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Herrera (iGraphi)  CONTENTS Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Abbreviations and Acronyms .............................................................................................................................................................. 7 Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 Purpose............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9 Key takeaways from the 3RF.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 10 Key challenges ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Table ES.1. 3RF Approaches to Overcoming Causes of Fragility................................................................................................................................ 11 Table ES.2. Key Lessons and Recommendations........................................................................................................................................................................ 12 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 14 1.1 Objective of this study......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 1.2 Methodology.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15 1.3 Outline of this study............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 2. Country Context .............................................................................................................................................................................. 18 2.1 Socioeconomic conditions ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 18 2.2 The explosion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 2.3 Disaster risk management.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 20 2.4 Failed reforms .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 20 3. The Lebanon Reform Recovery and Reconstruction Framework................................................................................ 22 3.1 Background and goals ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22 3.2 The design of the 3RF........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23 3.3 Key interim results ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 24 Figure 3.1 A Snapshot of the 3RF and Lebanon Financial Facility (LFF) ............................................................................................................ 24 4. Priorities, Challenges, and Lessons......................................................................................................................................... 25 4.1 Strategic decision-making ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 25 4.1.1 Coordination of the principal organizations .................................................................................................................................................................... 26 4.1.2 Multiple aid coordination mechanisms in Lebanon ................................................................................................................................................ 26 4.1.3 Key lessons and recommendations: Strategic level................................................................................................................................................. 26 4.2 Working-level progress....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 4.2.1 Challenges at the working level ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 4.2.2 Organizing the Working Groups...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 4.2.3 Communications ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 28 4.2.4 Key lessons and recommendations: Working level .................................................................................................................................................. 28 4.3 Engagement with the Lebanese state................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 29 4.3.1 Window of opportunity for engagement ............................................................................................................................................................................. 29 4.3.2 Challenges in state engagement ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 29 4.3.3 Lessons and recommendations: Engagement with the Lebanese state........................................................................................... 30 4.4 Engagement with Lebanese civil society........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 30 4.4.1 The whole-of-Lebanon approach ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 30 4.4.2 Challenges of CSO engagement ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 31 4.4.3 Lessons and recommendations: Engagement with Lebanese civil society .................................................................................. 31 4.5 Funding ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 32 4.5.1 Key lessons and recommendations: Funding.................................................................................................................................................................. 32 4.6 Monitoring reform results .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 33 4.6.1 Key lessons: Monitoring results....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 33 Summary.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 35 Appendixes................................................................................................................................................................................................ 36 Appendix A. Institutional Setup of the 3RF.......................................................................................................................... 37 Table A.1. Civil Society Organizations in the Consultative Group............................................................................................................................ 38 Figure A.1. 3RF Institutional Arrangements...................................................................................................................................................................................... 39 Table A.2. 3RF Timeline............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 40 Appendix B. Precedent: Iraq Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Fund............................................................ 41 Appendix C. Investment Projects Developed under the 3RF........................................................................................ 43 Appendix D. Summary of the Working Groups SWOT Analysis ................................................................................... 45 Appendix E. Table of Operational Lessons........................................................................................................................... 46 Endnotes..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 48 References.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 50 Acknowledgments This case study, led by GFDRR’s Disaster-Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV)Nexus thematic area, aims to present the lessons learned from Lebanon’s Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) as an example of developing post-disaster recovery governance structures in a context of FCV, specifically under compounded crises. This report was prepared under the overall guidance of Karima Ben Bih (Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist), in coordination with Hiromi Akiyama (Consultant) and Pol Nadal Cros (Consultant). The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable insights shared by interviewees from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and Lebanese state institutions and civil society. They also wish to extend their appreciation to the valuable contributions of Zoe Trohanis (Lead Disaster Risk Management Specialist), Mouna Couzi (Senior Operations Officer), and Mona Harb (Professor at the American University of Beirut). The team would like to express its gratitude to Niels Holm-Nielsen, GFDRR Practice Manager, for his strategic guidance in the preparation of this report. About the Disaster-FCV Nexus Thematic Area at GFDRR: In a world grappling with multiple crises, addressing the complex challenges at the intersection of disasters in Fragile, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) settings is more crucial than ever. Recognizing this urgency, GFDRR has launched its pioneering Disaster-FCV Nexus Thematic Area in 2018. This initiative provides operational support, strategic guidance, and global public goods, leverages development finance to enhance disaster resilience in FCV environments, and produces original analytics to deepen our understanding of the compounding effects of FCV and disasters. Disaster-FCV Nexus website 6 Lessons from Disaster Governance Abbreviations and Acronyms 3RF Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework 3RP Regional Refugee Resilience Plan ALDIC L’Association Libanaise pour les Droits et les Intérêts des Contribuables ALI Association of Lebanese Industrialists BE Bank-Executed BHI Beirut Heritage Initiative CCI cultural and creative industries CDR Council for Development and Reconstruction CG Consultative Group CMU Central Management Unit CSOs civil society organizations EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EIB European Investment Bank ERP Emergency Response Plan ESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan EU European Union FCV fragility, conflict, and violence FER Forward Emergency Room GIZ German Agency for International Cooperation HRC Higher Relief Council I3RF Iraq Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Fund ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IFIs international finance institutions IMF International Monetary Fund INGOs international nongovernmental organizations IOB Independent Oversight Board IOF Institute of Finance (Institut des Finances), Lebanon IS Islamic State LAF Lebanese Armed Forces 7 LCHR Lebanese Center for Human Rights LCRP Lebanon Crisis Response Plan LFF Lebanon Financing Facility LHDF Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum LHIF Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum LLB Live Love Beirut LLWB Lebanese League for Women in Business LUPDD Lebanese Union for People with Physical Disabilities MDTF multi-donor trust fund MFIs microfinance institutions MSEs micro and small enterprises NGO nongovernmental organization OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OEA Order of Engineers and Architects OMSAR Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform PDO Project Development Objective PIA Project Implementation Agency RCO UN Resident Coordinator’s Office RDNA Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment RE Recipient-Executed SDGs Sustainable Development Goals SSVP Society Saint Vincent de Paul SWOT strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats TA technical assistance UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSDCF United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework WG Working Group All dollar amounts are US dollars unless otherwise indicated. 8 Lessons from Disaster Governance Executive Summary Purpose Lebanon’s experience of compounding crises over to facilitate recovery and reconstruction in the the past several years points to the nexus of fragility aftermath of the disaster while reactivating reforms and disaster. The country has recently experienced to address the drivers of fragility in the country. one of the worst financial and economic crises Organized by the European Union (EU), the United in human history. The crisis derives from a set of Nations (UN), and the World Bank in December 2020, structural causes of fragility: a combination of chronic the 3RF not only provided a prioritized comprehensive macroeconomic imbalances and political inaction plan across various sectors to support Beirut’s stemming from political polarization and decision- recovery and reconstruction but also included a making paralysis. Lebanon’s economic model has second track to advance critical reforms to address failed to generate economic opportunities, leading to governance challenges in Lebanon. The 3RF is a unique high levels of inequality and poverty. The privatization governance platform, backed by a fund-pooling of services and their patronage-based access, coupled facility (the Lebanon Financing Facility, or LFF), with the capture and mismanagement of public funds which links the unlocking of investments in Lebanon intended for infrastructure, have led to a decline in with the reform results so that nonhumanitarian the quality of virtually all public services—including a assistance received through national institutions is near collapse in electricity provision. conditional on the implementation of reform. While the people-centered recovery response (Track 1) The devastating August 2020 explosion in Beirut concluded in June 2022, the 3RF continues on Track exacerbated many of the preexisting drivers of 2, which focuses on inclusive policy dialogue, the fragility in Lebanon. The impact of the explosion at implementation of reforms, and the reconstruction the Port of Beirut that destroyed homes, businesses, of critical services and infrastructure. and infrastructure aggravated the already grave socioeconomic impact on the population of COVID-19–induced lockdowns and the presence of a large refugee population from Syria, with worsening poverty rates, unemployment, basic service delivery, social stability, and food security. Despite this dire situation, the government’s response was limited, relegating the response coordination role to the Forward Emergency Room (FER) set up by the military and relying on the humanitarian relief efforts of international partners. The accumulation of public frustration at failing public services, the lack of accountability, and low economic growth has eroded public trust in the state and given rise to mass protests, social unrest, increased crime and violence, and increased tensions between refugees and host communities. The international community’s response after this humanitarian disaster was an innovative institutional platform—the Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF)—aiming 9 Key takeaways from the 3RF Despite challenges at each stage, the 3RF has itself presented a governance mechanism that goes beyond a recovery roadmap document to facilitate reforms needed to address the underlying causes of fragility. The examination of interviews with stakeholders involved in the 3RF and a desk review of literature reveal four big-picture achievements that provide insights into the work in other post-disaster settings under conditions of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) (see also table ES.1). These achievements are listed below. 1. Holistic vision of recovery and development. 3. Bringing everyone to the same table. The While initiated as a framework for the recovery of participatory process of setting up the 3RF has been Beirut in the aftermath of the port explosion, the 3RF unprecedented, considering the challenges that was simultaneously conceptualized as a driver for countries with fragile contexts normally experience. nationwide reforms to address the underlying drivers The setup of the 3RF is the tripartite partnership of fragility that have contributed to the ongoing crises between the EU, the UN, and the World Bank that and the humanitarian disaster. The Port of Beirut encourages civil society, the private sector, and other explosion came after a series of failed attempts at relevant local stakeholders to come to the same table national reforms (Paris I, II, III, and the CEDRE) and the to increase interaction among each other. This setup popular uprising in October 2019. To achieve a long- had a positive effect by including a broader range of lasting impact from recovery, policy and governance public voices and airing grievances along the way, reforms at the national level were essential. The 3RF thereby increasing the legitimacy and accountability of not only reactivated these past efforts at reform but the process. also introduced an implicit conditionality that linked 4. Change in the perception of development partners the disbursement of investments in Lebanon to the and better partnership. Prior to the 3RF, one of the implementation of reforms, to make a lasting impact inhibiting factors to the engagement of the World on recovery and development. Bank and other development partners was the lack of 2. Strong commitment from the three organizations trust within the Lebanese state toward development and donors. The 3RF has had strong commitment to partners. Despite the initial challenge of engaging recovery, reconstruction, and reform in Lebanon from the Lebanese government, there was a window of all three partner organizations—the EU, the UN, and the opportunity for increasing engagement. The increased World Bank—as well as from donors. This commitment interactions between international partners and helped to define a holistic vision for recovery and the Lebanese state and civil society organizations development in Lebanon, clear strategic objectives, and (CSOs) have gradually helped to build trust, a critical a common agenda that transcends different mandates component that facilitates collaboration on important and functions of the international organizations. It also work for reform and recovery. helped to anchor the mobilization of funds. 