proposing 15.0 percent. The Bill is now in Congress. Producers seem to have accepted the plan to lower tariff rates because, if tariff rates had been kept high, the DR could not have signed a Free Trade Agreement with the Central America Common Market whose common external tariff (CET) is significantly lower than the level of Dominican tariffs. 39. Non-agricultural trade liberalization raises the demand for imports and leads to a depreciation of the ERER. This improves the competitiveness of both agricultural exportables 68 and importables, raises unskilled rural labor demand and reduces rural-urban migration. Also, since agriculture and non-agricultural exportables are likely to be more unskilled-labor-intensive than the liberalized non-agricultural sectors, real wages of unskilled rural labor should increase.8 Note that depreciation of the RER has an adverse effect on non-tradables, including the construction sector, and reduces the demand for unskilled urban labor. This also helps lower rural-urban migration. 40. There is also a need for customs reform. The rules that are applied are cumbersome and not up-to-date. The same is true with respect to customs valuation, where no international rule is followed and where the DR obtained a one-year waiver from the WTO. C.2.ii Agricultural Trade Reforms 41. The DR obtained a "technical correction" (or "rectificacion tecnica") from the WTO for 8 agricultural products. These are rice, milk, sugar, maize, beans, onions, garlic and poultry. This "technical correction" entails import quotas, which are exempt from tariffs, and very high tariff rates for out-of-quota imports. The tariff rate schedule from 1997 to 2005 by product category is shown in Table 5.4 (World Bank 2000a) and indicates significantly higher tariff rates in 2005 (for out-of-quota imports) than in 1997 (including the tariff equivalent of NTBs) for all products except maize. For maize, the tariff rate falls from 85.0 to 40.0 percent by 2005. For all the others, tariffs increase, to 99.0 percent in 2005 for rice, poultry and garlic, 97.0 percent for onions, 89.0 percent for beans, 85.0 percent for sugar, and 56.0 percent for milk. Table 4: Scheduled tariff rates for agricultural roducts ercent) 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Maize 85 60 53 46 40 Milk 48 83 74 65 56 Beans 70 95 93 91 89 Onions 38 97 97 97 97 Rice 43 114 109 104 99 Garlic 35 119 107 103 99 Poultry 75 136 124 III 99 Sugar 38 94 91 88 85 'Corresponds to tariff equivalent of current protection. Source: World Bank estimates (1997) and ONAPLAN. 42. Food prices are not always free to reflect market forces. Even with trade barriers on food imports, whenever the price has increased, the government--which is the importer and on whom tariffs do not apply--has allowed more food imports to come in. Also, in order to reduce the impact of tariffs on the prices of products imported by the private sector at times when world prices were high, the government has lowered the reference price on which tariffs are imposed. This is typical of many developing countries where government agencies--such as Instituto de Estabilizaci6n de Precios (INESPRE) in the DR--do the importing and are not subject to trade barriers. The experience from countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America is that public agencies such as INESPRE tend to corrupt the workings of the free market system because of their discretional decision-making process which inhibits the development of market institutions such as private marketing channels, storage facilities and transport. 43. Moreover, these public agencies often end up being captured by the powerful interest groups. In fact, the President-elect has decided to make INESPRE the first target of his anti- corruption campaign by reducing its size and scope of activities. 8 This follows from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 69 44. We saw earlier that high interest rates lower the incentive to raise capital-intensity and modernize agriculture. On the other hand, the government tried to raise the capital intensity through lower tariffs (zero by 1997) on machinery, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs. This is likely to have helped large farmers more than small ones since the large farmers tend to have a more capital-intensive agriculture due to economies of scale (e.g., for tractors etc.) and more access to (cheaper) credit. 45. Given the agricultural trade policy of tariff-quotas, rents can be obtained by receiving a high support price and by getting an import license. The fact is that small producers get neither. They typically sell at a lower price to those who finance their crop (the mill or the exporter) who then get the higher government support price as well as the import quota. The same is true for the large farmer. Thus, the small farmer is stuck in a sort of poverty trap. 46. Rather than providing producer subsidies (say through support prices), most of which are captured by large farmers and tend to distort market forces, the government should provide a type of support which is de-linked from prices and market forces.9 This should be provided in the form of public goods and services, including health, education, and research and extension. Also, higher prices are unlikely to benefit the poor unskilled agricultural workers because they compete with Haitian immigrants, and higher unskilled labor demand will simply attract more immigration (see Section C for an analysis). Thus, liberalization of agricultural trade will raise efficiency, and is unlikely to significantly hurt the poor unskilled rural labor. The reason is that liberalization of agricultural trade will lower agricultural prices, and though it will have a negative effect on rural wages in the short run, the lower wages will make immigration from Haiti less attractive. Over time, the lower migration flows will dampen the negative wage effect and will likely cancel the effect in the long run. And supporting the rural poor through public investment will be much more effective in lowering poverty than using subsidies which are mostly captured by the rich. 47. On the other hand, small-scale farmers are likely to be hurt by the reform (though experience in many developing countries shows that they are able to change their output mix towards the crops whose price has declined the least). Targeted income support programs that are de-linked from prices or output might make sense for them. C.2.iii FTAs 48. DR is negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with CARICOM (Caribbean Common Marketl) and the Central American Common Market (CACM"). Studies (e.g., Schiff, 1997; World Bank, 2000b) show that FTAs between small developing countries are unlikely to enhance welfare. In fact, a FTA between two or more small open economies which keeps external trade barriers unchanged and whose members continue to trade with the rest of the world (ROW) will generate trade harmful diversion and no beneficial trade creation because domestic prices remain unaffected. Of course, though the FTA as a whole loses, some members may gain. This depends on the volume of trade between the members and the level of external trade barriers. The DR is more likely to gain the higher its exports to the FTA partners, the lower its imports from them, the higher the partners' external trade barriers, and the lower the DR's external trade barriers. 9 This is also the direction that the EU is taking, i.e., it is moving from price-related subsidies to income support that is de-linked from prices and output. 10 Members of CARICOM are: 1973: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago; 1974: Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines; 1983: The Bahamas (part of the Caribbean Community but not of the Common Market). 1 Members of the CACM are: 1960 (revived in 1993): El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua; 1962: Costa Rica. 70 49. The DR had higher trade barriers than the common external tariff (CET) of the CACM. This is one reason why the DR has waited to enter in a FTA with the CACM. Why is that? In a FTA between small member countries, as long as the member countries continue to import from the ROW and since these imports from the ROW continue to be subject to tariffs, prices in the member countries are unlikely to change. So what is then the impact of such a FTA if prices remain unchanged? One must distinguish between the impact on a single member country from the impact on the FTA as a whole. As mentioned above, the FTA as a whole is expected to be worse off because the main effect is likely to be harmful trade diversion (and thus a less efficient allocation of resources, replacing some cheaper imports from the ROW with more expensive imports from partner countries). 50. What about the impact on a single member country called, say, DR? Partner countries can now sell to DR at the high price that exists in DR due to its tariff barriers with respect to the ROW (P = Pw + Tw, where P is the price in DR, Pw is the price in the ROW, and Tw is the DR tariff on ROW imports). Since partner countries no longer have to pay the tariff Tw on their exports to DR, they benefit for exporting at the higher price Pa. This benefit for partner countries is a loss for DR, which no longer collects the tariff on imports from the partner countries. This loss increases with the level of the tariff: the lower the tariff Tw, the smaller the transfer of tariff revenue to the partners and thus the smaller the loss. Thus, the DR would lose less on imports from its partners if its own tariffs on the ROW were lower, and it would gain more on its exports to its partners if the partners had higher tariffs on imports from the ROW. Given that the DR had high tariffs compared to the CET of the CACM, it is likely that the DR would have lost because it would have transferred more to its partners than it would have received from them. 51. In order for a small country to gain from forming a FTA with a group of small partner countries, it must lower its own trade barriers unilaterally. If these trade barriers are lowered sufficiently, the country will not only obtain the standard gains from trade associated with unilateral trade liberalization, but it will also gain by reducing the transfers to its partner countries. This is what the DR should do. 52. A number of analysts in and out of government have mentioned that trade liberalization would not have been possible without the prospect of these FTAs. This type of argument has been made for other FTAs as well, for instance in the case of the EU-Morocco Euro- Mediterranean Agreement. If political economy conditions are such that general liberalization requires some promise of improved market access in order to get the support of producers, then a FTA may be beneficial. However, in the case of Morocco, the EU is by far its largest trading partner, Morocco obtained increased aid flows after signing the FTA, and there were political reasons for Morocco to enter the FTA (e.g., potential sources of instability from its neighbor, a desire for a rapprochement with the EU, and the fear of being left out because of the rapprochement between the EU and the CEECs). None of these arguments hold in the case of the DR's FTAs with CACM and CARICOM. 53. The DR has decided to enter into these FTAs with the CACM and CARICOM for reasons that are not entirely and may involve political considerations. But whatever the reason, in order to minimize any potential harm from these free trade agreements and maximize their benefit, the DR should further liberalize its trade regime with respect to the ROW. This will provide the classical gains from trade as well as reduce the harmful transfers to the partner countries. 71 D. Haitian Immigration 54. The DR shares some characteristics with another island economy across the world, namely Mauritius. Similarities include exporting sectors such as sugar, FTZs and tourism. A basic difference is that there is no Haiti bordering Mauritius. In this, the DR resembles more South Africa, which is surrounded by lower-income countries with a large pool of unskilled labor which is drawn by the high South African wages (Cling, 2000). 55. The effect of growth and of various policies on poverty depends crucially on the elasticity of supply of Haitians to the DR. That elasticity is likely to be high. The first reason is the enormous difference in incomes between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with per capita income in the DR some five times higher than in Haiti. The second reason is the high rate of unemployment in Haiti, implying a low opportunity cost of migration. A third reason is the low cost of moving from Haiti to the DR. This is due to the migration networks existing between past Haitian immigrants and prospective ones, the existence of Dominican buscones looking for candidates within Haiti and the Dominican military helping with transport from the border. 56. On the other hand, one might be tempted to conclude that the fact that Haitian immigrants earn more in the DR than in Haiti means that their elasticity of supply is not very high. This is not necessarily true. The reason is that immigrants may earn more but are not necessarily better off, i.e., the difference in earnings may be an equilibrium one (a 'compensating differential') that is required to attract them to the DR. The costs include real migration costs, and--more importantly--the cost of not living with their own people in their own country, culture, language, of being ill-treated, etc. (Ill treatment seems to apply mainly to new immigrants who plan to remain for a limited period and can more easily be taken advantage of). In that case, the elasticity could still be large (infinite), but with a real wage differential to compensate for these costs. For instance, note that some Haitians (try to) return to Haiti because the wages they receive do not compensate for the human cost of working in the Bateyes (and some claim that they stay not because they are better off but because they are embarrassed to return home with almost nothing to show for their migration effort). 57. The fact that Haitian immigrants obtain a very low pay according to Dominican standards is due to the fact that employers in the Bateyes operate a monopsonistic labor market and are able to pay Haitian immigrants less than the value of their marginal product. Employers only have to pay them the opportunity cost of their labor (the wage rate in Haiti or less if they were unemployed) plus any "compensating differential" for being away from home, hard conditions etc. Thus, these immigrants earn possibly more than in Haiti but they are still paid less than what Dominicans would receive for comparable work (the proof is that no Dominicans work in the sugarcane sector). By paying Haitian immigrants less than the value of their marginal product, employers obtain a surplus or a rent. The rent is shared between the employers in the Bateyes, the sugar industry, and the military, which helps to implement and enforce the system. This rent is an important element in the policy recommendations given below. 58. An indication that the elasticity of supply is high to the sugarcane sector is that the "Dominico-Haitianos" tend to reject the inflow of new Haitian immigrants, often by calling the guards in order to reject the new immigrants and prevent increased competition in the labor market of the Bateyes. "Dominico-Haitianos" claim that their earnings would be higher in the absence of these new immigrants. 59. Another possibility, based on a very recent survey by FLACSO is that many of the Haitians in the urban areas are more skilled than those in the rural areas and have legal documents 72 obtained at Dominican consulates. If so, their supply elasticity depends on the ease or degree of difficulty with which they can obtain legal documents to migrate to the DR. 60. The issue of the elasticity of supply of Haitian immigrants is not fully resolved due to the absence of reliable data. For example, according to the 1998 Central Bank Household Survey, there are about 70,000 Haitians in the DR while the actual number is more in the order of 500,000. This is because Haitian migrants flee all Dominican officials for fear of being deported to Haiti. 61. Two final points on this issue. First, any elasticity depends on the time lag allowed for the response to take place. Haitian immigration may take time to respond and it may take longer to respond to changes in urban wages than in rural wages since Haitians typically move first to rural areas. Since the concern is with improving the long-term situation of the poor, the relevant elasticity of supply of immigrants is the long-term one, which is larger than the short-term one. Second, this elasticity is also a function of government immigration policy. The more permissive the immigration regime, the larger the elasticity. And though there is periodic talk by politicians of closing the border to immigrants or otherwise taking care of the problem, in reality little has been done, partly because there are powerful interests (e.g., landowners, builders) who favor an open border. 62. The number of illegal Haitian immigrants is unknown, and estimates vary from 500 thousand to one million. Volume 1 of the 1998 World Bank Report "Haiti. The Challenges of Poverty Reduction" gives an estimate (p. 11) of 800 thousand Haitians in the DR, or more than half the 1.5 million Haitians living abroad. Haitian total emigration provides a safety valve for Haiti by lowering unemployment and through remittances on which many families depend (estimated at 10-15 percent of GDP). On the other hand, emigration of skilled labor, mainly to the U.S. where 650 thousand Haitians reside, results in a brain drain and a loss of positive externalities skilled workers have on the rest of the Haitian labor force and on the quality of governance. 63. Haitian immigration has a triple negative effect on the Dominican poor. First, they compete directly with them and depress their wages. Secondly, because Haitians are available at low wages and because they lower Dominican wages, the incentive to modernize and invest in labor-saving technology is weakened, and this keeps the productivity of unskilled Dominican labor at a lower level than would have been the case in the absence of Haitian immigration. Third, the highly elastic supply of Haitian immigrants tends to neutralize the poverty effect of policies that raise the demand for unskilled labor. Consequently, such policies will be less helpful in reducing poverty. The same may be true of economic growth. A rise in the demand for unskilled labor will result in an increase in Haitian immigration, as occurred in the high- growth period of 1995-1999, little (or at least less) gain for the poor, and possibly in a more unequal distribution of income. 64. What should be done in terms of migration policy? The DR and Haiti could benefit from devising a migration policy cooperatively. By working together to put some restriction on the number of immigrants, unskilled wages in the DR would remain higher than they otherwise would have been. This would benefit Haitian immigrants who would have more money to send home as remittances, and it would benefit unskilled Dominicans who compete with Haitian immigrants. On the other hand, it is likely to hurt the potential migrants who were prevented from emigrating as well as other labor in Haiti competing with them. In other words, it might depress wages in Haiti or raise unemployment. Thus, whether Haiti as a whole, including emigrants to the DR, would be better off with this policy is unclear. 73 65. Of course, Haiti happens to have monopoly power in selling Haitian labor to the DR. If Haiti exploits that monopoly power (which depends on how inelastic the demand for Haitian labor is in the DR) by optimally restricting emigration to the DR (say, by sufficiently raising the fee on passports or travel documents), then Haiti would gain. Of course, the DR has monopsony power with respect to its employment of Haitian labor and can exploit it by taxing the entrance of Haitians (Schiff, 1999). The best option is for both countries to come to some cooperative arrangement on how to control the flow of migrants and how to share the rents. 66. So far, we have examined Haitian and rural-urban migration. Dominicans also emigrate to the US (including Puerto Rico) and Europe. Section B examined the effect of this emigration on remittances, the RER and poverty. Another aspect is the impact on the productivity of Dominicans left behind. As discussed earlier, these emigrants are typically better educated than the average. Emigration of these better-educated people is likely to have a negative impact on the productivity of those left behind by reducing the average level of human capital. Another way of stating the same point is that skilled labor generates a positive externality by raising the productivity of labor in general. With more educated labor emigrating, these positive spillovers are lost. This also has a negative impact on the productivity and thus on the income of the poor. E. Investing in the Poor 67. Since raising the return on the asset owned by the poor is hard due to Haitian immigration, the best way to help the poor seems to be to raise the quantity or quality of their assets or both. These assets include education, health, housing, infrastructure, research and extension, land, access to credit and to the legal system. In terms of unskilled labor, this policy would differentiate Dominican labor from Haitian immigrant labor and turn them into complements rather than substitutes, in which case, increased immigration might raise the demand for Dominican labor rather than lower it. Also, land reforms through the distribution of property rights to the small holders would be a way to reduce the uncertainty small holders face and would raise the quantity of the assets they own. It would also be likely to raise the quality of the land because security of ownership would raise the incentive to invest in land improvements. This would raise the value of the land and the return on it. 68. However, the quality and quantity of a number of public goods in the DR is low. In education, the quality of teachers (maestros) has declined dramatically since the early 1980s. Also, while the average social spending in Latin America is 14.0 percent of GDP, it is only 6.5 percent in the DR. In public education in 1997 and 1998, the DR spent 2.3 percent of GDP, Latin America spent 3.8 percent of GDP, and the rest of the Caribbean spent between 7.0 and 8.0 percent of GDP. And the problems are worse in rural areas. For instance, in 1996, about 75.0 percent of the public education budget went to the urban areas.'2 69. To improve the delivery of public goods and services, the basic institutional framework needs to be reformed (including the budget process--both at the national and at the municipal level--and the relation of the Central Bank to the Executive). There seems to be a culture of private appropriation of public goods, with a low degree of social trust and a lack of trust in the authorities to deliver needed public goods and services.'3 This is true of the budgetary process, 12 Note that, statistically, rural areas may have similar services to those in urban areas because suburban neighborhoods are classified as rural. 13 In surveys done in 1990-91 and 1995-96 by the World Values Surveys where individuals were asked the degree to which they trusted others, countries were ranked from zero to the high sixties. Scandinavian countries scored in the 60s, Canada and the Netherlands in the 50s, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK and the US in the 40s, Mexico 74 banking regulation, supervision and enforcement of rules, the treatment of immigrants and their children, the police, and compliance with and enforcement of driving rules. This results in a "Prisoner's Dilemma"--type situation where the degree of civic sense and social cooperation is low and where most people try to maximize their own share of the pie. This is likely to result in losses for everyone.'4 Given the system, individual behavior is rational. However, there exists a superior (cooperative) equilibrium where everyone follows the law, but getting there requires an enormous degree of coordination and trust. 70. Some groups also benefit from the system at the expense of others, with the benefits typically lower than the costs because of the inefficiencies involved. For instance, the fact that a significant share of the budget is controlled by the President's office benefits that office as well as certain privileged groups. This is part of the culture of private appropriation of public goods. Another compelling example is the appropriation of quotas and tariffs by powerful groups including large producers but excluding the poor. 71. Another example relates to the foreign aid in the aftermath of Hurricane George. Foreign donations of wood and materials for building of houses after Hurricane Georges were more than enough to resolve the housing problems of most of the poor. Unfortunately, much of these donations were taken by the authorities and resold in the open market and for the most did not reach those for whom they were initially intended. 72. At the local level, there is no oversight or transparency with respect to the budget assigned to the municipalities and mayors have total discretion over spending. Thus, at the local level as well, groups with more influence are able to obtain a lion share of the resources of the municipalities. Once again, we have a case of private groups appropriating the public good. The municipalities should have to submit a budget plan which would be discussed with the central authorities and whose execution would be monitored. Assuming the central government is less likely to be influenced by local interest groups than mayors, such a system would improve the allocation of public resources and would provide more support to the weaker members of the municipalities, i.e., the poor. 73. In the case of Haitian immigrants, the law--a public good--is privatized for the benefit of the sugarcane producers. The government until recently owned a large proportion of the Bateyes or sugarcane plantations. It has very recently rented its land for a 30 year lease to a consortium made up of three foreign companies. The consortium appears to continue the previous policy with respect to the Haitian labor in the Bateyes region close to the Haitian border. Haitians-- including children between the ages of 10 and 14--are typically brought from the border to the Bateyes by the military or by Haitian "buscones". This is often done under false pretenses, with promises of being taken to the main cities to work in construction (at up to 300 pesos a day) but in fact taken no further than the Bateyes to do the very hard work of cutting cane, a job no Dominican is willing to do, for as low as 100 pesos a week. 74. Once they are in the Bateyes, their freedom to leave is severely limited both by the landowners of the Bateyes and by the military. For instance, in the region of Barahona, guards (so-called "serenos") armed with pistols in their belt riding motorcycles can be seen around the Bateyes. Theirjob is to prevent labor from leaving. got about 30 and the Dominican Republic got 26. This is lower than Yugoslavia (31) despite its recent wars, and similar to much poorer Bangladesh, Ghana or Georgia. 14 Urban transportation is a clear case where the law is privatized, with everyone trying to reach their destination with little regard for the rules or the welfare of others, and everyone ending up in a Prisoners' Dilemma and losing (and where policemen--the enforcers of the law--are easily bought). 75 Anyone born in the DR of parents who are not there temporarily is Dominican by law. Thus, children of Haitians born in the DR--known as 'Dominico-Haitianos'--are Dominican and should be able to move freely around the country. However, obtaining legal documents is difficult because their parents are illegal and have no documents. The Haitians and 'Dominico-Haitianos' who try to leave the Bateyes are typically stopped by the military and often jailed. And the military confiscates (steals) the documents of those who have them. These measures by the landowners and the military attempt to keep real wages lower than they would have been in the absence of the measures. Here again, the law has been privatized for the benefit of the powerful (landowners) and with the support of the authorities (the military). And a new Migration Law has been proposed which is more restrictive than the existing one. For instance, under this new proposal, Haitians would be considered 'temporary' even after residing in the country for several years and their children born in the DR would have no legal status. 75. Two points are worth making. First, in the U.S. and EU, there is a continuing debate about the legalization of illegal immigrants. In the DR, there is a process of 'illegalization' where people who, according to the Constitution, are legal citizens are reduced to the status of illegal immigrants. Second, at times, the authorities decide to repatriate Haitian immigrants to Haiti, a policy implemented by the military. Thus, the DR does not seem to have a consistent migration policy. 76. To conclude, in order to increase the quantity and quality of the assets owned by the poor, spending on public goods needs to be increased, especially in the rural areas, and institutional reforms must be undertaken (e.g., with 1NESPRE) to ensure that public spending earmarked for the poor actually increases and to ensure that it actually reaches the poor. These changes would probably go a long way to reduce poverty. 77. However, they may not be sufficient due to potential demand problems in areas such as education and health. In some "barrios", though schools are available, many children do not attend, either because there is family pressure to earn a living or because they do not see additional education as a way out of poverty. This phenomenon develops because of better alternative opportunities (especially in a growing economy) and low returns on primary and secondary education due to low quality and low quantity of public education, the only one available to the poorest. Raising attendance requires subsidizing not only the public cost of education and the private (opportunity) cost of the child's time as well. For instance, lunch school programs have helped raise attendance in various countries. In the case of health, in a number of developing countries where mothers have access to free health programs, many do not take advantage of them. These programs are not truly free because of the time cost involved in going to the health centers and many poor mothers are heads of families and their time is very valuable. Combining health programs with milk and nutrition programs is likely to be effective. F. Hispaniola 78. For South Africa, Cling (2000) suggests that the only way to solve the immigration problem and thereby help the South African poor is by improving economic conditions in the rest of SADC (Southern Africa Development Community). Similarly, poverty in the DR would be alleviated if economic conditions were to improve in Haiti. Thus, given that the World Bank should be concerned with the poor in both Haiti and the DR, and since policies in one part of the island have effects on poverty in the other part due to the migration link, it would make sense for the World Bank to consider policies that would best tackle the problem of poverty in the whole island. Thus, measures to reduce poverty in Haiti should be thought of as part of a package of 76 poverty-reducing measures for the DR, and vice versa. Internalizing these cross-country effects in the poverty-reducing policy package should improve its effectiveness. 79. Proposals have been floated, including by the EU, to fund industrial projects in the border area between Haiti and the DR. This might entail a FTZ, including storage areas where goods would be brought and then re-shipped. The idea is to reactivate the economy in that region which would absorb labor and would reduce immigration to the rest of the DR. This seems to be an expensive proposal. This region is not a natural "entrepot" region since there are no important consumption centers or ports there, and a FTZ in that area is thus unlikely to succeed. If the objective is to help Haitians as well as lower immigration to the DR, it would make more sense to support projects in Haiti which are likely to be economically successful. G. Policy Recommendations 80. Five aspects are discussed: institutional reforms, migration policy, macroeconomic and trade policy, investing in the poor, and poverty in Hispaniola. Rather than repeat the analysis, recommendations are presented in the form of bullets. 1. Institutional Reforms * Provide Congress with strict oversight power with respect to the execution of the budget, with stiff penalties and enforcement capacity. * Remove (or reduce) control over any part of the budget from the President's Office. * Give Central Bank (greater) independence over monetary policy. * Provide the Central Government with oversight power with respect to the execution of municipal budgets. 2. Migration Policy * Set an explicit and clear immigration policy cooperatively (with Haiti) that satisfies both countries. * One element of such a policy needs to be clear and accurate information on job opportunities in the DR, work conditions (including the level of pay), legal status, etc. * Another element is the establishment of a Joint Committee to manage all migration issues and disputes that will unavoidably arise. On this, much can be learned from cooperative efforts by neighboring countries around the world in areas such as natural resources, infrastructure, etc., and where the World Bank has played a major role. * Move the military out of all aspects of the immigration business, including transport, jailing, and confiscating documents. * Move the landowners and their "serenos" (guards) out of the business of preventing immigrants from leaving the plantation areas. * Give legal documents to those Dominico-Haitianos who can prove their status. 3. Macroeconomic and Trade Policy * Reform the budget process and Central Bank independence; this should reduce borrowing and result in a depreciation of the RER and lower interest rates, both of which will help agriculture and the rural poor (abstracting from the migration effect). * Continue to liberalize general trade policies; it makes no economic sense for a small open economy to maintain high trade barriers; trade liberalization will generate the classic gains from trade and will reduce transfers to partner countries in the CACM and CARICOM. 77 * Liberalize agricultural trade policies; together with price interventions, agricultural protection has essentially benefited the large farmers, traders and exporters, and not the small farmers and the rural poor. 4. Investing in the Poor * Raise investment in the quantity and quality of assets owned by the poor, especially in rural areas, including education and health, but also the environment and rural infrastructure (policies to raise the return on existing assets of the poor are likely to be less effective due to effects on immigration). * This will require institutional reforms in the budget process and in public agencies (e.g., INESPRE). * Authorities also need to take measures (some type of subsidies) to ensure that there will be demand for education and health by the poor. 5. Povertv in Hispaniola * Given the link between poverty in the DR and Haiti, a cooperative policy by the two countries should be more effective than two policies followed independently by each; the World Bank (and others) could play a constructive role here. 78 BIBLIOGRAPHIY J. P. Cling. 2000. L 'economie Sud-Africaine au sortir de l 'Apartheid. Karthala: Paris. J. A. Escuder and A. Dauhajre, hijo. 1997. "Efectos de las Politicas Macroeconomicas y Sociales sobre la Pobreza en la Republica Dominicana," mimeo, Santo Domingo. Fundacion Siglo 21. 1999 (August). "Las Politicas Macroeconomicas y su Incidencia sobre el Sector Agropecuario." Zeev Rosenhek. 1999. "Migration Regimes, Intra-State Conflicts and the Politics of Exclusion and Inclusion: Migrant Workers in the Israeli Welfare State." Working Paper #99-S5, Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis (RIIM), Vancouver Centre of Excellence. Schiff, Maurice. 1997. "Small is Beautiful: Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of Country Size, Market Share, and Smuggling." Journal of Economic Integration 12 (3): 3 59-87. Schiff, Maurice. 1999. "Trade, Migration and Welfare. The Impact of Social Capital". World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2044 (January). World Bank. 1998. "Haiti. The Challenges of Poverty Reduction." Report No. 17242-HA, Volume 1 (August). World Bank. 2000a. Dominican Republic. Social and Structural Policy Review. Volume I. PREM Unit (ECSPE), Latin America and the Caribbean (March 10). World Bank. 2000b. Trade Blocs. Policy Research Report (July). World Bank 2000c. Dominican Republic. Poverty Assessment (various background papers). Draft Document, Dominican Republic. 79 A Review of the Haitian Immigrant Population in the Dominican Republic Marco Scuriatti 1. The Dominican Republic (DR) and Haiti share the island of Hispaniola. These two countries are at different stages of economic development and maintain an uneasy relationship marked by racial and political tension that dates back to colonial times. Haitian migration to the DR is an important component of this relationship. It started in earnest during the U.S. occupation of the island between 1916-34 and since then has fluctuated depending upon the political and economic situation of both countries. 2. The Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent currently form the basis of important formal and informal economic networks in the DR. They have become essential to both countries' economies, benefiting certain interest groups at the expense of others. Their presence is most obvious in the sugar cane, coffee, rice, and tomato agricultural sectors as well as the construction industry and other lines of work where inexpensive unskilled labor is a critical production factor. In these sectors, according to most estimates, they comprise over 80 percent of the DR workforce. Nevertheless, despite their important presence in the Dominican socioeconomic reality, the majority remains poor and vulnerable, susceptible to exploitation and deportation because the Dominican government has not yet undertaken a serious and consistent program to normalize their legal status. 3. The objective of this paper is to: (i) provide a review of the extensive work already carried out on Haitian immigrants in the DR; and (ii) offer recommendations to help resolve the poor state of affairs this segment of society finds itself in. The paper is organized into four sections: Section A analyzes the presence, status and socioeconomic condition of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic. It is based on the findings of various surveys, including two World Bank social assessments recently conducted in ten bateyes and in the urban slum of Santo Domingo along the Ozama River, as well as extensive interviews with primary sources, including several interviews in the field with NGO officials and Haitian immigrants; Section B analyzes both the push (willingness to leave Haiti) and the pull factors (attractiveness of the DR) behind the migration. This section is based on the use of secondary sources, including recent literature and statistics on the subject; Section C analyzes the policies and measures adopted thus far, by both island governments, NGOs and international organizations, related to the Haitian immigrant issue. For this section, extensive consultations with various governmental and non-governmental institutions in both the DR and Haiti provided background material; Section D of this paper will set forth conclusions and recommendations; Finally, the Bibliography will help the reader of this paper to pursue his interest on the subject in further detail by offering a list of what has been recently been published on the subject. A. Presence, Status and Socioeconomic Conditions of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic 4. How Many?: The migration from Haiti to the DR is not a recent phenomenon. Box 1 below provides a brief historical overview of the establishment and development of this trend. Although the migration plays a fundamental role in both economies, the number of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent living in the country has never been officially determined -- The Dominican government has never conducted a census that properly includes the Haitian population, and most demographic information released on the subject by either country has been fabricated solely for political purposes. During the time of General Rafael Francisco Trujillo it appears that the migratory flux was maintained somewhat under control, with most Haitian workers returning to Haiti after their seasonal contracts came to an end. However, with the return of "democracy" in the early 60s, the control diminished and the number of immigrants without a legitimate work permit increased. Estimates now range from between 400,000 to one million, with half a million being the preferred guess-estimate of most NGOs. This figure represents approximately six percent of the 8.4 million people currently living in the Dominican Republic. 