IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing Volatility Spring 2021 Middle East and North Africa Region Iraq Economic Monitor Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing Volatility With a Special Focus Towards Increased Economic Opportunities for Women in Iraq Spring 2021 Middle East and North Africa Region © 2021 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. 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TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ‫الملخص التنفيذي‬ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1.  Recent Economic and Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Output and Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Oil and Gas Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Public Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 External Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Monetary Policy and Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.  Outlook and Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Risks and Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Special Focus: Towards Increased Economic Opportunities for Women in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2. An Overview of the Labor Market Outcomes for Women in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.1. Low economic participation for women, especially for less-educated women, women in rural areas, and married women with young children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 2.2. Women in the labor market are more likely to be unemployed, and tend to experience worse labor market outcomes compared to men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3. A restrictive Environment for Women’s Access to Employment Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.1. Limited economic opportunities compounded by significant supply-side challenges . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.2. Legal and s gaps and restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.3. Barriers related to social norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4. The Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 iii References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Selected Recent World Bank Publications on Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 List of Figures Figure 1 Overall GDP has Posted Sharp Contraction in the 9M-20, the Largest Since 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Figure 2 Iraq is also Falling behind the GDP Per Capita of its Regional Ad Income Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Figure 3 The Contraction was Extensive across Sectors, Except for Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Figure 4 With Large Negative Contribution from Oil and Services Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Figure 5 COVID-19 Sharply Impacted Private Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Figure 6 A New Strain of COVID-19 Led to Renew the Lockdown Since Mid-February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Figure 7 OPEC+ Cuts and Falling Global Demand Weighed Heavily on Oil Production and Exports Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Figure 8 But Iraq’s Oil Prices have Rebounded Since Mid-2020 Driven by the Partial Pick Up in Global Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Figure 9 Sharp Decline in Oil Receipts Exerted Severe Pressure on Government Finances . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Figure 10 But Rigid Expenditures Continue to Pile, with the Wage Bill Remaining the Largest Budget Item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Figure 11 Execution Rates, Particularly for Public Investment, have Deteriorated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Figure 12 Lower Oil Export Volumes Weighed Heavily on the CAB in Q3–2020… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Figure 13 Though a Decline in Imports Softened the Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Figure 14 Better Oil Export Values Moderated Pressures on CBI Reserves in end-2020… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Figure 15 Though Usable Reserves have Fallen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Figure 16 The Devaluation Partially Offsets the Recent Depreciation Trend Against Main Import Partner Currencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Figure 17 Though Non-Price Barriers Inhibit Trade Diversification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Figure 18 Inflation Remained Low in 2020 but the Currency Devaluation Pushed Up Prices in Recent months . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Figure 19 Measures by CBI in Response to COVID-19 Boosted Credit to Private Sector and Money Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Figure 20 Higher Non-Oil Growth and Wage Bill Reforms Would Improve the Fiscal Deficit . .. . . . . . . . . . . .16 Figure 21 LFPR by Gender (Iraq, MENA, UMIC, World) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Figure 22 Adjusted LFPR by Gender and Level of Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 List of Boxes Box 1.1 Iraq – Socioeconomic Impact of COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Box 1.2 New Strain of COVID-19 Prompted the Authorities to Speed Up Vaccine Procurement . . . . . . . . . 6 Box 2.1 Government Initiatives and the World Bank Group Administered Mashreq Gender Facility (MGF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Box 2.2 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 List of Tables Table 1 Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2018–2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Table 2 Addressing Female Labor Force Participation Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 iv IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY ACRONYMS Bcf Billion cubic feet MENA Middle East and North Africa BOP Balance of payments MGF Mashreq Gender Facility CAB Current account balance MoF Ministry of Finance (Iraq) CBI Central Bank of Iraq MoO Ministry of Oil (Iraq) COSIT Central Organization for Statistics and MW Megawatt Information Technology OPEC (+) Organization of Petroleum Exporting COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019 Countries (plus other non-OPEC partner DRM Domestic revenue mobilization countries) EIA US Energy Information Administration OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief ER Exchange rate PDS Public Distribution System ESCWA United Nations Economic and Social pp Percentage points Commissions for Western Asia q/q Quarter-on-quarter (growth) FDI Foreign Direct Investment RHS Right hand side GBV Gender-Based Violence SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence GCC Gulf Cooperation Council SMEs Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises GDP Gross Domestic Product SOBs State-owned banks GoI Government of Iraq SWIFT Rapid Welfare Monitoring Survey IDP Internally Displaced Persons Tcf Trillion cubic feet IEM Iraq Economic Monitor UMIC Upper middle-income countries IHFPS Iraq High Frequency Phone Survey UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade IHSES Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey and Development ILO International Labor Organization UNDP United Nations Development IMF International Monetary Fund Program IOM International Organization for Migration UNFPA United Nations Population Fund IQD Iraqi Dinar UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund ISIS Islamic State US United States KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq WB(G) World Bank (Group) LFPR Labor force participation rate WDI World Development Indicators LHS Left hand side WEEAP Women Economic Empowerment mbpd Million barrel per day Action Plan mbpm Million barrels per month y/y Year-on-year (growth) v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS T he Iraq Economic Monitor provides an inputs from Syed Mehdi Hassan (Senior Financial update on key economic developments Sector Specialist), Lokendra Phadera (Economist) and policies over the previous six months and Andrius Skamulis (Young Professional). The and presents findings from recent World Bank Special Focus Chapter was prepared by a Social work on Iraq, placing them in a longer-term and Protection and Poverty team consisting of Zeina global context and assessing the implications of Afif (Senior Social Scientist), Khalid Ahmed Ali these developments and other changes in policy Moheyddeen (Senior Social Protection Specialist), regarding the outlook for Iraq. Its coverage ranges Jonna Maria Lundvall (Senior Social Protection from the macro-economy to business environment Specialist), Dalal Moosa (Economist), Gharam and private sector development. It is intended for a Alkastalani Dexter (Private Sector Specialist), wide audience, including policy makers, business Nour Nasr (ET Consultant) and Soraya El Khalil leaders, financial market participants, and the (Consultant). Special thanks to Muna Salim (Senior community of analysts and professionals engaged Program Assistant, MTI) for her administrative support. in Iraq. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions The Iraq Economic Monitor is a product of expressed in this Monitor are those of World Bank the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) unit in the staff and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Macroeconomics, Trade & Investment (MTI) Global Executive Board of the World Bank or the governments Practice in the World Bank Group. The report was they represent. For information about the World Bank written by Wael Mansour (Senior Economist, MTI), and its activities in Iraq, please visit www.worldbank. Majid Kazemi (Economist, MTI) and Ashwaq Maseeh org/en/country/iraq (English) or www.worldbank. (Economist, MTI). org/ar/country/iraq (Arabic). For questions and The report was prepared under the direction of comments on the content of this publication, please Saroj Kumar Jha (Country Director, MNC02), Eric Le contact Wael Mansour (wmansour@worldbank.org), Borgne (Practice Manager, MTI), Anush Bezhanyan Majid Kazemi (mkazemi@worldbank.org), Ashwaq (Practice Manager, SPJ), Johannes Hoogeveen Maseeh (amaseeh@worldbank.org) or Eric Le Borgne (Practice Manager, POV), Ramzi Neman (Head of (eleborgne@worldbank.org). Baghdad Office, MNCO2), Christos Kostopoulos The data cut-off for this Iraq Economic Monitor (Lead Economist, MTI). The first chapter includes is April 30, 2021. vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Recent Economic and Policy the share of households receiving transfers dropped Developments by more than 8 pp. The loss of household income and social assistance has increased vulnerability to Oil price volatility and COVID-19 have amplified food insecurity. COVID-19 has also severely limited Iraq’s economic woes, reversing two years child learning as evidenced by the small proportion of of steady recovery. These twin shocks have students engaged in learning activities during school deepened existing economic and social fragilities, closure. These impacts coupled with reduced access adding further to public grievances that existed pre- to market and healthcare services undermined COVID-19. The absence of fiscal space has limited human capital accumulation and economic mobility. the ability of the Government of Iraq (GoI) to provide Iraq’s fiscal balance suffered from the oil a stimulus to an economy highly dependent on oil crisis forcing the government to cut discretionary exports for growth and fiscal revenues. As a result, spending and accruing arrears. Budgetary rev- the country experienced the largest contraction enues in 2020 fell by over 9 pp to 32 percent of GDP of its economy since 2003. GDP contracted by as oil receipts severely contracted. To deal with the 10.4 percent in 2020 on the back of the OPEC+ oil situation, the GoI cut discretionary spending including production cuts agreement as well as the negative slashing public investments by 87 percent, deferred impact of COVID-19 on non-oil sectors including a the regularization of new entrants and contractual plunge in religious tourism services following border workers to 2021 thus accruing wage arrears, and restrictions. As a result, GDP per capita, a proxy for rescheduled part of the domestic debt. An emergency individual welfare, is estimated to have contracted by financing law ratified by the legislature late in 2020 15 percent in 2020—a significantly larger contraction was not enough to avoid delayed and non-payments than regional and income peers. to public sector workers and contractors. The authori- The economic downturn also had an ties also opted for an 18.5 percent devaluation for impact on the welfare of Iraqis especially among the Iraqi Dinar against the US$ in December 2020, informal workers and those in self-employment. which boosted oil receipts. Despite these measures, Unemployment remained more than 10 percentage the fiscal balance still registered a 6.4 percent of GDP points (pp) higher than the pre-pandemic level. deficit. Financing was primarily secured through the Limited fiscal space has impacted transfers, including central bank and state-owned banks increasing their the universal Public Distribution System (PDS), where exposure to the sovereign. ix Recognizing the severity of the crisis, the deficit and exchange rate pressures. However, more GoI devised a national reform plan (the white structural issues such as public wages and pension paper) that sets out a bold blueprint of structural rigidities remain unaddressed. reforms to achieve sustainable medium-term Sizeable downside risks cloud Iraq’s growth through economic diversification and fragile economic recovery prospects over the boosting private sector growth and private sector medium-term, but reform implementation could job creation. The GoI has also devised an imple- bring positive dividends. Oil price down cycles and mentation and governance framework for the white failure to implement fiscal reforms in an election year paper in which it proposed a detailed reform matrix threatens macroeconomic sustainability; delays in and launched a High Reform Council headed by the vaccine rollout could lead to additional lockdowns with Prime Minister to accompany the implementation. negative knock on effects on services sectors’ activi- Actions have already been realized starting with the ties; continued underinvestment hampers pro-growth reforms adopted in the 2021 budget law and other programs and service delivery; and deteriorating areas including in the business environment and the security conditions amidst high regional geopolitical financial sector. The ultimate success of the reforms tensions increases overall risks. Nevertheless, there though depends on the political will and public sup- is a markable dividend from implementing reforms port to implement the proposed measures and lead and maintaining fiscal prudence. Pro-growth poli- the country out of a long-standing fragility trap. cies in non-oil sectors and tackling budget rigidities, Iraq’s economic outlook hinges on global oil as outlined in the GoI white paper, can improve the markets prospects, the implementation of the white fiscal balance outlook by 5.5 pp annually (or annual paper reforms, and on the evolution of COVID-19. fiscal gains of US$11 billion). Moreover, accelerating The economy is forecast to gradually recover on the the vaccination program could help speed up the back of rising oil prices and rising OPEC+ production recovery process and gradually reverse the surge quotas. GDP is projected to grow by 1.9 percent in in the national poverty rate that occurred during 2021 and 6.3 percent on average over the subsequent the summer of 2020. However, in the absence of two years (Table 1). Non-oil GDP is forecast to recover sustained fiscal reforms, the budget deficit could in 2021, growing by 5.5 percent before converging to be considerably worse and follow an unsustainable historically low potential growth trend in 2022–23. The trajectory in the outlook period. currency devaluation is estimated to push inflation to Incorporating climate change policies at 8.5 percent in 2021 due to limited capacity for import the heart of Iraq’s development plan will also be substitution. This will present an additional pressure on essential for raising revenues, inducing growth Iraqi households’ wellbeing. and job creation in the medium term. Apart from The fiscal stance remains expansionary the negative health and environment externalities, the with only limited reform measures being included lack of integration of climate related goals continues in the 2021 budget law after an extended delib- to present significant direct and indirect costs for the eration in the Parliament. Higher oil revenues in country. Despite joining multiple global emissions tandem with the devaluation effect on those receipts control initiatives, Iraq is the world’s second largest are projected to narrow the fiscal deficit to 5.4 per- gas flaring country and burns the equivalent of 320 cent of GDP in 2021. Financing needs are forecast thousand barrels of oil per day in associated gas (as to remain elevated compared to pre-COVID-19 levels, a biproduct of oil production). This waste of resources averaging at US$13.7 billion per year (7.5 percent of alone is estimated to directly cost Iraq’s economy by GDP) in the outlook period (2021–2023). The 2021 US$2.5 billion annually. Thus, the case for greener approved budget includes limited reforms such as investment and climate aware policies in Iraq is one new consumption taxes and better targeting of PDS of good economics and could be a crucial measure transfers which are in line with the GoI white paper. to improve government finances, reduce imports and If implemented they could help moderate the fiscal bring gains of higher GDP growth and job creation. x IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY The recent recovery in oil prices provides ongoing COVID-19 crisis heightens the urgency of an opportunity to push ahead with reforms. The mitigating labor market inequalities, as poor labor Iraq experience has repeatedly showed that oil prices market outcomes are expected to have significantly and reform drives are inversely related. Successive deteriorated. This is especially true for women, who governments launched reforms under the pressure of take on most of the burden of additional unpaid care low