10 Lessons from Disaster Governance Key challenges Despite the above achievements, the 3RF has faced challenges that may impact its effectiveness in facilitating reform and recovery. These are summarized below. Key lessons of the 3RF are summarized in table ES.2 and described in more detail in section 4. Impact on fragility. While the reform track and the institutional setup that promotes inclusive dialogue facilitated wider engagement of stakeholders compared to past attempts by Lebanon’s international partners, it still fell dramatically short of bringing stakeholders together. The impact of the 3RF on making meaningful political progress is yet to manifest in a meaningful and measurable way. Set against the original plan, the 3RF yield on policy reforms after two years of 3RF is low, particularly regarding the enactment of laws and decrees that require high political commitment Table ES.1. 3RF Approaches to Overcoming Causes of Fragility Cause of fragility 3RF approaches to overcome fragility causes Elite-level power-sharing arrangement. Lebanon’s political A recovery framework as a governance mechanism. In the settlement, grounded in a sectarian power-sharing agreement, context of a dysfunctional government without either a donor has led to elite capture, widespread clientelism, and patronage coordination structure or a planning ministry, the 3RF proposes that increase polarization and political paralysis. itself not only as a fund platform but also as a governance structure to discuss and address short-, medium-, and long-term strategies. A framework for nationwide reforms. Although the disaster (that is, the explosion) is local, policy reforms are addressed at the national level. A framework as an anchor for funds mobilization. An inclusive, transparent, and long-term recovery and reform framework has the capacity to convene donors; this, in turn, consolidates the independence of the governance structure. State-society relations. An increasing divide between people’s An accountable, integrated, and participatory framework. needs and expectations and the political elite’s priorities has The framework promotes the integration and harmonization of undermined state-society relations and fueled discontent, strategies, plans, and programs for recovery and reconstruction, grievances, and widespread unrest. explicitly linked to reforms and owned by all stakeholders by strengthening the role of oversight, human rights, and rule- Intra-societal relations. High levels of socioeconomic inequality of-law institutions. As a governance mechanism rather than and exclusion, very low levels of trust between communities, a roadmap, the 3RF setup seeks to engage many stakeholders and (perceived) competition between host communities and and to empower representative sections of communities, refugees over access to services and economic opportunities including local actors and businesses, and creates space for harm the quality of social relations. their meaningful participation in the recovery process beyond the catastrophe. The inclusion of a group of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the setting up of a third-party monitoring agency is vital to maintain legitimacy, strengthen the public voice, and build the capacity of civil society to become partners for the government. Source: Original table for this publication. Note: 3RF = Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework. 11 Lessons from Disaster Governance Table ES.2. Key Lessons and Recommendations Lessons learned Recommendation Strategic level The sense of crisis and past experience around the Lebanese reform 1. Immediately prepare for longer-term reconstruction and economic agenda highlighted the need for implicit conditionality on a reform. recovery to make best use of momentum after a disaster. The strong engagement of the three principals helped define an 2. Employ coherent, collective, and disciplined messaging by all ambitious strategic objective and achieve commitment under the international actors to achieve any reform. common agenda, overcoming the differences in mandates of the three organizations. Unclear demarcation of objectives among coordination frameworks 3. Ensure alignment with other development structures to guarantee can lead to a significant delay in implementation. Refocusing the 3RF a rapid implementation. on longer-term challenges helped humanitarian actors focus on a purely humanitarian response. Working level Much of the initial 3RF input was, at the strategic level, driven by 1. While strategic-level decisions are important, it is equally critical to the principals. This did not translate immediately into results on make use of concrete, technical-level actions to achieve the progress the ground either in setting specific objectives or in institutional that matters to the people. arrangements. In the setup of 3RF, personal rapport between principals, fostered 2. Engaging principals is essential but not sufficient to maintain through weekly meetings, worked in favor of quick strategic-level momentum. To maintain a momentum, it is recommended to decisions. Later, the departure of principal leadership caused a delay invest in handovers, with solid institutionalization and especially in in implementing and revising the 3RF for almost a year. emergency context. There was much goodwill immediately after the explosion, but a shift 3. For continuity, maintain the interest of headquarters and donors, in priorities and political landscape among the international partners as well as clear informing to the public. contributed to a decline in momentum. Engagement with the Lebanese state Despite initial discussions of excluding the inefficient government 1. The government cannot be excluded from the Reform and from the 3RF setup, without engaging the government the reform Reconstruction Framework. Engage very visibly with the state, even agenda would not advance. if there is limited state capacity. Besides the lack of incentives, the state also faces limited capacity in 2. Support the state and CSOs practically to bring them into technical practical terms. discussions on specific reforms and projects. Until the new deputy prime minister, who was more receptive of 3. Engage individually with the state beyond the government to the reform, agenda was appointed, the reform agenda of the 3RF avoid the tempo being dictated by national development beyond the struggled to advance. framework’s control. 12 Lessons from Disaster Governance Engagement with Lebanese civil society CSOs prefer setting up their own structures and meetings to avoid 1. Defend the space for civil society to avoid their discouragement confrontation with a government that in their eyes lacks legitimacy, when attacked by the state. or with international actors that are perceived to be transitory. While it may be challenging to represent the entirety of civil society 2. Have a clear understanding of the CSO sphere in the country and in the country, it is important to get a sense of which CSOs represent in their respective sectors, and maintain legitimacy with civil society, the people, their neutrality and agenda, and potential conflict with the government, and the broader public all at the same time. the reform agenda. The initial expectations among CSOs that they themselves would 3. Reflecting on the World Bank’s funding mechanisms so that funding be direct recipients of funding created confusion and may have is allowed to empower local CSOs. increased grievances. Funding Despite the initial promises and interests from donors, the LFF 1. Although it is ideal that the financing facility is well replenished, remained lacking in funding. expect funding to be insufficient and expect that it will be necessary to find a way to work with limited financial resources. The costed priorities gave the impression that these projects were 2. Manage expectations on capacity funding to prevent ready to be developed, while in fact they were conditional on reform disappointment when funding is waiting for conditional reforms. progress. The framework can become a way to provide tools for the government 3. Use trust funds to help implement reforms. to deliver on reforms, including through technical assistance, equipment, and auditing of banks. Monitoring results The implementation of the results framework initially stalled. 1. Use a prioritized results framework with the simplicity and flexibility to improve outreach and maintain momentum. Institutionalization is one of the strengths of 3RF that can move 2. Compile a practical handbook for following up on the RDNA can beyond personalities and skills. In 3RF, input and internal process streamline implementation. took the bulk of the effort. Source: Original table for this publication. Note: 3RF = Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework; CSOs = civil society organizations; LFF = Lebanon Financing Facility; RDNA = Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment. 13 Introduction Fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) present unique challenges for countries in managing the impacts of disasters, making a state and its society vulnerable to shocks. This is often the result of weak institutions, a lack of social cohesion, political instability and fragmentation, social tensions, and disputes. These challenges appear in full force after a disaster, when there is a heightened need for concerted effort and coordination of response actions and recovery. Managing disaster impact requires significant financial investments, the capacity to disperse finances, an effective coordination mechanism, and a sound legal footing that underpins the necessary actions. Financial investments are necessary to enable restoration and reconstruction of critical infrastructure, basic services, housing, and production capacities. Collaboration and coordination between national and local institutions, as well as with external stakeholders, is critical for swift and effective disaster recovery and for attracting and dispersing investments. The legal and institutional frameworks underpin all of these actions, including the swift setup of disaster response mechanisms, post-disaster reconstruction planning and implementation, and all aspects of managing investments. Lebanon’s experience following the August 2020 Beirut port explosion illustrates the intersection of disasters and FCV. The explosion of a large stock of ammonium nitrate stored at the Port of Beirut caused not only the loss of lives, but it also brought severe destruction to homes, businesses, and infrastructure within a 5-kilometer radius of the central area of Beirut. The impact extended beyond the immediate area, as the impact area comprised the core of economic, industrial, social, and cultural activity for the whole country. The financial and economic crisis that had unfolded in the country since the year before, along with the underlying elite-level power-sharing arrangement of governance, both were contributing factors to the port explosion and were exacerbated by the disaster. The increasing political polarization in the country and a decision-making paralysis stemming from sectarian allegiance, widespread clientelism, and patronage eroded trust between the state and its citizens and limited the country’s capacity to lead post-disaster planning and deliver for recovery. Lebanon’s Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) presents a case of disaster recovery framework that goes beyond a recovery roadmap document (World Bank 2020c). It provides a platform that seeks to advance consensus building and national dialogue with the aim of formulating a vision for the country’s post- disaster renewal and long-term reform. Under globally increasing FCV environments, this case can be used as an example in instances where governments struggle with the capacity, resources, and governance structure to plan and implement investments after a major disaster. In the absence of a functional governance structure and a planning agency to lead recovery in Lebanon, the 3RF functioned as both a roadmap to deliver short- to medium-term recovery projects and a channel through which to bring together multiple stakeholders to make political progress beyond the disaster. This strategy for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction is not limited to financing projects in the impacted area, but it also functions as a platform for advocating for critical reforms and 14 Lessons from Disaster Governance a capacity-building agenda for the entire country, with a focus whose governments lack the institutional capacity to organize on transparency, accountability, and inclusion. By employing the recovery after having suffered a disaster. The Lebanon 3RF whole-of-Lebanon approach—which bridges state institutions, model presents insights about a collaborative mechanism at civil society, and international partners in its governance international, governmental, and local levels and an independent structure—the 3RF has pushed the government to engage with and inclusive governance framework, albeit with challenges that the public, which is a critical element of the reform. The 3RF has warrant attention from organizers of a similar framework. also become an opportunity for dialogue between international This case study is addressed primarily to the practitioners and partners and the Lebanese government to impact its legal specialists of international institutions and donors interested framework with a lasting effect on the country’s governance in developing a post-disaster recovery framework, but it is also structure. While navigating the multiple challenges described useful for planners at the governmental level who engage in in this study, the design of the 3RF has helped build consensus post-disaster recovery issues as an example for engaging with and the institution for continuous engagement between the civil society and local non-state actors. Likewise, the analysis country’s international partners and the stakeholders of can be useful for international partners and specialists in social Lebanese society. Such an inclusive approach ensures that development, economists, urban planners, and, in general, for all recovery is grounded in and representative of the needs of the persons interested in the problem of post-disaster recovery and Lebanese people, rather than limited to selective segments of reforms in fragile contexts. the society.1 1.1 Objective of this study 1.2 Methodology This case study is based on interviews and a desk review of secondary The aim of this analytical case study is to showcase the lessons information. Interviews were conducted with 25 respondents learned from Lebanon’s 3RF as an example of developing encompassing Lebanese state institutions; Lebanese civil society; post-disaster recovery governance structures in an FCV diplomats based in and out of Beirut; and staff of the EU, the UN, context of compounded crises in the areas of economic, and the World Bank who were closely involved with the 3RF in one financial, political, and service provision. The case study phase or another and represented different levels of their respective aims (1) to conduct a retrospective analysis of the design, organizations. Interviews were semi-structured, with questions implementation, and the future prospects of the 3RF; and divided into three parts: (1) country context before the 3RF setup, (2) (2) to extract lessons and recommendations that can apply implementation, and (3) lessons for the future. The findings from the in other FCV contexts where a similar structure may need to interviews were complemented by a desk review of 3RF documents be established. and other reports on the socioeconomic contexts and the crisis Within the framework of the Global Program for Disaster–FCV response and recovery in Lebanon. Nexus at GFDRR, this case study is proposed as an entry point for operational discussions on post-disaster recovery and policy reforms modeled in a context where governance and coordination structures are lacking. The 3RF represents an innovative mechanism for engaging civil society and the broader public as well as a platform for dialogue that lays the groundwork for new coalitions for reform that support constructive citizen engagement. This work would be relevant in highly fragile states 15 1.3 Outline of this study The document has the following main sections: After this introduction, section 2 briefly presents the country context of Lebanon in terms of its pre-disaster political and socioeconomic section 2 conditions, the disaster’s impact on these conditions, and the country’s and development partners’ response to the disaster. Section 3 presents an overview of the 3RF including its strategic vision, section 3 institutional arrangements, and memberships. Key interim results of the 3RF are presented. Section 4 draws key lessons learned from the implementation of the 3RF’s strategic vision and the challenges it faced along the way. This section is approached via themes of strategic decision-making, working-level progress, engagement with the Lebanese state, engagement with Lebanese civil section 4 society, funding, and monitoring. Priority lessons and recommendations are provided under each theme; these can provide insights for the preparation and implementation of a similar framework in the future. Finally, a series of appendixes are presented. Appendix A provides details about the institutional setup of the 3RF, appendix B considers the I3RF Appendixes precedent in Iraq, appendix C lists investment projects developed under the 3RF, appendix D presents a summary of the Working Groups’ SWOT analysis, and appendix E summarizes the operational lessons needed to ensure effective implementation. 