81 Ironically, according to the 1998 Central Bank Household Survey, there are only about 70,000 Haitians in the DR. Box 1: Historical Background of Haitian Migration to the DR The Haitian immigrant population in the Dominican Republic grew gradually over the early part of this century along with the sugar industry's demand for cheap labor. Between 1914 and 1915, as international investors sought new sugar supplies in the wake of the collapse of the European beet-sugar industry, the United States government, prompted by a powerful sugar lobby, occupied Hispaniola and proceeded to dramatically expand sugar cane production. Most U.S. investments on the island flowed into the DR rather than Haiti because of strong Haitian opposition to U.S. military rule and investment. U.S. companies in the DR then began to import the cheaper Haitian seasonal labor, thus setting the trend for the industry that continues to this day. By 1934, when the United States finally bowed out of Hispaniola's politics, the first quasi- permanent group of Haitians in the DR had established itself, for a variety of economic and personal reasons, from among these low-wage cane cutters. This seasonal migration came to an abrupt end during the 1930s and 1940s with General Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, who ruled over the country until his assassination in 1961. In 1934, wishing to "Dominicanize" the sugar industry, and with the United States no longer in a position to oppose the loss of cheap labor for its sugar plantations, Trujillo initiated a wave of anti- Haitian propaganda. This period was marked by frequent round-ups and deportations, finally culminating in the infamous 1937 Vespers massacre in which thousands of Haitian immigrants were killed.' The political rhetoric of this period set the stage for much of the anti-Haitian prejudice that continues to pervade parts of Dominican culture today. Ironically, Trujillo's attitude toward Haitians changed when he personally took over most of the Dominican sugar industry in the early 1950s. His need for a steady flow of cheap labor from Haiti required him once again to establish work contracts with Haitian laborers. Hence, the Haitian seasonal migration resumed, first in the sugar plantations, then spreading to coffee and rice plantations, and more recently to the construction and tourism sectors. In 1952 and 1959, two five-year accords between the two countries were signed to regularize the contracting of Haitian seasonal workers. These accords where meant to regularize the flow of these workers through the granting of temporary work permits. With time, as new accords followed suit, the system was easily abused due to lack of enforcement. The formal and informal economic networks that eventually fell into place to sustain this 'trade' have survived to this day, posing the greatest obstacle to its solution.2 5. Who are they?: The Haitian population in the DR comprises four distinct subgroups, each with its own migration pattern and immigration status under Dominican and international law: (i) Seasonal agricultural workers - This group is contracted to work in the sugar cane fields each season for the zafra (harvest) and returns to Haiti when the harvest ends. Most sources suggest that 15,000 to 20,000 temporary workers, also known as braceros, are recruited yearly for the sugar cane industry alone through the use of buscones (paid recruiters) and then issued a temporary work permit. A large number of these seasonal workers then move on to the rice, tobacco, coffee and other agricultural harvests thus creating a circular internal migratory pattern. Many of these braceros are also contracted semi-legally and brought in with the complicity of border guards and the military;3 (ii) Undocumented "permanent residents" - The first quasi-permanent group of Haitians in the DR grew out of those braceros who, for personal and economic reasons, opted on settling in the DR as early as the 1930s. Better known as Viejos, with time, as the demand for unskilled labor increased in the DR, so did their numbers. Viejos comprise approximately one third to one half of the estimated half-million undocumented "permanent residents" of Haitian descent living in the DR; ' The number of Haitians killed has always been in dispute. According to a 1995 National Coalition for Haitian Rights report, entitled Beyond the Bateyes, estimates range from 5,000 to 37,000. In 1937, the Dominican government of Trujillo recognized the massacre and paid US$275,000 to the Haitian government to compensate the families of the victims. 2 Ruben Silie, "Aspectos Socio-Historicos sobre la Inmigracion Haitiana a la Republica Dominicana" in Ruben Silie, Orlando Inoa, Arnold Antonin, eds. La Repzublica Dominicana y Haitifrente al Futuro. 3The current immigration law stipulates that to control clandestine border immigration, border guards have the right to imprison anyone attempting to cross the border without papers. However, border guards allegedly ignore this requirement, collecting bribes instead from the Dominican and Haitian recruiters to facilitate the entry of this cheap source of labor. 82 (iii) Children born of Haitian immigrants in the DR - The Dominicans of Haitian descent, i.e., the children born in the DR to both seasonal and permanent Haitian workers, comprise a distinct third group. Although they are constitutionally entitled to Dominican nationality, the majority of them have not been granted legal status by the Dominican government. Because they are also not technically Haitian, they subsist in an indeterminate legal status. Estimates of their numbers are vague because it is not possible to know how many of these children arrived with their parents and how many were actually born in the DR. It is likely that this group accounts for approximately 50 percent of the undocumented Haitian population;4 and (iv) Political refugees - Political refugees comprise the smallest of these four groups. Because of their special rights as refugees and their small number this report will not directly concentrate on their plight.5 Table 1: Subgroups of Haitian Immigrants in the DR- 1995 Estimates Subgroup Number Haitian Political Refugees 500-1,000 Seasonal Agricultural Workers 15,000-20,000 Undocumented Haitians living permanently in the DR 250,000-300,000 Children of Haitian descent bom in the DR 250,000-300,000 Total 515,500-621,000 Source: UNHCR, Beyond the Bateyes, 1995 pp. 14-15. 6. Legal Status: This is probably the most complex issue surrounding the current debate on the Haitian migration to the DR. A general state of illegality continues to permeate the communities of most Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the DR. The Dominican government has not yet recognized any legal obligation toward this large segment of its working population, facilitating its exploitation and the appropriation of migration rents by recruiters, large landholders and the military. As evidenced by the frequent abuse and exploitation endured by holders of temporary work permits that has been documented by NGOs, it is clear that they possess little or no legal protection. The majority of Haitian immigrant workers exists under the constant threat of deportation, has no leverage to bargain for better pay or working conditions and must accept the "feudal" control imposed by their employers. 7. To this day, their legal status continues to be tied to a 1939 migration law which stipulates that seasonal workers and their families have the right to a temporary work permit but not to the international civil rights and labor codes normally granted to legal immigrants. This work permit, when issued, does not allow for the mobility of the laborer outside of the plantation/place of employment. In addition, braceros are warned not to participate in union activities and their protests have been repressed forcefully by the army on several occasions. They are frequently deceived when paid and at times simply not paid at all but rounded-up and deported back to Haiti when the demand for manual labor declines, or a contractor simply decides he has had enough. Haitians who give birth in the DR often face enormous hurdles in registering their offspring as Dominican citizens, which would permit their children to attend public schools and claim the political and social rights of Dominican nationals.6 4 This group has been known to display a strong anti-Haitian sentiment, adding complexity to the Haitian-Dominican issue. Interviewees in the field pointed out to their resentment towards new Haitian immigrants as they inevitably put pressure on the already fragile presence of the existing Haitians in Dominican society, i.e. new immigrants drag down their potential earnings. Some of them gain access to the Dominican army and have been known to actively participate in abusive practices against Haitian immigrants. s Patrick Gavigan, Beyond the Bateyes, 1995. A report written for the National Coalition for Haitian Rights. Of the estimated 25,000-30,000 Haitians who fled Haiti as refugees after the 1991 coup, 1,075 were granted political refugee status by the UNCHR office in Santo Domingo. The Dominican government, however, granted political asylum to only 35 individuals. Since the return of democracy UNCHR has aided 871 political refugees to return voluntarily to Haiti. 6 Carmen Cedeffo, "La nacionalidad de los descendientes de haitianos nacidos en la Reputblica Domincana," Wilfredo Lozano, ed. La Cuestion Haitiana en Santo Domingo. 83 8. As evidenced by the 1995 report of the NCHR, and confirmed by interviews with NGOs officials for the writing of this report, this pattern of legal abuse has been institutionalized and includes indiscriminate arrests, verbal and physical mistreatment, arbitrary confiscation and destruction of identification documents, and theft of personal belongings. Government officials have been known to refuse to allow rounded-up individuals to notify family or friends before being transported to a sugar mill or deported. The NCHR report goes on to state that the victims of these round-ups are frequently imprisoned and made to wait until enough Haitians have been collected before being delivered to either the cane fields or the border. In sum, as long as there is no enforced political agreement between the two countries, or resolute international pressure, this pattern of abuse and exploitation will continue. 9. Current immigration reform measures by the Dominican government are analyzed in Section C of this review. 10. Socioeconomic Condition: Tightly linked to their precarious legal status is the poor socioeconomic condition of the Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the DR. As confirmed by several social assessments, the latest having been done for this report, their socioeconomic condition remains depressing. 11. Although mostly employed, their pay is well below the lowest paid Dominican worker, and in most cases only just enough to etch a living in the bateyes or urban slums where their majority resides. Their toil of their work is enormous and the very low wage -- approximately less than US$5 per day -- is usually paid in non-currency equivalents to cover for their room and board costs. Also, to this day, cane cutting has been characterized by many NGOs as offering quasi-slavery conditions violating ILOs conventions. 12. Bateyes traditionally lodged the majority of Haitian immigrants. Most of these communities are located in or close to the sugar cane plantations. A 1999 survey conducted by the Comision de Reforma de la Empresa Publica (CREP) estimated that approximately 200,000 people live in 220 bateyes located in 10 sugar mills formerly owned by the Consejo Estatal del Azzucar (CEA). Since the mid-i 980s, the already marginal living conditions of these bateyes have steadily declined as growth in the Dominican agricultural sector has stagnated -- the outgrowth of decades of political mismanagement, corruption, failure to invest in and modernize equipment, and widely fluctuating (usually falling) international prices. In addition, transition issues with respect to the recent privatization of the CEA sugar plantations have placed many workers out of work and limited what scant public investment there was. 13. Most recently, the thriving construction and service sectors of the Dominican economy (together with this year's uncertainty regarding the harvest because of the CEA privatization) have been causing an internal migration of Haitian laborers from bateyes to urban and tourist centers. The number of these new urban slum dwellers is hard to estimate, however, it is obvious that this internal migration is leaving behind in the bateyes the most disadvantaged, including women and children, and creating additional entrenched pockets of poverty in urban slum areas. Living conditions in these slums are comparable to the bateyes left behind, and although closer to the services offered by an urban conglomeration, residents inevitably fall prey to many of its problems, including crime, pollution and congestion. 14. Basic government investment in infrastructure, sanitation, health and education in the bateyes and the urban slum areas have not taken place for the simple reason that these communities do not have a political voice. In fact, government and IFIs have been woefully absent in addressing the basic needs of this population. Any humanitarian aid, be it a latrine or a health post, has been donated by an NGO or a parish community. Housing conditions in the two bateyes and one slum visited for this report varied from bad to worse. Large families shared a tiny roofed structure often built with cardboard, sheet metal or mud. The heat and dust were stifling and a foul smell saturated the air. Makeshift beds, clothing and 84 cooking utensils were stored on the dirt floor. Electricity was a luxury and potable water was available only after a lengthy walk. It was pointed out that the dirt road serving the two bateyes visited would turn into a muddy lake during the rainy season cutting off its inhabitants from the outer world for weeks at a time. 15. Access to health care and education is difficult in the bateyes. Hospitals and clinics are usually located in cities far away and transportation is not always available while permission to travel for medical reasons is not always given. NGOs have set up rudimentary medical posts but a permanent physician is seldom available. Primary education, when available, takes place in overcrowded classrooms, lacks the necessary textbooks and materials, and is often conducted by disinterested teachers. 16. Within this population the women face particularly difficult conditions. While they are the principal providers and caretakers to the children of the community, they are banned by law to participate in certain income-earning manual activities such as cane cutting. Common practice is to permit their presence in a batey only if they are married to, or living with a cane worker. Often, they live with several men from whom they have different children. Overall, they posses few avenues to earn money. Some turn to prostitution to feed themselves and their children. They are also subject to sexual violence with little legal recourse. B. Push and Pull Factors behind the Haitian Migration to the DR 17. Emigration from Haiti: Data on total Haitian emigration, although not accurate due to its mostly clandestine nature and frequent deportations and repatriations by many host countries, points to a strong tendency to leave the country. A 1996 World Bank background paper on Haitian migration, written for the Haiti Poverty Assessment Report, conservatively estimated that approximately 1.5 million Haitians, or 20 percent of the population, lived abroad in 1995, with the DR and the United States possessing the largest numbers, followed by France, Cuba and the Bahamas (Table 2). Since 1995, as the economic and political situation has deteriorated in Haiti, an estimated average of 40,000 Haitians have left their country yearly. The International Labor Organization (ILO) statistics estimate that in the 1990s approximately 12,000 Haitians migrate to the DR every year.7 18. Why do they leave Haiti?: The resurgence of the plight of the so-called "boat people" that had characterized Haitian emigration in the early 1980s reflects the desperation to leave in search of a better future.8 The push factors behind Haitian migration are very strong. They can be best explained as a fight for survival due to the endemic poverty and lack of confidence in the future economic development of their country. Several causes contribute to the perpetuation of these push factors, including: (i) historic inability of the state to provide the most basic social services such as water, sanitation, schooling, etc.; (ii) limited industrial capacity and its inability to develop due to lack of investment and consequent inability to generate employment; and (iii) more recently, soil degradation and erosion which is affecting agricultural output and rural livelihood. Among the push factors, mention should also be made of the strong role of political elements. A recurrent issue has been the physical violence related to Haitian political instability. Fear of the Tontons Macouttes, for example, has produced many political refugees in the late 1980s. 7The most reliable data comes from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Legal and illegal Haitians immigrants to the U.S. between 1995-1998 averaged 20,000 per year. According to Ruben Silie, in his 1998 paper entitled Aspectos-Socio Historicos sobre la Inmigraci6n Haitiana a la Republica Dominicana, most recent sources point to the U.S. as the principal destination for Haitian Immigrants, having received these last 20 years 40-50 percent of the total migrating population. 8 By October of 1998 the U.S. Coast Guard picked up 1,116 Haitians trying to enter the U.S. illegally, compared to 587 recorded for 1997. A June 2000, New York Times Magazine report on Haitian boat people starkly recounts the failed boat journey of several Haitians bound for the U.S. The article points out that the majority of these boat people may actually perish at sea. 85 Table 2: Conservative Estimates of Haitians Residing outside Their Country Country 1996 Estimates USA 575,000 Canada 40,000 Dominican Republic 500,000 Bahamas 40,000 French Guyana 20,000 Cuba 250,000 Europe (mostly France) 50,000 Total 1,475,000 Source: Rubtn Sil, "Aspectos socio-histoncos sobre la inmigraci6n Haitiana a la Republica Dominicana" in Rubtn Sil, Orlando Inoa, Arnold Antonin, eds. La Repdiblica Dominicana y Haitd frente al futuro, pp.10-13; Caroline Tsilikounas, Poverty and Migration in Haiti, 1996 Haiti Poverty Assessment by the World Bank, pp.5-6. 19. Why go to the Dominican Republic?: As described in Box 1 of Section A, substantial migratory trends from Haiti to the DR began in the early 1900s, pulled by a seasonal demand for cheap labor by the U.S. sugar industry which had invested in the DR. From then on, geographic proximity, i.e. an inexpensive and relatively easy destination to reach, and the continued demand for cheap and unskilled labor by the Dominican economy have provided the two main pulling factors behind the Haitian immigration. The economic expansion experienced this last decade by the DR (Table 3), particularly in the construction and tourism industries, provides an additional incentive for this trend to continue, as well as contributing to an internal migration from bateyes to urban areas as mentioned in Section A. Indeed, although historically Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent were exclusively found in the bateyes, they are now spread all across Dominican territory engaging in all sorts of low skilled activities. 20. Who are they?: The majority of the braceros originate from a very poor social rural environment lacking in physical and human capital and few of them possess secondary education and most of them are illiterate. According to a survey carried out by the Facultad LatinoAmericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO),9 the majority of their numbers is composed of young people, whose age lies somewhere between 20-40 years, 75 percent of which are men. It is also apparent that the women who emigrate do so at an older age then the men. Around 50 percent of the men are not married while 35 percent of them posses at least one child. To this day, there are very few Haitian immigrant families established in the DR and the survey concludes that the migratory trend is composed mostly of single individuals or individuals who prefer to leave their families behind. Most of the immigrants live with friends, or work partners and do go back and forth between the DR and Haiti on a regular basis. Finally, the non-braceros tend to come from Haitian urban centers rather than the countryside as is commonly perceived by most Dominicans, and appear to posses a slightly higher level of education. Overall, they are relatively more flexible and mobile since they are not tied to a collective work contract, as is the case with most braceros, and thus more independent and better placed to bargain and somewhat improve their working condition. 9 Equipo FLACSO, Prejuicio y Segmentacion de la Fuerza de Trabajo. La Inmigracion Haitiana en Republica Dominicana, Version Preliminar, June 2000. 86 Table 3. Economic and Social Comparison between the DR and Haiti Economic Indicators DR Haiti Population (1999) -in thousands 8,404 7,771 Population growth (1991-99) 2.3 1.8 GDP (1999) -m.p. 1990 US$ millions 11,606 2,352 GNP per capita (1999)" 1,910 460 GDP growth (98-99) 8.1 1.5 GDP growth (91-99) 5.5 -1.2 Social Indicators (199S) Illiteracy 17% 52% Infant mortality rate 40 per 1/000 71 per 1/000 Access to safe water 73% 39% Life expectancy 71 years 54 years "GNP per capita calculated by Atlas Method. Source: Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators database of the World Bank, World Bank staff estimates, Intemnational Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund. 21. Other factors add complexity to the migration pattern between Haiti and the DR. For example, the routine practice of hiring unscrupulous buscones to recruit Haitian labor either deceptively or forcibly, and the Dominican military helping with transport from the border has facilitated the entry of Haitians.1° Conversely, the frequent deportations and round-ups by the Dominican army have played a role in stemming this influx. Trujillo's massacre in 1937, a wave of deportations in 1981, Balaguer's decree in 1991 which ordered the deportation of all Haitian cane workers under 16 or over 60 years of age and a military-directed campaign deporting several thousand Haitians in 1993 are four notable examples. In April of this year alone, over 700 Haitians were deported by the Dominican army and dumped at the Haitian border, according to the Haitian Office of National Migration. Finally, on the other hand, factors inhibiting the Haitian immigrant from returning home, include hope for a better future (often victim to false promises by contractors) and pride, manifesting itself in the fear to return home empty-handed." 22. Impact on the two economies: Migration has an ambiguous impact on both island economies. In Haiti, emigration acts as an escape valve releasing pressure on social services and provides much needed revenue through international remittances, but it also results in a serious brain drain whose impact on the economy can only be measured in the long-run. In the DR, the unique push-pull factors tend to create a supply of Haitian labor which is very elastic, thus providing a quasi-endless supply of cheap labor. This inevitably affects the standard of living of Dominicans, especially the unskilled. In fact, because Haitians are available at lower wages and because they keep Dominican wages low, the incentive to modernize and invest in labor-saving technology is weakened, and this keeps the productivity of unskilled Dominican labor at a lower level than it would have been in the absence of Haitian immigration. Also, the highly elastic supply of Haitian immigrants tends to neutralize the poverty effect of policies that raise the demand for unskilled labor, i.e. social programs targeted to the poor may become more expensive if they also benefit Haitians. In this case, more Haitians would migrate, as they know that they can benefit from these programs. The same holds true of economic growth -- unskilled wages become less responsive to the increased labor demand associated with growth and, therefore, most of the poor may to Buscones have actually been prohibited from operating in 1990. Nevertheless, this has not been enforced and the practice runs unabated as evidenced regularly by the press and confirmed by many of the people interviewed for the report. Moreover, there have been frequent denunciations of the Dominican army, claiming that army men are involved in the recruiting of Haitian workers for Dominican farms. The farms that are in need of labor pay the arny men. The Haitians pay the army members up to RD$800 for a chance to earn a living at a Dominican farm. Father Pierre Ruquoy of Pastoral Dominico-Haitiana de Barahona and coordinator of the Centro Puente Neyba says that many immigrants have the wrong vision of where they are going to be taken to and end up being sent to sugar plantations. Father Ruquoy in a May 2000 press release, characterized the migration as a "pacific invasion of Haitians" and estimated the flow at about 30,000 in the past months. PIn several interviews with NGO representatives and residents of Bateyes these two factors were repeatedly mentioned. 87 obtain limited benefits out of the growth process. Instead, a rise in demand for unskilled labor results in an increase in Haitian immigration, as occurred in the high-growth period of 1995-1999, less gain for the poor, and possibly a more unequal distribution of income. Haitian immigrants may also exert negative externalities on poor Dominicans by limiting their access to public goods like health services for example. If congestion effects are sufficiently strong, they can outweigh the direct beneficial effects of immigration. This may be the case in the border area where both the quality and quantity of a number of public goods are especially limited. Finally, immigrants may exert negative externalities like introduction of disease or deterioration of the social fabric. Maurice Schiff and Ramon Lopez, in their accompanying papers for this Poverty Assessment, provide a more detailed analysis on the elasticity of supply of Haitians to the DR and the impact this bears on the Dominican poor and the economy. C Policies Implemented by Dominican Authorities and the Role of NGOs in Resolving the Haitian Immigration Issue 23. Responsibility: The Haitian migrant's decision to seek a better future in an historically unfriendly socioeconomic environment is the sad product of the prevalence of push versus pull factors. Dominican large landowners, which often belong to the government and have invested in industry as well, have clearly taken advantage and exploited this imbalance. It could be argued that the Dominican society has acquired a responsibility and a moral obligation for this population it has attracted. Moreover, the Dominican government itself has been implicated in employing the services of many Haitian laborers through its ownership of the CEA sugar mills and its role in the construction and road building industry, which depend largely upon public work contracts. 24. Response of the Dominican Government: Several initiatives have been undertaken by the Dominican authorities to address the status of the Haitians and the Dominicans of Haitian descent residing in the Dominican Republic. They have rarely been enforced, however, possessing many loopholes and serving mainly as buffers to criticism from the international community. The repeated concerns of many NGOs on the continued exploitation of this population point to the failure of these initiatives to address the problem. Box 2: Balaguer's 1990 Presidential Decree (Decreto 417/90) Ex-President Balaguer offers a notable example of the DR's disposition of appeasing international criticism early this past decade. In 1991, the Bush Administration's Trade Representative Office ended its review of Dominican labor practices and decided to extend trade benefits based upon the improvements allegedly brought by Balaguer's Presidential Decree in 1990 (Decree 417/90) which addressed the questionable labor practices used on the Haitian and Haitian-Dominican population. However, the promises contained in the 1990 Decree to appease the Bush administration have been rarely enforced and remain largely unmet. The legal status of Haitian workers has not yet been nomnalized, while the registration procedure initiated by the Department of Migration in 1991 has reached only a small part of the population of Haitian descent residing in the DR. Overall, these workers continue to be exploited by the Dominican industry in much the same way as before. Emboldened by the positive U.S. trade review, Balaguer than proceeded with another decree deporting all Haitians cane workers under 16 or over 60 years of age. In the process 25,000-50,000 Haitians, many with no connection to the cane industry, were forced out or fled voluntarily to avoid military round-ups or in fear of further govemment action. 25. The latest proposals addressing Dominican nationality and immigration norms aimed at controlling the migration of Haitians to the Dominican Republic have been heavily criticized as once again inconclusive. In 1995, the Director General of Migration proposed a reform of the governing migration law that then became the Ley de Migracion (95-39). However, this law together with a new proposal currently being discussed does not yet address in a definitive manner the legal rights of this population, fails to address actual migration patterns and practices in Dominican agriculture and completely ignores the long-time undocumented Haitian residents. An in-depth analysis on the subject is provided by the 88 Red de Encuentro Dominico Haitiano "Jacques Viau, " a local NGO, founded in 1995 to help defend the rights of this population. Amongst other things, it points to the proposed changes to the Dominican constitution which shift the basis of Dominican nationality from jus soli (birth in country) to jus sanguini (birth to a Dominican national) thereby maintaining the state of illegality for the majority of the Dominican-Haitian population. 26. There is evidence, nevertheless, that the two governments are beginning to discuss concrete proposals to address the political and economic bases of the migration. Four years ago official diplomatic relations were established for the first time between Haiti and the DR and steps have been taken to improve cooperation. Spurred by international criticism and NGO action, the public debate on the Haitian issue is now much more open in Dominican society. For example, this past April, a peace march from Santo Domingo to Port-au-Prince was staged to deliver a message of brotherhood and solidarity to Haiti in the hopes of finding peaceful solutions to the problems between the two countries. Also, through a World Bank sponsored consensus building initiative, representatives of the Dominican government, political parties, private sector NGOs, and civil society participated in roundtable discussions on the Haitian Immigration issue whose findings and conclusions were presented in a Public Act in December of 1999.12 Spillover of this initiative was the February 2000 meeting between the two governments to discuss ways to integrate their economies through development of the border area. 27. The Role of NGOs: Local parish groups and grass roots NGOs have been the only organizations committing what scant resources they have to the alleviation of the Haitian and Dominico-Haitian residents of the bateyes and urban slums. All have condemned the appalling conditions in which the cane cutter and the Haitian manual labor at large work and live. As the DR develops into a wealthier economy, international donor funds are fading away from targeting direct poverty programs, perhaps with the illusion that the State will take over this responsibility. Hurricane Georges, which hit the DR in 1999, was actually a welcome relief as it helped mobilize much needed financing from the multilateral and bilateral donors that was eventually channeled by the smaller grass-roots organizations toward the needs of batey and slum areas. 28. In researching this report, a World Bank team met with several of these parish groups and NGOs, including members of the Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados and the Centro de Estudios Sociales P. Juan Montalvo. A 1997 survey conducted by these two umbrella organizations identified 73 NGOs that are inspired by the plight of the Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the DR -- 12 of which are religious groups of different Christian denominations. Albeit small, their impact has been invaluable in providing basic assistance and in acting as public watchdogs and fostering discussion within Dominican society. Their observations have been supported by large international organizations and interest groups over the last 20 years, including the ILO, the Organization of American States, NCHR, Americas Watch and Caribbean Watch, as well as the U.S. Trade Department. D. Conclusions and Recommendations 29. One cannot talk about true poverty reduction in any society when such a large portion of the poor is consistently ignored. Both countries of Hispaniola, as well as the international community, have a moral obligation to intervene and remedy this issue, which has now become an almost intractable problem. 30. Throughout the years, several economic, legal and humanitarian recommendations have been advanced to solve the immigration issue. 12 "Mesa de Trabajo: Desarrollo Fronterizo y Relaciones con Haiti" en Resultados. Proceso de Concertaci6n sobre Prioridades del Desarrollo Nacional (Segunda Etapa), Resumenes Ejecutivos, Santo Domingo, Repuiblica Dominicana, Diciembre 2000. 89 31. Most of these recommendations do offer plausible solutions to different parts of the problem; nevertheless, the political will to enact and enforce these solutions has been lacking. Fundamental to this problem is the pervasive prejudice still prevalent in the DR towards Haitians. Developing a campaign in the DR to sensitize the society to the plight of these people may, therefore, serve as a starting point -- because, in the end, in a modem democratic state the political will to enact change can only come from the people. As long as Haitians are regarded solely as a source of exploitable and cheap labor, hence substitutable, rather than an integrated and dynamic ethnic community, hence complementary, the problem will remain. 32. As mentioned in Section C, the public debate is growing and increased national and international NGO activity is producing some effect. Proposals such as the NCHR plan to organize a national NGO forum in each country to focus on solutions and to build a bridge between civil society organization in the two states offer a welcome step in the right direction. An NGO strategy would serve as an effort to develop national and bilateral NGO networks aimed at improving Haitian-Dominican relations at the level of civil society and providing a countervailing voice in the debates in both countries. The IFIs should recognize this opening in the debate and interact more closely with these NGOs, to offer needed financial resources and technical support. In the spirit of the Comprehensive Development Framework,13 this approach could advance if IFIs and the NGOs work in partnership with local authorities and civil society. The synergies created could then serve as a platform for better legislative proposals on three kev issue areas: (i) On-Going Migration - The two states should begin to normalize the labor flow within the context of an overhaul of the DR's immigration and naturalization system. To start, the immigration status of current DR residents of Haitian origin should be legally determined once and for all. This would allow [at least] half of the Haitian immigrant population to begin new lives as recognized members of Dominican society - with the full rights and obligations this entails. Such a positive first step should be the prelude to tough and enforced bilateral commercial or migrant labor agreements that would address the status of the remaining Haitian migrants and better govern the flow of future workers. Of course, the Dominican authorities should take the lead on enforcing border controls since Haiti, as discussed in Section B, would have little incentive to stem the flow as it provides a much needed relief to its ailing economy and social services. To undertake these tasks, it would be critical to determine the size and composition of the Haitian populations in the DR through a complete and proper census. On the Dominican side this would set the stage for a comprehensive and fair program of naturalization and, consequently, justifiable deportation in certain cases. From this census, both countries could also better quantify the impact of their policies, projected taxation revenue and social safety budgets. The migration policy should aim at limiting the adverse impact that migration from unskilled Haitians has on unskilled Dominicans. First, the migration rents should be taken away from recruiters, large Dominican landholders, the military of both Haiti and the DR, and more recently the construction sector, and reallocated to the poor Haitians and Dominicans. Both governments should come to some cooperative arrangement so as to appropriate the migration rents: Haiti exploiting its monopoly power over the supply of Haitians, which could be done through a fee on passport, and the DR exploiting its monopsony power over the employment of Haitians which could be implemented by imposing a fee on entry visas. Second, the gains from migration which benefit the Dominican society as a whole should be 1 The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) represents a new way of doing business for the Bank and its members. It is an approach to development that helps countries become the leaders and owners of their own development actions. The CDF is essentially a process; it sets out country-driven mechanisms for development stakeholders to reach consensus and work together and allows donors - including the World Bank - to be more selective in what they do to help countries achieve concrete results. The CDF is currently being piloted in 13 countries, including the Dominican Republic. 90 reoriented towards poor Dominicans. For example, a tax could be levied on the hiring of unskilled Haitian workers. Third, the DR may want to restrict the number of immigrants so as to reduce the congestion impact of immigration on public services. This could be done by adequately designing the entry fees. Fourth, to prevent diluting social programs the Dominican government may target Dominican families. This may be considered unethical but one may argue that the DR has no moral responsibility to reduce poverty among Haitians. Instead, this moral duty falls on Haiti's richer neighbors and on Haitian elite. The final objective of the migration policy should be to differentiate unskilled Dominicans from unskilled Haitian migrants. Once appropriated by the state, migration rents and immigration gains could be used to invest in education in the DR. In the long-run, this would differentiate unskilled Dominican labor from Haitian immigrant labor and turn them into complements rather than substitutes, in which case, increased immigration might raise the demand for Dominican labor rather than lower it. Also, land reforms through the distribution of property rights to small holders would be a way to raise the quantity of the assets they own and differentiate them from Haitian immigrants (ii) Human Rights - This should become an on-going issue on both sides of the border. On the Dominican side, the situation would be greatly ameliorated by normalizing the immigration status of undocumented residents, as mentioned above, and also incorporating enforceable labor and other human rights protections into the bilateral trade, migrant labor and migration accords. On the Haitian side, strengthening and enforcing laws against the practice of abusive buscones would be a minor step forward. However, any real progress toward protection of Haitian citizens in the DR and in Haiti itself would of course be best addressed once military control of the Haitian population comes to an end. Applying forceful diplomatic pressure through international forums such as the UN Tribunal Against Human Rights Abuse could help curb ad hoc deportations. (iii) Trade and Joint Economic Development Issues - In this regard, the most sustainable approach to easing migration pressures in the DR must include the fostering of opportunities for long-term trade and economic development planning on the island as a whole. A shift in focus in the economic and political development efforts from the DR to the island of Hispaniola could encourage the promise of joint economic aid to develop strategies for regional economic development projects. The recent debate on development of the border area as described in the "Mesa de Trabajo: Desarrollo Fronterizo y Relaciones con Haiti" to help promote growth on the whole island is an important step in this direction. However, such strategies would need refocusing, as the great part of the border region in itself is not economically viable -- there are no vital urban centers or ports that could sustain large business investment operations.'4 It would make more sense to support economically viable projects in Haiti that could absorb local labor and reduce emigration to the DR. Poverty reduction measures in Haiti should, perhaps, be planned and financed as part of an overall poverty reduction package for the region, including both Haiti and the DR. Nevertheless, the political implications for such a shift in strategy could prove daunting. 33. Addressing these key areas for a global solution requires a combination of pressure and support by the major economic and political actors in the region, the United States and the European Community, and international and regional organizations concerned with development and migration issues. Real progress toward protection of Haitians in the DR would require strong political will to go against powerful Dominican political groups including large producers, constructors and the army. Thus far, both the pressure and the support have either been too weak or too small and, thus far, the implementation of consistent and well defined policies has eluded both governments. 