oil prices and the need for fiscal consolidation. and domestic work and are put at a disadvantage by Amidst persistently high perception of corruption and a general societal attitude suggesting that the few weak public service delivery, this combination gave available jobs during a crisis should go to men. rise to social and political tensions that undermined Weak labor demand, while affecting both the success of most reform initiatives. In the absence women and men, disproportionally impacts of fiscal rules, pro-cyclical and expansionary policies women, as the few jobs that are created are in the often followed as soon as oil prices rose with little oil-related, male-dominated industries. Iraq faces impact on non-oil growth. However, this time is dif- a significant employment challenge, as economic ferent for Iraq. The country stands at a crossroad as growth does not translate into sufficient job creation. economic and fiscal rigidities have been accumu- Recent economic growth was driven mainly by growth lating and have reached a point where quick fixes are in mining, a sector that merely employs 1 percent of limited, and the economy is in need of a serious trans- the labor force, the weak link between employment formation if it is to create jobs and opportunities for its and growth in Iraq is evident across most other ever growing youth. As such, with oil prices trending economic sectors. The combined sectors of manufac- above the US$60/barrel, Iraq could engage actively turing and agriculture constitute less than 6 percent of on the white paper reforms and use those windfalls GDP, constraining women’s economic opportunities to soften the potential repercussion of those reforms. to the public sector, which, given the fiscal constraints of the country, is limited in size and growth potential. Obstacles to entering and remaining in the Towards Increased Economic labor market vary drastically for women from dif- Opportunities for Women in Iraq ferent socio-economic groups, and across critical turning points in women’s lives. Women in urban Beyond the intrinsic value of empowering women areas who have higher education levels and higher and girls, greater gender equality in the labor reservation wages, tend to seek scarce public sector market is smart economics. Gender inequalities jobs, and are therefore more likely to be unemployed in the labor market are estimated to have cost the compared to their rural counterparts. Gender gaps in Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) up to 38 education are especially pronounced in rural areas. percent of its income. The situation is especially dire Women in rural areas are more likely to participate in in Iraq, where poor labor market outcomes for women the labor market, and accept low-paid private sector are exacerbated by years of armed conflicts and jobs, out of necessity and poverty, they also share a economic sanctions. Female labor force participation larger burden of unpaid work compared to their urban in Iraq is among the lowest in the world, and even counterparts. when women do enter the labor force, they are three In addition to job creation, labor market times as likely to be unemployed compared to men. Interventions centered around different chal- While not explicitly mentioned, increasing lenges faced by women in Iraq are needed to women’s labor force participation is instrumental encourage women to actively participate in the to achieving the economic transformation economy and to ensure a better match of labor described in the Government of Iraq’s white supply and demand. Such interventions include a paper. Boosting the labor force participation of focus on the existence and accessibility of demand- women to the average rate of its income group would driven skills training programs to address gaps in increase GDP per capita by almost 31 percent. The knowledge and experience for Iraqi women searching Executive Summary xi for work or seeking to grow in their employment, regulations are needed, and although addressing improving access to affordable and quality childcare, social norms can be challenging, some interventions providing incentives to the private sector to invest aimed at correcting misperceptions can be effective in sectors that employ more women and providing in improving labor market participation of women in culturally acceptable income-generation options for Iraq. women, including via enabling wider assistance for The table below spells-out a non-exhaustive home-based businesses to register and grow. set of recommendations to help the GoI reach its Labor market interventions are necessary objective of increasing labor force participation but not sufficient for improving labor market rate by 5 pp in 2025. These recommendations, outcomes of women in Iraq. Specific legislation which build on a pool of analytical underpinnings and regulations contribute to limiting women’s access conducted by the WB, call for a better match between to employment opportunities including ambiguous labor supply and demand (e.g. via the development child marriage legislation, as well as striking gender of credible matchmaking services), the establishment inequalities in property and inheritance rights of gender-specific solutions in the workplace, and compounded by traditional, patriarchal gender the creation of an inclusive legislative framework norms assigning men as protectors and providers, (e.g. via the elimination of occupational and sectoral and women as care givers. Revisions to laws and restrictions). ADDRESSING FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION CHALLENGES Addressing challenges related to Legal and regulatory Demand for labor Supply of labor framework Social norms 1.  Getting ready • Enhance access to and • Implement policies that • Enforce prohibition of • Work with men and boys retention of girls and increase digital skills in child marriage. on the promotion of women in education, young women who have alternative gender roles including through left school and those still as positive role models. ensuring safe and in it, including training accessible transport for programs for women. girls in rural areas; • Encourage demand- driven upskilling and training of women. 2.  Entering and remaining • Encourage women’s • Focus on the existence • Remove night hour • Provide female job in the labor market collectives and and accessibility of restrictions imposed on seekers with more collaborative work skills training programs women; information about schemes, including to address gaps • Remove job and sector jobs available in the women’s social in knowledge and restrictions imposed on private sector, including enterprises; experience for Iraqi women; which parts of the • Devise employer- women searching for • Prohibit discrimination in private sector women oriented incentives work or seeking to grow access to credit based are already working for hiring women in all in their employment; on gender; in, and highlighting sectors; • Improve job matching • Grant male and female jobs with greater skill • Provide incentives to the for women by expanding children as well as requirements; private sector to invest access to formal and female and male • Provide culturally in sectors that employ informal networks. surviving spouses equal acceptable income- more women, e.g. care inheritance rights; generation options for economy; women: e.g. avoiding mixing with unrelated men, providing options within the home or in an enclosed area nearby. (continued on next page) xii IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY ADDRESSING FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION CHALLENGES (continued) Addressing challenges related to Legal and regulatory Demand for labor Supply of labor framework Social norms • Promote • Expand and strengthen entrepreneurship among the labor inspection women, enabling wider system and enforce assistance for HBB’s to appropriate penalties register, create market to ensure employer linkages and integrate in adherence with relevant value chains nationally, international labor regionally and globally standards and local by easing export labor laws including licensing and unifying contracts, pay equity and formal registration. protection from sexual harassment. 3.  Getting married and having • Expand access to • Introduce legislation • Contribute to shifts a child affordable, quality criminalizing domestic in unpaid care work childcare. violence by reducing the • Amend legislation to stigmatization of men’s shift responsibility for household and care administering maternity work. leave benefits to the government; • Introduce legislation or amendments providing for paid paternity and shared parental leave; • Prohibit dismissal of pregnant workers; • Consider mandating employer-supported childcare. Executive Summary xiii ‫المرصد االقتصادي للعراق‬ ‫التقاط الفرصة لإلصالح وإدارة التقلبات‬ ‫مع فصل خاص حول زيادة الفرص االقتصادية للمرأة في العراق‬ ‫الملخص التنفيذي‬ ‫تأثر التوازن املايل يف العراق بأزمة النفط أجرب الحكومة عىل‬ ‫التطورات االقتصادية والسياساتية األخرية‬ ‫تقليص النفقات غري امللزمة و مراكمة املتأخرات‪ .‬لقد انخفضت إيرادات‬ ‫املوازنة يف عام ‪ 2020‬بأكرث من ‪ 9‬نقاط مئوية اىل ‪ 32%‬من الناتج املحيل‬ ‫جاءت تقلبات أسعار النفط وجائحة كورونا لتضيف هموماً أخرى عىل‬ ‫حد كبري‪ .‬ويف محاولة منها ملواجهة‬‫اإلجاميل مع تقلص إيرادات النفط اىل ٍ‬ ‫كاهل االقتصاد العراقي‪ ،‬ولتنقض إنجازات عامني من التعايف املطّرد‪ ،‬كام‬ ‫هذا الوضع‪ ،‬لجأت حكومة العراق اىل تقليص النفقات غري امللزمة وأشتمل‬ ‫مقت تلك الصدمة املزدوجة جوانب الهشاشة االقتصادية واالجتامعية‬ ‫عّ‬ ‫ذلك عىل خفض االستثامرات العامة بنسبة ‪ ،% 87‬وتأجيل اقرار القوانني‬ ‫القامئة‪ ،‬وأضافت مربرا ً جديدا ً لحالة السخط الشعبي التي سبقت جائحة‬ ‫املتعلقة بالتعيينات الجديدة واصحاب العقود اىل عام ‪ 2021‬وبالتايل‬ ‫د غياب الحيز املايل من قدرة حكومة العراق عىل تقديم‬ ‫كورونا‪ .‬ويح ّ‬ ‫تحمل متأخرات األجور املرتاكمة وإعادة جدولة جزء من الدين املحيل‪.‬‬ ‫محفزات لالقتصاد العراقي الذي يعتمد بشكلٍ كبري عىل إيرادات النفط‬ ‫وعىل الرغم من مصادقة مجلس النواب عىل قانون للتمويل يف حاالت‬ ‫يف تحقيق منوه وعائداته املالية‪ .‬ونتيجة لذلك عاىن البلد من أكرب حالة‬ ‫الطوارئ يف أواخر عام ‪ ،2020‬فأن ذلك مل يكن كافياً لتجنب حاالت التأخر‬ ‫انكامش واجهها منذ عام ‪ ،2003‬إذ انكمش الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل بنسبة‬ ‫يف دفع أجور موظفي القطاع العام والعاملني بالعقود أو حتى عدم دفعها‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 10.4‬باملائة عام ‪ 2020‬عىل خلفية اتفاق تخفيض إنتاج النفط ملنظمة‬ ‫كام سعت حكومة العراق يف كانون األول ‪ 2020‬اىل إجراء خفض قدره‬ ‫(أوبك ‪ )+‬والظالل القامتة التي ألقت بها جائحة كورونا عىل القطاعات‬ ‫‪ % 18.5‬عىل قيمة الدينار العراقي مقابل الدوالر األمرييك مام أفىض اىل‬ ‫غري النفطية مبا يف ذلك الرتاجع الكبري يف خدمات السياحة الدينية يف‬ ‫تعزيز إيرادات النفط‪ .‬وعىل الرغم من تلك اإلجراءات‪ ،‬سجل التوازن املايل‬ ‫أعقاب القيود التي فرضت عىل الحدود‪ .‬وكمحصلة لذلك‪ ،‬يقدر بأن حصة‬ ‫عجزا ً بلغ ‪ % 6.4‬من الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل‪ ،‬وقد تم استحصال التمويل‬ ‫الفرد الواحد من الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل‪ ،‬وهي مقياس للرفاه الفردي‪،‬‬ ‫بشكل رئييس من خالل البنك املركزي العراقي واملصارف اململوكة للدولة‪.‬‬ ‫انكمشت بنسبة ‪ 15‬باملائة يف عام ‪ – 2020‬وهذا أعىل بكثري مام هو عليه‬ ‫إدراكاً منها لفداحة األزمة‪ ،‬وضعت حكومة العراق خطة‬ ‫يف بلدان املنطقة وتلك التي متاثل العراق يف دخله‪.‬‬ ‫إصالح وطنية سميت بالورقة البيضاء لتطرح من خاللها مخططاً جريئاً‬ ‫كام كان لل رتاجع االقتصادي أثره عىل رفاهية املواطن‬ ‫إلصالحات هيكلية سعياً اىل بلوغ منو مستدام متوسط األمد من خالل‬ ‫الع راقي وبخاصة بني أوساط العامل يف القطاع غري الرسمي وأولئك‬ ‫التنويع االقتصادي وتعزيز منو القطاع الخاص وخلق فرص العمل فيه‪.‬‬ ‫الذين يعملون يف قطاع األعامل الحرة‪ .‬حيث استمر بلوغ نسبة‬ ‫واىل جانب ذلك اهتمت حكومة العراق بصياغة إطار عمل لتنفيذ الورقة‬ ‫البطالة أعىل من ‪ 10‬نقاط مئوية عام كانت عليه قبل الجائحة‪.‬‬ ‫البيضاء وضبط حوكمتها‪ ،‬اقرتحت من مبوجبه مصفوفة إصالح مفصل‪ ،‬بل‬ ‫وأعاق الحيز املايل املحدود تدفق تحويالت الدعم املايل مبا يف ذلك‬ ‫وأنشأت مجلساً أعىل لإلصالح يرتأسه رئيس الوزراء ليواكب مهام تنفيذ‬ ‫نظام الحصة التموينية حيث انخفضت نسبة األرس التي تتلقى‬ ‫ء باإلصالحات‬ ‫اإلصالح‪ .‬وات ُخذت بعض اإلجراءات يف هذا الصدد ابتدا ً‬ ‫هذا الدعم بأكرث من ‪ 8‬نقاط مئوية‪ .‬وأفىض فقدان األرس ملدخوالتها‬ ‫التي اعتمدها قانون موازنة عام ‪ ،2021‬والنطاقات األخرى لبيئة األعامل‬ ‫وللدعم االجتامعي اىل زيادة احتامالت التعرض النعدام األمن الغذايئ‪.‬‬ ‫والقطاع املايل‪ .‬ولكن يبقى النجاح النهايئ لإلصالحات مرهوناً باإلرادة‬ ‫دت الجائحة بشكلٍ كبري من تعليم األطفال‪ ،‬وهذا‬ ‫وفض الً عن ذلك ح ّ‬ ‫السياسية والدعم الشعبي لتنفيذ اإلجراءات املقرتحة وانتشال البالد من‬ ‫ما برز واضح اً من خالل النسبة الصغرية من األطفال الذين واصلوا‬ ‫واقع الهشاشة الذي دام طويالً‪.‬‬ ‫التعليم خالل ف رتات غلق املدارس‪ .‬وهكذا فان هذه التأث ريات التي‬ ‫تعتمد األفاق االقتصادية املستقبلية للعراق عىل توقعات‬ ‫وضت‬ ‫صاحبها تقلص الوصول اىل األسواق وخدمات الرعاية الطبية ق ّ‬ ‫أسواق النفط العاملية‪ ،‬وتنفيذ إصالحات الورقة البيضاء وتطورات جائحة‬ ‫ت راكم رأس املال والح راك االقتصادي‪.‬‬ ‫‪xv‬‬ ‫ذلك تحقيق النمو وخلق الوظائف عىل املدى املتوسط‪ .‬اىل جانب اآلثار‬ ‫كورونا‪ .‬تشري التوقعات اىل إن االقتصاد سوف يستعيد عافيته بشكل‬ ‫الصحية والبيئية الخارجية السلبية فأن اإلخفاق يف إدماج األهداف البيئية‬ ‫تدريجي عىل خلفية ارتفاع أسعار النفط وزيادة حصة اإلنتاج يف منظمة‬ ‫ذات الصلة سيواصل فرض تكاليف كبرية‪ ،‬مبارشة أو غري مبارشة‪ ،‬عىل‬ ‫(أوبك ‪ .)+‬ومن املتوقع أن ينمو الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل بنسبة ‪% 1.9‬‬ ‫البلد‪ .‬وعىل الرغم من انضامم العراق اىل العديد من املبادرات العاملية‬ ‫خالل عام ‪ ،2021‬و‪ 6.3%‬خالل العامني اللذين يليان ذلك (الجدول ‪.)1‬‬ ‫الخاصة بضبط االنبعاثات فانه مازال يحتل مرتبة ثاين أكرب بلد يف إطالق‬ ‫كام يتوقع أن يستعيد الناتج املحيل االجاميل غري النفطي عافيته خالل‬ ‫الغاز املحرتق‪ ،‬وهو يحرق ما يعادل ‪ 320‬ألف برميل من النفط يومياً من‬ ‫عام ‪ 2021‬لينمو بنسبة ‪ % 5.5‬قبل أن ينكفئ نحو اتجاه النمو املنخفض‬ ‫خالل الغاز املصاحب (كناتج عريض إلنتاج النفط)‪ .‬وتشري التقديرات اىل‬ ‫املحتمل خالل العامني ‪ .2023 – 2022‬ويقدر أن يسهم الخفض الحايل‬ ‫إن إضاعة املوارد هذه تكلّف اقتصاد البلد وبشكل مبارش ‪ 2.5‬مليار دوالر‬ ‫لقيمة الدينار العراقي يف دفع التضخم اىل نسبة ‪ 8.5%‬خالل عام ‪2021‬‬ ‫سنوياً‪ .‬ولذلك فأن السعي نحو تبني استثامرات صديقة للبيئة وسياسات‬ ‫جراء القدرة املحدودة عىل استبدال البضائع املستوردة‪ .‬وسوف يشكل‬ ‫تتسم بالوعي املناخي يعد من سامت االقتصادات الحسنة‪ ،‬بل وميكن أن‬ ‫ذلك ضغطاً إضافياً عىل مستوى رفاهية األرسة العراقية‪.‬‬ ‫ء حاسامً يف تحسني السياسة املالية العامة والتقليل من االسترياد‬ ‫يكون إجرا ً‬ ‫يدرج يف قانون موازنة عام‬ ‫يواصل الوضع املايل إتساعه حيث مل ُ‬ ‫وتحقيق مكاسب أعىل يف منو الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل وخلق الوظائف‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 2021‬سوى عدد محدود من إجراءات اإلصالح بعد مناقشات مستفيضة‬ ‫التعايف األخري يف أسعار النفط يوفر فرصة نحو امليض قدماً يف‬ ‫يف مجلس النواب‪ .‬يتوقع أن تعمل إيرادات النفط العالية التي أعقبها‬ ‫طريق اإلصالحات‪ .‬كانت التجربة العراقية قد أظهرت مرة بعد األخرى‬ ‫تأثري خفض الدينار العراقي عىل تقليص العجز املايل بنسبة ‪ 5.4‬يف الناتج‬ ‫وجود عالقة عكسية بني أسعار النفط وتوجهات اإلصالح‪ .‬فالحكومات‬ ‫املحيل اإلجاميل خالل عام ‪ .2021‬ولكن يُتوقع أن تبقى االحتياجات املالية‬ ‫رشع اإلصالحات تحت وطأة ضغوط انخفاض أسعار‬ ‫املتعاقبة كانت ت ّ‬ ‫عالية مقارنة مع مستويات ما قبل جائحة كورونا‪ ،‬حيث سيبلغ معدلها‬ ‫النفط والحاجة اىل احتواء النفقات العامة‪ .‬وأفىض االقرتان بني تواصل‬ ‫‪ 13.7‬مليار دوالر (‪ % 7.5‬من الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل) خالل فرتة التوقعات‬ ‫التصورات الشعبية حيال تفيش الفساد وسوء تقديم الخدمات العامة اىل‬ ‫(‪ .)2023 – 2021‬واشتملت موازنة ‪ 2021‬عىل إصالحات محدودة مثل‬ ‫وضت نجاح العديد من معظم مبادرات‬ ‫ظهور توترات اجتامعية وسياسية ق ّ‬ ‫رضائب االستهالك الجديدة واالستهداف األفضل للحصة التموينية وهذا‬ ‫اإلصالح‪ .‬ويف ظل غياب القواعد الخاصة باملالية الحكومية‪ ،‬كان غالباً ما‬ ‫ما يتوافق مع أهداف الورقة البيضاء التي وضعتها الحكومة‪ .‬وإذا ما‬ ‫يتم إتباع السياسات الداعمة لالتجاهات الدورية والتوسع يف أعقاب ارتفاع‬ ‫وضعت هذه اإلصالحات حيز التنفيذ فسوف تسهم يف التخفيف عن‬ ‫أسعار النفط‪ ،‬وحيث ال يكون لذلك سوى أثر بسيط عىل النمو غري النفطي‪.‬‬ ‫العجز املايل وضغوط سعر الرصف‪ .‬وعىل أية حال‪ ،‬هنالك جوانب هيكلية‬ ‫ولكن تبدو األمور مختلفة بالنسبة للعراق هذه املرة‪ .‬فالبلد يقف يف مفرتق‬ ‫اخرى مل تطلها اإلصالحات لحد اآلن‪ ،‬منها االفتقار اىل املرونة يف سلّم‬ ‫طرق بعد تراكم الجمود االقتصادي واملايل وبلوغه نقطة أصبحت فيها‬ ‫رواتب القطاع العام والرواتب التقاعدية‪.‬‬ ‫الحلول الرسيعة محدودة‪ ،‬وأضحى االقتصاد بحاجة لتغيري حقيقي إذا كان‬ ‫مازالت هنالك مخاطر كبرية تلقي بظاللها عىل آفاق التعايف‬ ‫يُراد له أن يكون قادرا ً عىل خلق الوظائف ألعداد الشباب املتزايدة من‬ ‫االقتصادي الهش للعراق عىل املدى املتوسط‪ ،‬إال ان تنفيذ اإلصالحات ميكن‬ ‫السكان‪ .‬وملا كانت تلك هي الحالة‪ ،‬ومع وصول أسعار النفط اىل مستوى‬ ‫أن يؤيت مثاراً طيبة‪ .‬إن دوامة انخفاض أسعار النفط واإلخفاق يف تنفيذ‬ ‫يتجاوز ‪ 60‬دوالر للربميل الواحد أصبح بوسع العراق الرشوع بشكل فعال‬ ‫اإلصالحات املالية يف سنة ستجرى فيها االنتخابات الربملانية سيؤثر سلباً عىل‬ ‫يف تنفيذ إصالحات الورقة البيضاء‪ ،‬وتوظيف هذه املكاسب غري املتوقعة يف‬ ‫االستدامة االقتصادية الكلية‪ .‬كام إن التأخر يف توزيع اللقاحات ضد فايروس‬ ‫التخفيف من أثر التداعيات املحتملة ملثل هذه اإلصالحات‪.‬‬ ‫كورونا قد يؤدي اىل فرض إغالقات جديدة ستكون لها تأثريات سلبية‬ ‫حادة عىل أنشطة قطاعات الخدمات‪ .‬وإىل جانب ذلك فأن تواصل ضعف‬ ‫االستثامرات سيعيق تحقيق الربامج الداعمة للنمو وتقديم الخدمات‪ .‬وال‬ ‫نحو زيادة الفرص االقتصادية للنساء يف العراق‬ ‫شك يف ان تدهور الوضع األمني يف خضم التوترات الجيوسياسية العالية‬ ‫سيزيد من املخاطر الكلية‪ .‬ومع ذلك‪ ،‬هنالك عوائد ملحوظة ميكن أن‬ ‫اىل جانب القيمة املتأصلة لتمكني النساء والفتيات‪ ،‬تعد املساواة األوسع‬ ‫يحققها تنفيذ اإلصالحات والحفاظ عىل الحكمة املالية‪ .‬بل وميكن لسياسات‬ ‫در أن تكون حاالت‬ ‫بني الرجل واملرأة ضمن مزايا االقتصادات الذكية‪ .‬يُق ّ‬ ‫الربامج الداعمة للنمو يف القطاعات غري النفطية ومعالجة جوانب الجمود‬ ‫انعدام املساواة بني الرجل واملرأة يف سوق العمل قد كلّفت منطقة‬ ‫يف املوازنة‪ ،‬كام هو موضح يف الورقة البيضاء للحكومة‪ ،‬أن تحقق تحسناً‬ ‫الرشق األوسط وشامل أفريقيا ما يصل اىل ‪ 38%‬من دخول بلدانها‪.‬‬ ‫يف اآلفاق املستقبلية للتوازن املايل مبقدار ‪ 5.5‬نقطة مئوية سنوياً ( أو ما‬ ‫وتفاقمت هذه الحالة بشكل خاص يف العراق حيث واصلت مستويات‬ ‫يعادل مكاسب مالية سنوية تصل اىل ‪ 11‬مليار دوالر)‪ .‬وعالوة عىل ذلك‪،‬‬ ‫نتائج املشاركة الضعيفة للنساء يف سوق العمل تراجعها جراء سنوات من‬ ‫ميكن لترسيع برنامج التلقيح ضد فايروس كورونا أن يسهم يف ترسيع عملية‬ ‫النزاعات املسلحة والعقوبات االقتصادية‪ .