16 2. Country Context 2.1 Socioeconomic conditions Since 2019, Lebanon has undergone an unprecedented financial poor and vulnerable, as the highest contributor to inflation is the and socioeconomic crisis that affects every aspect of the lives rise in the price of food and non-alcoholic beverages, averaging of Lebanese citizens, who experience economic deterioration, a 240 percent increase in 2022 (World Bank 2023c) Lebanon was inflation, and a decline in basic service delivery. The eruption reclassified by the World Bank as a lower-middle-income country of conflict in Syria and its spillovers in Lebanon, which is the in July 2022, down from its previous upper-middle-income status recipient of the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, (World Bank 2022e). has exposed the Lebanese economy to increased risks since 2011. The deteriorated economic conditions have led to a dramatic A financial crisis brought about by the sudden end to capital collapse in basic services, including power, water, and health inflows—which widely impacted banking, debt, and the exchange care, giving rise to public grievances. Public service delivery had rate—spilled over into a compounded crisis that culminated in a been already dilapidated by elite capture of the state’s resources Eurobond default in March 2020. The imposition of COVID-19– for personal gain prior to the crisis. Severe fuel shortages further related lockdown measures in late March 2020 closed borders worsened electricity supply, resulting in more than eight rolling and shut down both public and private institutions, severely blackouts in the national electric grid that limited electricity contracting the country’s economy (World Bank 2020a). This supply to as little as two hours per day, hindering access to health economic and financial crisis in Lebanon ranks among the worst care and clean water (World Bank 2022a). Food supply shops, economic crises seen globally since the mid-nineteenth century transport service providers, and telecom network operators (World Bank 2021a). The protracted economic contraction led face severe disruptions to their supply chains. Health service to a marked decline in disposable income and dramatically delivery has deteriorated as 40 percent of doctors and 30 percent increased the poverty rate.2 Inflation continuously reached of nurses have left Lebanon and one out of five has lost their job triple digits for three years (2020–22), averaging 171.2 percent in since 2019 (WHO 2021). 2022; it was expected to reach 231.3 percent in 2023 (World Bank 2021a, 2023b). The hyperinflation disproportionally affects the 18 Lessons from Disaster Governance 2.2 The explosion and economic activities in Beirut and the importance of the port, severely impacting commerce, real estate, and Further deepening the crisis was the tourism. The Beirut port functioned as the main point of entry for the country’s economy, channeling 68 percent devastating explosion that destroyed the of the total external trade prior to the economic crisis Port of Beirut with wider socioeconomic (World Bank 2020a). impacts. The issues that led to the explosion reflected the On August 4, 2020, a large stock of ammonium nitrate issues of governance and decision-making paralysis stored at the Port of Beirut exploded, causing severe in the Lebanese state, deepening public grievances. destruction to homes, businesses, and infrastructure The explosion resulted from the mismanagement within 5 kilometers of the explosion. The explosion killed of tons of ammonium nitrate that was stored in the 218 people, wounded 7,000 people, and displaced over port (Human Rights Watch 2021). The call from both 300,000 people (including 80,000 children) (Human Rights the domestic and the international community for Watch 2021). It caused significant damage to structures the Lebanese government to take responsibility for and basic services, damaging 77,000 apartments and 163 the explosion led to Prime Minister Hassan Diab’s schools and disabling half of Beirut’s health care centers. resignation on August 10, 2020, propelling the Some 56 percent of the private businesses in Beirut government into a caretaker status. The fragmented were affected (Human Rights Watch 2021). Damages political leadership of the Lebanese state failed to physical assets amounted to an estimated $3.8–4.6 to manage or coordinate an immediate disaster billion, with housing and cultural sectors most severely response, relegating nongovernmental organizations affected (World Bank 2020a). Estimated economic losses (NGOs) to lead the response. Despite a new prime were $2.9–3.5 billion, mostly in the housing, transport, minister being appointed in September 2021, the and culture sectors. Although a localized incident, the government decision-making apparatus continues to economic impact of the port explosion extended beyond be paralyzed with the heterogenous representation Beirut because of the concentration of demographic of the parliament and the Council of Ministers.3 The Beirut port functioned as the main point of entry for the country’s economy, channeling 68 percent of the total external trade prior to the economic crisis (World Bank 2020a). 19 The Lebanese state lacks a comprehensive disaster risk management system, has a historically divided disaster response mechanism along sectarian lines, 4 and it relies on non-state organizations. In the past, the coordination of reconstruction processes in Lebanon has been led by state institutions and implemented by the nongovernmental sector. For instance, after the 1975–90 civil war, the reconstruction of the historic core of Beirut was led by Solidere, a private, joint-stock real-estate company led by long-serving Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.5 More recently, the reconstruction of Beirut’s suburban district following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War was led by the Waad Project, a private agency set up by Hezbollah, using foreign donations transited through the Higher Relief Council (HRC) that was established by the government.6 Unlike these precedents, the government did not have the sufficiently powerful political capacity to take over the early stage coordination of response or recovery efforts in the aftermath of the port explosion. The government relegated the damage monitoring to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), who established the Forward Emergency Room (FER) to map out and monitor the delivery of relief and goods mainly led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and NGOs. In contrast to the lack of government response, the coordination of the first response to provide humanitarian relief, and later reconstruction, was led mainly by nongovernmental groups.7 Various CSOs—including NGOs, international NGOs (INGOs), political groups, universities, and domestic and international faith-based organizations—organically led and organized the humanitarian response immediately after the explosion. Some of them formed solidarity among them but, given the existing decision-making structure of the country, their capacity to act would not be reflected in decision-making for longer-term recovery and reconstruction. 2.4 Failed reforms In addition to the humanitarian responses to various crises such as a refugee crisis, the international community’s past experience with the Lebanese state was characterized by failed attempts at promoting reform. In response to the economic and financial crisis, two major reform plans with the Brussels and CEDRE conferences did not materialize with sufficient change to address Lebanon’s governance failures.8 Policy makers do not see the international call for reforms as a genuine attempt to improve Lebanon’s prospects, but instead as political positioning by the West. When the political tide turns in Lebanon’s favor—by electing a new president, for example—a bailout can be expected. Undermining the sense of urgency and international leverage is the fact that the overall level of aid flows has not dropped compared to the pre-2019 level.9 This has also increased the perception among civil society actors that international support has reinforced the elite settlement structure and the reform preconditions for financial support have failed (World Bank 2022f). Besides the systematic hurdle to decision-making, most Lebanese policy makers have little reason to want to reform. Their political and economic interests are best served by maintaining the status quo and their share of political power and of state enterprises and revenues. The same applies to international aid, which is often perceived as a support for political allies in Lebanon, distributed through networks of patronage. 20 Lessons from Disaster Governance 2.5 The RDNA recommendations The Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), published in August 2020, recommended a framework for Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction (the “3Rs”) as an approach to build back a better Lebanon based on the principles of transparency, inclusion, and accountability (World Bank 2020a).10 The priority needs for recovery and reconstruction were estimated to be $1.8–2.0 billion, with the greatest needs in the transport sector, followed by the culture sector and housing (World Bank 2020a). Besides the immediate recovery and reconstruction needs in the impact area of Beirut, the RDNA pointed to the structural drivers of fragility that have constrained Lebanon’s economic development and service delivery for a decade and highlighted the needs for structural and sectoral reforms to mitigate risks and boost economic growth. The recommendation of “build back better” in the Lebanese context was to increase inclusion and transparency to achieve a people-centered approach to recovery and restore the sense of hope, rather than to specifically target physical or resilience or improve emergency management mechanisms for future disasters such as the one at the Port of Beirut. The RDNA proposed a whole-of-Lebanon approach to be achieved by including civil society in the 3RF to bring transparency and develop CSO capacity. CSOs in Lebanon have historically played a prominent role within the governance structure of the country in both service provision and promoting transparency and accountability.11 Their relevance was demonstrated when CSOs led the response on the ground in the immediate aftermath of the explosion, funded both by humanitarian institutions and private initiatives, mainly through the Lebanese diaspora.12 Civil society was a partner in data collection for the RDNA and in discussions about setting up the 3RF, although not involved in writing the 3RF. It was under these circumstances that the 3RF was proposed and organized, with the aim of assisting beyond the immediate humanitarian response with medium- to long-term recovery in the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion. The issue of central coordination that manifested during the early-stage response phase implied that the challenge of leading and coordinating recovery and reconstruction would persist without addressing the underlying structural governance. The political polarization and fiscal and economic policies that minimizes state interference dates back to the 1990s (World Bank 2022f), and have led to the lack of a development coordination structure and a planning ministry that would raise funds and oversee the recovery and reconstruction efforts. The challenges of governance meant that presenting a roadmap for recovery is insufficient for implementation and that a deeper level of support was needed to enable effective reconstruction—one that incorporates inputs from wider segments of society to address the crisis of trust.   21 3. The Lebanon Reform Recovery and Reconstruction Framework 3.1 Background and goals The 3RF is an innovative institutional The Lebanon Reform Recovery and Reconstruction structure that served both to address Framework (3RF) was set up as a multistakeholder the most urgent recovery needs governance structure in support both of the recovery of Beirut after the port explosion and of longer- after the port explosion and to term national reform to bolster the reconstruction promote reforms that would ensure process. In the early days of humanitarian response, including wider segments of society in it quickly became apparent that addressing recovery needs in the medium to long term is more extensive Lebanon’s decision-making structure. than merely providing a direction for recovery in a A vision for the 3RF was provided by another roadmap. A more fundamental governance reform preceding Recovery and Reconstruction was needed to solve the underlying cause of fragility Framework in an FCV context: the Iraq that was partly responsible for the explosion itself. Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Fund Following the RDNA’s recommendations, the EU, (I3RF) (for detailed description of the I3RF, see the UN, and the World Bank established the 3RF, appendix B). The I3RF was the first multi- alongside a multi-donor trust fund, the Lebanon donor–led attempt to expand a recovery Financing Facility (LFF), to support its financing.13 framework from a policy paper detailing a recovery roadmap into a structure that pushes for reform for long-lasting impact. 22 Lessons from Disaster Governance The 3RF was designed to pursue two tracks in parallel: a people- centered recovery track and a reform and reconstruction track Building on the experience of the I3RF—which faced challenges affected by the explosion in the first 18 months (until June 2022). that included limited technical engagement from the government, Track 2 focuses on critical reforms needed to address governance a low level of CSO engagement, and donor preference for fund and recovery challenges that are the underlying drivers of use specifications—the Lebanon 3RF was established as a fragility, along with investments that would achieve the long- recovery governance structure that created space for larger term reconstruction of critical assets, services, and infrastructure societal engagement than the I3RF did in order to take advantage whose provision had been failing since before the port explosion. of the historically robust CSO presence in Lebanon. It was also The whole-of-Lebanon approach is reflected in the setup that designed to provide general monitoring and guidance on the urges engagement of both state institutions and Lebanese recovery process, and to provide greater flexibility in the use of civil society. The engagement of the actors was achieved finances with an independent multi-donor trust fund (the LFF) through CSOs, non-state actors (such as the Order of Engineers administered by the World Bank that advises on what it finances. and Architects, or OEA), government representatives, and The novelty of the 3RF lay in the whole-of-Lebanon approach, international partners in the Consultative Group (CG) and which would bring together actors that have rarely acted as Working Groups (WGs). Bringing these actors to the same table part of the same institutional setup—namely, state institutions, was a useful tool that allowed them to air potential grievances international partners, and Lebanese civil society. Systemic both toward the government and toward international actors, institutional, economic, and social change was needed in the and to promote a transparent consultative process of developing face of the expression of public frustration through widespread draft proposals for policy changes. By setting up a mechanism protests following the explosion. At the same time, the relatively that enables inclusive consultation, the design of the 3RF aimed high capacity of Lebanese CSOs as demonstrated by their to increase interactions between state actors and CSOs, thereby spontaneous response efforts meant that there was potential facilitating transparent governance reform. CSOs are not only to engage the wider society in the recovery and reconstruction part of a steering committee but also represented in the CG, WGs, process. The 3RF aimed not only at the reconstruction of critical and Independent Oversight Board (IOB; appendix A provides assets, services, and infrastructure, but also at reforms toward more details on the institutional setup of the 3RF). promoting citizen trust and improving governance and at people- Strong support for the 3RF was reflected in the inclusion of centered recovery. international partners in the CG, which enabled stronger The promotion of reforms as the focus of the framework was in coordination. Notably, CG membership was not limited to LFF part a reactivation of past failed reform attempts. In the view of donors. A group of international partners, selected based on the international community and civil society, Lebanon needed to the size of their development portfolio, was invited to the CG: address the underlying drivers of fragility as much as it needed to Canada, Denmark, the European Bank for Reconstruction and work on short- to medium-term recovery needs from the disaster Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), itself. By setting the reform at the center of the core goals of the France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, 3RF and linking the reform results to the disbursement of funding the United Kingdom, and the United States.14 The group met from the LFF, an implicit conditionality to push the government to to discuss 3RF progress at the technical level and then at the undertake reform efforts was created. ambassadors’ level. This resulted in a larger awareness among international partners of the common priorities for recovery investments and the strategic direction of reforms. 