70481 The World Bank Vested Interests in Legal and Judicial Reform May 2008 With the support of the Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP) Table of Contents Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... 4 Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 5 1. Reforms in the Administration of Justice in Bolivia and Honduras ................................. 11 1.1. Purpose of the Report....................................................................................................... 11 1.2. Reforms in the Administration of Justice in Latin America ............................................ 12 1.3. Main Reforms and Obstacles to their Success in Honduras ............................................ 13 1.4. Main reforms And Obstacles to their Success in Bolivia ................................................ 16 1.5. Criminal Justice: Interests Against Success in Honduras ................................................ 18 1.6. Pretrial Detention and Criminal Procedural Reform in Bolivia....................................... 20 1.7. Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 22 Annex to Section 1: Consultations with Civil Society in Honduras .......................................... 31 2. Civil and Commercial Justice in Paraguay ......................................................................... 38 Abstract and Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 38 2.1. Introducción ..................................................................................................................... 41 2.2. Diagnóstico sobre la Organización y Procesos Judiciales ............................................... 46 2.3. Recomendaciones sobre la Organización y Procesos Judiciales ..................................... 57 2.4. Obstáculos para la Modernización: los Intereses Creados ............................................... 61 2.5. Conclusiones .................................................................................................................... 66 2.6. Referencias Bibliográficas ............................................................................................... 70 2.7. Lista de Entrevistados ...................................................................................................... 72 3. Vested Interests in Legal and Judicial Reform Projects in Guyana ................................. 74 3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 74 3.2. Challenges - Background to Reforms .............................................................................. 74 3.3. Legal and Judicial Reform Projects ................................................................................. 79 3.4. Specific Legislative Reforms ........................................................................................... 82 3.5. Suggested Reforms – Identifying Strategies/Mechanisms for Addressing Obstacles ..... 88 3.6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 90 3.7. References ........................................................................................................................ 92 3.8. Interviews in Guyana ....................................................................................................... 92 2 3 Acknowledgements This document is the final output of the BNPP-funded Project entitled ―Vested Interests in Legal and Judicial Reform Projects‖. This project was a collaborative exercise involving many people. We would first like to thank the Project Team, which included Pamela Aparicio, Ledda Macera, Rosmary Cornejo, Carolina Rendón, and Nancy Chaarani Meza, for their contributions at all stages of the Project. We would also like to thank the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF) and its Executive Director, Eduardo Bertoni, for the DPLF‘s contribution to the Project in the form of the country reports on Honduras and Bolivia, prepared by Rigoberto Ochoa and Iván Lima, respectively. We would also like to acknowledge the invaluable contribution made by Laura Louza, author of the report on Paraguay; Leo Valladares Lanza (ACI-Participa) for the consultations with civil society in Honduras; and Yolande C. Forde, author of the report on Guyana. The Project Team is grateful to the following World Bank Staff and Consultants for their participation and comments during the dissemination workshop which was held in Washington, DC and which brought together the authors of the country studies included in this report: Daniel Kaufmann (Director, WBIGP), Nick Manning (Sector Manager, LCSPS), María González de Asis (Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, WBI), Robert Buergenthal (Senior Counsel, LEGJR), and Paulina Soto (Consultant, LCSPS). Finally, the Team would like to thank the Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP) for funding this research and Helena Y. Nkole (TFO) for her support throughout the Project. Lisa L. Bhansali and Linn Hammergren (Task Team Leaders of the Project) 4 Overview Forgotten Stakeholders and Vested Interests in Latin American Judicial Reforms: An Action Research Project to Investigate the Problems Posed The countries of Latin America began a concerted process of judicial reform in the early 1980s and continue with the undertaking to this day. Disappointments with the lack of progress are causing proponents to explore new explanations for why their efforts have been so difficult. It bears mentioning, nonetheless, that changes and improvements have occurred and that for some observers the only ―problem‖ is the reformers‘ excessive optimism as to how fast they could produce results. However, progress remains highly uneven. Even in areas like criminal justice where reforms began very early, countries in the vanguard in adopting them too often show little improvement in outputs and outcomes. In contrast, some of the late adopters (Chile, for example) seem to be doing much better. Given the enormous similarities in the reform objectives and methodologies across countries and across time, a second explanation – that late starters have perfected both – is also suspect, suggesting that still other reasons lie behind the considerable differences in results. While some critics have pointed to problems with the technical content of reform measures and worked to refine them, more attention is now turning to the issue of what used to be summarized as ―political will.‖ Even in the early years, observers stressed the importance of the will to change, but usually defined this as a function of broadly based, ―bottom up‖ support and its impact on the political elites responsible for (top-down) implementation of programs. An early USAID strategic framework (Blair and Hansen, 1994) thus specified constituency building as a first step in any justice reform effort. However, the measures recommended to advance that end seemed largely limited to public consultations and education intended to endorse the reformers‘ plans. It was simply assumed that reform was in the majority interest and thus that the challenge lay in mobilizing the majority to support it. Moreover, constituency building as depicted in the framework was a one-time endeavor, with no thought given to the need to maintain support over what might be years, if not decades of implementation. Finally, the concept pretty much ignored the multiple sources of opposition to the reforms, and the reasons behind their obstructionism. Concepts like an ―inquisitorial mentality,‖ used to explain judges‘ failure to implement new criminal procedures codes, really do not add to our understanding of why this resistance occurs. They only give it another name. Although some countries succeeded in mobilizing considerable support early on, it has tended to dissipate as other issues emerged to absorb public attention. When it has been reactivated, it often takes directions (e.g. a ―hard on crime‖ outlook) contradictory to the reformers‘ aims. The fact of the matter is that judicial reform is not high on the list of public priorities except when a crisis emerges. Unfortunately, crisis planning tends to be short-sighted, reactive, and given to quick fixes of dubious longer term value. Typical crisis-inspired measures include throwing out the incumbents (judges, prosecutors, or police), legal change unsupported by institutional strengthening measures (and thus unlikely to have real effects), and the hardening of sanctions for 5 those violating civil and criminal norms. In short, the concept of political will needs further unpacking and a consideration of some of the following observable phenomena:  Justice reform is a difficult political venture because its benefits are dispersed among an entire population, but its costs are concentrated. This means that it is easier to mobilize opposition (because of its higher motivation) than support (free rider effect – everyone assumes someone else will make the effort, but few do so because the individual benefits are usually not that visible).  Despite the reformers‘ claim that reform is good for all, both support, and even more, opposition may arise in more specific interests and considerations. It will be important to tap into these to develop a political strategy for pushing changes forward.  Justice reforms are long term, and support mobilized at their beginning tends to fade as time goes on, results emerge slowly, and other issues divert popular attention. Moreover, once beyond their initiation, reforms are more likely to have negative impacts on potential opposition and thus encourage its mobilization. The ―vague consensuses‖ supporting global objectives often break down when stakeholders begin to experience the costs to their own endeavors. The ―constituency building‖ dialogue is thus a long term challenge, and also needs to focus on identifying and either combating or converting potential opponents.  