14 An initiative to invest in a Free Trade Zone in the Manzanillo area that would employ Haitian day laborers is currently being explored by some influential local business men and appears to have gained the support of the Dominican government. 91 BIBLIOGRAPHY Below is the list of the publications, papers and other reference material, including web sites, seminars, and government statistics used as background for this paper. It serves as a partial list to the numerous literary contributions on the subject, but it nevertheless provides a good starting point for the reader interested in reading further. Publications Abbott, Elizabeth: "Haiti: An Insider's History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers", Simon & Schuster, 1988 Danticat, Edwige: "The Farming on Bones," Penguin USA, September 1999. Gavigan, Patrick: "Beyond the Bayetes," National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), 1995 Lozano, Wilfredo, ed: "La Cuestion Haitiana En Santo Domingo. Migraci6n Internacional, Desarrollo y Relaciones Inter-Estatales entre Haiti y Repuiblica Dominicana," University of Miami, 1992 Moya Pons, Frank, ed., "El Batey. Estudio Socioeconomico del los Bateyes del Consejo Estatal del Azucar," Fondo para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales, inc., Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana, 1986. Silie, Ruben, ed.: "La Repuiblica Dominicana y Haiti Frente al Futuro," Fondo para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales, inc., Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 1998 Papers Derecho y Migraciones-Estudios Sociales Juan Montalvo, Editorial: "Kosovo, Timor Chechenia, Repuiblica Dominicana,...: Derechos Humanos y Deber de Injerencia," Derecho y Migraciones-Estudios Sociales Juan Montalvo, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 1999 Evetsz, Franc Baez: "Migrantes Haitianos en un Barrio de Santo Domingo," Derecho y Migraciones- Estudios Sociales Juan Montalvo, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 1999 Fondo para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales, inc.: "Prejuicio y Segmentaci6n de la Fuerza de Trabajo. La Inmigraci6n Haitiana en Repuiblica Dominicana. Versi6n Preliminar" Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, July 2000 Gerdsmeier, Katrin: "Los Trabajadores Migrantes Haitianos en la Republica Dominicana: Su protecci6n en el Derecho Intemacional," Derecho y Migraciones-Estudios Sociales Juan Montalvo, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 1999 International Council of Voluntary Agencies: "The Situation of Haitians in the Caribbean: Draft Report of an NGO Mission," July 1994 Lopez, Ramon: "Rural Poverty in Dominican Republic: Market Failures and New Policies," University of Maryland, June 2000 92 Ruquoy, Padre Pedro: "Estudio sobre Conciones de Vida, Laboral y Status Legal de los Trabajadores Haitianos o de Origen Haitiano en Bateyes y Zona Cafetalera del Suroeste," Diocesis de Barahona- Pastoral Haitiana, Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana, April 1996 Schiff, Maurice: "The Effect of Macroeconomic Policies on Rural Poverty in the Dominican Republic or The Poverty Impact of Migration and the Private Appropriation of Public Goods," University of Maryland, June 2000 Tsilikounas, Caroline: "Poverty and Migration in Haiti: Does Migration Help Alleviate Poverty?," World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Region, Haiti Poverty Assessment, March 1996 Veiga, Americo B.: "Reflexi6n a Partir del Inventario de Organizaciones No Gubemnamentales que Trabajan con Haitianos/as y Domicanos/as de Ascendencia Haitiana en Republica Dominicana," De Este Lado De La Frontera - Centro de Estudios Sociales P. Juan Montalvo, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 1998 Miscellaneous "Compte Rendu Du Seminaire Sur La Migration Et La Politique Migratoire En Haiti" Seminaire sur la Migration et la Politique Migratoire en Haiti, June 1999 Batey Relief Alliance. A Foundation For the Betterment of Haitian Migrant Farm Workers In the Dominican Republic: http://www.batey relief.org/Bateyl.htm [Accessed 19 May 1999]. Cabral, Carlos D., "Caracterizaci6n Socioecon6mica y Cultural de los Dominicanos de Ascendencia Haitiana", Seminario "Migraci6n, Mercado de Trabajo y Relaciones Intereitnicas, Organizado por la Facultad LatinoAmericana de Ciencias Sociales, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, December 1999 Comisi6n de Reforma de la Empresa Puiblica, "Reforma del Consejo Estatal del Azucar - Diagnostico Social de los Bateyes," Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, May 1999 De Este Lado De La Frontera - Centro de Estudios Sociales P. Juan Montalvo, "Catalogo de Organizaciones e Instituciones que trabajan con Haitianos/as y Dominicanos/as de Ascendencia Haitiana en Republica Dominicana," Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 1999 Haiti Study Group, Info Circular, The Georgetown University Caribbean Project - Haiti Program, Number 8, February 1999 Red de Encuntro Dominico Haitiano: Jacques Viau, "Documento de Analisis Critico del Anteproyecto de Codigo de Migraci6n," Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 2000 U.S. Department of Justice-Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Policy and Planning, Statistics Branch "Legal Immigration, Fiscal Year 1998," Annual Report. Washington D.C., May 1999 93 Managing Social Risks in the Dominican Republic Tarsicio CastaReda and Edgar A. Victoria Yeb' A. Executive Summary 1. The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations on the design and implementation of a comprehensive Social Protection (SP) strategy in the Dominican Republic. The report contains recommendations on social policies and programs, which can be effective in protecting the poor and in managing social risks. To this end, the report: (a) evaluates social indicators and social spending in the Dominican Republic within the Latin American context; (b) identifies key social risks and vulnerable groups in the Dominican Republic; (c) analyzes current government SP programs (content, coverage and gaps) drawing attention to key issues for the Government to consider in developing its SP strategy; and (d) discusses options for dealing with these issues, along with guiding principles for program design and implementation, drawing on international experience where relevant. 2. This report is organized as follows. Section A presents the setting of the Dominican economy, the evolution and characteristics of the poor and some of the problems facing current social protection programs. Section B presents an overview of social indicators and social spending in the Dominican Republic within the Latin American context. Section C develops a conceptual framework for identifying key risks and target groups in the Dominican Republic, following similar studies by the Bank in Argentina and Jamaica. Section D analyses the effectiveness of the current network of social protection programs at reaching these groups, and the usefulness/cost-effectiveness of the benefits provided. Section E concludes by highlighting priority issues for social protection policy in the Dominican Republic. Section F sets out some principles for designing and implementing a SP strategy in the Dominican Republic. Annex I provides a detailed matrix on government social protection programs in the Dominican Republic. 3. The Setting. The Dominican economy has been performing admirably since 1991, following a stabilization program, which eliminated the fiscal deficit and implemented trade and financial sector liberalization reforms. Average GDP growth from 1991 to 1999 stood at 6 percent, and has been especially strong in the last four years with an average of 8 percent. Income per capita has consequently increased from US$860 in 1991 to US$2,082 in 1999 (DR Poverty Report. World Bank, 2000d). The unemployment rate was 13.8 percent in 1999, which affected primarily teenagers. As a consequence of both growth and reduction in the unemployment rate, the percentages of poor households have declined from about 22 percent in 1992 to about 15 percent in 1998, according to estimates by the DR Poverty Report (World Bank, 2000d). 4. Entrenched "hard core" poverty is widespread in marginal urban areas and especially in rural areas, which appear to have been affected minimally by economic growth. The poor of the Dominican Republic share many of the characteristics identified in many Latin American countries. The poor have larger families, and are concentrated in rural areas. Their income often derives from agriculture and self-employment (DR Poverty Report, World Bank 2000d). Of the people belonging to the lowest income decile, 62 percent reside in rural areas, while 38 percent reside in urban areas. Of people belonging to the thirty poorest percent of the population, 65 percent use outdoor latrines, 44 l This report was prepared by Tarsicio Castafieda (Consultant) and Edgar Victoria (World Bank, LCCDO) with the assistance of Luisa Fernandez, under the supervision of Philippe Auffret (World Bank, LCCDO), who provided detailed comments and suggestions for this report. Ana Maria Arriagada and Kathy Lindert from the World Bank provided many useful comments and suggestions. Rita Mena (Consultant) provided very valuable inputs for Annex 1. 95 percent are without access to in-house running water, 36 percent of households suffer from over- crowding and 15 percent still have mud floors. 5. An analysis of social indicators and social spending, including safety nets, in the Dominican Republic leads to the following conclusions. First, the aggregate size of social spending in the Dominican Republic is much lower than that of comparable LAC countries, but this does not fully explain why social indicators are so much worse than those of other LAC countries. Second, too little spending is allocated for education and health, while too much funding is allocated for housing, food assistance and other untargeted programs. Third, social spending fails to efficiently target the poorest, especially in secondary and university education where middle income and higher income groups benefit the most from public spending. Housing programs benefit blue-collar workers and other middle income groups rather than the poor and most vulnerable who need them most. Fourth, the size of safety net programs in terms of GDP is comparable to that of other countries in LAC (around 1.1 percent), but its distribution among programs in the Dominican Republic is highly inadequate for the risks facing poor and vulnerable groups (see below). Almost two-thirds of spending on safety net programs finance general food subsidies (this includes cooked meals for the open public in popular restaurants, subsidized food sales in open markets and the distribution of food baskets to the public) and housing programs going to state workers, teachers and other middle-class individuals. A minimum portion of the spending for safety nets goes to needy and at-risk children less than four years old, unemployed and illiterate youths and young adults, the incapacitated, and the elderly poor. 6. To analyze the adequacy and effectiveness of social spending, especially safety net programs in the Dominican Republic we proceeded as follows. First, we classified the population by age group from birth to death. Second, we identify key risks by age group, and discuss possible measures to address these risks, distinguishing between risk prevention (which are in the sphere of social insurance) and coping measures (primarily social assistance), relying when possible on international experience. Third, we identified critical gaps that need to be filled. The results are as follows: 7. The Dominican Republic is not adequately covering major risks faced by key at risk groups. First, most social programs do not address the main risks of the poor and general population. There are in fact many programs whose effectiveness and impact are questionable, such as the food distribution programs. Second, there are great inefficiencies in social spending. A large share of expenditures is devoted to administrative expenditures and personnel, especially in health and education. Third, there is a myriad of safety nets programs (about 42) representing a budget of about US$196 million in 1999 (1.1 percent of GDP), which are not coordinated, have questionable benefits, have no single uniform targeting criteria, and have no evaluation studies. It is recommended that the Dominican government makes a complete change in programs and spending priorities towards early child development programs, primary and secondary education, youth training and job search programs, income support to parents conditional on sending their children to school, direct income support (DIS) to small farmers to protect them from any negative effects of agricultural support policy reforms, assistance pensions for the elderly indigent, and low-cost housing and land titling programs. It has been estimated that addressing the urgent needs of the poorest 10 percent of the Dominican population in the above mentioned priorities (not including DIS) would cost about US$70 million (only about 0.5 percent of GDP) a figure well within the envelope of current safety net programs. Food assistance programs such as the Comedores Econ6micos, Alimentos para Todos and food baskets from the Plan Social should be eliminated and the funds directed to the above priorities. Also, housing programs should be rationalized and targeted to only the poorest segments of the population. 96 8. The following is a brief summary of main risks faced by the Dominican population following the age-group classification used in the report, and recommendations to address them. 9. 0-4 Year Old Age Group: The major risk facing poor children in this age group is the lack of cognitive stimulation which results in intellectual impairment, low human capital formation, permanent losses in productivity and chronic poverty. Existing programs in the Dominican Republic provide coverage to only about 4.0 percent of poor children. There are approximately 140,000 children in this age group belonging to the first income decile and 350,000 belonging to the third income decile who are not covered by early stimulation programs. Recommended strategies to assist this group in coping with the consequences of poverty include early stimulation programs for children in poor families operated by communities or NGOs with funding provided by the government. 10. The 5 Year Old Age Group2: The major risks facing poor children in this age group are developmental lags and learning difficulties due to a lack of preparation for primary school. There are an estimated 17,000 children in this age cohort belonging to the poorest decile and 43,000 belonging to the poorest thirty percent who are uncovered by pre-primary education and who should have priority for enrollment. The key recommended preventive strategy for this age group is to increase access to pre- primary education. 11. The 6-13 Year OMd Age Group: The major risk for poor 6-13 year olds is low human capital formation. In the Dominican Republic, this age group presents very low school enrollment rates (66 percent of relevant age group, for poorest income decile). There are an estimated 70,000 children in this cohort belonging to the poorest decile and 162,000 belonging to the poorest thirty percent who are not involved with the educational system. The effective recommended social protection strategy is to make every effort to enroll these children in school and induce them to attend regularly. This could be achieved by improving the access and the quality of primary education. In addition, strategies could be devised to reduce the private costs of education through scholarships and/or targeted income support to families that is contingent upon the child's school attendance. 12. The 14-24 Year Old Age Group: The major risk for poor youths in this age group is low human capital accumulation and consequent deficient skills arising from incomplete and/or poor quality secondary school education leading to high unemployment and teen frustration. Secondary school net enrollment rates are very low: 29.2 percent for teenagers in the poorest income decile, and 36.2 percent in the lowest three income deciles. There are an estimated 27,000 children in the 14-17 year-old age cohort belonging to the poorest decile and 70,000 belonging to the poorest thirty percent who are not attending school. Teenage unemployment rates are over 40 percent. Recommended risk prevention strategies for the poor in this age group include the promotion and completion of secondary school enrollment, coupled with labor intensive growth. Recommended risk coping measures include scholarships and income support tied to school attendance, targeted income support for those unable to work, targeted social services to build self-esteem, improve work attitudes, and social capital skills. Also, strategies can be designed to increase employment opportunities through partnerships with the private sector to increase on-the-job training and job search opportunities. 13. The 25-64 Year Old Age Group: The major risk facing poor 25-64 years olds is low income due to underemployment and unemployment. Due to the excellent performance of the Dominican economy in the last 10 years, unemployment has dropped, particularly for prime age workers (World 2 * The 5 year group was considered separately because formal pre-primary education offered by the Ministry of Education starts at this age. 97 Bank, 1999). There are an estimated 31,000 people unemployed in this cohort belonging to the poorest decile and 81,500 people belonging to the poorest thirty percent. The key risk prevention strategy for the working age poor is a sound macroeconomic policy framework that promotes labor intensive growth and employment creation. Also, more labor market flexibility is needed, particularly for the industrial sector. Possible risk coping strategies include income transfers for those not able to work and for the very indigent, and direct income support payments to small farmers. Targeted on-the-job training and job search programs may be effective in generating some employment and income benefits for the working age poor. 14. The 65 and Older Age Group: The main risk for this age group is little or no income, thus reducing their chances of a decent survival. The IDSS arid/or assistance pensions granted by the SESPAS do not cover the majority of the elderly poor in the Dominican Republic. It has been estimated that only about 4.0 percent of the elderly belonging to the poorest thirty percent of the population are covered by any pension. There are an estimated 50,000 elderly in this cohort belonging to the poorest decile and 135,000 belonging to the poorest thirty percent who are uncovered by any pension. The best risk prevention strategy for the elderly is to implement a social security reform, which increases coverage for all of the population in the future. In the short-run, the best coping strategy is to provide them with adequate income support in order to have a minimum consumption capacity. 15. Risks Not Related to Age: Major risks which are not related to age in the Dominican Republic include those resulting from poor health care coverage, and inadequate housing and basic sanitary services such as potable water and sewage. Ensuring access to health care will require reforms to improve primary health care, improve efficiency and promote participation of the private sector in health insurance. Housing and sanitary services strategies include increased access to land titling, improving the capacity of the capital market to provide mortgage loans to middle and upper income families, so as to reduce and/or eliminate the pressure these groups exert over government subsidies, targeting housing subsidies only to the poorest, provide land titling subsidies, and finance resettlement and slum upgrading programs as well as investment in basic infrastructure development. Some of these measures have begun to be implemented under the RESURE project in Santo Domingo. 16. Priority Issues for Designing and Implementing a Social Protection Strategy in the Dominican Republic: include a) developing a coherent SP protection policy framework (elements of which are contained in this report), which include explicit political decisions to target social expenditures to the poorest, b) restructuring programs and institutions so as to be able to find resources, currently poorly allocated without the need for increased resource reallocation from other sectors or increased tax revenues which normally take time and difficult political decisions, c) designing and implementing appropriate targeting instruments, and d) developing appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems. A new Living Standards Measurement Survey explicitly designed to monitor critical risks and the impact of programs can be developed to complement the on-going household surveys made by the Central Bank for the National Accounts. B. Introduction 17. The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations on the design of a comprehensive Social Protection (SP) strategy in the Dominican Republic. The report contains recommendations on social services that benefit the poor and on the programs that could be effective in protecting the poor and managing social risks. To this end, the report: (a) evaluates social indicators and social spending in the Dominican Republic within the Latin American context; (b) identifies key social risks and vulnerable groups in the Dominican Republic; (c) analyzes current government SP programs 98 (content, coverage and gaps) drawing attention to key issues for the Government to consider in developing its SP strategy; and (d) discusses options for dealing with these issues, along with guiding principles for program design and implementation. 18. Following the 1991 stabilization program, which eliminated the fiscal deficit and made some trade and financial sector liberalization reforms, economic performance in the Dominican Republic has been remarkable with high economic growth and low inflation. Average GDP growth from 1991 to 1999 stood at 6 percent, and has been especially strong in the last four years averaging 8 percent. Income per capita has consequently increased from US$860 in 1991 to US$2,082 in 1999 (DR Poverty Report. World Bank, 2000d). Construction and other more liberal, open sectors of the economy such as tourism, communication and production in the Free Trade Zones, have been the driving forces of growth. Industry and agriculture, however, have been lagging behind the dynamism shown by other sectors. 19. Economic growth has had a positive impact on employment. The overall unemployment rate stood at 13.8 percent, representing an estimated 500,000 people in 1999, according to figures from the Labor Force Survey, published by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.3 Unemployment has been concentrated most heavily among teenagers4 (39.1 percent in 1996 and 28.3 percent in 1999). The unemployment rate of 20-59 year olds has been much lower than those of teenagers and has declined from an average of 14.3 percent in 1996 to 12.5 percent in 1999. However, the largest reduction in unemployment rates has occurred for the 40-59 year olds whose unemployment rate declined from 8.4 percent in 1996 to 5.2 percent in 1999. As a consequence of both growth and the reduction in unemployment, the percentage of poor households has declined from about 22 percent in 1992 to about 15 percent in 1998, according to estimates by the DR Poverty Report (World Bank, 2000d). 20. The government has not, however, seized the opportunity of high economic growth and unemployment reduction to undertake structural reforms that, in the long-run, would sustain economic progress, improve overall economic efficiency and improve income distribution in the Dominican economy. Only recently have long-awaited measures such as the privatization of deficit-producing electricity and sugar companies been completed. Moreover, the agenda of reforms before Congress have started to include important issues such as tariff reform, social security reform including pensions and health care, the budget and public accounting reform laws, along with the financial and monetary reform law --which will address current weak financial regulations (World Bank, 1999)-- and reform the procurement law, all of which are expected to move the Dominican Republic more in line with reforms made in other countries in the LAC region. 21. Despite the achievements in poverty reduction, poverty continues to be the main social problem in the Dominican Republic. Entrenched "hard core" poverty is widespread in marginal urban areas and especially in rural areas, which appear to have been affected minimally by economic growth. The poor of the Dominican Republic share many of the characteristics identified in many Latin American countries. The poor have larger families, and are concentrated in rural areas. Their income often derives from agriculture and self-employment (DR Poverty Report, World Bank 2000d). Of the people belonging to the lowest income decile, 62 percent reside in rural areas, while 38 percent reside in urban areas. Of people belonging to the thirty poorest percent of the population, 65 percent use outdoor latrines, 44 percent are without access to in-house running water, 36 percent of households suffer from over-crowding and 15 percent still have mud floors. Also, poor families have a relatively larger 3According to the Labor Force Survey, unemployed people are the portion of the working age population who declared not to have a job in the reference period, but were actively looking for one, either by themselves or through a third party, plus people who did not get a job and did not continue looking for one or were waiting for results of application for employment. For the purpose of the survey the unemployed peoplelO-14 year olds are not registered because this age group has an exceptional treatment in the category of occupied. 4 Age group 10-19 years. 99 proportion of children and elderly people than the non-poor, and a lower proportion of working age adults, leading to greater dependency ratios for the poor. Of all children 0-4 years old in the country, 15 percent belonged to families in the lowest income decile and a very high 40 percent to families classified in the lowest three income deciles of the income distribution. Of all the older than 65 years old, 11 percent belonged to families in the lowest decile, while 29 percent belonged to families in the lowest three income deciles. By contrast, of all 25-64 year old working age individuals in the Dominican Republic, only 7 percent were in families in the poorest decile and 24 percent in families in the lowest three income deciles, in 1998 (Table 6 and Chart 1, below). 22. Other poverty indicators show poor housing conditions and lack of basic services of in-house running water and sanitation for those belonging to the lower three deciles of the income distribution. For example, 80 percent of these people had houses or shacks with pieces of zinc used as a roof, 65 percent use outdoor latrines, 44 percent are without access to in-house running water, 36 percent of households suffer from over-crowding, --defined as households with more than three members per available room in the house-- 15 percent have mud floors, and 28 percent use wood and kerosene for cooking (ENGIH 98). In addition, large numbers of people live in high-risk flood areas. For instance, over 300,000 persons, over 11 percent of the residents in the Santo Domingo area, are located in the margins of the highly polluted Ozama River in Santo Domingo. 23. Combating poverty in the Dominican Republic will require, in addition to continued economic growth, an adequate combination of risk prevention and risk coping government policies and programs to protect the poor and most vulnerable population and stimulate their human capital development. Risk prevention policies consist of (i) improving access and quality of education of the poor since the time they are very young to at least secondary education, which has been shown to constitute the minimum level for a person to be able to break the cycle of poverty and contribute to growth (Castafneda-Aldaz, 1999; Barro, 1997), (ii) improving access to quality health care and basic shelter and infrastructure services, especially in a country prone to hurricanes, floods, mudslides and other natural disasters such as the Dominican Republic. Risk coping strategies consist of government support to cover major gaps which are currently present in child education, youth unemployment and the elderly poor who lack income to buy even a minimum food basket. As seen below, this can be achieved in the Dominican Republic, through a combination of scholarship for poor children and/or income support tied to school attendance provided to families to help them finance private and opportunity cost of schooling, which may be a factor behind the high repetition and dropout rates in primary and secondary education, and income support for the elderly poor. 24. Financing the risk prevention and coping strategy for the poor in the Dominican Republic poses some important challenges. On the one hand, aggregate social spending in education, health and social security in the Dominican Republic is low when compared with other countries of similar development in Latin America (see below). Expenditures on safety net programs relative to GDP, at 1.1 percent although comparable to that of Argentina (0.7 percent) and Jamaica (1.2 percent) are not directed at addressing social risks of critical groups.5 On the other hand, there are major inefficiencies and waste in current social spending. Many programs, such as the food distribution programs, are not benefiting the poorest and are not having major impacts on nutrition and/or income support. Other expenditure such as that of health care is devoted primarily to pay for salaries of public employees rather than to provide for critical inputs for quality services. Thus, prior to increasing social spending and consequent tax revenues, the Dominican government could well start with rationalizing social spending, including the restructuring of social sector institutions, as proposed in this report. Figures for Argentina in World Bank, 2000a and for Jamaica in World Bank, 2000b. 100 25. Designing and implementing a social protection strategy is probably the first priority for the new Dominican government. Such a strategy will need to be based on filling identified critical service gaps affecting the poorest and most vulnerable, so as to protect the poor and help them manage social risks, breaking poverty cycles and eliminating destitution. The strategy will need to include the explicit objective of targeting non-universal spending to the poorest and most vulnerable, and the design of efficient modem targeting instruments to achieve those objectives, as well as the financing and institutional arrangements to implement such a strategy. Some of these elements are suggested in this report. 26. This report is organized as follows. Section B presents an overview of social indicators and social spending in the Dominican Republic in the Latin American context. Section C develops a conceptual framework for identifying key risks and target groups in the Dominican Republic, following similar studies by the Bank in Argentina and Jamaica. Section D analyses the effectiveness of the current network of social protection programs at reaching these groups, and the usefulness/cost-effectiveness of the benefits provided (as much as data permits). Section E concludes by highlighting priority issues for social protection policy in the Dominican Republic. Section F sets out some actions for designing and implementing a SP strategy in the Dominican Republic. Annex I provides a detailed matrix on government social protection programs in the Dominican Republic. C. An Overview of Social Indicators and Social Spending in the Dominican Republic in the Latin American Context C.1. Social Indicators 27. The Dominican Republic has some of the worst social indicators of the LAC region. As seen in Table 1 below, infant mortality rate, illiteracy rates of youths and adults, and gross enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education, all are much worse than the average for a number of selected LAC and Far Eastern countries. For instance, infant mortality rate at 40 per 1000 live births in 1996 (the latest year for which comparable data are available for Dominican Republic and the other countries) is much higher than the average for a set of LAC countries. Only Bolivia has a higher rate than the Dominican Republic. Youth illiteracy-defined as the percentage of youth 15-24 year olds who are unable to read and write-at 9.5 percent is more than twice as high as the LAC average and is the highest among the countries considered. A similar situation occurs for the adult illiteracy rate. Finally, secondary and tertiary school gross enrollment rates in the Dominican Republic are also much lower than the average for the LAC countries considered. 28. The above comparisons hold true even after controlling for differing levels of economic development among the comparative LAC countries. That is to say, the Dominican Republic performs much worse in these indicators than countries with similar economic development.6 For instance, the infant mortality rate is about 10 percent higher than that predicted for a country of similar economic development, while the youth illiteracy rate is 150 percent higher than predicted for a country of similar economic development (World Bank, 2000c). 6 The way to control for economic development is by running a regression between each of the social indicators (as dependent variable) and per capita GDP as independent variable (See regression results in World Bank, 2000c). 101 Table 1: Social Indicators in Selected LAC and Far Eastern Countries, 1996 Infant Mortality . Child* Illiteracy Gross Enrollment Ratios (per i000 live Malnutrition (percent, 1997) (percent) births) Youth Adult Secondary Tertiary Argentina 22 2 1.5 3.5 77 42 Bolivia 67 8 5.5 16.4 n.a. 24 Brazil 36 6 8.5 16.1 45 12 Chile 12 1 1.5 4.8 75 30 Colombia 25 8 3.5 9.0 67 19 Costa Rica 12 5 2.0 5.0 47 33 Dominican Republic io ; 6 9.5 17.5 41 23 Indonesia 49 34 3.0 15.0 48 11 Korea 9 n.a. 0.0 2.8 102 60 Malaysia 11 20 3.0 14.4 61 11 Mexico 32 14 4.0 10.0 61 16 Panama 22 6 3.5 8.9 68 32 Philippines 37 30 2.0 5.4 77 35 Turkey 42 10 5.0 16.8 56 18 Uruguay 18 4 0.5 2.6 85 29 Latin American Average 34 9 g 4.3 10.9 61 27 Far Eastem Average 27 21 2.0 9.4 72 29 Overall Average 29 ' t0 3.5 9.9 61 26 'Weight for age measure (% of children under five years of age) 1992-97. Source: World Bank, 2000c. 29. In this section, we will explore four possible reasons for the deficient social indicators in the Dominican Republic. First, the size of the social spending including expenditures on education, health, social security and social assistance programs. Second, the adequacy of expending allocations or composition among different sectors and programs. Third, the adequacy and composition of safety net programs. Fourth, targeting of social spending to the poorest. In the subsequent sections of this report, we will analyze the adequacy of social spending to address critical risks of the poorest and most vulnerable, which is a critical factor for impacting social indicators and for protecting the poor from income and consumption shocks and help them manage social risks. C.2. The Size of Social Spending in the Dominican Republic 30. The size of social spending in the Dominican Republic is lower than in most other countries, buD thhs may not explain entirely why social indicators are so deficient. As shown in Table 2 below, the size of social spending in the Dominican Republic in per capita terms, as a share of GDP, and as a share of government spending is much lower than the average for the LAC comparison countries. Total public social spending in the Dominican Republic is only about one third of the average for LAC countries. The size of social spending in the Dominican Republic is much more similar to the levels shown in the Far Eastern countries in the table, but these latter countries show remarkably better social indicators than those shown by the Dominican Republic. When controlled for economic development, the Dominican Republic also demonstrates a lower level than a corresponding country of similar economic development in LAC. The difference is smaller if the Dominican Republic is compared to the Far Eastern countries in the table. In terms of the share of government spending, social spending in the Dominican Republic is among the lowest in the LAC region. This reflects the fact that historically, the Dominican government has not prioritized social spending. Among these priorities in the Dominican Republic is high spending on productive activities in deficit producing public enterprises within the industrial and agricultural sectors (World Bank, 1999). 102 Table 2: Level of Public Social Spending (PSS) in Selected LAC and Far East Countries, 1996 -PSS per capita (US$1996, PSS as percent of GDP PSS as percent of public PPP) expenditure Argentina 1,359 14.1 64.0 Bolivia 406 14.3 40.9 Brazil 1,032 16.2 40.0 Chile 1,716 14.0 67.3 Colombia 884 13.0 13.5 Costa Rica 1,194 18.2 59.7 Dominican Republic 296 6.5 41.5 Indonesia 195 5.7 39.1 Korea 851 6.5 34.9 Malaysia 724 9.3 42.5 Mexico 625 7.8 50.5 Panama 1,199 17.1 62.6 Philippines 161 4.7 25.2 Turkey 360 5.1 19.0 Uruguay 2,120 23.9 76.1 'Latin American Average 993 14.5 51.6 Far Eastem Average 483 . 6.6 35.4 OverallAverage 815 11.8 45.1 Source: World Bank, 2000c based on Government Finance Statstics Yearbook (1998) of the IMF. C.3. Inadequate Composition of Social Spending 31. Too little spending on education and health and too much spending on housing. One of the most striking features of table 3 is the very high proportion of social spending on housing in the Dominican Republic as compared to all the other countries. Although some water and sanitation and other infrastructure expenditures may be included in these figures, expenditures on housing relative to other social sectors in the Dominican Republic are higher than those of education or health, a pattem that is different from that of any other LAC country in the table. While overall housing spending within the social spending budget for the LAC countries is about 6 percent, it is 32 percent in the Dominican Republic. This has resulted in very low per capita spending on health and education compared to other countries. In addition, since housing spending is mainly directed to middle and upper income groups social spending as a whole is poorly targeted (see below). 32. Inadequate composition of expenditures on safety net programs. In view of the many flaws of the formal education, health and social security systems, there is ample room and need in the short- term for social assistance for extremely poor and vulnerable people. Expenditures in social safety nets programs at about 1.1 percent of GDP are comparable to those of Argentina and Jamaica (World Bank 2000a, World Bank 2000b).' However, safety net spending in the Dominican Republic is greatly inadequate for the needs of the poorest population and to cover the major risks they face. As shown in table 4 below, the largest safety net expenditure items are in untargeted food subsidy programs and housing programs for middle and upper income groups. The lowest expenditure items correspond to nutrition and child stimulation programs for the poor 0-5 year old children, youth programs and remedial education for school dropouts. There is also insufficient coverage of the school-feeding program especially in rural areas. No programs exist to help families finance the direct and opportunity costs of sending their children to primary and secondary education and to help them reduce drop outs and absenteeism from school. Also, unlike many other countries in the LAC region (notably Brazil, Uruguay and Chile), expenditures on pensions in the Dominican Republic are very low as a result of extremely 7 Expenditures on safety nets include nutrition programs for small children 0-5 years old, welfare programs for students such as school feeding, scholarships, training programs, assistance pensions, among others. 103 low coverage of elderly people in the formal pension system and the almost absolute lack of any assistance pension program. Table 3: Public Social Spending by Sector in Selected Countries as a Percentage of GDP, 1996 Education -' Heath> . social-Secw't and -Housing ,Total WOelfarp Argentina 3.5 1.8 8.0 0.8 14.1 Bolivia 7.4 2.2 4.5 0.2 14.3 Brazil 3.0 1.7 11.0 0.6 16.2 Chile 3.2 2.5 7.1 1.2 14.0 Colombia 5.4 2.0 4.9 0.7 13.0 Costa Rica 5.1 6.8 6.3 0.1 18.2 Dominican RepuOlc . . 1.7 2.1.5 Indonesia 1.3 0.4 113.0 5.7 Korea 3.7 0.2 2.2 0.5 6.5 Malaysia 5.0 1.4 1.5 1.4 9.3 Mexico 3.8 0.5 3.0 0.5 7.8 Panama 4.6 5.6 5.7 1.2 17.1 Philippines 3.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 4.7 Turkey 3.5 0.7 1.4 0.4 5.1 Uruguay, 2.1 1.9 19.4 0.5 . 23.9 Latin America Averg 40 77.1 : 14.5 Far EastrAvag 34 0.6 1.3 1.3 6.6 _Qverall,Averagoe Ow. . 38205..- . 09 11.8 ~g: World Bank, 2000c, based on Governmnent Finance Statistics Yearbook (1998) of the IMF. Table 4: Dominican Republic Main Safety Net Programs 19989 Area and Program Total US$* Percent GDP Percent Coverage Percent to Poorest Million 30% Des ayuno Eseolar piro gram 402 32 8 (shol launch)' Youth programs - 0,42 . ~~~~~~~~~~~'A9.02 ..... ..... , neitaae for elderly6, 0.04 n.a. na Health (Prowese) 7. 