3.2 The design of the 3RF The 3RF was designed to pursue two tracks in parallel: a people-centered recovery track (Track 1) and a reform and reconstruction track (Track 2). Track 1 focused on essential actions that must be taken for recovery to address the urgent needs of the most vulnerable populations and small businesses 23 3.3 Key interim results The key interim results of the 3RF are summarized in figure 3.1. Figure 3.1. A Snapshot of the 3RF THE PEOPLE-CENTERED RECOVERY TRACK (December 2020 – June 2022) Four core investment projects on “socioeconomic and business recovery” (Focus Area 1) (appendix C describes the four core investment projects) REFORM AND RECONSTRUCTION TRACK (December 2020 – ongoing) Two World Bank–executed projects on “preparing for reform and reconstruction” (Focus Area 2) Two World Bank¬–executed projects on “coordination, monitoring, accountability and oversight” (Focus Area 3) Note: RE = Recipient-Executed, BE = Bank-Executed. Source: LFF 2022, LEF 2023. 24 Lessons from Disaster Governance 4. Priorities, Challenges, and Lessons This section describes the approaches in the 3RF setup and the challenges faced in the implementation under the following themes: strategic decision-making, working-level progress, engagement with the Lebanese state, engagement with Lebanese civil society, funding, and monitoring reform results. Lessons learned and recommendations are provided under each theme, which can be useful considerations for the preparation and implementation of a similar framework in the future. The overall key lessons are summarized in table ES.2. Operational lessons––equally important to ensure effective implementation—are summarized in a table provided in appendix E. 4.1 Strategic decision-making From the outset, donors and international partners in Beirut and abroad expressed strong support for setting up a comprehensive framework that addresses issues of reform and reconstruction beyond the immediate crisis. The sense of crisis that resulted from the high economic volatility at the time and past experience around the Lebanese reform agenda highlighted the need for a reactivation of reform efforts with implicit conditionality. 4.1.1 Coordination of the principal organizations As Lebanon has historically had limited donor coordination, the expectation of the international organizations and donors was that the 3RF would improve the government’s capacity for 25 development coordination. The 4.1.2 Multiple aid coordination identified the unique added value to the strong engagement of the three mechanisms in Lebanon 3RF’s efforts to maintain its focus on principals from the EU, the UN, longer-term investments in reform and and the World Bank helped define The 3RF’s national scope required economic recovery beyond Beirut.19 an ambitious strategic objective demarcating issue areas and financing to and achieve commitment under avoid redundancy with other existing aid 4.1.3 Key lessons and the common agenda of supporting frameworks for Lebanon. Although the recommendations: Strategic level recovery and reform of Lebanon. 3RF was set up primarily in response to The strategic objective overcame the Beirut port explosion, its nationwide The three priority lessons taken from the the differences in mandates among scope for reform established in Track 3RF’s strategic decision-making efforts the three organizations, eliciting 2 highlighted 3RF’s unclear relations are listed below. commitment to the 3RF from all three with other aid frameworks, namely the 1. Immediately prepare for longer- organizations. Weekly meetings of Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), the term reconstruction and economic principals during the design stage Emergency Response Plan (ERP), and the recovery to make best use of helped to formulate a clear division of United Nations Sustainable Development momentum after a disaster. Crises labor for their strategic engagement. Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF).17 can be an opportunity for systemic While Track 1 of the framework focused change, and swift formulation of the The concerted effort to initiate on areas of Beirut affected by the blast, planning for longer-term recovery longer-term needs helps grab that unaffected suburbs of Beirut were momentum. The strategic defining ultimately helped with a focus experiencing a drop in living standards due on humanitarian aid activities. of objectives helps to avoid the to the ongoing economic crisis. When the “humanitarian trap” where the state In August 2020, OCHA published 3RF was set up, the ERP had not yet been a six-month flash appeal after the actors plead only for emergency launched, and the LCRP was set to expire support and avoid long-term reforms explosion, which referenced a new in 2020 (though it was later extended). framework that was to become related to development. Reforms In summer 2021, the 3RF Secretariat and should be urgent, but not limited the 3RF (OCHA 2020). Knowing RCO staff prepared a proposal to merge that longer-term challenges would only to emergency. They should be the 3RF and the ERP at least at a technical comprehensive, as ad-hoc solutions be addressed by the 3RF helped level.18 This proposal was rejected by the humanitarian actors focus on tend not to work. UN management for two main reasons: purely humanitarian response, (1) funding priorities for each mechanism 2. Coherent, collective, and disciplined making humanitarian advocacy had already been set, and (2) given the messaging by all international actors with beneficiaries and state actors institutional interests involved, pushing is essential to achieve any reform. more credible. The humanitarian- through a merger would have required The whole effort will fail if one slips— development nexus was covered, expending significant political capital one actor softening on conditionalities for instance, by the United Nations from donors. creates dysfunctionality. This High Commissioner for Refugees requires a very honest conversation (UNHCR), leading the health sector on The conflicting mandates within the 3RF among actors, which should involve access to primary health care at the governance structure and the overlap with their headquarters. Once the forefront of the emergency response other frameworks were resolved through mandate is clear, it is important to and, in parallel, participating in a consultative process to realign the 3RF’s ensure that the structure is used by the discussions for long-term focus. Consultations with donors, the all stakeholders to avoid parallel rental subsidies options.15 While prime minister’s team, key ministers, civil discussions. An internationally united humanitarian response was explicitly society, and working group leads clarified position provides a convening power left out of the 3RF, the inclusive the 3RF’s mandate and consolidated for a policy reform discussion with process ensured that bridges were working groups in the context of other the government. built between humanitarian and frameworks in Lebanon. A clearer development actors.16 division of labor was defined through 3. Ensure an alignment with other realignment, with the LCRP and the development structures to ERP focused on providing humanitarian guarantee a rapid implementation. assistance and the 3RF focused on long- Unclear links among coordination term reforms and economic recovery. The frameworks can lead to a significant 3RF’s Track 1, which aimed at a people- delay in implementation. This can centered recovery of Beirut, was the main be avoided by explicitly aligning source of conflict with the LCRP and the frameworks from the outset, at ERP, which are better equipped than the strategic level and implementation 3RF for addressing humanitarian needs. through Working Groups (WGs). Therefore Track 1 was not extended beyond its original target of June 2022, both resolving the conflict and realigning the 3RF’s focus to Track 2. Consultations 26 Lessons from Disaster Governance 4.2 Working-level progress This section considers challenges encountered in translating the strategic vision of the 3RF into the working-level implementation, how the challenges were addressed along the way, namely by organizing the WGs, and other considerations to ensure accountability and legitimacy. 4.2.1 Challenges at the their organizations to various degrees. The WGs were created to convene the working level The three organizations come from full range of stakeholders and bring different perspectives on resources and together resources needed to achieve Despite clear decisions at the strategic coordination in their respective roles—the reform progress. The interactions taking level, translating them to the working World Bank as a fund manager, the EU as place at the WGs would enable the state level and implementation stalled because a donor, and the UN as implementer. For institutions to present their strategies, of a lack of engagement by other senior instance, the EU’s donor status meant that highlight their challenges, draw on the staff within each organization. Much of its role as political actor gave them more expertise of civil society—which also the initial 3RF input was at the strategic freedom to be critical of the Lebanese monitors progress on reforms—and seek level driven by the principals; this did not government, which is a member state support from international organizations translate immediately to results on the for both the World Bank and the UN. As and donors. ground. Setting up internal processes a result, for the most of the first year, the to manage differences of opinion at the However, the WGs were not as functional effort was concentrated at the strategic working level took time. Some of the ideas as intended; there was confusion level and lacked working-level follow-ups for internal processes failed to materialize about what they would do and a lack of to move the reform agenda forward. after much deliberation—including a engagement from the government. The communication strategy, a monitoring WGs had a primarily advisory function 4.2.2 Organizing the rather than an executive one. Despite framework, and an aid tracking tool. Working Groups Some working-level practices proved that being communicated, there was useful—for example, the shared drive, The solution to the imbalance between confusion among stakeholders, who a reform tracker, and the later setup of strategic and working-level progress was were expecting more executive roles WGs. When two of the 3RF principals left provided by setting up the WGs to advise in the implementation of prioritized due to staff rotations within the principal on the implementation of 3RF priorities, investments. While transparency and institutions, the strategic direction of the albeit more than a year after the explosion. inclusion are core 3RF principles, adhering 3RF paused for almost a year. Most of the to these principles also undermines the proposals that had already taken shape in the Fourth CG meeting on April 4, 2022, were hanging until March 2023, when they were formally adopted. Only when all three 3RF principals had recommitted their organizations to revitalizing the 3RF could the process of revision resume. The difference in visions and mandates across organizations emerged as hurdles of implementation at the working level; these included differences in ideas about staffing, obtaining resources, and decision-making. At first, slow hiring processes at the UN and the World Bank delayed the Secretariat coming together.20 Three staff members of the Secretariat provide full-time dedication to bring stakeholders together to make progress and pull together the resources needed from each organization. The three members of the Secretariat, acting on the guidance of their respective principals and being their spokespersons to expedite decisions, are embedded in 27 autonomy of organizations in their sector. Ultimately, reform still recovery and reform framework is kept invisible to decision- needs to be led by the government, which lacked the resources, makers and the public even if the donors are informed about 3RF the political support, and at times even presence. There was low- activities. level government representation with limited decision-making power at WG meetings. Some WGs that were initially more 4.2.4 Key lessons and recommendations: Working effective later stalled on progress once the director general–level level government representative left the country. The three priority lessons taken from the 3RF’s working-level Furthermore, WGs did not all move at the same speed because efforts are listed below. of different stakeholder interests. The long time needed to set up the WGs led to issues of sectoral leadership and control of 1. While strategic-level decisions are important, equally funding. When principals directed to empower WGs with the critical are the concrete technical-level actions undertaken freedom to set their own agenda, the 3RF Secretariat took more to ensure the progress that matters to the people. While the than a year to act because of bureaucratic internal requirements setup of WGs in the 3RF later helped, a potential framework within each of the organizations involved—for example, multiple may consider the institutionalization of WGs at a technical SWOT analyses (see appendix D for a summary of the WGs level from the outset to help engagement with concrete SWOT analysis), multiple revisions of a new mandate, lengthy practical matters. The technical-level action requires consultation processes, and delayed meetings. The prioritization strong engagement from all stakeholders and a granular of investments in the 3RF ultimately caused a rift between understanding of the conditionalities. Successful WGs different WG parties over the control of funding. require strong engagement from the government, especially as these WGs serve as policy dialogue platforms for reform. 4.2.3 Communications 2. Engaging principals is essential but not sufficient to maintain momentum. Given the sometimes diverging mandates of the Communications hold a key to the accountability and three institutions, seniority of the staff matters in navigating legitimacy of the 3RF in the eyes of the public, yet external strategic discussions. Involving staff of greater seniority communication took a back seat in the operation of the 3RF. would avoid a gap between the Technical Secretariat level The primary reason for the lack of public communication was a and decision-making at each of the organizations. At the deliberate decision to avoid an unintended message. During the same time, too much reliance on personal commitment and design phase, it was decided to focus on implementation over connections would be costly at the time of staff rotation. communication to avoid sending a wrong message about the To maintain momentum, it is recommended to invest in intention of the 3RF. Trying to establish the 3RF as a separate handovers with solid institutionalization and especially in an “brand” could have easily been construed as being too focused emergency context. on the international community’s efforts over the needs of the people. For this reason, communications were simply carried 3. For continuity, maintain the interest of headquarters and out through the existing channels of the World Bank, the EU, and donors and keep the public informed. There was much the UN, and were limited to the publication of the RDNA, the 3RF goodwill immediately after the explosion, but continuous document, and press releases of the CG meetings. A 3RF dedicated engagement of the headquarters and donors is key. website (www.lebanon3rf.org) took more than a year to develop, Recognizing a shift in priorities and political landscape, in large part because of the World Bank’s procurement rules and international partners headquarters need to be continually technical requirements related to hosting a website with external involved to support the principals, and to secure funding partners (that is, the EU and the UN). At the operational level, commitments of donors in support of reform and the use of SharePoint as a portal of related documents was not reconstruction. At the same time, without adequate external communicated clearly to CSOs, and many CSOs did not know communications, the momentum from the public and civil how to access it. society may be lost along the way. The insufficient external communication meant insufficient public awareness of the 3RF’s efforts on reform, which lessened civil society’s engagement and gave the impression that information was being withheld. In hindsight, the lower priority placed on public communication led to a loss of momentum among CSO actors. Virtually no public communication happened apart from press releases after CG meetings and a handful of interviews (Iskandarani 2021). A video was produced just before the two-year commemoration of the explosion (World Bank 2022c). A communications strategy was written, but its implementation faltered after the dedicated communication officer resigned to pursue a different career; the communication post was not filled until five months later. A citizen engagement module was under consideration but has not materialized. By focusing on communication within the existing channels, the 28 Lessons from Disaster Governance 4.3 Engagement with the Lebanese state This section considers lessons on engaging with the state, specifically on identifying windows of opportunity for engagement and residual challenges for state engagement in the reform agenda of the 3RF. 4.3.1 Window of opportunity for engagement been reticent to engage with the government, the importance of working closely with