Support can also be converted to opposition by a careless treatment of its sources. When those the reform purports to benefit do not get to have their say, they can become its most virulent opponents. Taking into account the factors discussed above, the activities sponsored under this grant took a second look at the political will concept, but this time with the benefit of various lessons learned over the past two and a half decades. The project combined two working hypotheses as regards reform failures: a lack of sufficient ―push‖ arising in the very limited set of actors usually engaged in the process and the existence of certain unanticipated obstacles originating with stakeholders, including those within the ―support constituency,‖ whose ―vested interests‖ in the existing system cause them to oppose key aspects of the changes being attempted. In combining the two explanations, the grant supported activities encouraging civil society groups and judicial ―operators‖ to examine more closely their experience with a series of apparently simple reforms (e.g. reduction in use of preventive detention, adoption of automated case tracking systems and other innovations already paid for through externally supported programs, or the depoliticization of judicial appointment systems) to determine why they had either been incompletely adopted or otherwise undermined during their implementation. The challenge was not simply to determine where they had gone wrong but to identify the interests behind the missteps. In the concrete cases reviewed, the most common problem was that the reform had been designed, officially introduced, and then ignored or even undermined by those expected to use it because of passive or very active resistance. However, in other cases surveyed here (introduction of pro- indigenous legislation or alternative dispute resolution) unrecognized or unconsulted interests effectively opposed adoption of some new programs, sometimes only because they had no chance to participate in their formulation. Opposition does not necessarily extend to all reform measures, but those most active in the process usually have some aspects of the status quo they want to preserve, or some preferences they will pursue no matter what the larger costs. Donors are not immune to these tendencies, and while they have been critical in pushing reforms forward, their 6 own preferences or internal conflicts also pose problems. Finally, some reforms seem more critical than others, and because of this, those opposing them may unintentionally block other changes – not because they are against them but simply because their obstructionism vis-à-vis the most crucial measures makes the realization of additional reforms less possible. Many of the reforms surveyed here fall into that second category – measures which appear not to impinge on the interests of powerful stakeholders, but which cannot go forward because of changes the latter have effectively blocked. As this suggests, the politics of reform adoption and implementation are often more complex than the usual portrayal of a group for and a group against. Unless reform proponents recognize this (and recognize as well that they may be part of the problem – because of their own vested interests) they are likely to pursue an unproductive tactic of direct confrontation when there are other ways to circumvent the obstacles. This is the reason for focusing on ―unrecognized stakeholders‖ and vested interests – as a means of understanding the sources of active opposition or passive noncompliance. The objectives pursued in this exercise were several fold: First, it aimed at providing substantive material on how a series of common reforms can go wrong, as a means of correcting errors in the countries surveyed. This is the minimal and in some sense easiest objective. On the basis of their research and consultations, the research teams came up with a series of recommendations as to how reforms already adopted could be made to work better. Further country consultations and subsequent publication of the documents should provide local reformers with a list of measures to advance their own aims. Second, it aimed at using this same information as a means to improve implementation strategies across the board. As all the measures studied are common elements of judicial reform programs, the shortcomings identified are also not unusual and thus the lessons learned are applicable to situations beyond those in the few countries surveyed. Again this is a lower level and fairly technical result, but it still should be useful for on-going and future reform efforts. Third, by involving international and local civil society organizations in the research process, it aimed at broadening the discussion of the need for political as well as technical improvements in reform strategies. These groups are an obvious source of support for the technical recommendations derived (e.g. provide training and incentives for judges and staff to use new information systems) but beyond that the purpose was to engage them in the reexamination of the obstacles (both technical and political) to adequate reform implementation and to encourage them to find more effective means of overcoming them. Fourth and finally, the exercise strove to introduce the concept of ―vested interests‖ as a tool for analyzing reform constraints. The term was used in both a positive and negative sense – as the interests likely to support reforms but still requiring measures to induce their ownership and active participation, and as the interests with something to lose, whose reservations, once understood, could be more successfully combated. To tell the truth, this was the hardest concept to transmit. The groups contracted to do the studies, and especially those representing NGOs, had a tendency to see opposition as wrong-headed or simply malevolent. However, some progress was made in 7 the discussions, especially at the country level and as noted below, all the teams provided a final, post-workshop analysis of the vested interests identified in the general discussions. This was an action research project. Teams were contracted to do participatory data collection involving other NGOs, independent experts, and judicial operators in the process. The aim was not just to develop diagnostic studies but rather to encourage broader within-country discussions of the issues, using the process both to derive inputs for the reports and as a way of encouraging further attention to the themes. The annexed country reports summarize the specific findings. At a broader level of generalization, the following conclusions merit separate attention: 1. The criminal justice reforms in particular have encountered obstacles as a consequence of rising crime rates and greater popular concern with citizen security. When the reforms began in the early 1980s, crime was much less of a problem. Over the intervening years, its incidence has risen, and popular concern has grown accordingly, in the views of some observers, disproportionately. While the preoccupation with citizen security represents a new source of support for reforms, the measures it advances are often in contradiction with the initial emphasis on due process rights and fair treatment of the defendant. On the one hand, this has led to backsliding in the reformers‘ initial program. On the other, it has encouraged some ―quick fixes‖ that may well not even resolve the problems they targeted. The public thus has a vested interest in reforms promising to combat crime, and this must be recognized and factored into any strategy, if it is to succeed. 2. Although the reformers, and our research groups, often blamed a sensationalist press for this phenomenon, it is evident that some part of the popular concern is based in real events. Not highlighted by our researchers, but probably worth considering, is an effort to a) develop better data on crime rates on a national and sub national basis, and b) to conduct national dialogues on the problem and its likely solutions. Denying the obvious is not an answer – for example, on visiting one of the countries treated here, one of the task managers was told that the crime scare was exaggerated but at the same time that she should not visit the shopping center next to her hotel (because of likely assaults) or take a taxi located in front of it. In brief, the media may indeed exaggerate the negative as a way of selling their product, but the impact of this ―vested interest‖ is a minor contributing factor. Crime has increased, citizens are justifiably concerned, and reforms must find a credible way to respond to their demands. 3. For a series of the reforms covered here, nonadoption or flawed execution may be less a factor of direct resistance than of imperfect implementation strategies, and there the reformers hold a good deal of the responsibility. Failure to consult adequately with the obvious stakeholders, recognize their concerns, and encourage their buy-in was one problem (e.g. Guyana with the indigenous law and ADR; or Paraguay with the case tracking systems). Inadequate follow-up to detect problems and introduce solutions (e.g. pre-trial detention in Honduras and Bolivia; Paraguay‘s case-tracking system) was another. Reformers in this sense represent another vested interest – in insisting on the adoption of their ―perfect solution‖ rather than showing a willingness to make compromises, including those with other reform groups with slightly different views on what is needed. 