‬وتقدر مشاركة اإلناث يف القوى‬ ‫التعايف ويعكس بشكل تدريجي اتجاه مسار االرتفاع يف معدل الفقر الوطني‬ ‫العاملة يف العراق من بني املراتب األدىن يف العامل‪ ،‬وحتى عندما تتمكن‬ ‫الذي ظهر خالل صيف ‪ .2020‬وعىل أية حال‪ ،‬يف ظل غياب اإلصالحات‬ ‫النساء من االلتحاق بصفوف األيدي العاملة فأن احتاملية أن يواجهن‬ ‫املستدامة من املرجح أن يبلغ عجز املوازنة مستوى أسوأ بكثري عام كان‬ ‫البطالة تبلغ ثالثة أضعاف ما هو عليه بالنسبة للذكور‪.‬‬ ‫عليه‪ ،‬بل وميكن أن يسلك مسارا ً غري مستدام خالل فرتة التوقعات‪.‬‬ ‫عىل الرغم من أن الورقة البيضاء مل تأت عىل ذكر ذلك عىل‬ ‫إدراج السياسات الخاصة بالتغري املناخي يف الصميم من خطة‬ ‫و رصيح فأن زيادة مشاركة املرأة يف القوى العاملة تعترب رشطاً أساسياً‬‫نح ٍ‬ ‫التنمية يف العراق سيكون عنرصاً أساسياً يسهم يف زيادة اإليرادات مبا يف‬ ‫‪xvi‬‬ ‫‪IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY‬‬ ‫باإلضافة اىل خلق الوظائف‪ ،‬هنالك حاجة اىل تدخالت سوق‬ ‫لبلوغ التغيري االقتصادي املنشود‪ .‬أن تعزيز مشاركة املرأة يف القوى‬ ‫العمل التي تتمحور حول التصدي للتحديات املختلفة التي تواجهها‬ ‫العاملة ‪ -‬مثالً لبلوغ مستوى متقارب من البلدان ذو الدخل املتوسط‬ ‫النساء يف العراق من أجل تشجيعهن عىل املشاركة بشكل فعال يف‬ ‫املرتفع الشبيهة للعراق‪ -‬من شأنه أن يزيد من حصة الفرد الواحد من‬ ‫االقتصاد وضامن تحقيق مواءمة أفضل بني العرض والطلب يف سوق‬ ‫الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل بحوايل ‪ .31%‬وترفع أزمة جائحة كورونا املتواصلة‬ ‫العمل‪ .‬تشتمل مثل هذه التدخالت عىل الرتكيز عىل توفري برامج تدريب‬ ‫من الرضورة العالية للتخفيف من حاالت انعدام املساواة يف سوق العمل‪،‬‬ ‫د الفجوات يف‬‫املهارات املستندة اىل سوق العمل وتسهيل الوصول إليها لس ّ‬ ‫إذ يُتوقع أن تكون محصالت سوق العمل الضعيفة قد تراجعت بشكل‬ ‫املعرفة والخربة لدى النساء العراقيات اللوايت يسعني إىل تطوير أنفسهن‬ ‫كبري‪ .‬ويصح ذلك بشكل خاص عىل النساء اللوايت يتحملن الشطر األكرب‬ ‫يف عملهن‪ .‬كام تتضمن هذه التدخالت تحسني الوصول اىل رعاية أطفال‬ ‫من عبء الرعاية اإلضافية والعمل املنزيل دومنا أجر‪ ،‬بل ويوضعن يف‬ ‫ميسورة التكلفة وذات جودة‪ ،‬وتوفري الحوافز للقطاع الخاص لالستثامر‬ ‫موضع الضعيف جراء املوقف االجتامعي السائد الذي يذهب اىل إن‬ ‫يف القطاعات التي توظف عددا ً أكرب من النساء‪ ،‬وإتاحة خيارات مقبولة‬ ‫الوظائف الشحيحة املتاحة يف أوقات األزمات يجب أن يحظى بها الرجال‪.‬‬ ‫اجتامعياً لتوليد الدخل بالنسبة للنساء‪ ،‬مبا يف ذلك تقديم املساعدة األوسع‬ ‫ضعف الطلب عىل األيدي العاملة إذ يؤثر عىل الرجال والنساء‬ ‫لألعامل التجارية املستندة اىل املنزل لتمكينها من التسجيل يف القطاع‬ ‫معاً فانه يؤثر بشكل أكرب عىل النساء‪ ،‬وحيث تظهر الوظائف القليلة‬ ‫الرسمي والنمو‪.‬‬ ‫املتاحة يف الصناعات املرتبطة بالنفط والتي عادة ما يسيطر عليها الذكور‪.‬‬ ‫تدخالت سوق العمل رضورية ولكنها ليست كافية لتحسني‬ ‫يواجه العراق تحدياً كبريا ً فيام يتعلق بحالة البطالة ألن النمو االقتصادي‬ ‫محصالت سوق العمل للنساء يف العراق‪ .‬ال شك أن هنالك قوانني ولوائح‬ ‫ال يُرتجم عادة اىل خلق فرض عمل كافية‪ .‬وكان النمو االقتصادي األحدث‬ ‫تنظيمية معينة تسهم يف الحد من وصول النساء اىل فرص العمل مبا يف‬ ‫قد تحقق بشكل رئييس يف مجال القطاع النفطي الذي ال يستوعب سوى‬ ‫ذلك القانون املبهم لزواج القارصات‪ ،‬والحاالت الحادة النعدام املساواة‬ ‫‪ 1%‬من القوى العاملة‪ .‬يبدو االرتباط الضعيف بني التوظيف والنمو يف‬ ‫بني الذكور واإلناث يف حقوق امللكية واملرياث وحيث يصاحب ذلك‬ ‫العراق جلياً يف معظم القطاعات االقتصادية‪ .‬وال يؤلف قطاعي التصنيع‬ ‫معايري تقليدية أبوية للنوع االجتامعي تنظر اىل الرجال عىل أنهم يوفرون‬ ‫والزراعة مجتمعني إالّ أقل من ‪ 6‬باملائة من الناتج املحيل اإلجاميل‪ ،‬مام‬ ‫الحامية واإلعالة‪ ،‬واىل دور النساء عىل انه يقترص عىل تقديم الرعاية‪.‬‬ ‫د من الفرص االقتصادية التي ميكن من خاللها للمرأة الوصول اىل‬ ‫يح ّ‬ ‫هنالك حاجة لتعديل القوانني واللوائح التنظيمية‪ ،‬ولكن عىل الرغم من‬ ‫القطاع العام الذي يتصف بكونه محدودا ً يف حجمه وإمكانيات منوه‪ ،‬إذا‬ ‫إن التصدي للمعايري االجتامعية قد يكون صعباً فأن بعض التدخالت التي‬ ‫ما أخذنا بنظر االعتبار القيود املالية التي يعاين من البلد‪.‬‬ ‫تهدف اىل تصحيح املفاهيم الخاطئة ميكن أن تكون فعالة يف تحسني‬ ‫يف الدخول اىل سوق العمل والبقاء فيه تواجه النساء معوقات‬ ‫مشاركة النساء يف سوق العمل يف العراق‪.‬‬ ‫تختلف اىل حد كبري‪ ،‬باختالف مجموعاتهن االجتامعية واالقتصادية‪ ،‬وخالل‬ ‫يورد الجدول أدناه قامئة غري شاملة للتوصيات التي ميكن أن‬ ‫املنعطفات املهمة يف حياتهن‪ .‬فالنساء يف املناطق الحرضية اللوايت يتمتعن‬ ‫تسهم يف مساعدة حكومة العراق عىل بلوغ هدفها املتمثل يف زيادة‬ ‫مبستويات تعليم وأجور أعىل هن أكرث ميالً نحو البحث عن الوظائف‬ ‫نسبة مشاركة النساء يف سوق العمل مبقدار ‪ 5‬نقاط مئوية يف عام ‪.2025‬‬ ‫الشحيحة يف القطاع الخاص‪ ،‬ولذلك يعانني من حاالت بطالة أكرب باملقارنة‬ ‫هذه التوصيات التي تستند اىل عملية تحليلية أجراها البنك الدويل تهدف‬ ‫مع نظرياتهن يف املناطق الريفية‪ .‬وتبدو ثغرات الجندر أو النوع االجتامعي‬ ‫اىل تحقيق مواءمة أفضل بني العرض والطلب يف سوق العمل (عىل سبيل‬ ‫أشد بروزا ً يف املناطق الريفية‪ .‬فالنساء يف تلك املناطق أكرث ميالً نحو املشاركة‬ ‫املثال‪ ،‬من خالل أنشاء خدمات موثوقة لتحقيق هذه املواءمة)‪ ،‬وصياغة‬ ‫يف سوق العمل والقبول بوظائف قليلة اآلجر يف القطاع الخاص تحت وطأة‬ ‫حلول خاصة بالنوع االجتامعي يف بيئة العمل‪ ،‬وبناء إطار ترشيعي شمويل‬ ‫ء أكرب من عبء العمل غري مدفوع‬ ‫الحاجة والفقر‪ ،‬ولكنهن يتحملن أيضاً جز ً‬ ‫(من خالل التخلص من القيود املهنية والقطاعية مثالً)‪.‬‬ ‫األجر (الرعاية يف املنزل) باملقارنة مع نظرياتهن يف املناطق الحرضية‪.‬‬ ‫امللخص التنفيذي‬ ‫‪xvii‬‬ ‫الجدول ‪  •  1‬التصدي لتحديات مشاركة اإلناث يف سوق العمل‬ ‫التصدي للتحديات املتعلقة بـام ييل‬ ‫املعايري االجتامعية‬ ‫اإلطار القانوين والتنظيمي‬ ‫عرض األيدي العاملة‬ ‫الطلب عىل األيدي العاملة‬ ‫ •التعاون مع الرجال‬ ‫ •تعزيز منع زواج القارصات‪.‬‬ ‫ •تنفيذ السياسات‬ ‫ • تعزيز وصول الفتيات‬ ‫‪ .1‬االستعداد‬ ‫والفتيان للرتويج ألدوار‬ ‫التي ترفع من‬ ‫والنساء اىل التعليم‬ ‫بديلة للنوع االجتامعي‬ ‫مستوى املهارات‬ ‫واالستمرار به مبا يف ذلك‬ ‫(الجندر) بصفتها مناذج‬ ‫الرقمية لدى النساء‬ ‫ضامن توفري خدمات نقل‬ ‫يحتذى بها‬ ‫الشابات اللوايت‬ ‫آمن ويسهل الوصول‬ ‫تركن الدراسة‪،‬‬ ‫اليه بالنسبة للفتيات يف‬ ‫وأولئك اللوايت ما‬ ‫املناطق الريفية‬ ‫زلن يواصلنها مبا‬ ‫ •تشجيع تدريب وتطوير‬ ‫يف ذلك برنامج‬ ‫مهارات النساء باالستناد‬ ‫التدريب الخاصة‬ ‫اىل الطلب يف سوق العمل‬ ‫بالنساء‬ ‫ •تزويد اإلناث الباحثات‬ ‫ •الرتكيز عىل وجود •رفع قيود العمل اللييل املفروضة‬ ‫‪ .2‬الدخول اىل سوق • تشجيع خطط العمل‬ ‫عن عمل مبزيد من‬ ‫عىل النساء‬ ‫وسهولة الوصول‬ ‫الجامعية والتعاونية مبا‬ ‫العمل واالستمرار‬ ‫املعلومات حول‬ ‫اىل برامج تدريب •رفع قيود الوظائف والقطاعات‬ ‫يف ذلك مشاريع النساء‬ ‫فيه‬ ‫الوظائف الشاغرة يف‬ ‫املفروضة عىل النساء‪،‬‬ ‫املهارات لردم الهوة‬ ‫االجتامعية‬ ‫القطاع الخاص مبا يف‬ ‫بني املعرفة والخربة •حظر التمييز املستند اىل النوع‬ ‫ •صياغة محفزات تتمحور‬ ‫ذلك النطاقات التي‬ ‫االجتامعي (الجندر) فيام يتصل‬ ‫لدى النساء اللوايت‬ ‫حول أصحاب العمل‬ ‫تعمل فيها النساء أصالً‪،‬‬ ‫بالوصول اىل خدمات االئتامن‪،‬‬ ‫يسعني اىل تطوير‬ ‫لتوظيف النساء يف جميع‬ ‫وتسليط الضوء عىل‬ ‫أنفسهن يف العمل •منح حقوق مرياث متساوية للذكور‬ ‫القطاعات‬ ‫الوظائف التي تتطلب‬ ‫واإلناث من األطفال‪ ،‬وكذلك لألرامل‬ ‫ •تحسني مواءمة‬ ‫ • توفري محفزات للقطاع‬ ‫قدرا ً أكرب من املهارات‪،‬‬ ‫من الذكور واإلناث‬ ‫الوظائف بالنسبة‬ ‫الخاص لالستثامر يف‬ ‫ •توفري خيارات مقبولة‬ ‫للنساء من خالل •توسيع وتعزيز نظام تفتيش العمل‬ ‫القطاعات التي توظف‬ ‫اجتامعياً لتوليد الدخل‬ ‫وفرض العقوبات املناسبة لضامن‬ ‫توسيع الوصول اىل‬ ‫املزيد من النساء ‪ ،‬ومنها‬ ‫للنساء‪ ،‬وعىل سبيل‬ ‫التزام أصحاب العمل مبعايري العمل‬ ‫الشبكات الرسمية‬ ‫مثالً دور الرعاية‬ ‫املثال تفادي االختالط‬ ‫الوطنية والعاملية ذات الصلة مبا يف‬ ‫وغري الرسمية‪.‬‬ ‫ •الرتويج لريادة األعامل‬ ‫الذي ال مربر له مع‬ ‫ذلك التعاقدات واملساواة يف األجور‬ ‫بني النساء لتقديم‬ ‫الرجال‪ ،‬وإتاحة خيارات‬ ‫والحامية من التحرش الجنيس‪.‬‬ ‫مساعدة أكرب للمشاريع‬ ‫العمل يف البيت أو يف‬ ‫املنزلية بهدف متكينها‬ ‫نطاقات مغلقة قريبة‪.‬‬ ‫من التسجيل التجاري‪،‬‬ ‫وإنشاء روابط مع السوق‬ ‫واالندماج يف سلسلة‬ ‫القيمة وطنياً وإقليمياً‬ ‫وعاملياً من خالل تسهيل‬ ‫إجازات االسترياد وتوحيد‬ ‫التسجيل الرسمي‬ ‫ •املساهمة يف شكل‬ ‫رم العنف‬ ‫ •سن القوانني التي تج ّ‬ ‫ •توسيع الوصول‬ ‫‪ .3‬الزواج وإنجاب‬ ‫تناوب يف أعامل الرعاية‬ ‫املنزيل‬ ‫اىل رعاية أطفال‬ ‫األطفال‬ ‫غري املدفوعة األجر من‬ ‫ •تعديل القوانني لنقل مسؤولية إدارة‬ ‫ميسورة التكلفة‬ ‫خالل إزالة الوصم الذي‬ ‫مزايا إجازة األمومة اىل الحكومة‪،‬‬ ‫وذات جودة‬ ‫ترتبط بعمل الرجال يف‬ ‫ •سن ترشيعات أو تعديالت متنح‬ ‫البيت ورعاية األطفال‬ ‫إجازات األمومة املدفوعة األجر أو‬ ‫اإلجازات املشرتكة لكال الوالدين‬ ‫ •حظر طرد العامالت الحوامل‬ ‫ •النظر يف جعل خدمة رعاية الطفل‬ ‫أمرا ً إجبارياً عىل أصحاب العمل‬ 1 RECENT ECONOMIC AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS* Introduction limited child learning as evidenced by the small proportion of students engaged in learning activities Oil price volatility and the pandemic have am- during school closure. These impacts coupled with plified Iraq’s economic woes, reversing two reduced access to market and healthcare services years of steady recovery. These twin shocks have undermine human capital accumulation and eco- deepened existing economic and social fragilities, nomic mobility. which further added to public grievances that exist- Recognizing the severity of the crisis, the ed pre-COVID-19. The absence of fiscal space has GoI devised a national reform plan (the white limited the ability of the GoI to provide a stimulus paper) that sets out a blueprint of reforms to to an economy highly dependent on oil exports for achieve sustainable medium-term growth. The growth and fiscal revenues. As a result, the country white paper is a bold and comprehensive plan of experienced the largest contraction of its economy structural reforms that sets out a path towards a more since 2003. sustainable growth through economic diversification These crises have also impacted the and boosting private sector growth and private sector economic welfare of Iraqi households, adding job creation. The GoI has also devised an imple- to unemployment pressures especially among mentation and governance framework for the white informal workers and those in self-employment. paper in which it proposed a detailed reform matrix Unemployment remained more than 10 percentage and launched a High Reform Council headed by the points (pp) higher than the pre-pandemic level. Prime Minister to accompany the implementation. Limited fiscal space has impacted transfers, including Actions are ongoing starting with the reforms adopted the universal Public Distribution System (PDS), in the 2021 budget law and other areas including where the share of households receiving transfers dropped by more than 8 pp. The loss of household * The data cut-off for this Iraq Economic Monitor is April income and social assistance has increased vulner- 30, 2021. Any data published after that date will be ability to food insecurity. COVID-19 has also severely reported in the next edition of the Monitor. 1 business environment1 and the financial sector. The COVID-19 has also taken a toll on the ultimate success of the reforms though depends on economy especially the non-oil sectors. Pandemic- the political will and public support to implement the related mitigation measures, border closures and proposed measures and lead the country out of a travel restriction resulted in a 9 percent contraction long-standing fragility trap. of non-oil GDP in 9M-2020. The non-oil industry was The recent recovery in oil prices provides an the hardest hit, especially the construction sub-sector opportunity to push ahead with reforms. The Iraq (Figure 3) which contracted by over 36 percent (y/y). experience has repeatedly showed that oil prices and The direct impact of the pandemic was most visible on reform drives are inversely related. Successive Iraqi the services sectors as travel restrictions and bordure governments launched reforms under the pressure closures limited the all-important religious tourism of low oil prices and the need for fiscal consolidation. sector, which in turn weighed on retail, transport, Amidst persistently high perception of corruption and and accommodation services. This caused over 12 weak public service delivery, this combination gave percent contraction in the services sector, shrinking rise to social and political tensions that undermined the overall growth by 3.7 pp (Figure 4). Agriculture the success of most reform initiatives. Pro-cyclical and remained a bright spot due to favorable climatic con- expansionary policies often followed as soon as oil ditions and continuous government support through prices rose with little impact on non-oil growth. However, various subsidies and transfers programs. Wheat and this time is different for Iraq. The country stands at a barley yield, for example, increased by respectively 44 crossroad as economic and fiscal rigidities have been and 16 percent (y/y) in 20203 while more Iraqi pro- accumulating and have reached a point where quick duce substituted imported food items. As a result, the fixes are limited, and the economy is in need of a serious sector grew for the third year in a row by a markable transformation if it is to create jobs and opportunities for 34.3 percent (y/y). its ever growing youth. As such, with oil prices trending Weaker aggregate demand manifested above the US$60/barrel, Iraq could engage actively in lower domestic consumption and consumer on the white paper reforms and use those windfalls to confidence as the twin shocks (oil and COVID-19) soften the potential repercussion of those reforms. materialized. The contraction in non-oil sectors caused disruptions to employment, increased job losses, and reduced household income. Low domestic consump- Output and Demand tion was most pronounced among informal workers4 and those in self-employment that have suffered the Oil price volatility has resulted in a sharp contraction of the economy. Available data from 1 On 4 March 2021, Iraqi parliament issued a long- Iraqi authorities for the first nine months of 2020 awaited development, the “Law on the Accession of (9M-2020) indicates that overall GDP has posted a the Republic of Iraq to the New York Convention on sharp contraction of 10.2 percent (y/y), its largest the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral contraction since 2003. Growth was mainly weighed Awards”. The convention is one of the most important initiatives in dispute resolution. This could help promote down by depressed global oil demand and adherence a more secure and transparent business environment to OPEC+ production cuts agreement that led to 11 thereby increasing the country’s attractiveness as a percent (y/y) contraction in oil GDP (Figure 1).2 This destination for FDI. accounted for almost three-quarter of the overall GDP 2 Oil GDP growth is estimated to contract by 17 percent contraction. The absence of fiscal space has limited in 2020. the ability of GoI to provide a stimulus to an economy 3 Iraq’s COSIT, 2020. 4 Almost 67% of workers in Iraq do not have access to highly dependent on oil exports for growth and social security benefits for various reasons, one of which fiscal revenues. Such volatility resulted in a marked is working across a range of informal sectors. See, contraction in GDP per capita—a proxy for individual Employment Profile and Challenges of the Private Sector welfare—of almost 15 percent in 2020 (Figure 2). in Iraq, ESCWA, November 2019. 2 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY Overall GDP has Posted Sharp FIGURE 1 •  Iraq is also Falling behind the GDP FIGURE 2 •  Contraction in the 9M-20, the Largest Per Capita of its Regional Ad Income since 2003 Peers 30 15 10 GDP per capita growth, percent 20 Y/Y growth, percent 5 10 0 0 –5 –10 –10 –15 –20 –20 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 9M-2020 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e Non-oil GDP GDP MENA (2020 estimate) UMIC MENA Iraq Source: COSIT and World Bank staff calculations. Source: COSIT, WDI and World Bank staff calculations. FIGURE 3 • The Contraction was Extensive across FIGURE 4 • With Large Negative Contribution Sectors, Except for Agriculture from Oil and Services Sectors 80 20 60 15 40 10 Y/Y growth, percent Y/Y growth, percent 20 5 0 0 –20 –40 –5 –60 –10 –80 –15 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 9M-2020 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 9M-2020 Agriculture Oil Non-oil industry Agriculture Oil Non-oil industry Services, other Public sector services Overall GDP Services, other Public sector services Overall GDP Source: COSIT and World Bank staff calculations. Source: COSIT and World Bank staff calculations. brunt of job losses5 (see Box 1). The sharp decline mid-February, which led to a new round of lockdown in oil revenues also placed immense pressures on measures being imposed, put additional pressures the government’s pro-growth and pro-poor spending. on private consumption (see Box 2). As evident from Tighter fiscal conditions impacted subsidies and trans- Google mobility data, activities in retail and recreational fers, including the universal PDS, where the share of places—grocery markets, and workplaces—continued households receiving transfers dropped by more than to drop as the COVID-Stringency Index rose from less 8 pp. This lower disposable income and an increase in than 50 prior to the new strain to over 806 (Figure 6). precautionary savings drove household consumption (39 percent of GDP in 2019) down by 9 percent in 2020 5 Notably in sectors such as construction, wholesale and (Figure 5), pushing the economy into a further slow- retail trade where informality is concentrated. down. The emergence of new strains of COVID-19 since 6 https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/. Recent Economic and Policy Developments* 3 BOX 1.1  IRAQ – SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF COVID-19 The negative socioeconomic effects of COVID-19 are disproportionally borne by those who, pre-pandemic, were already disadvantaged (Hill and Narayan 2020, Oxfam International 2021). The poor and vulnerable population face greater risk of exposure to the virus. Many live-in cramped conditions with insufficient amenities, informality with no insurance and have fewer social protections. The pathways through which COVID-19 increases inequality across the globe also holds for Iraq. Pre-pandemic, the recurrent episodes of violence, displacement and economic shock had left many already vulnerable. With 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDP) and 4.7 million recent returnees (IOM 2020), the humanitarian conditions were already critical. While spatially the poverty distribution was polarized between the chronically poor South and the newly poor North on one hand, and lower level of poverty in the Center and Kurdistan on the other, prevalence of poverty among IDPs was more than two times greater than among non-IDPs. Furthermore, low labor force participation, especially among women (less than 12 percent), and unemployment and underemployment among youths (35.5 percent were neither in employment nor in