the state to achieve aspired reforms The 3RF provided a legitimate and cohesive front on behalf of and investment results. The Secretariat helped the government the international community, the CSOs, and non-state actors to identify mutual priorities; draw on the expertise of civil society, engage positively and productively with the government. Initially, which would also monitor progress; and seek support from there were discussions about excluding what was perceived as international organizations and donors. The new government the inefficient government from the 3RF setup, instead taking full ensured the engagement of different ministries and set up a advantage of the presence of an active civil society. In the end, Central Management Unit (CMU), which has improved state by engaging the government, the 3RF provided the caretaker participation in WGs to push their comprehensive reform plan government with a clear roadmap for recovery and reconstruction (including the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, and access to the Lebanese people’s priorities. or IMF) with international support. The CMU was envisioned During the initial stage of the 3RF, the limited mandate and as a proto-Ministry of Planning staffed by the state that would incentives of the caretaker government led to limited engagement develop national strategies and coordinate with major actors of from the Lebanese state. As the caretaker government could the framework. not pass any legislation, incentives to deliberate policy reforms were limited. During the early stages of setting up the 3RF, the 4.3.2 Challenges in state engagement former deputy prime minister, who was appointed as the main The Secretariat’s separation from the government of Lebanon at counterpart, focused on specific investment projects by the LFF the working level was a lost opportunity to strengthen government rather than leading the reform agenda; this was perceived as engagement and to build institutional capacity. As an independent sidelining by the international community. unit to coordinate among the principals, the Secretariat enjoys no Besides the lack of incentives to engage, the state also faced formal channel of engagement with the government. As a result, limited practical capacity. The ongoing economic crisis and there was a slowdown in recommendations from WGs going to the COVID-19 pandemic added extra layers of difficulty to the the Secretariat, then the CG, then on to the government’s top caretaker government. The Lebanese government invested in officials. Institutionalizing a channel between the Secretariat the reform agenda mainly through a dedicated Office of the and the state—such as incorporating an appropriate government Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR), the Council entity into the Secretariat as an observer—may increase its sense for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), and dedicated semi- of ownership and help increase the public perception that the governmental organizations such as the Institute of Finance (IOF), state can work with international donors and civil society in a each of which faced issues. OMSAR has focused on digitalization transparent manner. but lacks funding to implement. The CDR, which made a large Set against the original plan, two years since the launch, the investment to rebuild areas hard-hit by the 1975–90 civil war, 3RF yield on policy reforms is low. This is particularly the case has become highly politicized and does not function as an open regarding the enactment of laws and decrees that require forum for reforms. The IOF played an important role in drafting high political commitment. A study by the Policy Initiative the Public Procurement law, but that very law created state and the Beirut Urban Lab identified that the 3RF’s reform bodies (such as the Public Procurement Authority) that made the agenda largely assembled pledges that the Lebanese state had IOF less central to policy; it now struggles to attract funding for made at previous international donor conferences, but it has training related to public procurement. Most coordinated efforts not significantly advanced (Maktabi et al. 2023). Nearly two- on reform happen with the prime minister and the deputy prime thirds of the pledged legislative and executive texts under the minister, but this is mainly focused on monitoring draft laws, not 3RF were repeated pledges from Paris III or CEDRE, and only a on investments in reform. quarter of them have been enacted by June 2022.21 The level of The tide turned for state engagement, which came in the form reform results measured in the number of completed laws and of a new government that was more receptive to the reform decrees are at a similar level as past experiences of the Paris III agenda. After Prime Minister Mikati took office just before the conference, which implies inaction in meeting the conditions third CG meeting, the government became more responsive to of aid programs.22 Furthermore, as the progress on reform repeated overtures by the Secretariat and the Technical Team. In depends on the engagement of both the government and the the process of revitalizing the 3RF, which included establishing parliament, the outcome of completed laws may not fully reflect WGs for sectoral progress, the new government committed to the recommendations from the WGs. For instance, various comprehensive reforms. This signaled to the CSOs, which had stakeholders submitted ideas for and commented on the draft 29 Procurement Law, yet when the law went to the parliament, many that all development is political and can contribute to the phrases were removed before it passed, making the outcome identification of entry points for reforms that do not require much less impactful than originally intended. legislation. The EU, the UN, and the World Bank together represent a significant portion of assistance to Lebanon, 4.3.3 Lessons and recommendations: Engagement which gives the 3RF a convening power that the state or civil with the Lebanese state society lacks. The three priority lessons on the 3RF’s engagement with the 3. It is important to bridge the distance between the Lebanese state are listed below. government and the Secretariat and to engage in outreach across the political spectrum. This may include engaging 1. We cannot exclude the government from the reform and individually with the state actors beyond the government reconstruction framework, which must engage very visibly to avoid the tempo being dictated by national development with the state even if there is limited state capacity. Despite beyond the framework’s control. Engage other state actors initial discussions about excluding the government from with sufficient political power to move reforms, especially the 3RF setup, it was determined that the reform agenda “champions of change” in the parliament and semi-state would not advance without engaging the government. agencies that have proven to be efficient. Outreach should Reform is impossible without considering the politics and be undertaken across the political spectrum, not only to underlying conflict risks. Without addressing the concerns parties seen as friendly to the West. Small preparatory and skepticism of decision-makers—even if some are meetings to set the stage will help with large meetings such legitimate and others are not—proactive engagement of all as the CG; these small meetings will also build trust for when stakeholders cannot be achieved. more difficult discussions must take place. Champions of 2. Consider providing practical support to the state and CSOs reform can also be found among traditional adversaries. to engage them in technical discussions on specific reforms Constructive individuals in the state and local government and projects. Even if it is not strictly the responsibility of must be empowered, thus avoiding relying on a narrow international organizations—and it in no way eliminates group of counterparts. Engaging with civil servants will also the decision-making—this practical support can make all help avoid feeding a “shadow bureaucracy” of international the difference when state institutions are overwhelmed. experts. This technical approach will help minimize the notion 4.4 Engagement with Lebanese civil society This section considers lessons on engaging civil society, namely the role of the whole-of- Lebanon approach and the challenges of civil society engagement. 4.4.1 The whole-of-Lebanon approach With the whole-of-Lebanon approach proposed in the RDNA, bringing CSOs into the 3RF was emphasized from the outset. The crisis of trust in the government provided the impetus to make civil society central to the 3RF to maintain legitimacy, show politicians that they were neglecting the public voice, and build the capacity of civil society to become partners for the government.23 Through the CG and WG setup where the government, civil society, the private sector, and donors are part of the same mechanism, the 3RF increased the level of interactions between these stakeholders. In this sense, the 3RF has become a step in the right direction to promote dialogue and collaboration in Lebanon. The 3RF took the innovative financial approach of funding certain CSOs as implementers of LFF-financed projects, increasing interest from CSOs yet with limited scope. The perceived lack of legitimacy in the Lebanese system and the caretaker status of the governments led to the decision to distance the government from the implementation of the framework’s priorities. This decision was perceived by CSOs as an opportunity to secure funding, which generated many applications to join the 3RF. In reality, only INGOs received funding from the LFF and local CSOs did not. Local CSOs would be funded only through different channels, such as contracting with funded organizations. A key criterion for the selection of a CSO to implement LFF projects would be their capability to meet the World Bank’s fiduciary standards, as well as a demonstration of tested implementation arrangements, transparent governance, and operational independence, which favored CSOs with an inclination for reforms (Bloemeke and Harb 2022). The lack of clarification on the selection criteria created confusion and tension among CSOs. 30 Lessons from Disaster Governance Overall, the 3RF has contributed to an increased level of 4.4.3 Lessons and recommendations: Engagement solidarity among the participating CSOs, but various technical with Lebanese civil society and capacity challenges hampered taking advantage of the full spectrum and capabilities of Lebanese civil society. To allow The three priority lessons of the 3RF’s engagement with Lebanese space for a genuine voice of CSOs, the Secretariat avoided steering civil society are listed below. CSO discussions and let them self-organize. CSOs report that the 1. Defend the space for civil society to avoid their 3RF allowed them to unite themselves and show the capacity discouragement when attacked by the state. The lack of of Lebanese experts for policy dialogue by presenting clear CSO participation deflates the platform given to them. It recommendations for each sector in the 3RF. At the same time, is vital that sponsors of the framework protect the space the process of CSO engagement did not take into account the where CSOs are included even when it goes counter to capacity gap that some CSOs face, limiting CSOs’ empowerment, international organizations’ own established way of working full representation, and effectiveness (Bloemeke and Harb 2022). with the state. The role of civil society should be explained from the outset: it is not to replace government decision- 4.4.2 Challenges of CSO engagement making, but to benefit transparency and accountability. CSOs’ diverse nature and the history of involvement in This will help alleviate pushback from the government policy dialogue resulted in a perception of lack of inclusion that is reluctant with CSO inclusion and negative in the conception of the 3RF. A set of factors constrained the media attention. participation of the CSOs in the CG and WGs. Despite the criteria 2. Have a clear understanding of the CSO sphere in the around impartiality and non–conflict of interest guided CSO country and in respective sectors, and maintain legitimacy selection, the CG does not reflect the full spectrum of CSOs with civil society, the government, and the broader public because of the heterogeneous nature of Lebanese civil society all at the same time. It is important to get a sense of which (Bloemeke and Harb 2022). Some decisions and requirements— civil society stakeholders represent the people. CSOs that such as the language of the terms of reference (only in English) and are more established organizing broader discussions and the requisites for application—restricted the full participation of channeling those discussions into the 3RF is an attractive CSOs. Furthermore, generic terms of reference for CSOs’ roles proposition, but its success depends on the neutrality of the within the CG and WGs created lack of clarity in CSOs’ coordination CSOs leading that effort. and led to further fragmentation. At the donor level, there was 3. It is worth reflecting on the World Bank’s funding no financial support for the CG or WGs. At the government level, mechanisms so that funding may be allowed to empower delegitimized ruling elites are not keen to engage CSOs. local CSOs. In FCV environments with low government At the working level, the way CSOs operate also at times came capacities but where relatively active CSOs are present, in conflict with that of the 3RF. For example, when a document is engaging CSOs with funding would increase investment shared with CSOs, instead of engaging in a discussion to challenge impacts. However, if such direct funding to CSOs is not the proposal, CSOs write their own alternative policy papers or possible, it is important to transparently communicate this organize their own conferences. A SharePoint was set up by the from the onset to avoid creating confusion and increasing 3RF Secretariat for CSOs to access all 3RF information, including potential grievances. The current operational experience does draft documents online; but CSOs rarely visited this SharePoint. not provide knowledge about how to work directly with local The SharePoint was seen as technically too complicated for CSOs through funding. Also important is the consideration many CSOs to use, partly because of the capacity gap between of how to engage them in a symbiotic relationship with the international organizations and CSOs. Similarly, the CSOs have government without increasing mistrust between them. set up structures to coordinate among themselves, which was perceived as in some ways mirroring those of WGs.24 Fragmentation, lack of cohesion, capacity gap, and competition for funding challenged effective CSO participation. CSOs that are part of the CG do not always agree on what the priority of the 3RF should be. Some CSOs pushed for reforms and institutional strengthening; others were more interested in investment project implementation. The CG has been working on consolidating itself and building its capacities with its previous co-chair of the Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB) and with the current co-chair of Live Love Beirut (LLB). 31 4.5 Funding Thanks to the display of support from the international community and swift strategic-level decision making, the LFF—the funding arm of the 3RF—was established quickly. The LFF was administered by the World Bank in close cooperation with the EU, while the UN was an observer.25 The LFF aimed to pool funding from key donors and international finance institutions (IFIs) to kickstart the immediate socioeconomic recovery of vulnerable population and businesses (Track 1) and to help the government of Lebanon prepare for medium- term reconstruction (Track 2). However, although the LFF was set up quickly, the fund remained 4.5.1 Key lessons and recommendations: Funding empty for several months, delaying project implementation and leading to a slump in momentum. An appetite for development The three priority lessons on funding are listed below. financing to Lebanon was low among the donor community, 1. Although it is ideal that the financing facility would be due to the country’s track record on implementing reforms and well replenished, expect funding to be insufficient and its lack of progress on the reform agenda. As investments were that it is necessary to find a way to work with limited linked to results in reform (though there was no conditionality in financial resources. The dilemma with funding lies in the the 3RF), donors were reluctant to contribute more because of the fact that funding availability indicates donors’ commitment implementation delays caused by difficulties with securing approval to rebuilding after the disaster, but donor funding is also set from the Lebanese government. A blanket approval to implement by the pace of implementation of reforms. This means that, LFF projects through civil society was rejected. The Ministry of without reform results, the LFF would not be fully replenished. Finance insisted that all funds flow through their accounts, but The commitment to the reforms in Lebanon should ideally this proposed approach was rejected by donors as a result of the be reflected in larger contributions to the LFF from a more banking crisis already in full swing. Regardless of how much funding diverse donor base, which may include other Gulf states. indirectly contributed to the 3RF, the LFF had difficulty filling its pipeline. 