Unblocking transformative development in Amman: a way forward for planning law reform Final Technical Assessment Report 31 May 2023 © 2023 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 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Cover photo: Pegasys Cover design: Pegasys Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Key Definitions & Acronymns ......................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................................................... ii Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................ iii 1 Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Report purpose .................................................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Context............................................................................................................................................... 7 1.3 Methodology and report structure ...................................................................................................... 7 2 Overview: Legal Framework.................................................................................................................. 11 2.1 1966 Zoning Law ............................................................................................................................. 11 2.2 1968 Subdivision Law ...................................................................................................................... 11 2.3 2019 Property Law........................................................................................................................... 11 2.4 2021 GAM Law ................................................................................................................................ 11 2.5 Draft Regulations ............................................................................................................................. 11 3 Land Value Capture ................................................................................................................................ 13 3.1 Criteria ............................................................................................................................................. 13 3.2 MENA Benchmark: Egypt ................................................................................................................ 14 3.3 Review ............................................................................................................................................. 16 3.3.1 Revenue raising mechanisms .................................................................................................... 16 3.3.2 Compensation for regulatory takings ......................................................................................... 24 3.3.3 Expropriation, compensation and land exchanges .................................................................... 25 3.3.4 Property appraisal ...................................................................................................................... 26 3.3.5 Land reallocation ........................................................................................................................ 26 4 Planning .................................................................................................................................................. 28 4.1 Criteria ............................................................................................................................................. 28 4.2 Benchmark: Cape Town, South Africa ............................................................................................ 29 4.3 Review ............................................................................................................................................. 30 4.3.1 Legislative objectives and principles .......................................................................................... 30 4.3.2 Mechanisms and Processes ...................................................................................................... 31 4.3.3 Standard of Drafting ................................................................................................................... 37 4.3.4 Content Addressed .................................................................................................................... 38 5 Public Participation and Safeguards .................................................................................................... 40 Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report i 5.1 Criteria ............................................................................................................................................. 40 5.2 MENA Benchmark: Tunisia.............................................................................................................. 41 5.3 Review ............................................................................................................................................. 42 5.3.1 Public Participation .................................................................................................................... 42 5.3.2 Environmental and cultural safeguards ..................................................................................... 43 6 Institutions, Governance, Capacity ...................................................................................................... 45 6.1 Criteria ............................................................................................................................................. 45 6.2 Benchmark: Rwanda ....................................................................................................................... 46 6.3 Review ............................................................................................................................................. 47 6.3.1 Inter-governmental relationships and mandates........................................................................ 47 6.3.2 Decentralisation ......................................................................................................................... 51 6.3.3 Capacity ..................................................................................................................................... 51 7 Proposed Reforms ................................................................................................................................. 54 7.1 Options for improved implementation and practice ......................................................................... 54 7.1.1 Land Value Capture ................................................................................................................... 54 7.1.2 Planning ..................................................................................................................................... 56 7.1.3 Public Participation and Safeguards .......................................................................................... 56 7.1.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity ............................................................................................ 57 7.2 Options for amendments to existing and proposed legislation ........................................................ 58 7.2.1 Land Value Capture ................................................................................................................... 58 7.2.2 Planning ..................................................................................................................................... 59 7.2.3 Public Participation and Safeguards .......................................................................................... 61 7.2.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity ............................................................................................ 62 7.3 Options for new legislation............................................................................................................... 62 7.3.1 Land Value Capture ................................................................................................................... 62 7.3.2 Planning ..................................................................................................................................... 64 7.3.3 Public Participation and Safeguards .......................................................................................... 65 7.3.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity ............................................................................................ 65 8 Recommendations ................................................................................................................................. 66 8.1 Land Value Capture recommendations ........................................................................................... 66 8.2 Planning ........................................................................................................................................... 68 8.3 Public Participation and Safeguards ................................................................................................ 69 Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report ii 8.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity .................................................................................................. 69 9 References .............................................................................................................................................. 71 TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1: LVC mechanisms under existing laws ............................................................................................... 22 Table 2: LVC mechanisms under new / proposed laws .................................................................................. 23 Figure 1: Methodology of Review undertaken in Technical Assessment Report .............................................. 8 Figure 2: Comparison of Higher Zoning Council versus Supreme Planning Council ...................................... 48 Figure 3: Comparison of District (Regional) Committee under 1966 Zoning Law versus 2021 GAM Law ..... 49 Figure 4: Comparison of Local Committee under 1966 Zoning Law versus 2021 GAM Law ......................... 49 Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report iii Key Definitions & Acronymns “1966 Zoning Law” Temporary Law No. (79) of 1966 Zoning Law for Cities, Villages and Buildings “1968 Subdivision Law No. (11) of 1968 The Law on Subdivision within the Boundaries of Law” Municipalities of 1968 Amended by the Law No. (9) of 1984 “2019 Property Law” Law No. (13) of 2019 Property Ownership Law of 2019 “2021 GAM Law” Law No. (18) of 2021 on Amman Municipality “Draft Property Tax Draft Law of the year 2023 on Property Tax Law” “Draft Regulations on Draft Regulations of the year 2023 on Property Assessment within the Municipal Property Areas for the purposes of levying the Property Tax Assessment” “Draft Regulations” Draft Regulation on Urban Planning of Amman City, version dated 26 October 2022 “GAM” Greater Amman Municipality “GHG” Greenhouse Gas “LVC” Land Value Capture “MENA” Middle East and North African “WB” World Bank Group Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report i Acknowledgement This diagnostic and strategy was developed by a World Bank team led by Jon Kher Kaw (Senior Urban Development Specialist) and comprising team members Lina Abdallah Saeed Abdallah (Senior Urban Development Specialist); Zheng Judy Jia (Urban Development Specialist), Mathew Glasser (Finance Consultant), and Ruba Ali Mohammad Alnoubani (Program Assistant). A Pegasys team led by Stephen Berrisford (lawyer and urban planner) and supported by Christian Alexander (lawyer and urban planner) and Vivienne Jonker (lawyer) undertook a detailed technical assessment of Amman’s planning and land use legal framework, including national legislation and local by-laws. The diagnostic and strategy was developed in collaboration with His Excellency, Dr. Yousef Shawarbeh, the Mayor of Amman; Rima Odeh, Executive Director of Planning; and their staff from the Greater Amman Municipality. The Pegasys team identified gaps in the legal framework and proposed targeted legislative reforms to address these gaps. They also developed a practical implementation plan to affect the reforms. This activity was funded by the City Climate Finance Gap Fund, a Multi Donor Trust Fund with support from the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK), and the Luxembourg Ministry of The Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development.” Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report ii Executive Summary [To insert. Refer to table on page x below.] Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report iii Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report iv Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report v Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report vi 1 Introduction 1.1 Report purpose The World Bank Group ("WB”) appointed Pegasys to provide a technical assessment of the laws establishing the framework for control of planning and land use in Amman, Jordan. This report reviews the Greater Amman Municipality’s (“GAM”) urban planning, land use and governance legal framework to identify any gaps and propose ways in which the laws could be improved, so that GAM can better meet the development demands of Amman. 1.2 Context In light of Amman’s rapidly increasing population and consequent expanding total urban land cover, GAM is required to develop infrastructure and provide services at a pace and scale far greater than in the past. Previous research predicts GAM incurring an estimated JD232 million (327 million USD) in infrastructure and JD253 million (≈356 million USD) in services to keep up with the growing population and land cover. 1 To meet these predicted budget needs, GAM will need to raise greater revenue. In order to deliver on infrastructure development and service provision, GAM will need to adopt planning and institutional best practices. Critically, given that uncontrolled urban expansion and fragmentation is a key driver of GHG emissions 2, GAM will also need to take measures and safeguards to mitigate adverse climate impact from Amman’s growth. These objectives are all connected: GAM’s ability to conduct integrated urban development, enforce land use, and unlock land value capture instruments are required for GAM to achieve its target of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050. 3 The more effectively GAM can raise revenue, adopt planning, land use, governance and institutional best practices, and mitigate adverse climate impact, the more sustainably Amman can develop. Achieving these objectives requires strong urban planning, land use and governance legislation. The WB has identified weaknesses in GAM’s urban planning, land use and governance legislation. These weaknesses need to be addressed in order to enable GAM to raise revenue, adopt planning and governance best practices, and mitigate climate impact in order to ultimately manage Amman’s growth and development sustainably. Strengthening GAM’s urban planning, land use and governance legislation can enhance GAM’s capacity for long-term and integrated urban planning for sustainable growth. 1.3 Methodology and report structure Our methodology for assessing Amman’s planning, land use and governance framework relied on direct review and evaluation of translations of applicable Jordanian laws. The laws identified for review were selected in consultation with GAM and included both existing laws as well as a draft of a newly proposed law for Amman. The criteria applied to evaluate these laws were developed using global best practices literature, taking into consideration specific areas of concern identified by GAM and the WB, as well as our own review of the legal context for planning in Jordan and Amman. Pursuant to engagement with the WB and GAM, special attention was paid to (a) GAM’s ability to conduct comprehensive urban development and spatial planning, including linkages to city finances, budgeting and economic development; (b) enforcement; (c) GAM’s ability to utilize 1 Haas, A.R.N. & Kriticos, S. 2019. Considerations for land value capture reform in the Greater Amman Municipality. International Growth Centre. p 3-4. 2 World Bank. 2022. Jordan Country Climate Development Report. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 3 Kaw, J., et al. 2022. Amman Urban Growth Scenarios. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 7 land-based financing / land value capture instruments to ensure that GAM captures a fair share of land value; and (d) inclusive processes needed to adopt robust and market- responsive land use plans. In order to assist in interpretation and explanation of the criteria, we selected benchmark countries and cities to illustrate particular aspects of planning frameworks in relatable contexts (i.e. MENA countries, middle income countries, or countries with similar governance attributes). Figure 1: Methodology of Review undertaken in Technical Assessment Report The results of the process described above has been structured in this report in the following manner: Section 2 of this report provides a descriptive overview of GAM’s urban planning, land use and governance legal framework. The legal framework is made up of a network of laws that need to be understood and applied collectively. Some of these laws are national, applying to all of Jordan, including GAM, and others apply to GAM specifically. Further, some of these laws are outdated, having been promulgated over 50 years ago, and others are more recent, having been promulgated and/or drafted in the past 5 years. The term ‘legal framework’ should be understood as referring to following five laws collectively: (1) Temporary Law No. (79) of 1966 Zoning Law for Cities, Villages and Buildings ("1966 Zoning Law”); Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 8 (2) Law No. (11) of 1968 The Law on Subdivision within the Boundaries of Municipalities of 1968 Amended by the Law No. (9) of 1984 ("1968 Subdivision Law”); (3) Law No. (13) of 2019 Property Ownership Law ("2019 Property Law”); 4 (4) Law No. (18) of 2021 on Amman Municipality 5 (“2021 GAM Law”) and (5) Draft Regulation on Urban Planning of Amman City, version dated 26 October 2022 ("Draft Regulations”). Sections 3 – 6 of this report cover the review of the legal framework. The legal framework has been reviewed against four criteria. The four criteria are fundamental features of strong urban planning, land use and governance legal frameworks that enable sustainable development, based on review of global best practices for evaluation and taking into account GAM’s particular circumstances. The four criteria are: (1) Land Value Capture (“LVC”): LVC is an umbrella term for legal mechanisms that enable governments to recover a portion of land value increases created by government activities, for reinvestment for the public good. LVC instruments can contribute significantly to financing and implementing public goods and services. Our review assesses the effectiveness of the LVC instruments in GAM’s legal framework. Section 3 of this report covers LVC. (2) Planning: Planning laws guide and regulate the complex interactions between spatial development, land management, and finance at multiple levels. An effective and high-quality planning legal framework is one that achieves its intended results with efficiency, clarity and precision, and in a manner that is easily understood by those administering it and governed by it. Our review considers the efficacy of GAM’s planning laws. Section 4 of this report covers Planning. (3) Public Participation and Safeguards: Public participation refers to engaging the public in decision- making and giving consideration to public input in making decisions, including decisions relating to development and development planning. Safeguards are mechanisms or management processes that allow stakeholders to analyse and mitigate any potential adverse environmental and cultural impacts of urban development. Our review assesses how well GAM’s laws facilitate public participation in decision making and make provision for appropriate safeguards to protect the environment and cultural sites in development projects. Section 5 of this report covers Public Participation and Safeguards. (4) Institutions, Governance and Capacity: Good governance is characterised by strong and clear inter-governmental relationships; decentralised state power and a sufficiently capitated local government institutions. Good governance enables better natural resource protection, disaster risk reduction, resilience, service delivery, resource efficiency, mobility and development planning. Good governance also requires utilising appropriate institutions and mechanisms that match the needs and capacity of the implementing institutions. Our review assesses how effectively GAM’s legal framework enables good governance. Section 6 of this report covers Institutions, Governance and Capacity. 4 In subsequent rounds of review, we were provided with English translations of the Draft Law of the year 2023 on Property Tax (“Draft Property Tax Law”) and Draft Regulations of the year 2023 on Property Assessment within the Municipal Areas for the purposes of levying the Property Tax (“Draft Regulations on Property Assessment”). We have supplemented our review under the LVC criteria (section 3) with these. 5 Citation as per Draft Regulations. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 9 Each of sections 3 – 6 below first set out the key tenants of the criteria and discuss why the criteria enable sustainable development. Second, they discuss benchmark examples of the criteria. Third, they cover the review of the five laws comprising the legal framework against the criteria. Notably, the four criteria overlap and are inter-linked; they both support and depend on one another. For example, effective planning would result in effective governance, and visa versa. Overlap between the criteria is evident throughout the report and is accounted for in the proposed reforms. Section 7 of this report sets out the proposed reforms to address the gaps identified in the legal framework. We have provided three broad categories of proposed reforms: (1) Options for improved implementation and practice without changes to legislation. These options may take quicker to affect given that they do not require amending or developing legislation; (2) Options for amending existing or proposed legislation; and (3) Options for proposing new legislation. Under each broad category we list options addressing the particular criteria by which we have assessed the relevant laws. Some of the proposed options are complementary with other options in the same or other categories, while others may be alternatives to other options. Section 8 of this report provides specific recommended reforms that we believe should be undertaken to improve Amman’s urban planning, land use and governance legal framework. Our next deliverable, a Draft Implementation Plan (due in mid-April 2023), will take these recommendations forward and guide GAM on implementation thereof. The Implementation Plan will serve as a work schedule or programme setting out a logical sequencing of implementation steps. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 10 2 Overview: Legal Framework This section provides a descriptive overview of each law comprising the legal framework. 2.1 1966 Zoning Law The 1966 Zoning Law is a national law and is the current foundation of urban planning in Jordan. While providing a framework for planning and land use decisions for the country, it is outdated, certain of its provisions are underutilized or cause confusion, and it is missing components of modern planning and land use management laws. Because of the importance of the 1966 Zoning Law, particular attention has been paid to its provisions in this review. Since at least 2019, it has been on the agenda to amend the 1966 Zoning Law to improve and clarify the planning processes it governs. 6 2.2 1968 Subdivision Law The 1968 Subdivision Law is also a national law. The 1968 Subdivision Law authorizes the Council of Ministers to permit GAM to “zone any area that falls under its jurisdiction” pursuant to a plan developed by GAM. 7 Zoning prepares land for development in line with an approved plan and after taking into account the layout of roads and other aspects of the public realm, public buildings, and utilities. 8 2.3 2019 Property Law The 2019 Property Law introduces additional governance and revenue raising mechanisms regarding property. However certain provisions conflict or overlap with the 1966 Zoning Law, creating confusion. This confusion arising from the lack of clarity has resulted in a number of legal proceedings against GAM, at great cost. 9 2.4 2021 GAM Law The 2021 GAM Law represents a first effort at reforming the 1966 Zoning Law. It does this by assigning new responsibilities and authorities with respect to planning to GAM. The 2021 GAM Law provides GAM with broad authority over municipal spatial planning as well as budget and economic development, including the activities of regional and local planning bodies authorized under the 1966 Zoning Law. It expressly provides that GAM shall ”assume all the city planning functions and powers and the manpower set out in the Law on Planning Cities, Villages & Buildings” and establishes new decision-making bodies to replace those provided in the 1966 Zoning Law. However, the 2021 GAM Law does not establish any new planning hierarchy or framework itself, and instead requires GAM to promulgate bylaws to assume the responsibilities provided under the 1966 Zoning Law, which bylaws must determine “all matters related to the planning and zoning within the boundaries of the Municipality.” 10 Accordingly, the 2021 GAM Law enables reform but does not itself replace the structures or processes established under the 1966 Zoning Law. 2.5 Draft Regulations The Draft Regulations are a GAM-specific proposal that seeks to use the authority provided under the 2021 GAM Law to establish new planning structures at the metropolitan level in Amman. The Draft Regulations significantly update and change direction from the 1966 Zoning Law and address some gaps in the previous 6 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 4). 7 1968 Subdivision Law Art.3. 8 Ibid. 9 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 4). 10 2021 GAM Law, Art. 32. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 11 legal framework, including the establishment of substantive principles and policies, mechanisms for more meaningful public participation in planning, and more express consideration of environmental, social, and historic resources. Notwithstanding these improvements, the Draft Regulations are still in an early stage, and require significant additional work in order to effectively replace, and improve, the current planning regime. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 12 3 Land Value Capture 3.1 Criteria As a finite resource and one of the most valuable forms of capital 11, the use and development of land is an essential component of healthy and stable cities. Public investment supporting urban development and public regulation of land use are key drivers of changes in land values. However, local governments often struggle to maintain the resources necessary to guide land use. At the same time, public investment and regulation, while pursued for public purposes, often disproportionately benefit certain private landowners, resulting in windfall gains. Land value capture (“LVC”) is an umbrella term for legal mechanisms that enable governments to recover a portion of land value increases created by government activities, for reinvestment for the public good. LVC instruments can contribute significantly to financing and implementing public goods and services, efficiently and fairly. LVC represents a wide range of legal instruments, from land taxes to fees to in-kind infrastructure contributions, based on different strategies for land value generation, re-capture, and sharing. Many of these instruments rely on broader frameworks for governance of land that may differ significantly from place to place. However, at a basic level, LVC is conceived as requiring three steps: 1. a government action that creates value resulting in increased land values; 2. recovery by the government of a portion of the resulting value created; and 3. government reinvestment in public benefits. 12 Generally speaking, LVC theory expects or requires the value or benefit incurred in each step to connect to other steps. In most cases, the second of these steps requires legislative authorization and definition of when, where, and how revenues are collected. Other complimentary legal frameworks involving the planning and implementation of public infrastructure and land acquisition and regulation of land use, as well as revenue collection, enable steps one and three. In middle- to low-income countries, more prescriptive parameters around the recoupment and use of LVC revenues are common, probably due to lower capacity for more sophisticated collection parameters and concerns about public funds waste and corruption. 13. There are a few generally applicable and widely recognized legal instruments for effecting LVC. These include the following: Property taxes are taxes assessed periodically (normally annually) based on the market value of land and/or improvements. 14 Because good governance and public administration of land should facilitate increases in property values, the government may justifiably share in this increase through increased taxes proportional to the overall increase in property value. Accordingly, property taxes are a form of LVC, although because of their broad nature and special limitations on their imposition in most jurisdictions they are often treated separately from other LVC mechanisms. Betterment levies (or infrastructure levies) are taxes or fees levied on landowners possessing land whose value has increased due to an infrastructure investment initiated by the government. 15 Common types of public 11 OECD: Regional Development Studies. 2020. Global Compendium of Land Value Capture Policies. Paris: OECD Publishing. p 14. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Walters, L.C. 2013. Land value capture in policy and practice. Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration. 10(2). 15 OECD (2020) Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 13 infrastructure improvements that generate value to neighbouring landowners include new or expanded roads, utilities, and parks. The levy amount is expected to be based on a proportion of the resulting land value increase, which is either assessed all at once or over a set period of time. Impact fees (or development charges/obligations) are cash or in-kind payments designed to defray the costs of new or additional public infrastructure and services required by a private development. 16 Such fees are normally triggered when an owner or developer seeks development approval or special permissions, requiring the government to expend monies to ensure adequate services, thereby increasing property values and costs to government. Fees may be charged based on a fixed formula or may be negotiated, but normally are tied to the actual costs of public infrastructure required as a result of the development. Development rights charges are cash or in-kind contributions payable in exchange for development rights or additional development potential above a set baseline. 17 The relaxation of zoning or land use regulations is a unique power afforded government that can increase the value of property by permitting higher rents for a property (for example, through increasing densities). Such charges require clear a pre-defined land use or zoning baseline. Land readjustment is the practice of pooling fragmented land parcels for joint development, with owners transferring a portion of their land for public use to capture value increments and cover development costs. 18 This strategy relies on reconfiguration of property boundaries and infrastructure investment resulting in more readily developable land and resulting increases in land value. In return for reorganization and infrastructure provision, the government retains a portion of the overall site. Landowners are each returned a smaller plot of land or smaller floor area of a multi-unit building, but this is compensated for by the increased value of each plot. Strategic land management is where governments actively buy, develop, sell and/or lease land to advance public needs and recoup value increments borne through public action. 19 The government receives part or all of land value increases where it acquires property at pre-development prices and leases or sells that property at a later stage after public investment, development, and/or regulation increases that property’s value. All of the above instruments for recapturing publicly improved land values rely on broader legal, administrative, and institutional frameworks that must be properly functioning in order to effectively achieve LVC. For example, imposing infrastructure levies requires accurately ascertaining the value increase in land related to a public improvement, while imposing developer obligations requires accurately accounting for the costs of public infrastructure provisioning. Both of these also require effective revenue collection mechanisms as well. 3.2 MENA Benchmark: Egypt Egypt utilizes an unusually wide range of LVC instruments among other middle low-income and low-income countries. These include developer obligations, charges for development rights, infrastructure levies, land readjustment mechanisms, and strategic land management. While use of these mechanisms is frequent, Egypt encounters similar challenges in implementation to many other MENA and middle- to low-income countries. Impact fees are incurred for all new development approvals. Obligations are charged based on a fixed fee or percentage of land value, depending on the type of development (residential, commercial, or industrial), and are generally paid in cash before or at the time the development is approved. In some cases developers may 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 14 provide in-kind payment of constructed infrastructure or land in-lieu of payment. OECD cites an inadequate legal framework and low administrative capacity at the local level as reasons for difficulties in implementation at local levels, as well as low-quality land cadastres. Local governments and development authorities frequently impose development rights charges upon a request by developers to build at higher density or when the government imposes land use changes or building constraints. The charge is based on 50% of the estimated value of extra density or the land use change. In some instances, in-kind contributes are permitted in lieu of payment. OECD notes limitations in charging for development rights where there is low demand for increased density. In addition, low administrative capacity, poor quality land registry systems, and inadequate legal frameworks are also cited as challenges. 20 Local governments frequently impose infrastructure levies on landowners benefiting from government-built infrastructure, e.g. public roads, public transport, public utilities, and green space. In Cairo, levies are set at 50% of the difference between land sale values before and after the public improvement. The catchment for covered properties is based on physical proximity to the improvement: 150 meters radius for roads, 300 meters for bridges, and 100 meters for sewage connections. OECD notes that “[l]ocal governments often lack the administrative capacity to implement the levy, but also the incentive to do so, since the revenues accrue to the governorate level. Landowners frequently appeal against the requirement to pay the levy, which makes implementation contentious and prone to litigation.” 21 The high proportion of land that is publicly owned, and supporting laws providing for expropriation and freezing of pre-acquisition property prices, allows for strategic land management. Disposal of public land is often by sale to developers or public development agencies, although leases of up to 50 years are sometimes negotiated. OECD reports that while strategic land management in Egypt facilities public development projects, challenges include unclear land ownership categories under the law and unclear information on occupancy, as well as lack of financing for land acquisition, low administrative capacity at local levels, and poor intra- governmental coordination. 22 Land readjustment projects in Egypt have historically been initiated by the government. Where landowners are unwilling to participate in a land readjustment project, their land may be expropriated for compensation. The share of land reserved for public improvements varies based on type of development, with slum upgrading projects earmarking 30% of land, while other types of projects the proportion is negotiated between landowners and the government. The government often reserves plots of land for sales in addition to land for public infrastructure. OECD cites an inadequate legal framework, low administrative capacities, unclear land records and the lack of resettlement alternatives as challenges. Resistance from landowners often complicates the enforcement of contributions. 23 20 Ibid. p 97. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. p 98. 23 Ibid. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 15 3.3 Review 3.3.1 Revenue raising mechanisms The 1966 Zoning Law provides for two development-related revenue raising mechanisms, but in practice one of these (improvement levies) is not used at all and the other (zoning revenues) has been used in only limited circumstances. Instead, development-related revenues are primarily collected based on interpretation of a third provision that only implicitly provides GAM with this right, and only under certain circumstances that are too narrow. Accordingly, GAM faces challenges collecting sufficient revenue to cover the cost of public investments, and legislative reforms or administrative reforms, or ideally both, are required to address these challenges. Article 54 of the 1966 Zoning Law authorizes the charging of improvement levies against properties located near publicly funded improvements based on a percentage of the difference between the price of land and the expected value increase. 24 The structure of improvement levies, under which owners of properties that are near to new public investments and that therefore assumedly benefit disproportionately from these improvements, are charged with an additional levy, indicate the logic of what is often also called a betterment or infrastructure levy and which are a commonly accepted means of raising development-related public revenue. GAM indicates in practice that improvement levies are not charged because of the difficulty in accurately calculating or demonstrating the increase in property value derived from a particular public improvement. This increase in value is required by statute to calculate the amount of the improvement levy. GAM suggests that revising the provisions under Article 54 to make determination of the levy easier to calculate and apply would allow for its application. GAM also acknowledges that imposition of improvement levies would likely be easier along with implementation of new public infrastructure projects it costs and associated land value increases should in theory be easier to ascertain. 25 Previous research also indicates limited use of Article 54 improvement levies, owing in part to overlap with the 2019 Property Law, discussed below, which provides for a similar charge. 26 In the benchmark example of Egypt, where the law also provides for infrastructure levies, the government has encountered opposition and litigation from landowners over these charges. Furthermore, in Egypt the revenues from infrastructure levies accrue to the governorate, while local government is responsible for enforcement, creating a diversion in incentives to assess this charge. Article 52 authorizes imposition of “public” and “private” zoning revenues on any “zoned area” or part thereof. 27 In order to impose a zoning revenue charge, the implementing authority (i.e. GAM for “public” zoning revenues and Local Committees (defined below) for “private” zoning revenues) must issue a decision that “should include clear definition of the area concerned, and the revenues percentage decided, on the basis of the land value assessed after being regulated or on any other basis shown in this matter.” 28 The basis for imposing zoning revenues is broad. Public zoning revenues may cover “expenditures and costs paid or to be paid in preparing and execution of projects of the area that are imposed in, including administration, control and execution of the regulations of the law” as well as “any technical or administrative expenditures.” 29 Likewise, 24 1966 Zoning Law Art. 54. 25 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 26 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 11). 27 1966 Zoning Law Art. 52.1, 52.3. While the translation provided identified the applicable area as the “regulation area”, we assume based on the context and name of the charge, which we have been informed is termed “zoning revenues”, that “zoned area” is likely a more accurate translation. 28 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 11). 29 Ibid. Art. 52.2. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 16 private zoning revenues may be imposed for a wide variety of public costs enumerated in Article 54.4, including infrastructure improvements, planning and construction of public parks and gardens, and “any other matter stated in the construction scheme and/or construction and any matter considered by the regulation committee concerned to facilitate neighbourhood and daily life of the area or citizens.” 30 Both public and private zoning revenues are assessed against land owners and must be paid by December of the year in which they became due. 31 GAM indicates that assessing zoning revenues is difficult in practice because of the statutory requirement to clearly define the basis for the amount charged. 32 GAM has faced litigation that has successfully challenged its determination of the calculations for zoning revenues, which has led GAM to avoid using this mechanism to collect revenues. In Hani Saeed Wahib Al-Afyouni and others v Greater Amman Municipality 33, GAM was sued for charging the claimants compensation under Article 52 pursuant to a change of the status of land use to category "C" residential land. The court held that there was no legal basis for charging the compensation and ordered GAM to refund the claimants. In certain areas of Amman, GAM imposed zoning revenues with some success, but only after undertaking a lengthy two year process to carefully detail costs serving as the basis for the zoning revenues. 34 GAM indicated that simplifying the burdensome process for calculating zoning revenues could help with implementation. Previous analysis of the zoning revenues established in the 1966 Zoning Law has characterized these charges as a combination of a betterment levy (which seeks to share a portion of the increased value in land) and a development impact fee (which seeks to cover the costs of additional public infrastructure required). 35 The breadth of the provisions under Article 52 could provide flexibility in imposing charges under either or both of the above theories, but its breadth and the mechanisms of its assessment have apparently also created confusion that has limited its use in practice. Previous research notes that if, as the contents of the 1966 Zoning Law suggest, zoning revenues are intended to act as development impact fees, then it differs in several respects from the manner in which such fees are normally structured. Specifically, development impact fees are normally charged against the developer of a property, as is done in the benchmark example Egypt, who may be different from the land owner. 36 Additionally, development impact fees are normally calculated based on actual costs to the government, rather than as a percentage of land values as provided for in Article 52. Tying the value of zoning revenues to actual costs could make calculation easier and better differentiate these charges form improvement levies, but success would depend on an accurate understanding and calculation of the cost of public costs. Previous analysis suggests that identifying charges based on distinct types of improvements could help with implementation, 37 an idea that could be particularly helpful where project costs might be more easily determined. In the benchmark example of Egypt, where capacity for accurate estimation of the cost of infrastructure provision is low, impact fees are in some cases based on a fixed fee. In other cases, Egyptian law provides for fees to be based on the percentage change in land value. As in Jordan, Egypt struggles with the capacity and means to implement these charges. 30 Ibid. Art. 52.4. 31 Ibid. Art. 52.7., 52.8. 32 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 33 Hani Saeed Wahib Al-Afyouni and others v Greater Amman Municipality, Amman Court of First Instance, Case No. 5-1- 19426-2019 34 1966 Zoning Law [Art 52.7 and 52.8]; See also Haas and Kriticos (2019: 12) (referring to implementation of Article 52 and 54 levies in Area C, the highest density area of the city). 35 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 10) 36 Ibid 37 Ibid. p 21. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 17 Previous research on 1966 Zoning Law, confirmed in an interview with GAM officials, reflects that in practice the primary mechanism used to collect development-related revenues is based on the 1966 Zoning Law’s provision regarding compensation for regulatory takings. This provision, contained in Article 47.2, does not expressly provide for such a power, but rather is part of the law meant to compensate private property owners where a regulatory decision reduces the value of their property. 38 Under the reported practice, government authorities interpret Articles 47 and 48 to charge a compensation fee in return for granting licensing requests that result in granting “extra development rights” that result in the increase in value of the property. The right to charge licensees is based on an inventive interpretation of the law, inferring an implicit right to charge for regulatory decisions resulting in property value increases based on an explicit obligation to compensate for decisions reductions in property value. 39 Article 47.2 provides the key language needed to interpret the statute in the manner that GAM utilizes it, stating that “If the refusal of the license or granting the license was taken for the benefit of a particular person and based on his request, then that person pays the compensation.” 40 This provision provides an obligation for a beneficiary of a regulatory decision to pay the “compensation.” According to previous research, the types of regulatory decisions for which the government may charge a compensation fee are based on a loose interpretation of Article 48 that assumes that the exceptions from the compensation requirement authorize charging the licensee a fee in those cases. 41 The calculation of the amount charged for compensation fees is not expressly defined in the 1966 Zoning Law, but has instead been developed by GAM based a percentage of the change in value of the land before and after zoning. 42 The percentage used, 25%, is taken from a provision of the 2019 Property Law (discussed below), 43 but in application is usually reduced further because the resulting amount is considered to be more reasonable. 44 While GAM’s practice of compensation fees constitutes flexible and creative approach that overcomes some of the difficulties in charging improvement levies and zoning revenues under the 1966 Zoning Law, the lack of clear statutory authority creates unnecessary uncertainty and risk. Furthermore, it inhibits other forms of revenue collection, since its character and justification overlaps with other types of LVC mechanisms. 45 Moreover, charging compensation fees has encountered its own challenges. GAM indicates that it encountered legal challenges in attempting to impose a compensation fee where no licensing request has been made. Because Article 47.2 requires granting of a license, private parties have successfully sued to prevent GAM from imposing this fee where GAM has initiated zoning and public infrastructure servicing without a request from property owners. 46 One such example is Laith Maan Nagi Abu Nawar v Greater Amman Municipality Council 47 in which GAM was sued for charging the claimant compensation under Article 47.2 pursuant to a change in the use and planning of the land. The court held that there was no legal basis for charging the compensation and ordered GAM to refund the claimant. In the benchmark country of Egypt, government officials have also struggled with development rights charges, in part based on poor quality land registry systems, as well as low administrative capacity and inadequate legal frameworks. 38 1966 Zoning Law Art. 47, 48. 39 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 12). 40 1966 Zoning Law Art. 47.2. 41 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 12). 42 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. See also Haas and Kriticos, pp 16. 43 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 16). 44 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 45 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 12). 46Ibid. 47 Laith Maan Nagi Abu Nawar v Greater Amman Municipality Council, Amman First Court of Instance, Case No. 5-2-4863- 2020 Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 18 In addition, there appears to be greater hesitancy to paying the compensation fee in unzoned portions of Amman on the basis that there is a less clear connection between payment and value added by public regulation and infrastructure, which are absent. 48 The 1968 Subdivision Law provides that the costs associated with appraisal are recouped via taxation of the property owners within the appraised area. 49 Article 25 of the 1968 Subdivision Law provides that “[i]n case the value of the real estates adjacent to the area increases as a result of applying the provisions of this Law, the owners of such real estates shall be required to pay the betterment tax set forth in the applicable Expropriation Law.” This provision appears to overlap with the incremental tax referenced in the 2019 Property Law. The 2019 Property Law establishes requirements for an “increment tax” that appears to be structured similarly and serve a similar purpose to the improvement levies that the 1966 Zoning Law authorizes authorities to charge. However, differing requirements under the two laws have caused confusion, limiting their use. 50 The 2019 Property Law’s increment tax is imposed on properties adjacent to new or improved roads whose value has increased as a result of these improvements. 51 The mechanism for calculating the tax is provided in Articles 211 and 212, and may not in any event exceed 25% of the total increase in the property value, and must be paid within four years of assessment. 52 According to previous research and discussions with GAM officials, this 25% maximum rate has been used by GAM as the default rate for assessment of the compensation fee. Compensation for expropriation is set aside from the increment tax, suggesting that this mechanism is intended to be used to offset the costs of acquiring land. Compensation for expropriation is set aside from the increment tax, suggesting that this mechanism is intended to be used to offset the costs of acquiring land for public purposes. 53 The 2021 GAM Law authorises GAM to wield or pursue a number of revenue sources. Authority is granted to GAM to raise revenues from a diverse array of sources, including “taxes, charges, rates, allowances, and fines.” 54 Other sources specifically authorized are the “proceeds of the investment projects . . . revenues generated from granting the development rights” as well as fees from markets.” 55 Among the powers authorized to GAM is the right to “[g]rant the rights to develop buildings and real estates in accordance with specific conditions and for charges determined under a bylaw issued for this purpose.” Revenues generated by charges for development rights are specifically designated as financial resources of the Municipality. 56 This provision appears to authorize development charges. Moreover, Article 22 of the 2021 GAM Law specifically authorizes GAM to charge properties adjacent to roadsides for up to half of the total cost of the establishment of the road. 57 Several provisions of the 2021 GAM Law refer to funding and financing of development. Article 14 of the 2021 GAM Law indicates approval of public-private partnerships by stating that the Municipality shall “[p]rovide an attractive and advanced investment-friendly environment to promote investment within its boundaries, . . . 48 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 20). 