education/training) and displaced population provided important group disparities (Sharma and Wai-Poi 2019). The evidence from Iraq’s high frequency phone survey suggests that the pandemic has affected the pre-pandemic vulnerable groups and poor disproportionally. The impact has been especially severe among workers in the Northern governorates with already high incidence of poverty and female workers. Following a surge during the initial lockdowns across the board, the unemployment rate decreased gradually among men but remained stable at 15 pp higher than the pre-pandemic level for both women and those in the North (Krah, Phadera and Wai-Poi Forthcoming). Workers in informal private sector are another group that are impacted the most during the pandemic. While majority of the wealthier Iraqis tend to be employed in public sector, the mostly informal private sector is dominated by the poorer segment of the workforce (Figure B1.1). Compared to 87 percent of the pre-pandemic public sector workers, only 66–67 percent of the pre-pandemic private sector workers were able to hold on to their jobs either working as usual or reduced hours in August 2020 (Figure B1.2). While 27 and 25 percent of the private sector workers and self-employed were out of work by August 2020, only 9 percent of the pre-pandemic public workers had lost their jobs permanently. COVID-19 has also imposed difficulty in accessing basic services. More than 30 percent of Iraqis needing medical attention during Aug- Oct 2020 reported having difficulty accessing the services (Krah, Phadera and Wai-Poi Forthcoming). Although the overall access to market and grocery stores improved after August, more than 11 percent of the population continued to face challenges during the months of September and October. More importantly, only a small share of children, mostly attending private schools, received any catchup or learning activities during the school closures. Among households with children attending school prior to lockdown, less than 23 percent indicated that their children engaged in any catch-up or learning activities (about 19 percent among public schools and 48 percent among private schools). These short-term impacts on child learning and access to market and healthcare services can be persistent, ultimately undermining human capital accumulation and economic mobility. The crisis will likely increase overall inequality in Iraq. With the opening of the economy, the immediate spike in poverty will recede somewhat but will remain significant. Compared to 2017, the national poverty rate was projected to increase by 7 to 14 pp in the short-term after the initial lockdowns in summer of 2020 (World Bank 2020) and is projected to recede slightly and remain 6.7 to 11.4 pp above the 2017 level.a However, the induced inflation due to the devaluation of Iraqi Dinar is projected to increase poverty headcount by additional 2.9 pp. In terms of disparity, the Gini index is projected to increase by 1.5 form 29.6 in 2017 to 31.1 in 2020 (Figure B1.3). Both Theil index and 10:10 ratio (consumption ratio between the 90th percentile and 10th percentile) are also expected to increase. The projected growth incidence curve between 2017 and 2020 shows a similar pattern (Figure B1.4), with the impact significantly greater for the poorer deciles. The rising inequality has consequences for planning the post-COVID period in Iraq. The diverging trends between groups and regions that overlaps with existing ethnic and religious divisions makes the situation more precarious and increases the risk of social instability. Post- COVID recovery, thus, needs to be inclusive with special attention to the poor and the more vulnerable population. References: Hill, Ruth Vargas, and Ambar Narayan. 2020. Covid-19 and inequality: a review of the evidence. Working paper, Centre for Disaster Protection. IOM. 2020. Displacement Tracking Matrix. October 16. Accessed October 16, 2020. http://iraqdtm.iom.int/. Krah, Kwabena, Lokendra Phadera, and Matthew Wai-Poi. 2020. Iraq high frequency phone survey (IHFPS): Results from August, September, and October 2020 Rounds. Washington, DC: World Bank. Oxfam International. 2021. The Inequality Virus: Bringing together a world torn apart by coronavirus through a fair, just and sustainable economy. Oxfam briefing paper, Oxford: Oxfam International. Sharma, Dhiraj, and Matthew Wai-Poi. 2019. Arrested Development: Conflict, Displacement, and Welfare in Iraq: Arrested Development – Conflict Displacement and Welfare in Iraq. Research report, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. World Bank. 2020. Iraq Economic Monitor Fall 2020; Washington, DC: World Bank. a These are estimates from a Macro-Micro simulation. The original model is updated with the recent Macro projections and information from the high frequency phone survey (IHFPS) to project poverty till end of 2020 and beginning of 2021. (continued on next page) 4 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY BOX 1.1  IRAQ – SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF COVID-19 (continued) FIGURE B1.1 • Poorer Iraqis Dominate the FIGURE B1.2 • Only Two-Thirds of pre- Mostly Informal Private Sector Pandemic Private Sector Workers were able to Hold on to their Jobs in August 2020 100 15 18 16 90 21 25 21 24 27 24 30 80 100 9 90 3 25 Employment status in August 27 70 29 80 60 28 70 7 8 43 44 50 44 62 45 50 34 60 56 50 40 87 40 67 66 30 55 30 48 20 20 32 37 35 36 29 32 10 10 18 22 0 0 Public Private Self-employed Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest Pre-pandemic employment status Deciles of household expenditure Working fulltime/reduce hours Laid-off expected to return Public Private Self-employed Permanent laid-off/out of labor force Source: Rapid Welfare Monitoring Survey (SWIFT) 2017/18 (B1.1,B1.3, B1.4); High Source: Rapid Welfare Monitoring Survey (SWIFT) 2017/18 (B1.1,B1.3, B1.4); High Frequency Phone Survey 2020 (B1.2). Frequency Phone Survey 2020 (B1.2). Note: 2017 estimates are from the SWIFT survey and the 2020 are projections from Note: 2017 estimates are from the SWIFT survey and the 2020 are projections from a Macro-Micro simulation. a Macro-Micro simulation. FIGURE B1.3 • The Crisis is Expected to Raise FIGURE B1.4 • With Poorer Deciles Handling Inequality the Brunt of the Impact 35 0 31.1 29.6 30 –3 25 –6 20 Percent Percent 16.6 –9 15.1 15 –12 10 –15 5 3.8 4.1 –18 0 Deciles of household expenditure Gini Theil P90/P10 ratio Overall average Average of bottom 40% 2017 2020 Incidence Curve (2020) Source: Rapid Welfare Monitoring Survey (SWIFT) 2017/18 (B1.1,B1.3, B1.4); High Source: Rapid Welfare Monitoring Survey (SWIFT) 2017/18 (B1.1,B1.3, B1.4); High Frequency Phone Survey 2020 (B1.2). Frequency Phone Survey 2020 (B1.2). Note: 2017 estimates are from the SWIFT survey and the 2020 are projections from Note: 2017 estimates are from the SWIFT survey and the 2020 are projections from a Macro-Micro simulation. a Macro-Micro simulation. Recent Economic and Policy Developments* 5 FIGURE 5 • COVID-19 Sharply Impacted Private A New Strain of COVID-19 Led to Renew FIGURE 6 •  Consumption the Lockdown since Mid-February 30 120 120 80 100 20 40 80 0 60 10 40 Growth rate, percent –40 0 20 –80 0 –10 –120 –20 –160 –40 –20 –200 –60 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Sep20 Oct-20 Nov-20 Dec-20 Jan-21 Feb-21 Mar-21 Apr-21 –30 –40 Retail and recreation percent change from baseline 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e Workplaces percent change from baseline Transit stations percent change from baseline Parks percent change from baseline Public consumption Private consumption COVID Stringency Index RHS Non-oil GDP growth Grocery and pharmacy percent change from baseline Source: COSIT and World Bank staff calculations. Source: Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, University of Oxford. NEW STRAIN OF COVID-19 PROMPTED THE AUTHORITIES TO SPEED UP VACCINE BOX 1.2  PROCUREMENT New COVID-19 cases and deaths surged in early 2021. As a result, new lockdown measures were imposed since mid-February 2021 on movement and businesses. As of April 25–2021, Iraq has reached a record level. Total cases per million in the country peaked over 25,600 and total COVID-19 related deaths passed 15,250 people, further strained the existing weaknesses in the health sector. Iraq has started its COVID-19 vaccination rollout, albeit at a slow pace. On March 2–2021, Iraq announced receiving its first 50,000 doses of the Sinopharm vaccine as a donation from China, with a total supply of around 2 million doses to follow in stages. In addition, an agreement was signed with Russia to import 1 million doses of Sputnik V, and discussions with the World Bank are underway to finance the import of Pfizer (US$100 million). The recovery path remains highly uncertain considering recent surge in cases. However, the crisis represents an opportunity to promote best practices in developing a more resilient health system. Investment in vaccination and health infrastructure would not only reduce the risk of a prolonged crisis and speed up economic recovery, but also could contribute to better long-term public health outcomes. FIGURE B1.5 • New Strains of COVID-19 9,000 30,000 Cases per million & total deaths 8,000 Number of new daily cases 25,000 7,000 6,000 20,000 5,000 15,000 4,000 3,000 10,000 2,000 5,000 1,000 0 0 4/10/20 4/29/20 5/18/20 6/6/20 6/25/20 7/14/20 8/2/20 8/21/20 9/9/20 9/28/20 10/17/20 11/5/20 11/24/20 12/13/20 1/1/21 1/20/21 2/18/21 2/27/21 3/18/21 4/6/21 4/25/21 New daily cases (LHS) Total deaths (RHS) Total cases per million (RHS) Source: Rapid Welfare Monitoring Survey (SWIFT) 2017/18 (B1.1,B1.3, B1.4); High Frequency Phone Survey 2020 (B1.2). Note: 2017 estimates are from the SWIFT survey and the 2020 are projections from a Macro-Micro simulation. Source: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus. 6 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY FIGURE 7 • OPEC+ Cuts and Falling Global FIGURE 8 • But Iraq’s Oil Prices have Rebounded Demand Weighed Heavily on Oil since Mid-2020 Driven by the Partial Production and Exports Volume Pick Up in Global Demand 6 110 90 5 70 US$/barrel mbpd 4 50 3 30 2 10 Mar-14 Jul-14 Nov-14 Mar-15 Jul-15 Nov-15 Mar-16 Jul-16 Nov-16 Mar-17 Jul-17 Nov-17 Mar-18 Jul-18 Nov-18 Mar-19 Jul-19 Nov-19 Mar-20 Jul-20 Nov-20 Mar-21 Mar-18 May-18 Jul-18 Sep-18 Nov-18 Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19 Nov-19 Jan-20 Mar-20 May-20 Jul-20 Sep-20 Nov-20 Jan-21 Mar-21 Oil production (mbpd) Exports volume (mbpd) Average Iraq export price Crude oil, Brent Budgeted price Source: Iraq’s Ministry of Oil (MoO). Sources: MoO, Iraq’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) and World Bank staff calculations. Gross capital formation remains a drag on its targeted quota, Iraq’s oil production dropped from growth as investment levels are well below par for an average of 4.6 mbpd in the first quarter 2020 to an upper middle-income country. Despite steps such around 4 mbpd in the second quarter before settling as the accession to the New York convention in March at an average of 3.7 mbpd towards the end of the year. 2021, Iraq’s investment climate remains a work in As a result, total oil crude production fell by more than progress, reflected in low levels of foreign direct invest- 17 percent (y/y) in 2020. In tandem, crude oil exports, ment (FDI) especially outside the energy sector. At 1.4 which accounts for 95 percent of overall Iraqi exports, percent of GDP in 2020, Iraq’s net FDI flows remain low fell by nearly 16 percent (y/y) in 2020 (to an average of as compared to MENA region average of 2 percent. 2.9 mbpd) ( Figure 7). Successive violent conflicts, poor business environment, Oil price volatility continued to dominate and underdeveloped financial sector left the country Iraq’s oil receipts. Iraq’s average oil export prices short of much needed private domestic investment, recovered from a low of US$13.8/barrel in April especially in non-oil sectors. Even public investment, 2020 to US$63.3/barrel by March 2021 (Figure 8). the main source for capital formation in the country, fell Favorable international markets supported by addi- from over 14 percent of GDP in 2015 to only 1.6 percent tional production cuts by Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s largest of GDP in 2020 as budget rigidities accumulated and producer, boosted oil prices in the second half of most of such investment was dedicated to the oil sector. 2020. Nonetheless, oil revenues in 2020 dropped to US$41.7 billion, a 47 percent reduction compared to 2019. The oil price recovery led Iraq to suspend a US$2 Oil and Gas Developments billion oil pre-sale deal with a Chinese oil company to protect future revenues. The volatility in international The OPEC+ agreement, weighed heavily on Iraq’s oil prices and consequently the unpredictability of crude oil production and export volumes. The revenues raises the risks of over-reliance on oil as slump in global demand due to COVID-19 brought the the sole source of budgetary revenues. This calls world economy to a near standstill in 2020. To avert for accelerating reforms aimed at boosting domestic oversupply in production, OPEC+ members reached revenue mobilization (DRM). This is important if the an agreement to cut oil supply by 9.7 mbpd in April GoI intends to create the needed fiscal space for a 2020 which would be phased out by 2022. To meet fiscal stimulus in the face of expenditure rigidities. Recent Economic and Policy Developments* 7 Despite having significant natural gas to restructure domestic debt to ease financing resources, Iraq flares sizable amount of this wealth pressures in 2020. High dependency on oil and thus, remains heavily reliant on energy imports. revenues coupled with budget rigidities linked to the With 132 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven reserves in 2020, public wage bill and pensions as well as a growing Iraq’s proven and largely untapped natural gas reserves subsidy to the electricity sector meant that the oil are the twelfth largest in the world. It is also second only price shock and resulting cuts in oil production to Russia in terms of the uncontrolled flaring of natural have turned a 2.5 percent of GDP primary surplus gas. Despite its pressing electricity supply needs, Iraq in 2019 to a 5.3 percent of GDP primary deficit flared 632 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural gas in 20197 in 2020 (Figure 9). This raised gross budgetary partly due to the absence of institutional, and regulatory financing needs to US$15.3 billion (or 9.2 percent framework for its gas sector development, and inad- of GDP). Those needs could have been higher had equate infrastructure, among others. This amount is the Ministry of Finance not rescheduled part of the equivalent to an annual economic loss of US$2.5 billion domestic debt held by State-Owned-Banks (SOBs) and to 10,000 MW of much needed power generation and the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI).13 This strategy capacity.8 In this regard, Iraq recently signed agree- increases the financial risks of these institutions ments with the US giant Honeywell and French company given the related loss in revenues and increasing Total to utilize associated natural gas and increase exposure to the sovereign. refinery productivity. The company will also work on the Budgetary revenues suffered given the development of Ratawi gas project in Basra province.9 prominent role of oil. With 95 percent share in Efforts are also underway to upgrade the revenues, Iraq remains highly dependent on oil energy infrastructure across the country. Iraq has exports to finance government spending. The OPEC+ the fifth largest proven crude oil reserves in the world oil production cuts and the drop in international oil (with 141.4 billion barrels). With the rapid increase prices resulted in a notable 41.3 percent (y/y) decline in production from 3 mbpd in 2013 to 4.8 mbpd in in overall budgetary revenues. Despite administrative 2019, the country became the world’s third largest efforts to improve revenue collection, notably from oil exporter. The government plans to ramp up oil customs14, non-oil revenues only reached 3 percent output to 7 mbpd by 2027. In March 2021, the Iraqi of GDP in 2020 (Figure 9), registering a 28 percent cabinet approved a US$480.5 million contract with decline (y/y). This is well below UMIC and MENA oil Schlumberger to drill 96 oil wells for Basra Oil Company exporters respective averages of 24 and 10 percent of and ExxonMobil in southern Iraq.10 Other energy and GDP. DRM reforms have been hampered by capacity infrastructure investment agreements were signed constraints, poor tax compliance and tax exemptions in 2020 to improve energy infrastructure and be less reliant on energy imports. Key projects include a US$8 billion deal with five major US firms to help Iraq achieve 7 World Bank Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report, July its full potential in the energy sector. Other agreements 2020. 8 Carlos Alberto Lopez Quiroga, Yulia Buynova Gas Sector were concluded with GCC, Turkey and Jordan11 are Reform in Iraq: Is It Working?, World Bank, March 2020. also underway to diversify the source of energy imports 9 Insight Iraq, August 25, 2020. and counter inefficiencies on the grid.12 Nevertheless, 10 Insight Iraq, March 25, 2021. experience has showed that these deals usually take 11 The deal with Jordan will construct a transmission line a long time to materialize, which raises questions over linking both countries and allow Jordan to export about the ability of the GoI to achieve its targets. 114 MW of electricity to Iraq, EIA, February 2021. 12 EIA, Middle East Economic Survey, February 2021. 13 World Bank estimates suggest that MoF has rescheduled around IQD3.7 trillion of domestic debt held by SOBs and Public Finance CBI (equivalent to US$2.6 billion under the new exchange rate). More than 70% was rescheduled with CBI. The oil shock has significantly impacted the 14 According to Iraq’s Border Ports Authority, customs fiscal position in Iraq forcing the government revenues increased by 2.2% in 2020 compared to 2019. 