2. It is important to manage expectations on capacity funding to prevent disappointment when funding is waiting for The lack of clarity about the availability of 3RF funds and its conditional reforms. The costed priorities can give the disbursement mechanism caused frustration among organizations impression that these projects are ready to be developed. and skepticism by the government that civil society would receive In Lebanon’s case, many stakeholders, including local CSOs, all the aid. Building on the RDNA, the 3RF presented fully costed thought the 3RF was a funding modality for projects, largely priorities for the first 18 months, amounting to a total for recovery because of the emphasis on the LFF from the outset. To of $584 million (Track 1) and $2 billion for reform and reconstruction avoid disappointment, clearer communication on funding (Track 2). However, the LFF covered only part of the 3RF funding. mechanisms could have helped: the 3RF is a framework to The rest of the 3RF actions would be funded through bilateral and align on reforms and reconstruction, with the LFF but one multilateral programs, which gave the 3RF, in theory, coverage of potential funding modality. all international funding in Lebanon. The challenge of delineating what funding is counted as 3RF and who led the implementation 3. Use trust funds to help implement reforms. Rather than generated confusion. In the absence of the government as project focusing only on large projects to be financed after reform implementor, the 3RF has had to counter the false impression that results, draw in government actors by helping them implement funds were not flowing to the government, because all money reforms. The framework can become a way to provide tools was promised to the Lebanese people via civil society (but it was for the government to deliver on reforms, including through implemented by other entities, including the UN). This undermined technical assistance, equipment, and auditing of banks. Once the real reason investments in reconstruction were withheld: lack reforms are in place, the framework can be the vehicle for of reforms. larger investments with stronger government involvement. No single donor can do that by themselves; the framework can help donors spread political risks. 32 Lessons from Disaster Governance 4.6 Monitoring reform results 4.6.1 Key lessons: Monitoring results At the setup stage, the rush to finalize the framework on time The three priority lessons on monitoring 3RF’s results are listed resulted in defining the results with unclear targets and lacking below. agreed upon progress tracking methodology. At the design 1. A prioritized results framework with simplicity and stage, wide consultation with stakeholders was skipped to meet flexibility to improve outreach and maintain momentum. the setup deadline. The results framework was developed at the An agile and prioritized results framework from the outset outset with goals and results defined for each of the sectors, in the would speed up implementation, improve advocacy, three areas of reform, reconstruction (in the form of investment and prevent stakeholders from losing track of what was projects), and institutional strengthening. While the plan was happening in implementation. A practical suggestion is to clear in its objectives, there were few identified benchmarks or keep the RDNA as a live document with thematic priorities, milestones with which to measure progress, and there was no to be regularly updated (yearly or biannual). It is important to system in place to collect data on progress, with clear roles and define the reforms in terms of implementation, with a clear responsibilities among the actors in the 3RF. threshold, to avoid later discussion about whether state To overcome the inefficiency in monitoring the results, during action towards reforms is sufficient to unlock investment. the implementation phase, a comprehensive monitoring 2. Compiling a practical handbook for following up on the framework was defined. The 3RF Secretariat prepared a packed RDNA can streamline implementation. Institutionalization monitoring framework for the fourth CG meeting in April 2022. is one of the strengths of the 3RF that can move beyond The monitoring framework defined specific indicators and personalities and skills. In the 3RF, input and internal intermediary targets to track results progress, making it a clearer processes required the bulk of the effort. Rather, results monitoring framework for the previously specified sectoral should be measured by output that can be publicized. A goals.26 A reform tracker was developed to check progress and recommendation is to complement the joint declaration identify actions at sectoral WG meetings. Much deliberation with a simple handbook that includes tools and methods was needed internally to define monitoring of the constant shift developed in other contexts, such as a template of terms on the reforms. However, the length and countless indicators of reference for Secretariat, WGs, and the Trust Fund. Such embedded in the monitoring framework sapped the energy a handbook may have different scenarios—for example, and interest of stakeholders. A gap also exists between the those with stable contexts or those in which there already framework and the existing programs or strategies: there are is a protracted crisis, those with existing coordination with few references to the indicators, and the framework does mechanisms, those with or without strong government, not include those prepared by the government. with organized or disorganized civil society, with existing or Later, alignment with the IMF’s prior actions and indicative constrained policy dialogue. benchmarks helped the 3RF to present clearer priorities. In April 2022, the IMF signed a staff-level agreement on economic policies with the Government of Lebanon (IMF 2022).27 One of the recommendations in consultations was a reform monitoring framework, which was subsequently developed in time for the fourth CG meeting in the same month.28 Substantive results mentioned are the successful passing of the public procurement law, improvement of the independence of the judiciary law (through the involvement of the Venice Commission), and an inclusive dialogue around investments in urban recovery. Yet these results are still considered too abstract to make a difference for the Lebanese people. The Article IV mission by the IMF in March 2023 notes the limited progress on reforms and warns that “Lebanon is at a dangerous crossroads, and without rapid reforms will be mired in a never-ending crisis” (IMF 2023). The relevance of the 3RF for all the stakeholders (that is, the government, the international community, and civil society) is linked to proving the delivery on the ground. Hence, a prioritization of reforms in 2023 was proposed by WG leads and will in the first half of 2023 be agreed upon by all members. 33 34 Lessons from Disaster Governance Summary As of publication of this report, the 3RF is still ongoing, beyond its originally planned lifespan of two years. The strategic thinking and solidarity evident among the organizations and the donor community have worked to create a framework that goes beyond presenting a reconstruction roadmap, which tends to fail in implementation given the governance and capacity challenges faced in an FCV environment. The unprecedented incorporation of CSOs into the recovery framework and the renewed engagement of the Lebanese state have paved the way for making progress on reforms that have historically stalled. Still, many challenges have emerged along the way, chiefly at the working and technical levels of implementation— particularly in clearly communicating agendas among all the stakeholders to keep them on the same page and maintain momentum, and in bringing the government actors on board with the reforms. The 3RF still has a possibility of becoming an all-encompassing donor framework, which is much needed considering how many separate initiatives coordinate part of Lebanese and international efforts. 35 Appendixes 36 Lessons from Disaster Governance Appendix A. Institutional Setup of the 3RF The institutional architecture of the Reform, Recovery and Secretariat acts on strategic guidance by the 3RF principals: Reconstruction Framework (3RF) is organized around five the EU Head of Delegation, the UN Resident Coordinator, units: the Consultative Group, the Technical Secretariat, the and the World Bank Country Director. The Secretariat has Lebanon Financing Facility (LFF), sectoral Working Groups, and no formal connection to the government but maintains a the Independent Oversight Board (figure A.1). The Consultative network of technical civil servants and some key ministers in Group (CG)—comprised of the Lebanese government, the UN, an attempt to link the 3RF to government realities. a donor representative, and civil society—serves as a decision-  The 3RF is supported and partially funded by a multi-donor making body for overall strategic guidance and a channel for trust fund, the Lebanon Financing Facility (LFF), administered high-level policy dialogue on 3RF priorities. The 3RF Secretariat by the World Bank in close cooperation with the EU (World provides technical coordination for day-to-day implementation Bank 2021b). The LFF aims to pool funding from key donors of the 3RF. The funding arm of the 3RF, the Lebanon Financing and international finance institutions (IFIs) to kickstart Facility (LFF), is a multi-donor trust fund that pools funding the immediate socioeconomic recovery of vulnerable to finance the investment projects under the 3RF. The 14 populations and businesses affected by the blast and help sectoral Working Groups (WGs) implement their respective 3RF the government of Lebanon prepare for medium-term priorities. In addition, the Independent Oversight Board (IOB) reconstruction. At the initial stage, the LFF planned to provide is a watchdog of the 3RF representing civil society that holds direct support to capable NGOs and CSOs and to private sector 3RF stakeholders accountable. The selection of civil society intermediaries, while also providing a mechanism to support organizations (CSOs) was based on the criteria of impartiality and program implementation by the UN and the World Bank. non–conflict of interest, as seen in the selection of 15 CSOs for However, direct funding to CSOs did not materialize. the CG based on the principle of non-sectarianism, non-political, and balanced representation of nongovernmental organizations  The sectoral Working Groups (WGs) implement their (NGOs), academia, and the private sector. respective 3RF priorities. The 14 sector WGs are co-chaired by two or more officials from the EU, the UN, or the World Bank,  The Consultative Group (CG) serves as a decision-making who work with members of Lebanese state institutions, body for overall strategic guidance and a channel for high- international organizations, donors, civil society, and the level policy dialogue on 3RF priorities. It is co-chaired by the private sector. Some 200 CSOs are involved in 3RF Working Prime Minister of Lebanon, the UN Resident Coordinator, Groups, including those that are also members of the CG. The one of the donors, and one civil society representative. process of including the state, donors, and civil society in Current donor members of the CG are Canada, Denmark, WGs was self-selection.29 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European  The Independent Oversight Board (IOB), composed Union (EU), France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, of civil society, is a watchdog of the 3RF that holds 3RF Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, stakeholders accountable. The IOB consists of six CSOs that and the United States. The EU Head of Delegation has served are not involved in the CG, WGs, or implementing projects as the first donor co-chair of the CG; its initial one-year term financed by the LFF, and thus have no vested interest in how was extended until mid-2023. Civil society is represented by recovery efforts are implemented. This setup enables truly two rotations of nine organizations each, who twice elected a independent oversight, which did not exist in any previous co-chair among themselves (table A.1). recovery frameworks. Key roles of the IOB include monitoring 3RF implementation progress and the use of financing,  The 3RF Secretariat provides technical coordination for day- periodically disclosing reports to the public and presenting to-day implementation of the 3RF. Staffed by the officials them to the CG, collecting feedback from beneficiaries and from the EU, the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank, the citizens, and reporting on its findings. 37 Track 1 focuses on essential actions needed to address urgent needs of the most vulnerable populations and small businesses affected by the explosion over the first 18 months. It comprises a costed proposal and a prioritized comprehensive plan of key actions—such as policy measures, investments, and institutional strengthening—across various sectors to support the recovery and reconstruction of Beirut. Track 2 focuses on critical reforms to address governance and recovery challenges in the country, along with investments that would achieve the long-term reconstruction of critical assets, services, and infrastructure. This is set up as an engagement model emphasizing direct support to affected communities through people-centered economic recovery while identifying a set of priority reforms as prerequisites for reconstruction. WGs were established to help focus the reform agenda and strengthen results-based engagement (table A.2). The second 3RF CG meeting on July 28, 2021, provided an update on people-centered recovery in the area affected by the blast and urged the then caretaker government to act on key reforms (World Bank 2021c). While this meeting recommitted all CG members to the 3RF, it highlighted how much more hands-on engagement was needed to support the government to show results, especially on the reform agenda. At the third CG meeting on November 16, 2021, in which sparse progress on reforms were reviewed, a strategic decision was made to set up 14 sectoral WGs, according to the sectors defined in the RDNA, to focus the agenda and strengthen results-based engagement (EEAS 2021b).30 Table A.1. Civil Society Organizations in the Consultative Group First rotation Second rotation CATEGORY I: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum (LHDF) Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF), replaced by (LHDF) Society Saint Vincent de Paul (SSVP) Live Love Beirut Green Mind Arc-en-ciel CATEGORY II: CIVIL SOCIETY OR COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS OR INITIATIVES Beirut Urban Lab Beirut Heritage Initiative (BHI) Lebanese Union for People with Physical Disabilities (LUPDD) Khaddit Beirut KAFA (Enough) KAFA (Enough) ALDIC (L’Association Libanaise pour les Droits et les Intérêts des Contribuables) Lebanese Center for Human Rights (LCHR), replaced by ALEF CATEGORY III: PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB) Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB) Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI) Order of Engineers and Architects Source: Created for this report based on World Bank 2021d and EEES 2021b. 38 3RF Institutional Arrangements LFF Independent Consultative Partnership Oversight Group Council Board Strategic guidance on Governing body Different group of whole 3RF Donor Community Civil Society Source: Created based on EEAS 2021a. Government of LFF CSOs hold all of 3RF to account Pillar 1: Improving Pillar 2: Pillar 3: Pillar 4: Governance & Jobs & Economic Social Protection, Figure A.1. 3RF Institutional Arrangements Improving Services & Infrastructure Accountability Opportunities Inclusion & Culture Sectoral WGs Sectoral WGs Sectoral WGs Sectoral WGs Housing Electricity Governance & LFF Private Sector Social Protection Anti-Corruption Municipal Services Education Management Social Cohesion, Team Rule of Law, Justice, & Human Inclusion, & Gender Environment Health Rights functioning of 3RF Culture Port Water 3RF Technical Team 3RF Secretariat Follow through on Consultative Day-to-day Group guidance 3RF functioning of Lessons from Disaster Governance 39 Table A.2. 3RF Timeline Year Month Event Aug Beirut explosion. Publication of the RDNA. Prime Minister Diab resigns and becomes caretaker prime minister. Sep 2020 Oct Nov Dec Publication of the 3RF and launch of LFF. Jan Feb Election of first CSO co-chair. Mar Consultative Group meeting 1. Apr May Jun Establishment of 3RF Secretariat. Setup of 3RF SharePoint. 2021 Jul Consultative Group meeting 2. Technical briefing with CSOs. Publication of the Public Procurement Law. Aug Principals’ strategy retreat. CSO discussions on sector recommendations. Sep The Mikati government is formed. Activation of WGs for the EU, the UN, and the World Bank. Activation of IOB. Oct Principals present 3RF to Prime Minister Mikati. Principals brief ambassadors. Technical briefing with CSOs. Principals lunch 3RF private sector. Nov Consultative Group meeting 3. Inclusion of CSOs in WGs. Dec Meeting of 3RF CSOs with Mikati. Jan Establishment of Central Management Unit under the prime minister. Opening of the 3RF SharePoint to CSOs, CMU, and IOB. Feb Technical briefing with state counterparts. Inclusion of state representatives and donors in WGs. Mar Principals brief Prime Minister Mikati. Technical briefing with Deputy Prime Minister Chami. Technical briefing with donors. Principals brief ambassadors. Apr Consultative Group meeting 4. IMF signs staff-level agreement. Technical briefing with CSOs. Election of new CSO co-chair. May Principals’ strategy retreat (national scope). Start WGs SWOT. Parliamentary elections; Prime Minister Mikati resigns. CSO Council established. 