13,9 ~~~~~~~~~~~0.08 n.a. n.a. Food asia e 5'6.2 0.3na. 111sin Prgas48,4 -08n.a. n.a. Total 964 1J The exchange rate used is 16.3 5 Coverage of initial education only for the 0-5 age giroup. O ~Coverage of CIANI only. The figure of Comedores Economicos is for 1998 and for PROALTO and Plan Social is for 1999. ~"Includes ProComunidad (I999), Comunidad Digna (1 999). n.a.: Not available Sourc: Annex I in ths report. C.4. Inequity of Social Spending 33. Social spending in the Dominican Republic is not adequately targeted to the poor and most vulnerable. Table 5 shows that the main targeting problems occur in secondary and university education. In secondary education the poorest quintiles account for much lower percentages than their corresponding population share. The larger subsidies go to middle income families in the third and fourth quintiles of the income distribution. In university education the situation is much worse since the 104 poorest quintile receives only 2 percent of the education subsidy while the richest quintile receives 39 percent of such subsidy. Health spending is better targeted to the lower income quintiles, but the amount of the public budget for health is very limited. Despite the importance of safety net programs in budgetary terms, there is almost an absolute lack of information as to who is receiving the subsidies. Partial information obtained from the eligibility requirements for some of these programs (notably food subsidies and housing programs) indicate that these programs are not directed to the poorest and most vulnerable and that most likely, the beneficiaries are blue collar workers, government workers and other middle income people. Much more research needs to be done to assess the targeting incidence of these programs. Table 5: Incidence of Expenditures on Education and Health (%), 1998 Area and Program 1 quintile 2"' quintile 3'd quintile 4th quintile 5tb quintile Education- Primary 25.4 25.9 23.5 15.8 9.4 Secondary 14.3 19.4 24.5 25.9 15.9 University 1.9 13.4 17.8 27.6 39.3 IIealth*-' 'Health Preventive . Vaccines 25.0 23.0 21.0 19.0 13.0 Pregnancy Services 31.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 9.0 Papanicolau 26.0 24.0 21.0 19.0 10.0 Child Preventive 31.0 24.0 21.0 15.0 8.0 Htealth Curative .. . Hospital M.A. Health 32.0 26.0 18.0 16.0 8.0 Hospital Social Security 33.0 15.0 17.0 29.0 6.0 Military Hospital 18.0 5.0 19.0 16.0 42.0 Source: World Bank, 1999 and data assembled for this report based on ENGIH 98. * Corresponds to 1996 C.5. Conclusion 34. From this section we can conclude the following. First, the aggregate size of social spending in the Dominican Republic is much lower than that of comparable LAC countries and more similar to the levels exhibited by the Far East Countries. However, these latter countries have substantially better social indicators than those of the Dominican Republic. Second, the problem of low level social spending is compounded by the highly inefficient nature of that spending. Too little spending is devoted to investments in education and health and too much spending is devoted to housing, food assistance and other untargeted infrastructure programs. Third, social spending does not effectively target the poorest segments of the population. This is especially true in secondary and university education where middle income and higher income groups benefit the most from this public spending. There is almost complete lack of information of distribution of benefits of safety net programs, but partial evidence from eligibility requirements suggests that the bulk of these benefits goes to blue collar workers and other middle income groups rather than the poor and most vulnerable who need them most. Fourth, although the size of safety net programs in terms of GDP is comparable to that of other LAC countries (around I percent), the distribution among programs is greatly inadequate for the risks facing poor and vulnerable groups in the Dominican Republic. Almost two-thirds of spending on safety net programs is made in general food subsidies-including cooked meals for the open public in popular restaurants, subsidized food sales in open markets and distribution of food baskets to the public-and housing programs going to state workers, teachers and other middle income people. A minimum portion of the spending on safety nets reaches needy at-risk children less than four years old, unemployed and illiterate youths and young adults, the incapacitated, and the elderly poor. 105 D. Conceptual Framework8 35. The concept of managing social risk comes from the notion that certain groups in society are vulnerable to unexpected shocks that threaten their livelihood and/or survival. Yet others live in a chronic state of impoverishment which places their livelihood in a constant state of risk. Social risk management involves policies aimed at reducing key risks, breaking inter-generational cycles of poverty and vulnerability. Recent trends towards globalization present enormous opportunities for income gains arising from global comparative advantages. However, the same process also increases potential income and variability for society as a whole, and even more so for specific groups. Globalization-induced income and consumption variability combined with marginalization and exclusion can, in fact, increase the vulnerability of major population groups.9 Alternative strategies exist to prevent, mitigate, or cope with risk, and the choice between them depends on an assessment of the costs and benefits arising from each one. 36. In general, it is less costly for society to prevent risk than to cope with it afterwards. And often, first-best solutions enable individuals and households to self-protectl' ex-ante against risks, rather than turn to the government for ex-post assistance. However, markets can fail to provide coverage for key vulnerable groups (health insurance for the terminally ill), or fail to fund risk reduction perceived to be a public good, so that governments must often intervene. Risk management, then, consists of the choice of appropriate strategies, aiming at minimizing the adverse impact of social risks. 37. In theory there are three main categories of social risk management (Holtzmann and Jorgensen, 1999). Risk prevention includes measures aimed at reducing the probability that a risk will occur, such as becoming unemployed, which might be prevented through labor market reform. Risk mitigation measures are also employed before a shock occurs, but involve strategies to reduce the potential impact of a risk (such as providing quality education so that workers are well prepared for structural change in labor demand). Risk coping aims at relieving the impact of a shock once it has occurred (such as retraining and job search programs for the unemployed)." In practice, the lines between these strategies can be less distinct. In practical application in the case of the Dominican Republic, we find it most useful to distinguish between strategies in two categories, risk prevention and risk coping. 38. To organize the analysis of social risk management in the Dominican Republic, we first classify the population by age group from birth to death, and estimate the number of people in the lowest third and first income decile in each age group (Table 6 and Chart 1). One key aspect shown in this table and chart is that a higher proportion of children in the Dominican Republic belong to families in the lowest income deciles while there are relatively few working age people in these deciles, resulting in high dependency ratios for the poor. Second, we identify key risks by age group and leading indicators of 8 This section draws heavily on World Bank (2000a). 9 The concept of vulnerability as used here has two elements: a person's resilience to a given shock (the higher the resilience the lower the vulnerability) and the severity of the impact of the shock (the more severe the impact, if the risk is not managed, the higher the vulnerability). By this definition, the very poor are very vulnerable since they have little opportunity to manage risk and even a small decline in welfare could be life threatening. In addition to the poor, the vulnerable include those above the poverty line who are subject to potentially severe shocks and have little ability to manage risk, i.e. those likely to find themselves in poverty once a shock occurs. (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999). '1 Actual options to this end in each country depend on (i) existence of an appropriate legal and institutional framework, including the macroeconomic framework, so that individuals and households can take self-protection measures through education and training, gainful employment, portfolio diversification (physical, financial and human capital assets), etc.; and (ii) existence of competitive insurance markets for major risks (old age, survivor, health insurance, unemployment/disability insurance, assets insurance, catastrophic risk) and their corresponding institutions, so that people find instruments to insure. These insurance activities should be preferably provided by the private sector and regulated by the govemnment. " Often, general social assistance not associated with a particular shock is necessary for supporting vulnerable groups unable to care for themselves such as the elderly poor without pension coverage, the handicapped poor, single mothers with large number of children, poor malnourished children, street children, etc. 106 these risks. We also identify some risks that are unrelated to age and affect the general population. Third, we provide current values for risk indicators for the poor in the Dominican Republic whenever possible and estimate the number of poor who are uncovered by the existing programs. Fourth, we discuss possible measures to address identified gaps, distinguishing between risk prevention and coping strategies, and clarifying the role of Social Protection programs in undertaking these strategies. Table 7 summarizes this analytical framework. Table 6: Estimated Population Size by Age and Group and Poverty Level, 1998 Age Group Share of total population Poorest thirty percent Poorest.ten percent 0-4 11.9 39.8 15.3 970,889 386,201 148,660 5* 2.5 35.3 13.2 207,066 73,098 27,372 6-13 20.4 37.0 12.4 1,661,335 615,409 206,629 14-17 8.5 30.4 9.6 695,687 211,652 66,848 18-24 12.6 25.9 8.5 1,025,989 265,924 86,799 25-64 38.3 24.3 7.3 3,122,934 758,198 228,284 Over 65 5.8 28.8 10.8 471,394 135,907 50,816 Total 100.0 30.0 10.0 8,155,294 2,446,389 815,408 e The 5-year group was considered separately because formal pre-primary education offered by the Ministry of Education starts at this age. Source: These calculations are based on ENGIH 98. 107 Chart 1: Estimated Shares of Age Groups of People Belonging to Poorest Ten and Thirty Percent of the Population 45% 40% - ____- _ _ _ 25% - - - - - - _ _ -- - _ - Poorest Thirty percent | - - Poorest Ten percent 20%- --- -- ----- - -- -- 20% __ _ _ _ _ ____ _ ______ _ _ ___ 15%- 10% - 5% 0% I 0-4 5 6-13 14-18 19-24 25-64 over65 Age Group 108 Table 7: The Dominican Republic - Risks by Age Group, Leading Indicators of Risks with Current Values, Uncovered Poor and Possible Measures to Cover Risks . Age Main Risks Leading Indicators Indicator Value Number of Poorest 10% and 30% Covering the Gap with Measures of: Group of Selected Risks (1998) Uncovered, 1998 . _________._________ ______________ .Poorest 10% Poorest 30% Poorest 10% Poorest 30% Risk Prevention Risk Coping 0-4 years Stunted child development - Malnutrition --- 11.0 --- - Reduce poverty - Care of malnourished - Pre-school coverage 4.0 6.1 140,000 350,000 - Increase coverage of ECD programs __(67% rural) (65% rural) 5 years - Stunted child development - Pre-primary 36.5 41.1 17,000 43,000 - Reduce poverty - Care of malnourished coverage (65% rural) (6% rural) - Increase coverage of ECD programs 6-13 vears Low human capital - Gross enrollment 65.7 73.6 70,000 162,000 - Increase coverage primary & - Scholarships development (63% rural) (56% rural) secondary education - Income support tied to schoo attendance - Grade repetition --- 5.7 - Late entry --- --- --- --- Reduce late entrance, repetition, - Remedial education raise quality 14-17 Low human capital - Gross enrollment 59.9 66.8 27,000 70,000 - Raise secondary school enrollment - Scholarships vears development (63% rural) (56% rural) - Income support tied to schoo attendance - Grade repetition --- 5.7 - Late entry --- --- --- --- Reduce late entrance, repetition, - Remedial education raise quality Unemployment, low wages - Youth 53.6* 49.0* 11,800 35,000 - Employment Unemployment (55% urban) (54% urban) 18-24 Low human capital - Gross enrollment 12.0 20.3 76,000 212,000 (57% - Raise secondary school enrollment, - Scholarship, years development (70% rural) rural) and reduce high drop-out rates - Income support tied to school attendance and/or training activity Unemployment, low wages - Youth 41.8* 38.0* 21,000 62,000 - Raise school enrollment and unemployment (58% urban) (61% urban) retention by improving access and quality - Improve access of poorest to tertiary ______ __ __ ______ _____ _____ ___ __ _____ _____ ____ _ _____ _____ed ucat o n __ _____ _____ed u catio n__ * Young people actively looking for a job, plus young people who did not get a job and did not continue looking for one or were waiting for results of application for employment. 109 Age Group Main Risks Leading Indicators Indicator Value Number of Poorest 10% and Covering the Gap with Measures of: of Selected Risks 30% Uncovered, 1998 . ________________ Poorest 10% Poorest 30% Poorest 10% Poorest 30% Risk Prevention Risk Coping Inactivity (violence, - Inactivity -- -- -- -- - Employment - Remedial education substance abuse, etc.) - Youth programs 25-64 years Low income - Unemployment 21.5 16.0 31,000 81,500 - Labor intensive growth - Income support (59% urban) (63% urban) - Remedial education - Targeted training/job searc assistance - Below poverty earnings ------ --- Flexible labor market . (underemployment) Over 65 - Chronic diseases - Health insurance 4.0** 50,000 135,000 - Increase coverage of health - Increase coverage of health years coverage insurance care for the elderly - Low income - Pension coverage 2.3** 50,000 135,000 - Increase coverage of pension - Increase coverage of non- ___________ _____________ system contributory pensions General Population - Health - Poor health care - Health insurance 3.0** 4.5*** 800,000 2,350,000 - Health insurance - Public health care coverage - Housing - Poor housing conditions - Housing deficit --- --- --- --- Promote savings and - Housing subsidies mortgages - Relocation of families - Lack of basic infrastructure - Land titling - Basic - Indoor running water 23.0 30.0 630,000 1,700,000 - Investment in water - Subsidies for water & Services - Indoor sanitation sanitation connection for - High frequency of 15.0 22.0 700,000 1,900,000 - Investment in sanitation the poorest hurricanes, floods - Damages of hurricanes, - Relocation of families to safe - Natural floods, etc. --- 170,000 houses --- 320,000 places - Temporary shelter provision Disasters affected by Hurr. (Living in the - Improve housing - Food / medicines Georges Ozama River ______________ I margins) _ ** Covered by IDSS. tDSS affiliates workers with less than two minimum wages. * Covered by IDSS. It does not include private coverage by the Iuglas. People not covered by insurance are, in principle, covered by the public health system. Source: Most values of indicators are from ENGIH 98. 110 D.]. Addressing Key At-Risk Groups 39. Examining the main risks and risk groups in the DR, it is clear that addressing them is not only a matter of designing and implementing coping social protection or safety net policies. In addition, the DR has significant gaps in the provision of preventive basic social services such as health and education, and infrastructure. These weaknesses in social service provision affect the poor the most (increasing their vulnerability) and call for a greater role for coping social assistance programs than would otherwise be expected, given the country's level of income per capita. Table 8 below highlights this distinction, clarifying the sector/area specific strategies necessary to address main risks by age group, and the specific role for SP policies and programs. Table 8: Key Risks by Age Group. Role of Services and of SN in Addressing Risks Age Group Mlain Risks Role for Healih. Education Role for Saretn Nets Social and Infra. Serices lnsurance Social Assistance 0-5 Stunted child development PHC Services Early Child Nutrition programs of Pre-school education Development small children and Programs mothers. 6-13 Low human capital Improve quality of primary development education -- -- Reduce late entry and repetition 14-24 Low human capital Improve access/quality of Scholarship/retum-to- development secondary education -- school incentive programs Unemployment, low wages Remedial education Teen pregnancy, STDs 2/ Reproductive health programs 25-64 Low income (unemployment/ Promote labor-intensive Income transfers, training underemployment) growth. Emphasis in - and/orjob search agriculture and rural assistance. development where poor live. 65 and Over Chronic diseases Health insurance Social security Income transfer Low income (contributory (non-contributory pensions) pensions) Health care General Poor health care Provision of health services Health insurance Population Savings & mortgages Poor housing conditions facilities; affordable housing Housing subsidies for construction, poorest, land titling. Lack of basic infrastructure Investment in basic infrastructure (water, Subsidies for connection to sewerage, etc.) services High frequency of hurricanes, floods Titling programs Relocation to safe areas Housing programs 1/ Pre 2/ Sexual Transmitted Diseases. E. Analysis of Existing Safety Net Programs in the Dominican Republic 40. This section has three objectives: (i) to examine the main risks faced by the various age groups and the programs currently in operation, (ii) to assess the effectiveness of these programs to reach target populations (as much as available data permits), and (iii) to present possible options for the future. This analysis does not cover provincial or municipal social programs, nor those operated by non-govemmental organizations. E.1. Ages 0-5: Early Childhood Development 41. In the Dominican Republic, a large share of the population of children ages 0-4 (39.8 percent) belongs to the lowest three deciles, and 15.3 percent to the lowest income decile (Table 6). International evidence clearly indicates that Early Child Development (ECD -nutrition, child-care, 111 early educational development) programs provide an unparalleled opportunity to break inter- generational cycles of poverty, by improving a child's lifelong potential for human capital accumulation, and hence productivity and income.'2 Among the benefits found are gains in emotional and cognitive development, improvements in mother-child health indicators, enhanced educational achievement, increased economic self-sufficiency (initially for parents, and later on for the children), higher income and lower welfare programs usage, and reduced levels of criminal activity when children grow older (Heckman, 1999). The 386,000 children in the poorest three deciles of the income distribution (of whom about 149,000 are in the poorest income decile) therefore represent a priority group for targeted social interventions that reduce short-term risks (i.e., of malnutrition) and that raise the child's longer-run chances of moving out of poverty. 42. However, compared to many Latin American countries, the Dominican Republic has very few ECD programs. Among 0-4 year olds, only 4.0 percent in the poorest income decile attend a nursery school or other child-care center (Table 7). Coverage is also low (6.1 percent) in the poorest thirty percent, and in the richest quintile (40.5 percent of the children attend school), indicating that not only economic reasons play a role but also a generalized lack of recognition of the importance of integrated Early Child Education programs.'3 Existing public programs focus on providing food supplements. It is not clear what proportion of the 0-4 age group is actually at risk of malnutrition, or the role that current programs play in eliminating that risk. 43. Implementing an early child development strategy in the Dominican Republic should be a key priority for protecting poor children from stunted development, which would handicap future human capital investments in the poor. Most primary and secondary school drop-outs and the failure to pursue higher educational investments by the poor may be due to lack of skill readiness which may occur at early stages of the human capital formation process (Heckman, 1999). As seen below, covering the children at greater risk in the poorest decile of the income distribution with ECD and pre-primary school enrolment can cost about US$30.5 million, which can be financed by switching resources away from ineffective and untargeted food assistance programs. Early Child Development programs in the Dominican Republic: Coverage, Targeting and Costs 44. There are two early child development programs in the Dominican Republic. These are as follows: 1. Centros Infantiles de Atencion Integral (CIANI). This program is operated by the Consejo Nacional de la Niuez (CONANI), under the Presidencia de la Reputblica and provides health services (primary care) and food supplements to 2-6 year old children from poor areas mainly in three provinces (Santo Domingo, Santiago and El Seybo). Meals and other health and education services are provided in special centers located in poor areas. In 1998, the program covered about 8,000 children at a total fiscal cost of DR$17.4 million (about US$1.2 million or US$150 per child per year). The total estimated target population nationwide in the poorest thirty percent is 386,000 children 0-4 years of age (of whom 149,000 are in the lowest income decile) in 1998. More than 60 percent of the uncovered children live in rural areas. Presently there is a strong focus of the program on nutritional support. These centers could be moved to SESPAS, concentrating in children 0-3 years of age. 12 ECD programs are known to provide significant benefits to participating children as shown in matched evaluation studies. The study by Karoly et al., at the Rand Corporation, which covered nine programs in the United States (among them the Perry Preschool, the Early Training Project, and the Chicago Child-Parent Center), found that these programs provided significant benefits at reasonable costs, to participating children and their parents, over those obtained by children and parents of similar low socio-economic background not participating in the program. Similar benefits, especially those benefits obtained by mothers in the labor force, have been reported by Deutsch (1998) for several Latin American countries. 13 In fact, one of the reasons cited by respondents of the ENGIH 98 conducted by the Central Bank for not enrolling children of this age group in nurseries or schools is that they are not in school age. 112 2. Public Day-care for Children (Guarderias Infantiles). This is a program operated by the Secretaria de Estado de Salud Pzublica y Asistencia Social (SESPAS) to provide day-care services for children whose mothers work. Currently, there are 6 day-care centers with 1,214 children registered. These services are provided free of charge. A high degree of centralization of the decisions has been concentrated in the office of the Minister, especially in terms of resources (monetary, human and physical). This program has a very low coverage rate considering that 471,249 children in this age group belong to the poorest 30 percent of the population. A transformation of these centers into more complete and service integrated childcare centers is needed. 3. Initial Education (Educacion Inicial). This is a program operated by the Secretaria de Estado de Educacion y Cultura (SEEC) to provide pre-school education services to five-year-olds in public schools'4. Some of these children also benefit from the school snack program offered by the SEEC. Despite recent efforts to increase enrollment, coverage of the program is still very low. In 1999, only about 103,864 children were covered by the SEEC. Private pre-schools attend another 55,000 children. Total pre-primary school coverage is only about 30 percent,15 (as compared to over 70% in Costa Rica16). The program is not explicitly targeted to children in poor areas. Very little is known about the impact of the program on school attendance, groups attended and coverage of needed groups. In 1998, the fiscal cost of the program (including the amount spent on Alimentaci6n Escolar program of these children) reached DR$74.1 million or about DR$775-per student (only about US$53 dollars per student per year). Strategy for 0-5 Age Group: Issues and Options 45. The current coverage of early childcare assistance for the poorest groups is minimal in the Dominican Republic. In addition, the effectiveness of these limited interventions for the 0-5 population is unknown. The Dominican Republic could consider emphasizing integrated cognitive development programs. Two options that the Dominican Republic may consider in Early Child Development include: 1. Government-sponsored community based child-care centers. These are programs developed and operated at the community level--usually operated by mothers from the community--who have been given proper training and technical assistance on child development. The programs include nutrition assistance (food and nutrition education for caring mothers and parents), training in psychological stimulation of children and the application of growth and psychomotor stimulation monitoring techniques. Financing arrangements from the central or local government or non- government agencies, include payments to communities on the basis of the number children attended (per-capita) or other similar demand-service-based payment system. 2. Promoting NGO and private sector service provision under a government regulated system. The government sets quality standards, regulates and supervises ECD providers. Financing (subsidies) for service providers can also be allocated on a per-capita or other demand-based system. This may be an important alternative for rural areas where NGOs and private sector based child care centers may be already promoting community work or may be motivated to provide ECD services. 46. Under both options, rough cost estimates according to international comparisons are about US$200 per child per year. Thus, providing all uncovered children age 0-4 in the bottom income decile who are the neediest and whose mothers are the least educated, with adequate ECD program access would cost US$28 million (0.18 percent of GDP). Providing the services to all children in this 14 Although this program is officially for the 5-year-old, below five-year-old are nonetheless accepted. 15 Due to lack of places for early childhood education, the Ministry of Education has had to attend some 3-4 year olds (about 12,800 in 1999) in pre-primary education in regular schools that lack trained teachers and materials for ECD education. 16 Costa Rica, Plan de Solidaridad, 2000. 113 age category in the lowest income quintile would cost over two times that amount. Increasing pre- school coverage of 5 year olds of the poorest ten percent would cost US$2.5 million."7 How to Finance the ECD Strategy? 47. Financing the ECD strategy in the Dominican Republic does not require additional fiscal resources. Indeed there are several untargeted food assistance programs that can be re- engineered or converted to provide resources to the ECD strategy and to increase coverage of the school-feeding program, especially in poor rural areas. The "Comedores Economicos" program, under the Presidencia de la Republica, sells cooked meals at highly subsidized prices to a host of groups including the general public (mostly blue-collar workers), public enterprises and ministries, and even private enterprises.'8 The annual fiscal cost of the program is US$4.8 million. There is little social justification for this fiscal expense to provide subsidies to these groups, while minimal resources are transferred to poorest critically needed and probably undernourished children. 48. A second program is the "Alimentos Para Todos" program under the Instituto de Estabilizaci6n de Precios (INESPRE), the price stabilization and marketing board of the Secretaria de Estado de Agricultura (SEA), which sells basic foods at subsidized prices in open markets nationwide. INESPRE purchases items (such as rice) from domestic producer at prices that are substantially higher than international prices (due to high tariffs and quotas) and sells the items to consumers at lower prices, thus creating a great fiscal loss in the process. Moreover, despite the subsidies provided by INESPRE, Dominican consumers pay more than two to three times more for basic foods than consumers in other countries. This affects the poor most severely because they consume a great proportion of these protected foods (e.g., rice, beans, others) (Fundaci6n Economia y Desarrollo, 1996). In 1998, the fiscal cost of the program was US$15.2 million and the 1999 budget was about US$20 million. A restructuring of agricultural commercial policy and the marketing board aimed at reducing protection for producers through lower tariffs and quotas, which would reduce consumer prices. This would benefit all consumers, particularly the poor. The corresponding fiscal savings could then be directed to high priority groups, such as young and poor children, and poor farmers. 49. A third program is the food distribution by the Plan Social de la Presidencia which is dependent on support from the Presidencia de la Republica. This program provides a large number of food rations to different groups, under no clearly established selection criteria. The foods are bought from the market and stored and packaged in program warehouses. Some of these rations were distributed to people affected by hurricane Georges that caused major damages to poor families in 1998. While there is a need to maintain a small program to respond to catastrophic events, such as hurricanes or flooding, there is no need to maintain a high cost food distribution program, especially if it does not effectively target the poorest segments of the population. The fiscal cost of the program was about US$40 million in 1999, and most of the corresponding savings could be channeled for implementing the ECD strategy. E.2. Ages 6-13: Primary Education 50. In the Dominican Republic, a large share (37 percent) of this age group belongs to the poorest three deciles and 12 percent to the lowest income decile (Table 6). Primary education coverage for 6- 13 year olds is still far from being universal. Primary school attendance among 6-13 year olds is 82 percent across the entire population and only 74 percent for those in the poorest three income deciles. The situation is even worse for the poorest ten percent of the population, whose enrollment rates '7 Assuming an annual cost of pre-primary education of US$150 per child per year. 18 Meals are sold to the public in specific places located in low-income areas at DR$5 (approximately US$0.30) per meal. There is no selection mechanism. The quality of food served (except for those served to ministries and public and private enterprises) is not so good and serves as self-targeting mechanism for lower income workers. 114 reached only 66 percent of the relevant age group in 1998 (Table 7). Despite efforts (see below) in recent years, the quality and efficiency of primary education is poor, and this problem is acute for schools located in poor neighborhoods in peri-urban areas and, especially, rural areas. For example, 6 percent of children in public schools were repeating at least one grade in primary school in 1997- 98. 51. Government efforts to improve coverage and quality of primary school under the "Plan Decenal de Educaci6n" include (i) the introduction of a more modern and flexible curriculum for all school levels, (ii) teacher training for implementation of the new curriculum, and (iii) hiring new teachers and improving school infrastructure and equipment (SEEC, 1999). An important development has been the distribution of over-10 million textbooks for basic education and about 2.7 million books and teaching aids for teachers (SEEC, 1999). 52. Other activities that the government has undertaken to improve education coverage during the last three years include: expansion of the school feeding program which now covers I million 3-14 year old children in marginal urban areas (Urbano-marginal program), and about 120,000 children in frontier areas, the latter jointly with the Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA). Also, a pilot program to transfer money for school feeding is being implemented in dispersed rural and remote areas. The first two programs -Urbano-marginal and that for frontier areas- include fortified foods and have been accompanied by a de-warming campaign under a World Bank project. These programs target schools that exhibit the worst nutrition indicators in the Censo Nacional de Peso y Talla 1994 of school children, along with other indicators of need (Annex 1). Also, CONANI implements the Ayzidame a Ser Nin-o program, which is oriented toward at-risk youth between 7-15 years of age and who belong to low-income families, who work or live in the street, but remain ties with their parents. Currently, the number of children registered in this program is 2,443, most of them are between 7-10 years old. In terms of monetary resources, it was estimated that the program receives DR$2,170 per child per year (US$133).19. E.3 Ages 14-24: Secondary and Higher Education 53. Serious problems emerge in the coverage and quality of secondary schooling. Among all 14- 17 year olds (age for secondary education in the Dominican Republic since the 1997-1998 school year), only 36 percent were attending secondary school in 1998. A high 40 percent were attending primary level as a result of repetition and/or late entry. Within this age group, the drop-out rate is highest among the poor - 40 percent in the poorest decile do not attend secondary school, as opposed to 17 percent in the wealthiest decile (ENGIH 98). Overall, the Dominican Republic has a low secondary school net enrollment rate of 34 percent of the relevant age group, as compared with 80 percent in OECD countries (World Bank, 2000a).20 Inefficiency and waste in secondary and higher education are also major concerns, especially for the poor. For instance, of those aged 14-24, attending school, and belonging to the poorest thirty percent of the population, more than half of those enrolled in the education system are still in primary education (ENGIH 98). This reflects the high number of students that are held back each year in primary school and also the high dropout rate for secondary education. 54. Reasons for the high secondary school dropout rate are a complex combination of supply and demand factors. On the supply side, population-wide problems with holding students back most likely reflect serious defects in school quality - poor teacher training, lack of school supplies -- combined with some access problems in poor and isolated peri-urban and rural communities. For I9 Other programs have also been implemented to achieve similar ends. For example, private schools provided 530 scholarships to the SEEC for poor students. In return, the schools are allowed to administer examinations without the presence of SEEC supervisors. 20 The net enrollment rate has, however, increased from about 22 percent in 1991 (World Bank, 1999). 115 instance, of total secondary school enrollment, only 25 percent come from rural areas, reflecting an access problem in those areas. On the demand side, low wages for secondary school graduates (relative to higher levels of education) and both the opportunity and direct costs of school (including transportation, eating out, school materials, etc.), may be too high and unaffordable to poor parents. 55. Overall national public expenditures on education have increased notably in the past few years from about DR$3.0 billion (1.5 percent of GDP) in 1995 to about DR$6.6 billion in 1999 (2.2 percent of GDP). These figures include financing for public and private universities but exclude education expenditures that did not originate with the SEEC. As seen previously in section B of this report, public expenditures on education at about 2.0 percent of GDP in 1996, were one of the lowest in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries (4.0 percent of GDP) (World Bank, 2000c).2' In addition, the Dominican Republic spends a relatively low proportion of public expenditures on secondary education (13 percent of the whole education budget versus 22 percent in other LAC countries) and a relatively higher proportion in "other education expenditures" (32 percent versus 16 percent in LAC). These "other education expenditures" include administrative expenditures, promotion of the arts and education expenditures made agencies other than the SEEC agencies, such as the Presidencia de la Republica, Secretario de Estado de Trabajo and the Fuerzas Armadas (Aristy et al. 1999). At the same time, several at-risk youth programs provided by the Direcci6n General de Promoci6n de la Juventud, under the Presidencia de la Repzublica, should be transferred to the SEEC, and to incorporate them in the Educacion Tecnica-Profesional program. Many of these expenditures could be channeled to secondary education where resource needs may be more urgent, before more budget allocations are planned for the entire education system. Strategy for 6-13 and 14-24 Age Groups: Issues and Options 56. A mayor risk facing both of these age groups is low human capital accumulation for a modernizing economy like that of the Dominican Republic. Over 79 percent of employed youths 14-17 years old and 55 percent of employed 18-24 year olds had not completed primary education in 1998 (ENGIH 98). Achieving high quality universal coverage of primary education and increasing enrollment and quality of secondary schooling is the best risk prevention goal, and falls under the domain of the formal education system. In the short-run, safety net programs can be effective at addressing problems with school attendance by providing incentives for parents to keep their children in school. 57. In addition to the efforts needed by the SEEC for continued general improvement in the primary and secondary education systems through teacher training, textbook provisions, school aids, including expansion of computer education in secondary schools, a few critical safety net programs need to be reinforced or introduced in the Dominican Republic. These are as follows: * Expanding coverage of the school feeding program, especially in rural areas where the children are poorer and at higher nutritional and dropout risks. The current pilot program which transfers money to school boards for the purchase of local foods and the production of school meals operated by SEEC appears promising and if successful, can be expanded quickly to rural areas. This will also serve to activate local food markets and assist the depressed agricultural economy. The cost to cover all rural primary school children without coverage under the Alimentaci6n Escolar program is approximately US$37 million.22 * Introducing a scholarship program to finance poor children in private schools. This program may be very effective in easing any supply constraints of public secondary schools. Rather 21 However, total spending on education including private spending is much higher at 5-6 percent of GDP, more in line with total expenditure in other LAC countries of similar development (World Bank, 2000d). 22 The cost figure includes US$9.4 million (US$4.0 per month multiplied by 200,000 children not attending school), and US$28.1 million for 600,000 children currently uncovered by the Alimentaci6n Escolar program. 116 than the government investing in new secondary schools at a great cost, the government may want to enter into agreements with private schools where excess supply exists or to areas where private schools would like to expand. Evidence dating back to 1989 shows that private schools are more effective than public schools (Jimenez et al. 1989). Cost estimates would depend on the size of the scholarship (tuition and/or other expenses) and the number of children attracted to the program. * Introducing a targeted income-support program which can be an effective medium- to long- term policy for bringing households out of poverty and for improving human capital development by targeting poor families with school-aged children and offering benefits that are contingent upon school attendance (see below). * Introducing remedial education programs to assist youth in returning to the formal education system, or technical training to improve their marketable skills. However, OECD experience with such training programs, particularly those designed to reduce youth unemployment rates, do not exhibit high success rates. No similar studies exist for such programs in LAC countries. Community college systems, such as those operated successfully in the United States, may provide a more successful model to work from. These schools provide secondary school equivalence programs and exams, along with 1-2 year courses providing specific accreditation for technical jobs, such as computing, nursing, hotel management, etc. How to Finance the Primary and Secondary Education Strategy? 