8 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY FIGURE 9 • Sharp Decline in Oil Receipts Exerted FIGURE 10 • But Rigid Expenditures Continue to Severe Pressure on Government Pile, with the Wage Bill Remaining Finances the Largest Budget Item 100 15 40 80 1.6 10 35 14.3 9.3 3.1 60 30 14.6 9.5 5 7.3 5.5 Percent of GDP 40 Percent of GDP 25 1.7 3.4 1.9 1.6 10.9 20 0 1.6 20 4.4 6.3 8.2 0 5.7 7.4 6.7 –5 15 5.4 –20 20.1 –10 10 17.2 15.5 –40 16.5 14.6 14.3 5 12.4 –60 –15 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Oil revenues Non-oil revenues Primary expenditure Non-oil investment expenditure Compensations of employees Transfers (including pensions) Oil investment expenditure Interest payments Goods and services Interest payments Overall fiscal balance (RHS) Investment expenditures Source: Ministry of Finance (MoF) and World Bank staff calculations. Source: MoF and World Bank staff calculations. that contributed to a narrow tax base. Boosting DRM, pension benefits, including the 2019 Parliament’s a key reform feature of the GoI white paper, will be key decision to reduce the retirement age from 63 to 60, to create fiscal buffers and mitigate against oil price have resulted in a public wage bill that reached a size- shocks in the future. able 20 percent of GDP by end of 2020 (Figure 10). Faced with these revenue shortfalls, the This is one of the highest levels in MENA oil exporters GoI resorted to severe cuts in discretionary and UMIC (respectively averaging 9.6 and 12.8 per- spending. These include operational expenditures cent). Two items alone, public wages and pensions, like purchases of goods and services as well as cuts averaged 60 percent of total spending in the last 5 in social assistance programs like the PDS.15 These years and over 70 percent in 2020. Hence, without measures were accompanied by a continuing policy structural reforms tackling these items, a credible of limiting public investment, which dropped by 87 fiscal consolidation plan becomes harder to imple- percent by the end of 2020, with potential conse- ment. Faced with this situation and in the absence quences on the development of the oil sector, service of a budget law approved by parliament in 2020, the delivery quality and reducing the infrastructure gap. GoI deferred the regularization of new civil servant Cuts were particularly observed in oil-related invest- entrants and contractuals to 2021 and accruing wage ments. Those dropped by a dismal 98.3 percent over arrears. As a result, public wages and pensions cumu- the year with only a mere 2.0 percent execution rate latively dropped by 3.5 percent in 2020 (y/y), reaching compared to the allocations planned in the draft 2020 IQD53.4 trillion. This compares with IQD65.3 trillion budget. Meanwhile, investment in non-oil sectors also originally allocated in the draft budget law 2020. Part dropped by 47 percent (y/y) with an execution rate of these salary commitments have been transferred to of only 13 percent (Figure 11). Such measures are the recently approved 2021 budget law. expected to have an impact on medium-term growth potential. The accumulated budget rigidities make 15 In this regards goods and services dropped by over 50 fiscal adjustments much harder. Years of expan- percent in 2020 (y/y) and PDS spending by nearly 64 sionary public employment policies and generous percent. Recent Economic and Policy Developments* 9 FIGURE 11 • Execution Rates, Particularly for Public Investment, have Deteriorated 128.8 110 105.8 90 79.5 74.8 70 70.6 Percent of GDP 61.0 50 30 30.4 29.7 10 13.0 2.0 –10 Oil revenues Non-oil revenues Current expenditures Oil investment Non-oil investment 2019 2020 Source: MoF and World Bank staff calculations. GoI fiscal consolidation measures have suc- the IQD devaluation are expected to increase govern- ceeded in reining in the budget deficit on a cash ment debt-to-GDP ratio by 24 pp in 2020 to reach 71.4 basis, but they created negative externalities that percent of GDP. Even though two-thirds of the debt can only be addressed through comprehensive stock is long term, Iraq faces liquidity risks from rising reforms. GoI measures has succeeded in reducing gross financing needs, which reached US$12.6 billion overall expenditures by 27 percent in 2020 (y/y), and (9.2 percent of GDP) in 2020. As access to international as a result, realizing a budget deficit of 6.4 percent of financial markets remained uncertain, the GoI opted GDP on cash basis. This is much lower than what was to finance most of the deficit by borrowing locally.18 anticipated in the previous Iraq Economic Monitor.16 Increased reliance on typically expensive short-term While these measures succeeded in deferring the domestic debt entails rollover risks on a yearly basis; fiscal crunch, they come at an economic and social accentuating liquidity needs over time and crowds cost down the line. Cuts to pro-poor and pro-growth out much needed private sector credit. Additional programs, like social assistance and public investment, risks arise from service guarantees related to the have negative implications to medium-term growth and electricity sector (estimated at over 17 percent of GDP poverty reduction efforts. Arrears, especially those in 2017-IMF 2020) and contingent liabilities related to related to wages and pensions, raise social tensions and aggravate popular discontent.17 Moreover, restruc- turing domestic debt in the absence of a comprehensive 16 Refer to World Bank Iraq Economic Monitor Fall 2020 macroeconomic program raises downstream risks https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/109 86/34749. as it puts further strains on the financial sector. The 17 Wage and Pensions arrears are calculated by the GoI white paper reforms constitute an opportunity to authors as the difference between allocated budget for address these issues structurally in a comprehensive these two items in the draft budget law 2020 and the manner, while benefitting from recent rise in oil prices realized spending. This adds to around IQD11.9 trillion could attenuate the costs associated with reforms. (6 percent of GDP). Moreover, arrears for electricity and Economic contraction, fiscal deficit, and the gas imports and for contractors are estimated at IQD2.9 trillion (1.5 percent of GDP). In total this raises the budget devaluation led to a higher public debt ratio, with deficit on accrual basis in 2020 to around 13.9 percent rising liquidity risks linked to increased reliance on of GDP. domestic financing. Negative growth, large financing 18 In November, parliament approved the GoI’s request to needs and the higher value of foreign debt following issue USD10bn of debt to cover the government wages. 10 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY FIGURE 12 • Lower Oil Export Volumes Weighed FIGURE 13 • Though a Decline in Imports Heavily on the CAB in Q3–2020… Softened the Shock 6 120 6 30 110 100 25 4 4 90 Percent of GDP 20 Percent of GDP 80 US$, billion 2 70 2 15 60 50 10 0 40 0 30 5 –2 20 Q1-18 Q2-18 Q3-18 Q4-18 Q1-19 Q2-19 Q3-19 Q4-19 Q1-20 Q2-20 Q3-20 Q4-20 –2 0 Q1-18 Q2-18 Q3-18 Q4-18 Q1-19 Q2-19 Q3-19 Q4-19 Q1-20 Q2-20 Q3-20 Q4-20 CAB (LHS) Oil price, US$ (RHS) Oil export volume, mbpm (RHS) Trade balance (LHS) Exports (RHS) Imports (RHS) Source: CBI, MoO and World Bank staff calculations. Source: CBI and World Bank staff calculations. the restructuring of the two largest SOBs. However, services imports in 2020 (Figure 13). Private sector provided that the planned fiscal adjustment outlined imports, mainly consisting of capital goods, shrank in the GoI white paper is implemented, public debt is by 10 percent amplifying the declining capital forma- projected to remain sustainable over the medium term. tion trend and reflecting the less favorable business environment. Public imports also fell by 42 percent as no financing was authorized by parliament to meet External Sector operational demands. The decline in imports had eased external financing pressure but was not enough Lower export volumes turned the current account to fully offset the declining oil export revenues. balance (CAB) into a deficit in 2020 despite the External financing available for the balance oil price recovery in the second half of 2020. As in of payments (BOP) deteriorated further due to previous periods, the CAB dynamics was dominated the COVID-19 global economic downturn. Iraq’s by the oil sector developments which are estimated to external financing sources remained constrained due account for 95 percent of exports in 2020. Average to a combination of lower global investment flows19 oil export price in the second half of 2020 (H2-2020) and domestic absorption capacity constraints. Net rose to US$42/barrel, up 20 percent from the record foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2020 was reported low levels of the COVID-19 induced global markets to be little short of US$3 billion (1.8 percent of GDP) collapse in the first half of the year. However, the sharp with 40 percent of it coming in Q1-20 just before decline in oil export volumes (down 47 percent) was the onset of COVID-19. The recovery of net portfolio the main driver of the CAB registering a 5.8 percent of investment flows was more than offset by a large GDP deficit in 2020 (Figure 12). This is equivalent to decline in official and private investment which jointly US$9.7 billion, a deficit comparable to that of during registered net outflows of US$6.8 billion. Other flows the ISIS insurgency in 2015. including remittances and portfolio investments also The external deficit was softened as imports remained weak. Towards end-2020, the gradual continued to decline due to weaker aggregate recovery in oil prices and a modest rise in export demand. The economic contraction coupled with the government decision to cut discretionary spending 19 Global FDI inflows declined by an estimated 42 percent including public investments and PDS have resulted in 2020 (UNCTAD Investment Trends Monitor, Jan. in a notable 22 percent reduction in goods and 2021). Recent Economic and Policy Developments* 11 FIGURE 14 • Better Oil Export Values Moderated FIGURE 15 • Though Usable Reserves have Fallen Pressures on CBI Reserves in end-2020… 80 12 80 10 75 10 70 8 60 8 Months of imports 65 US$ billion 60 6 US$ billion US$ billion 40 6 55 50 4 4 45 20 40 2 2 35 30 0 0 0 Jan-13 May-13 Sep-13 Jan-14 May-14 Sep-14 Jan-15 May-15 Sep-15 Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16 Jan-17 May-17 Sep-17 Jan-18 May-18 Sep-18 Jan-19 May-19 Sep-19 Jan-20 May-20 Sep-20 Jan-21 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Foreign reserves (exc. gold) (LHS) Oil exports (RHS) Foreign reserves (exc. gold) (LHS) Coverage ratio (RHS) Source: CBI, MoO and World Bank staff calculations. Source: CBI and World Bank staff calculations. volumes contributed to lowering short term external Currency devaluation alone will not be account pressures (Figure 14). enough to boost competitiveness and reduce The devaluation of the Iraqi Dinar import dependence. The import adjustment to the eases pressures on international reserves and exchange rate devaluation was largely constrained reverse part of the appreciation of the local cur- by limited domestic productive capacity. Domestic rency relative to the main import partners. Limited production and non-oil exports diversification are availability of external financing led to a steady decline inhibited by other structural bottlenecks such as inad- of international reserves in 2020. The readily usable equate transportation and energy infrastructure which component of reserves (i.e., reserves excluding together with security issues and a fragmented incen- gold) in this period fell to US$48 billion, covering tive structure undermine productive activities. Iraq 9.9 months of imports (despite lower imports), down ranks poorly (147 in the world) in the global logistic from US$63 billion in 2019 (covering 10.1 months of rankings lagging especially behind in the customs imports) (Figure 15). In this backdrop and while the component (Figure 17). These challenges are yet to 18.5 percent devaluation of the dinar against the US$ be addressed as part of a strategic medium-term plan in December 2020 was primarily aimed at addressing that would also require improvements in technology fiscal pressures in the short run, it will also help ease adoption by firms and provision of adequate skills for pressures on reserves going forward. Moreover, the labor force. The reforms proposed by the GoI white from January 2020 to November 2020, before the paper are well placed to tackle those bottlenecks and devaluation was announced, the Iraqi dinar gained boost Iraq’s competitiveness. 103 percent and 35 percent against the Iranian Rial and Turkish Lira, respectively (Figure 16). The accumulated depreciation over the recent years has Monetary Policy and Prices increased Iraq’s overdependence on imports at the expense of domestic production. However, COVID-19 Weak domestic demand and cheaper imported trade restrictions and the exchange rate devalua- consumption goods kept inflation pressures tion dampened imports in 2020 thereby modestly low in 2020. Iraq’s consumer prices remained reducing external account pressures. muted in 2020 due to weak domestic demand and 12 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY FIGURE 16 • The Devaluation Partially Offsets FIGURE 17 • Though Non-Price Barriers Inhibit the Recent Depreciation Trend Trade Diversification against Main Import Partner Currencies 5 LPI Score 120 IQD devaluation 4 Nominal ER index (Jan-2019=100) Timeliness 3 Customs 100 2 80 1 60 0 40 Tracking & Infrastructure tracing 20 0 Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19 Jul-19 Aug-19 Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Sep-20 Oct-20 Nov-20 Dec-20 Jan-21 Feb-21 Logistics competence International shipments Iraq MENA Germany (LPI frontier) IQD/IRR IQD/TRY Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI), 2018. Source: CEIC data, Central Bank of Iran, and World Bank staff calculations. Note: A score of 5 represents best outcome. cheaper imported consumption goods. As a result, Inflation Remained Low in 2020 but FIGURE 18 •  headline and core inflation only edged up to 0.6 the Currency Devaluation Pushed Up Prices in Recent Months and 1.0 percent in 2020, respectively (Figure 18). However, the combination of currency devaluation 5 6 and recovering domestic demand have drove up 4 5 inflation since December 2020. Jan-Feb 2021 saw 4 3 an increase om inflationary pressures largely driven In percent, % 3 2 by items such as health (13.5 percent), transportation 2 1 (12 percent), and recreation and culture (10 percent). 1 0 0 Thus, the headline and core inflation rose to an –1 –1 average of 3.6 percent and 5 percent (y/y) over this –2 –2 period. The devaluation and disruptions to the flow of Feb-18 Apr-18 Jun-18 Aug-18 Oct-18 Dec-18 Feb-19 Apr-19 Jun-19 Aug-19 Oct-19 Dec-19 Feb-20 Apr-20 Jun-20 Aug-20 Oct-20 Dec-20 Feb-21 goods due to tightened border measures following the spike in COVID-19 are expected to keep inflation Food Transportation Recreation, culture & restaurants elevated, at an average of 8.5 percent, throughout the Headline inflation (RHS) Health Education year (Table 1). Communication Core inflation (RHS) Prompt and corrective policy measures by Source: CBI and World Bank staff calculations. CBI in response to the twin shocks of Covid-19 and low oil prices have managed to maintain financial stability. To minimize the impacts on an already fragile banking system, CBI rolled out sev- also requested banks to suspend charging com- eral policy measures to inject much needed liquidity. missions on electronic payment transactions for 6 These included lowering the reserve requirement months and directed banks to provide consumers and extending repayments on its directed lending flexibilities to extend maturities on loans and reduce initiatives; moratoriums on principal and interest interest rates. Furthermore, CBI took another action payments on loans for Small and Medium-Sized in March 2021 to further reduce all interests imposed Enterprises (SMEs). In September 2020, the CBI on loans granted within the CBI’s one trillion dinars Recent Economic and Policy Developments* 13 initiative.20 These measures have somewhat miti- Measures by CBI in Response to FIGURE 19 •  gated the liquidity crisis and financial stress brought COVID-19 Boosted Credit to Private Sector and Money Supply by the pandemic. While access to credit remains a challenge 25 in Iraq, the above-mentioned measures have supported an increase in credit to the private 20 sector and money supply in 2020. Iraq ranks 186 y/y change, percent 15 out of 190 in terms of ease of getting credit in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. Years of 10 increased borrowing by the public sector to finance 5 the deficit has largely crowded out the private sector. 0 This is also exacerbated by credit infrastructure shortfalls, weakness in credit information and legal –5 Dec-17 Mar-18 Jun-18 Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20 Dec-20 procedures. Therefore, credit remains difficult to obtain and requires high levels of collateral. In 2019, Credit to private sector Broad Money (M2) total credit to the economy was only 8 percent of GDP, the lowest level in MENA region. However, measures Source: CBI and World Bank staff calculations. adopted by the CBI to help mitigate the impact of the outbreak on households and businesses have sup- ported a better outcome in 2020. As such, lowering channels, among other. CBI is encouraging the usage reserve requirement on banks’ lending to households of digital finance and sees access to finance and and businesses together with extending repayment financial inclusion including through the development on CBI directed lending initiatives have resulted in a of digital financial services as priorities. As part of its 22.6 percent (y/y) increase in private sector credit by COVID-19 response and to encourage the usage of Dec-2020 (Figure 19). electronic payments in lieu of cash, CBI has issued Iraq is making progress in strengthening temporary eKYC regulations allowing Iraqi citizens its financial sector. GoI has identified financial to open e-wallets from home. These measures have sector reforms as a key structural improvement and is facilitated the distribution of cash transfers to citizens undertaking a series of reforms to unlock the banking during the pandemic. This is a step forward toward sector’s latent potential and facilitate the sector strengthening the legal and supervisory framework of to play its required part in the economy, including the financial system as stipulated under the GoI white reforming the State Owned Banks (SOBs). The WB paper for economic reform adopted in October 2020. and IMF continue to provide technical assistance to the CBI to strengthen the supervisory and regulatory 20 These include reducing interest for large projects to frameworks and adopt international standards. These 1% (from 2%), interest for banks on housing loans to reforms will allow the sector to provide support to the 2% (from 4%) and amending the CBI commission (for Iraqi economy through increased financial intermedia- housing loans) 5 per thousand (from 7 per thousand), tion, access to finance, and enhanced digital payment www.cbi.gov.iq. 14 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY 2 OUTLOOK AND RISKS Outlook will likely result in increased inequality, and worsen the pre-existing group disparities. Higher inflation will Iraq’s economic outlook hinges on global oil present an additional pressure on Iraqi households’ market prospects, the implementation of the white wellbeing and impede poverty reduction. paper reforms, and the evolution of COVID-19. The The fiscal stance remains expansionary and economy is forecast to gradually recover on the back only limited reform measures were included in the of rising oil prices and OPEC+ production quotas. 