49 1968 Subdivision Law Art. 21. 50 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 11). 51 2019 Property Law Art. 210. Note that this interpretation is based on the English translation provided for review and production of this report, and is subject to confirmation. 52 2019 Property Law Art. 210.C, 212.A. 53 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 16); Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 54 2021 GAM Law Art. 22.1. 55 Ibid. Art. 22.a.2-3, 22.b. 56 Ibid. Art. 22.a.3. 57 Ibid. Art. 22.c. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 19 through . . . 1. Attracting investments and developers to develop, upgrade, and rehabilitate its facilities. 2. Establishing investment arms for the management and investment of its funds, facilities, and functions to assist in delivering its services.” 58 No additional details are provided. Article 35 provides that the Council of Ministers must issue bylaws determining the charges allowances, trusts, compensation, and rates to be collected by GAM in consideration of performing its tasks and responsibilities. 59 Generally speaking, it appears that the broad revenue generating authority provided under the 2021 GAM Law positions GAM well to undertake reform of development-related revenue streams. Indeed, the Draft Regulations, discussed below, clearly and expressly invoke this authority in establishing revenue generating provisions, such as those involving the grant of development rights. However, the 2021 GAM Law does not establish specific charges or taxes, but rather broadly authorizes GAM to establish such revenue streams. Accordingly, the 2021 GAM Law is not sufficient to as a legislative reform measure, but rather acts to empower GAM with the authority to pursue reforms. Importantly, the 2021 GAM Law provides that GAM may assume its new powers over planning only after passage of a bylaw that determines “all matters related to the planning and zoning within the boundaries of the Municipality.” 60 This requirement indicates that GAM is not authorised to pursue reforms incrementally. GAM has provided a draft provision to be contained in the Draft Regulations regarding “development rights” under which a “competent planning committee may impose a development right allowance on any real estate affected by a regulatory or amendment plan that included an amendment to the regulatory provisions or restrictions of the real estate and its was found that it achieves a benefit for the owner as a result of granting him new development rights.” 61 In addition, the second provision of the “development rights” provision provides that property owners requesting regulatory approvals from a competent committee shall be assessed a development right allowance. 62 GAM indicates that these new provisions codify the “compensation fee” currently assessed under Article 47.2 of the 1966 Zoning Law, and expands it to expressly allow for charges against properties even where no licensing request has been submitted by a property owner. In this manner, this provision appears to address some of the problems currently affecting GAM’s ability to generate development-related revenue, namely the restriction in interpreting the existing law to allow for charging property owners who do not request licensing approval. However, the provisions do not provide a clear explanation for how “development right allowances” are calculated. The provision’s reference to property value increases suggest that the amount would be calculated based on the increase in property values, as is the case currently with compensation fees under Article 47.2 of the 1966 Zoning Law. Silence as to the means of calculating compensation may be intentional to avoid previous difficulties in applying the express provisions of Article 52 and Article 54, and to provide GAM with more flexibility and discretion in making calculations, as it does now. However, omission of any means of calculating the amount charged could also cause uncertainty. Even if GAM would prefer intends to provide itself some flexibility, it would be preferable to make the basis more explicit. Another issue related to the charges provided in the development rights provision is that it perpetuates, and even increases, the ambiguity characterizing these charges. In reality, the proposed development right allowances, like the compensation fee under the current structure, is a hybrid form of land value capture, combining aspects of development impact fees, betterment levies, and land value increment taxes. 63 In 58 Ibid. Art. 14.a.1. 59 Ibid. Art. 35.a. 60 Ibid. Art. 32. 61 Draft Regulations amendment “Development Rights” provision provided to Pegasys 21 January 2023. 62 Ibid. In correspondence with Pegasys GAM identified this charge as a “development levy.” 63 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 5-10). Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 20 particular, there is no direct connection between development right allowance charges and public investment in infrastructure or cost associated with servicing new development, which would be required for impact fees or betterment levies. Instead, compensation to the government appears to potentially be justified based on its powers to enact regulatory changes to permit new development, thereby increasing property values. While this is characterization as a development charge is feasible, its enforceability and acceptability with the public may be challenged because the value created by regulation of land uses is not as apparent. This is why many jurisdictions frame development rights charges as density bonuses or in-kind contributions based on developer requests, or otherwise seek returns through taxing instead. Article 9 of the Draft Regulations requires that parties applying to amend the applicable zoning of a property must (1) pay administrative fees and costs associated with approving the amendment, and (2) implement or pay for “the planning and building of public utilities and the infrastructure services, including the sewerage network, rainwater drainage systems, water networks, transport lines, telecommunications and electricity, and any other related matters, as per the plan ratified in accordance with the Council’s decision.” 64 The terms of this provision indicates that it is intended to serve as a broad development impact fee. It is unclear whether the charges under both the “development rights” article and Article 9 could be charged at the same time. 65 Table summaries of the various LVC mechanisms provided in existing and new/proposed laws are provided on the pages to follow. 64 Draft Regulations Art. 9.a. 65 GAM officials have indicated that they are developing a new article of the Draft Regulations identified as ”Development levies." Review of this new article will be undertaken once an English translated version is provided to Pegasys. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 21 Table 1: LVC mechanisms under existing laws Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 22 Table 2: LVC mechanisms under new / proposed laws Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 23 3.3.2 Compensation for regulatory takings On its face the 1966 Zoning Law’s provisions establishing compensation for license refusals appears outdated and potentially opens the government up to excessive claims for compensation. In practice, some of these provisions are never used for their apparent intended purpose while others have been interpreted by GAM to impose development impact fees as a workaround to avoid legal pitfalls associated with other provisions under the 1966 Zoning Law. Article 47.1 establishes a default requirement that the government pay compensation to landowners if one of its land use licensing decisions results in a valuation of the land that would be less than would otherwise be the case: “If the regulatory decision referred to in the previous article stipulates the refusal of the license or the granting of the license with conditions and it appears that the value of the interest accruing to the person from the land in respect of which the regulatory decision was taken is less than if the license was granted without conditions or granted with conditions, then the relevant organizing committee may pay To that person a compensation estimated under the expropriation law in force at the time equal to the difference between the two values.” 66 The default compensation requirement in Article 47 does not qualify the amount of compensation, suggesting that unless otherwise stated, any diminution in value may qualify for compensation for any decision. While provisions for compensation in the diminution of value resulting from government regulation may be appropriate in certain cases, too broad a compensation rule may have the effect of paralyzing officials from making land use determinations in the broader public interest for fear of triggering compensation. Article 48 provides a broad list of exceptions to the default rule, including for refusal of a license to make a major change in use of land or buildings, construction refusals on land that is prone to flooding or collapse, or construction refusal that would result in exorbitant expenses towards public infrastructure serving the new development. 67 Article 49 further provides that “[n]o compensation is paid according to this chapter because of a regulation decision taken and refuses the construction of any land, regardless of mentioned refusal, if a license for another type of construction, not required, on all of the land or only part of it, could be issued.” 68 While these exceptions do much to mitigate the risk of unwarranted compensation for reasonable government licensing decisions, their breadth suggests a need to reform the default requirement and instead provide for limited exceptions or triggers for compensation, even if there is no need for change in substantive policy. The literature indicates that the 1966 Zoning Law was itself based on the 1932 British Town Planning Act, which served as the basis for the planning law governing the area during British rule under the Mandate of Palestine. 69 The framework for compensation of regulatory takings under laws based on 1932 British Town Planning Act has been assessed to grant landowners an extremely high degree of compensation rights. 70 The concept of compensating land owners by default for any diminution in value caused by regulation is relatively 66 1966 Zoning Law Art. 46.1. 67 Ibid. Art. 48.1.A, C. 68 Ibid. Art. 49.1. 69 UN Habitat. 2022. Urban Planning & Infrastructure in Migration Contexts, Amman Spatial Profile: Jordan. p 32. 70 Alterman, R. 2010. Comparative analysis: A platform for cross-national learning. In: Alterman, R. Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights. p 25 (discussing Israel’s National Planning and Building Law of 1965, which was also based on the 1932 British Town Planning Act and contains similar provisions regarding regulatory takings). Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 24 uncommon because doing so could paralyze governments seeking to take decisions in the public interest even where the harm to private property rights is relatively minor and in the greater public interest. 71 GAM officials note that in practice Article 47.1 is never invoked to compensate landowners. 72 While the risks of heightened municipal fiscal exposure based on broad private property compensation rights therefore does not appear to be a realized threat at present, the provisions regarding compensation for regulatory takings are nevertheless out of step with both GAM’s practices as well as the practices of many other countries. Moreover, even if GAM wishes to maintain the same threshold for regulatory takings, a clearer and updated restatement of the standard would be preferable to the present provisions, in which exceptions to compensation appear to swallow the default rule. In contrast to Article 47.1, GAM indicates that it commonly relies on Article 47.2, but in a manner to compensate GAM, not a private party, for the costs of granting regulatory licenses. 73 As discussed above, GAM has faced litigation challenging its ability to collect development-related revenue under the provisions provided for under Article 52 (zoning revenues) and Article 54 (development levies). While Article 47.2 has provided a useful and more legally defensible alternative basis for collecting revenue, for the sake of clarity and to protect better against further legal challenges, it would be advisable to restate affirmatively and more clearly GAM’s right to make assess development-related charges. 3.3.3 Expropriation, compensation and land exchanges The 1966 Zoning Law provides for appropriation of land with compensation, including provisions that allow for land exchanges in place of appropriation. Specifically, under Article 57.1, authorities “have the power to . . . transfer the ownership of another land to [the owner of appropriated land] to his name whether it lies in the area of his appropriated land or not, in exchange of all rights resulting from the land dispossession or selling it instead of paying the land value in cash to him.” 74 Article 57.1 allows for authorities to negotiate with groups of owners. These provisions appear to potentially enable land pooling and land readjustment schemes, where re-subdivision of a group of private properties allows for more efficient use and higher property values, which in turn may subsidize infrastructure improvements serving the area. The 1966 Zoning Law also authorizes authorities to dispossess less than 25% of any property without compensation where necessary to provide for public roads, public squares, gardens, and school sites. 75 GAM indicates that the appropriation provisions of the 1966 Zoning Law were superseded by subsequent expropriation laws (most recently, the 2019 Property Law, discussed below) and that they are not relied upon. For the same reason, the provisions in the 1966 Zoning Law authorizing land exchanges are not relied upon; instead the 1968 Subdivision Law (discussed below), authorizes such practices but only in the case of new subdivisions. 76 Chapter 9 of the 2019 Property Law establishes the general requirement that “[n]o property shall be acquired except for a project that achieves a public benefit in return for fair compensation and, in accordance with the procedures set forth in this chapter.” 77 The remainder of Chapter 9 details the conditions and process for appropriation of property by the Council of Ministers on behalf of public entities, including municipalities, and 71 Ibid. 72 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 73 Ibid. 74 1966 Zoning Law Art. 57.1. 75 Ibid. Art. 58., Art. 59. 76 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 77 2019 Property Law Art. 178. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 25 provides for further detail be promulgated by regulation. Some provisions, such as Article 192, providing for appropriation of up to 25% of a property for roads without compensation, 78 overlap significantly with provisions provided in the 1966 Zoning Law. The fact that the provisions of the two laws differ in detail could lead to conflicts and confusion regarding their application. However, GAM indicates that the provisions of the 2019 Property Law supersede the 1966 Zoning Law’s terms. The invalidity of such provisions under the 1966 Zoning Act suggests a need to completely repeal and replace it with a new law to improve clarity. Under the 2021 GAM Law, GAM is also empowered to “expropriate lands and properties for the sake of public interest, in accordance with expropriation plans and zoning plans, or acquire the same by way of direct purchase,” and may dispose of expropriated properties. 79 This appears to be a very broad expropriation provision. Of note, the version of the Draft Regulations provided indicates that GAM appears to consider including a land compensation provision in the law. 80 Given the issues surrounding compensation provisions of the 1966 Zoning Law, careful attention to this provision and its relationship to the 2019 Property Law is advised. 3.3.4 Property appraisal Articles 7 and 8 of the 1968 Subdivision Law establish the means and process for appraising the value of property. Of note, properties appear to be appraised according to “areas” rather than particular properties. This aligns with previous research indicating that valuation in Jordan is conducted by valuation of areas rather than individual properties, and indicates that the official valuation for particular properties may not be very accurate given the potential for considerable variation within an area. 81 In an interview, GAM indicated that land valuation is based on prices determined by GAM’s land survey department based on each type of zoning in a particular area. Valuation is based on the difference between a standard “base” for unzoned land and a standard for zoned land. 82 The appraisal method under the 1968 Subdivision law applies only to new subdivisions. GAM indicates that there are very few opportunities for new subdivision with Amman. For appraisal for property tax purposes, separate legislation is utilized. The Draft Property Tax Law and Draft Regulations on Property Assessment, drafts of which were provided for this review, provide for a separate and more detailed appraisal process used for taxing both land and improvements. 83 Under the Draft Property Tax Law, taxes on improvements are calculated based on the zoning and the size of the building, while taxes on land are determined based on the estimated value determined by the Department of Land and Survey. 84 3.3.5 Land reallocation Article 18 of the Draft Regulations, containing provisions providing for shared urban development contracts and land reallocation, appears geared towards obtaining contributions and/or land for public benefit. Under the Draft Regulations, shared urban development contracts “regulate the beneficiaries‘ contribution to the costs arising from . . . planning development contracts“ in order to contribute to the cost of public infrastructure. The 78 Ibid. Art. 192. 79 2021 GAM Law Art. 13.15. 80 Draft Regulations Art. 18.c. In the version of the Draft Regulations provide, there is only a heading “Land compensation” provided under 18.c. but no terms. 81 Haas and Kriticos (2019: 23). Note that Haas and Kriticos reference the 1927 Land Demarcation and Valuation Law, not the 1968 Subdivision Law. 82 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 83 See Draft Property Tax Law, Art.5. 84 Ibid; Draft Regulations on Property Assessment, Art. 8. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 26 process for developing a shared urban development contract under the Draft Regulations suggest that they are prepared at the initiative of GAM along with proposed infrastructure improvements and are then presented to beneficiary landowners as a condition of making such improvements. 85 There is, however, a lack of clarity in respect of the definition and operation of these contracts. Land reallocation in particular appears to be a vehicle for land readjustment, but likely requires further development. GAM officials have indicated that this provision has been removed in a subsequent version of the Draft Regulations because of concerns it could obstruct land survey department work. GAM indicates that share urban development contracts are intended to replace the arrangements made under the 1968 Subdivision Law for arrangements with developers for subdivision of land. If that is the case, they need to be laid out in far more detail, and additional engagement needs to be conducted in order to outline this mechanism. In the benchmark example of Egypt, land readjustment schemes are generally government-imposed, with expropriation with compensation permitted for those landowners who are unwilling to participate. This may be the reason for landowner resistance to such schemes there. 86 85 Draft Regulations. Art. 18. 86 See OECD p 98. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 27 4 Planning 4.1 Criteria Planning laws are necessary to establish predictability and order to urban development, which contributes to the stability needed to allow for human and economic development. 87 The framework set out by a jurisdiction’s planning laws guides and regulates the complex interactions between spatial development, land management, and finance at multiple levels, and ensuring it does so effectively is therefore a priority. Strengthening the planning framework is a critical factor in achieving more efficient urban form, which is linked to a number of other benefits, including reductions in energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, productivity gains, and less costly housing and lifestyles. 88 An effective and high-quality planning legal framework is one that achieves its intended results with efficiency, clarity and precision, and in a manner that is easily understood by those administering it and governed by it. Unenforceable laws are not effective laws. The quality and effectiveness of planning legislation may be assessed through a set of elements: the objectives of the law; its mechanisms and processes; the organization of its institutional responsibilities and roles; the standard of drafting; its capacity for implementation; and the coverage of its substantive content. 89 These are described in more detail below: Objectives. Planning legislation should have a clear, policy-based objectives backed by evidence to serve as meaningful benchmarks for what the legislation seeks to achieve. Without clear objectives, consistent interpretation and application may be a challenge. While legislative goals are appropriately aspirational, objectives that are unrealistic or that do not match with local realities serve to undermine legislation’s effectiveness. 90 Mechanisms and Processes. Planning legislation needs to provide for clearly defined processes and cadence for making and implementing planning decisions. Such processes should be structured to prevent arbitrary or inconsistent decisions. Decisions also need to be effectively integrated with concordant government activities, such as budgeting and infrastructure spending. Moreover, planning processes should incorporate active public participation as a means of strengthening the defensibility of decisions and increasing the likelihood of compliance. 91 Organization of Institutional Responsibilities and Roles. The promulgation of planning standards and requirements depend on well-defined institutional roles and clearly defined responsibilities. Institutions responsible for implementing or adhering to planning legislation should be made clearly aware in the legislation of the circumstance under which it must, may, or may act, and in what capacity it is to act. Overlap of powers or implementing responsibilities between more than one governmental authority can create significant challenges to effective implementation. Legislation should also consider how implementing authorities will be equipped with the technical and financial means necessary to implement the law. 92 87 UN Habitat. 2018. Urban Law Tools No. 1: Planning Law Assessment Framework. Nairobi: UN Habitat. 88 Kaw, J., et al (2022); Kleineberg, T., Murray, S., Tang, Y., & Kaw, K. 2023. The Welfare and Productivity Effects of Transit Improvements in Amman. 89 Ibid. p 7. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 28 Standard of Drafting. Effective planning legislation needs to “communicate its objectives and the means of achieving them”. 93 The language of planning legislation must be clear, unambiguous, simple, and accurate. Content Addressed. The quality of planning legislation frameworks may also be assessed based on their substantive content. In most contexts this includes considering the extent and manner in which a planning regime deals with the following matters: land and urban planning, public space, plots and blocks, development rights, building codes, and land-based finance. There are many ways in which these topics may be addressed. 4.2 Benchmark: Cape Town, South Africa The legislative landscape governing planning in Cape Town, South Africa, has transformed significantly in the past decade. New interrelated planning laws on the national, regional (provincial), and metropolitan level have been enacted, replacing older planning laws and seeking to establish a new framework for planning and land use decisions that addresses historically discriminatory planning policies and more recent spatial development challenges. At the national level, South Africa’s Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 94 (“SPLUMA”), has created a uniform, comprehensive framework for spatial planning in the country. This law expresses national objectives, which includes the promulgation of national development principles to which all governmental authorities involved in spatial planning and land use decisions must adhere. 95 These principles expressly articulate the intention to address the fragmented, inconsistent, and unequal planning regime under apartheid, and to seek achievement of citizens’ constitutional rights, including those to housing and a healthy environment. 96 SPLUMA also allocates responsibility for the development of nested “Spatial Development Frameworks” (“SDFs”) of appropriate levels of detail to guide spatial development at national, provincial, and municipal scales, undertaken by designated authorities at respective levels of government in accordance to regular multi-year schedules. 97 SPLUMA requires consistency between SDFs at different scales (e.g. s 15(2)), and also requires SDFs to be incorporated into related processes governing the promulgation of “integrated development plans” that govern public budgeting and expenditures. 98 The allocation of responsibilities between national, provincial, and municipal levels of government is expressly stated, as are mechanisms for coordinating intergovernmental activities and resolving disputes. 99 Decentralized decision-making processes are expressed, including opportunities for public consultation and redress, such as with regard to land use and building approvals 100, and both planning and land use management decisions are required to comply with environmental review processes provided for in separate environmental legislation 101. The national and regional governments are required under SPLUMA to support the capacity of local governments to implement SPLUMA, and in some cases provision is made for provincial or national governmental authorities to step in to serve as or support the role of local governments 102 The regional (provincial) government within which Cape Town rests enacted complimentary legislation in 2014, the Western Cape Land Use Planning Act 103 (“LUPA”), which gives further effect and detail to provincial and local planning and land use management processes and responsibilities and authorizes municipalities within 93 Ibid. 94 Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act No. 16 of 2013 95 Ibid. Ch 1. 