4. Another type of vested interests identified in the reports on Honduras and Bolivia in particular comprises the donor community. Much like the local reformers, donors also have their preferred programs which may not coincide with local priorities. Conflicts among donors over program ownership were also cited as impeding progress and moreover 8 sometimes discouraging cooperation among and within local agencies. Finally, donors often work with a very narrow range of local stakeholders, meaning that only the latter‘s viewpoints are reflected in the assistance offered. Judges commonly cite buildings, equipment, and higher salaries as the keys to improving their performance; their tendency to ignore measures to curb judicial corruption or enforce productivity quotas is understandable, but makes programs based only on their input less credible in the eyes of other stakeholders. 5. Although there are positive and negative interests vested in many of the individual reform measures or the status quo, one overarching obstacle to change arises in resistance to the creation of professional, independent, and accountable judiciaries and other sector agencies. The sources of resistance are both internal to the agencies (the incumbents who derive their own benefits from existing weaknesses) and external (political parties, governmental authorities, and economic elites who resist losing their privileged access to or control of agency activities). The impact of these vested interests directly impedes achievement of this objective and also poses indirect obstacles to advancing other reforms by reducing agency willingness and ability to implement them. One important question is thus how far any more targeted reforms can advance without improvements in this central, structural problem. As an example of the teams‘ final thoughts on the issues, the following table represents input from the group responsible for surveying Honduras and Bolivia:1 INTEREST GROUP EXAMPLES OF OBSTACLES TO SELECTED REFORMS JUDICIARY HONDURAS and BOLIVIA: Persistence of a judicial cultural not consistent with reform principles. Judges apply non-due process principles to due process procedures, thus tending not to improve the use of pretrial detention DONOR AGENCIES BOLIVIA: Conflicting interests impede reform implementation EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES HONDURAS: Both respond to a citizen security concerns (gangs or maras) with hard-line laws not consistent with the principles of the new criminal procedures code. BOLIVIA: The executive has no ownership of the reformed procedural code, leaving the impression that it is a bad copy of another country‘s law 1 Translation of submission by the Due Process of Law Foundation, one of the entities contracted to do the field work and study. 9 MEDIA HONDURAS and BOLIVIA: Judges and prosecutors claim they are ―pressured‖ by the media to put suspects into preventive detention despite the inconsistency of the practice with the principles of the new criminal procedures codes. POLITICAL PARTIES HONDURAS: the new system whereby the Supreme Court selects judges has been co-opted by the political parties. LAWYERS GUYANA; they oppose reforms introducing mediation (a threat to their livelihood). CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS GUYANA: opposed implementation of reforms because they were not consulted during the planning stage. As the table demonstrates, the research teams began to address the concept of vested interests and were able to break down the resistance to reforms into a number of parts. This is a first step toward developing strategies to deal with them. Although only mentioned in the context of Honduras, the role of political parties and elites in obstructing depoliticization of the judicial selection process is a problem in all countries, and as the Paraguay report argues, impedes other types of reform. When justices and judges owe their jobs to political favoritism, doing those jobs better (whether as deciding cases fairly or running the court system efficiently) is literally a thankless task. This and the consequent improvements in internal governance may be, as the Paraguay report also argues, the key reform. Once it is accomplished, the judiciary will be in a better position to push for improvements in its own performance, but for this to occur, other stakeholders will have to add their support for the transformation. Hence, broad discussion of the reforms, the impediments to their realization, and the reasons behind the obstructionism are also key. This was the logic behind this exercise, and one which all participants hope will lead to further and more rapid progress in the countries surveyed and in others within and outside the region. 10 1. Reforms in the Administration of Justice in Bolivia and Honduras 1.1. Purpose of the Report2 The purpose of this report is to analyze the main reasons or interests that have prevented some recent judicial and legal reforms in Honduras and Bolivia from becoming effective. Given the fact that both countries have undergone far-reaching criminal justice system transformations as well as reforms of the judge selection system, this report focuses on those reforms. In order to analyze the impact of the above reforms, we have selected some of the most delicate situations that they intended to improve. Regarding criminal justice, the report focuses on the reasons why the reforms were unable to put an end to the misuse of pre-trial detention. The abuse or misuse of pre-trial detention is one of the most important problems affecting the criminal system in Latin America. Thus, this should be the focus of our study for Bolivia and Honduras. The report also includes a study of some of the reasons that have prevented reforms, particularly those of the criminal procedure codes, from reducing the perception of impunity prevailing in both countries. With respect to the reforms of judicial selection mechanisms, the report focuses on the interests that have prevented the public perception of judicial independence from improving in spite of the implementation of those reforms. The study on Honduras3 covers mostly the period 2002-2006 from a qualitative and quantitative perspective, and it is exploratory in nature. To carry out that study, information was obtained from several sources, and several texts, laws and documents were analyzed; also, many interviews were conducted, and they are mentioned in the report. The opinions expressed by several national and international experts at an international workshop hosted by the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF) in Tegucigalpa in July 2007 were also a valuable contribution for this research. The preparation of the report did have its limitations and difficulties, such as the scarce literature on this problem in Honduras and incomplete statistical information. Although it was impossible to have access to some quantitative information and files, we consider that the necessary data to prepare the document was obtained. The study on Bolivia4 analyzes some of the problems encountered in the implementation of the Bolivian criminal procedure reform, considering two main aspects: the enforcement of 2 This study was possible thanks to the generous support of the World Bank Group. The project was performed under the direction and general supervision of DPLF Executive Director, Eduardo Bertoni. Also participated in the project: DPLF Program Director, Katya Salazar, and the Coordinator of the Program ―Acceso Igualitario a la Justicia‖ (Equal Access to Justice,) Thomas Antkowiak. In addition, two consultants worked for this study: Rigoberto Ochoa, from Honduras, and Iván Lima Magne, from Bolivia. 3 This study was prepared by Rigoberto Ochoa, DPLF consultant for this report. 4 This study was performed by Iván Lima Magne, DPLF consultant for this report. 11 precautionary measures in connection with the guidelines proposed by the reform and judicial independence. The study describes the bodies in charge of implementing the reform of the criminal procedure, the guidelines established by such reform and the areas in which the implementation work was divided, with the purpose of relating each of these categories to the current problems in the field of precautionary measures. Here we analyze the role of cooperation agencies in the implementation of the reform of the criminal procedure. As for judicial independence in Bolivia, the role of the Judicial Council (Consejo de la Judicatura), the judicial career system, the judicial disciplinary system and the judicial motion system have been specifically addressed in a separate section. 1.2. Reforms in the Administration of Justice in Latin America It is important to begin our analysis with a description of the regional context of the reforms in Bolivia and Honduras. More than two decades ago, a significant process of legal and structural reform commenced within the Latin American judicial sphere. Among other reasons, this transformation process was triggered by the crisis of the old justice administration structures. Today, more than two decades after those reforms began, few would dispute that the problems faced by the criminal systems at that time were critical. The reforms were originally intended to solve those problems. Impunity and human rights violations could not be tolerated in a state that purported to respect the rule of law, and hence the need to carry out the reforms. At that time, the reforms were the result of political as well as economic needs.5 From the political point of view, the return to democracy in the countries of the region gave rise to social claims intended to improve the quality of emerging democracies. Human rights advocates also played a significant role in including the reforms in the political agenda. However, the reforms were also the result of economic reforms implemented in several countries where international cooperation agencies played a significant role. In addition to the above political and economic grounds, the work of a network of Latin American lawyers, who both drafted the amended laws (particularly those laws related to the criminal system) and worked towards their implementation, was essential. This network of lawyers was able to convince both national and international actors and donors of the benefits of their proposed reforms.6 Responses varied from one country to another within the region, and they did not take place simultaneously. But a process of change did indeed begin and it entailed profound legal and judicial reforms. More than twenty years after the commencement of the reforms in Latin 5 See Lisa Bhansali and Christina Biebesheimer, ―Measuring the Impact of Criminal Justice Reform in Latin America‖, p. 362, in ―Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad,‖ Thomas Carothers, Editor, Carnagie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2006. 