58. Public social spending in the Dominican Republic remains low compared to similar countries as we have previously seen. To increase social spending in the long run would require increased revenues, which would necessitate some tax reforms. In the short run, the Dominican Republic may not be currently in a position to increase social spending significantly. Thus, financing needs to come primarily from the reallocation of current expenditures from lower priority programs within and outside the education sector. In terms of resource allocation within the education sector, there are several programs that can be used to provide funding for secondary education. For instance, it has been estimated that over US$3 million could be saved annually if the budget for University education were maintained at current constant real levels, rather than increasing it over the next several years. As graph 2 indicates, university students in the Dominican Republic come primarily from middle and upper income families and such a high subsidy cannot be justified on grounds of equity. Also, reallocation of education expenditures from "other expenditures", mainly administrative expenditures and financing of private institutions, to secondary education can contribute another US$5.4 million. Finally, the funding for the Instituto Nacional de Formacion Tecnico-Profesional (INFOTEP) for about US$14 million through the SET,23 can be best used to finance the remedial education program, along with the funds for technical education managed by the Army which costs about US$1.6 million. Savings from cutting off subsidies to public enterprises that have been partly divested and now are managed by the private sector can finance remaining funding needs. 23 INFOTEP is financed by 1% of payroll contributions paid by employers plus 0.5 percent of bonuses of workers and some small government contributions, penalties, etc. 117 Graph 1: Lorenz Curve of Public Expenditure in Education by Type of Education, 1998. 100 90 so = // / 70 __.my Li-ne45 grde 60 50 40 30 20 I 0 - 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Aeumulated peantge of the populaton Source: Figures from ENGIH 98. E.4. Ages 25-64: Employment 59. Following the 1991 stabilization program, economic performance in the Dominican Republic has been remarkable with high economic growth and low inflation. Average GDP growth from 1991 to 1999 stood at 6 percent, and has been especially strong in the last four years averaging 8 percent. Construction and the more liberal open sectors of the economy such as tourism and telecommunications continue to be the driving forces of growth. Preliminary results from the ENGIH 98 suggest that the percentages of poor households have declined from 22 percent in 1992 to 15 percent in 1998 (DR-Poverty Report World Bank, 2000d). Poverty gap and income gap ratios have simultaneously improved. However, poverty is still prevalent, especially among unskilled and rural households. 60. The unemployment rate in 1999 stood at 13.8 percent, representing an estimated 500,000 people.24 Unemployment has been concentrated most heavily among teenagers25 (39.1 percent in 1996 and 28.3 percent in 1999), being higher for females (55.8 percent in 1996 and 54.8 percent in 1999) than for males (29.8 percent in 1996 and 15.0 percent in 1999). The unemployment rate of 20- 59 year olds has been much lower than those of teenagers and has declined from an average of 14.3 percent in 1996 to 12.5 percent in 1999, despite an increase in participation rates from 71.0 percent to 72.1 percent for this age group in the same period. However, the largest reduction in unemployment 24 The definition of unemployment in the Dominican Republic is in footnote 1. 25 Age group 10-19 years. 118 rates has occurred for the 40-59 year olds whose unemployment rate declined from 8.4 percent in 1996 to 5.2 percent in 1999.26 61. Using the ENGIH 98, the results show that the unemployment rate was far higher among the bottom income decile (21.5 percent) and the thirty poorest percent (16.0 percent) compared to the seventy percent richer (13.5 percent). Indeed, the probability of being poor rises if one is unemployed. The incidence of poverty among the unemployed stands far above that of the employed and inactive. In fact, while the incidence of poverty was 42 percent for the unemployed head of household, it was 19.2 percent for the employed and 26.7 percent for the inactive.28 Also the poverty gap and poverty severity indicators are higher for the unemployed than for the employed household heads. 62. Nevertheless the majority of the poor in the Dominican Republic are employed - their contribution to the national poverty rate is 69.3 percent versus 7.8 percent of the unemployed and 22.9 percent of the inactive. Hence for the bulk of the poor, poverty arises from underemployment and/or from low earnings. Poverty is concentrated among the unskilled workers (31.3 percent) and agricultural sector workers (30.0 percent) versus professionals, scientific and intellectuals who have a very low unemployment rate of 1.7 percent. Sixty percent of the people in the first quintile work in unskilled job categories (non-qualified job and agricultural job). SP Policies and Strategy for the Labor Market and Income Support - Issues and Options 63. Formulating a coherent policy response to the prevailing high rates of unemployment and underemployment - and the poverty they generate - lays outside of the realm of Social Protection, and lays under macroeconomic, labor market, and education sector policies. These policies should aim at: a) raising the long-run demand for labor by developing a macroeconomic strategy that promotes labor-intensive growth job creation through opening the economy to foreign competition, agricultural reform policies, etc.). Such policy reforms for the Dominican Republic are discussed in World Bank (1999). b) reducing rigidities in the labor market to ease recruitment processes and reduce the transaction costs of labor.29 Labor market flexibility exists in the "zonasfrancas", the construction industry and commerce, but more flexibility is needed in the industrial sector. c) on the supply-side, raising the productivity and earnings potential of the labor force by improving the access to and quality of education, including on-the-job training. 64. Social Protection policies, on the other hand, should function as a safety-net responding to short-term income risk arising from structural unemployment (generated by shifts in the structure of production prompted by the transition from a closed to open economy), temporary upswings in unemployment generated by external shocks and recession, as well as providing permanent protection for those unable to enter the labor force and hence without sources of income (the handicapped, elderly, etc.). However, the macroeconomic and institutional reforms discussed in (a) through (c) 26 Figures from ENGIH 98. 27 According to ENGIH 98; inactives are those in the working age population not working or looking actively for ajob. This category includes housewives, students, pensioners, discapacitated, among others. 28 See, Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (1999), "Situaci6n de la Pobreza y la Distribuci6n del Ingreso en la Republica Dominicana". 29 In Argentina, for instance, the "Modalidades Promovidas" program, which exempted employers from certain payroll and severance payments, is a successful example of such a policy. Between 1996 and 1998 (when the program was terminated) over 12 percent of formal sector jobs (one-third of new hires) were under this program (as estimated by Guasch, 1999). 119 above are long-run in nature, and even if undertaken immediately are unlikely to have a significant short-term impact on poverty in the Dominican Republic. Hence, in the short-term, grappling with the current problems of poverty wrought through high unemployment andlor low earnings fall into the domain of Social Protection. 65. In view of the few employment-related SP programs currently in place in the Dominican Republic, following are some of the options that can be considered to provide some social protection to people 25-64 years old. Options 66. Introducing a targeted income-support program can be an effective short-term mean to mitigate the consumption effects of extreme poverty and a medium- to long-term mean for raising households out of poverty and for improving human capital development by targeting poor families with school-aged children, with benefits conditional on school attendance. Such a program can be implemented in the Dominican Republic following the experiences of some Latin American countries, such as Mexico (Progresa program), Brazil (Bolsa Escola), Honduras (PRAF) and others under preparation such as Nicaragua's Red de Proteccion Social program.30 The direct income support program can also be targeted to extremely poor families without children, poor farmers, the handicapped poor, women household heads with small children, and other critically vulnerable groups who can not or should not work, such as the elderly poor. 67. Some critical design and implementation issues are as follows: 68. The identification of beneficiaries. Selection criteria should be transparent, objective and difficult to manipulate by prospective beneficiaries or administrators - and the system used to identify beneficiaries should be cost effective. In the Dominican Republic, a system for selecting beneficiaries needs to be developed. Initial costs for setting up comparable systems in other countries are about US$7-8 over three years per family registered in the system. Assuming a similar cost figure in the Dominican Republic, registering all of the people in the lowest income decile, 815,000 people equivalent to 192,000 households in the system would cost about US$1.5 million over three years, while registering all of the Dominican Republic's households in the lowest three income deciles (2.5 million people and 575,000 households) would cost about $4.5 million.31 69. Another consideration is determining the amount of the transfer, which is critical for generating program sustainability by limiting disincentives as well as program outlays. While there are no widely agreed upon precise criteria for calculating benefit amount, it is generally thought that the benefit should be 'inframarginal' - less than a threshold level of basic survival expenditures (say, the cost of the basic food basket) so as not to severely affect work incentives, but high enough to have a welfare impact on the household (so that poor families are not deterred from program participation). A rule of thumb often used in both developed and developing countries is to establish the transfer value at about 40 percent of the food consumption basket of the poor (Castafleda, 1998). Accordingly, in the Dominican Republic a reasonable transfer value would be about 12 dollars per capita per month, which is 40 percent of the cost of the basic food basket (US$30 per capita per month, or the extreme poverty line).32 Program costs - not including administration - can be 30 A review of these and other Direct Income Support programs in developing countries is in Castaileda (1998). 3' Ideally, this system would be used to administer most if not all central (and potentially provincial) targeted programs. In addition to identifying program beneficiaries, such a system can be an excellent diagnostic tool to assess the characteristics of the poor at the regional and national level, and design programs best suited to their needs. 32 In terms of payment means, there are several options: cash, electronic transfers, check or vouchers for specific goods (i.e. food stamps) and/or services. Cash and electronic transfers are the superior altematives as they are the most liquid, but are normally dangerous to deliver and requires strict security measures (in the case of cash) or have high administrative cost (electronic transfers). Checks are a safer altemative but require a widely available network of banks or branches and highly accurate information system that minimizes mistakes when issuing checks. Food stamps or other types of vouchers are an 120 estimated from this rule of thumb; for example, providing the lowest ten percent of the 25-64 year old population (13,440 people in rural zones) with a monthly transfer of US$12 implies an annual outlay of US$1.9 million. Expanding coverage to all of the urban poor in this age category (32,000 people) would increase outlays to over US$4.6 million. 70. Finally, given the high visibility of such a program and the sizeable amount of public resources it is likely to command, effective monitoring and evaluation procedures are critical. Program monitoring should include regular revision of operations and budget indicators (by an independent auditing/ex-post evaluation agency); evaluation should assess program targeting as well as its impact on beneficiaries, and can be done effectively by drawing random samples of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the program. An annual budget of about US$1.5 million would be sufficient to finance surveys and evaluation studies by the National Planning Office (ONAPLAN). 71. Introducing a Direct Income Support (DIS) program for small and poor farmers can be an effective safety net to protect them from any negative effects produced by agricultural reforms which lower tariffs, eliminate quotas and price supports to farmers and which are needed for improving agricultural productivity and competitiveness (World Bank, 1999). Such a program has begun to be implemented in other countries. In the United States, the deficiency payment program (and production controls) has been largely ended for the most important crops. In the European Union, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms since 1992 have brought the prices of many important agricultural products (particularly cereals) much closer to world prices, and reforms are continuing. Subsidy payments in the EU are increasingly linked to farmers' measures to conserve resources or to regional development. Profound reforms in their agricultural commodity policies towards less reliance on price support programs have also taken place in recent years in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, as well as in many middle-income developing countries, especially in Latin America. In Mexico, for example, support through pricing and the subsidy (measured as Producer Subsidy Equivalent, or PSE) has fallen from 30 percent in 1992-94 to only 5 percent in 1995, and has been replaced by direct income support (Nash, 1999). 72. In countries that have reformed agricultural policies, governments have recognized that the objectives for which the inefficient policies were designed can be better met by using other instruments. One of the most important of these is the direct income support subsidy payment, which can be substituted for price supports or subsidies when they are removed. The principle of the direct payment is that it cannot be based on something over which the producer has control. For example, it cannot be based on how many tons of rice he produces in the current year; if it does depend on that criteria, it is just like giving him a higher price for his rice. For this reason, direct support cannot be used to encourage production of specific crops or use of specific inputs. The principle of providing subsidies through lump sum payments instead of through prices is called "decoupling" or "delinking" support from prices. In the US, the EU, and Mexico, the reduction of price supports has been accompanied by full or partial compensation to farmers through de-coupled payments based on production in some baseline period in the recent past. This is important: payments each year stay the same or are reduced by a pre-determined formula. They do not change from year to year based on that year's input use or output production. 73. Among the advantages of substituting a direct subsidy program for other subsidies are: * Increased efficiency of resources devoted to agriculture, as farmers are encouraged to make production and input use decisions on the basis of the true economic value and cost to society (that is, market prices). alternative when for political reasons or other reasons (usually misuse of benefit funds) the government does not want to issue cash. Food stamps and other vouchers have one important disadvantage - they require additional logistical arrangements for printing of the stamps, and for redemption procedures, which raise administrative costs. 121 * Reduction in prices of some products to consumers. * Better budget planning and execution; since the amount of subsidies does not depend on how many inputs are used or output produced, the total budget is completely predictable. * Better predictability of income for farmers since payments do not depend at all on current production and input use. If payments are predictable, they can also be pledged as collateral for loans. * Better distribution of government support to farmers most in need of assistance. Direct payments can be targeted at the small, poor farmers who devote a great part of production to their own consumption (and so do not benefit much from high support prices), and use few purchased inputs. * Lower distribution cost of subsidies. 74. Some implementation issues deserve special attention. Among these are developing a transparent and reliable registry of farmers (and other rural residents). There are several options for developing such a register, but this will require time and resources. Many countries have used existing cadastre and land registration records and census information as a starting point. Other issues include deterrnining the size of the transfer, the payment basis and the payment means (cash vs. input vouchers, among others). See Castafleda-Fernandez, 1997. 75. One option to begin with is to design and implement a pilot program to test the logistics of different mechanisms and approaches with the registry of farmers, and to monitor farmers' attitudes and responses to a direct income support program, which will replace indirect agricultural subsidies.33 76. The potential of small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSEs) in job creation may be more limited than commonly thought. An examination of cross-country evidence in OECD countries shows that: 1) very few among the unemployed seek opportunities for self-employment (no more than 5 percent in OECD countries); 2) MSEs are short-lived: one-third to one-half of businesses close down during the first year of operation; 3) among those businesses that survive, the multiplier effect on job creation is small: each surviving business creates, on average, half an additional job; 4) no OECD government dedicates more than 10 percent of funding for active labor market programs to MSEs - presumably because other programs are more effective at job creation (Dar and Tzannatos, 1999). Unfortunately, no similar studies exist for LAC countries. 77. Temporary employment programs (workfare), such as Argentina's Trabajar or Jamaica's Skill 2000, are common and effective mechanisms for bridging high unemployment, particularly among the poor. However, they represent a relatively costly means of transferring income to the poorest because those who benefit from infrastructure projects are hired to work with required complementary inputs, such as construction materials. Often these programs must comply with minimum wage regulations or be close in value to the market wage for day labor. Workfare programs can best be conceived of as a short-term policy option implemented in the face of emergency conditions, and phased out as conditions improve. Thus, they are complementary to income-support programs of more medium- to long-run nature. 78. Training Programs. Based on experience elsewhere in the world, training programns are inefficient. They usually provide benefits to a very small number of people relative to the total unemployed labor force, at a relatively high cost per beneficiary. Further, international experience 33 Such a pilot program for 10,000 farmers is currently under implementation in Turkey under a World Bank Economic Reform Loan Project. A national input voucher program for about 4.5 million farmers was introduced in Romania to replace input subsidies and crop purchases by the govemment in 1997 (Castafleda-Femandez, 1997). 122 with training programs is at best mixed - obtaining a positive impact on the unemployment rate seems to depend primarily upon whether the economy is growing, which is the case in the Dominican Republic. And even under conditions of growth, not all training programs work well - those that are tightly-targeted to women and other disadvantaged groups have the most positive impact. Notably, youth seldom benefit from training programs or any other active labor market intervention for that matter. It is very difficult to correct the long-term failures of the education system with training programs which are short in duration by nature and at a relatively late stage of the youth's development. Evidence also shows that large-scale retraining for those laid-off as a result of economic change in the structure of production has little impact. In general, training programs have proven to be more expensive and no more effective than job-search assistance. Job search assistance tends to be successful at reducing unemployment during periods of general economic expansion (World Bank, 2000a).34 The 65 and Older Age Group: Status and Main Risks 79. The 65 and older age cohort constitutes a low 5.8 percent (as compared to Argentina's 10.2 percent and Jamaica's 7.1 percent) of total population in the Dominican Republic (Table 6 and World Bank, 2000a and 2000b). Although the Dominican population is still young, which makes it an appropriate timing to reform the pension system (see below), there is a considerable number of elderly in extreme poverty who are uncovered by any kind of economic assistance. 80. Pension coverage in very low in the Dominican Republic. The Instituto Dominicano de Seguridad Social (IDSS) created in 1947 is the single social security institution in the Dominican Republic. Its mandate is to provide health and old age, disability and survivorship pensions for formal sector workers earning less than two times the minimum wage.35 In pension coverage, the IDSS was covering only about 4.0 percent of the population over 65 years of age in 1999.36 In the lowest income decile where the share of elderly people is larger than in the whole population (Table 6), coverage is still much lower. It has been estimated that about 50,000 elderly people belonging to the lowest decile and about 135,000 (ENGIH 98) belonging to the lowest three income deciles are uncovered by pensions of the IDSS. SESPAS has an income assistance (Protecci6n al Anciano program) that provides monthly cash payments (US$12) to about 9,000 old people living in extremely poor conditions. 81. The health care needs of the elderly are significant. Almost 36 percent of the elderly reported illness or injury during the reference period of three months before the survey (ENGIH 98). Despite this fact, the elderly poor have extremely low levels of insurance coverage (9.7 percent for the general elderly population and 3.4 percent for the elderly poor, ENGIH 98). 82. The elderly poor are dependent on relatives for support. The ENGIH 98 reports that over 93 percent of elderly-headed households in poverty received transfers from relatives. Of these elderly poor only about 14.0 percent received external transfers indicating that most transfers are from relatives living in the country. In 1998, employment rate among elderly people who belonged to the poorest three income deciles was 41 percent (as compared to 57 percent in Jamaica) (ENGIH 98; DR Poverty Report; World Bank, 2000b). 34 For OECD experience with active labor policies the review in World Bank, 2000a has drawn heavily on Dar and Tzannatos, 1999. 35 The level of minimum wages depends on the capital size of the enterprise. For example, enterprises with more than DR$500,000 (US$30,000) in capital have to pay DR$2,633 (US$160) as monthly minimum wage. Enterprises with capital between DR$500 and DR$200,000 have to pay DR$1,880 (US$115) and enterprises with less than DR$200,000 has to pay DR$1,757 (US$107). The exchange rate for this calculation was 16.35 pesos per dollar. 36 Coverage is, however, much lower than the above figure since many people less than 65 years of age can get a pension under the current system. 123 Strategy for the 65 Years Olds: Issues and Options 83. The Dominican Republic needs to address issues for the elderly in two fronts. The first is expanding the Protecci6n al Anciano program SESPAS provided as a safety net for the current elderly poor, while the second front is reforming the social security system to increase coverage of the elderly over the medium to long term. As seen previously, many of the elderly poor are in difficult economic conditions and are unable to work and to maintain a minimum standard of living. 84. On the first front, expand the targeted income support program or non-contributory pension system for the poorest elderly, and the implementation of an adequate mechanism of control is required. Despite the income support provided by the SESPAS that operates like a non- contributory pension scheme, benefits are low relative to other countries. In many LAC countries, non-contributory pension subsidies may be as high as half the minimum wage of unskilled workers. However, we estimate that expanding the actual SESPAS program would cost approximately US$7.2 million to provide a well-targeted income support program to the elderly in the poorest income decile (approximately 50,000 persons) - assuming forty percent of the cost of the food basket plus administration costs (US$12/month). 85. On the second front, the proposal now in Congress for reforming the pension and health insurance systems goes a long way towards building a modem system which will be able to address the income needs of the elderly in the future. In pensions, the proposed system will rely on individual capitalization accounts of workers (as opposed to the current pay-as-you-go system) which has shown great benefits, such as increased national savings, improved management of funds, etc. in other countries. The proposed pension system will rely on three pillars: the subsidized pillar, for poor persons not contributing to finance their pension; the semi-subsidized contributory system for self-employed individuals and those working in micro enterprises; and the contributory regime for dependent workers who contribute in full to finance their pensions. Contribution rates are low (10 percent total for pensions) and are not expected to increase labor costs significantly. Also, unlike many other Latin American countries, the fiscal cost of the reform appears to be very small, as a result of the low coverage of the current system and young population structure of the Dominican population. E. 5. General Population Risks 86. In the Dominican Republic there are several risks that are unrelated to specific age groups but correspond to the general population. These are, poor health care resulting from inadequate health insurance and public service provision; poor coverage of basic sanitation services such as potable water and sewage; inadequate housing and shelter conditions for a great number of poor families nationwide, which make them vulnerable to the occurrence of natural disasters like hurricanes; and poor preparation to respond to recurrent natural disasters, such as hurricanes and floods. The following is a brief description of each one of these risks. Health risks 87. Health indicators in the Dominican Republic are very poor and show that SESPAS, the major provider of health services, the IDSS and other public and private health providers do not protect the population from health risks adequately. Infant mortality rates at 40 per 1000 live births in 1996 are much higher than the mean for Latin America (Table 1). However, not all the blame can be put on the health care system since among the main causes of infant deaths are diarrhea, respiratory illness and other transmitted diseases, and malnutrition, which are related to poor sanitary conditions and poverty. In addition to high infant deaths, there are also high rates of cardiovascular diseases, accidents and violence and others, which are prevalent in the older population. 124 88. Among the causes of the deficient health indicators there may be access problems since SESPAS, which operates a network of rural and urban health posts and clinics, and secondary and tertiary hospital services, suffers from shortfall of resources and great inefficiencies (see below). In addition, health services of the IDSS and the armed forces attend only their very limited clienteles. The private sector provides a significant amount of outpatient and inpatient health services for those who can pay. According to SESPAS 's 1996 health survey, only one fifth of the population reported having health insurance services in 1996.37 IDSS 's coverage alone is less than 4.0 percent of the total Dominican population. 89. In addition, the quality of health services appears to be deficient leading to low use of public infrastructure by poor households. In 1998, only about 37.0 percent of persons who reported receiving any medical attention said they had used SESPAS installations. Also, of people belonging to the poorest quintile only 67.0 percent reported using SESPAS services. In some services there were frequent complains with long waiting lines, delays in needed diagnostic exams and lack of basic supplies and medicines. In hospital services in areas where no private infrastructure is available, the rich use public services free of charge. Indeed, ENGIH 98 reports that 46.0 percent of population that received attention without payment was non-poor. Health Risks: Issues and Options 90. Several reasons are often cited to explain the deficient health services in the Dominican Republic. First, is the low level of expenditures on health care as seen in Table 3 earlier in this report, public expenditures on health care have been estimated at 1.7 percent of GDP in 1996, a level much lower than that of Latin American countries (2.7 percent of GDP). However, total expenditures on health care, including that of the private sector, is a higher figure at 6.5 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2000d). Second, not only have public expenditures been low, but also expenditures have been badly allocated among health care levels (primary versus hospital care) and among uses (administrative versus service expenditures) within the SESPAS and health care providers. Among health care levels, most expenditure (over 80 percent) is allocated to hospitals even though spending on primary health care would be more effective for the health needs of the Dominican population. Among expenditure uses, most expending is allocated to pay for administrative personnel (about 40 percent of all personnel is working on administrative matters), and physicians, instead of auxiliary and professional nurses. Third, high centralization of spending and other critical decisions such as hiring of personnel. The Presidencia de la RepuTblica does hiring of permanent staff, for the most part, outside the SESPAS.5 91. Recent proposals have sought to address some of these problems. The SESPAS is undertaking an ambitious deconcentration and decentralization program whereby provincial health offices are created with the power to administer budget and some personnel actions with some freedom from the center. 92. A promising attempt at reforming the health care delivery system is in the current proposal in Congress as part of the social security reform. The health sector reform component proposes to create a universal health insurance system combining public and private resources and providers for health care. The system will be based on payroll contributions to finance health insurance costs, and public funding of a safety net non-contributory system for those unable to contribute or pay. This will enable the public and private sectors to marshal all funds for health care to finance a comprehensive health care package, seeking to eliminate duplication of expenditure and waste. 37 Figure reported in Aristy et al. 1999. Data from the ENGIH 98 indicate that about 16.0 percent of households report having health insurance, the majority from employer funded private suppliers (52 percent) and the rest from the IDSS and other sources. 3 The Presidencia de la Republica fills permanent positions. This may be a source of the high increments in staff occurred recently as each new administration wants to provide its own staff. (Aristy et al. 1999). 125 Public hospitals and clinics will receive funds on the basis of services rendered to health insurance companies (private, public or mixed) rather than on the basis of historic budget allocations. 93. The main safety net program in the health sector is Programa de Medicamentos Esenciales (PROMESE). This program provides generic medicines to the public at below market prices (in some cases, up to 50 percent) in health posts, clinics and hospitals of the public health system. It also provides medicines and supplies to public hospitals and clinics. The program is financed with program sales and budget transfers from the government. Little is known about the targeting impact of the program, the budget costs to the government and the effect this large program has on the private pharmaceuticals market. The total budget of the program was DR$227 million (about US$13.9 million) in 1999. If anything, this program should be targeted to only the poorest, especially young children and the elderly. Shelter Protection 94. Despite high public investments in housing, the Dominican Republic exhibits many deficiencies in housing and basic infrastructure common to the rest of Latin America. Survey data for 1998 indicates that about 69.0 percent of households had pieces of zinc39 used as a roof, 48.0 percent use outdoor latrines, 28.0 percent have no access to in-house running water, 18.0 percent suffer from over-crowding40, 7.0 percent have mud floors, and more than 13.0 percent of households use wood and kerosene for cooking and lighting. The problem is, as expected, more acute for the poor. For example, among those in the thirty poorest percent of the population, 80.0 percent of households had pieces of zinc used as a roof, 65.0 percent use outdoor latrines, 44.0 percent are without access to running water in the home, 36.0 percent of households suffer from over-crowding, 15.0 percent have mud floors, and 28.0 percent of the poorest quintile use wood and kerosene for cooking. Further, large numbers of people live in high-risk flood areas. For instance, over 300,000 persons, more than 11.0 percent of the residents in the Santo Domingo area are located in the margins of the highly polluted and flood prone Ozama River. Data are not available, but the situation appears to be much worse for the rural poor. 95. Estimates by the National Housing Institute (INVI, Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda) indicate that the housing deficit can reach 500,000 houses (or about 25 percent of families), increasing by 50,000 house needs annually. These estimates do not consider houses with deficient materials and inadequate construction, not able to withstand the fury of hurricanes, floods and/or mudslides. Estimates by the Consejo Nacional de Asuntos Urbanos (CONAU) indicate that Hurricane Georges, who hit the Dominican Republic in 1998, affected 170,000 houses, especially in the poor areas. 96. Although municipal governments are responsible by law for provision of water and sewage and other municipal services, it is the central government who provides most of the public services (water, sanitation, and street paving, among others) and finances low-and "middle" income housing construction and rehabilitation. This is done through a large number of uncoordinated public institutions, including the Oficina Coordinadora y Fiscalizadora de Obras del Estado, Oficina Supervisora de Obras del Estado adscrita a la Presidencia de la Reputblica, Secretaria de Estado de Obras Publicas, INVI, Oficina de Pro-Comunidad, and Programa de Comunidad Digna.4' Total public expenditures operated by all these agencies totaled US$212 million (1.3 percent of GDP) in 1999. In addition, estimates from the ENGIH 98 reported that households spent an additional US$200 million (about 1.2 percent of GDP) on capital expenditures on house construction and rehabilitation, in 1998. 39 "Techos de hojas de Zinc". 40 More than three people living in one room. 41 The Comunidad Digna Program was created in 1999 with the objective of coordinating many social programs operated by different ministries and decentralized institutions. 126 97. Public expenditures on housing have been concentrated on the non-poor. In fact, the beneficiaries have been professionals who belong to middle income segments. This segment of the population has been unionized and well-organized, and able to exert pressure on other groups. Furthermore, public sector workers have also received generous housing programs from successive governments. Strategy for Shelter Protection: Issues and Options 98. Housing programs need immediate restructuring. Following are some options to consider. First, housing policy needs radical change to eliminate housing subsidies to middle and upper income families and concentrate all subsides on the poorest families who need them the most. Second, several programs and institutions need to be eliminated to consolidate all funds into a single agency charged with financing slum upgrading and rehabilitation and housing programs. Third, strict targeting mechanisms need to be used to target subsidies to the poorest, breaking the current practice of political patronage and providing subsidies to professional and or organized groups. Fourth, capital markets need to be improved to further increase private sector mortgage lending to middle and upper income families to finance their housing needs, relieving the pressure these groups exert on government programs. 99. In terms of shelter programs for the poor the following order of priorities can be considered. The first priority is to finance a national land titling program by subsidizing the transaction costs of purchasing lots, notary costs and corresponding taxes. This is a very cost effective program- introduced in Chile in the 1970s to regularize thousands of irregular settlements and invasions-since it provides security to families who can start building their own housing solution (Castafneda, 1992). The second priority is to finance relocation of families from at risk zones such as the Ozama river margins or those still living in shelters from the consequences of Georges by providing them a subsidized housing unit. Given advances in construction engineering, low-cost housing units can be built quickly and cheaply (US$6,000 per unit) in the Dominican Republic.42 If current public resources (US$212 million) were spent on the poorest, over 53,000 subsidized housing units could be provided annually to these people to relocate them from dangerous areas (assuming a subsidy of US$4,000 per poor family, which is becoming the norm in some other LAC countries). Third, where relocation is not necessary, sites and services projects are highly recommended with subsidies provided for basic infrastructure of water and sanitation. Most of these programs should have the highest priority in rural areas, including the Bateyes, where some of the poorest people are located. E. 6. Summary of Risks and Possible Social Protection Strategies 100. The Dominican Republic is not adequately covering major risks faced by key at risk groups. The main instruments for risk prevention and risk coping are deficiently funded and operated. Ideally, risk prevention achieved through services provided by line ministries, such as health and education, or through public or private insurance, such as health insurance or pensions, should be the main long-term policy goal. Social assistance schemes, such as income support should be used as short term measures to cover eventual flaws in the social insurance system, and to respond to emergencies from unexpected crises or natural disasters. The following is a brief summary of main risks faced by the Dominican population and the main recommendations to address them, following the age-group classification used in the previous section. Table 9 summarizes the risks and recommendations for addressing them with cost estimates to cover the poorest population decile. 42 Approximate total cost of a low-cost housing unit in the Dominican Republic is estimated by the authors at about US$ 6,000, a figure which is similar to that of other LAC countries that have developed standard techniques and materials. Some of these programs have started to be introduced successfully in the Dominican Republic in the RESURE project in Santo Domingo. 127 Table 9: Summary Cost of Recommended SP Programs to Cover Gaps of Poorest Decile Priority Group Recommended program Responsible Cost Financing from: agency (US$ Million) 0-4 Years Old -ECD programs Community, 28.0 Food assistance programs NGOs, private 5 Years Old -Pre-primary education SEEC, private 2.5 Budget 6-13 Years Old -Income transfer tied to school Special 10.1 Budget attendance, scholarships, and school program lunch. SEEC 9.4 Food assistance 14-24 Years Old *Secon1irN Edue.ai,on SEEC Special To be estimated Budget allocations for -Income support program. with better secondary education, -Income support for disabled, single information. Budget for transfers. mothers, others -Youth programs Ages 25-64 -Income transfers for not able to work Special To be estimated. Budget Years Old indigent. program -Retraining programs Ages 65 plus -Assistance pensions SESPAS 7.2 Budget allocations Years Old All Ages_ Health care Healih insurance He,lih relform To be determined Housing Land tiiling slum rehat',iianon d,re Houing se%lor 4.5* No more resources are subsidies to poorest. reform needed per year. Overall Support -Targeting system ONAPLAN 4.5 (targeting) Budget allocations for SP -Monitoring and evaluation system ONAPLAN 1.5 (surveys studies) -otsl Cost | -- C7.8 ...___________ .