2021 budget law after an extended deliberation GDP growth is projected to rise to 1.9 percent in 2021 in the parliament. Higher oil revenues coupled with and 6.3 percent on average over the subsequent the devaluation effect on those receipts are projected two years (Table 1). Delays in vaccine rollout could to narrow the fiscal deficit to 5.4 percent of GDP in lead to additional lockdowns, which in turn impact 2021. Gross financing needs are forecast to remain economic activity. Non-oil GDP is forecast to recover elevated compared to pre-COVID-19 levels, averaging in 2021, growing by 5.5 percent before converging to at US$13.7 billion per year (7.5 percent of GDP) historically low potential GDP growth trend in 2022– during the outlook period. The 2021 approved budget 23. However, continued underinvestment such as the includes reforms such as the introduction of consump- one experienced in 2020 can hamper future growth in tion taxes (on gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol), better both oil and non-oil sectors. targeting of PDS benefits, improved electricity tariff The economic recovery and mass vaccina- collection and automatization of customs. These tion would gradually reverse the surge in poverty. measures are in line with the GoI white paper and if The COVID-19 shock and economic recession is implemented could help moderate the fiscal deficit projected to have increased poverty by 7 to 14 pp at and pressures on the exchange rate. However, more the national poverty line of IQD110,881 per person structural issues such as the rigidities in expenditures per month. The disproportional impact of the shock remain unaddressed. In the absence of sustained and on the informal sector, dominated by the poorer more comprehensive fiscal reforms, the budget deficit segment of the population and vulnerable groups, could be markedly worse and become unsustainable. 15 The projected recovery in global oil market FIGURE 20 • Higher Non-Oil Growth and Wage dynamics will boost Iraq’s export while the devalu- Bill Reforms Would Improve the fiscal Deficit ation is expected to have some impact on imports. Oil windfalls and a stability in the levels of imports will 6 contribute to reversing the current account deficit in 2020 and 2021 into a surplus of 3.4 percent of GDP 4 Fiscal deficit, percent of GDP by 2023 (Table 1). Reforms could help motivate new 2 FDI which could assist the country meet its external 0 financing needs and reduce pressures on the CBI for- eign exchange reserves. As a result, usable reserves –2 are projected to recover and exceed 10 months of –4 imports coverage over the outlook period. –6 –8 2020 2021 2022 2023 Risks and Opportunities Upside Status quo Downside Sizeable risks cloud the prospects for Iraq’s Source: World Bank staff calculations. economic recovery over the medium-term. Oil price down cycles are the largest source of risks and volatility to the country’s outlook that can materialize at help improve the fiscal trajectory. This simulation short notice. Lower oil receipts could severely impact demonstrates that reforms which spur growth and service delivery and wage bill payments and have right size expenditures can help reduce the fiscal knock-on effects on social and political stability. Other deficit-to-GDP ratio by 5.5 pp (or annual fiscal gains significant downside risks include failure to implement of US$11 billion). The white paper policies could help fiscal and structural reforms in an election year, delays achieve an outcome along the same line and help put in vaccine rollout, and deteriorating security conditions Iraq’s on the path to macroeconomic sustainability. amidst high regional geopolitical tensions. Fiscal policy Incorporating climate change policies at could remain expansionary and not address rigidities the heart of Iraq’s development can help raise in recurrent expenditures due to parliamentary revenues and help job creation in the medium election dynamics (scheduled in October 2021). The term. Apart from the negative health and environment continuation of reforms will also depend on the policy externalities, the lack of adoption of climate related stance of the elected government. goals continues to present significant direct and On the upside, a faster pick up in non-oil indirect costs for the country. Despite joining multiple activity together with implementation of fiscal global emissions control initiatives, Iraq is the world’s reforms could improve Iraq’s fiscal outlook. If the second largest gas flaring country (after Russia) COVID-19 vaccination process is streamlined and and burns the equivalent of 320 thousand barrels of past years trend of under investment is reversed, oil per day in associated gas (as a biproduct of oil as presented in the budget law, the overall macro- production). This underinvestment in processing and economic outlook could be markedly better. In the waste of resources is estimated to directly cost Iraq’s absence of sustained fiscal reforms, however, the economy by US$2.5 billion annually. Thus, the case budget deficit could be considerably worse. Figure 20 for greener investment and climate aware policies in compares the baseline fiscal deficit trajectory with two Iraq is one of good economics and could be a crucial alternative scenarios. The downside scenario shows measure to improve government finances, reduce the outcome if DRM efforts are not pursued and imports and bring growth and employment gains.21 recurrent expenditures remains at the same share of GDP in the outer years. In the upward scenario, higher 21 Globally, there are large deviations from sustainable non-oil growth and continued fiscal adjustments will paths of greener growth and maintaining emissions 16 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY While there has been important progress in check.22 It will be important for the GoI to avoid on the path and commitment to reforms there is repeating past experiences and not allow reforms to still more to be done to deeply ingrain the reform be derailed as oil prices trend upwards. The imple- momentum. The authorities have made important mentation of policies and governance framework of progress in pushing the reforms agenda ahead the GoI white paper geared towards promoting private despite a difficult socio-economic and security con- sector and economic diversification will be crucial in text. The formation of the Higher Council of Reforms achieving this long-sought paradigm shift. and some reform measures along the GoI reform plan in the revised 2021 budget law demonstrates the commitment of all players to making difficult deci- in line with global conventions such as the Paris sions. However, these steps only mark the first stage Agreement. For example, the current carbon price of and other crucial steps still need to be taken to put US$2/ton is far below the level needed to meet those the economy on a sustainable path that is less reliant agreements. However, studies show that greener on oil. To this end, creating fiscal space and reducing investment and higher carbon prices can be good economic volatility (e.g. through utilizing fiscal rules economics and lead to higher GDP growth (0.7 pp per and creating a sovereign wealth fund from oil receipts) year over the next 15 years) and create millions of jobs. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/04/22/ could ultimately pave the way for sustained invest- sp042221-md-remarks-at-the-leaders-summit-on-climate. ments. Moreover, wage bill rightsizing and pension 22 The forthcoming Iraq Human Development Public reforms including the consolidation of relevant laws Expenditure Review report by the World Bank proposes will also be paramount to keeping the fiscal pressures some actionable pension reform options. TABLE 1 • Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2018–2023 2018 2019 2020e 2021p 2022p 2023p Economic growth and prices Real GDP (percentage change) –1.2 4.4 –10.4 1.9 8.4 4.2 Non-oil real GDP (percentage change) –1.0 5.6 –9.1 5.5 3.2 3.2 GDP per capita (US$) 5,340 5,550 4,028 3,979 4,296 4,722 GDP (in IQD trillion) 251.1 262.9 199.3 248.0 277.3 295.6 Non-oil GDP (in IQD trillion) 133.2 148.9 135.5 155.0 166.1 177.1 Oil production (mbpd) 4.61 4.84 4.00 3.98 4.44 4.65 Oil exports (mbpd) 3.50 3.54 2.99 3.25 3.34 3.51 Iraq oil export prices (US$ pb) 65.5 61.1 38.4 56.0 60.0 61.0 Consumer price inflation (percentage change; average) 0.4 –0.2 0.6 8.5 3.8 3.3 In percent of GDP Public Finance Government revenue and grants 42.4 40.9 31.7 40.1 42.0 42.0 Government oil revenue 38.1 37.7 28.7 36.0 38.3 38.4 Government non-oil revenue 4.4 3.2 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.6 Expenditures 30.7 39.6 38.1 45.5 43.0 42.6 Current expenditure 25.2 30.3 36.5 39.5 36.8 36.0 (continued on next page) Outlook and Risks 17 TABLE 1 • Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2018–2023 (continued) 2018 2019 2020e 2021p 2022p 2023p Wages and salaries 14.3 15.5 20.1 21.7 20.0 19.3 Goods and Service 1.6 3.4 3.1 4.4 4.1 3.9 Interest payment 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.3 Other 8.1 10.3 12.2 12.1 10.9 10.4 Investment Expenditure 5.5 9.3 1.6 6.0 6.2 6.6 Oil investment 4.2 7.2 0.2 4.3 4.3 4.5 Non-oil investment 1.3 2.1 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 Primary fiscal balance, cash basis 13.0 2.5 –5.3 –4.1 0.9 1.7 Budget balance 11.8 1.4 –6.4 –5.4 –1.0 –0.6 Gross budget financing needs 10.2 –1.6 –9.2 –11.2 –6.0 –5.2 In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated Public Debt Total government debt (percent of GDP) 52.1 46.9 71.4 62.8 57.1 54.2 Total government debt (US$ billion) 110.6 104.4 98.1 107.4 109.3 110.4 External government debt (percent of GDP) 27.8 24.3 36.9 32.5 33.0 28.0 External government debt (US$ billion) 59.0 54.0 50.7 55.5 56.5 57.1 Monetary indicators Growth in broad money 2.7 8.4 15.8 n.a n.a n.a Policy interest rate (end of period) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated External sector Current account 10.5 5.9 –5.8 –0.7 2.7 3.4 Trade balance 16.7 13.3 1.5 6.6 9.9 10.6 Exports of goods 41.1 36.7 28.0 37.4 39.7 39.8 Imports of goods 24.4 23.4 26.5 30.8 29.8 29.2 Gross reserves (US$ billion, excl. gold) 60.3 62.9 48.1 45.6 49.7 56.0 In months of imports of goods and services (excl. gold) 10.4 10.1 9.9 8.1 10.5 11.3 Exchange rate (IQD per US$; period average) 1183 1182 1192 n.a n.a n.a Sources: Iraqi authorities and World Bank staff estimates and projections. 18 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY SPECIAL FOCUS: TOWARDS INCREASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN IRAQ Summary: Beyond the intrinsic value of empowering centered around different challenges faced by women and girls, greater gender equality in the women in Iraq are needed to encourage women to labor market is smart economics. Iraq has one of actively participate in the economy and to ensure a the lowest female labor force participation rates better match of labor supply and demand. (LFPR) in the World. Boosting female labor force participation enough to raise the country’s LFPR to its income group average (Upper-middle Income 1. Introduction Countries) would increase GDP per capita by almost 31 percent. Weak labor demand, while affecting both Promoting women’s access to economic opportunities women and men, disproportionally impacts women, not only improves the welfare of women and reduces as the few jobs that are created are in the oil-related, inequality, but also implies large benefits in terms of male-dominated industries. Obstacles to entering output and economic growth. The potential economic and remaining in the labor market vary drastically contribution of women remains untapped in most for women from different socio-economic groups, parts of the world, but especially in the Middle East and across critical turning points in women’s lives. and North Africa region (MENA), which is estimated In addition to job creation, labor market Interventions to have lost up to 38 percent of its income due to 19 GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES AND THE WORLD BANK GROUP ADMINISTERED MASHREQ BOX 2.1  GENDER FACILITY (MGF) To respond to challenges to women’s access to employment opportunities, the government of Iraq has developed a Women’s Economic Empowerment Action Plan. The World Bank’s MGF* is supporting the implementation of the Action Plan based on a government-led country work plan developed within the context of Iraq, inclusive of the Kurdistan region. In collaboration across government agencies and with the private sector, civil society and development partners, the MGF Iraq work plan focuses on strengthening the enabling environment and on addressing specific constraints to women’s economic activity. *The MGF, established in 2019, provides technical assistance to the Mashreq countries to enhance women’s economic empowerment and opportunities as a catalyst towards more inclusive, sustainable, and peaceful societies, where economic growth benefits all. https:// www.worldbank.org/en/programs/mashreq-gender-facility. BOX 2.2  DATA SOURCES Labor market indicators in this chapter are drawn from two different data sources. International Labor Organization (ILO) modeled estimates, which are harmonized to allow for international benchmarking, were used for comparisons with global and MENA figures. The rest of the analysis focuses on the Iraqi context and relies on the most recent household socio-economic survey (IHSES), which was conducted in 2012. Figures listed throughout this report include the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). existing gender inequality in the labor market.23 in Iraq, reveal that labor force participation among Lagging behind both MENA countries and Upper- women decreased drastically in September 2020 Middle Income Countries (UMIC), Iraq has one of the compared to pre-crisis levels, whereas participation lowest female labor force participation rates (LFPR) in in the labor market remained similar to the pre-crisis the World. Boosting female labor force participation level for men.27 The burden of additional unpaid care enough to raise the country’s LFPR to the UMIC and domestic work during COVID-19 falls almost average would increase GDP per capita by almost 31 exclusively on women in the household. Around 25 percent.24 percent of men compared to more than 40 percent of Iraq has set a policy objective of increasing women reported an increase in time spent on unpaid women’s LFPR by 5 percentage points (pp) between 2019 and 2024. If the country reaches this objective, 23 IMF, 2016. Women, work, and economic growth: leveling it could benefit from a 1.6 pp increase in its annual the playing field. Washington, DC: International Monetary economic growth.25 While not explicitly mentioned, Fund. increasing women’s labor force participation is part 24 World Bank, 2020. Breaking Out of Fragility, A Country of reaching the objectives of economic transformation Economic Memorandum for Diversification and Growth put forward in the Government of Iraq’s white paper. in Iraq. Washington, DC: World Bank. Raising overall LFPR to UMIC average is nearly equivalent to raising Increasing the LFPR of women in Iraq is particularly the LFPR of women to the UMIC average for women, challenging, as the country has one of the youngest because the LFPR of men in Iraq and UMIC are nearly populations in the World, and the economy needs to equal, see figure 1. cater to a growing number of individuals joining the 25 World Bank, 2020. Women’s Economic Participation in labor force.26 Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Washington DC: World Bank. Most of the labor market statistics referred 26 World Bank, 2020. Breaking Out of Fragility, A Country Economic Memorandum for Diversification and Growth to in this chapter rely on data collected prior to the in Iraq. Washington, DC: World Bank. COVID-19 crisis. Labor market outcomes are expected 27 World Bank, 2020. Iraq High Frequency Phone Survey to have significantly deteriorated since then, especially (IHFPS) Results from August, September, and October for women. High frequency phone surveys conducted 2020 Rounds. Unpublished. 20 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY domestic work since COVID-19 in Iraq.28 Additionally, LFPR by Gender (Iraq, MENA, UMIC, FIGURE 21 •  general societal attitudes suggest that the few avail- World) able jobs should go to men, further excluding women from the labor market.29 This Special Focus first offers a brief descrip- World tion of key labor market indicators for women in Middle East & Iraq, highlighting differences across life stages and North Africa levels of education. It then goes over evidence on Upper Middle the different barriers faced by women in Iraq towards Income Countries participating in the labor market, such as legal, behav- ioral, and market-related constraints. It recognizes that Iraq women of different socio-economic backgrounds and 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 at different life stages and experience these chal- lenges differently (using both education and location LFPR, male (% of male population ages 15–64) LFPR, female (% of female population ages 15–64) as proxies for socioeconomic status). The chapter concludes with possible interventions and lessons for Source: World Development Indicators, ILO modeled estimates for 2019. policy. labor force compared to their older counterparts) An Overview of the Labor Market 2.  