6 Máximo Langer suggests this idea in a recent work. See Máximo Langer, ―Revolution in Latin America Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery,‖ in 55 American Journal of Comparative Law 617 (2007.) 12 America, the argument that it is difficult to measure the impact or the success of the reforms can no longer be valid.7 By way of example, it is worth mentioning that assessments of the judicial reform processes have been recently conducted in six countries of the region.8 Several experts stated that, in general terms, the results of the reforms undertaken more than twenty years ago are not satisfactory, as they have not fulfilled the purposes intended for them. For example, Linn Hammergren, one of the experts who delivered the closing address, stated that she felt an overall disappointment for the results of the reforms. Douglas Cassel, who also participated in the conclusions panel, suggested that reform processes should take into account society's unsatisfied demands. Juan Enrique Vargas, Executive Director of the Justice Studies Center of the Americas (JSCA,) expressed a clear message: though he remarked that there had been progress in the last 15 years of reforms, he considered that the demands that had triggered these reforms were far from being satisfied. Another problem that has been frequently noted is that the ambitious goals of many of the reforms were very difficult to achieve and generated excessively high expectations. The failure to keep up with these expectations helps reinforce the perception that reforms achieved little or no success. This report is not intended to undertake a thorough analysis of the results of the reforms in the administration of justice within the region. Nonetheless, it is important, at the very least, to note that drawing any generalized conclusions may be a mistake. The reforms of the Chilean criminal procedure are often mentioned as successful experiences, as opposed to other reforms, such as those implemented in Bolivia and Honduras, whose results are discussed in this report. Notwithstanding a general feeling of dissatisfaction towards the reforms, in some cases it can be empirically demonstrated that there has been a significant improvement in terms of due process and individual guarantees. In countries with a recent history of massive human rights violations, these advances must be acknowledged. 1.3. Main Reforms and Obstacles to their Success in Honduras To better understand the obstacles that prevent the success of reforms, it is advisable to review the circumstances in which such reforms occurred. Only after the second half of the 21st century -with the so-called liberal reform- the legal and institutional basis was set for the construction of an emerging state under the rule of law in Honduras. The Honduran legal system consolidated at the second half of the first decade of the 20th century with the coming into force of the new civil code, the new codes of civil and criminal procedure, and with the organization and granting of powers to the courts of the Republic. However, its development has been chaotic as a result of the political instability that prevailed during the last century.9 7 See Lisa Bhansali and Christina Biebesheimer, ―Measuring the Impact of Criminal Justice Reform in Latin America,‖ p. 301, in ―Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad,‖ T homas Carothers, Editor, Carnagie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2006. 8 The countries assessed were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and Guatemala. The conference summary can be found in http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0609_latin_judicial_reform.pdf 9 Compare Romero, Ramón and Salomón, Leticia, ―La Reforma Judicial: Un reto para la Democracia � (The Judicial Reform: A Challenge for Democracy,) Tegucigalpa, Centro de Documentación de Honduras (CEDOH,) 2000, p. 57. 13 In effect, the Judiciary in Honduras was seriously influenced by traditional political parties and their constant partisan fights: once parties assumed power they would exercise a complete control over the weak Honduran Judiciary. In 1963, there was a breach in the constitutional order that paved the way for a series of de facto military governments that –except for the brief period during which the lawyer Ramón Ernesto Cruz was in office10- dissolved the Executive and Legislative Powers and controlled the Judiciary for 19 years. In 1982, Honduras resumed constitutional life in the context of the East-West conflict and, more specifically, in the context of the internal armed conflicts in Central America, particularly in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. These circumstances gave way to a democracy that, for many people, was purely formal. This transition from authoritarianism to formal democracy has advanced significantly, and the situation of the Judiciary, which in the 1980s accepted serious human rights violations resignedly, has gradually improved. In this way, due to constant social demands, on the second half of that decade that tendency began to reverse and the Commission for Judicial System Reform was created.11 This commission fostered many important measures, such as: the enforcement of the law that regulates the judicial career; the creation of the Judicial School (Escuela Judicial); the creation of the Public Defender's Office (Defensa Pública); the start-up of the Court Inspection Office (Inspectoría de Tribunales); and the implementation of family, juvenile and contentious- administrative courts. In the 1990s progress concentrated on the readjustment of the military to the organic structure of the Executive and on the transfer of police powers to the civil sphere. At the same time, the image of the justice system was distorted by its lack of credibility, its failure to properly enforce laws and its weak institutional presence12. Therefore, the old demands reappeared for an impartial system of justice and an independent Judiciary as necessary conditions for strengthening the rule of law. In this decade, with the financial assistance of international organizations, the judicial reform was carried out as part of the State Modernization Program (Programa de Modernización del Estado).13 Also, progress was made as to the partial implementation of the judicial career and the improvement of the organization and administration of the Judiciary. Subsequently, the Judiciary Modernization Program (Programa de Modernización de la Justicia)14 was created to develop the infrastructure of the Judiciary, support the institutional consolidation of the Public Defender's Office and the Court Inspection Office, and to enact and enforce new laws15. With the new millennium, the issue of judicial reform was taken to the constitutional level; important amendments to the constitutional regulation of the Judiciary were made. In 2000 the constitutional amendment was enacted and in 2001 it was ratified by the Honduran Congress. Changes were made as to the election of the justices of the Supreme Court of Justice, who are now elected with the vote of two thirds of all members of the Honduran Congress, out of a list of 45 candidates proposed by a nominating board formed by representatives of the Supreme Court of 10 Ramón Ernesto Cruz was in office from April 1971 to December 1972. 11 Created by the Supreme Court of Justice by mid-1980s. 12 Compare United Nations Development Program (UNDP,) Report on Human Development, Honduras, 2002, p. 73. 13 Created in 1992 within the authority of the Executive. 14 Created by the Judiciary in the second half of the 1990s. 15 Compare Report on Human Development, Honduras, 2002, Cit., p. 76. 