2022 Jun Official end of Track 1 on recovery (unofficially extended to end of 2022). Mikati named prime minister designate. Jul End of term for UN RC and World Bank Country Director. Aug Launch of 3RF video. Sep Technical briefing with donors. Three principals recommit to the 3RF. Start consultations of new mandate. Oct President Aoun’s term ends. CSOs retreat. CSOs state of the sectors. Nov Dec Jan Principals’ consultation of new mandate with Prime Minister Mikati and CSOs. Technical briefing with donors. Feb Principals’ consultation of new mandate with ambassadors. 2023 Mar Technical consultation new mandate with presidency. Apr Source: Original table for this publication. 40 Lessons from Disaster Governance Appendix B. Precedent: Iraq Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Fund The Iraq Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Fund (I3RF) was the first example of a reconstruction framework that was combined with a reform agenda, on which the design of 3RF was built. The I3RF was set up by the World Bank and the UN in 2018, in partnership with the government of Iraq in the aftermath of the 2014–17 war against the Islamic State (IS), as a platform for financing and strategic dialogue for reconstruction that addresses the underlying drivers of instability in Iraq, and to support the Iraqi government in meeting the needs of the Iraqi people. Iraq has experienced a period of instability for over a decade, characterized by sectarian tensions among Sunni and Shiite groups and between Kurdish groups. The resultant power vacuum was taken over by ISIS in 2014, triggering armed actions from abroad that continued into 2017. After the declaration of victory by the Iraqi government in December 2017 and the subsequent withdrawal of foreign troops, Iraq faced significant challenges with post-conflict recovery. The underlying sectarian tensions continue to threaten the stability of the Iraqi state, which aims to prevent ISIS resurgence. More than 1.14 million people remain internally displaced,31 and nearly 3 million (including 1.3 million children) remain in need of humanitarian assistance as of mid-2023 (UNICEF 2023), and the reconstruction of the former ISIS-occupied areas (of the seven directly affected governorates) was projected to cost at least $88 billion (World Bank 2018). To support the Iraqi government in the recovery and reconstruction from the conflict, a funding facility, the I3RF, was set up by the UN and the World Bank. The I3RF is a $126 million multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) to support Iraq’s recovery and reconstruction plans and to inform its economic reforms. It is funded by four donors: Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The I3RF focuses on promoting targeted national reform efforts and improving the effectiveness of public and private investments in socioeconomic recovery and reconstruction. To ensure that there is a sense of ownership within the fund’s results framework, the I3RF Secretariat has facilitated the development of a policy document (the White Paper) by the Iraqi government, with feedback from donors, as a leading document for the government’s plan to tackle reform within the framework of the fund. Sector teams work closely with over 28 government counterparts to support the implementation of the reform agenda and the development of concrete action plans, through technical assistance, advisory and analytical work, as well as both Bank-Executed (BE) and Recipient-Executed (RE) pilot projects. The I3RF projects have informed policy and programming in areas including reconstruction, agriculture, environment, energy, social protection, education, public financial management, the financial sector, the private sector, economic diversification, poverty programming, and peacebuilding. In 2021, following the adaptation of the White Paper, the I3RF increased its focus on reforms by supporting the Iraqi government to build coordination systems to manage reform efforts. The I3RF plays an important role as a platform for dialogue, by bringing together various stakeholders—including different government entities, 41 international development partners, experts, and beneficiaries—to discuss issues related to Iraq’s reconstruction and reform. The I3RF activities have increased engagement with the government in recent years, through enhanced coordination and communication between the Ministry of Planning (as the Co-Chair of the I3RF Secretariat) and the World Bank (as the Trust Fund administrator). The regular meetings and communication have helped align government counterparts and the Ministry of Planning technical team with the I3RF objectives, the I3RF Work Plan, its Results Framework, and the operational procedures of the Trust Fund. As an evolving platform in the fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) context, the I3RF is not without challenges. Security constraints, issues of institutional continuity and the funding, the lack of coordination with local stakeholders, deteriorating institutional capacity, and the issue of governance all contribute to low effectiveness of recovery and reconstruction despite high spending. The civil society organization (CSO) engagement in a post-conflict environment has also seen challenges, especially in the formal engagement of stakeholders outside of the public sector. To start with, Iraq’s CSO presence is much smaller than Lebanon’s, and the Iraqi government was not keen on listening to CSOs. While the Steering Committee includes a representation from CSOs and the private sector, their meaningful engagement and impact was limited because of the much smaller funding availability in the MDTF compared to the extent of the damage and the restrictive nature of funding. The MDTF, with its various priority agendas from the donors, was restricted in what it was financing, which meant little ownership from the Iraqi government in how the money should have been used. Building on such lessons from the I3RF, the Lebanon 3RF incorporated the traditionally robust CSO, private sector, and academia presence in Lebanon. With CSO representation not only in the Steering Committee, CSOs are represented through the Consultative Group and the Independent Oversight Board. 42 Lessons from Disaster Governance Appendix C. Investment Projects Developed under the 3RF Beirut Housing Rehabilitation and Cultural and Creative Industries Recovery (P176577) Project Implementing Unit Amount Timeframe United Nations Human Settlements US$12.75 million February 23, 2022 – December 15, 2024 Programme (UN-Habitat) Project Development Objective (PDO): The project aims to support the rehabilitation of prioritized historical housing for the most vulnerable people and to provide emergency support to creative practitioners and entities in the cultural sector in the Port of Beirut explosion areas. Components Component 1: Housing Recovery ($8.28 million). Providing support for: (a) rehabilitation of select vacant structurally damaged residential units in the historical neighborhoods located within five kilometers of the epicenter of the Port of Beirut August 4, 2020, explosion and that were inhabited by lower-income and vulnerable households; (b) necessary inspection and supervision of the works; and (c) development of communication and awareness materials, website and a hotline for the grievance redress mechanism. Component 2: Emergency Support for CCI Recovery ($1.95 million). Providing grants (“CCI Grants”) to eligible practitioners and entities in the cultural and creative industry sector (“CCIs”) affected by the Port of Beirut August 4, 2020, explosion (“CCI Grant Recipients”), including carrying out of the outreach and communication campaign to raise awareness of the activity. Component 3: Project Management and Monitoring and Evaluation ($2.52 million). Project implementation support to the Project Management Team for the management, coordination, communication, awareness raising and outreach pertaining to the Project activities, and monitoring and evaluation of the Project, and to cover the Project-related management and Operating Costs, audits, financial management, and compliance Environmental and Social Standards, including Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP), Direct Costs and Indirect Costs. Building Beirut Businesses Back & Better (B5) Fund (P176013) Project Implementing Unit Amount Timeframe Kafalat US$ 25.00 million October 8, 2021 - July 31, 2024 PDO: The Project Development Objective is to support the recovery of targeted micro and small enterprises (MSEs) and sustain the operations of eligible microfinance institutions (MFIs). Components Component 1: Grants to Micro and Small Enterprises (Proposed Allocation: $18.5 million). This component will provide grants to eligible MSEs that have been affected by the Beirut port explosion. It will award non-reimbursable grants to eligible MSEs, including self- employed, regardless of whether they are formal or informal, following a wholesale and retail implementation approach. Component 2: Grants to microfinance institutions (MFIs) (Proposed Allocation: $5 million). This component will provide self-sustainability grants to MFIs to preserve the microfinance sector and its capacity. MFIs have decades of experience serving micro and small businesses, low-income populations, and the informal sector at large. This component will help MFIs stand by the communities they serve and bounce back during the time of multiple crises. Initially, this component will help eligible MFIs sustain their activities by covering part of their operational expenses for an average of six months. Component 3: Project Management and Gender Support (Proposed Allocation: $1.5 million). This component will finance project management costs over the project life. Kafalat will be the Project Implementation Agency (PIA). Costs of the PIA include management and consultancy fees, operations and administrative costs for the management and supervision of the project activities. Project funds will support the PIA costs for the following: gender-sensitive capacity-building support to Women-Owned or Led Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) beneficiaries, conducting of assessments and analysis (including climate change risks assessment), citizen engagement activities, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), safeguards monitoring and review, legal, accounting, auditing, financial management, and gender. 43 Support for Social Recovery Needs of Vulnerable Groups in Beirut (P176622) Project Implementing Unit Amount Timeframe International Rescue Committee (IRC) US$ 5 million April 4, 2022 - October 31, 2023 PDO: To support the immediate social recovery needs of vulnerable groups following the Port of Beirut explosion. Components Component 1: Support for Social Services for Vulnerable Groups Affected by the Explosion ($7,305,000). This component will finance NGOs to provide social services to vulnerable groups affected by the crises including: (i) survivors of GBV; (ii) those suffering from deteriorated psycho-social wellbeing; (iii) and persons with disabilities and OPs facing limitations related to their disabled or elderly status. Given the cross-cutting nature of their vulnerability, refugees and migrant domestic workers will be targeted across these beneficiary groups. Component 2: Component 2. Capacity Building and Project Management ($490,000). This component will finance project management over the project life, including incremental operating costs incurred while implementing and supervising project activities. Activities undertaken by the IA will include: (i) overall project management, fiduciary and safeguards management; (ii) providing technical assistance (TA) and institutional strengthening measures; (iii) developing and implementing a monitoring and reporting plan to provide visibility of the results and a transparent model for the development and implementation of all activities. Beirut Critical Environment Recovery, Restoration and Waste Management Program (P176635) Project Implementing Unit Amount Timeframe United Nations Development Programme US$ 10.00 million May 18, 2022 – June 30, 2025 (UNDP) PDO: To support immediate environment control measures from the impacts of August 2020 Port of Beirut explosion and planning for longer term environmental restoration efforts in Beirut City Components Component 1: Rehabilitation of damaged solid waste management infrastructure and management of asbestos contaminated debris generated due to PoB explosion ($8.00 million). This component aims to support the refurbishment and reintegration of affected SWM infrastructure in Beirut, and the containment of contaminated waste material generated from the port explosion. Component 2: Policy & institutional support for greening Beirut Reconstruction Agenda ($0.50 million). This component supports the establishment of an enabling environment for policy and institutional reform for climate change and environmental management by strengthening the building blocks for environmental governance and climate action. In addition, the component will also support the participatory planning process for a green recovery of Beirut based on a comprehensive framework for responding to key priorities identified by stakeholders resulting from the explosion. Component 3: Project Management ($1.50 million). This component supports project management activities to be carried out by UNDP as an IIA. These include: (i) overall project management, fiduciary and Environmental Social Framework (ESF) compliance; (ii) conducting/managing necessary technical, financial, environment and social safeguard studies; (iii) supporting technical assistance and institutional strengthening measures; and (iv) developing and implementing a monitoring and reporting plan to provide visibility of the results and a transparent model for the development and implementation of all activities. A Project Management Unit (PMU) will be established by UNDP for this purpose comprising a project manager, environmental engineer and safeguards analyst, finance associate, procurement associate and a social and gender analyst. 44 Lessons from Disaster Governance Appendix D. Summary of the Working Groups SWOT Analysis SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis is a strategic technique used to identify and analyze internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats. A SWOT analysis was conducted for the Working Groups (WGs) in May 2022, following the Fourth Consultative Group meeting. STRENGTHS WEAKNESS The WGs are almost all inclusive of all 3RF WGs sometimes feel unsure of their role. stakeholder groups. There is irregular presence and sometimes The convening power of the UN, the World Bank, ineffective participation, especially from and the European Union (EU) brings together all government representatives. important actors in each sector, including those The monitoring framework and commitments need from the state and civil society. to be better defined to be effective. S W Some WGs are integrated successfully into wider Lebanon is facing new crises since the blast, so the sector coordination mechanisms. 3RF should be national in scope. OPPORTUNITIES There is the potential for the 3RF to be the O T THREATS development coordination structure for WGs are documented unevenly. Lebanon. There is weak capacity of the Lebanese state to The 3RF offers a platform for substantive act on reforms. strategic discussion beyond info-sharing There is a large number of WGs in Lebanon. addressing challenges. In part because of institutional interests, there The WGs offer partners a chance to align are differences in the willingness of members to their work in each sector, including common provide meaningful input. advocacy. 