which has yet to happen in Iraq.31 Outcomes for Women in Iraq In contrast, a strong positive association between women’s education-level and their labor Low economic participation for 2.1.  participation can be observed. Women with tertiary women, especially for less-educated education are more than six times as likely to join women, women in rural areas, and the labor market compared to women with less than married women with young children secondary education (Figure 22). This association is weaker for men, who are only slightly more likely to With little more than 1 out of 10 women join the labor force when they acquire tertiary educa- economically active, female LFPR in Iraq is tion, compared to having some secondary education among the lowest in the world. Women in the or less than secondary education (93.2 percent, 89.9 MENA region are twice as likely to be in the labor percent, and 88.5 percent, respectively). force compared to women in Iraq. On the global While this positive association between level, the average woman is four times as likely to LFPR and education level is also observed in be in the labor force compared to a woman in Iraq other countries, less-educated women represent (Figure 21). In comparison, standing at 74 percent, a larger share of the female population in Iraq. men’s participation rate is in line with global levels. This partially explains overall low female LFPR. This This gives Iraq one of the highest gender gaps in trend is magnified in rural areas, where 90 percent of labor participation worldwide. women have no secondary education, but is partially There are no obvious patterns of differen- offset by the observation that less educated women tial participation for women across age groups in Iraq are more likely to work if they live in rural areas in Iraq. Labor force participation remains relatively constant for women until the age 54,30 as women start exiting the labor force. In comparison, younger 28 UNW, 2020. Whose Time to Care? Unpaid Care and Domestic Work during COVID-19. women (ages 15–44) in the MENA are almost twice 29 World Values Survey Wave 7 (2017–2020), Iraq. as likely to participate in the labor force than those 30 World Bank, 2020. Women’s Economic Participation in over 45 years of age, indicating a generational shift Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Washington DC: World Bank. (where younger women are more willing to join the 31 2019 ILO Modeled Estimates for MENA data. Special Focus: Towards Increased Economic Opportunities for Women in Iraq 21 Adjusted LFPR by Gender and Level FIGURE 22 •  almost three times as likely to be unemployed of Education compared to men, 30.6 percent of women are unemployed, compared to 10 percent of men.36 These 100 89.9 93.2 numbers are likely to have increased significantly 88.5 today. Based on a rapid assessment of the impacts of 80 COVID-19 on vulnerable populations and small-scale 63.6 enterprises in Iraq, about one-quarter of those who 60 were employed prior to the lockdown reported that they were permanently laid-off.37 40 Women with tertiary education are the most 19.9 likely to be unemployed, followed by women with 20 10.5 less than secondary education, and women with some secondary education (with unemployment rates of 17 0 Less than secondary Some secondary Tertiary percent, 13 percent, and 10 percent, respectively). These unemployment trends reflect the propensity of Female LFPR (adjusted) Male LFPR (adjusted) women to queue for scarce public sector jobs (further Source: World Bank 2020, based on 2012 Iraq household socio-economic survey. details in the following section). Note: adjusted participation rate is the share of the population in the labor force over the total population excluding those in full-time education. While the composition of employment for women in Iraq is similar to what is observed in upper-middle-income countries, these similarities rather than urban.32 Various factors contribute towards do not prevent significantly different gender bar- Iraq’s educational gender gap, with a main reason riers from occurring. Around 60 percent of employed being that schools are overcrowded and not within a women in Iraq are wage workers, compared to a safe traveling distance, especially in rural areas, a situ- quarter who are self-employed.38 The vast majority of ation that is intensifying due to public budget cuts.33 wage-employed women reside in urban areas, have Unmarried women without children are public sector jobs, and are likely to have tertiary edu- the most likely to participate in the labor force. cation. Women’s engagement in the digital economy Female LFPR drop from 22 percent to 14 percent remains very limited.39 Because public employment is once women get married,34 and only recover once the estimated to absorb the majority of working women youngest child finishes compulsory education. Stark in Iraq, being a woman is associated with a lower distinctions exist between rural and urban areas. While probability of being employed in the informal sector in urban areas, unmarried women have the highest compared to men, who are mostly engaged in private participation rates, in rural areas, married women with older children are more likely than their unmarried counterparts to participate in the labor force. The 32 World Bank, 2020. Women’s Economic Participation in relatively high LFPR of women with older children and Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Washington DC: World Bank. women living in rural areas likely arise out of necessity 33 OXFAM, 2018. Gender Profile, Iraq: A Situation Analysis and poverty, similarly to high LFPR observed in low- on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Iraq. income countries (excluding MENA).35 34 Adjusted LFPR for women aged 15–44. 35 ILO modeled estimates, 2019. Women in the labor market are more 2.2.  36 Ibid. likely to be unemployed, and tend 37 ILO, FAFO, 2020. Rapid Assessment of the impacts of COVID-19 on vulnerable populations and small-scale to experience worse labor market enterprises in Iraq. outcomes compared to men 38 The remaining 15 percent are categorized as employers or contributing family workers. Unemployment rates were high among women 39 Women’s Economic Empowerment Action Plan even before the pandemic. Women in Iraq are (WEEAP), Challenges Strategies and Initiatives, 2019. 22 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY sector employment, the vast majority of which is women and men employed in the private and public informal.40 sectors reported experiencing challenges finding their The vast majority of self-employed women current job because of lack of job opportunities.46 are engaged in own-farm activities in the agricul- Weak labor demand, while affecting both ture sector, have less than primary education, and women and men, disproportionally impacts very limited access to assets.41 The main sector of women, as the few jobs that are created are in employment for women in rural areas is agriculture, the oil-related, male-dominated industries. The 55 percent of women in rural areas are employed in combined sectors of Manufacturing and Agriculture agriculture, compared to 21.5 percent of men. Across constitute less than 6 percent of GDP.47 Employment Iraq, 34.6 percent of working women are considered opportunities for women are consequently limited to be unpaid, this increases to 79.3 percent in rural to the public sector (also aligned with preferences), areas is particularly pronounced in the agriculture which, given the fiscal constraints of the country, is sector.42 Women’s access to assets, in terms of land limited in size and growth potential. titles (inheritance rights) and bank accounts (see section 3 of this chapter), remains extremely limited 3.1.2. Challenges related to labor supply (70 percent of women in UMIC own an account at a Women’s human capital accumulation, especially financial institution or with mobile-money-service pro- in terms of formal education and skills, plays a vider, 38 percent in MENA, compared to 20 percent pivotal role in the labor market outcomes they in Iraq).43 experience. There are significant gender gaps in education. Only one in two girls complete primary education compared to three out of four boys. These A Restrictive Environment for 3.  gaps are accentuated with age, 40 percent of girls Women’s Access to Employment and 80 percent of boys at age 13 still attend school, Opportunities and are even more striking for women in rural areas, who begin to drop out of school at the age of nine.48 Limited economic opportunities 3.1.  Factors affecting low enrollment and high compounded by significant supply- dropouts of girls in Iraq are numerous. These side challenges include concerns over safety (in traveling to school), family and household responsibilities, child marriage, 3.1.1. Challenges related to labor demand lack of availability of schooling infrastructure (some Iraq faces a significant employment challenge, as low economic growth is compounded by low employment-growth elasticity, characteristic of 40 World Bank, 2014. Striving for Better Jobs: The most MENA countries. Employment is relatively Challenge of Informality in the Middle East and North inelastic to GDP growth in Iraq: a 1 percent increase Africa. Washington DC: World Bank. in GDP only generates 0.3 percent growth in 41 Ibid. employment.44 Recent economic growth was driven 42 Women’s Economic Empowerment Action Plan (WEEAP), Challenges Strategies and Initiatives, 2019. mainly by growth in mining, a sector that employs 43 World Development Indicators, 2017. a very small share of the labor force (1 percent). 44 World Bank, 2014. The unfulfilled promise of oil and However, while not as pronounced as in the mining growth: poverty, inclusion and welfare in Iraq 2007– sector, the weak link between employment and growth 2012. Washington DC: World Bank. in Iraq is evident across all other economic sectors, 45 Ibid. with the exception of manufacturing and the finance.45 46 IMPACT, 2020. Assessment on Barriers to Women’s Economic Empowerment in al Basra, Baghdad and Erbil. Economic growth prospects have been hampered by 47 World Bank, 2020. Women’s Economic Participation in the 2003–2011 and 2014–2017 Iraq wars, and the Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Washington DC: World Bank. creation of “good jobs” in productive sectors hindered 48 Ibid, Based on data from 2012 2012 Iraq Household by a high dependency on oil. Over two-thirds of both Socio-Economic Survey. Special Focus: Towards Increased Economic Opportunities for Women in Iraq 23 schools work morning shifts and night shifts due to affect women’s economic empowerment. It should limited capacity), combined with the consequences of be noted that the index for Iraq refers to the laws and years of unrest and conflict. regulations that are applicable to the main business Gendered time-use profiles restrict city (Baghdad), and therefore excludes the KRI.54 women’s capacity to participate in the labor market, the situation is accentuated for women 3.2.1.  Employment restrictions with children and women in rural areas. Iraqi Specific legislation and regulations limit women’s women spend on average more than six hours a day access to employment opportunities in Iraq performing unpaid domestic and care work,49 figures (including the KRI). The Labor Law prohibits women that are in line with the time-use profiles of women in from working night hours and from working in jobs other MENA countries.50 As such, they account for 86 that are deemed dangerous. In Iraq, Law, Art. 85 percent of the time dedicated to care work, while men refers to instructions to be issued by the Minister that only account for 14 percent.51 Households very rarely determine the exact sectors and jobs which fall under rely on external institutions for childcare, as statistic this provision. To date, no decrees or instructions have show that only 3% of children age 3–4 attend any form been issued to regulate this provision. While the Labor of Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) and Law mandates equal remuneration for work of equal only half have any experience of childhood develop- value, gender wage gap for women and men working ment activities.52 similar jobs with similar education and experience is The amount of time Iraqi significantly about 22 percent in Iraq. decreases their chances of participating in the labor market. Spending 10 hours a week on child- 3.2.2.  Sexual harassment in the workplace care or domestic work is associated with a 20 percent While the Labor Law in KRI guarantees the right to lower probability of participating in the labor market work without discrimination, it does not specifically for women with a tertiary degree, this rate drastically mention sexual harassment. Iraq has passed laws increases to 70 percent for women with less than prohibiting sexual harassment at the workplace secondary education. which include imposing penalties on perpetrators of The digital economy has the potential to sexual harassment (Labor Law article 10-1), however provide jobs for young women in Iraq that offer exposure to harassment for women who are working flexible hours and the ability to work from home, is still prevalent.55 This indicates a lack of enforcement overcoming many constraints identified in this and communication surrounding law and regulations chapter. Iraq fairs significantly worse in the digital protecting women in the workplace,56 combined with economy compared to the of the MENA (even when excluding GCC countries), and the situation is dispro- portionally worse for women, only 72 women using 49 Vilardo, V., Bittar, S., 2018. Gender Profile—Iraq: A the Internet for every 100 men.53 The main barriers for Situation Analysis on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Iraq. Oxfam International, Oxford, U.K. women are ownership are cost, low literacy and digital 50 World Development Indicators, various years (latest year skills, and safety concerns, and a general belief that available for each country). the digital economy is not relevant to them. 51 ILO, 2018. Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work. Geneva: ILO. 3.2.  Legal and s gaps and restrictions 52 World Bank, 2014. Early childhood development in Iraq. Washington DC: World Bank. Iraq scores 45 out of 100 on the Women Business 53 Digital Gender Gaps, www.digitalgendergaps.org. and the Law Index, a score that is lower than the 54 World Bank, 2021. Women, Business, and the Law. Washington DC: World bank. regional average observed across the MENA (51.5 55 IMPACT, 2020. Assessment on Barriers to Women’s out of 100). The World Bank’s Women, Business and Economic Empowerment in al Basra, Baghdad and Erbil. the Law index is estimated on a yearly basis and covers 56 World Bank, 2020. Women’s Economic Participation in 190 countries by measures laws and regulations that Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Washington DC: World Bank. 24 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY general reluctance to enforce these laws because of 3.2.4.  Parental leave and benefits entrenched social norms. Women who still perceive Women are granted 98 days of maternity leave a risk of being exposed to sexual harassment might paid by the employer in Iraq, and 62 days in refrain from joining the labor market.57 the KRI. Iraq also requires all employers to provide onsite childcare.67 These provisions meet 3.2.3.  Obstacles to starting a business the ILO standards on the length of maternity leave including access to property and found in the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 inheritance (No. 183).68 However, contrary to best practice,69 The World Bank Doing Business report ranks Iraq current responsibility for paying maternity leave falls 172nd in the world (out of 190) for its ease of doing exclusively on the employer, which may dissuade business.58 The most frequently reported challenge employers from hiring women. For pregnant women in starting self-employment activities for self-employed that are already in employment, there is heightened respondents was a lack of financial support or risk of dismissal, especially as no law prohibits the capital.59 These difficulties in starting and growing a dismissal of pregnant women.70 business are compounded for women:60 while women It should be noted that the above-men- are technically allowed to open a bank account in tioned maternity benefits only apply to formally the same way as men, no legislation or amendment employed women, i.e. registered work contracts prohibits discrimination by creditors based on gender that fall under the labor code. The fact that 40 per- in access to credit.61 For instance, women reportedly cent of women are non-wage workers, and others are face higher collateral requirements compared to men, informally employed by private sector firms, implies compounded by difficulties in owning assets. that many women do not get access to this paid Striking gender inequalities exist in prop- maternity leave. erty and inheritance rights. Male children and male Paid leave is not available for fathers. While surviving spouses have clear advantages over female the burden of care work and child rearing already falls children and female surviving spouses in terms of their rights to inherit assets (Personal Status Law, Arts. 89 and 90), (Personal Status Law, Arts. 90 and 91).62 57 IMPACT, 2020. Assessment on Barriers to Women’s Discriminatory inheritance and property Economic Empowerment in al Basra, Baghdad and Erbil. laws, combined with traditional social norms, 58 World Bank, 2020. Doing Business 2020, Comparing make it hard for rural women to own agricultural Business Regulation in 190 Economies. land.63 Women own a smaller share of agriculture 59 IMPACT, 2020. Assessment on Barriers to Women’s Economic Empowerment in al Basra, Baghdad and Erbil. land compared to men, they account for 28 percent 60 World Bank, 2020. Doing Business 2020: Economy of agricultural landowners in the country compared Profile of Iraq. Washington DC: World Bank. to 72 percent of men. Women are also significantly 61 World Bank, 2021. Women, Business, and the Law. less likely to own land compared to men, only 1 out Washington DC: World Bank. of 10 women in Iraq owns land, compared to nearly 3 62 Ibid. out of 10 men. It should be noted that women in Iraq 63 World Bank, 2020. Gender in the Agri-Food Sector of Iraq. Unpublished. fair significantly better than their global (15 percent of 64 FAO, 2018. The Gender Gap in Land Rights. all landowners are women) and MENA counterparts 65 World Bank, Land tenure in Iraq and KRG. Unpublished. (5 percent of landowners in the MENA are women).64 66 World Bank, 2020. Gender in the Agri-Food Sector of A growing body of research demonstrates Iraq. Unpublished. the importance of women’s ownership of and 67 With the exception of women engaged in a family control over assets for a range of develop- business. 