96 Ibid. Section 7. 97 Ibid. Ch 4. 98 Ibid. Sections 17(2), 20(2). 99 Ibid. Ch 3 100 Ibid. Section 51 101 Ibid. Sections 19(g), 24(2)(b), 42(2). 102 Ibid. Ch 3 103 Western Cape Land Use Planning Act 3 of 2014 Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 29 its jurisdiction to promulgate bylaws establishing zoning schemes and land use requirements. Likewise, the City of Cape Town, representing the largest city in the Western Cape (and second largest in South Africa), enacted municipal-level legislation in 2015 conforming the City’s planning and land use management processes with the requirements of SPLUMA and LUPA, namely the City of Cape Town Municipal Planning Bylaw, 2015 (“CCT Bylaw”). For example, the CCT Bylaw includes requirements that all land within its boundaries be covered by its zoning scheme 104 , as depicted in a publicly accessible zoning map that may be updated according to the provisions of the CCT Bylaw. 105 The CCT Bylaw address, to a greater or lesser degree, land and urban planning, public space, plots and blocks, development rights, building code compliance, and land-based finance within the authorizations delegated under SPLUMA and LUPA. 4.3 Review 4.3.1 Legislative objectives and principles The 1966 Zoning Law generally lacks express legislative objectives. Moreover, it also fails to establish or facilitate development of strategic principles or criteria for spatial decision-making. Accordingly, it is a challenge to determine the goals of the 1966 Zoning Law, how it should be interpreted, or how decisions made under its authority are to be assessed. The 1966 Zoning Law does not explain its objectives; to an extent, those objectives are indicated by the intended applicability of the law, which broadly covers “all types of lands and buildings uses” 106, and by the duties and authorities proscribed to various entities. Chapter 1 of the 1966 Zoning Law, which establishes the authorities empowered with making land use decisions, tasks the Prime Minister with “coordination using the regulation of all lands for the best aspect of public interest[;] Having regulation of all lands in harmony with the governmental and economical zoning scheme[; and] Having regulation of all cities and villages in conformity with the governmental social policy, and development and upgrading of society.”1 These indicate a broad intent to regulate land use decisions, but without explanation of intended outcomes or guiding principles or policies. In certain other provisions, such as Article 40’s protections of green and park space, policy goals may be implicitly derived by virtue of the provisions themselves. Otherwise, there is no express guidance on substantive policies, strategy, or principles to guide decision-making beyond instructions to comply with existing laws and policies.2 This is problematic as no clear policy or strategic basis for decisions made under the law, and therefore there is less certainty regarding how the law should be implemented, or whether a planning or land use decision is properly justified. Chapter 2 of the benchmark South African national legislation provides express legislative goals and principles for spatial planning and land use management. The absence of express objectives and legislative principles can result in less accountability from decision- makers. For example, provisions that empower Local Committees to order changes to buildings in furtherance of beautification (Article 42) do not establish the standards for such a determination, making such a decision (or its review by a higher committee) potentially arbitrary. In contrast in the benchmark example of Cape Town and other South African cities, the national legislation, SPLUMA, specifically requires consideration of that legislation’s principles in all decisions affecting land use. The 1968 Subdivision Law, which is of similar vintage to the 1966 Zoning Law, likewise does not contain express legislative objectives, nor does it provide and guidance or direction regarding the policy of the Kingdom 104 City of Cape Town Municipal Planning Bylaw, 2015. Section 25. 105 Ibid. Sections 28 and 29. 106 1966 Zoning Law. Art. 3. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 30 with respect to subdivision of property. The 2019 Property Law similar provides no stated objectives or public policy principles. As with older planning legislation, the applicable provisions 107 of the 2021 GAM Law do not provide any express objectives or principles guiding the application or implementation of its planning-related requirements. It may be implied from the broad re-assignment of planning powers to GAM that one policy objective is the devolution of higher-level planning decisions to a metropolitan-level authority. However, this is not expressly stated. In certain cases where requirements indicate specific policy considerations, such as “[c]onserv[ing] the city’s identity, and its cultural and architectural heritage,” 108, or “[p]rovid[ing] an attractive and advanced investment- friendly environment to promote investment,” this may be taken as the legislation’s policy objective. Likewise, to the extent the 2021 GAM Law assigns duties and responsibilities that must be effected “in alignment with the national policies and strategies,” 109, this may assist in guiding application if they have been clearly articulated through some other means. The lack of a comprehensive statement on the objectives of regulation of land use may hinder application or implementation through lower level laws, regulations, and policies, particularly if the authority for promulgating policy-based laws below is reliant on the 2021 GAM Law. In contrast with older planning legislation, the Draft Regulations expressly establish principles, goals, and objectives that are to guide planning decisions in Amman. Part of the Draft Regulations note five principles upon which GAM relies: sustainable development, flexibility and resilience, participatory planning, social justice, and public benefit.3 These principles are followed by nine “goals of the sustainable and flexible urban planning.”4 Part One also establishes the objectives of the Draft Regulations, which include laying out specific principles and standards for planning activities in Amman, applicability of the Draft Regulations to all aspects of planning in Amman, and the requirement to ensure alignment between spatial planning and financial considerations. These provisions provide a helpful basis of understanding how this law should be applied and interpreted, and an important improvement over prior legislation. However, there is a lack of connection in the Draft Regulations between these provisions and mechanisms and processes provided for in the rest of the legislation that make the policy-based objectives and principles enforceable. For instance, there does not appear to be internal cross references to the principles or goals stated in Part One elsewhere in the Draft Regulations. GAM should consider expressly connecting objectives and principles established in the Draft Regulations with planning and land use activities and decisions provided in other parts of the law. For example, in South Africa, the national legislation SPLUMA requires all spatial development frameworks at national, provincial, and local levels to give effect to the principles enumerated in the legislation 110. Likewise, local government land use decisions must also take into consideration the enumerated development principles. 111 4.3.2 Mechanisms and Processes The 1966 Zoning Law provides for a suite of mechanisms and processes that oversee the administration and regulation of land use and development, including: 107 We were not provided with the full English translation of the 2021 GAM law, and therefore cannot speak to provisions that were not translated for us. 108 2021 GAM Law Art. 13.a.6 109 2021 GAM Law Art. 13 110 See SPLUMA, Ch.4. 111 See SPLUMA s42. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 31 • Establishment of “regions of regulation”, 112 Regional Committees (defined below) and Local Committees. 113 • Development and approval of region zoning schemes, structural zoning schemes, and detailed structural zoning schemes. 114 • Issuance of land partition schemes. 115 • Permissions for use contrary to a zoning scheme. 116 • Building and land use license applications. 117 • Issuance of notices or orders proscribing illegal construction, land uses, and public nuisances. 118 • Public notification, comment, and objections/appeals to the aforementioned governmental activities. As the backbone of planning processes in Jordan, the 1966 Zoning Law establishes a hierarchy of "zoning schemes”, moving from high level “regional schemes”, “structural schemes”, and then to “local schemes” at a local level of planning. 119 Regional schemes are prepared on a regional basis and are intended to show both existing land use and construction restrictions and the general planned development of an area and phasing. 120 Regional schemes are intended to serve as the basis of local structure schemes, which reflect planning at a city level. 121 The legislation provides in prescriptive detail the contents of zoning schemes. GAM indicates that this hierarchy of planning documents is no longer used, providing one of the primary motivations for legislative planning reform. One issue specifically identified by GAM with the old plans were the types of information required in the statutory provisions, which are seen as unnecessary and unduly burdensome. 122 The process of developing zoning schemes, like other mechanisms and processes contained in the 1966 Zoning Law, are laid out in relatively clear detail and organization, with roles, responsibilities, and timing plainly stated. Processes such as the development of zoning schemes set out the steps of scheme development and coordination between different governmental stakeholders involved in such processes, including review by higher level authorities with input from lower level authorities and other stakeholders, including the public . 123 The level of detail and organization provided in these processes generally seems sufficient, although as indicated by GAM’s input, various aspects, such as particular institutions and contents of schemes, are decades old and may no longer reflect existing processes or planning needs. One of the primary challenges regarding the planning mechanisms and processes in the 1966 Zoning Law is that the law lacks clear standards or criteria for how these mechanisms should be applied, or even determining the circumstances under which action is required or permitted. For example, while the legislation provides that structural schemes “show types of [uses of] the lands in area of structure scheme, and about way of developing the economic situation and upgrading society, and stages of execution of various aspects of construction,” 124 no standards or criteria are provided as a basis for justifying or assessing the contents of such schemes. The legislation also provides that region zoning schemes are to be prepared “whenever needed by the [Department 112 1966 Zoning Law. Ch. 2. 113 Ibid. Art 7, 9. 114 Ibid. Ch 3. 115 Ibid. Art 28 – 30. 116 Ibid. Art 32. 117 Ibid. Art 34 – 36. 118 Ibid. Art 38 – 45, 61. 119 Ibid. Art. 15, 19, 23. 120 Ibid. Art. 15.1. 121 Ibid. Art. 19.1. 122 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 123 Ibid. Ch. 3. 124 1966 Zoning Law Art. 19.1. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 32 of Local Government]” 125 without any additional basis for determining when a regional zoning scheme is required (or required to be amended). As another example, public notice and comment is provided in the process of developing schemes and other processes, but there is no standard or basis for determining whether an objection that is lodged should result in an amendment to a scheme or change in decision taken. The lack of standard by which mechanisms are used or processes undertaken makes determining whether they are being successfully utilized. The absence of specific criteria or standards to guide decision-making is exacerbated by the lack of any expressed legislative objectives, principles, or goals (see section 4.3.1 above ). In the benchmark example of South Africa, decision-making is guided by the express principles provided in the legislation, as well as standards for reasonable decision-making through express reference to separate legislation governing administrative procedures, including the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000. 126 The 1966 Zoning Law also reflects a lack of express connection between planning processes and other governmental and administrative processes, most importantly funding and budgeting processes. From the language of the 1966 Zoning Law there is no requirement to ensure the proposed projects provided for under a zoning scheme are in line with approved budgets or forecasted budgets, or that they are connected in any other way with governmental budgeting processes. The lack of a connection between spatial planning and public revenues and budgets or economic factors is likely to weaken the effectiveness of both planning and revenue generation. The benchmark example of South African provides that spatial planning documents, known as “spatial development plans”, must be developed in accordance with municipal budgeting and economic development plans, which are governed through separate complimentary legislation. Since initial promulgation, there have been several amendments to some of the 1966 Zoning Law’s processes. These amendments are not clear and appear to complicate some of the procedures provided for in the law 127. GAM indicates that the hierarchy of zoning schemes is no longer used, which is one motivation for reform, suggesting that the processes in the law are outdated and not in line with current practices. 128 This would be an important reason to undertake a comprehensive review and updating of the law. The 1968 Subdivision Law specifically addresses the process for initial subdivision of land, a process that is laid out in relatively clear detail in the law. However, GAM officials indicate that the law is only applied as to the initial subdivision of land, and that practically all land has already been subdivided within GAM’s jurisdiction. While it does not appear that there is any express statement in the law restricting its application to the initial subdivision of land, if it has in fact been interpreted as such this suggests that this law is no longer applicable or relevant and that subsequent subdivision of land must be addressed by a new law. The reviewed provisions of the 2021 GAM Law do not set out new planning mechanisms or processes, but instead allocate authority to GAM to oversee and implement existing processes or develop new ones. The 2021 GAM Law expressly empowers GAM to develop draft strategic, development, master and zoning plans, 129 and for the Municipal Council to “[a]pprove the draft strategic plans” and the City’s master plan. 130 Engagement with GAM indicates that these types of plans are intended to replace the hierarchy of planning documents under the 1966 Zoning Law, which are no longer used. 131 However, the 2021 GAM Law provides practically no direction on how GAM should reform planning mechanisms or processes governing its jurisdiction. This is a potential limitation that would need to be redressed by more comprehensive legislation 125 Ibid. Art 15. 126 See SPLUMA s52. 127 See e.g. Ibid. Art. 27.1.A., Art. 31.1. 128 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 129 2021 GAM Law, Art. 13.a.1. 130 Ibid. Art. 11.b., h. 131 Ibid. Art. 13.9-13. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 33 repealing and replacing the 1966 Zoning Law. Ideally, legislation at national level would provide a general framework for more specific complimentary local laws, similarly to the nested laws at national, provincial and municipal levels in the benchmark example of South Africa. The 2021 GAM Law authorizes GAM to control its finances, including the power to develop and approve and file its annual budget and balance sheet, 132 approve “programs developed to achieve sustainable development with the participation of local communities,” 133 and approve investment of Municipal properties. 134 The City Manager is responsible for drafting an annual and multi-year budgets, balance sheet, and financial statements. 135 Alignment of control over both spatial planning and municipal finances and budgeting responsibility is a good step towards integration of spatial and economic planning. The Draft Regulations introduce a new suite of planning documents that are intended to replace the outdated hierarchy of planning documents provided for under the 1966 Zoning Law. According to GAM, the new hierarchy under the Draft Regulations is guided by a “master plan” or “Amman plan”, followed by several layers of more specific plans including local plans and detailed local plans. 136 The provisions of the Draft Regulations reflect the following hierarchy: (1) a national plan; (2) regional plans, (3) city plan; and (4) local plans. 137 In introducing and explaining this hierarchy, the Draft Regulations create ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to the scope of the legislation. Although the Draft Regulations purport to authorize planning for the City of Amman, Articles 4 and 5 address national and regional plans, which are beyond the authority of GAM to legislate or administer. GAM officials have indicated that these provisions are simply meant to contextualize planning for Amman in the broader planning hierarchy. 138 If this is the case, the Draft Regulation’s language and structure should be revised to make this clear. 139 For example, Articles 4 and 5 could be revised to eliminate statements making proclamations regarding national or regional plans. 140 Appropriately, plans at the city and smaller level are expressly required to comply with the applicable regional plan, with compliance presumedly enforced through approval by the Supreme Zoning Council 141. In the benchmark example of South Africa, provincial and municipal legislation relies on higher level legislation to speak for itself, or otherwise generally repeats verbatim higher level provisions in order to provide consistency. At the core of the new planning framework established by the Draft Regulations are the planning documents for Amman City. These include a suite of related documents: the Planning Guideline, the Executive Plan for City Growth, and local plans, which together constitute the “Master Plan” for the City. 142 The City’s Planning Guideline, which is intended to replace the structural scheme under the previous planning regime, constitutes a forward-looking document guiding development. In this sense, it differs from structural schemes under the 1966 Zoning Law, which appear to have combined existing requirements and future planning. The content and process for development of Planning Guidelines, laid out in Article 6, is less prescriptive than the requirements for structural schemes under the 1966 Zoning Law, and therefore likely more flexible to the needs and capacity of GAM to implement them. However, the process prescribed by the law is far less specific than in the 1966 132 Ibid. Art. 11.a., b. 133 Ibid. Art. 11.e. 134 Ibid. Art. 11.i. 135Ibid. Art. 17.a.5-6. 136 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 137 Draft Regulations, Art. 3.a. 138 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 139 We refer to the language of these provisions as translated into English, recognizing that there may be important nuances of language lost in translation. 140 Draft Regulations Art. 4.a. 141 Ibid. Art. 6.1.d 142Ibid. Art. 6, 7.2.c. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 34 Zoning Law, which could create ambiguities and challenges for undertaking and participating in the process of developing the Planning Guidelines. For example, no timeframes are given for the drafting process, nor are any specific roles identified in development. 143 More detail regarding the steps for drafting the Planning Guidelines could help clarify the process. While the lack of detail may be a strategic decision to provide GAM with more flexibility in determining the process for developing these documents, there should at the very least be a requirement for GAM to articulate the process in some form of accessible and binding document, such as implementing regulations. In addition to the Planning Guideline, the other major component of the Draft Regulations is the City Growth Executive Plan, which is “a mechanism to implement the Amman City’s planning guideline, and it constitutes the future urban vision, the objectives, urban development policies, and the structural plans.” 144 The city growth executive plan “defines the types and limits of the existing and future uses, including the residential, commercial, and service uses, as well as the public utilities, transport, and other private businesses, and the spatial distribution thereof at the city level.” 145 It also is described as serving “as a strategic benchmark that regulates and guides the Amman city’s future development and finetunes all the factors affecting its growth.” 146 The integration of economic development into the spatial planning process is an important and commendable step, and a significant improvement over previous legislation. However, like the Planning Guideline, the detail regarding the City Growth Executive Plan’s development and specific roles and responsibilities is not as clearly articulated as could be. In the benchmark example of South Africa, separate laws describe in detail the process for municipalities to develop ”integrated development plans” to guide public infrastructure investments, which must interlink with development of ”spatial development frameworks”. Another issue with the proposed planning hierarchy of documents is that what actually constitutes the “Master Plan” for the City is not clear because the “Master Plan” is ambiguously defined and is a collection of different documents with separate processes for development. As a defined term in Article 2 of the Draft Regulations, the “Master Plan” constitutes “urban plans and schemes at the level of Amman city, and the plans and their levels which are developed, or co-developed, for the purpose of implementing sustainable and flexible urban planning”. 147 Section 7.2.a, concerning development of City Growth Executive Plans ambiguously states that “master planning of the urban area” is constituted by the City Growth Executive Plan, the land subdivision system, the planning criteria, and local plans. More clarity would be desirable in defining the primary spatial planning document for the City in relation to related economic planning. As described above, in the benchmark example of South Africa, there is one primary document for spatial strategies at different scales, referred to as a ”spatial development framework”, which is connected to a broader ”integrated development framework“ that reflects a broader social and economic development process. The Draft Regulations provide for several categories of smaller scale local plans, including development plans, special planning zone plans, overlay zoning plans, and subsequent provisions’ plans. 148 Appropriately, these plans must conform with higher order planning documents, e.g. the Planning Guideline and City Growth Executive Plan, 149 and must be congruent with one another. However, as currently drafted, more clarity is needed regarding the purpose of these different types of plans and their relationship to each other. For example, Article 8.d. provides for the “categories“ of local plans, but the items enumerated differ from the 143Ibid. Art. 6.1.g. 144 Ibid. Art. 7.2.a. 145 Ibid. Art. 7.2.b. 146 Ibid. Art. 7.2.e. 147 Ibid. Art 2. 148 Draft Regulations. Art.8.c-d. 149 Ibid. Art. 8.e. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 35 “types“ provided in the definition of “local plan“ provided in Article 2, and none of the types or categories are described or explained. As another example, ”urban zoning plan amendments” 150 or ”zoning amendments” 151 are a component of local plans, but it is not clear whether this is a stand-alone document or amendments to the existing plan, and if so which component (as there is no zoning map or scheme indicated). Most likely, the categories of plans could be simplified and defined with more clarity and uniformity. As with other planning components, the process provided for development of local plans could be provided in more detail. 152 Importantly, there does not appear to be any distinction between maps or schemes reflecting existing permitted land uses and forward-looking plans. In the benchmark example of South Africa in contrast, there is a clear distinction made in the law between forward-looking ”spatial development frameworks” and existing land use requirements provided for in ”land use schemes”. The Draft Regulations provide for a suite of “planning tools” in Part Five, which include special planning zones, overlay zones, subsequent provisions, building envelope provisions, incentives for the promotion of green buildings, urban studies, shared urban development contracts, and land reallocation powers. 153 The need and purpose of these ”planning tools” is not clear from the legislation, and their grouping together does help in providing clarity. For example, ”special planning zones” and ”overlay zoning plans” are explained in this part, although these processes relate to components of local plans, which are dealt with earlier in the legislation. Provision for special zoning and overlay zoning also suggests that the original zoning will be inadequate—if possible special zoning and overlay zoning should be avoided. Furthermore, the Draft Regulations make reference to a “subdivision plan”, which “delineates one or more plots of lands.” 154 This appears intended to equip GAM with mechanisms and procedures for regulating the subdivision of land in light of the prevailing interpretation of the 1968 Subdivision Law that that law only applies to the initial subdivision of property. This is a positive step. However, the requirements under the Draft Regulations do not provide the same level of detail that the 1968 Subdivision Law does. As with other mechanisms provided for under the Draft Regulations, more attention is required to drafting with clarity the process and responsibilities associated with the subdivision of land. GAM notes that the hierarchy provided in the Draft Regulations more accurately reflects the how planning is currently conducted in Amman. 