___________ ___________ ______ ____ _ (0.5% orG D P) *Assurning that about 110,000 farnilies in the poorest decile (80% of total in that group) need a housing subsidy of about USS4,000 per fanily. Source: Author calculations based on gaps of Table 7 and estimated per unit cost figures in the text. 101. The 0-4 Year Old Age Group: The major risk facing poor children in this age group is the lack of cognitive stimulation which results in intellectual impairment, low human capital formation, permanent losses in productivity and chronic poverty. Existing safety net programs in the Dominican Republic provide coverage to about 4.0 percent of poor children, provide benefits that are unlikely to have a significant impact on the child and also do not address the need for cognitive stimulation among poor children. There are approximately 140,000 children in the 0-4 year group belonging to the first income decile and approximately 350,000 belonging to the third income decile who are not covered by early stimulation programs. Strategies to assist this group in coping with the consequences of poverty include early stimulation programs for children in poor families. Communities or NGOs can operate these programs with funding provided by the government. Current government programs are very inefficient with most spending and a large portion of it goes to personnel services rather than to child care stimulation and nutrition assistance. CONANI should be restructured to act as a financing agency of ECD programs transferring its current child care centers to organized communities and NGOs. It has been estimated that covering children from the poorest income decile with ECD programs over the next few years would cost US$28 million. Moneys for this program could come from savings from elimination or reduction of the current highly inefficient and untargeted food assistance programs, such as the Comedores Economicos program, the food distribution program of the Plan Social and INESPRE 's Alimentos para Todos program. 102. The 5 Year Old Age Group: The major risks facing poor children in this age group are developmental lags and learning difficulties related to the lack of preparation for primary school. The key preventive strategy for this age group is to increase access to pre-school education for poor children. There are an estimated 17,000 children in the age 5 cohort belonging to the poorest decile and 43,000 belonging to the thirty percent poorest children who are not covered by pre-school education and who should have priority for enrolling. Covering all 5 year olds in the poorest decile with pre-primary education would cost US$2.5 million (excluding the cost of school launch and infrastructure). This will require additional resources for the SEEC for pre-school education, which can come from expenditure reallocation from "administrative and other expenditures" within SEEC and/or from outside the education sector. 128 103. The 6-13 Year Old Age Group: The major risk for poor 6-13 year olds is low human capital formation. The most salient feature of this age group in the Dominican Republic is its very low (for LAC standards) school enrollment rate of only 82 percent of the relevant age group. The enrollment rate is even lower for the children belonging to the poorest income decile (66 percent). High rates of repetition, coupled with poor quality of primary education compound the problem. The effective social protection strategy is to promote human capital formation by making every effort to enroll poor children in school and inducing them to attend regularly. Some of the inducements to enroll and stay in school include improving access and quality of primary education and strategies to reduce the private costs of primary education, such as scholarships and targeted income support to very poor school age children (with benefits tied to attendance). It has been estimated that providing an income support of US$12 per child in the poorest decile conditional on school attendance would cost US$10.1 million. Finally, as discussed earlier in this report, improvements in coverage of the school lunch program especially in rural areas, where most students are uncovered would cost US$9.4 million annually. Funding for these purposes can also come from the inefficient food distribution programs mentioned earlier, and from better management of SEEC resources. 104. The 14-24 Year Old Age Group: The major risk for poor youths in this age group is low human capital accumulation and consequent deficient skills arising from incomplete and/or poor quality secondary school education. Secondary school drop out and attrition rates are very high in the Dominican Republic leading to very low secondary school net enrollment rates, especially for teenagers in the poorest three income deciles (36.2 percent) and in the lowest income decile (29.2 percent), in 1998. Repetition of the same grade with older students is the norm in the DR. About half of those enrolled in school in this age group are still in primary education (Figures from ENGIH 98). Teenagers in the poorest three income deciles are also affected by unemployment rates of more than 40 percent. Such a reality leads to teenage frustration, early motherhood, and, possibly, antisocial behavior. Low human capital development results in low productivity, low wages and chronic poverty. 105. Risk prevention strategies for this age group include promotion of secondary school enrollment and completion, especially for the poor, and labor intensive growth. Short-duration training opportunities in post-secondary education, such as those offered by community colleges in the United States, can be introduced in the Dominican Republic to provide alternatives to students who are not willing or not able to pursue long-duration professional training in universities. Possible safety net measures to address the needs of this age cohort include (a) scholarships or income support tied to school attendance to encourage school attendance and reduce secondary school attrition, targeted to parents of school age children, (b) targeted income support programs for those unable to work (pregnant/lactating women, single parents and the disabled); (c) targeted social service programs to build self-esteem and improve work attitudes and social capital skills; and (d) partnerships with the private sector to increase on-the-job training and job search opportunities. 106. The 25-64 Year Old Age Group: The major risk facing poor 25-64 years olds is low income due to underemployment and unemployment. Due to the excellent performance of the Dominican economy in the last 10 years, unemployment has dropped particularly for prime age workers (World Bank, 1999). However, youth unemployment is still a major problem in the Dominican Republic. In addition, many poor Dominicans are affected by low wages and incomes, due to low productivity, rather than by open unemployment. The key risk prevention strategy for the working age poor is a sound macroeconomic policy framework and flexible labor market that promote labor intensive growth and employment creation. In the Dominican Republic major macroeconomic and trade liberalization reforms are still to be implemented (World Bank, 1999). Also, more labor market flexibility is needed, particularly for the industrial sector. Recommended safety net strategies include income transfers for those not able to work and for the very indigent. Targeted on-the-job training and job search programs may be effective in generating some employment and income benefits for the working age poor. 129 107. The 65 and Older Age Group: The main risk to this age group is little or no income, which places these people at great risk of not being able to maintain a decent survival. The IDSS and/or assistance pensions granted by the SESPAS do not cover the vast majority of elderly poor in the Dominican Republic. It has been estimated that about 50,000 elderly belonging to the poorest ten percent of the population are not covered by any assistance pension. The best social protection strategy for the elderly is to provide them with adequate income support so that they can maintain a minimum consumption capacity. This would be best achieved by improving the formal pension system. This system, however, can only offer results in the long run, if current proposals for pension reform are passed by Congress. In the short run, safety net measures for those not covered by a pension should include a well targeted income support program. The cost of covering the poorest elderly has been estimated at US$7.2 million annually. 108. Risks Not Related to Age: Major risks not related to age in the Dominican Republic include poor health care coverage, lack of adequate housing, and lack of basic sanitary services such as potable water and sewerage. Ensuring access to health care will require decentralization efforts of the public system, restructuring the health care delivery system to favor primary health care, improve efficiency in resource use and undertake reforms to introduce participation of the private sector in providing health insurance services. Housing, strategies include increased access to land tilling, improving the capacity of the capital market to provide mortgage loans to middle and upper income families, so as to reduce and/or eliminate the pressure these groups exert over government subsidies. In addition, the housing policy needs to include, low-income housing programs targeted to the poorest for resettlement and slum upgrading programs, and investment in basic infrastructure development. No additional resources to the current 1999 levels may be needed to implement such a strategy. E. 7. How to Design and Implement the Social Protection Strategy 109. The implementation of the Social Protection strategy outlined above requires several steps: 1. Preparing the policy framework. In the Dominican Republic there have been few attempts to having a global vision of poverty and social risks faced by the population. Also lacking is a review of the impact and effectiveness of current programs in reducing poverty and or protecting vulnerable groups from the social risks they face and the consequences of child abandonment, retardation, and other adverse effects posed by unemployment, low incomes and natural disasters. 2. Addressing financing issues: Rationalization before expansion. It is clear that compared to other LAC countries of similar socioeconomic development, social spending is low in the Dominican Republic. However, it is also clear that social spending in the Dominican Republic finances inefficient programs, does not address high priority needs of the population, and does not adequately reach the poorest population. Most spending goes to pay for salaries with little money left for other inputs - which are critical for the quality of services provided. For instance, in the CONANI program, over 80 percent is spent on salaries with little left for food and nutrition and other interventions for small children. Also, regarding health care, most spending is made in hospitals and the personnel they employ, while the real need is in primary health care, which provides greater benefits to the poor. 110. In dealing with financing issues for the social sector, government needs to make hard choices before consideration is given to increasing tax revenues to finance increments in social spending. These hard choices include the elimination of untargeted and inefficient feeding programs, such as the Comedores Economicos program and the Food Distribution program of the Plan Social, both depending on the Presidency of the Republic, and the Alimentos para Todos program depending from INESPRE. None of these programs has great benefits for the poorest and none is justified in terms of impact on nutrition and income support. While a small food distribution program network can be justified to respond to natural disasters posed by hurricanes, floods or other natural disasters, there is 130 no justification for the government to distribute food assistance in the scale the above programs are doing. Food markets are quite developed in the Dominican Republic and, if agricultural protection is reduced, food prices will go down benefiting the poorest population. As much as US$65 million in fiscal resources can be saved in these food distribution programs. Additionally, spending made by line ministries on health and education need to be restructured to devote more resources to programs which have more impact on the poor, such as primary and secondary education, and primary health care. Only after this restructuring takes place can additional resource needs for social spending be considered. 3. Solving targeting issues. Directing subsidies to the poor is a matter of both policy decision and the development and implementation of targeting instruments. In terms of policy decisions, the government has to decide clearly if it wants to use public resources to improve income distribution directing resources and the services they produce to the poorest population groups. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish social programs that by constitutional or legal mandate are of a universal nature such as primary education, from those that are to be directed to certain population groups, such as the elderly poor, the incapacitated or those unable to work and sustain themselves. In terms of targeting instruments, it is critical that the decisions to target certain social spending be supported by modern information systems that permit an adequate selection of beneficiaries on the basis of poverty, unmet basic needs or other indicator(s) of need. 111. In the Dominican Republic the best option is to introduce proxy-means testing instruments currently under development or application in some Latin American countries, such as Colombia, Mexico and Costa Rica. The desired characteristics of such system are as follows: * Uniform and objective. People in all parts of the country should be measured with the same standard and criteria. * Based on a Poverty Index. The poverty index should be calculated from a set of indicators, including income and other variables that are correlated with poverty; e.g., type of toilet facilities, source of water, type of lighting. * Easy to administer and apply. This means that the system should be as simple as possible, so that people at local or municipal level could administer and update it. * Cost effective. This means that the cost of application and administration of the system should be low relative to the amount of the benefits targeted. 112. A national system for targeting programs could be constructed as follows. First, poor areas are identified using poverty maps from census information and surveys such as the poverty map developed by ONAPLAN in 1996. Second, using statistical analysis of survey data, the variables most strongly associated with poverty are selected, along with the weights they exhibit in statistical analysis. Third, the selected variables are placed in a questionnaire that is administered to all households in selected poor areas, generating the database of potential beneficiaries (poor people who do not live in the selected area can apply for inclusion in the database). The variables are used to construct a poverty index, normally ranging from 0 (poorest) to 100 (richest); program eligibility begins from the poorest up to a predetermined cut-off point on the index, established according to the program's budget and target population. This cut-off point can be flexible in the face of an economic crisis, so that program eligibility can expand (and contract) with changes in economic conditions. 113. It is not clear how long it would take to implement a national system in the Dominican Republic. However, based on experience in other countries it would most likely take 1-2 years - including design of the system, field testing, systematic cleaning and cross checking of data and refinement of cut-off points. As indicated previously in this report, initial costs for setting up 131 comparable systems in other countries is about US$7-8 over three years per family registered in the system. Assuming a similar cost structure in the Dominican Republic, registering all households in the lowest three income deciles would cost approximately US$4.5 million. Ideally, this system would be used to administer most if not all targeted programs. 4. Introducing monitoring and evaluation systems. The Dominican Republic is in a good position to implement a Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) bi-annually. A general purpose representative survey of living conditions such as this, can provide information on the status of key risk groups and on the targeting outcomes of the main social programs, complementing the current more limited Household Survey carried out by the Central Bank. To strengthen the capacity of the LSMS to monitor risk groups and programs, the following information should be included on a regular basis: * Coverage of programs for children in the birth to five years old age cohort, * Private costs of pre-school education, * Incidence and coverage of social protection programs, including income support programs, education- based transfers, community based strategies, labor market programs, subsidized drug programs, feeding programs and low-income housing programs. 5. Improve research base. More information is required to guide planning development of social protection strategies for school age children, especially with respect to the following: * Demand and supply issues with respect to pre-school education; * Demand and supply issues with respect to secondary education; * Reasons why children are absent from school; * Evaluations of existing social safety net programs, including participatory and impact evaluations of income transfer, labor market and early childhood stimulation programs. 132 BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristy, Jaime. Mena, Rita. and Mendez, Arturo. 1999. Gasto PuTblico en Servicios Sociales Bdsicos en la Repzublica Dominicana: Iniciativa 20/20. Fundacion Economia y Desarrollo. Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana. 2000. Impacto del Gasto PuTblico Social sobre el Bienestar y la Equidad. 2do Borrador. Santo Domingo. . 1998. Encuesta Nacional de Gastos e Ingresos de los Hogares, Octubre 1997-Septiembre 1998. Santo Domingo. 1999. 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How Early Childhood Education Can Reduce Inequality: An Overview of Recent Findings. IADB. Washington, D.C. El Senado de la Repuiblica Dominicana. 1999. Proyecto de Ley Unificado sobre El Sistema Dominicano de Seguridad Social. Santo Domingo. Fundaci6n Economia y Desarrollo. 1996. Programa Macroeconomico de Mediano Plazo para la Repuiblica Dominicana: 1996-2000. Santo Domingo. Guash, J. 1999. Argentina Labor Market in the New Millenium. The World Bank. Processed. Heckman, James. 1999. Policies to Foster Human Capital. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series. Working Paper NO. 7288. Holtzmann, R., and S. Jorgensen. 1999. Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper, Second draft, August 1999. World Bank. Jimenez, E. et al. 1989. School Effects and Costs for Private and Public Schools in the Dominican Republic. Working Papers, The World Bank. Washington D. C. 133 Karoly, Lynn, et al. 1998. Investing in Our Children: What we Know and Don't Know About the Costs and Benefits of Early Childhood Interventions. Rand Corporation. Nash, John. 1999. Supporting Rural Development in Turkey: Effects of the Current System and Some Options for Reform. The World Bank. Secretaria de Estado de Educaci6n y Cultura (SEEC). 1999. Logros del Gobierno en el Sector Educaci6n de 1996 a 1999. The World Bank. 2000a. Argentina: Managing Social Risks. Washington, D.C. . 2000b. Jamaica. Social Safety Net Assessment. Draft Document, Kingston. . 2000c. Brazil. Selected Issues in Social Protection. Volume 11. Report No. 20054-BR. Washington, D.C. . 2000d. Dominican Republic. Poverty Assessment (various background papers). Draft Document, Dominican Republic. . 1999. Dominican Republic Social and Structural Policy Review. Washington, D.C. Other Documents Reviewed Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica. 1999. Resultados del Proceso de Concertacion sobre Prioridades del Desarrollo Nacional. Santo Domingo. Aleman, Jose Luis. 1997. Desarrollo con Pobreza. Reforma Social y Disminuci6n de la Pobreza. Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica. Rathe, Magdalena. Salud y Equidad. Una Mirada al Financiamiento a la Salud en la Republica Dominicana. Programa DHS/ Macro International, Inc. 134 Annex 1: Programas Sociales en la Repiublica Dominicana, 1999 Programa/ Objetivo Poblad6n Objeffvo Mecaismotde Focali2adc6n No. . Cobertura Monto de Presupuesto Institucin -- - enefidanos % Transferencia .(en RD$) (Afo Proramnas para Nilios de 0-5 aflos Centro infantil de Resolver la deficiencia de servicios en Niflos de 2-5 aflos de Padres o tutor inscribe al niflo. 8,020 1.7 2,170 1998* 17,400,949 Atenc,dn Integral cuatro areas basicas para los niflos: barrios marginados de Requiere acta de nacimiento (Niflos 0-5, (CIANI) salud y nutrici6n, educaci6n inicial, Santo Domingo, Santiago y tarjeta de vacunas. Debe 30% sicologia y trabajo social. y El Seybo vivir en la zona donde este el mas pobre) CONANIV CIANI y tener padre o tutor. Presidencia Educaci6n Inicial Contribuir con el desarrollo flsico Niflos de 0-5 aflos Universal Aflo 97-98 8.7 137 1997: 8,962,495 motriz, psiquico, cognitivo, afectivo, 102,902 (Niflos 0-5, 1998: 14,128,494 Dpto. Educ. IniciaU social, dtico, estetico y espiritual de los 1999:103,864 total pobl.) SEEC educandos Programas para Nillos de 6-13 aflos Educaddn ProgramaAyuidame a Lograrla superaci6n yeducaci6n de Niflosy Adolescentes de 7- Trabajadoras sociales captan a 2,641 0.4 2,170 1998: 5,730,163 Ser Niio (PASN) los niflos y niflas adolescentes que 15 aflos de familias de los niflos en la comunidad; (Nifbos deambulan y trabajan en las calles y escasos recursos padres inscriben a los niflos, y 6-13 CONANV que no asisten al colegio, tratando de econ6micos. niflos se acercan al PASN. 30% mas Presidencia insertarlos en escuelas de educaci6n Residen en la zona pobre) basica EducacidnBdsica Promovereducaci6n integral del Niflos entre 6 y 13 aflos Universal Aflo 97-98: 74.7 2,130 1997: estudiante 1,241,050 (Niflos 1,677,058,380 Dir. Gral. Educ. 6-13 total 1998: BAsica/SEEC pobl.) 2,643,718,078 * Estiiado en fimci6n del presupuesto total de la instituci6n y el total de niftos beneficiarios. Nota: El porcentaje al que se refiere la cobertura es con relaci6n a la poblacion especificada en el parfutesis. 135 Prograrnat.Objethvo -. . . ^Po a Objetivo .Mecanisimo de]Focalizadon ~, * ,No. Cobertura ' Monto.de Presupuesto *,Ina i ci6n Obuetivo .'e*a'-, - - FA d Benefic.'irl.'' , :% Tnferencia, . ;(en R ) Asistencia Alimentaria Desayuno Escolar: Mejorarel estado de saludy nutrici6n Niflosy j6venes de 3 y 14 Resultado Censo Tallay Peso 1998: 87 1999**: Inclhye los siguientes de la poblacion escolar otorgando alos de ingresos bajos y (1994) Encuesta Nac. de 1,000,000 (GrupoO 17 732,000,000 tres programas: raciones de desayuno y merienda medios Micronutrientes. 1999: 30% mas matutina y vespertina Accesibilidad de las escuelas. 1,200,000 pobre) Situaci6n marginalidad. Escuelas con menos de 800 32 alumnos Escuelas nivel inicial (Grupo 0-17 y basico. Existencia orgs. total pobl.) comunitarias. 1) Programa Mejorar el estado de salud y 605,896 4 Urbano/marginal nutricion de la poblaci6n escolar (Costo de la otorgando raci6n diaria de leche racion) saborizada y galleta o pan de huevo 2) Programa Fronterizo Mejorar el estado de salud y nutrici6n 119,843 3 de la poblaci6n escolar otorgando (Costo de la raci6n alimentos cocidos donados por raci6n) el PMA 3) Programa Transferir recursos financieros para Niflos y j6venes de 4 y 14 2,000 2 Transferencia de compra raciones alimentos que suplan aflos pertenecientes al (Costo de la Fondos (Programa el 20% de los requerimientos Distrito Edu. Sabana de la raci6n) Piloto) nutricionales de los escolares Mar Dir. Gral Bienestar Se refiere a] costo total de los au progmams que comnrende el Desayuno escolar, de acuerdo a las infornimciones provistas por Ia Direcci6n de Bienestar Estudiantil. 136 Progrrnna/ Objetivo Poblad6n Objetivo Mecansmo de Focalizaci6n No. Cobertura Monto de Presupuesto Insfftuci6n Benefidarios Trsnsferencia ,,(en RD$) '(Aflo) Programas 14-17 afos Educacion Educaci6n Secundaria Formar educandos capaces de J6venes 14-17 aflos Universal Aflo 97-98: 92 1,877 1997: participar en la sociedad con una 249,936 (Grupo 373,927,090 Dir. Gral. Educ. Media/ conciencia critica frente al conjunto de 14-17 30% 1998: SEEC creencias, sistemas de valores etico mas pobre) 469,057,883 morales propios del contexto socio- cultural en el que habita. 28 (Grupo 14-17 total pobl.) Programas 18-24 aflos Programa Elevar niveles educativos de la Poblaci6njoven yadulta Universal 1997-98: 10 1,518 1997: Alfabetizacidny poblaci6njoven y adulta que no ha de bajos ingresos 101,109 (Grupo 109,661,525 Educaci6n basica de concluido educaci6n basica 18-24 30% 1998: Adultos (PRALEB) mas pobre) 153,482,031 SEEC Educacion Tecnica Obtener formaci6n general y Estudiantes Universitarios Universal 1997-98: 8% 4,885 1997: 8,274,725 profesional a estudiantes paza que les de bajos ingresos 20,163 (Grupo 1998: 98,493,002 Dir. Gral. Educ. Tdcnica/ ayude a adaptarse al cambio en 18-24 30% SEEC necesidades laborales mas pobre) Programa Nacional de Canalizar becas a estudiantes de bajos Estudiantes de bajos Solicitud de beca y formulario 3,500 becas 1% n.d. n.d. Becas (PRONAB) ingresos. Las becas las financian los ingresos tecnicas (Grupo centros de capacitaci6n. Solo se otorga (se asume una 18-24 30% Dir. Gral. Promoci6n media beca becal mas pobre) Juventud estudiante) 137 Programa/ Obietivo Poblaci6n Objetiio Mecanismo de Foeaizaci6n No. Cobertura Monto de Presupuesto Institucion Beneficiarios % Transferencia (en RIMW (AMlo) Viviendas Estudiantiles Programas Residencias Adquirir recursos para que Asoc. Asoc. Estudiantes del Lienar solicitud, ser del n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. Estudiantiles Casa Estudiantes del Interior puedan tener interior, de bajos ingresos interior y mantener indice alto Pension recursos minimos para alquilar su casa (sobre 70 puntos) pensi6n y tener una alimentaci6n Dir. Gral. Promoci6n adecuada Juventud Programas Residencias Habilitar y equipar edificio de 12 pisos Estudiantes meritorios de Capacidad de n.d. n.d. n.d. Estudiantiles construido por el gobiemo y entregado bajos ingresos 280 estudiantes Programa Torre del a la UASD para servir de residencia a del interior Estudiante estudiantes meritorios de escasos recursos Universidad Aut6noma Santo Domingo Producco6n y Empleo Producciony Empleo de Otorgar credito a la juventud rural J6venes rurales n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. jovenes rurales organizada via el Banco Agricola, para organizados incorporarla a la producci6n Banco Agricola/ agropecuaria. Programa esta en fase FUNDEJUR piloto. Se abri6 ventanilla de credito de RD$I0,000,000 Cooperativa de Contribuir a la reducci6n del Mujeres de bajos ingresos n.d. 400 n.d. n.d. 60,000,000 Produccion Mujeres desempleo femenino mediante el apoyo oganizadas en grupos (a la fecha) (Costo total del en Crecimiento a la creaci6n y cooperaci6n de comunitarios proyecto) cooperativas de producci6n. A la fecha 8190 Dir. Gral. Promoci6n de solo funciona capacitaci6n (estimado en la Mujer total) 138 crontribmias 6afoy mas oe essnaalsidgne IDSS Ofrecerpnsioneso de vejeze invalidez Empleadosprivadoscon Ser empleado pivado con 15% 1998: Cotizantes (1997) a cotizantes ingiresos menores al salario ingreso inferior a dos salarios 488,648 (Grupo 48,000,000 Pensionados (1997n minimo minimos 19,874 (mayores 65 30% mas . ~~~~~~~~~~pobre) Pensiones no Otorga pensiones no contributivas a Mayores de 60 arlos n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. contributivas mayores de sesenta af1os indigentes ESSESPAS Pensiones a Civiles Pensiones otorgadas por instituciones n.d. n.d. n,d. n.d. 1998: gubemarnentales 49,887,259 Programas para la Poblacion General Salttd Programa Venta de Medicamentos a personas de UniverdaloPeal rsonas que van a boticas Diferencia de 1998: Medicamentos bajos recursosta ecios bajos. ubicadas en barrios y precio de mna de 227,649,961 Esenciales Donacian materiales a hospitales y hospitales 50% (productos (PROMESE) laboratorios de la SESPAS genericos) Presidencia de la Rep6blica Programas de la Of recer acceso a un servicio de salud Cobertura nacional con 1998: SESPAS de bajo costo eficaz y con teenologia atencion particular zonas 3,543,862,065 adecuada rurales y barrios SESPAS marginados Servicios Medicos Of recer asistencia medica a los Miembros de las FFAA y 1997: miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas Policia Nacional 71,904,680 FFAA Nota: nd. Indica que la infornaci6n no esta disponible o no se tienen registros de beneficiarios * En el caso del programna de PROMESE no se tienen datos de beneficiarios y el programa no esta focalizado a poblaci6n rnas pobre. 139 Programa/ ObJetivo Peblac6n ObJetivo Mlecanismo de Focalkalnci6 No. Cobertura Monto de Presupueslo Instltud6n-. Beneficiarios % Transferencia (en RD$) (MAo) Vivienda** Programa Mejoramiento Ayudar a grupos poblacionales Poblaci6n que vive en Mediante solicitud 863 Acum. Jul.96- Urbano asentados en ciudades cuyo habitat condiciones precarias mejoradas Ago.99: demanda mejoramiento y mejoradas 117 22,497,013 INVI en ejecuci6n Prom. Anual: 4,536 7,499,004 en proYecto Programa Viviendas Mejoramiento y/o reconstrucci6n de Familias campesinas de Mediante solicitud 275 Acum. 96-99: Rurales viviendas existentes, asi como la menores ingresos sols. Habit. 11,894,729 construccion de viviendas nuevas 1,108 Prom. Anual: INVI en ejecuci6n 3,964,910 6,843 formulaci6n Programa Viviendas Construcci6n de viviendas nuevas Familias de ingresos bajos Mediante solicitud 2,731 nuevas Acum. 96-99: Nuevas terminadas para combatir ddficit (menos 4 sal.min.) y 3,464 663,623,161 habitacional medios (entre 4 y 7 en ejecuci6n Prom. Anual: INVI sal.min.) 7,747 221,207,720 formulaci6n Bonopara Vivienda Ofrece subsidio a las familias para Familias de ingresos Mediante solicitud 600 certificados Acum. 96-99: completar sus ahorros para adquirir medios de bonos 35,665,500 INVI (Prog. Especiales) una vivienda de los cuales 300 Prom. Anual: monet. 520 cert. 11,888,500 precalificac. Sols.Habitacionales Construcci6n de viviendas de Familias ingresos bajos Mediante solicitud 134 viviendas Acum. 96-99: Progresivas caracter progresivo 14,793,955 Prom. Anual: INVI (Prog. Especiales) 4,931,318 ** En el caso de los programas del INVI, el mismo esta orientado a diferentes grupos de poblaci6n y es dificil esfimar numero de beneficiarios. Nota: n.d. Indica que la infornaci6n no estA disponible o no se tienen registros de beneficiarios 140 Programa/ Objetio Poblaci6n Objetho Mt1ecanismo de Focalizaci6n No. Cobertura M*1onio de Presupoesto .Istltuci6n Benericiarios .Transferencia (en RD$) Viviendasde Reparacionesdeviviendasde arnfli,h ingressbay- N1ediarie solicawm nd n d nd 5ii. . Emergencia damnificados por el huracan Georges INVI (Prog. Especiales) Programa Tripartito de Construccion de viviendas con Miembros cooperativa Mediante solicitud 35 viviendas (CEA) n.d. n.d. n.d. Viviendas recursos del INVI-CEA miembros Porvenir y dominicanos cooperativa Porvenir e INVI- residentes en el exterior 535 viviendas INVI (Prog. Especiales) Promotores privados Programa Comunidad Reparacion viviendas de bajo costo Familias de bajos ingresos Mediante solicitud n.d. n.d. n.d. 1999*: Digna 240,000,000 ONAPLAN Oficina Coordinadora Construcci6n viviendas de madera y de Familias de bajos ingresos Mediante solicitud 42,682 madera n.d. n.d. n.d. de Obras del Estado bloques 2,033 bloques de madera Presidencia Suministro de Agua y Alcantarillado CAASD Provisi6n Agua y Alcantarillado en 455,507,605 CORASAAN Sto. Dgo. 205,650,955 INAPA Agua y Alcantarillado en Santiago 821,195,236 Fondo Saneamiento Realizaci6n pequeflos proyectos de 252 pequeilos 1999: Urbano Comunidad saneamiento en barrios del pais proyectos 36,000,000 Digna (letrinas, cafiadas, etc.) * Infomnaciones summnistradas por Comunidad Digna. 141 Programa/ Objetivo Poblaci6n Objetivo Metanismo de Focalizacid6n No. Cobertura Monto de Presupuesto Institucl6n Beneficiarios % Transferencia (en RD$) (Aflo) Asistencia Alimentaria Programa Comedores Venta decomida cocida a personas de Toda la poblaci6n Universal Estimado en 14,204 n.d. RD$5 1998: Economicos' bajos recursos. Venden tambien a Las personas que vayan a (maximo) (Costo de la 70,833,485 empleados y empresas. Suministran comedores raci6n) Presidencia de la comida a las carceles del pais. Republica ProgramaAlimentos Proporcionar a las familias de bajos Toda la poblaci6n Universal n.d. n.d. n.d. 1999: para Todos ingresos los productos de la canasta Las personas que van a 227,985,192 familiar a precios por debajo del puestos de venta INESPRE mercado. Plan Social de la Despacho de raciones alimenticias Toda la poblaci6n Universal n.d. n.d. n.d. 1999: Presidencia y asistencia hospitalaria 620,000,000 Presidencia de la Republica Desarrollo Comunitario Pro Comunidad Realizaci6n de varias obras en areas Areas marginales n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. Acum. 96-99: rurales y urbano-marginales 343,810,471 Prom. Anual: 114,603,490 Programas para Grupos Especiales Educaddn Educacion Especial Ofrecer educaci6n de calidad a niflos, Estudiantes con 1998: 9,560,879 niflas yj6venes con necesidades necesidades especiales SEEC educativas especiales A.sistenclales Ayuda Directa a 1998** Personas 113,319,426 Varias Instituciones * Para el caso de Comedores Econ6rnicos el programa tiene caracteristica universal y se asume que no atiende debidamente al porcentaje mras pobre de la poblaci6n. Esto inCluye los aportes directos a personas realizados por varias instituciones oficiales. 142 Institutional Aspects of Social Programs Rita Mena A. Introduction 1. In the Dominican Republic there has been no defined or clear strategy to combat poverty. The social programs that are being implemented by the Government show a high degree of centralization, particularly at the level of the Presidencia de la Repuiblica. In addition, a high degree of interrelation is observed between the programs and there is a high degree of overlap between the programs carried out by different public institutions. This disorganization results from a lack of coherent, efficient and adequate social policies to meet the needs of those most in need. 2. The participation of the State in the social programs not only covers the design and supervision of the programs, but also the direct provision of the services. For example, the Presidencia de la Repu'blica, through the Secretaria Administrativa de la Presidencia and the respective institutions in charge, carries out different social programs oriented towards children, youth, the rural population and the general population. In 1998, according to the Informe de Ejecuci6n Presupuestaria 1998 published by the Oficina Nacional de Presupuesto (ONAPRES), the expenditures of the Presidencia de la Repzulica in these social programs were estimated to be DR$328.4 million, representing 0.84 percent of total public expenditure and 2.2 percent of social public expenditure.' 3. Since there is not a well-defined social public policy, the existing programs are usually characterized by a reduced coordination between them. Also, due to administrative and institutional weaknesses, some programs are not efficiently implemented. For example, there is no systematic registration of costs and beneficiaries, which makes the evaluation of the incidence of those programs very difficult. On the other hand, some of the programs are not well targeted, others could be better implemented by the private sector under state supervision and others lack coverage, particularly in health and education. 4. Nonetheless, during the last years, the Government has made efforts to increase the efficiency of the management of its social programs with initiatives such as Comunidad Digna which tries to unify the different social programs in order to constitute a "a group of strategies of integral social intervention, that takes into consideration economic, social, political, gender, cultural, and environmental factors."2 5. In this paper we will present a description of the institutions in charge of the social programs carried out by the Dominican Government, describing the programs and highlighting those institutional aspects that hinder the efficiency of such programs. Some recommendations regarding institutional and administrative aspects as well as options for change in the structure of the programs to increase coverage and efficiency will be presented. B. Ages 0-5: Early Child Development 6. Three public institutions carry out programs to benefit the population in this age group. The Consejo Nacional para la Niniez (CONANI), a dependent of the Secretaria Administrativa de la Presidencia, Direcci6n de Protecci6n al Menor a division of the Secretaria de Estado de Salud Ptiblica y ' This excludes funds assigned to the Plan Social de la Presidencia, which in 1999 totaled DR$620 million, almost two times of which was assigned to the rest of the programs carried out by the Presidency. In addition, resources assigned to Oficina Coordinadora de Obras del Estado and ProComunidad are excluded. 2Comunidad Digna Program, Oficina Nacional de Planificacidn (ONAPLAN). August, 1998. 143 Asistencia Social (SESPAS), and the Secretaria de Estado de Educaci6n y Cultura (SEEC), through its program of initial education. The following chart presents the organizational structure of the mentioned programs: Ministry of the Presidency Ministry of Education Health Ministry CONANI Subsecretary of Technical Subsecretary of Social F CIANIs I and Pedagogical Issues Assistance I I General Direction of General Direction of Initial Education Children and Old Population Pre-schools Children Division Guarderias 7. In 1998, the total amount of resources assigned to these programs totaled DR$36.4 million representing only 0.25 percent of social expenditure and 0.09 percent of total public spending.3 B.1. CONANI/Centros Infantiles de Atenci6n Integral (CL4NI) 8. The Consejo Nacional para la Niiiez (CONANI) was created in 1979 with the objective of carrying out programs in centers, in favor of poor children. As a consequence, the following programs were designed: (i) Centros Infantiles de Atenci6n Integral Program (CLANI), for 2-6 year olds, (ii) Ayzudame a Ser Nino Program (PASN), for 7-15 year olds, and (iii) Educaci6n Masiva Program, for youngsters.4 CONANI depends on the Presidencia de la Repzublica, and even though it does not formally depend on the Secretaria Administrativa de la Presidencia, in practice, there exists total dependency on this office. This dependency holds not only for the monetary resources to be assigned but also for aspects related to procurements, selection and designation of personnel and budget distribution, which hinders the well functioning of the institution. Consequently, the quality of the services provided by the centers has been affected considerably. 9. CONANI received in 1998 an annual budget of DR$23.1 million, 84 percent of which pays for personnel services. The annual budget of this institution represented only 0.27 percent of the total budget of the Presidencia de la Repzublica and only 0.06 percent of total public expenditure, representing a slight 0.1 5 percent of social public expenditure. 10. According to a study carried out by Fundaci6n Economia y Desarrollo in May 19985, the availability of physical and human resources in CONANI is adequate. The selection process of the CONANI staff depends on their position. Usually the selected person is chosen out of three candidates. However, in other instances the selection is highly discretionary, the decision being made at the central level (Presidencia de la Reputblica). If needed, the personnel are trained by a group of technicians from CONANI. The centers have teachers to offer the educational component of the program, sometimes high school graduates that live in the same community. Also they have medical personnel, nurses or nurse 3 Includes only resources assigned to Guarderias. If we exclude the program carried out by SEEC, these resources represent only percent of total public spending and a percent of social spending. 4 This program is not currently operating. 5 Analisis del Gasto de Programas de la Presidencia de la Republica, Fundacion Economia y Desarrollo, 1998. 144 assistants some of whom are paid by SESPAS who are in charge of the health and nutritional component of the centers. In case there are children with nutritional problems, a special diet for them is designed by the doctors/nurses. There are also psychologists and social workers that work directly with the parents of the children registered to assist them regarding hygiene, health and education of their children. In 1996, the total number of employees in the centers (both PASN and CIANI) was 653. 11. The total number of beneficiaries of the programs is estimated in 10,453 children, which is equivalent to less than 1 percent of poor children (belonging to the poorest 30 percent of the population) between the ages of 0-13 years old. This shows in fact the small impact that the programs carried out by CONANI has in the community. 12. There are important links between CONANI and other ministries that carry out similar programs such as SESPAS and SEEC. SEEC pays for 12 teachers while SESPAS pays part of the salaries of the medical personnel and give workshops on nutrition. 13. Regarding records and administrative factors CONANI and in particular the head office of each of the programs, must have a record on each child that is registered. Although information on the number of children was available, inforrnation regarding costs, other sources of income such as donations and the like, and potential beneficiaries are not known. 14. Centros Infantiles de Atencion Integral (CIANI): CONANI offers centers for integral care of children between the ages of 2 and 6, whose parents have a low income and live in poor sections of Santo Domingo, Santiago and El Seybo. The centers are established based on demand by the communities. 