14 Justice, the Bar Association, the National Human Rights Commissioner, the Honduran Board of Private Companies, legal scholars, civil society organizations, and workers' unions16. Despite the new features of the judicial election system, for many its results are somehow discouraging; others, instead, view the new system as a step forward in the de-politicization of the Judiciary. By far, one of the positive aspects of the constitutional reform of the Judiciary is the increase in the number of justices of the Supreme Court of Justice from nine to fifteen and the extension of their office from four to seven years, which provides more stability to the function and continuity to the Court, regardless of changes in the government. Furthermore, the Court has been organized in divisions and a constitutional division has been created to control the constitutionality of laws and to guarantee constitutional rights. The enactment of the Criminal Procedure Code (2002), the Constitutional Justice Law (Ley de Justicia Constitucional) (2005) and the amendments to the Criminal Code (2005) among others, evidence that a modernization is taking place in the Honduran legal system. However, it is important to highlight that problems not only arise in connection with law enforcement by the institutions within the justice system, but are also associated with political and economic factors external to this system. It is now a favorable time to lay the foundations of the justice system of the 21st century. Judicial independence should be furthered and a judicial career should be created. This tendency is reinforced by the advancement of the Law Regulating the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), the law regulating the Judicial Council and the Judicial Career (Ley del Consejo de la Judicatura y de la Carrera Judicial) –which are yet to be enacted by the Honduran Congress- and the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil,) that would modernize and introduce changes to the current court system, and contribute to the strengthening of a democratic and constitutional State under the rule of law. January 2007 marked the 25th anniversary of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, an unprecedented event in the short and troubled history of democracy in the country. Despite the problems that still subsist, there is no doubt that the organization and operation of the democratic system and the Honduran justice system have improved during the last century. In conclusion, we may say that the judicial reform process was made possible through the support provided by international cooperation agencies to the country. The cooperation has concentrated, to a great extent, on organizational, technical and administrative aspects, and the internal reorganization of the Judiciary is remarkable. Efforts by international cooperation agencies to provide the courts with the necessary infrastructure are also visible; it will help many jurisdictions meet the minimum requirements to duly carry out their judicial mission. An example of the above is the implementation of the new Criminal Procedure Code, which required suitable facilities for conducting oral and public trials, and which is part of the modernization efforts mentioned above. 16 Compare Political Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, Article 311. 15 1.4. Main reforms And Obstacles to their Success in Bolivia Just like in the case of Honduras above, in order to understand the obstacles that prevent the success of the reforms in Bolivia, we must first review the context in which such reforms took place. Until 1997, the Bolivian criminal system had been governed by the "Banzer Codes" enacted in 1972. The Criminal Procedure Code (Código de Procedimiento Penal) was in accordance with a reformed inquisitorial model: it adopted the principles that proceedings should be oral, continuous and adversarial and provided for written proceedings. This system brought about a great degree of discrimination and instituted the belief that the "criminal system" was the most effective way for collecting debts. The system put special emphasis on the prosecution of property crimes and, as from 1989, on the prosecution of drug-trafficking crimes. The period from 1982 to 1997 was characterized by the subordination of the Judiciary to the Executive, as the judicial term was four years and they were appointed by political agreement on the basis of majority in Congress. The Prosecutor's Office was legally within the sphere of the Ministry of Government (Ministerio de Gobierno) and the appointment and removal of prosecutors was at the sole discretion of the Ministry of Government. A second issue to be considered is the use of physical coercion for monetary debts: before 1995, no realistic assessment of the criminal system could be made, as prisons were crowded with people who had been unable to pay their debts (this situation degenerated to the point where a great majority of detainees were "indefinitely" detained for not paying their attorneys' fees.) These laws were repealed in 1994, and all forms of coercion and detention for failure to pay debts were expressly eliminated. Finally, before the criminal procedure reform of 1997, a Criminal Code Reform was enacted updating the general provisions of the Code to keep up with the new developments in criminal law doctrine, amending some serious mistakes of the previous Code and adjusting the definition of certain crimes contained in the special provisions. By 1997, the Preliminary Draft of the Criminal Procedure Code (Anteproyecto del Código Procesal Penal) was ready for legislative consideration. However, due to a change in government, its consideration was postponed until 1999, when the new Criminal Procedure Code (Nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal, NCPP) was promulgated. It was agreed that the Code would become effective 24 months after the date of its publication. This two-year grace period of vacatio legis was provided to prepare the institutions within the justice system for the adequate implementation of the NCPP. As will be explained in the section dealing with the implementation of the reform, several actions were taken to that end. However, it is worth mentioning at this point that the most important task undertaken at that time was in terms of legal adaptation; once the NCPP was enacted, the focus was placed on the design, analysis and debate of several bills on the subject of implementation, so that institutions could be fully adapted to the reform at the legislative level. 16 As for the rules governing precautionary measures, legal amendments in Bolivia were similar to those of other Latin American reforms. In this regard, the NCPP makes provision for the principle of exceptionality and proportionality; time restraints on pre-trial detention; judicial control over the need to extend precautionary measures; the requirement that material basis (defined as the existence of persuasive elements of commission or participation in the crime) and procedural risk (the possibility of risk of flight on the part of the accused or of risk of obstruction of efforts to establish the truth) be verified; and, finally, the enforcement of other precautionary measures in place of pre-trial detention (home detention, the duty to appear periodically before a designated authority, posting of bonds, prohibition to visit certain places or to communicate with certain individuals, oath of compliance, bond on one‘s own recognizance and property bond.) In spite of the above reforms, statistics indicate that the number of people subject to pre-trial detention was not reduced after the NCCP became effective. We can infer from this that, when compared to the pre-reform scenario, changes in terms of pre-trial detention were not very significant. Nevertheless, the new requirement that an oral and public hearing be held prior to imposing precautionary measures has permitted a greater access to information regarding the administration of the criminal justice system. Paradoxically, as a result of this increased access to judicial administration, in 2002 the media began to criticize the provisions of the NCPP regarding precautionary measures and to demand its amendment, requiring "stricter" Code provisions and criticizing the "lenient" implementation of these mechanisms. Faced with pressures and demands for an amendment to the system of precautionary measures, the Legislative Committee on Constitutional, Justice and Judicial Police Issues of the Chamber of Deputies (Comisión de Constitución, Justicia y Policía Judicial de la Cámara de Diputados) held a public hearing in the Santa Cruz Department (a locality where pressure from civil society organizations had been most intense and where a bill modifying precautionary measures had been proposed) to discuss the issue of citizen safety and the reasons that have caused its impairment. Surprisingly, the citizens present at the hearing (at least the individuals and entities that participated in the public hearing) did not see the laws governing precautionary measures as a factor directly affecting the increase of "citizen insecurity."17 In spite of this public hearing and of initiatives to come up with genuine solutions to address security demands, the discussion resulted in the amendment of the NCPP and the incorporation of a measure to assess recidivism risk as a condition for the enforcement of precautionary measures of detention. In the final analysis, it is evident that as a result of security demands, and due to the media campaign against the enforcement of precautionary measures on individuals associated with the wave of crime, the law was amended without taking into consideration any statistical reports regarding the current crime situation in Bolivia.18 Today, the number of detainees under preventive custody continues to rise, proving the failure of a reform to the criminal procedure that purported to reduce the use of pre-trial detention. 17 Information taken from the report submitted to the Legislative Committee on Constitutional, Justice and Judicial Police Issues of the Chamber of Deputies by the Normative Adequacy division of the Implementation Technical Team in 2002, as part of a debate on the possible reform to the existing system of precautionary measures. 