155 If this is the case, it is an improvement as the law should reflect reality. However, an initial review of the types of planning documents suggests a need for better explanation of the role and uses of these documents and their relationship with one another. For example, it is unclear whether there are multiple types of local plans (and if so, why) or multiple components of a local plan. 156 Likewise, it is not completely clear what the relationship is between local plans and subdivision plans. 157 In the benchmark example of South Africa, the national legislation clearly describes documents such as “"spatial developers” and details regarding who is responsible for drafting these at different levels of government, how they are approved, and what topics they must contain. 150 Ibid. Art 2. 151 Ibid. Art 8.d.2. 152 Ibid. Art. 8.g. 153 Ibid. Part Five, Art. 12-18. 154 Ibid. Art. 2 (definitions). 155 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 156 Draft Regulation, Art. 8. 157 Compare Draft Regulations Art. 8 and Art. 9. The confusion may be due to translation issues. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 36 4.3.3 Standard of Drafting Because review and analysis of the laws had to be conducted using English translations rather than the original Arabic, it is impossible to speak to the standard of drafting of the reviewed laws in their original language. It may be that words, phrases, or concepts with well understood meanings in Arabic do not translate easily into English, or that their meaning changes when translated or when using specific words. Moreover, technical terms are particularly prone to difficulties in accurate translation and interpretation. With these caveats in mind, the below provides an assessment of the drafting of the English translations of the reviewed laws. 1966 Zoning Law is reasonably well drafted and organized in many respects. The overall architecture is logical and understandable. The order and categorizing of institutions and processes addressed in the statute generally reflects the hierarchy and timing of activities. For instance, the authority and constituency of the highest planning authorities, e.g. the Higher Zoning Council, are addressed first, then Regional Committees, then Local Committees. 158 The description of processes, such as the development and promulgation of zoning schemes, is generally described in the order in which the process would be conducted, 159 which makes them easier to understand. In certain cases, the organization or wording of the statute is confusing or misaligned. For example, under the provision for powers of the Higher Council of Regulation, there are provisions stipulating what steps the minister is required to take once the Higher Council cancels a license. 160 These activities are not powers of the Higher Council, but rather the responsibility of the Minister which should be stated as such under the appropriate provision regarding responsibilities and powers of the Minister. The process itself would be better stated separately under its own provision. In a few instances, the language of provisions in the law is cumbersome and confusing to the point of being incomprehensible. Some of these issues may have been created by subsequent amendment to the original law. Language added by subsequent amendment is confusing and not well worded in several places. 161 In these cases breaking down the intended provisions into more simpler provisions would improve comprehension. Although a number of terms are helpfully defined, they are also a source of confusion in some places of the legislation. The naming conventions of some terms is unusual or awkward as translated into English (for example, the word “regulation” to refer to both regulations and zoning), and certain defined terms are not used consistently (e.g. “regional regulation committee” vs. “regional committee”). Inconsistent use of defined terms and failure to capitalize defined terms makes proper interpretation and understanding difficult. Some of the numbering and indentation is inconsistent, as are some internal cross references. These issues may relate in part or in whole to translation, rather than to issues with the original Arabic text. The organization and structure of the 1968 Subdivision Law reflects a similar level of drafting as the 1966 Zoning Law. It is relatively well organized, adhering to an order that follows the procedures for subdividing land under the law. The use of defined terms is not always consistent, and certain terms, e.g. “Final Distribution Committee”, are not defined along with other terms. As with the 1966 Zoning Law, some of these discrepancies may have resulted from the subsequent amendment of the original law. 158 Draft Regulations. Art 7, 9. 159 Ibid. Art. 15 – 17. 160 See Ibid. Art. 6D, B, C2 (note that the numbering of the provisions in the English translation of this part of the 1966 Zoning Law is inconsistent as well) 161 See Ibid. Art. 27.1.A., Art. 31.1. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 37 An assessment of the drafting of the 2021 GAM Law is difficult given that we only received portions relevant to the Draft Regulations. To the extent reviewed, the language of the provisions reflects clear drafting. The Draft Regulations are reasonably well organized in some respects, but could be improved in many other respects. With respect to positive attributes, the objectives and principles of the legislation are covered early on, as are defined terms, which is logical. Similarly to the 1966 Zoning Law, grouping and discussion of the hierarchy of applicable plans is located in one place and moves from most authoritative and general (national plans) to most specific (local plans), which is helpful for understanding how they relate. Organization of provisions could be improved in a number of areas. The placement of Part 6, concerning the duties and powers of particular planning institutions, seems incongruous, and this discussion would be better placed towards the beginning of the legislation. Moreover, the description of some entities, such as Planning Area Committees, is split between different parts of the legislation. The defined terms section of the Draft Regulations causes confusion because many of the definitions contain provisions that go beyond mere definition, and therefore this section includes many “hidden” provisions. For example, the definition of “Planning Area Committee” includes provisions establishing its composition, and the definition of “Competent Body” establishes who and how such a body is formed. These matters seem more appropriately discussed under Part 6, which set out these entities. In addition, the defined terms are used inconsistently throughout the rest of the document, creating ambiguity. For example, Article 6.1.a. concerning Planning Guidelines references the “city’s plan”, which is not a defined term. As discussed elsewhere in this report (see section 4.3.2 above), the Draft Regulations contain provisions that are meant to be explanatory but that read as requirements for processes or systems that are beyond the scope of the legislation. One example is the discussion regarding national level plans, in which it is stated that “The national plan for urban planning aims at providing a general framework for planning and development in the Kingdom.” However, it is not within the scope of authority of this legislation to set out what the aims of the national plan are. These types of statements should be removed or revised. Similarly, some provisions are redundant or stated slightly differently in different places. 162 Requirements should be stated clearly once. Excessive use of the passive voice and words that are non-committal create ambiguity in the legislation, for example in the following statement: “The planning guideline should be developed.” 163 Where possible, sentences should include subjects and state assertively the law’s requirements, e.g. “The Competent Body shall develop . . . the [Planning Guideline].” 164 With respect to numbering, some provisions, such as individual defined terms, are not numbered, or are numbered inconsistently. 165 In some provisions it appears that there are multiple headers, 166 whereas it would be preferable to include one header. Defined terms are in some places used inconsistently or in a manner that may increase confusion (e.g. multiple terms used for the Supreme Council for Planning). 4.3.4 Content Addressed The 1966 Zoning Law focuses primarily on two aspects of planning law: zoning and construction and land use licensing. This law is a framework law in that it provides for the further development of laws (zoning 162 Ibid. Art. 6.1.c. and 6.1.g (Process for Development of Planning Guidelines). 163 Ibid. Art. 6(1)(e) 164 See e.g. Ibid. Art. 6.1.c 165 See e.g. Ibid. Art 7.2., Art. 8.d.(1). 166 See e.g. Ibid. Art. 5. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 38 schemes and associated regulations) regulating land use and construction, rather than regulating those activities itself. The law sets out detailed parameters for the establishment of zoning restrictions. It also includes substantive provisions regarding the preservation of parks and green space. 167 A major apparent ambiguity in the 1966 Zoning Law is that zoning schemes are intended to reflect both existing realities and requirements as well as future plans for development. Many jurisdictions distinguish between zoning schemes, which reflect existing land uses and restrictions, and future plans. Combining these can create ambiguity regarding whether land use restrictions and plans are being complied with. Another issue identified with current planning practices in Amman is the practice of zoning land and the designation of “unzoned” vs. “zoned” areas. Because the rights and responsibilities vary considerably between these two types of land, and because of the limited capacity of the government to properly “zone” (i.e. plan and service) land, the designation has outsized implications. Moreover, overly restrictive and prescriptive zoning requirements in Amman have created challenges to complying or enforcing the law. The 1968 Subdivision Law addresses the subdivision of land, which is normally a critical planning tool for governments. However, as noted above, this law has been interpreted to apply only to the initial subdivision of land, and because practically all property within GAM has already been subdivided once, it has practically speaking limited applicability or usefulness. It is appropriate for GAM to be equipped with a law regulating the subdivision and re-parcelling of property. The 2021 GAM Law addresses a broad array of planning tools and processes, delegating these powers to GAM. Beyond this delegation of authority, the 2021 GAM Law is of limited utility in terms of understanding the planning framework applicable to Amman, as it leaves detailing of any revisions in the law to GAM. The Draft Regulations replace the process of city-wide planning (i.e. “zoning”) and building licensing under the 1966 Zoning Law, as well as the subdivision requirements under the 1968 Subdivision Law. While revision of these processes is necessary, the Draft Regulations as currently drafted introduce ambiguity into these processes and should undergo considerable revision. For example, while the Draft Regulations loosen the prescriptive requirements provided in city-wide and local plans, the process of zoning does not appear to be simplified, and in fact may be complicated through the introduction of new mechanisms such as special zoning and overlay zoning. While these mechanisms may be important to providing flexibility to City officials in relaxing zoning restrictions, a preferable solution would be to adjust the underlying zoning requirements to be responsive and flexible in the first place. The Draft Regulations also do not address the issue of “unzoned” land and the implications of leaving certain portions of the City unzoned. A comprehensive regulation of all land uses in the City’s jurisdiction could reduce the outsized impact of the designation of some lands as “unzoned.” Attention to requirements regarding both less developed and more developed areas may help create more appropriate regulatory requirements that reflect on-the-ground realities. One of the major issues in the content of the 1966 Zoning Law that remains unaddressed in the Draft Regulations is the distinction between existing land use requirements and forward-looking plans. Conventionally, mechanisms such as zoning schemes present existing uses and requirements, and are binding, while plans are forward-looking and aspirational. Although plans must be enforceable or binding to some extent, they necessarily must project expected uses or activities that do not exist presently. 167 1966 Zoning Law Art. 40. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 39 5 Public Participation and Safeguards 5.1 Criteria Development projects are likely to be carried out more sustainably if they include (i) public participation in the decision-making process and (ii) assessments of impacts on the environment and cultural sites. 168 These inclusions promote social benefits and values in the planning process. In turn, this builds credibility and legitimacy in the planning system, which makes it more robust and resilient in the long term. Public participation refers to involving or engaging the public in decision-making and giving consideration to public input in making decisions, especially those relating to development and development planning. It affords interested stakeholders the opportunity to influence decisions that affect their lives. 169 Public participation can be direct (where citizens provide input directly to government) or representative (where citizens elect representatives to provide their input indirectly). Legislation must provide for public participation in decision-making on development related issues. Public participation legitimizes decision-making and results in greater satisfaction with government decisions, thereby reducing the probability of conflicts or legal disputes in respect of decisions. It enhances citizen engagement through more transparent decision-making that affords people the right to be informed and consulted. Public participation can also facilitate better decision-making in respect of development as it can draw out technical knowledge, use local knowledge not known to government, identify issues that may be overlooked by decision- makers and enable a better evaluation of issues. 170 Public participation in decision-making enables inclusive and sustainable decision-making in development and planning, and it needs to be legally prescribed. Where public participation is not mandatory the public voice is drowned out by that of powerful political and commercial interests. Laws that facilitate public participation typically: • Reflect that public participation is an over-arching goal, value or principle of the law; • Delineate clearly which stakeholders or groups comprise the public that is to participate in the decision- making process; • Set out clear planning processes that the public can understand, enabling them to participate in planning; • Require government to inform the public of a proposed decision with sufficient notice; • Require government to provide the public with relevant information relating to the decision to equip them to provide meaningful input in consultation; • Establish clear and transparent processes for government to consult the public and allow the public an opportunity to comment on the proposed decision; • Establish clear processes for the public to object to and appeal government decisions. Safeguards are mechanisms or management processes that allow stakeholders to identify, analyse, avoid, minimise, and mitigate any potential adverse environmental and cultural impacts, to maximise environmental and cultural benefits, and to improve the environmental and cultural performance of a place. 171 Given that 168 Porras, I. M. 2009. The city and international law: In pursuit of sustainable development. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 36. p 541. 169 United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2023. Public Participation Guide: Introduction to Public Participation. 170 Petts, J. & Leach, B. 2000. Evaluating Methods for Public Participation: Literature Review. Bristol: Environment Agency. 171 Green Climate Fund. 2023. Safeguards: Environmental And Social Safeguards. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 40 urban development can adversely impact on the environment and cultural sites, the appropriate safeguards need to be in place to protect the environment and cultural sites in development projects. Accordingly, environmental safeguards protect the environment, and cultural safeguards protect cultural and heritage sites. Strong environmental safeguards are particularly critical to mitigate climate change, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect biodiversity during the course of development. Effective safeguards require a basis in the law. Promulgating laws that require an assessment of a development project’s impact on the environment or cultural sites is an effective way of protecting the environment and cultural sites. Such assessments would go hand in hand with public participation requirements: for example, an assessment of environmental impact of a development project should be provided to the public decision to equip them to provide meaningful input in consultations. 172 Legal frameworks that provide for environmental and cultural safeguards typically: • Reflect that protection of the environment and cultural sites are over-arching goals, values or principles of the law (see section 4.3.1 above); • Require environmental impact assessments to be conducted and reports to be produced and made available to the public as part of a public participation process; • Require assessment of impact on cultural sites to be conducted and reports to be produced and made available to the public as part of a public participation process; • Establish a process for consultation with relevant other government departments. Public participation and safeguards can be embedded in the law in several ways: either planning legislation can refer to complimentary legislation that requires public participation and safeguards; or planning legislation itself can require public participation and safeguards. Where planning and environmental laws exist side by side, then it’s important that there are clear mechanisms to align both public participation and safeguards, to minimise duplication of processes and requirements and reduce confusion among both the public and officials. 5.2 MENA Benchmark: Tunisia Tunisia is exemplary in having embedded public participation in its legal framework. Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution sets the basis for Tunisian citizens and civil society to actively participate in cultural, social and political life. A number of the 2014 Constitution’s provisions directly reinforce the rights of citizens to participate in government decision-making, the most relevant being Article 139, which requires local authorities to adopt instruments that give effect to principles of open governance and enable citizens’ and civil society’s participation in preparing and implementing development projects. 173 In addition, Article 32 guarantees citizens’ right to access information, a central tenant of public participation. 174 Even prior to the adoption of the 2014 Constitution, the Tunisian government issued laws 175 to establish a formal basis for broader participatory governance that provides for, inter alia, public engagement on delivery of services such as health, education, social affairs, transport and public works, as well as the creation of working groups with civil society for participation at the local level. Tunisia is also making use of technology to engage meaningfully with the public. 176 172 United States Environmental Protection Agency (2023) 173 OECD Public Governance Reviews. 2016. Open Government In Tunisia. Paris: OECD Publishing. p 82-3. 174 Ibid. p 85 175 Circular No. 12 of 21 May 2011 and Circular No. 13 of 23 May 2011 176 OECD (2016: p 94-5) Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 41 Tunisia’s land use planning legislation is equipped with environmental safeguards and is strongly interrelated with environmental legislation. 177 Tunisia’s Land Use Code 178 prescribes the use of a Master Plan and provides that the agency responsible for the affected territory develops such Master Plan in collaboration with other interested ministries and public agencies, organised in an inter-ministerial committee. 179 It also requires such Master Plan to summarise all feasible options for land use and propose mitigative measures to respond to environmental and other impacts. 180 5.3 Review 5.3.1 Public Participation The 1966 Zoning Law provides for public notice and objection requirements for the promulgation of public decisions and regulation and structural schemes 181 and provisions for right to appeal decisions and seek compensation for appropriation. The public is also afforded the right to request that violators of land use laws be noticed and cited by public officials for violations. 182 These requirements are provided with relative clarity regarding timing and procedures. However, there are several important shortcomings with the public participation processes under the 1966 Zoning Law. First, the 1966 Zoning Law‘s public participation processes are not proactive, and instead come after the applicable planning documents have already been drafted and are awaiting approval or ratification. Placing public participation so late in the process limits the usefulness of these features, as there will be a strong incentive at that point not to change course on the proposed measures. In the benchmark example of Tunisia, applicable laws require intergovernmental coordination and additional proactive participation and local levels. Second, there is no standard provided under the law for evaluating public comments or ruling on objections. In other words, there is no objective means of determining when the public’s input should or must inform public decision-making. Without this, a decision-maker could reject any public input or objection regardless of its merits, without recourse. In many jurisdictions, administrative due process laws require that, at the very least, public decision-makers must take into account public comments and objections, that they provide a response to such input, and that their responses and resulting decisions are rational or reasonable. The result may be arbitrary decisions that lack transparency and openness. Through consultation GAM indicates that there are no existing laws that provide for robust public engagement, and that this is a challenge for GAM. With respect to public consultation, GAM indicated that the lack of a process resulted in dissatisfied and uninformed citizens complaining about GAM land use decisions, or questioning why certain provisions have been put in place. 183 In contrast, in the benchmark example of Tunisia the 2014 Constitution requires open and transparent government practices that include proactive public involvement in preparing and implementing development projects. 177 World Bank. 2006. Safeguard Diagnostic Review for Piloting the Use of Tunisian Systems to Address Environmental Safeguard Issues in the Proposed World Bank-Assisted Tunisia. p 6. 178 Code of Land Management and Urban Development, Law 94-122 of November 28, 1994 179 Ibid. Arti. 5 180 Ibid. Art. 10 181 See e.g. 1966 Zoning Law Art. 17, 20, 21.1, 53.1, 62. 182 Ibid. Art. 38.13. 183 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 42 Public engagement processes appear to be stronger in the Draft Regulations than in previous laws. For example, public engagement is required prior to ratifying the Planning Guideline 184 and the City Executive Growth Plan. 185 The process for developing the Planning Guideline specifically calls for ”[e]ngaging the related parties in the formulation of the vision” for the City, 186 indicating a more proactive approach to development of this planning document. As discussed elsewhere in this report (see section 4.3.2 above), more detail could be provided in describing these public participation processes. Aspects such as the timing of public notice and comment, the standard of review for public comments, amendments based on comments, and appeals of decisions regarding comments are not included, and in fact the level of detail regarding the public participation processes is less than in the 1966 Zoning Law. While the lack of detail may be a strategic decision to provide GAM with more flexibility in determining the process for developing these documents, there should at the very least be a requirement for GAM to articulate the process in some form of accessible and binding document, such as implementing regulations. For detailed local plans, the Draft Regulations provide for a proactive approach to incorporating public participation in the development of local plans, whereby the “local community, including persons of competence, shall be engaged in developing the plan, by inviting them for a general meeting held for this purpose.” 187 This seems to be a positive development considering the lack of public participation processes in the 1966 Zoning Law. However, according to GAM recent changes under the 2021 GAM Law have also eliminated locally elected representatives from local decision-making planning bodies. 188 While this as improved GAM’s ability to implement planning decisions, it has removed a representative means of community input on planning decisions. As with previous legislation, the Draft Regulations also fail to provide indication of the import and effect of public participation. For example, the grounds for successful objection to a planning decision are not provided anywhere in the legislation. Accordingly, there is no standard by which to judge the reasonableness of responses to public participation or objections. The result may be arbitrary decisions that lack transparency and openness. 5.3.2 Environmental and cultural safeguards The 1966 Zoning Law also does not appear to require much consideration of environmental, historical, or cultural impacts of planning or land use decisions. Such considerations are indirectly addressed in the compensation provisions for licensing decisions, which includes an exception to compensation where authorities deny a license on the basis that construction “hinders, abuses, or harms archaeological objects, natural beauty, or its preservation.” 