15. Before the installment of the center, CONANI completes a questionnaire (similar to a census) with information regarding the number of children living in the area, level of education, diseases affecting the children, information about their families, level of education of members of the family, jobs, the socioeconomic condition of the families, and housing and other services. 16. The CIANIs offer pre-school education, also covering other aspects such as nutrition, health, and social work with families. These services are offered free of charge. In terms of education, the CLkNIs work with the curriculum prepared by the SEEC, but they are not recognized as formal educational institutions. 17. The program targets its services to children that live in the neighborhood where the CLANIs are located. In order to accept children in the CIANIs, the parents must go to register the children with the corresponding birth certificate and vaccination chart. 18. In 1996, the program had 430 employees, which results in one employee for every 19 children. In 1998, the program covered about 8,000 children at a total fiscal cost of DR$17.4 million (about US$1.2 million or US$150 per child per year). This shows a coverage rate of 1.7 percent of the children in that age group that belongs to the poorest 30 percent of the population. B.2. Secretaria de Estado de Salud Puiblica y Asistencia Social (SESPAS)/Direcci6n General de Protecci6n al Menor/Public Day-care for Children 19. The SESPAS, through the Direcci6n General de Proteccion al Menor, has implemented three programs for children and at-risk youth. These programs are conducted by the Departamento de Hogar Escuela, Departamento de Guarderias, and Departamento de Asuntos Juveniles, which depend on the Direcci6n General de Protecci6n al Menor. 145 20. The Departamento de Hogar Escuela, and the Departamento de Guarderias provide home- schools (hogares escuela) and day-care services to take care of children whose mothers go out to work. The Departamento de Asuntos Juveniles provides a rehabilitation program for convicted children. 21. Currently, there are 6 day-care centers with 1,214 children registered. These services are provided free of charge. A high degree of centralization of the decisions has been concentrated in the office of the Minister, especially in terms of resources (monetary, human and physical). In 1998, the Direccion received DR$37.1 million, corresponding to I percent of the total budget of SESPAS and less than 0.01 percent of total public expenditure. 22. The SESPAS has signed agreements with religious organizations transferring them the management of some of the day-care centers. In those day-care centers directed by nuns there are extra resources, obtained through donations from several sources. Information regarding costs, beneficiaries and the like are not available6. The operational cost of each program was not available since the resources are distributed as needed according to past allocations and in some instances resources are transferred from one program to the other. 23. In addition to the services provided through the Direcci6n, SESPAS finances similar private institutions administered by religious groups, non-governmental associations and private sector. 24. Day-Care Centers (Guarderias Infantiles): In these centers an integrated attention is offered with several components: education, nutrition and health, recreation, education, and psychological and social work component. The children can stay in the center from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and later depending on the mother's schedule. They serve the children a complete meal, including breakfast, lunch and two snacks. In order for the children to enter this program they must meet several requirements: the mother must present a letter from where she works stating her condition as employee, a vaccination chart for the children as well as his/her birth certificate. The selection is made in the Direcci6n taking into consideration the information given as well as rooms availability. 25. In 1999, the total number of children in the institution is 1,214. This program has a very low coverage rate considering that 471,249 children in this age group belong to the poorest 30 percent of the population. 26. The number of employees varies between center. The total number of employees is of 266, averaging 5 children per employee. These centers have a multidisciplinary team that includes teachers, doctors/nurses, psychologists, and social workers. In terms of monetary resources, the total amount transferred in 1998 by SESPAS was DR$405,500 for an average of DR$337 per child. B.3. Secretaria de Estado de Educacidn (SEEC)/Initial Education 27. The SEEC has a program of pre-school education intended for children in ages between 0-5 years old. The pre-school education is open to every one and offered free of charge. 28. The initial education embraces three levels corresponding to ages 3, 4, and 5 of which only pre- primary (age group 5 year olds) is offered. However, not only 5-year old children attend. In some schools, children of age 3 and 4 attend to. The absence of initial educational centers faces mothers to register their children in pre-primary even though they do not have the required age. 6 At the time we visited the Direccion they were processing the information gathered at the different centers in order to have a more recent estimate of number of children, resources available. 146 29. According to the information of the SEEC, the number of registered children during 1997-1998 was 103,864 with a total amount of resources available of DR$14.1 million. This corresponds to a total of DR$ 137 per child per year (excluding the Desayuno Escolar program). 30. The SEEC transfers money to private educational institutions in a discretionary way. B.4. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group: 31. In the Dominican Republic, there are only three public programs which benefit the age group 0-5. Of these programs, CIANIs are supposed to specifically target children from poor families. However, these programs cover only 24 percent of the children between 0-5 years old in the lowest 30 percent of the population. There is an increasing need for day-care centers for low-income children in the country.7 The fact that in public pre-primary schools there are children of even three years old evidence the demand for day-care centers. 32. A preliminary assessment of these programs shows very close links between the institutions that carry them out. The programs under CONANI and SESPAS are of a similar nature (in terms of the services rendered). The latter is directed toward taking care of children of working women. It should be noted that setting aside the SEEC program, which is considered mandatory by the Education Law of the country (specifically pre-primary attendance by children of 5 years old), the centers (CIANIs) from CONANI and the day-care centers (Guarderias) from SESPAS are the only public centers of this nature. 33. The resources spent in these programs would cover 270,000 children.8 This amount is similar to the number of children ages 2-5 that belong to the poorest 30 percent of the population. This offers a rough indication of the high cost of the programs implemented by CONANI and SESPAS as well as its high opportunity cost. 34. The low coverage of the programs may be a reflection of their institutional and administrative weaknesses. In the case of the CIANIs and the Guarderias, it appears that at their point of inception, these programs were not intended to have a high impact on the target population since they are govemed by different types of constraints, which limits their performance. In fact, they are highly centralized and discriminated against. On the other hand, even though a record of children is available, information such as costs, impact and evaluation are not systematically registered. Such a factor makes it very difficult to assess the real impact of these programs. 35. CONANI is not reaching a high percentage of the population in need. Given the high social returns of programs oriented towards children in this age group and the poor performance by the existing programs it becomes necessary to redefine the roles played by CONANI and the Guarderias. It is difficult to determine whether the poor performance of CONANI is the result of the small amount of resources and the high degree of centralization to which it is submitted or if its performance results in the small amount of resources that is assigned by the Presidencia de la Repuiblica. 36. In the case of the Guarderias, the provision of this service through the SESPAS is questionable. They reach a very small percentage of children; have very limited resources and institutional capability to carry out a program of this sort. In this sense, even though there is a need to increase the coverage of 7There is a vast supply of nurseries and pre-schools at the private level, at an average cost of DR$1,000 per month (excluding registration fees). 8 Using as unit cost per child the current expenditures per child in the Initial Education program (excluding the expenditures of Desayuno Escolar program). 147 early childcare assistance for the poorest groups a reformulation of the existing programs is of extreme importance. There are several options to be considered: > The Initial Education program of the Ministry of Education should be strengthened and expanded to offer the first two levels they are supposed to offer. The target population would be 3-5 age group. > Government-sponsored community based child-care centers could be implemented. These are programs developed and operated at the community level--usually operated by mothers from the community--who have been given proper training and technical assistance on child development. The programs include nutrition assistance (food and nutrition education for caring mothers and parents), training in psychological stimulation of children and the application of growth and psychomotor stimulation monitoring techniques. Financing arrangements from the central or local government or non- government agencies, include payments to communities on the basis of the number children attended (per-capita) or other similar demand-service-based payment system. > These levels could be offered at the nurseries and child-care centers whose administration should be transfer to the SESPAS. There is no need of having two public institutions (Presidencia de la Repzublica and SESPAS) administering two different programs oriented to the same population. These programs should be unified into a single program that could be made dependent of the SESPAS. Coordinating actions between the formal educational systems, the private sector and the communities should be made in order to incorporate them in the process. > Since SESPAS already has agreements with some religious orders (nuns) that are in charge of some of their nurseries (they administer 4 out of the existing 6) the possibility of transferring all the nurseries to these nuns should be evaluated. > In the case of CONANI, there is the possibility of promoting the participation of the private sector and NGO, as well as the community in which the center is located. In that sense, the government could sponsor child-care community centers in which the administration of the resources will be the responsibility of the community in charge with close supervision of NGO and religious institutions that exist in the area. The government will have limited participation in the decision-making process of these centers, regarding use of resources, but since the resources are coming from the government supervision and evaluation of how these resources are being used is expected. 37. Finally it needs to be mentioned that the new Social Security Law establishes under the family health insurance the creation of Estancias Infantiles to take care of children (between ages 45 days-5 years) of working parents. They will offer services similar to those provided by CIANl/Guarderias and pre-schools. These Estancias Infantiles will be managed by the Instituto Dominicano de Seguros Sociales (IDSS) and will be financed by public funds, private institutions, donations and a 0.1 percent of the contribution paid for the family health insurance. It is interesting to notice that even though SESPAS operates Guarderias Infantiles there is no mention, in Chapter 4 of the referred law, of what is going to happen with such a program or with the CIANIs operated by CONANI. Moreover, the law establishes the Consejo Nacional de Estancias Infantiles, formed by representatives of SESPAS, IDSS and SEEC, among others, but information regarding the participation or coordination between CONANI, the Direccion de Protecci6n al Menor or SEEC is not included. 38. It can be assumed that this program will duplicate the roles of the existing ones, without any coordination or interrelation. Since it is a fact that more programs which target this age group are needed, the creation of the Estancias may not be an efficient solution to the problem. Besides, the IDSS has proven to be a very inefficient manager and it cannot be assumed that its institutional capabilities will improve merely by a new law that reduces its scope and functions. 148 39. The organizational structure proposed will be as follows, where the Ministry of Education will be in charge of pre-schools and nurseries, where the latter could be managed by NGO's from the communities, or religious groups, with the supervision and monitoring of the SEEC: Ministry of Education i Subsecretary of Technical and Pedagogical Issues General Direction of General Direction Initial Education of Community , ~~~~~~Participation Pre-schools Nurseries and NGO's, Religious| Day-care centers Groups, Parents Associations, elc C. Ages 613: Basic Education 40. Two public institutions carry out programs oriented toward this age group: CONANI, and the Ministry of Education. It is difficult to estimate the total amount of resources assigned to these programs. Approximately, DR$4,000 million has been estimated, representing 10.2 percent of total public spending. 41. The programs are organized as follows: Ministry of the Presidency Ministry of Education | CONANI Subsecretary of Technical National Institute of PASN and Pedagogical Issues Student Well-Being BECAS PARA MAESTROS P BECAS PARA ESTUDIANTESI DESAYUNO ESCOLAR C.]. CONANI/Ayiudame a SerNifo Program (PASN) 42. This program (PASN) is oriented toward at-risk children/youth between 7-15 year who belong to low-income families work or live in the street, but remain attached somehow to their parents. The program captures children through the social workers who work in the centers. On some occasions the parents come to the centers to register their children or some children come to the centers by themselves. The social workers work with children living in the area where the centers are located. The number of children registered in these centers is 2,443 currently, most of them between 7-10 years old. These centers are located not only in Santo Domingo but also in some provinces of the South, East and North of 149 the country. The children are supposed to leave the centers once they finished four years of basic education, regardless of age. The number of children who completed the program in 1996 was 965, out of 2,443 children registered (a rate of 40 percent). 43. The program offers integral care with the following components: health, education, psychology and social work. These children have little if any education. Also the PASN works with children to transfer the children who are not accepted in the formal education sector because they are over age. The main object of the program is to offer four years of basic education in order to transfer the children to the formal public sector. 44. According to an assessment of the program carried out in 1998,9 the program administrators consider that the availability of physical resources was deemed appropriate, with the exception of transportation equipment. The availability of human resources was considered appropriate. In addition to the CIANIs, the PASN has a multidisciplinary team of teachers, psychologists, doctors and nurses, as well as personnel of lower qualification. The Ministry of Education as well as the SESPAS pays for some of the teachers and medical personnel. In 1996, there were 223 employees corresponding to an average of 11 children per employee. 45. In terms of monetary resources, it was estimated that the program receives DR$2,170 per child per year (US$133). In addition to these resources, in some areas a contribution of DR$25 (US$1.5) is charged to parents of the children. Also, some donations and external aid is occasionally received. C.2. Secretaria de Estado de Educacion y Cultura (SEEC) 46. The Ministry of Education carries out several programs to benefit the children of this age group. In addition to basic education, SEEC offers scholarships for children, scholarships for the professors that teach at this level and a school-feeding program. C.Zi Basic Education 47. The basic education program, for children between 6-13 years old is offered (it is mandated that the State offer this program). The program has eight levels, from first through eighth grades. The basic level of education is divided into two cycles: the first one goes from first through fourth grade, and the second from fifth through eighth. There is special emphasis on math and grammar. In recent years, some effort has been made in order to reduce repetition rates in the first cycle as well as dropout rates and over age. Primary education coverage is still far from being universal. Primary school attendance among 6-13 year olds is 82 percent across the entire population and only 74 percent for those in the poorest three income deciles. 48. Monetary resources transfer to this program has shown an increase in recent years. In 1998, the annual resources budget amounted to DR$2.6 billion'0 (US$180 million) equivalent to DR$2,130 per child per year (US$145). 49. There has been increasing efforts by the SEEC to improve the quality of basic education. Among the measures taken in this direction are modernization of the curriculum, introduction of programs to improve the capacity and quality of teachers, programs of recognition of excellence for students from fifth grade and above (Programa de Reconocimiento al Merito Estudiantil) which benefits students with scholarships, internships, etc. 9 Fundaci6n Economiay Desarrollo, 1998. '° Figures excluding the Desayuno Escolar program. 150 50. It should be noted that the Ministry of Education transfers resources to private educational institutions of the private sector. C.2.ii Scholarships for Children to Study in Private Schools 51. The SEEC give scholarships to students to study at private schools. The Instituto de Bienestar Estudiantil, through its division of scholarships and juvenile interchange, assigns these scholarships. These scholarships are given in order to fulfill what was established in the 1991 ordinance No.7-75, which gives authority to some private schools to give their exams without the presence of examiners from the SEEC. In turn, those private schools would give 5 scholarships to the SEEC that will assign them accordingly. According to this, the SEEC does not pay for these scholarships. 52. At this time a total of 106 private schools are under the protection of the referred ordinance. There are 530 student beneficiaries of the program. The scholarship covers only tuition. Even though it is not clearly established, the program gives preference to those students who are already registered at a private school. Other requisites include letter of application, stating in what school the student is going or is actually enrolled, copy of transcripts from the ongoing grade, and photos of the student. The final selection is done according mainly to grades, and "other" criteria, which is not too clearly established. 53. Scholarships are maintained as long as students maintain an academic index of 80 points or higher. The SEEC meets with parents and students to give them some follow-up. Also, SEEC receives a copy of their grades, directly from the schools. C.2.iii. Scholarshipsfor Teachers 54. In order to increase the quality of basic education, the SEEC carries out a program to sponsor scholarships for teachers in both private and public schools. The Minister directly assigns the scholarships oriented to teachers of public schools. For teachers of private schools the assignment of scholarships is as follows: a) Schools pre-selected are those that have less than 100 students, apply the new curriculum, are located in urban-marginal areas and offer basic education. b) Schools pre-selected apply for scholarships and the corresponding educational district approves such applications. The applications are for studies of profesorado or for a bachelor in education at the universities that have agreements with the SEEC: Universidad Aut6noma de Santo Domingo (UASD), Universidad Nacional Pedro Henriquez Urena (UNPHU), Universidad Catolica de Santo Domingo (UCSD), and the Escuela Superior Felix Evaristo Mejia. 55. At the moment a new master program in administration of school centers is being developed, in order to increase the qualification of the principal of the schools. 151 C.2.iv. Instituto de Bienestar Estudiantil/Desayuno Escolar Program 56. The SEEC, through the Instituto de Bienestar Estudiantil, carries out the Desayuno Escolar program", whose objective is to increase students' nutrition. This program also provides incentives to the parents to send their children to school. 57. The Instituto de Bienestar Estudiantil is very well organized and adequately structured. It has highly trained personnel, some of whom moved from well-known private companies. It has more than 150 supervisors and a team of nutritionists, chemical engineers and microbiologists working in coordination to establish a feeding program which meets the nutritional requirements of children between the age of 3 and 14. They also work with SESPAS (Environmental Direction) and the Direcci6n General de Normas y Sistemas (DIGENOR), and laboratories such as the ones in Instituto Dominicano de Tecnologia (INDOTEC), Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana (JAD) and UASD. There is a high participation and collaborative effort of the communities, which participate in the cooking of foods, buying-selling of some foods, etc. 58. Initial targeting of schools was initially conducted according to the results of the Censo de Peso y Talla 1994 (a new census under preparation), Encuesta Nacional de Micronutrientes, and other criteria such as access, number of students, level of schooling, existence of organized communities. The program has been expanding and, in 1998, the Desayuno Escolar program reached 996,583 children all over the country. However, coverage is still far from being universal (coverage rate is about 70 percent across the entire population attending basic public schools). In 1998, the budget was DR$520 million (US$35 million). The program has resources provided by donors, such as the Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA). 59. Every six months the program carries out an evaluation of the program, with the participation of SESPAS and UASD, in order to measure the impact of the program and assess the quality of the food provided. There are strict controls to supervise the use of resources and the distribution of the rations. Also there is a well-supervised houseware where the food donated by PMA is stored. An evaluation study is currently carried out in order to deternine whether the pilot project in Sabana de la Mar, municipality that corresponds to the Hato Mayor del Rey province, can be replicated in other remote areas with difficult access. 60. The Desayuno Escolar program conveys three different sub-programs: C2.v. Urbano Marginal Program 61. This program provides a daily breakfast of flavored milk with cookie or egg bread (made with fortified corn flour). It extends to marginal sectors of urban areas. The cost of each ration, in 1998, food was of DR$3.75 (US$0.25). In 1998, the program provided 875,000 rations to children. SEEC signs contracts with suppliers from the private sector, usually in the communities where the schools are located, in order to buy from them the bread and milk supplied to students. There is close supervision of these suppliers in order to ensure that they prepare the same kind of bread (with the same nutritional component) under specified and required hygiene conditions. For example, they are compelled to use the corn flour sold by Maicera Dominicana, private monopoly that received from SESPAS a vitamin dosificator to fortify the flour with vitamin A, iron, folic acid and others. In 1999 a workshop was offered to the panaderos that supply the bread to the program in order to homogenize the supply of bread. Attendance to this workshop was compulsory. ' This is only one of the program carried out by this Institute. The others include scholarships and exchange programs, schools cooperatives, teachers wealth and health (dental and eye care). 152 C.2.vi. Fronterizo Program 62. This program provides food (rice, oil, milk, meat, fish, fortified corn flour and beans) donated by the PMA to children at school in 10 provinces located in the frontier area with Haiti. Parents from the Asociaci6n de Padres y Amigos of each school cook the food. They provide gas and other ingredients to cook the food. According to SEEC figures, in 1998, the cost of the program, including administrative costs, was DR$21.8 million (US$1.3 million) and covered 119,883 children. C.2.vii Transferencia de Fondos Program 63. This is a pilot program that is being carried out in the Sabana de la Mar educational district. The funds are transferred from the central office in Santo Domingo to the district and through it to the corresponding committee to buy food for students that attend schools in remote and inaccessible areas. The funds are handed to the committee and are equivalent to the amount they will spend during the week in the procurement of the food. The weekly amount received by each school is DR$300 (US$18), which corresponds to an average of DR$2.25 per ration (US$0.14). In 1998, the program benefited 1,700 students. The food purchased includes oatmeal, bread, rice, milk, fortified corn flour, plantains, and eggs. C.3. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group: > Taking into consideration the institutional limitations of CONANI and the high cost of the PASN program the possibility to eliminate this program and strengthens the basic education program of the SEEC needs to be evaluated. Given that the SEEC is including some programs to work with school overaged children and children with special learning needs it seems that the population intended to be cover by the PASN could be attended in SEEC schools. Also there are some initiatives in the private sector, lead by religious organizations (as the program Yo Tambien carried out by Pastoral Juvenil) that could receive those children and be expanded through government support. > The strengthening of programs carried out by the SEEC must be aimed to reduce the high rate of dropouts, increase enrollment and reduce repetition. This along with programs to improve the quality of teachers will contribute to improve quality of basic education. > On the other hand, an expansion of the coverage of the Desayuno Escolar program to cover rural areas must be sought. According to a mid-term evaluation to Transferencia de Fondos program'2 this program could be extended to other communities with similar characteristics as Sabana de la Mar. Some of the results indicate that the program has contributed to increase school attendance rates as well as agriculture production of the area. The support and active participation of the community is another factor that should be considered as a positive result of this program. The evaluation makes some recommendations for the extension of such a program including that each school center must have its own kitchen, must have an Asociacion de Padres y Amigos to the school, that District Commissions as well as Nutrition Committees be formally appointed, among others. In relation to the scholarship program it is not very clear that the actual program has an important impact to favor the population in need. In fact, it looks as the scholarships are given to the SEEC to pay for the "favor" of not having the examiners from the Ministry during mid-final exams. According to employees interviewed at the SEEC, it does not seem very "convenient" to finance poor children in private school due to the high cost of tuition at those schools. Nevertheless it is necessary to re-evaluate this program and to consider the introduction of a scholarship program to finance poor children in private school. Tuition in private schools varies from one school to another, depending on 12 Instituto de Bienestar Estudiantil, July 1998. 153 the region, and if in the city in what area of the city. It would be important to assess the quality of schools, define which schools have excess supply or would like to expand its places. 64. The proposed institutional organization for the programs oriented to this age group is as follows: | Ministry of Education l |Subsecretary of Technical |National Institute of l |and Pedagogical Issues | Student W ell-Being l I General Direction of ||BCSPRA MAESTROS | | ESAUNO ESCOLAR | Basic Education I l IBECAS PARA ESTUDIANTES D. Ages 14-24: Secondary and Higher Education 65. Three public institutions carry out several programs intended to benefit the population in this age group. The SEEC, through its programs of Secondary Education, Technical Education and Adults Education executes formal educational activities for this group. The Direcci6n General de Promoci6n de la Juventud (DGPJ), under the Presidencia de la Repzublica carries out different programs to benefit students coming from different provinces that study at the UASD or need assistance to pay some technical education. Finally the Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo (SET) will carry out a capacitating and orientation program (Quisqueya Joven) to help youth increase their abilities to find a job. This program is expected to initiate as soon as Congress approves the loan from the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) that will finance its execution. 66. The programs mentioned (excluding the one from the Labor Ministry) received a total of DR$727.4 million (US$46 million), representing 2 percent of total public expenditure and 5 percent of social public spending. The organizational structure of such programs is as follows: Ministry of the Presidency Ministry of Education Labor Ministry Administrative Secretariat Subsecretary of Technical Employment and Human of the Presidency and Pedagogical Issues Resources Office General Direction of Youth General Direction of General Direction of Promotion l Basic Education High School General Direction of General Direction Technical-Professional for Adults Education Education 154 D.1. Presidencia de la Republica/Direcci6n General de Promoci6n de la Juventud 67. The Direcci6n General de Promocion de la Juventud (DGPJ) sponsors several programs for youth between 14 and 25. The DGPJ works closely with the Secretaria Administrativa de la Presidencia, the Plan Social de la Presidencia and the UASD. 68. There is some evidence that the students are selected based on their political affiliation. Absence of controls and supervision of the programs is presented. Also there is no systematic information regarding beneficiaries, costs of the programs, number of students actually living in the pension-houses, and donations received through the Plan Social de la Presidencia. D.1.i. Programa Nacional de Becas 69. This program channels scholarships to low-income students. The scholarship consists of the payment of half the tuition in the centers of studies that have a signed agreement with the DGPJ. Between January 1997 and June 1998, 1398 scholarships have been given to students at the Universidad Interamericana and Instituto Tecnologico Santiago Apostol. Additional scholarships were given to students at the UASD and Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica Madre y Maestra (PUCMM). The students must apply for the scholarship through a written questionnaire and present a written certification of academic index. D.l.ii. Program of Housing for Students/Pension Homes (casa-pension) 70. Through this program, the DGPJ and the UASD seek to provide housing to students who come to Santo Domingo to study at the public university (UASD). The students must fill out a questionnaire and present documentation to certify their economic situation along with a certification of studies and level of academic index (must be higher than 70), a certification stating the province from which they are from, a certification of good behavior and a medical certificate. 71. After that requirement is met, the DGJP along with the student association of the province of which the student comes from decide if the student is going to be included in the pension homes. Evidence suggests that this selection process is politically motivated. Every province has its student association at UASD, and they manage their pension home. The DGPJ channels approximately DR$21 million to pay monthly rents of the pension homes. Each association receives DR$10,000 (US$600) to pay for the rent and other expenses. Food is supplied every fifteen days through Plan Social de la Presidencia, which assigns rations of food according to the number of students at each pension home. Also the Plan Social de la Presidencia contributes with furniture for the homes, especially beds, refrigerators and stoves. D.2. Secretaria de Estado de Educaci6n y Cultura (SEEC) 72. The SEEC carries out several programs for the young in this age group. Most of these programs are associated to the formal and compulsory education system. Some programs also teach reading and other basic skills to the population between the ages of 14 and 45. D.2.i Secondary Education 73. Secondary education for children between 14-17 years old is offered as compulsory by the State. The program establishes a four-year course, divided into two cycles of two years each. Each cycle includes two grades, organized in two academic semesters. The first cycle is identical for every student and the second cycle offers three different areas: traditional, technical-professional and arts. 155 74. The number of students registered for the 1997-98 year was 262,965 for coverage of 36 percent out of total population in this age group. Monetary resources transfer to this program has shown an increase in recent years. In 1998, the annual resources budget amounted to DR$469.1 million"3 (US$32 million) equivalent to DR$1,784 per student (US$121). 75. The SEEC aims at reducing the rate of dropouts, repetition rates as well as to improve other educational indicators. The high opportunity cost of staying at school also leads the students to leave the school seeking a job. In fact, 55 percent of young people who were working in 1997-98 had not completed primary education. 76. Also the Ministry of Education transfers resources to educational institutions of the private sector. D.2.ii Technical-Professional Education 77. Technical-Professional education gives the student an education in science and technology. The students must have completed the first cycle of secondary education. With two more years of study the students graduate with a technical high-school degree. 78. This modality of high school is divided into three sectors: industrial, services and agriculture. In 1998, there were 154 official centers offering this education, with 24,717 students. Some of the centers operate as technical institutions, while others combine basic and secondary education. 79. Total amount of resources channeled through the SEEC to this program amount to DR$98.5 million'4, for a total of DR$3,985 per student (US$271). In addition to this program, the SEEC transfers resources to private technical institutions that carry out similar programs. D.2.iii BasicEducationforAdults 80. Adults' basic education contains three different programs: 81. The basic education for adults aimed at increasing the educational level of the young/adult population who are poor and have not started or finished basic education. In 1998, there were 108,260 students in this program, with a budget of DR$153.5 million'5 (US$10.4 million). 82. The SEEC with the support of the Government of Spain carries out the Programa de Alfabetizaci6n RALEB program, which in its first stage (1994-98) helped 57,562 persons in the 19 provinces where it was developed gain literacy. As a result, it reduced the illiteracy rate by 15 percent in Azua and by 22 percent in Barahona. 83. The Jornada de Alfabetizaci6n that SEEC carries out with the support of civil-political organizations is working with 31,450 adults, equivalent to 20 percent of total illiterates that have been identified. 3 Figures excluding administrative programs. 14 Figures excluding administrative programs. 15 Figures excluding administrative programs. 156 D.2.iv. Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo (SET)/Quisqueya Joven Program 84. This program is oriented to the population aged 15-24 who lives in urban areas and belongs to groups that live in poverty. This group has abandoned the regular educational system and is unemployed. The objective of the program is to increase labor opportunities of this group by offering capacitating programs and internship programs. 85. The program is intended to finance 1,500 courses and workshops in areas highly demanded by the private sector, including courses that require a high level of technical specificity, which will be designed by technical capacitating institutions. The curriculum includes two parts, a formal course followed by an internship. In order to have access to the program, the applicants must fill out an application and selection form that measures poverty as well as other socioeconomic conditions. With this application, the selection of the beneficiaries will be considered based on the established requirements. 86. The program will subsidize the participants in the courses covering transportation costs, stipends, medical and accident insurance. The amount of the subsidy must be less than the average salary earned by the poorest 40 percent of the population. 87. The participation of social institutions, from both the private and public sectors, is expected on both the promotion of the Program and the identification of possible beneficiaries. 88. The cost of the project is estimated at US$33 million, 70 percent of which will be devoted to capacitating courses. The remaining 30 percent will be used to strengthen the institutional capabilities of the SET. 89. The number of beneficiaries is estimated in 37,500 persons, equivalent to the 8 percent of this age group in the poorest 30 percent of the population. 90. The program has not started since Congress has not approved the loan made by the IDB for its implementation. At the moment, the SET is organizing the unit that will be in charge of the execution of this program. The systematization of the department, installation of software for registering and identifying beneficiaries is actually under way. D.3. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group: 91. There is need to improve quality of secondary schooling, expand the ongoing programs for teacher training, school aids, informatics, among others. 92. In relation to the programs carried out by the DGPJ they have a very small impact and seem to be highly discriminative. For example the program of Pension-homes is intended only to students at the UASD and the Asociacion de Estudiantes from the provinces is the one that determines if the student is allowed or not to live at the pension-homes. 93. Regarding the Quisqueya Joven program, the program has not started. The SET will carry out the program, which is also intended to increase the institutional capabilities of the Ministry. Some considerations should be made to the programs carried out by Instituto Nacional de Formaci6n Tecnico Profesional (INFOTEP) since the Ministry of Labor transfer resources from private enterprises to this private institution that offers technical courses to the youth population. 157 E. Ages 25-64: Employment E.1. Employment 25-64 94. In the Dominican Republic there are very few programs especially designed for low-income groups and oriented to fight unemployment. Some existing programs have a very limited impact and others are informally created as temporary solutions to pressures from groups affiliated to political party in power. For instance, both Ayuntamiento del Distrito Nacional16 (ADN) and the Secretaria de Estado de Obras Puiblicas (SEOP) hire people from low-income groups to clean the streets and its surroundings. 95. There is no relation or coordination among the existing programs. One program is directed toward single head of household mothers. Another program focuses on young population living in rural areas. Another program is essentially universal and intended to attend low/middle income persons seeking employment. E.l.L Secretaria de la Mujer/Programa de Cooperativas de Producci6n para Mujeres 96. This program started in 1998. It seeks to help women through the creation and operation of women cooperatives and the formation of small enterprises. At the present time, women's capabilities are increased through workshops, which teach them sewing and provide them training in cooperative management and gender issues. 97. The program has 400 women participating in workshops in Santo Domingo and other regions (in the North and Central area of the country). The person responsible of training selects single women heads of household and with an approved 6th level of basic education. In practice, there is a great number of women who do not meet the education requirement, so this last criterion is not closely followed. 