18 For further information, see the Follow-up Report on the Criminal Procedural Reform in Bolivia ( Informe de Seguimiento a la Reforma Procesal Penal en Bolivia,) Part I. p. 119, 2004 (www.cejamericas.org) 17 As far as reforms to guarantee the independence of the judiciary are concerned, constitutional amendments were introduced in 1994 designating the Judicial Council as the body responsible for overseeing such independence. However, the operating independence of the Judicial Council set out in its regulatory framework has been severely questioned. The procedure for the appointment of the Members (Consejeros) of the Judicial Council is within the competence of the legislative branch, and this circumstance may be pointed to as the fact that undermines said independence. The appointment of the Members of the Judicial Council within the Bolivian political system may lead to one of the following two situations: either the ruling parliamentary majority appoints the Members or, in the absence of such majority, appointments are the result of a "consensus" or "agreement" between the government in office and the opposition; in this case the process becomes little more than a sharing of positions in which political patronage and favoritism prevail. The merits, qualifications and skills of the candidate are not assessed in either case. The possibility that the Judicial Council may act on the basis of political, party or other interests leads us to believe that mechanisms for the selection, appointment and removal of judges and magistrates are probably subject to the same criteria. This is because the Law of the Judicial Council (Ley del Consejo de la Judicatura) has prevented this institution from fulfilling the needs and achieving the objectives that inspired its creation. This fact sheds light on two contrasting moments in time in Bolivia: when the institution was created and the present situation, characterized by the presence of a Judicial Council that is nothing more than a series of good intentions. But this reality should not be viewed as a justification for the elimination or drastic reduction of its powers; on the contrary, it implies the great responsibility of analyzing and assessing the problems of the Council to help strengthen the administrative and disciplinary body of the Judiciary. 1.5. Criminal Justice: Interests Against Success in Honduras The information that has been gathered suggests that significant economic resources from international cooperation agencies have been allocated to judicial reform. Nonetheless, open spaces for developing judicial independence and the autonomy of the Prosecutor's Office have been scarce and co-opted by different forces. In practice, prosecutors have been unable to assume a leading role in investigating crimes, the police has not managed to conduct such investigations professionally and, as a result, judicial orders and charges are not well founded. Under these circumstances, social pressure shifts to trial judges (jues de letras,) expecting that they order the pre-trial detention of accused individuals, and to sentencing judges (jueces de sentencia,) so that they convict defendants, guided by the belief that these mechanisms are the most effective for improving public security. On the other hand, the exclusive authority of the Prosecutor's Office to institute criminal actions interferes with the rights of victims to advance the investigation. The most obvious consequences 18 of this monopoly are the absence of efficient criminal prosecution owing to the limitations of the Prosecutor‘s Office, the impunity enjoyed by offenders and the vulnerability of victims. Under this model, during the investigative stage, the assessment of fundamental rights is left to administrative authorities and the prosecutor and the investigator are expected to work in collaboration; the fact that such cooperation has not been accomplished yet has helped undermine the rights and guarantees of individuals. With the implementation of the new police model, the Prosecutor‘s Office was profoundly affected by the transfer in 1998 of its Criminal Investigation Division (Dirección de Investigación Criminal) to the National Police, a change that impaired investigation initiatives and which led to a high level of impunity. This contradictory measure constituted a backward step for the justice system as the reform passed by the National Congress, rather than enhancing professional investigation within the framework of the new criminal procedure, served only to debilitate the struggle against impunity. Poor professionalism on the part of investigation personnel, together with the lack of appropriate skills, equipment and materials to conduct a criminal investigation, are all factors that impact negatively on the quality of public prosecution and, consequently, on the overall efficacy of criminal justice. This, in turn, paves the way for increasing levels of impunity, widespread social distrust and skepticism towards the institutions of the justice system. Given the incompetence of criminal investigation and public prosecution, and the difficulties that the burden of proof entails for prosecutors, there is a clear tendency to produce evidence in the early stages of trial. Evidence is read out and introduced as documentary evidence; this practice, however, is a serious regressive tendency as it contributes to the preponderance of written procedures over oral ones. Specifically with regard to pre-trial detention, during the term that the new Criminal Procedure Code has been in force (2002-2006) 49,348 precautionary measures have been issued, the most common being pre-trial detention (24%) periodic appearance in court and the prohibition to leave the country, in order of frequency. There has been a trend towards gradually increasing the enforcement of precautionary measures, though such enforcement rate had only a limited growth between 2004 and 2006. Furthermore, the number of individuals detained by virtue of the laws against youth gangs (ley anti-maras) has reached 1,028, and this confirms the idea that subsequent legislation at odds with the procedural reform can only represent a serious obstacle impairing the success of reforms. In other words, ensuring legislative consistency is key to a successful reform. Of all the circumstances that must be present for a judge to order a pre-trial detention, the "risk of flight of the accused" is the most common. One of the most persuasive factors for establishing the risk of flight is the absence of strong ties in the country (arraigo). In judicial practice, risk of flight is established by judges on the basis of whether the accused owns his house or not. Therefore, in the Honduran scenario, pre-trial detention will most likely be imposed on any accused individual who does not own the house where he lives, whose address may not be verified due to the fact that he lives in "cuarterías" (shanty houses), or who has no permanent job or regular income and does 19 not maintain strong family ties. That is to say, even reforms that are inspired by laudable principles get distorted in practice. The actual enforcement of pre-trial detention shows that, although this precautionary measure is different from imprisonment, it is indeed punitive in nature and neglects the fact that the person subject to it has a constitutional right to be presumed innocent. The public opinion is still that imprisonment is the right remedy for fighting crime and prosecutors feel compelled to request the issuance of detention orders and the pre-trial detention of the accused upon filing formal charges. Judges, in turn, feel constrained to issue detention orders as a precautionary measure. Similarly, tighter punishment continues to be used as a "deterrent." In spite of reforms and training programs, the new judicial culture that a criminal system respectful of civil rights entails has yet to be assimilated by judicial personnel, prosecutors, police officers and citizens in general. The characteristics of the inquisitorial system are still present, and this fact is manifested, for instance, in the excessive use of pretrial detention as a form of anticipated punishment. The enforcement of pre-trial detention orders is intended to address social demands for security, as growing crime rates and the victimization of citizens -a sign of social alert that should not be confused with the social reality that media convey- call for a response; this argument of criminal policy understands pre-trial detention as having a retributive purpose that far exceeds its precautionary nature and that is clearly punitive. Two examples that confirm the adoption of pre-trial detention and reinforce the country's inquisitorial culture are: first, the Guidelines for the Enforcement of Precautionary Measures in place of Pre-trial Detention for Organized Crime (Instructivo sobre la Aplicación de Medidas Cautelares Sustitutivas de la Prisión Preventiva en Delitos de Crimen Organizado) approved by the Supreme Court of Justice, which states that "in the case of very serious crimes... pre-trial detention is the appropriate precautionary measure for the success of the procedure..."; and second, the reform incorporated to the Code of Criminal Procedure which states in Section 184, last sentence, that "under no circumstances shall pre-trial detention be replaced with any other precautionary measure in the case of crimes committed by members of organized crime groups or illegal associations." The way politics has handled crime has resulted in the use of pre-trial detention as a general rule rather than as an extraordinary measure; it is regarded as a logical solution to crime. This position acknowledges social pressure from different sectors, like the news media. 