189 In the preparation of a regulatory scheme, existing natural, economic, human, and animal wealth must be taken into account. 190 However, there is no policy direction regarding the preservation of these resources or how these factors can be ‘taken into account’ in a meaningful way. The 1966 Zoning Law also provides for notices to be issued against various activities affecting the human and natural environment, including the destruction of trees, gardens, and parks, control of ads, preservation of the 184 Draft Regulations. Art. 6.1.i. 185 Ibid. Art. 7.2.f. 186 Ibid. Art.6.1.g.2. 187 Draft Regulations. Art. 8.h. 188 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. 189 2021 GAM Law. Art. 48,1,C. Third. 190 Ibid. Art. 14.1.L. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 43 city‘s “beauty and vigor“, prevention of pollution, control of traffic, and control of noise. 191 The basis for these violations is not provided in the law, however, so it is difficult to determine the basis for issuing a notification. GAM has indicated that in practice there are no existing laws that provide for robust review to identify, analyse, avoid, minimise, and mitigate any potential adverse environmental impacts, and to maximise environmental benefits, and that undertaking such review is a challenge for GAM. There is no environmental review process, although consideration of certain environmental factors are conducted as a result of designations made in the master plan for Amman. 192 In the benchmark example of Tunisia, separate environmental legislation applicable to planning processes provides safeguards to ensure adequate consideration of environmental issues. The 2021 GAM Law requires that GAM “[m]anage the crises and take the required precautions to protect the individuals and properties against the risks and damages caused by flooding, torrential rains, snow, fire, and other natural disasters”. 193 Otherwise, the law is largely absent on the topic of environmental safeguards. The 2021 GAM Law provides some policy direction with respect to the protection of cultural and historical resources. Article 13 provides that GAM shall assume powers to “conserve the city’s identity, its cultural and architectural heritage, by studying and identifying, assessing, and classifying the heritage buildings and sites . . . and developing policies, bylaws, instructions, and urban studies in relation to the preservation of architectural heritage of the Municipality’s areas.” 194 The goals provided in the Draft Regulations indicate some policy direction regarding protection of the environment and cultural resources where it lists “[c]onserving the natural or civilizational heritage system, and the environmental ecosystems in the city”. 195 Similarly, attention to the natural environment can be read into the Draft Regulations’ principle of sustainable development, which is described as: “planning contributes to developing the city to meet the needs of the individuals without undermining the ability of the future generations to meet their needs”. 196 However, as discussed elsewhere (legislative goals and principles), the goals and objectives of the Draft Regulations are not well tied to any mechanism or decision-making process in the rest of the legislation. In a few instances this goal is reflected in decision-making, for example where local plans must include a component addressing “[l]andscapes and urban spaces” and “[c]ivilization and natural heritage conservation sites”. 197 Similarly, overlay zones may be utilized for the protection of the natural environment or culturally important sites. 198 Currently there does not appear to be integration between planning requirements under the Draft Regulations and environmental requirements for projects required under environmental legislation. For example, there is no reference to compliance with environmental review as a condition of development or planning approval. As indicated above, the benchmark example Tunisia provides for interlinked environmental and planning legislation. 191 1966 Zoning Law. Art 40 – 45 192 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. The specific example presented was for West Amman, where the master plan calls for “green residential”, i.e. low density, development. 193 2021 GAM Law Art. 14.d. 194 Ibid. Art. 13.6. 195 Ibid. Part I. 196 Ibid. Part I. 197 Ibid. Art. 8.f. 198 Ibid. Art. 13. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 44 6 Institutions, Governance, Capacity 6.1 Criteria Good urban governance is required to achieve a sustainable city. Good governance enables better natural resource protection, disaster risk reduction, resilience, service delivery, resource efficiency, mobility and development planning. 199 This section describes the tenants of good urban governance, including institutional structuring and alignment to available capacity. Good governance is characterised by strong and clear inter-governmental relationships, including both vertical relationships between national, regional and local levels of government, and horizontal relationships between different departments or institutions on the same level. 200 Legislation can create clear inter- governmental relationships by delineating different government institutions and providing sufficient detail on their establishment, composition, reporting lines and, as discussed further below, their mandates/functions. Good governance also requires mandates/functions of local government assigned clearly and with sufficient detail. Legislation and policy ought to clearly set out exactly what local government’s functions are and how these are to be implemented. Decentralised state power (from national level to regional or local level) also marks good governance. This involves a degree of transfer or ‘devolution’ of legal powers to local governments in legislation. These powers include the ‘functions and responsibilities associated with essential service delivery, local economic development, the regulation of urban local form and function’ and urban planning. 201 Decentralised urban planning takes place closer to the citizens impacted by such plans and accordingly leads to better urban planning in general. Decentralisation also involves transferring or deploying sufficient human and financial resources at the local government level, i.e. sufficiently capacitating local government, as discussed further below. 202 Local government needs to be sufficiently capacitated in order to execute their functions competently and effectively. 203 The legal framework should make provision for adequate staffing, human resources, capacity building and training. In addition, legislation itself needs to consider capacity for implementation. Unrealistic requirements are unlikely to be effectively implemented. High quality planning legislation considers the capacity of those administering and enforcing it, and those governed by it, to comply with its requirements. For this reason, it is highly beneficial for legislation to be developed in consultation with those affected by it, including stakeholders who will implement it and those industries and members of the public who will be regulated by it. 204 199 United Nations Development Program. 2017. Sustainable Development Goals: Sustainable Cities and Communities. 200 Pieterse, M. & Mughogho, D. 2002. Governing South African cities. In: South African Cities Network. State of South African Cities Report. p 73. 201 Ibid. p 72. 202 Ibid. p 74. 203 Ibid 204 UN Habitat (2018: p 7) Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 45 6.2 Benchmark: Rwanda Rwanda’s practice of good governance, as described above, has translated to sustainable and effective service delivery at the local level. 205 In the early 2000s, Rwanda prioritised decentralising its government. It developed robust policies to achieve this objective: the National Decentralization Policy of 2000 (“Decentralization Policy”) sought to establish and empower decentralised local government, addressing devolution of powers, delegation of functions and deconcentration 206, and the Rwanda Decentralization Strategic Framework of 2007 (“RDSF”) sought to guide the implementation of the Decentralisation Policy. 207 The National Decentralization Stakeholders Forum was established as a platform for regular dialogue and inputs from a wide range of stakeholders on Decentralization Policy implementation. 208 Pursuant to the Decentralization Policy, the Rwanda government developed its legal framework (policies, laws, and medium term plans) to decentralise. 209 Accordingly, central government functions have been progressively devolved to local government, resources transferred to local government and mechanisms have been established to harmonise planning and budgeting processes between central and local level. 210 Rwanda’s decentralisation implementation process was successful in reinforcing institutional capacity building in participatory planning, budgeting and monitoring and evaluation. 211 Rwanda has well delineated inter-governmental relationships. It’s government is composed of two layers of government (central and local) and six administrative entities. The legal framework has established these institutions such that they are complementary; their roles and responsibilities are clear and distributed based on estimated capacities at each level and their comparative advantages. 212 The transfer of mandates/functions to local government was done clearly and with sufficient detail. The RDSF detailed exactly what functions would be transferred to which institutions at the local government level. 213 Rwanda is exemplary in how it has capacitated its local government workforce so that it can fulfil its mandate. Measures that have been taken to do so include: ensuring a high level of skill and qualification in government by requiring all districts’ and some sectors’ staff to have university degrees, with those in oversight positions requiring masters’ level degrees; empowering the workforce with status and corresponding salaries; and providing training to officials on many aspects of their roles (including, for example, how to approach media briefings). 214 205 Chemouni, B. 2017. Taking stock of Rwanda’s decentralisation: changing local governance in a post-conflict environment. London: Department of International Development, London School of Economics. p 5. 206 Ibid. p 7. 207 Ibid. p 3. 208 Ibid. p 4. 209 Ibid. p 3. 210 Ibid. p 3. 211 Ibid. p 10. 212 Rwanda Decentralization Strategic Framework of 2007.p 8. 213 Ibid.p 29-60 214 Chemouni; B. p 6 and 12. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 46 6.3 Review 6.3.1 Inter-governmental relationships and mandates The 1966 Zoning Law establishes inter-governmental relationships and assigns some local government functions. It provides for a hierarchical tiering of decision-making bodies. It starts with the Higher Zoning Council as the highest authority, composed of high-ranking national officials and the Mayor of Amman, which is and empowered with final appeal authority. 215 Below it, each governorate/district has a Regional Committee for Zoning and Buildings (“Regional Committee”), formed by high level governorate officials, whose responsibilities includes approval of detailed zoning schemes and considering appeals from below. 216 Below those, Committees of Local Cities Regulation (“Local Committees”) may be established, whose members include high ranking municipal officials, among them the municipality engineer. 217 Local Committees have authority to prepare detailed schemes of zoning, and to regulate and issue licenses for construction and buildings within its jurisdiction. 218 While the 1966 Zoning Law does establish the committees, their relationships and functions in some respects (the development and approval of regional and zoning and structural schemes, 219 and licensing approvals and appeals 220), clear delineation of responsibilities is limited. There is also an overlap of authorities under the 1966 Zoning Law. For example, both the Minister and the Higher Council of Regulation are responsible for declaring “areas of cities regulation.” 221 In other places, subsequent amendments have attributed authorities to more than one entity. 222 While GAM officials serve within the hierarchy of committees established under the 1966 Zoning Law, particularly at the local level, national government officials play a far more prominent role at regional and the Higher Zoning Council, reflecting a centrally-controlled decision-making focused at the national level. Even at the local level, Local Committee appointments may not be controlled by GAM. GAM officials have indicated that there has been tension at a local level between the authority committees and GAM. 223 This tension is likely a reflection of the lack of decision-making control by GAM at all levels of the hierarchy under the 1966 Zoning Law framework. The 1968 Subdivision Law appears to interlink the authority of governmental actors under that law with associated laws, including the predecessor to the 1966 Zoning Law 224 and the “applicable Expropriation Law”. 225 215 1966 Zoning Law Art. 5, 6. 216 Ibid. Art. 8. 217 Ibid. 9. 218 Ibid. 9.3.F.2 219 Ibid. Art. 6.B, 8.3.A., 9.3.F.2.A, 24. 220 Ibid. Art. 6.C. 9.3.F.2.D 221 Ibid. Art. 4(E); Art. 6(A). 222 Ibid. Art 14.4. 223 Videoconference call between WB, GAM officials and Pegasys held on 19 October 2022. 224 1968 Subdivision Law Art 2 225 Ibid. Art. 8.e. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 47 Article 32 of the 2021 GAM Law revises the governance structure established under the 1966 Zoning Law. Article 32 provides for the composition of the Supreme Planning Council (termed the ”Higher Zoning Council” in the 1966 Zoning Law), District Committees and Local Committees. The new composition of the Supreme Council under the 2021 GAM law reflects a modernized constituency, including representation of the Ministry of the Environment, the Director-General of the Department of Land and Survey, and urban planning expertise. These all appear to be positive developments. The diagram below reflects a comparison between the old and new compositions. Figure 2: Comparison of Higher Zoning Council versus Supreme Planning Council The 2021 GAM Law also departs from the 1966 Zoning Law in that it provides that Local Committees are to “comprise members from among the Municipality’s employees, under a decision issued by the Mayor upon the recommendation of the City Manager.” 226 As such, the new composition of Local Committees shifts power of Local Committees within GAM’s jurisdiction more directly to GAM, while GAM also plays a stronger controlling role at the regional level. GAM has advised that local representation has been removed from Local Committees in order to reduce tension and conflict between these committees and GAM. 227 The diagrams below reflect comparisons between the old and new compositions. 226 2021 GAM Law. Art. 32.c. 227 Interview with GAM officials 20 January 2023. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 48 Figure 3: Comparison of District (Regional) Committee under 1966 Zoning Law versus 2021 GAM Law Figure 4: Comparison of Local Committee under 1966 Zoning Law versus 2021 GAM Law Article 32 also importantly transfers or devolves powers to GAM with respect to planning for Amman. Article 32 provides that “[t]he Municipality shall, within its boundaries, assume all the city planning functions and powers and the manpower set out in the [1966 Zoning Law], or any other law that amends [or] supersedes it, provided that all matters related to the planning and zoning within the boundaries of the Municipality shall be Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 49 determined, including the planning and improvement proceeds, under a bylaw issued by GAM for this purpose.” 228 Article 35 further provides that the Council of Ministers must issue the bylaws required to implement to provisions of the law, ”including bylaws that enable the Municipality to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities provided in this Law.” 229 The 2021 GAM Law also preserves pre-existing laws until changed, meaning that the old laws will continue in effect until GAM enacts replacement laws. 230 The Draft Regulations are intended to replace the existing planning and institutional hierarchy established under the 1966 Zoning Law with new or amended institutions that better reflect current planning processes. In line with the delegation of planning responsibility to GAM, the membership of the Supreme Council for Planning is reformed, and several new institutions are established or announced including: the “Competent Body”, “Planning Area Committee” and “Planning Committee”. There are a number of instances in of the Draft Regulations where the roles of governmental actors and their relationships between each other is ambiguous and in need of clarification. In some cases, provisions are stated in the passive voice, making it difficult or impossible to identify who is responsible for conducting the action or activity. 231 In other cases, the legislation allocates responsibilities and rights in several different ways or in a way that makes the allocation of responsibility conditional or uncertain. For example, the Planning Guideline is to be developed by the Competent Body as defined under the law, but only “provided that it has the required technical, financial, and human capabilities and qualifications pursuant to the principles and standards specified for this purpose”. 232 It is not clear who is to determine whether the Competent Body meets these requirements, or whether another body if any would develop the Planning Guideline if the Competent Body were deemed unqualified. Likewise, Article 9, concerning amendments of subdivision plans, refers to both the “planning committee” and the “Competent Body” as the authority designated to approve zoning amendments. 233 Moreover, the “duties and powers” and “powers” of the Competent Body are contained in two different provisions, Articles 22 and 23, as well as in the definition of “Competent Body” under Article 2. The responsibilities and powers of entities should be stated clearly once in order to avoid contradictory statements of authority. The relationships between entities should be clearly stated in the processes for various planning mechanisms. In this respect, the benchmark examples of Rwanda and South Africa reflect a clearer legislation articulation of roles and responsibilities of institutions at a more local level. In some areas it appears that the allocation of responsibilities between entities may create discord or redundancy. For example, Article 8.i. provides that the “Competent Body is in charge of developing the detailed local plans, commissioned by the planning committee, and such plans shall be ratified by the planning area committee or the District Committee, for the plans that fall under category (a) of clause (c) above.” This provision indicates multiple parties involved, but does not clarify exact relationships and therefore could potentially lead to turf wars between competing bodies, or indecision because of a lack of clarity regarding the process involved in coordinating the activities of these entities. Again, the benchmark example of Rwanda can be useful in clearly explaining relationships between different levels and actors in government. In conclusion, review of the proposed relevant bodies and the relationship between them needs to be more carefully detailed in the Draft Regulations. 228 2021 GAM Law Art. 32. 229 Ibid. Art. 35.a. 230 Ibid. Art. 22.d., 32, 35.b. 231 Draft Regulations Art. 6(1)(e). 232 Ibid. Art. 6.1.c. 233 Ibid. Art. 9.a., 9.b. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 50 6.3.2 Decentralisation The structure of the 1966 Zoning Law provides for significant national government oversight over local planning decisions through entities such as the Higher Zoning Council. Such a structure is not in keeping with general planning trends, which have sought to localize planning decisions and increase local participation in planning matters. Nevertheless, the 1966 Zoning Law also reflects some devolution of authority, particularly through the establishment and powers of Regional Committees and Local Committees, which maintain significant responsibilities for administering local planning and land use activities within their respective jurisdictions. As with the 1966 Zoning Law, the 1968 Subdivision Law maintains strong national government oversight of local land use decisions. For example, the Council of Ministers must approve the zoning of any particular area within a Municipal Council’s jurisdiction. 234 However, the 1968 Subdivision Law also reflects some devolution of decision-making and, importantly, allocation of financial resources towards local structures. This is a critical feature enabling devolution of planning and land use authority. Article 32 of the 2021 GAM Law importantly transfers or devolves powers to GAM, namely powers relating to planning for Amman. Article 32 provides that “[t]he Municipality shall, within its boundaries, assume all the city planning functions and powers and the manpower set out in the [1966 Zoning Law], or any other law that amends [or] supersedes it, provided that all matters related to the planning and zoning within the boundaries of the Municipality shall be determined, including the planning and improvement proceeds, under a bylaw issued for this purpose.” 235 Article 35 further provides that the Council of Ministers must issue the bylaws required to implement to provisions of the law, ”including bylaws that enable the Municipality to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities provided in this Law.” 236 In keeping with the 2021 GAM Law devolution of local planning power, the Draft Regulations provide GAM with significant planning powers. Nevertheless, the national government continues to play a significant controlling role in metropolitan and local planning decisions through institutions such as the Supreme Planning Council. In broad terms this reflects a devolution of authority to more local levels similar to that of the benchmark example Rwanda. 6.3.3 Capacity The 1966 Zoning Law provides some useful tools for enabling implementation. It authorizes the issuance of regulations to carry out the provisions of the law. 237 It also empowers local authorities to issue notifications and orders of violations, to collect fines in some cases, and to collect fees (e.g. “zoning revenues”) that are deposited in the collecting entity’s accounts. 238 To the extent that the law provides detailed prescriptive requirements, such as for zoning schemes, this level of detail will be helpful for guiding zoning committees in their duties, although the inflexibility of these provisions has resulted in officials responsible for developing zoning schemes ignoring these, which corrodes the integrity of the law. 234 1968 Subdivision Law. Art 3. 235 2021 GAM Law Art. 32. 236 Ibid. Art. 35.a. 237 1966 Zoning Law. Art 67. 238 Ibid. Art 53.4. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 51 Some aspects of the 1966 Zoning Law suggest a need for significant capacity at implementing levels that may not be realistic. For example, the prescriptive requirements of the contents of regional zoning schemes and structural zoning schemes are extremely detailed, and this level of detail could well be beyond the ability of any governmental entity to either prescribe or enforce. 239 The need for zoning schemes to achieve regulation, and the fact that zoning schemes do not necessarily cover all or much of a jurisdiction, could create dramatically different development atmospheres in zoned areas versus non-zoned areas, or in areas subject to a valid zoning scheme versus other areas. This can result in perverse outcomes in practice, with developers seeking out the least regulated areas. Other provisions indicate that capacity for compliance with the law is a perceived issue. For example, the authority to grant contrary use permissions 240 indicates that legislators have sought to accommodate noncompliance with applicable zoning schemes. However, contrary use permissions only delay the need for compliance, and do not otherwise facilitate alignment between existing land uses with intended or expected uses provided in applicable zoning schemes. In certain respects the 1968 Subdivision Law indicates attention to the capacity of the institutions charged with implementing it. Valuation of property is accomplished by area, rather than individual property, for example. The attention to covering the costs of subdivision also indicates capacitating the government to effectively implement the law. However, given the difficulty in valuation of property, the law could provide more flexibility in survey and appraisal methods. 241 The 2021 GAM Law generally provides very little guidance or direction in implementing its transfer of authorities to GAM. While providing GAM with wide flexibility in implementing its new authorities, it also makes the work of developing lower level legislation more onerous. This raises the prospect of that legislation not clearly reflecting the intention to devolve power to GAM. The Draft Regulations appear to respond to some of the capacity issues limiting implementation of zoning schemes under the 1966 Zoning Law. For example, the detailed prescriptive requirements for contents of local zoning schemes have been replaced with a more performance-based set of requirements for the contents contained in city-wide and local plans. 242 This is an improvement. However, there does not appear to be any effort to address disparities in capacity to adhere to land use requirements. In some ways the relative lack of detail regarding processes contained in the Draft Regulations, such as in the process to develop plans, could help facilitate implementation by providing flexibility to GAM in establishing these processes. However, without sufficient guidance from the legislation or documentation of processes, effective implementation could be hampered simply because officials are unsure how to use the flexibility provided to them. For example, the lack of specific schedules or timelines for taking administrative decisions could immobilize officials rather than encourage them to be innovative, especially in a context where risk- taking in the administration is rare and, often, inappropriate. While legislation can anticipate capacity, it is also important for legislators to consider how capacity might be enhanced in response to the needs of the legislation. Undertaking a program of skills and qualifications improvement as well as training, as was done in the benchmark example of Rwanda, can prepare an administration to handle the demands of new legislation. 