45 Appendix E. Table of Operational Lessons Issue areas Operational lessons STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING During the design stage, weekly meetings of principals, where they had frank International partners should remain committed and convey the added value exchanges on challenges each faced within their mandate, led to an agreement of the framework by taking part in WGs. This will help mitigate confusion and on a clear division of labor for their strategic engagement. concerns over competition for funding and other institutional interests and avoid the proliferation of ad-hoc working groups. The intentions and implementation of conditionalities for fund disbursement Conditionality should be specific to be effective. At the center of discussions were not clearly communicated or upheld, impacting the progress on reforms. about conditionality must be clearly defined thresholds for what constitutes a The whole effort will fail if one slips—one actor softening on conditionalities progress on reforms. This avoids political pressure to fund when progress on creates dysfunctionality. reforms is contentious. Difficult reforms can then be split up in implementation. While the 3RF is a successful platform for coordinating donors and other actors, The coordination of different meetings should be made clear between the CG there has been a lack of clarity among meetings of different 3RF units that led to meetings, the Secretariat-level meetings involving the principals, the meetings progress stalling. The CG meetings were always prepared at ambassadors’ level to coordinate international actors, and the WGs. to align statements and strategy. Between CG meetings, donors met only on an as-needed basis to review LFF progress at the technical level. Although this approach mitigated fragmented efforts in the donor community, the agendas were not aligned between the CG, the donors, and the WGs. This led to lost momentum, even though much effort was made behind the scenes to set up the WGs. WORKING LEVEL At first, slow hiring processes at the UN and the World Bank stalled the Prompt staffing of the Secretariat, the engine of implementation, is needed to Secretariat coming together. The gap in implementation for the three months avoid a loss of momentum. A dedicated semi-embedded Secretariat should be after the first CG meeting was due to a lack of peoplepower to operationalize instituted as soon as possible. The Secretariat staff should have strategic policy the 3RF. Combined with the differences in perspectives and priorities for the dialogue skills, in addition to project portfolios. A dedicated scheduler for the three organizations, for the most of the first year, the effort concentrated at the Secretariat would be helpful. strategic level, lacking working-level follow-ups to move forward the reform agenda. Knowledge of local contexts is especially important in long-term planning Country-based staff versed in local contexts are crucial to the quick drafting for recovery and reconstruction. For example, the port explosion in Beirut of the framework and setting engagement parameters. Stakeholders with may appear on the surface to be a failure to handle hazardous materials, yet experience with the pre-crisis context can help to integrate political context someone experienced in the Lebanese context can quickly point to the lack and conflict sensitivity into the response, something regional or headquarters- of accountability and transparency and the need for reforms with judicial based staff would take longer to grasp. independence. The lack of external communications led to low recognition of the 3RF and Prioritizing external communications would help build trust among hence limited accountability in the eyes of the people. stakeholders and engage the public in a discussion about why reforms matter, increasing legitimacy and accountability. A detailed communication plan and strategic media engagement are needed. Clear communication to the public about legitimate money use would pressure the elite about their responsibility to the people. 46 Lessons from Disaster Governance ENGAGEMENT WITH THE STATE As an independent unit to coordinate among the principals, the Secretariat has Including appropriate government entities in the working of the Secretariat as no formal channel of engagement with the government. There was a slowdown observers could increase ownership from the government and increase impact in the recommendations from WGs going to the Secretariat, the CG, and the and effectiveness of operationalizing them. At the same time, it would be an government’s top officials. opportunity to build trust in the government institutions in the eyes of the public by showcasing that the state can work with various parts of civil society and with international donors in a transparent manner. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY CSOs with access to 3RF internal documents rarely consult them or refer to In-person information sessions are key to genuinely engaging civil society in their substance in meetings. Making information available through a passive lengthy internationally driven processes. High CSO capacity for advocacy and medium such as SharePoint did little to engage stakeholders. implementation does not necessarily translate to effective policy dialogue or cooperation with other stakeholders. Virtual meetings have become the default in the post-COVID environment, but this should not endanger engagement. The representation of CSOs In the 3RF may not be in line with the full spectrum Efforts should be made to select greater representation of CSOs, including, for of Lebanon’s CSOs. Capacity gaps of some CSOs kept them from fully example, whose staff do not speak English and those that come from outside participating. the capital. Capacity building should be introduced, and discussions should be moderated by neutral experts. Self-organizing was difficult for CSOs. CSOs complied with what the co-chairs A structure for capacity building and empowerment is needed. The CG should advocated. Eventually, only a handful of CSOs continued to attend meetings have had clearer ToRs and/or bylaws to guide its mandate. It could have been that the co-chair called for. The attempt to create a Majlis (CSO council) was useful to fund the co-chair of the CG, and perhaps secure some overhead somewhat appealing to the CSOs but CSOs had already lost momentum. funding for their CSO to operate as a “secretariat” to incentivize the work. Resource limitation of CSOs may prevent their participation. One cannot expect Consider solutions for CSO resource limitation. From the CSO perspective, CSOs to operate on a pro-bono basis for a long time, especially in times of crisis. dedicating some funds to further build the capacity of the CG to become a more Only the CSOs that were financially more secure could continue attending capacious interlocutor might have helped. meetings, while others needed to address their needs of fundraising, staffing, and administrative management. MONITORING RESULTS A SWOT analysis after one year was conducted to streamline the WGs (appendix A prompt and transparent SWOT would help avoid a loss of momentum and D). This was considered to be too late as there was a sense that the momentum promote accountability. During implementation keep all stakeholders informed had already been lost. and involved, including an earlier SWOT analysis of WGs. Communication should create trust and define results together and avoid the perception of a missed opportunity. Source: Original table for this publication. Note: 3RF = Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework; CG = Consultative Group; CSOs = civil society organizations; LFF = Lebanese Financing Facility; SWOT = strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; ToR = terms of reference; WG = Working Group. 47 endnotes 1 Effective citizen engagement, defined as the two-way interaction between clear that unconditional support was not sustainable in Lebanon. In place citizens and the government that gives citizens a stake in decision-making, of a Paris IV, France in 2018 launched CEDRE (Conférence économique can help design and implement investment plans that are responsive to pour le développement, par les réformes et avec les entreprises), which the needs of the wider society and engage their local knowledge for more explicitly linked reforms with investments, focusing on strengthening the effective outcomes (GFDRR 2018). Engaging with diverse stakeholders can Lebanese economy. The 3RF was set up in line with and referencing CEDRE’s enhance the sense of ownership and sustainability of DRM-related initiatives objectives, though by mid-2021 the latter was considered to have failed. where trust in in government is low (World Bank 2023a). Benefiting wider segments of society is also a step for conflict-sensitive approach in disaster 9 Ninety percent of this aid is humanitarian aid for refugees and other risk management projects. crises and not targeted at general development of the country (such as infrastructure and service provision). This creates an impression that 2 By the end of 2020, more than half of the population was expected to be Syrian refugees receive more aid than the Lebanese, and that CSOs have living below the national poverty line (World Bank 2021a). According to replaced the state as an international partner. estimates, the poverty rate in Lebanon increased from 25 percent in 2019 to 55 percent in 2020 and then to 74 percent in 2021 (UN ESCWA 2021). 10 The RDNA was prepared by the World Bank in collaboration with the United Nations and the European Union. 3 The fragmentation in governance dates back to the system of dividing power and income that was adapted with the Taif Accords after the 1970–90 11 Two types of CSOs have existed in Lebanon: those that provided parallel Lebanese Civil War between Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia services—particularly in health and education—to complement the low Muslim groups. Legislation cannot be introduced without agreement from level of service provided by the government. These parallel services the president, the parliament, and the council of ministers—but the latter are often provided along sectarian and political lines. The other type two bodies are heterogenous and rarely even agree to meet. The prime is an advocacy type of CSO, which advocates for transparency and minister has limited control over the cabinet and no single actor can force accountability, including the CSOs that monitored elections in the 1990s. a decision. Any decision is part of a complex of puzzles involving many This dichotomy in the types of CSOs in Lebanon deepened after the 2019 political and economic actors, often regional, as a result of international civil protests against the failing governance (the 17 October Revolution) patronage. Alignment on decisions, and therefore progress, is rare. The Fall and following the 2020 port explosion. 2020 World Bank Lebanon Economic Monitor characterized how elite capture 12 See, for example, the Beirut Urban Lab’s Initiatives in Response to the Beirut contributed to the ongoing economic crises as “the deliberate depression” Blast (Beirut Urban Lab, no date) or the ActionAid report Participation and proposed a reform agenda to turn around the governance failure (World of Local and International Civil Society in the Beirut Port Blast Response Bank 2020b). (2021). 4 For example, different ambulance services serve different sociocultural 13 Formally launched on December 4, 2020, the implementation of the 3RF sections of society (Peters and Holloway 2019). began with the first Consultative Group (CG) meeting on March 31, 2021, 5 Although led by the prime minister, Solidere is not a public organization but through the formal end of the recovery phase (known as Track 1) in June a private company. Yet the fact that the prime minister can set up a private 2022. The implementation then continued to a strategic discussion of organization to operate and work on reconstruction also points to the the future of the 3RF in June 2022. Details about the LFF can be found at historically high levels of connectedness between political and business https://www.lebanon3rf.org/lebanon-financing-facility. elites that characterize the Lebanese economy (World Bank 2022f; see also 14 The Gulf states (the Gulf Cooperation Council) countries were excluded World Bank 2022b). from membership as the result of a diplomatic incident, which suspended 6 The Waad Project was later designated by the U.S. Department of the relations between Lebanon and most of these countries. Treasury as an organization that provides support to terrorists or acts of 15 Details about UNHCR Lebanon’s response to the Beirut blast are available terrorism (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2009), and this reconstruction at UNHCR Lebanon (2024). was seen by the international community as the Hezbollah’s means to channel funding. 16 This process is especially important in Lebanon, where 90 percent of international response is humanitarian, much of it related to Syrian 7 A study from The Policy Initiative and the Beirut Urban Lab identified 224 refugees. actors that led the first response on the ground from a wide range of nature; 69 percent of them were NGOs and 31 percent were political and religious groups. This effort mainly focused on the reconstruction of collective goods, such as heritage buildings, community facilities, and public and shared spaces (The Beirut Urban Lab and The Policy Initiative 2023). 8 Paris I, II, and III were the conferences convened by French President Jacques Chirac between 2001 and 2007 to mobilize international financial assistance for Lebanon. While the Lebanese reform agenda was part of these discussions, there was no explicit conditionality in return for soft loans and grants. By the time a Paris IV was conceived in 2018, it was 48 Lessons from Disaster Governance 17 The LCRP is the Lebanese chapter of the Regional Refugee Resilience 26 The 3RF monitoring framework dashboard can be found at https:// Plan (3RP) in response to Syrian refugees in Lebanon (originally set for www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/3RF%20 2017–20 but extended because of growing humanitarian needs). The ERP Monitoring%20Framework.pdf. was launched in 2021 to address increasing humanitarian needs caused by complicating shocks from the COVID-19 pandemic. The UNSDCF was 27 The agreement, signed shortly before Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, signed in 2022 as a part of the global UN Agenda 2030 to coordinate outlines a set of 10 prior actions that would unlock a $3 billion aid package efforts on implementing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the when approved by the IMF board. A further 28 actions indicative of government of Lebanon for 2023–25. All of the three frameworks are led by structural benchmarks form a comprehensive economic reform program the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO). aiming to (1) rebuild the economy, (2) restore financial sustainability, (3) strengthen governance and transparency, (4) remove impediments to 18 The RCO is currently preparing a proposal to merge the LCRP and the job-creating growth, and (5) increase social and reconstruction spending. ERP in response to criticism from donors on redundant coordination. The agreement was foreshadowed in the 3RF Foreword, and many of the The SDCF is currently being operationalized, and its operation does not recommendations are also part of the original 3RF. include donors or civil society. There is considerable overlap in 3RF and SDCF objectives, including a proposal presented by the RCO to revive an 28 See the tracker action points, which comprise a live document that take old trust fund similar to the LFF. stock of action points over time, available at https://www.eeas.europa. eu/sites/default/files/documents/Tracker%20CG%20action%20 19 While the LCRP offers strong sector operational coordination, it does not points.pdf address long-term or reform needs. The LCRP has participation from CSOs at the level of implementation, but CSOs are not included at a strategic 29 The co-chair of the CSO group in the CG was asked to consult and level. Donors are not part of the LCRP. recommend WG members based on the organic organizing of CSOs from immediate post-disaster response phase. The group of donors in the 3RF 20 The EU-funded member joined in June 2021, the World Bank member was asked to fill in a table to join WGs. The prime minister’s CMU was asked joined in September 2021, and the UN representative—funded by the to select members, after an information session by the 3RF secretariat for German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)—joined in February political advisors of all relevant ministries. 2022. 30 Sectors defined in the RDNA are the Anti-Corruption Coordination Group; 21 Nearly half (66 out of 138) of the 3RF action points require legislative the Justice Working Group; the Private Sector; the Social Protection effort from the Lebanese government; this translates to 86 legislative and Coordination Forum; and the sectors of Social Inclusion and Gender, executive texts to be enacted by the government (Maktabi et al. 2023). Out Culture, Housing, Municipal Services, Port, Environment, Electricity, of the 86 legislative and executive texts pledged at the start of the 3RF, Education, Health, and Water. 52 (60 percent) were previously pledged at Paris III or CEDRE. Only 20 (23 percent) had been enacted by June 2022. 31 At its peak, in June 2017, the number of internally displaced persons reached 3.35 million. Returnees have steadily increased since 2017— 22 Among the 60 legislative and executive texts that require moderate or high numbering nearly 5 million by December 2022. See the IOM Displacement political commitment (39 laws and 21 decrees), 18 percent of laws (7 laws) Tracking Matrix, Iraq Mission. Last update August 31, 2023 (accessed and 10 percent of decrees (2 decrees) have been completed. This compares October 2, 2023) http://iraqdtm.iom.int. to the Paris III conference results of 14 percent of laws and 24 percent of decrees (Maktabi et al. 2023). 23 Some Lebanese CSOs, for example, refused to take part in the 3RF because they felt that engagement with the state would compromise their advocacy. Apart from a handful of umbrella organizations—the Lebanese Humanitarian Development Forum, for example, is involved in the 3RF— there is little coordination among CSOs. CSOs also prefer the creation of a big multi-donor trust fund. While the call for aid transparency has fostered a participatory approach, CSOs have focused less on advocating for reform, representing citizens, and holding state and international actors accountable. 24 When the second rotation of the CSOs in the CG started in the spring of 2022, the CSOs attempted to better organize their collective efforts by establishing a coordination and communication committee and a CSO council known as Majlis (Bloemeke and Harb 2022). 25 There was skepticism among the Lebanese state actors toward the UN, who were concerned that funding through the UN would flow to its own staff rather than to the people of Lebanon. 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