1.6. Pretrial Detention and Criminal Procedural Reform in Bolivia 20 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has recently prepared a report on Bolivia.19 The chapter on administration of justice mentions, among the problems identified by the IACHR, the institutional inadequacy arising from lack of training, adequate infrastructure, technical support and personnel stability, as well as the uneven allocation of cases among courts and tribunals.20 From the information presented in this report we can identify the problems associated with the reforms undertaken in the field of criminal justice, more specifically the problems posed by pre- trial detention in three different spheres: the exclusive territory of the institutions involved in this field, the elaboration of public policies on criminal justice, and the social domain. We believe that a major obstacle in the advancement of the reform and the achievement of its original purposes regarding respect for the rights of the parties and the use of pre-trial detention only as an exception originates from the obscurity that still surrounds the role of the hearing as a work methodology within the accusatory system. Although the criminal procedure reform has advanced in the direction of establishing oral proceedings as a rule not only for trials but also for the other stages of the procedure, it is also true that hearings have become the oral equivalent of the written procedure conducted under the previous system; the participants in the case (prosecutors, public defenders and judges) have a formal role in the enforcement of pre-trial detention, and this results in different problems such as the lack of case analysis, the filing of petitions for pre-trial detention in cases in which other alternatives provided in the law may apply, delays of justice and little judicial control. Furthermore, although there is awareness regarding the need to adapt the institutions involved in the administration of justice to the new procedural system, reality suggests that, in a way, the structure that has been adopted still conforms to the logic of the inquisitorial system. The manner in which institutions administer cases also appears to evidence the same logic: every participant operates individually, in isolation from the rest of the institution, assumes responsibility for a given number of cases and neglects issues that do not have to do with their cases. It is worth noting that today this form of organization causes interruptions, delays, lack of coordination in the proceedings and eventually extends the term of procedures that could otherwise be settled in an expedite manner with the agreement of all participants. As long as unnecessarily lengthy procedures are permitted, pre-trial detention will continue to be used, as it operates as a mechanism that conveys a certain sense of "reassurance" to society. As long as the institutions involved in the administration of justice do not realize that reaching an agreement as to holding hearings and attaining tangible results that are measurable and that can be assessed both internally and externally is key to a better implementation of the criminal procedure reform, excessive delays of justice will continue to occur. Another issue that appears to be problematic is the specialization of training. Although a structured training plan had been devised for implementing the reform, one cannot deny that, given the manner in which such training has been approached, its actual impact has not lived up to 19 ―Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The road towards strengthening democracy in Bolivia,‖ IACHR, in http://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/BOLIVIA.07.ENG.pdf 20 Ibid, par. 117. 21 expectations. In terms of training methodology, efforts to instill the values of accusatory systems have resulted in excessively theoretical training programs and have ignored an aspect that is central to the effective application of said values: the inherent practices of oral procedures. Litigation itself was considered in most cases as a secondary issue, and priority was given to the study of written materials and case analysis, always from a theoretical perspective. The passing of time and the analysis of other reform experiences have taught us that the best way to conduct training is by taking into account the specific needs of those who work within the justice system (rather than designing courses according to demand) and designing the contents of courses on the basis of the tools that are needed for each position. Some people consider that, in order to improve the quality of the service, periodic tests should be taken. Complications also arise around the fact that there is little interest in Bolivia in the creation of public policies regarding implementation. Although coordination bodies have been set up to properly implement the procedural reform (Comisión Nacional de Implementación, Comité Ejecutivo de Implementación,) the role of these bodies has been rather sporadic and has resulted from the evaluation meetings organized and scheduled by international cooperation agencies. Finally, we believe that it is essential to conduct an analysis of the criminal procedure reform at the social level. It has been suggested that some of the work of the Technical Implementation Team (Equipo Técnico de Implementación) was aimed at disseminating the contents and values of the reform to the civil society. However, citizens' perception of the criminal procedure reform is often expressed in phrases like "it is a copied code" or "this is a law that favors criminals." Perhaps one of the reasons for this feeling is the way in which the criminal procedure reform was made known, almost conceiving the NCPP as a brand that had to be publicized21. In this respect, there has been a limited incorporation at the social level of the constitutional values and principles that inspired the reform and their importance for peaceful coexistence. This, in turn, contributed to the subsistence of certain conflicts which are often mentioned by various powerful sectors of society (like news media and certain political spheres) with the purpose of engendering negative feelings about the criminal procedure reform. 1.7. Recommendations In June 2007, DPLF organized a series of expert meetings on judicial reform in the city of Tegucigalpa that specifically addressed the impact of such reforms on the reduction of pre-trial detention rates and the enhancement of judicial independence. At the meetings, national experts were joined by their international counterparts. The purpose of gathering national and international actors in one place was to broaden the perspectives of the debate and to assimilate the lessons learned from contrasting experiences. 21 Advertising spots were broadcasted, billboards with information on constitutional guarantees were placed alongside roads, short radio programs were aired explaining the advantages posed by the reform, and several communication initiatives were carried out, all of which, though necessary, were insufficient to instill the values of the accusatory system in society. 22 Judges, prosecutors, former judges, members of judges and prosecutors' associations and representatives of non-governmental organizations attended the meeting.22 Participants' response to the agenda of the meeting was overwhelming. On the one hand, the experience of judges and prosecutors highlighted the practical obstacles to the enforcement of well-designed laws. They all agreed in that the issue of "judicial culture" is one of the major factors preventing the full enforcement of laws protecting civil rights in Honduras and emphasized the tension between laws that are respectful of fundamental rights and the problem of lack of safety that afflicts the country, which forces citizens to demand strict measures from judges and prosecutors along the lines of crime (mano dura.) As this report shows, the "inquisitorial culture" continues to prevail among justice operators in Honduras and Bolivia in spite of legal reforms. Written procedures that for years have dominated the judicial practice in the region are rooted in a system that is based on inquisitorial principles and are accompanied by a particular behavior that combines a formalist and bureaucratic mentality with obscure language. As for formalism, it has inspired the magic belief that strict compliance with certain formalities will solve a controversy. As far as the bureaucratization of the system is concerned, it has given way to even more serious consequences: the delegation of purely judicial functions to (often well-meaning) ordinary employees. It is this type of "inquisitorial culture" that has survived legal reforms. During the meetings in Honduras, justice operators clearly pointed the misconceptions of citizens regarding the role of judges and explained that their job was not to combat lack of safety but to defend legality. In this regard, the role that the press can play in misleading citizens was also discussed. A further issue addressed during the meetings was the role of emergency laws —such as anti- maras laws— that undermine the principles of the new Criminal Procedure Code. The meeting also emphasized the important role that the civil society as well as judges and attorney's organizations can play to cope with these problems. These conclusions reached during our research, and which are further described in the report, confirm a reality that extends beyond the situation in Honduras: criminal and procedural law compose a single body of law that should be coherent, as they both greatly influence the determination of the general criminal policy goals of the State. Unfortunately, as we will discuss further throughout this report, the need to harmonize procedural and substantive law was not taken into account in Bolivia and Honduras, and this prevented the progress and consolidation of reforms that were originally respectful of the rule of law. 22 Among the national participants in the meeting were Guillermo López Lone, President of Asociación de Jueces por la Democracia; José Maria Palacios, former member of the Supreme Court of Justice; Danelia Ferrera, Coordinator of Prosecutors of the Prosecutor's Office ( Coordinadora de Fiscales del Ministerio Público ;) Rita Nuñez, Director of the Centro de Informática de Estudios Legislativos del Congreso Nacional de Honduras ; Rafael López Murcia, Sentence Tribunal Judge; Sandra Ponce, Special Prosecutor on Human Rights, Honduras Public Ministry; Ana Pineda, Director, Fundación Democracia Sin Fronteras. International guests included: Guillermo Zepeda (from Mexico,) Associate Professional at Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo (CIDAC,) Denise Tomasini-Joshi, Legal Officer of Open Society Justice Initiative, Gustavo Vivas Usher, argentine consultant with extensive expertise in judicial reform in Honduras, and Abraham Siles, Peruvian researcher and professor of constitutional law and jurisdictional policy. 