239 See Ibid. Art. 15.1 (region zoning schemes), Art. 19 (structural zoning schemes). 240 Ibid. Art 32. 241 1968 Subdivision Law. Art 6 and 8. 242 Draft Regulations. Art 6.1.f. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 52 The Draft Regulations provide for cost recovery of public expenses related to the amendment of subdivision plans. 243 This enables the capacity of GAM to recoup costs, thus opening the door to a form of land value capture. 243 Ibid. Art. 9.a. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 53 7 Proposed Reforms The proposed reforms fall into three broad categories: options for improved implementation and practice without changes to legislation; options for amending existing or proposed legislation; and options for proposing new legislation. Under each broad category we list options addressing the particular criteria by which we have assessed the relevant laws. Some of the proposed options are complementary with other options in the same or other categories, while others may be alternatives to other options. 7.1 Options for improved implementation and practice NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 7.1.1 Land Value Capture 1. Improve accuracy and detail of land valuation. The lack of accurate and detailed Inaccurate land-related Building internal capacity and information regarding urban land values constitutes a major impediment to information will continue to experience is difficult and effectively utilizing existing land value capture mechanisms, particularly hinder effective LVC time-consuming; data may be improvement levies under Article 54 of the 1966 Zoning Law. Reforming this would mechanisms even if there are very difficult or expensive to require investment in data collection and analysis, particularly in the land survey legislative reforms, or will obtain and maintain. department of GAM. It would also require that valuation be conducted more often, otherwise require new Demanding or unclear to provide more granular detail regarding changes in property values. Land legislation to adopt simplistic legislative requirements could valuation data should also be made public and easily accessible to enhance formulas that may unfairly be more easily solved through transparency and facilitate efficient land markets. allocate costs. legislative reforms that simplify calculation of valuations. 2. Improve accounting of public expenditures. The lack of accounting of public Improving accounting would GAM’s successful expenditures constitutes a major impediment to effectively utilizing existing land provide GAM with an implementation of zoning value capture mechanisms, particularly zoning revenues under Article 52 of the improved basis for calculating revenues indicates that 1966 Zoning Law. Improving accounting would likely require administrative reforms zoning revenues, thereby sufficiently justifying charges to processes much broader than those dealing only with planning. making such charges more is a very burdensome defensible in court. GAM has process. Some of the burden already demonstrated that it also appears to be based on can impose these charges the legislatively defined successfully. means of calculating the rate, which takes into account property values rather than strictly GAM costs (assuming Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 54 that zoning revenues act as impact fees, not increment taxes). 3. Improve levy and tax collection. One of the major limitations for GAM is with Improving collection would New imposition of annual respect to the point of collection for levies, forcing GAM to collect only when a unlock existing and new LVC taxes or levies is likely to be specific license or approval is needed, rather than subsequent to completion of mechanisms (it would be a unpopular. development or on an ongoing basis (in the case of taxes). Review of existing pre-requisite to levy collection practices should be reviewed and assessed for opportunities to improve. collection). 4. Improve compliance with land use regulations through review of enforcement A review of enforcement can Internal reviews and public practices and public outreach. Effective regulation of land use relies on effective help identify areas for outreach is time consuming compliance. Compliance relies on both enforcement and acceptance and improvement of existing and costly, and benefits may understanding of applicable requirements among stakeholders. Review of current requirements. Public outreach only be realized if they are enforcement practices could lead to improvements in effective compliance and point can facilitate understand and taken up and acted upon. to areas of public investment. Acceptance and understanding amongst stakeholders acceptance of land use requires engagement with the public and industry, both to convey requirements and regulations. also to understand obstacles to compliance. See also section 7.1.2.1 and 7.1.3.1 below 5. Focus use of betterment levies to project-specific or service-specific cases. Selecting certain projects for Limited selection based on Narrowing the focus of development levies and/or zoning revenues could reduce implementation of levies that particular projects and types the implementation burden on GAM and improve GAM’s ability to demonstrate land lend themselves to easier of service would preclude value increases. calculation of benefits could broader recoupment of public improve the defensibility of costs or benefit of public such charges. Focusing on investments, and could create specific projects or services an expectation of such with that provide clearer benefits the public. Selective will make collection easier. implementation could unfairly target certain areas or groups. 6. Develop and publicize guidance clarifying the methodology for calculations of Developing guidance is Even if more transparent, zoning revenues and development levies. Clearer documentation of the means relatively easy to implement, such charges may still not be for calculating existing mechanisms could lead to better public expectations and not requiring legislation. A accepted by the public. The acceptance of charges and lead to calculations that are more defensible in court. better system of legislation itself is not very disseminating and clear and could be subject to communicating guidance multiple interpretations, could reduce legal exposure making it difficult to craft and Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 55 by clarifying “rules of the defend a particular game” to the public. methodology. 7.1.2 Planning 1. Improve urban data collection, use, and dissemination. Good planning requires Better coordination regarding Data collection, retention, and informed decision-making to achieve intended urban development goals. While it sharing and disseminating organizing can be costly and appears from engagement with the WB that GAM has relatively good urban data data could improve the level time-consuming. Increased availability, the relatively high-level data regarding property valuation indicates that of analysis conducted, data collection can create improvements could be made in terms of land markets. Leveraging data also resulting in better projections concerns regarding control requires investing in tools (e.g. consolidated portals and databases) and processes upon which to plan urban and security of private and to ensure that data is used effectively and productively. For instance, preliminary development. personal data, requiring calculations from the WB regarding the potential changes in land value based on additional safeguards. zoning changes suggests significant potential for LVC that could enhance the resources available for promoting healthier and more sustainable urban form. 244 This information is vital to making the case for planning reform. See also section 7.1.3.1 below 2. Engage public and industry in planning process reform workshop series. Proactive public outreach Public outreach is time- GAM could engage in a public workshop or listening series to gather feedback could better equip GAM to consuming and public input about current planning processes and suggestions for reform. Initiating a workshop propose workable may not be constructive or or listening series with the public and particularly those involved in the building and improvements to its current participation may be lack- development industries would provide GAM with a better understanding regarding planning system and set the luster. bottlenecks in the regulated development of Amman, and could also generate stage for future reforms. It public interest and investment in planning law reform. Such engagement would be could increase public advisable as a pre-requisite to larger-scale legal reforms to GAM’s system of stakeholder support for planning and land use regulation. reform. See also section 7.1.3 below 7.1.3 Public Participation and Safeguards 1. Establish policies, best practices, and/or guidelines for public consultation Establishing proactive Requiring specific types of and education in plan development. While no existing law or regulations mandate accessible and transparent public consultation without it, GAM could implement internal policies, best practices, and/or guidelines for practices for public authorizing legislation could soliciting and incorporating public comment on proposed government actions, consultation could help GAM potentially expose GAM to particularly the development of plans. In so doing, GAM could simply begin identify and address key litigation, particularly if such a consulting with the public in their decision-making process in practice, even before sensitive public policy issues process had the effect of 244 Kaw et. al. (2022); Kleineberg, T. et al. (2023) Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 56 amending or promulgating legislation to this effect. These policies could require earlier in planning cycles, unduly delaying decisions. GAM to, inter alia, inform the public of certain development-related decisions with resulting in more robust plans The additional burden of sufficient notice; make information pertaining to the decision available to the public, and reducing some types of engaging in public including environmental or cultural impact assessments; undertake a process of litigation. Informing the public consultation in general is consultation to obtain public comment; and enable a process for the public to earlier on in planning likely to slow down planning appeal a decision. processes could result in process in general. better acceptance and less resistance to projects and policy decisions that are priorities for GAM. 2. Establish policies relating to the preservation of architectural heritage. The Establishing such policies Establishing such policies 2021 GAM Law expressly authorizes GAM to perform this task, which could set out would increase sensitivity of could create additional burden the ground rules for considering the architectural heritage of Amman in making government planning in complying with new plans and approving development. decisions to architectural procedures. Per the 2021 heritage; expressly authorized GAM Law, GAM authority in by the 2021 GAM Law. this area is subject to passing comprehensive legal reforms. 7.1.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity 1. Develop strategy for improved capacity building. It is recommended that GAM Developing and implementing Implementation of capacity capacitate officials to execute their functions competently and effectively. As a strategy in place to develop building strategy would starting point, GAM could develop a strategy for how it plans to carry out such improved capacity building require significant time and capacity building. Such strategy should cover how GAM intends to provide officials would move GAM towards a resources. with training or develop guidelines in relation to several aspects of officials’ jobs, more capacitated and including: the legislative framework governing their role; their mandate and how to effective workforce. implement it; their relationships with other government institutions; decision-making processes. The strategy should also cover providing technical training per department for GAM officials. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 57 7.2 Options for amendments to existing and proposed legislation NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 7.2.1 Land Value Capture 1. Provide express legal authority for existing practice of assessing This change provides legal The assessment of “compensation fees” as a development rights charge. The national authority for a charge that is compensation fees as government, in consultation with GAM, could codify the authority and process for already widely used in development rights charges imposing “compensation fees”, which it already imposes through an interpretation of practice and more accepted may be unpopular, and Article 47 of the 1966 Zoning Law. It is our understanding that this is the objective of than other legislated compliance may be low, the new proposed “development rights” provision in the Draft Regulation. However, charges, but also improves because of challenges in the national government in consultation with GAM could enact a stand-alone GAM’s authority to impose calculating or demonstrating provision to clarify GAM’s authority to impose this charge while more charges where no license the value created through comprehensive legislation is being developed. has been requested. regulation alone (as opposed to value created by public infrastructure provision). In addition, charging a development rights charge may practically speaking discourage imposition of impact fees, which are easier to justify. This change would require stand-alone stopgap legislative action by the national government. 2. Revise proposed provisions to introduce development impact fees. The This change reforms a Existing charges may have too national government in consultation with GAM could redraft the provisions for longstanding legal much “history”, discouraging zoning revenues found under Article 52 the 1966 Zoning Law for incorporation into mechanisms and fixes compliance or confusing the the Draft Regulation. GAM states that it is already attempting a form of this through “known” problems. It also public. This change would its proposals for “development rights allowances” under the “development rights” improves differentiation require stand-alone stopgap provision of the Draft Regulations, which GAM asserts reflect a combination of between development impact legislative action by the Article 47.2 and Article 52. In addition, Article 9 of the Draft Regulations also fees and other available land national government. provides for what appears to be a development impact fee. To improve the value capture mechanisms, functioning of these provisions as true development impact fees, the applicable such as betterment levies provisions should be restated to more clearly reflect a true development impact fee, Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 58 NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES i.e. a fee imposed by local government on a new or proposed development project (e.g. Article 54 development to cover all or a portion of the costs of providing public services and/or infrastructure levies). serving the new or proposed development. 245 Revisions and restatement of the development impact fee provision would include the following: (1) re-term the charges as “development impact fees”; (2) eliminate the distinction between “public” and “private” zoning revenues provided for under the 1966 Zoning Law and consolidate the authority to impose them with GAM; (3) provide the calculation of charges purely based on public costs of infrastructure improvement, rather than to land values (4) consider narrowing the types of public expenditures upon which zoning revenues are calculated; (5) charge the applicant of a development, not the property owner; (6) charge the applicant at the time of application. Clear thresholds for the amount charged, similar to those used in practice today, could also be considered to improve implementation, but doing so could also render the law too inflexible and may result in over- or under-payment. 3. Reintroduce improved version of betterment levies. GAM could redraft the This change retains Existing charges may have too provisions for development levies found under Article 54 of the 1966 Zoning Law for longstanding legal much “history”, discouraging incorporation into the Draft Regulation. To improve the functioning of development mechanisms and fixes compliance or confusing the levies, the applicable provisions adopted from the 1966 Zoning Law should be “known” problems. public. This change would restated to more clearly reflect a betterment levy, i.e. a tax or fee imposed on require stand-alone stopgap owners of selected properties to cover the cost of public investments from which legislative action by the they directly benefit. 246 Moreover, the betterment levy provision would need to be national government. tied to new public investments. 7.2.2 Planning 1. Make application of stated legislative planning principles and goals more More explicit application of Even if made more explicit, explicit in Draft Regulations. While the Draft Regulations, unlike the 1966 Zoning stated planning principles, broad and vague statements of Law, establish planning principles, goals, and objectives that are to guide planning goals, and objectives could principle may be difficult to decision in Amman, these could be integrated more expressly into decision-making guide decision-makers and enforce. Requiring decision- provided under that draft law, through cross references or provisions requiring assist the public in holding makers to take into account decision-makers to take them into account in making particular decisions. officials accountable principles may subject them to more requirements and less 245 Juergensmeyer, J. C. & Roberts, T. E. 2003. Land Use Planning and Development Regulatory Law. St. Paul, MN: West Group. p 351-373. 246 Schloeter, L. 2016. Financing Urban Infrastructure in Emerging Cities: Betterment Levies. Inter-American Development Bank. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 59 NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES flexibility, and result in additional litigation. 2. Make plans more enforceable by connecting their development and More explicit and direct links Overly prescriptive or onerous implementation with other administrative processes and decisions. A common between planning processes requirements can limit efficacy struggle in many jurisdictions is the enforcement of plans. The most effective means and other governmental and implementation. of creating this enforceability is by expressly connecting them with other processes impacting governmental administrative processes, including budgeting and land use development increases the decisions. The Draft Regulations make explicit connections between spatial and impact and success of economic planning, but more explicit ties between spatial and economic planning planning projects. and budgeting, financial decisions, and governmental projects will increase the probability that the vision reflected in planning documents are realized. At the same time, the flexibility of planning documents must be maintained. 3. Make enforcement provisions of land use regulation clearer and more explicit Additional clarity regarding Enforcement may be limited by in the Draft Regulations. In order to improve compliance, the enforcement enforcement will make capacity issues, which need to mechanisms for land use regulations should be made clearer and more explicit in implementation more legally be considered in drafting the Draft Regulations. Currently, there is a lack of detail regarding how land use defensible. requirements. regulations will be enforced, when, and by whom. These may be articulated in greater detail in implementing regulations and policies, but the authority to do so should be made more explicit. 4. Clarify language regarding hierarchy of plans in Draft Regulations. Under the Revising the Draft It may be easier to reformulate English translation of the Draft Regulations the mechanisms and processes for Regulations to establish hierarchy to reference existing planning, including the new proposed hierarchy of plans, is not clear, which could clearer relationships and economic/financial result in significant difficulty applying them. For example, the contents of the processes will decrease administrative processes, if Amman master plan are contained in two different plans, the Planning Guideline ambiguity in implementation, these processes are well (Article 6) and the Growth Executive Plan (Article 7), but these plans have reducing legal exposure for defined. The hierarchy should overlapping yet separate requirements and timelines. Moreover, the categories for GAM. be consistent with future local plans are unclear, including whether different “categories” of local plans are broader national legislative separate or components of a single plan. Finally, it is not clear how the master plan framework. or local plans relate to subdivision plans (Article 9). Revisions to organization and clearer use of defined terms would improve clarity. In general, the planning processes proposed lack the level of detail provided in the 1966 Zoning Law or the planning benchmark case. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 60 NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 5. Clarify the Draft Regulations’ “planning tools”. The “planning tools” contained in Clearer understanding of It is preferable to incorporate Part 5 could be clarified further, particularly their purpose and use, and relationship uses of planning tools the “planning tools” section of with primary plans. For example, the reasons and criteria for utilizing special provided in proposed the Draft Regulations into planning zones (Article 12), overlay zones (Article 13), and “subsequent provisions” legislation will decrease other provisions of the Draft (Article 14) should be made clearer. It is recommended that these provisions be ambiguity. Regulations. integrated into the appropriate sections of the Draft Regulations, rather than grouped together under their own section. 7.2.3 Public Participation and Safeguards 1. Incorporate more proactive public consultation in government planning Establishing proactive The additional burden of processes in the Draft Regulations. The Draft Regulations already provide new accessible and transparent engaging in public consultation authority requiring public consultation in the development of city and local plans. practices for public in general is likely to slow However, these provisions could provide for a more robust and proactive process, consultation could help GAM down planning process in with public notice and comment and public outreach more integrated into the identify and address key general. development of plans. sensitive public policy issues earlier in planning cycles, resulting in more robust plans and reducing some types of litigation. Informing the public earlier on in planning processes could result in better acceptance and less resistance to projects and policy decisions that are priorities for GAM. 2. Reintroduce local representation on land use committees in the Draft Local representation on Reintroduction of local Regulations. The 2021 GAM Law could be revised to reincorporate local Local Committees would representation would likely representation on Local Committees. In other words, GAM’s decision remove local establish a built-in means of result in the same challenges representatives should be reversed. Local representation on Local Committees incorporating public input that GAM previously faced in enables indirect public participation through representation In addition to enabling through local public leaders. coordinating planning and land Public Participation, revising the 2021 GAM Law to reincorporate GAM use activities with Local representation on Local Committees would improve GAM’s urban governance. Committees. 3. Explicitly incorporate reference to existing laws providing environmental and This incorporation could Cross-cutting requirements cultural safeguards in the Draft Regulations. Approval and decision-making assist in ensuring compliance can be difficult to coordinate Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 61 NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES processes under the Draft Regulations could make reference to corresponding with environmental and could cause confusion if environmental review requirements for development projects. This could be through legislation. inarticulately drafted reference to applicable environmental legislation, e.g. Law No. 6 of 2017 and Regulation No. 37 of 2005 (note that detailed review of this law was beyond the scope of this engagement). 7.2.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity 1. Pass Draft Regulations to empower GAM under 2021 GAM Law. Article 32 of Passage of a bylaw by GAM Rushing development and the 2021 Gam Law requires legislation to devolve to GAM the power to promulgate would automatically trigger promulgation of a bylaw to bylaws, particularly in relation to planning. In order to assume these powers and the reformed institutions allow GAM to assume operate in a decentralised way, GAM needs to proceed with developing and provided under the 2021 authority could create passing the bylaws as it is now mandated to do. This would be accomplished by GAM Law, setting members significant confusion, finalising and passing the Draft Regulations. of planning bodies that are particularly if the new bylaw is more in line with existing ambiguous and not well planning needs. understood by relevant stakeholders. This could well require significant additional effort to further amend and reform the new systems— likely more work than a slower but more deliberate initial rollout. 