68 Iraq has not ratified Convention No. 183. ment outcomes.65 In the agriculture sector and in 69 World Bank, 2021. Women Business, and the law. developing countries specifically, an equal access Washington DC: World Bank. to productive resources for men and women would 70 World Bank, 2021. Women, Business, and the Law. increase farm yields by 20 to 30 percent.66 Washington DC: World Bank. Special Focus: Towards Increased Economic Opportunities for Women in Iraq 25 disproportionally on women, the absence of legisla- households as a result of the armed conflict (widowed tion or provisions providing for paid paternity and women or women living with men who were injured parental leave71 places the responsibility of caring for and unable to work).77 The UNDP estimates that 10 young children almost exclusively on women. percent of households in Iraq were headed by women in 2019. It should be noted that economic necessity 3.2.5.  Domestic violence does not necessarily generate a shift in social norms While a law on combatting domestic violence was and can increase the incidence of sexual and gender- passed in KRI in 2011, no such law exists in Iraq. based violence (SGBV) against women and girls, a Domestic violence not only affects the safety and risk that is compounded by the ongoing COVID-19 well-being of women, it also hampers their capacity crisis.78 to generate income and participate in the labor market. There are high levels of acceptance of GBV 3.3.1. Attitudes towards work in general and in Iraq, where half of women believe that it is justified work in the private sector specifically for husbands to beat their wives under certain In Iraq, societal expectations remain a barrier circumstances (World Values Survey 2014). Recent to women’s engagement in employment. These studies have shown that domestic violence against expectations partly stem from prevalent negative women and girls has increased Since the outbreak perceptions toward the frequent presence of women of COVID-19.72 in public spaces, and especially when engaging in physical activities.79 It should be noted that women 3.2.6. Child marriage are socially more encouraged to work in the KRI, After Yemen, Iraq is the Arab country with the compared to other parts of Iraq.80 Higher drop-out highest prevalence of child marriage,73 where and lower enrollment rates for girls living in rural areas one out of four girls is married by the age of 18 and (as described in section 2 of this chapter) seem to 5 percent of girls get married before they reach indicate that these gendered societal expectations the age of 15.74 While the legal minimum age of are more pronounced in rural areas. marriage is 18, the law permits a judge to marry Anecdotal evidence of distinctive private/ children as young as 15 (16 in the KRI) under loose public sector preferences for women and men circumstances (1959 Personal Status Law).75 Apart are supported by employment figures described from being a form of violence against women, child in the previous section. A majority of men reported marriage lowers economic outcomes for women and jeopardizes girls’ ability to invest in their education. 71 Defined as leave shared between parents to care for Relatedly, the adolescent fertility rate (women aged children. 15–19) is much higher than that of the MENA average 72 UNW, 2020. The Shadow Pandemic: Violence Against (72 and 40 births per 1,000, respectively). Women During COVID-19. 73 UNICEF Global Databases, 2019. 3.3.  Barriers related to social norms 74 ibid. 75 World Bank, Iraq Legal Review. Unpublished. 76 Dietrich, L., and Carter, S.E. , 2017. Gender and Conflict While traditional, patriarchal gender norms Analysis in ISIS Affected Communities of Iraq. OXFAM assigning men as protectors and providers, and Report. women as care givers, are still prevalent, there 77 National Democratic Institute, 2018. Opening up new seems to be an ongoing renegotiation of gender opportunities for women in Iraq: Report on focus group norms as a result of the displacement resulting discussions in Iraq. from the conflict with ISIS.76 Part of this shift arises 78 UNFPA, 2020. COVID-19: Reporting on gender-based violence during public health crises. as a matter of economic necessity, as men face 79 Vilardo, V., Bittar, S., 2018. Gender Profile—Iraq: A considerable constraints in living up to their expected Situation Analysis on Gender Equality and Women’s roles as the main household providers, and more Empowerment in Iraq. Oxfam International, Oxford, U.K. women find themselves in the position of heads of 80 UNDP, 2015. 26 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY preferring to work in the private sector compared the for pay, children suffer” decreases from 100 percent public sector, conversely a majority of women reported among older generations (70 to 74-year-olds) to preferring to work in the public sector compare to the 45 percent among the youth (20 to 24-year-olds), but private sector.81 Women employed in the public sector only decreases slightly from 68 percent among men reported fewer working hours (main reason), better to 59 percent among women. This indicates a rela- benefits and amenities, job security and a steady tive internalization of women’s roles as mothers and income as reasons for preferring to work in the public caretakers. sector.82 Perceptions towards private sector work are influenced by both societal expectations and counter- part beliefs within the household. These perceptions 4.  The Way Forward improve with knowing more people who work in the private sector.83 Iraq has one of the lowest female LFPRs in Even where job opportunities are available, the world, across all age groups. Obstacles to gender norms can prevent women from taking entering and remaining in the labor market vary part in certain activities. This stems from a general across different socio-economic groups and attitude against women mixing with men in public across critical turning points in women’s lives. spaces.84 Activities that suit women’s conventional For instance, women in urban areas who have higher roles as caretakers are relatively more acceptable from education levels and higher reservation wages, tend cultural or religious points of view, such as cleaning to seek scarce public sector jobs, and are therefore schools, childcare, or cooking for male workers.85 more likely to be unemployed compared to their rural counterparts. In comparison, women in rural areas 3.3.2.  Women as caregivers and attitudes are more likely to participate in the labor market, towards childcare Women’s position in society and within their families as wives and care providers constrains 81 IMPACT, 2020. Assessment on Barriers to Women’s Economic Empowerment in al Basra, Baghdad and their participation in the labor market. As shown Erbil. Based on Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and in the previous section, getting married is associated Individual Interviews (IIs) held with members of the target with a lower probability of participating in the labor populations across Iraq. In total, 94 KIIs were conducted market. Participation rates fall for married women between 21 May and 6 October 2020 with public and because of expectations around women’s roles and private employers, female business owners, and subject post-marriage responsibilities. These observations matter experts. 82 Ibid. hold across most MENA countries. 83 both women and men know very few women actually The burden of unpaid care work is ampli- working in the private sector (about 1 out of 10 working fied in the context of conflict and displacement, women on average), Sen, I., Afif, Z., Gauri, V., and where it is disproportionately carried out by women Mohamed, G., 2020. Women’s labor force participation and girls, perpetuating gender inequalities. This is in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: a study of social and especially relevant to the Iraqi context, where the psychological barriers. 84 Cash for work activities as part of an Oxfam livelihoods provision of care work has become a part of women’s project in Diyala (2015) were modified to better suit identity and is perceived as a social responsibility.86 women’s acceptable roles, namely cleaning schools, These childcare and household responsibilities have childcare, or cooking for male workers, after staff were been further exacerbated throughout the COVID-19 told by the local leaders (mukhtars) that women were pandemic. “unable”. Sider, R., and Sissons, C., 2016. Researching Data from the 7th wave of the World Values Livelihoods Recovery and Support for Vulnerable Conflict-Affected Women. Gender & Development, Survey shows a generational gap in the percep- 24(3): 317–441. tion of women’s roles in the household, but 85 Dietrich, Carter, 2017. Gender and conflict analysis in no significant gender gap. Agreement or strong ISIS affected communities of Iraq. agreement with the statement “when a mother works 86 Ibid. Special Focus: Towards Increased Economic Opportunities for Women in Iraq 27 and accept low-paid (or unpaid) private sector jobs, economic opportunities in Iraq: getting ready to join out of necessity and poverty, they also take on more the labor market, entering and remaining in the labor unpaid (domestic and care) work compared to their market, getting married and having a child. These rec- urban counterparts. Challenges vary in nature and ommendations call for, among other things, a better scale according to whether women are preparing match between labor supply and demand (e.g. via the for participation in the labor market, entering and development of credible matchmaking services) and remaining in the labor market, or getting married and the establishment of gender-specific solutions in the having children.87 workplace (including enforcing sexual harassment Based on the challenges identified in regulations and providing childcare), and the creation section 3, and since gender constraints are not of an inclusive legislative framework (e.g. via the explicitly mentioned in Iraq’s white paper, this elimination of occupational and sectoral restrictions). section suggests a non-exhaustive set of recom- mendations that can support the government in reaching its objective of increasing women’s 87 The critical turning points for women participation in LFPR by 5 pp in 2025. The regulatory reforms and the labor market are highlighted in World Bank, 2020. policy recommendations spelt-out in the table below Women’s Economic Participation in Iraq, Jordan and aim to loosen the constraints women face in accessing Lebanon. Washington DC: World Bank. 28 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY TABLE 2 • Addressing Female Labor Force Participation Challenges Addressing challenges related to Legal and regulatory Demand for labor Supply of labor frameworka Social norms 1.  Getting ready • Enhance access to and • Implement policies that • Enforce prohibition of child • Work with men and boys on retention of girls and increase digital skills in marriage. the promotion of alternative women in education, young women who have gender roles as positive including through ensuring left school and those still role models. safe and accessible in it, including training transport for girls in rural programs for women.c areas;b • Encourage demand-driven upskilling and training of women. 2. Entering and • Encourage women’s • Focus on the existence • Remove night hour • Provide female job seekers remaining in the collectives and and accessibility of skills restrictions imposed on with more information labor market collaborative work training programs to women; about jobs available in the schemes, including address gaps in knowledge • Remove job and sector private sector, including women’s social and experience for Iraqi restrictions imposed on which parts of the private enterprises;d women searching for work women; sector women are already • Devise employer-oriented or seeking to grow in their • Prohibit discrimination in working in, and highlighting incentives for hiring women employment;e access to credit based on jobs with greater skill in all sectors; • Improve job matching gender; requirements; • Provide incentives to the for women by expanding • Grant male and female • Provide culturally private sector to invest in access to formal and children as well as female acceptable income- sectors that employ more informal networks. and male surviving spouses generation options for women, e.g. care economy; equal inheritance rights; women: e.g. avoiding • Promote entrepreneurship • Expand and strengthen the mixing with unrelated men, among women, enabling labor inspection system providing options within wider assistance for HBB’s and enforce appropriate the home or in an enclosed to register, create market penalties to ensure area nearby.f linkages and integrate in employer adherence with value chains nationally, relevant international labor regionally and globally by standards and local labor easing export licensing and laws including contracts, unifying formal registration. pay equity and protection from sexual harassment. 3. Getting married • Expand access to • Introduce legislation • Contribute to shifts and having a affordable, quality criminalizing domestic in unpaid care work child childcare.g violence by reducing the • Amend legislation to stigmatization of men’s shift responsibility for household and care work. administering maternity leave benefits to the government; • Introduce legislation or amendments providing for paid paternity and shared parental leave; • Prohibit dismissal of pregnant workers; • Consider mandating employer-supported childcare. a World Bank, 2021. Women Business, and the law. Washington DC: World Bank. b World Bank, 2020. Women’s Economic Participation in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Washington DC: World Bank. c Ibid. d Dietrich, L., and Carter, S.E. , 2017. Gender and Conflict Analysis in ISIS Affected Communities of Iraq. OXFAM Report. e IMPACT, 2020. Assessment on Barriers to Women’s Economic Empowerment in al Basra, Baghdad and Erbil. f Ibid. g IMPACT, 2020. Assessment on Barriers to Women’s Economic Empowerment in al Basra, Baghdad and Erbil. Special Focus: Towards Increased Economic Opportunities for Women in Iraq 29 REFERENCES Cash Consortium for Iraq. (2020). Cash Consortium Phadera, L., Sharma, D., & Wai-Poi, M. (2020). Iraq’s for Iraq Brief: COVID-19 Impacts on Prices and Universal Public Distribution System: Utilization Markets. OCHA Services. and Impacts During Displacement. Policy Chaudhuri, S. (2003). Assessing vulnerability to Research working paper, WPS 9155. 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WPS 7567. impact-poverty-and-vulnerability-iraq. 31 SELECTED RECENT WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS ON IRAQ (For an exhaustive list go to: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq) Title Publication Date Document Type Iraq Public Expenditure Review for Human Development Sectors Forthcoming Public Expenditure Review Iraq-High Frequency Phone Survey (IHFPS) to monitor impacts of COVID-19 April 14, 2021 Report Iraq-Navigating through COVID-19: A snapshot on how the pandemic affected MSMEs in Iraq February 15, 2021 Report Breaking Out of Fragility: A Country Economic Memorandum for Diversification and Growth in Iraq September 30, 2020 Country Economic Memorandum The Seasonality of Conflict August 31, 2020 Policy Research Working Paper Iraq Economic Monitor: Navigating the Perfect Storm (Redux) May 4, 2020 Economic Update Multidimensional Poverty Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq April 6, 2020 Policy Research Working Paper Iraq’s Universal Public Distribution System: Utilization and Impacts During Displacement February 19, 2020 Policy Research Working Paper EITI as an Instrument of Fiscal Transparency and Accountability: A Case Study of Two FCV Countries November 1, 2019 Brief Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies – Economy Profile of Iraq October 24, 2019 Working Paper Iraq Economic Monitor, Fall 2019: Turning the Corner – Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunities for October 20, 2019 Economic Update Iraq’s Youth (continued on next page) 33 (continued) Title Publication Date Document Type EITI as an Instrument of Fiscal Transparency and Accountability in Contexts of Fragility and Violence: A August 1, 2019 Brief Comparative Case Study of Afghanistan and Iraq (Part One) EITI as an Instrument of Fiscal Transparency and Accountability in Contexts of Fragility and Violence: August 1, 2019 Brief A Comparative Case Study of Afghanistan and Iraq (Part Two) Mashreq 2.0: Digital Transformation for Inclusive Growth and Jobs: Executive Summary June 25, 2019 Report Jobs in Iraq: A Primer on Job Creation in the Short-Term February 19, 2019 Working Paper Arrested Development: Conflict, Displacement, and Welfare in Iraq January 1, 2019 Report Bringing Back Business in Iraq: Analytical Note January 1, 2019 Report The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures January 1, 2019 Publication Iraq – Interventions to Urgently Improve the Quantity and Quality of Drinking Water January 1, 2019 Brief Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform – Iraq October 31, 2018 Working paper Iraq Economic Monitor: Toward Reconstruction, Economic Recovery and Fostering Social Cohesion October 1, 2018 Working Paper Advancing the Public Procurement – Governance Nexus – The Case of Iraq (English) October 1, 2018 Brief 34 IRAQ ECONOMIC MONITOR: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS AND MANAGING VOLATILITY 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433