98. The workshops are being offered in coordination with the INFOTEP. The guideline of Instituto de Desarrollo y Credito Cooperativo (IDECOOP) is helping in the formation of the cooperatives. Once the cooperatives are formned, the women make some contribution, the government will give part of the resources needed to start the small enterprises that will give these women the opportunity to increase their level of income. E.].ii Direccion General de Promocidn de la Juventud (DGPJ)/Production and Employment for Youngsters 99. This program is oriented to the young between 14 and 18, who live in rural areas and has some kind of organization. This program will provide credit from the Banco Agricola de la Reputblica Dominicana (BARD) to the groups. The amount of resources will vary from DR$ 10,000 to DR$50,000 (US$600-3 125). 100. The program is expected to be carrying out by the DGPJ, and the Fundacion para el Desarrollo de la Juventud Rural (FUNDEJUR). Both will work in coordination with the BARD (that will provide the resources) and the Secretaria de Estado de Agricultura (SEA) (that will give the technical training in agricultural and animal production). 16 The Ayuntamiento is the public institution in charge of municipality issues. 158 E..iii. Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo (SET)/Bolsas de Empleo Program 101. One of the main activities of the SET is to act as an intermediary between seekers and providers of jobs. With the approval of the Quisqueya Joven program it is expected that the SET will play a more active role in this process focusing on the entrance of young people to the job market. The Quisqueya Joven program includes the institutional strengthening of the SET, identifying potential beneficiaries of jobs and to facilitate job creations. 102. It should be said that there are several private institutions that offer this kind of service but usually are costly either to the company that is hiring or the person being hired. E.2. Institutional Strategy for this Age Group: 103. As in most developing countries, permanent programs to combat unemployment are scarce in the DR. According to the Central Bank, poverty is higher for those that are unskilled or work in the agricultural sector. In this sense, policies to face unemployment must be directed toward increasing productivity through improvement in education especially in technical education. 104. One option to be considered is the introduction of a targeted income-support program. Such a program should be directed towards vulnerable groups, like poor families with school-aged children (with benefits conditional on school attendance), women household heads, poor farmers, handicapped poor, among others. The design and implementation are crucial for this mechanism to be effective. F. Ages over 65 F.1. Pension system 105. The existing pension system in the Dominican Republic is characterized by the existence of different compulsory programs, voluntary programs regulated by law and other programs, including those offered by life security companies, private companies and the discretionary pensions granted by the Executive and Legislative powers. 106. The most important compulsory programs are those of the Instituto Dominicano de Seguros Sociales (IDSS), Fondo de Jubilaciones y Pensiones para los Empleados Publicos (FJPEP), Instituto de Seguridad Social de las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policia Nacional (ISSFAPOL), pension funds of other autonomous public institutions and a non-contributory pension program by SESPAS oriented to the elderly. 107. The volunteer programs include the complementary pension programs of the private and public sector, programs regulated by special law (private enterprises), pension programs for special occupations, including workers in the construction sector (10,250 in 1992) in hotels and restaurants (6,000) and lottery ticket sellers (8,000) and drivers. 108. Additionally, there are payments of a one-year salary in case of an employee's death of the Central Government and for employees of autonomous institutions, paid by the Instituto Nacional de Auxilios y Vivienda (SAVICA). F.lL. Instituto Dominicano de Seguros Sociales (IDSS) 109. The IDSS is the office in charge of the social security system of the private sector. It depends formally on the SESPAS. The President of the Board of Directors is the Labor Minister, and the Director 159 General of the IDSS is appointed by Decree of the Presidencia de la Repzublica. In 1997, 75 percent of the population between 18 and 60 years old (3.2 million) was not formally covered by a pension program. Of the population actually covered, 61 percent were covered through the IDSS. 38 percent of the population was covered by the Pension Fund for public employees. 110. The law regulating the pension system that operates through the IDSS is the Law 1896 of Social Insurance, dated 1949. According to that law, a social compulsory insurance system was created including pensions and health. The system established a "pay-as-you-go" system where pensions are financed by contributions of actual workers. 111. All private sector workers earning a monthly salary of less than DR$2,976 must be affiliated with the social insurance system of the IDSS. Informal workers and independent workers are excluded from this system. 112. The contribution rate is established at 12 percent of the workers salary, with the employer contributing 7 percent, the worker 2.5 percent and the government with 2.5 percent. The public sector has rarely paid its contribution to the IDSS. 113. Retirement age is established at 60 years old. After 15 years of contributions, the system grants a pension equivalent to 40 percent of the average salary of the last four years of work plus 2 percent for each 100 additional weeks up to a maximum of 70 percent of the average salary. As of December 1997, 82 percent of the beneficiaries were receiving the minimum pension of DR$ 1,000 monthly (US$60). 114. In 1997, IDSS total income was DR$1.6 billion (US$116 million), of which 80 percent comes from contributions and 10 percent from investments. The number of contributors was 488,648 while 20,484 elderly people were receiving a pension and 5,642 others received pension for incapacity. Over the last 10 years IDSS average coverage is estimated at 15.5 percent of the Poblaci6n Economicamente Activa (PEA). 115. The Social Security System administered by IDSS is highly inefficient. In 1997, it had one employee per 39 contributors, one of the highest ratios in Latin America. F.l.iL Fondo de Jubilacionesy Pensiones de los Empleados Publicos (FJPEP) 116. The Law 379 of December 1981 regulates the FJPEP. This law established a pension system for employees of the Central Government. 117. The funds for pension payments come from the public budget through the Fondo de Pensiones y Jubilaciones Civiles. Public employees pay a contribution of 4 percent of their salary to the FJPEP. Pensions are granted to those with 20 years of service or 60 years old. Those who have 30 years of service can automatically receive their pension independently of their age. All employees of the Central Government contribute to this system, including the Presidencia de la Repzublica. Some employees of decentralized institutions also contribute to the system. 118. Monthly pension payment is equivalent to DR$1,014 (US$62) for those pensioned before 1996 and DR$1,500 (US$92) for those newly pensioned. 119. Pensions are granted through the Consultoria Juridica del Poder Ejecutivo through sometimes a long process. Sometimes it is carried out with a high sense of discretion and the approval process usually takes several years. The Secretaria de Estado de Finanzas is the institution that controls monthly payments of the pensions. 160 120. By July 1998, the government paid, through FJPEP, around 25,695 pensions, for a monthly total of DR$28 million (US$1.9 million). Also, the government contributes to other public funds and to complete pensions through the FJPEP, with an amount of DR$70 million monthly (US$4.8 million). F.l.iii. Instituto de Seguridad Social de las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policia Nacional (ISSFAPOL) 121. The Fuerzas Armadas y la Policia Nacional have their own Social Security Institute created by Decree in 1982. This social security system includes health, pensions and other social benefits. 122. Pensions are financed with contributions of active members amounting to 6percent of their salary. If total contributions are not enough to pay total pensions, the government pays the necessary amount. F.1.iv. Other Laws 123. There are several law that regulate the pension system for workers in specific sectors: Law 250 of 1985 established a Fund for workers in hotels and restaurants; Law 10-91 creating a Pension and Social Protection Institute for Journalists; Law 146 of 1983 creating the Pension Fund for workers in ports; Law 6-86 was established a Pension Fund for workers in the construction sector. 124. In addition, SESPAS has a non-contributory program that pays pensions to people over 60 years old, with a very low-income that are not covered by any of the systems mentioned above. Pensions paid by SESPAS are very low, only a monthly amount of DR$200 (US$12); in 1992 around 9,283 pensions were paid. F.l.v. Private Pension Funds 125. There does not exist any institution to regulate pension plans of private companies. The internal pension plans are included among the benefits for workers of some companies. It has been estimated that there are around 120 of these plans covering around 80,000 individuals. 126. In 1998, some private institutions of the financial sector established the Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones that will offer pension plans for all individuals. The companies are not regulated by any special law and were created according to the Codigo de Comercio. F.l.vL Some Final Issues and Comments 127. The actual proposal for reforming the pension and health insurance system establishes a new social security system. The pension reform will be based on three pillars: one subsidized that will be financed by the government for poor, handicapped and unemployed persons, one semi-subsidized for independent workers that earn low and unstable salaries; and a contributory regime for those working in the public and private sector. 128. The Law establishes a National Council of Social Security (CNSS) that will be a public institution in charge of regulating, supervising and directing the entire system. This Institution will be funded through the National Budget and its president will be the Minister of Labor. The Institution will be administered by a General Manager appointed by the Executive power out of three candidates recommended by the Council. 161 129. The Law also establishes a Superintendencia de Pensiones and a Superintendencia de Salud y Riesgos de Trabajo that will regulate matters concerning the pension system and the health system, respectively. 130. According to the Law, the IDSS will be converted into an institution that will administer risks, provide health services and assistance in case of job accidents. It will maintain its condition as a public institution, but the functions of regulating and supervising will be transferred to the CNSS. Also the law gives 4 years to this institution to increase quality, efficiency and productivity during which the State will give it a temporary monthly subsidy. 131. It is important to evaluate the labor costs of this proposal. Not all private companies actually have a pension fund. The employer will have to pay 7.12 percent of the contribution for pension and a xx percent of contribution to the health system. 132. The Government will finance the subsided pillar. Also contributions to the IDSS will be made during the 4-year transition period. In addition, the Law establishes an increase in the pensions given by the non-contributory system that actually operates through SESPAS. In fact, in the law it is not very clear the difference between the assistance pension and the pension given through SESPAS. Since both are in fact non-contributory pensions, they should be unified and only given through SESPAS or through the CNSS. G. Programs Oriented to the General Population G.1. Food Assistance 133. The Government carries out three different food assistance programs: two of them are carried out directly by the Presidency (Comedores Econ6micos and Plan Social de la Presidencia) and one is carried out by the INESPRE, a commercialization bureau of agricultural products. The institutional organization of such programs is as follows: IMinistry of the Presidency |Comedores Economnicos | Administrative Secretary | of the Presidency l L Plan Social l de la Presidencia INESPRE PRO-ALTO 162 G.1.i. Presidency of the Republic 134. The Ministry of the Presidency of the Republic carries out two food assistance programs: Comedores Econ6micos and Plan Social de la Presidencia. Each of them has a different executing agency: Comedores Economicos has the executing agency of the Comedores, while Plan Social is carried out through the Administrative Secretary of the Presidency. *> Comedores Econ6micos 135. The program of Comedores Econ6micos was created in June 1972, through Decree Number 2052, with the purpose of establishing a service for the community so that it could obtain an adequate intake of food as part of social development. The main objective of this program is to sell food to people from low-income families. 136. In addition to selling food at pre-determined fixed places, a distribution process and sale of rations with mobile characteristics was established in 1999 with the creation of sale places that are not fixed in determined areas which could be in different locations in a week or in a given time, in order to reach high poverty areas of the country. 137. The program sells cooked food rations to all who goes to buy at the sale places, fixed or not. They also sell food to employees, private enterprises (usually for special occasions) and to the District Attorney Office (Procuraduria de la Repzublica) to be distributed at Dominican jails. 138. In general, the Comedores have had a lack of the resources necessary to handle a program of this nature in an efficient way. Recently, in 1999 a modernization process was initiated which included the purchase of computers, transportation units (pickups, buses, motorcycles, automobiles and trucks). In addition to these, industrial and kitchen equipments were purchased to modify and restore six producers of comedores. 139. Regarding human resources, in 1997, they had 1050 employees, of which 665 worked in the production process and the remaining 385 in administrative chores. The personnel works for a little more than 6 hours per day, and different shifts are established for weekend labor that corresponds to the distribution of food to different prisons in the country. 140. The Comedores have no record of the number of direct beneficiaries, in terms of persons, homes, communities or of their socio-economic conditions.'7 On the other hand, there are administrative and monitoring deficiencies such as the lack of trusted and systematic register of costs, produced rations, installed capacities, loss in the management of food, adequate inventory controls. It could be argued that with the installation of computers, the institution will be able to establish the necessary mechanisms to keep records of beneficiaries, costs, rations and all the necessary information for the efficient function of this institution. But there is not yet a system of controls, registration process or the like. 141. In 1999, the rations sold by the Comedores Econ6micos summed up to 7.4 million, of which 16.6 percent was sold directly to the public, 1.2 percent sold as credit, 4.8 percent were used up by the employees, 3.3 percent as donations to the poor, 74 percent sold to prisons and less than 0.1 percent delivered to the homeless of Hurricane Georges. If you compare this distribution with the one existing in 17 The study of Fundaci6n Economia y Desarrollo (1998) through a survey carried out at selling spots found out that the population served by this program earned in average the minimum wage and live in precarious conditions. 163 194-1996I8 it can be observed that in addition to the decrease of the number of rations sold, the higher part of these are assigned to the District Attorney Office to be distributed in jails, which contrast with the 36 percent assigned in the aforementioned period, in which 55 percent of the rations were bought by the public. The rest were used up by the employees, private companies or as donations to the poor. 142. In 1999, 69 percent of the income of this program comes from the National Budget. In addition to the resources assigned through Budget ($63.9 million), the institution received DR$24.4 million from sale of cooked rations as well as DR$4.1 million for salaries for sugar cane industry and Metaldom (for the payment of the incomes of the personnel related to the preparation and sale of the food in this company), as well as for other incomes. 143. It is important to point out that due to the transfer that it receives from the State, the sale of rations to the public by the Comedores have practically no competition, since there is no private supplier who could sell food for a price 156 percent lower than its production costs. In fact, the barras-comedores and fondas located in the neighborhood in which the comedores are placed, could be considered as potential competition to them, sell the food services between DR$15.00 and DR$25.00. Plan Social de la Presidencia 144. This program started in 1989 distributing baskets of basic goods to low-income families in an irregular way. In 1996 the program received complete support of the government to carry out several programs in favor of poor families in urban and rural areas. The programs included: food donations, hospital assistance, emergency assistance, donations of foods, etc. 145. The food distribution program distributes basket of goods (uncooked) to families. It is the most important program carried out by this office, since it absorbs 70 percent of the budget assigned to it through the Presidency. Each basket contains 14 items: rice, beans, sugar, pasta, tomato paste, milk powder, cocoa, oil, etc., with an estimated value of DR$70/basket. 146. The beneficiaries of this program were chosen based on the National Poverty Map (designed by the Planning National Office) and the Statistics National Office figures. The majority of the beneficiaries are located in provinces along the frontier with Haiti: Pedernales, Elias Pinia, Dajab6n, among others, which are also the poorest areas of the country. 147. The Plan employs about 500 people (for the food distribution program), including those working in the packaging and transportation process. 148. According to the Direction of this plan, the annual budget of the program is estimated at DR$600 million. But, these resources are not clearly presented in the budgetary reports published by ONAPRES, where you can not find as a program or activity carried out by the Presidency, the Plan Social de la Presidencia. It is difficult to determine the exact amount of resources allocated to this program. Even though the Director of the Plan Social stated that prior to 1996, the program was completely disorganized in terms of record of beneficiaries, costs, and the like, it seems that the situation has not changed much. The perception is that this is an assistance program to benefit those families (middle to low income) that have political ties with the government. 149. Also, there seems to be a high discretionary power by the Director in terms of the procurement of the food to be distributed and also where to allocate them. For some, political relations highly influence donations of the food baskets. 18 Fundacion Economia y Desarrollo (1998). 164 G.1.ii INESPRElAlimentos para Todos (PROALTO) 150. This program started at the Ministry of Agriculture and then was transferred to INESPRE, a public enterprise that buys and sells agricultural goods. At the beginning, the program started selling agricultural products, pasta, oil and cocoa (at subsidized prices) through mobile units in urban zones. They incorporated units in the "popular markets" established by INESPRE. At the present the program sells food only in these markets. 151. As the programs of "mercados populares" of INESPRE, there are not enough records registering the costs and benefits of this program (putting aside the distortion in prices that may arise in this program). G.l.iii Final Comments and Options for Food Assistance Programs 152. The programs stated here as food assistance programs exclude the distribution of food through CONANI and the School Feeding Program of the Ministry of Education. 153. In the case of Comedores Econ6micos there seems to be little justification for the govemment to carry it out. This program has lost its original objective and is being converted to the monopolist supplier of foods to the Prisons Direction. 154. Concentrating its operations on supplying food to the needy population in cases of emergency seems to be one future option for this program. Since it does not have a valuable infrastructure, in terms of areas of "expendio", warehouse, production units, the cost of reducing this program initially does not seem very high. The actual areas where the food is being sold can be used to distribute food to victims of hurricanes, fires, etc. Or, in some cases an evaluation could be made to determine whether some areas could be rented19 to private users. 155. The resources freed with such a reform will allow the govemment to expand other programs proved to be more effective, like the School Feeding Program, as well as to organize the setting up of a system to identify potential beneficiaries of social programs. 156. The Direction of Prisons must find other potential suppliers of food to prisoners. Contracting a private sector enterprise (it could be through a bidding process) to supply this food with arrangements similar as those it have with Comedores, could be a more feasible and efficient solution in terms of social retums. Another option could be to leave Comedores as the suppliers for food to Prisons. This option could be more "adequate" in political terms. 157. Another option includes the establishment of a mechanism of vouchers to assist with the poorest segment of the population that goes to Comedores to eat. Or these people could be assisted through an income support-program and attach it to school attendance or health care. In this case, it could be evaluated, through a system of register of beneficiaries, who are the people that attend the Comedores, that will not be able to have a "decent" meal, if this program is eliminated. 158. In addition, the elimination of the distribution of food through Plan Social de la Presidencia should be considered, due to its high degree of politicization. The existence of a program of this nature should be considered only for emergency cases. Plan Social could be left only with other assistance programs of emergency nature. 19 For instance, in Los Mina, (the largest Comedor in Santo Domingo) since the Comedor is located near the Hospital Maternidad de los Mina, the place can be rented to a private organization to convert it to a cafeteria to serve the Hospital. 165 159. In relation to INESPRE, the existence of this institution as a whole should be evaluated. The prices of agricultural products in the Dominican Republic are considerably higher than in other countries, which mostly affect the poor. In addition, the agricultural policy, which protects agricultural producers, need to be reconsidered in order to establish a system of direct subsidies, such as the one implemented in Mexico, that seems to be more effective. G.2. Housing 160. In the Dominican Republic the Government has not carried out a definite and coordinated housing policy. Traditionally many of the housing projects developed have had a strong political criterion. There has been a duplicity of actions through various public institutions: Coordinating Office of the Presidency, Supervising Office of the Presidency, Ministry of Public Works, National Institute of Housing and SAVICA. 161. According to the National Institute of Housing (INVI) the deficit of houses has been estimated to be more than 500'000 units, including not only the need of new units but also the need to improve the quality of the existing ones. 162. Since 1996 there has been a tendency to centralize public actions in the housing sector through INVI and to increase coordination not only within the public sector but also with the private sector, including participation of communities. G.2.i INVI 163. This institution was created in the 1960s. At the present time it is the central institution for housing activities carried out by the government. INVI develops several programs oriented to different kinds of beneficiaries, with a total investment of DR$1,244.7 million and more than 70,000 units of houses built, in process of construction or improvement or in a formulation process. *: Urban Improvement Program (Programa Mejoramiento Urbano): This program is oriented to help people that live in urban areas in units that need to be improved. The program includes not only the improvement of housing but also of living conditions as well. According to INVI, inter-institutional coordination is a key factor for this program. It encompass three different areas: 1) One that includes improvement of housing with the participation of the communities in favor of those living in precarious conditions; 2) One that includes improvement of housing without the participation of the communities in favor of those living in precarious conditions; and 3) One that includes individual improvement of houses. The main projects included here are: Saneamiento de Barrios, San Juan de la Maguana, Mejoramiento Urbano La Piina, Mejoramiento Urbano Pueblo Nuevo en SJM, Resure, among others. Under this program, there are 863 houses that have been improved, 117 are being improved and there are around 4,536 units involved in projects that are being formulated. Investment in this program (from August 1996-July 1999) was DR$22,497,013. * Rural Houses Program (Programa de Viviendas Rurales): This program is oriented toward poor low- income families whose houses need to be improved or built. It is complemented with other actions to improve rural habitat. This program works in coordination with NGO of the communities involved. Totals invested in this area sum up to DR$11,894,729. As of July 1999 there were 8,226 units rebuilt, built or in the process. 166 *: Program of New Houses (Programa de Viviendas Nuevas): This program includes two different program for families considered to be excluded by private sector investment: 1) Construction of new houses for low-income families (salaries below 4 minimum wages); 2) Construction of new houses for middle-income families (salaries between 4-7 minimum wages). The program for low-income families includes programs carried out by the Ministry of Public Works and the Coordinating and Monitoring Office of the Presidency, and that where transfer to this institution in January 1998. As a whole, there are 13,942 units built or in process of construction/formulation. Total investment on this program is of DR$663,623,161. * Special Programs (Programas Especiales): Under this category, INVI carries out five different programs: I) Housing Subsidy Fund (Bonds for houses): This program was initiated in 1998 with the purpose of helping families to complete their savings to buy a house financed and constructed by the private sector. As of July 1999 they gave 680 bonds and 520 pre-qualification certificates, with 300 been monetized to acquire 300 houses. Investment in this program is DR$35,665,000. (Incluir bonos viviendas para medicos/noticia prensa de hoy). 2) Progressive housing solutions (Soluciones habitacionales progresivas). This program is intended for low-income families. At the present they are working in the area of Sabana Perdida, where they are constructing 134 houses. Investment in this program is DR$14,793,955. 3) Emergency Houses: This program started in 1998 to help victims of Hurricane Georges. This included not only activities to help families reconstruct their houses (low-income families) but also the construction of temporary houses (albergues) for families that lost their homes because of Georges. Under this program 19,852 units were rebuilt, and 12,000 temporary houses constructed. Also under this line of activities 300 houses were built for families affected by tropical storm Marcos, and 40 houses to families that lost their houses to a fire in Santo Domingo in March 1997. A new project for victims of a fire in Santo Domingo in 1998 and for people that live in dangerous zone near Gaspar Herndndez was started, that included the building of 160 houses. The total investment for these emergency programs is DR$505,819,250. 4) Programa Tripartito de Viviendas: This program started in 1998 and is a coordinated effort of INVI, Consejo Estatal del Azzucar and workers of the cooperative of the sugar mill of Porvenir to construct 35 houses in land given by Consejo Estatal del Azuicar. Also, another project was started to build 535 new houses in land belonging to INVI and workers of sugar mills (INVI- DOREX); the construction of these houses are oriented to Dominican families that live abroad in order to promote their return to the country. 5) Legalization of Public Terrain: the Executive Power dictated a decree creating a "Titles Commission", to elaborate proposals and actions in favor of titling public land. 164. According to INVI, there is a new policy in this sector that includes giving the state a role as facilitator, and allowing the private sector to function as executor. This new policy looks for more coordination among all institutions that participate in the housing market, as well as giving direct demand subsidies, and increasing community's participation. As a part of this new policy, the institution is going through a serious of organizational changes in order to carry out all its programs more efficiently and effectively. They look forward to the creation of a Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and wish to see the State constructing only the poorest groups of the population and helping and regulating private activities in the market for the rest of the population. 167 G.2.ii Programa ComunidadDigna 165. This program is carried out by the National Office of Planning (ONAPLAN), a branch of the Technical Ministry of the Presidency. Under this program, considered by some as the "social arm" of the government, a series of programs to increase living conditions of the poorest sectors is being carried out. In the housing sector, most of the programs are being coordinated with INVI specifically in the urban improvement program, houses for people that live in vulnerable areas, subsidy fund for housing and program of rural houses (see above). (Me parece que ya esta inversi6n esta incluida en lo del INVI). G.2.iii Oficina Supervisora de Obras del Estado 166. This office carried was an important piece of the previous government. They have constructed around 7,200 new houses for middle-income families whose beneficiaries were assigned by presidential decree prior august 1996. The process of assignment of these beneficiaries is not very clear and it is assumed that it follows political criteria. 167. It is important to notice that this office was created by Decree in 1986 so the funds it receives are assigned directly by the Executive (excedentepresupuestario). 168. Also they have developed programs of construction of houses made of wood and blocks to help the poorest families. The number of houses built is 42,682 (in wood) and 2,033 (blocks). G.2.iv. Some Final Comments and Options for this Sector 169. The housing sector is a very important area. The government spends in this sector approximately 3 percent of public total expenditure. The condition of the existing houses particularly in the rural sector and the urban poor areas is very deficient. The existing policy of centralizing all the programs in one institution seems to be necessary in order to focus the housing policy of the government in favor of those that need the most. But there is also a need to eliminate political consideration and target the subsidies only for those most needed. 170. It seems that the government through INVI understands the importance of this sector and knows what institutional changes are needed to increase the efficient participation of the government in this area. The increasing investment in programs to improve quality of houses and reallocate people that live in vulnerable areas, strengthening the participation of the communities seems to be in the right direction. 171. But the need to target the resources to favor the poorest sector of the population does not seem to be very clearly understood. Also, there is the need to end the traditional policies of benefiting only those that are somehow politically related. Subsidies for middle-income families or particular groups should be eliminated (poner ejemplo de medicos que recibieron bono habitacional). Also there is the need to establish a mechanism for identifying beneficiaries for the housing subsidies. Since there does not exist a mechanism like that, the government must elaborate a system that could be used to identify beneficiaries for different social programs, not only housing. ONAPLAN or some agency at the Presidency level should be in charge of the creation of such a mechanism. 172. Another aspect that should be improved is the titling of the land. At the moment there is a program to title public land, where a commission was created to start developing proposals of action. But there is a need to improve the existing office of titling "Oficina de Catastro Nacional". At this time, this office has been characterized by high political influence and is very discretionary. Some small reforms are being carried out, but they are minimal. Still, there is a high cost in all the procedure for obtaining legal titling. 168 G.3. Water and Sanitation 173. There are a number of institutions that participate in the provision of water and sanitation services. Corporacion Dominicana de Agua y Alcantarillado (CAASD), Instituto Nacional de Agua Potable (INAPA) and Corporacion de Agua y Alcantarillado de Santiago (CORASSAN) are the main institutions in charge of the provision of water and sewerage. They cover in general all urban and rural areas, but their coverage in particular that related to sewage in low-income urban and rural areas is rather limited. For those areas in particular the Ministry of Health, Pro-Comunidad and the Program Comunidad Digna provide the services. G.3.i Pro-Comunidad 174. This office is a dependency of the Administrative Ministry of the Presidency. It develops programs in poor communities to increase their living standards. The investment done by this office includes the rehabilitation of schools, construction of rural clinics, water systems and waste disposals. 175. From 1996-1999, the projects executed by this office (water systems and waste disposals) summed up to DR$47.0 million, out of a total of DR$343.8 million of the total resources invested by this office. In average more than 50 percent of the resources channeled by this office goes to the construction or rehabilitation of schools in poor rural areas. G.3.iL Final Comments 176. Even though the need to increase coverage in basic services, particularly in water and sanitation, the programs developed by Pro-Comunidad seems to have low coverage. The institutions actually involved in water supply (CAASD-CORASAAN and INAPA) have traditionally been engaged in huge projects to increase supply of water to cities in urban and rural areas. 177. There is a need to increase involvement of the communities, through NGOs, religious organizations and the like, to participate in programs in coordination with the public sector, to increase coverage in these services that critically affect the health status of the people living in poor areas. G.4. Health 178. In the Dominican Republic health services can be considered as one of the more deficient public services. The Ministry of Health and Social Assistance (SESPAS) is the main coordinator of all public actions related to the health sector. Along with SESPAS, the IDSS and the Social Institute of the Armed Forces (ISSFAPOL) are the main providers of the services. G.4.i SESPAS 179. There is a lack of coordination among all the participating institutions, SESPAS, IDSS, ISSFAPOL and private providers of health services. At the moment, a decentralization process is going on, aimed to give more institutional and financial independence to the regions or health districts. Even though the regulatory framework of such decentralization exists since 1998, nowadays the situation has not changed, with resources (financial, human and material) being assigned to each region at the central level, according to historical records. 180. Another problem relates to the distribution of the resources assigned to the Ministry. There is a high proportion of the resources oriented to tertiary attention, rather than to primary or secondary which have proven to be more efficient preventing and reducing diseases and mortality rates. 169 181. At the moment there is a new health code that seeks to increase coverage and efficiency of health services in the country. This system, that is part of the Social Security Reform that is being proposed to the Congress, plans to create a universal health insurance system with the combination of public and private providers. G.4.iL Presidency/PROMESE/: Programs of Basic Medications 182. PROMESE is a program initiated in 1981, as part of the popular sales of food and medications by the Instituto de Estabilizaci6n de Precios (INESPRE). In 1993, the Program was changed to the Presidency of the Republic, depending on the Administrative Secretariat of the Presidency. The objective of this program is to give medications to the low income families of the population, at a very low price; in addition, the institution buys all the necessary materials such as usable materials and radioactive ones to be supplied to hospitals, health sub-centers, rural clinics and laboratories. 183. The boticas are installed in the hospitals and/or neighborhoods inside and outside the city, these last ones as required by the Junta de Vecinos. It must be pointed out that there is no other additional requirement for the installation of a botica, so they are not subjected to the same requirements that the private sector must fulfill in order to establish a drugstore. 184. In regards to human resources, the administration of the Program considers to have a qualified personnel.20 The process of selecting personnel is done in a discretionary way, by recommendations of the Presidency or by any other recommendations. If the selected personnel goes to work at the boticas, they are generally put through a training in a botica before been sent to the corresponding post to which he/she was assigned. Such training lasts a week to fifteen days in duration, depending on the selected person. The number of employees in the boticas populares changes according to the size of the same. Generally they require 3 employees but the bigger ones can have up to 6 employees. 185. At the beginning of 1998 a training course was taught, which included actualization of management of boticas populares. 186. The medications of the boticas are distributed directly by PROMESE. The hospitals send their own vehicles to look for the materials requested by the Program. The distribution of the medications to the rural centers are done through the Public Health Secretariat, to which the medications are delivered and it takes care of taking them to its final destiny. The hospitals receive their supplies monthly or every fifteen days, depending on the requests of their needs. The boticas, especially those located at the public hospitals, receive their supplies every week. 187. In relation to the sale through boticas populares, PROMESE seeks to establish efficient supervision mechanisms in order to see that the boticas only sell medications for personal use, avoiding that anyone could use these medications for commercial purposes. 188. In PROMESE they keep complete files of all the hospitals, with dispatch orders, purchase orders, etc. The same is recorded for laboratories with their corresponding invoices and all the other purchase documents. 189. Similar procedures are used in the boticas to keep control of the medications that are sold, in order to supervise the boticas so all the documents have a correspondence with the medications sent and those sold. 20 Fundaci6n Economiay Desarrollo, 1998. 170 190. In addition, all the records and required documents are kept to allow adequate accountable and financial information. 191. In relation to the costs of the boticas, the cost of purchasing medications has been estimated to be between DR$5.00 and DR$10 millions per month. PROMESE does not cover the cost of the buildings of the boticas, specially those in neighborhoods are covered by their respectivejunta de vecinos. 192. The possibility of selling medications at a low price is directly related to the fact that the Program sells generic medications, with no brand whatsoever. To this it should be added the fact that the purchases are done in a big scale, since PROMESE buys not only for the boticas but for the hospitals as well. Nonetheless, it has not been possible to define which of these two aspects have a higher incidence at the final sale price of the medications. 193. It must be pointed out that since this Program has universal coverage, the lack of controls, in general for its execution, could be an indicator of the lack of efficiency with which these are handled. Of special interest is the handling of inventories of the company, since in different occasions there has been public accusations of the problems related to the loss of medications. 171