7.3 Options for new legislation NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 7.3.1 Land Value Capture 1. Authorize new provisions for development impact fees as part of new Authorizing new provisions Global standards may not be planning framework. As an alternative to amending and reincorporating existing for development impact fees as well suited to the local provisions of Article 52 of the 1966 Zoning Law for zoning revenues, GAM could as part of new planning context as existing provisions draft an entirely new replacement, termed a “development impact fee”, for inclusion framework would provide a that have been shaped to meet in the Draft Regulation. Development impact fees would be based purely on the “fresh start” that can draw on local circumstances and cost of public infrastructure serving a particular development, chargeable to a international experience and expectations. Starting over Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 62 NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES developer at the time of seeking development approval. The elements of the new global best practices to could require additional provision would be the same as those provided for under the option for revising the clarify charges and make training and capacity building zoning revenue provisions (discussed above). them more publicly on top of that already required acceptable. This would not for existing reforms. This require further national would require enactment of legislation if part of comprehensive planning comprehensive GAM legislation by GAM. planning law. 2. Authorize new provisions for betterment levies as part of new planning Authorize new provisions for Global standards may not be framework. As an alternative to amending and reincorporating existing provisions betterment levies as part of as well suited to the local of Article 54 of the 1966 Zoning Law for development levies, GAM could draft an new planning framework context as existing provisions entirely new replacement, termed a “betterment levy” (or “infrastructure levy”), for would provide a “fresh start” that have been shaped to meet inclusion in the Draft Regulation. Betterment levies would be assessed on property that can draw on local circumstances and owners after completion of a project within a bounded period and would be based international experience and expectations. Starting over on detailed assessment of the impact of public improvements on individual global best practices to could require additional properties. The elements of the new provision would be the same as those provided clarify charges and make training and capacity building for under the option for revising the development levies provisions (discussed them more publicly on top of that already required above). acceptable. This would not for existing reforms. require further national Betterment levies are generally legislation if part of difficult to implement due to comprehensive GAM the difficulties in accurately planning law. determining property value increases. This would require enactment of comprehensive planning legislation by GAM. 3. Authorize land readjustment provisions as part of new planning framework. Land readjustment is Coordinating cooperation of Land readjustment provisions authorize the government to pool or re-assemble effective in areas with more local landowners can be private land in a given area in order to more efficiently plan and serve it. Private cohesive communities and difficult. This would require land owners agree to receive a smaller parcel made more valuable by resulting that have been developed enactment of comprehensive public improvements. The government in turn receives excess land in to use for but are poorly and planning legislation by GAM. public purposes. 247 The Draft Regulations appeared to contain a provision inefficiently planned and serviced, allowing for 247 World Bank [Internet]. Land Readjustment: Urban Regeneration. [updated 2015; cited 2023]. Available from: https://urban-regeneration.worldbank.org/node/31. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 63 NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES equipping GAM with the authority to enter into land readjustment agreements, but opportunities to consolidate GAM has indicated that it has removed this provision. parcels. This would not require further national legislation if part of comprehensive GAM planning law. 4. Authorize charges for development rights. GAM could impose a new charge or Authorizing charges for Authorizing such charges extraction for granting additional development rights. This law would resemble development rights would would not be effective where GAM’s current “compensation fee” in many respects, but would be expressly provide tailored opportunity land values are suppressed; codified and would be based on a theory of contribution to public benefit purposes for GAM to incentivize and generally only applied to in exchange for existing development rights. This new charge might be applied in a benefit from increased development rights beyond more targeted manner, e.g. as a “density bonus.”’ Provides tailored opportunity for density not provided for in those already provided. This GAM to incentivize and benefit from increased density not provided for in existing existing zoning. This would would require enactment of zoning. This would not require further national legislation. require further national comprehensive planning legislation. This would not legislation by GAM. require further national legislation if part of comprehensive GAM planning law. 7.3.2 Planning 1. Authorize comprehensive planning legislation from GAM to replace 1966 Authorizing comprehensive Authorizing comprehensive Zoning Law. Comprehensive reform of the planning framework in Amman and planning legislation from planning legislation from GAM Jordan is needed. The existing law is extremely outdated, and its institutions and GAM to replace 1966 Zoning to replace 1966 Zoning Law processes are not used and do not respond to the current needs. A new network of Law is a much needed will take significant time and institutions and systems built on current working practices and lessons learned from change that can allow for effort, as well as buy-in from past failures is required. Comprehensive reform will allow for the government to utilization of new planning relevant stakeholders. Until take advantage of new planning standards and tools, to holistically and sustainably tools and techniques, as well GAM issues the Draft address development challenges. The 2021 GAM Law serve as a useful enabling as reform of existing planning Regulations (or other bylaws law, and the Draft Regulations constitute a promising early beginning to processes and mechanisms. as prescribed in the 2021 GAM comprehensive legislative reform. However, completing and refining the Draft It is necessary to take this Law), GAM is unable to assert Regulations to properly replace the older legislation will take time and significant action in order to effect the the new authority granted to it buy-in from multiple levels of government. Ultimately, there needs to be reform not reforms under the 2021 GAM under the 2021 GAM Law. just within Amman but nationally. Law, and avoid the need for Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 64 NO. PROPOSED REFORM ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES additional national legislation to reform current processes. 7.3.3 Public Participation and Safeguards 1. Require environmental review of governmental planning decisions as part of Incorporating new New environmental review new planning framework. New environmental review requirements beyond environmental review requirements could increase project-specific environmental impact statements could be imposed through the requirements would increase burdensomeness of Draft Regulations or by means of other legislation. The objective would be to extend consideration of procedures for governmental the type of environmental assessment imposed on particular projects to other types environmental impacts in all decision-making, e.g. approval of decision-making, including both policy actions such as the adoption of plans or governmental planning and of plans, and expose GAM to zoning changes, in order to ensure environmentally sound decision-making for land use decisions. new environmental litigation. governmental planning activities guiding development. 248 Further review of the applicable environmental legislative framework would be required to determine to what extent public decisions are subject to environmental review requirements, but discussion with GAM officials indicates that such decisions are not. 7.3.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity 1. Authorize new comprehensive institutional hierarchy to replace 1966 Zoning Clearer consolidation of This reform may diverge too Law hierarchy. Rather than using the existing planning hierarchy as it is or as control over metropolitan much from current institutional reformed, GAM in conjunction with the Jordanian national government could planning within GAM may establishments and be consider a new hierarchy that devolves more authority to GAM without reliance on reduce bureaucracy and unnecessary to reform existing Regional and Local Committee structure. Responsibility for the achieve the goal of more planning in Amman. Further development of plans would rest solely within the GAM planning department, with localized control over consolidation of control in approval by the Municipal Council of Amman. This would consolidate power more planning decisions. Amman may not align with clearly within GAM, reflecting the direction of reforms in Jordan global trends national government goals, towards metropolitan control over planning. However, it may unnecessarily diverge could disempower sub- too much from existing practices and reforms and may not be necessary to achieve metropolitan institutions the goals of providing GAM additional control over metropolitan-wide planning. further. See also section 7.3.2 above. 248 Note that review of the applicable environmental legislation of Amman and Jordan is beyond the scope of this project, and would need to be undertaken to further refine this proposal. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 65 8 Recommendations From the available options for reform described above, we have identified specific recommended reforms that we believe should be undertaken in order to improve planning and sustainable development in Amman. The following recommendations are organized according to the four criteria used to assess the legal framework. Within each category of recommendation, we have referenced certain legislative and non-legislative options (in bold) that are introduced above. The Implementation Plan accompanying this report takes these recommendations forward and guides GAM on implementation thereof. The Implementation Plan should serve as a work schedule or programme setting out a logical sequencing of implementation steps. 8.1 Land Value Capture recommendations In order to improve key revenue generating mechanisms and improve financial sustainability, GAM needs to undertake both administrative and legislative reforms. To effect the new powers granted to GAM under the 2021 GAM Law, GAM should pass legislation that gives effect to recommended reforms. However, the Draft Regulations, which are the currently proposed vehicle to accomplish this, are still in an early form and require significant revisions and workshopping before they can be promulgated. GAM should revise the land value capture provisions in the Draft Regulations to appropriately link fees and levies to the rationale for and means of their collection. The following revisions should be made to the Draft Regulations with respect to LVC: (i) GAM should revise proposed provisions to introduce development impact fees to explicitly link the calculation and payment of fees authorizing development to direct public costs incurred in providing additional infrastructure and services as a result of that development. Article 9 of the Draft Regulations provides the language closest to a development impact fee, but this fee must be more clearly and explicitly stated and criteria or an explanation of how charges will be set is necessary. To increase the defensibility of the charge, the revised provisions would differ from existing “compensation fees” under Article 47.2 of the 1966 Zoning Law and proposed “development right allowances” in that their calculation would be based on purely on costs of additional infrastructure and services, not land value increases. They would differ from “zoning revenues” of Article 52 of the 1966 Zoning Law, in that the allowable costs would be more narrowly tailored to the impacts of development. (ii) GAM should also authorize new provisions for betterment levies that are calculated based on the incremental increase in value of properties as a result of a public investment in infrastructure or services (other than roads, which is provided for in Articles 211 and 212 of the 2019 Property Law). This provision may resemble the development levy provisions of Article 54 of the 1966 Zoning Act, but provide more workable provisions for calculations of levies. The means of calculating the rate of the levy should be clearly stated in the law. This provision would authorize assessments for projects. (iii) GAM should also consider using the Draft Regulations authorize land readjustment provisions. While existing provisions are not used, and GAM indicates that draft provisions were eliminated because of potential conflict with land surveying, land readjustment can serve as an effective land value capture tool when properly tailored and targeted. There is no need for land readjustment provisions to conflict with land surveying if properly drafted. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 66 (iv) GAM should also authorize charges for development rights, which would resemble GAM’s current “compensation fee” in many respects, but would be expressly codified and would be based on a theory of contribution to public benefit purposes in exchange for existing development rights. To improve effectiveness, it is suggested these charges should be narrowly tailored. In order to effectively implement the above LVC provisions, it is essential that GAM improve accuracy and detail of land valuation. GAM also needs to improve accounting of public expenditures related to major public investments so that it may accurately calculate and defend charges. If GAM desires to also impose a development rights charge based on a theory of LVC similar to its existing compensation fee, it would likely maximize compliance by characterizing this change as a density bonus or by extracting in-kind contributions rather than financial ones. Specific LVC mechanisms such as development impact fees and betterment levies cannot and should not substitute for an effective land taxation system. Furthermore, an effective taxation systems are required to implement many forms of LVC that GAM may want to pursue in the future, including specific land value increment taxes, special assessment districts, and business improvement districts. Accordingly, GAM should improve levy and property tax collection. Finally, for the LVC mechanisms to be implemented effectively, GAM will need to take measures to improve compliance with land use regulations through review of enforcement practices and public outreach. In the interim, while the Draft Regulations are being revised, GAM can undertake certain reforms that would in any event compliment the revised Draft Regulations once they are enacted. While it is a tempting alternative to expressly authorize “compensation fees,” the primary source of development-related revenues for GAM, as proposed in the Draft Regulations, this mechanism reflects a compensation theory based on development rights charges, which are more difficult to calculate and impose than other charges discussed above, and may reduce willingness to comply. The “development rights allowances” proposed in the Draft Regulations is calculated based on incremental increase in property values, but is not closely tied to specific public investments or costs of servicing new development. Instead, it seeks to recapture value created by GAM’s regulatory power over land. While such development rights charges can be used, this is often more appropriately and fairly captured through taxation. If GAM decides to continue charging development rights charges, it should work on reforming the calculation of these charges in order to make them more legally defensible and also to provide more transparency to payers. Development rights charges that are more fairly assessed or more narrowly tailored will increase the successful imposition of other complimentary LVC mechanisms, such as impact fees. GAM should also focus use of betterment levies to project-specific or service-specific cases, i.e. areas that benefit from major public infrastructure projects whose costs and expected benefits can be well documented. Targeted national-level legislation could seek to reform GAM’s existing authority to impose LVC mechanisms under the legal regime imposed under the 1966 Zoning Law. This could include passing a national law reforming one or more of the mechanisms described above, in order to strengthen GAM’s existing authority pending more comprehensive reforms.These revisions would require and be contingent upon non-legislative reforms described above, including simplifying the calculations of “improvement levies” and “zoning revenues”, and providing express legal authority for existing practice of assessing “compensation fees” as a development rights charge. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 67 8.2 Planning The hierarchy of planning documents is clearly established under the existing 1966 Zoning Law, but this hierarchy does not follow current practice or modern standards for planning and land use processes. Recent national legislation, i.e. the 2021 GAM Law, has further authorized GAM to impose reforms. Accordingly, it is appropriate and timely for GAM to develop a new hierarchy of planning mechanisms and procedures to meet GAM’s current needs through comprehensive planning legislation governing Amman. GAM has begun work on comprehensive planning legislation, drafting the Draft Regulations, which include a number of important and positive reforms. However, the Draft Regulations are in an early stage and lack the organization, coherence, and comprehensiveness required. Accordingly, GAM should revise the Draft Regulations to improve planning related provisions. The Draft Regulations should be revised to include clarifying the language regarding the hierarchy of plans in the Draft Regulation, which currently (in its English translation) is ambiguous in some respects. This includes more accurate and appropriate explanation of the scope of the legislation, better organization of provisions, and better definition and explanation of proposed institutions, mechanisms, and processes., For instance, GAM should clarify the Draft Regulation’s “planning tools”, contained in Article 12, particularly their purpose and use, and relationship with primary plans. Improving the clarity and structure of the Draft Regulations overall will improve understanding and clarity regarding the different complimentary components of GAM’s comprehensive planning strategy. Additionally, in order to make more effective use of the principles and goals established in the Draft Regulation, GAM should make application of stated legislative planning principles and goals more explicit in Draft Regulations. For example, these could be required to be considered in developing plans, helping improve accountability regarding application of the principles and goals. As discussed below, GAM should also improve the robustness of its analysis and decision-making by incorporating more proactive public consultation in government planning processes in the Draft Regulation. More proactive public participation will help reveal challenges and tensions earlier in the process, and provide more opportunity to address them up front rather after a plan has been approved. Importantly, GAM should engage the public and the real estate industry in a series of planning process reform workshops in respect of the Draft Regulations, to gather feedback about current planning processes and further suggestions for reform. GAM would be able to garner stakeholder buy-in and support of the new planning processes that would be incorporated in the revised Draft Regulations through such a workshop series, and this would ultimately lead to effective implementation of planning processes. In addition, GAM should establish policies, best practices, and/or guidelines for the new planning process to accompany the revised Draft Regulations. Improvements in communicating planning and land use decisions should also help encourage wider acceptance of taxes and charges that are directed towards realizing plans and land use strategies. A further measure that GAM should take to improve planning in general is to improve its information systems with respect to urban data collection, use, and dissemination. Being equipped with sufficient data with respect to land use will enable GAM to make more informed decisions and plan with greater accuracy. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 68 Ultimately, the new planning reforms established for Amman should be replicated for the entire country, and a comprehensive national framework for planning and land use management should be introduced. The current provisions of the 2021 GAM Law do not provide such a framework, and consideration needs to be taken to longer term reforms to the rest of the country’s planning processes that integrate with the planning framework for Amman. This is particularly important in order to ensure integrated urban-rural policies and practices around the Amman metropolitan area. 8.3 Public Participation and Safeguards Reforms should be undertaken to improve public participation and impose environmental and social safeguards. The quickest way to improve public participation and safeguards is for GAM to develop policies, best practices, and/or guidelines (i.e. not legislation) that require GAM to consult the public and consider emotional and cultural impacts in its existing decision-making processes. This would be an initial and preliminary measure to start GAM’s practice of public engagement in decision making and could anticipate or guide development of complimentary legislation. There are however risks associated with undertaking public participation processes without these being provided for in legislation, as noted in the previous section. The best option, although it would take longer to effect than introducing policies, would be for GAM to update the Draft Regulations to make improved provision for public participation and safeguards. While the Draft Regulations for the first time expressly provides for direct public consultation in publishing plans, GAM should take further steps to incorporate more proactive public consultation in government planning processes in the Draft Regulations. More proactive public participation should help GAM identify, understand, and address opposition within communities to proposed plans. The legislation for planning should also better integrate with applicable environmental legislation. As a relatively simple measure, GAM should explicitly incorporate reference to existing environmental safeguards in the Draft Regulations, i.e. the environmental review processes required for development under applicable environmental regulations. This recommendation would require closer analysis of adjacent environmental legislation and potentially revisions to overlapping environmental and planning law regimes. 8.4 Institutions, Governance, Capacity There is a clear need to establish new legislation clarifying the mechanisms and processes that GAM uses to plan and regulate land use in Amman, and the 2021 GAM Law authorizes GAM to assume increased planning powers and reform its planning regime. Accordingly, GAM should continue work towards passing revised Draft Regulations governing planning in Amman in order to provide more clarity and legal basis for its planning and land use decisions, and to implement institutions that are more responsive to existing practices and needs. As part of reforming the current planning system for Amman, GAM should revise the Draft Regulations to ensure responsibilities are assigned to the appropriate level of authority, and that certain duties are made delegable under appropriate circumstances. As an example, GAM indicates that the Mayor of Amman’s required attendance at weekly Regional Committee meetings is a poor use of the Mayor’s time and this duty could be more appropriately delegated. The Draft Regulations should provide for delegation or re-assignment of such tasks pursuant to appropriate mechanisms and documentation. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 69 In response to elimination of local representation on Local Committees, GAM also needs to improve public participation mechanisms in order to better understand local needs and to ensure responsiveness. The proposed reforms to improve public participation discussed above would equally improve governance in Amman. To sufficiently capacitate local government institutions, GAM should develop a strategy for capacity building and training on the reformed legislation. Such strategy should cover how GAM intends to provide officials with training or develop guidelines in relation to several aspects of officials’ jobs, including: the legislative framework governing their role; their mandate and how to implement it; their relationships with other government institutions; decision-making processes. The strategy should also cover providing technical training per department for GAM officials. Ultimately, any reforms to Amman’s planning law should respond to local circumstances and needs, including the capacity of stakeholders to successfully understand and comply with it, and if administrators to implement and enforce it. While new reforms should strive to achieve better development outcomes, they need to be grounded in reality, which may require simplifying processes and responsibilities even whether more comprehensive options exist. It also requires proactive engagement with all stakeholders, including particularly the public, industries, and officials most affected by proposed changes, in order to better understand both existing capacities and opportunities to address specific contextual obstacles to reform. Technical Assessment Report Pegasys Report 70 9 References Reviewed law of Amman: 1. Draft Law of the year 2023 on Property Tax. 2. Draft Regulations of the year 2023 on Property Assessment within the Municipal Areas for the purposes of levying the Property Tax. 3. Draft Regulation on Urban Planning of Amman City, version dated 26 October 2022. 4. Hani Saeed Wahib Al-Afyouni and others v Greater Amman Municipality, Amman Court of First Instance, Case No. 5-1-19426-2019. 5. 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