23 A reform of the criminal procedure is only one of the foundations of any reform of the administration of justice that intends to cure the above deficiencies, but it is neither the only nor the most important pillar. Legal reform is vital for implementing a process of change, but this process is bound to fail if no implementation program for such reform is simultaneously devised. The importance of training for the success of the reform has been noted repeatedly and is further confirmed in this report; however, in some cases the training provided was not suitable. Finally, on the basis of our conclusions throughout this report, we provide several recommendations that may help improve the quality of the implementation of reforms regarding the appointment of judges and the criminal system.23 7a- The situation in Bolivia Below is a series of recommendations that could be implemented at different levels: A- At the level of institutions involved in the administration of justice: strengthening the struggle for oral proceedings - Organizing institutions to meet the requirements of the hearing system. Understanding that resources are and will continue to be scarce is of utmost importance; as a result, we think that the current planning and organization logic should be changed in order to shift from a situation in which the institutions involved in the administration of justice continuously complain about the lack of human, technical and economic resources to one in which they organize themselves on the basis of actual possibilities. In the last decade, the different experiences in the region have proven that, even with scarce resources, it is possible to achieve institutional goals and set up a system that respects the rights of people. We have not yet learned sufficiently from these experiences so as to avoid making the same mistakes, and it is our opinion that this is the right path to follow. Specifically, in terms of organization it is essential to abandon the case portfolio approach (cartera de causas) that creates watertight compartments within institutions. With respect to the Prosecutor's Office and the Public Defender's Office, society must understand that the job of prosecutors and defenders is to litigate and not to carry out administrative or secretarial work and therefore such offices should be organized in manner that facilitates the work of those involved in the administration of justice. The Judiciary, for its part, needs a system of organized hearings: judges must take quality decisions on the basis of the information provided by the parties during hearings, and having staff members that are unfit for this end (such as lawyers who work as court clerks and who also act as notaries) implies under-utilizing the limited resources available. - Litigation training for oral hearings. In line with the previous paragraph, the training provided to individuals who work within the court system must be oriented towards improving their effectiveness at hearings and must enhance their litigation capacities. This by no means implies that training should neglect the study of academic opinions and case law within the accusatory system, but rather that theoretical knowledge and practice should intertwine so that those involved in the administration of justice can see litigation tools as true tools for their jobs 23 Similar problems in both countries result in similar initiatives. But, as each country has its own peculiarities and institutions, we have made a separate analysis. 24 and not as "resources for the theatrical performance." Training must never promote improvisation and must be carefully planned and devised in order to achieve tangible results within institutions. In this regard, gathering information about needs, clearly identifying the operators that will receive training and setting up adequate result assessment methods are all elements that must be present in training processes that are oriented towards consolidating the reform. Also important in this respect is the selection of trainers, as the instructor, who will convey both theoretical and practical knowledge to his audience and show them the way in which this two aspects interact, must have the necessary expertise and skills not to trivialize the learning experience. - Developing assessment indicators that can measure the effectiveness of the work carried out by justice operators. It is important to assess the work performed by those involved in the administration of justice; otherwise, we will not be able to provide society with a clear picture of criminal justice administration. The manipulation of precautionary measures is a good example: as we have no means for assessing operators we end up assessing laws and describing them as "unfit for our reality," "lenient," "foreign" or any other similar synonyms that pursue the same goal: to demand the amendment of laws to make up for the poor performance of operators and to make their job easier. We must develop indicators that help us assess the work of judges, prosecutors and defenders, as only then will we be in a position to state with absolute certainty which resources are needed to improve the system, and where they ought to be allocated. - Citizen monitoring of the actions of operators within the justice system. Citizen participation must not be limited to acting in trials as lay judges (juez ciudadano.) Instead, the administration of justice must open up to society and develop mechanisms to reach society, so that citizens themselves assess the performance of operators on a case by case basis. Today the news media act as intermediaries between the work of operators and citizens, often qualifying the work of operator based on prejudices or their own prevailing interests rather than on actual facts. Hence, promoting greater citizen participation and control in the sphere of criminal justice will help preserve a system that respects constitutional rights and guarantees. - Duty to produce reliable statistical information unified at the inter-institutional level. Today, criminal justice system information varies from one institution to the other. The Judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office produce a series of data; the Public Defender's Office compiles its own statistics and the Special Task Force on Crime Prevention (Fuerza Especial de Lucha contra el Crimen) also develops its own database. Any person who checks the information from these four institutions will realize that it does not coincide, and in some cases it is so dissimilar that it appears to have been obtained from different judicial systems 24. An institution that cannot provide reliable information to citizens is not trustworthy, and the result, as we have already mentioned, is detrimental for legal institutions. In spite of the efforts undertaken before the enactment of the National System of Citizen Security Law (Ley del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana) to show that the number of precautionary measures enforced by the new system had not been reduced, and given that statistical 24 One of the main difficulties encountered by CEJIP when preparing the Report on the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Reform in La Paz (Informe sobre la Implementación de la Reforma Procesal Penal en La Paz,) was obtaining consolidated statistical information, due to the fact that information varied greatly from one institution to the other. 25 information inspires very little confidence in Bolivia, no one took the data seriously, and this in turn led to the adoption of the normative solution. Mechanisms should be developed forcing institutions to provide information on their daily activities, so that citizens can get to know the work of the administration of justice and assess its reliability. B- At the political level: perceiving the procedure as a self-generated development - Undertaking the reform of the criminal procedure as a self-generated process rather than as an outside imposition of international cooperation agencies. As we have already mentioned throughout this report, the predominant presence of international cooperation agencies in the implementation of the criminal procedure reform has nurtured the perception that this is an "imposed reform." In this scenario, the temptation of resorting to counter-reform is almost inevitable.25 We believe that in order to consolidate the reform and prevent possible regressions it is essential to involve the political sector and make it accountable for the process, reassigning cooperative agencies their assistance role, away from the limelight associated with results. - Controlling the effectiveness of the actions of the institutions involved in the administration of justice. In addition to developing the above-mentioned assessment indicators for justice operators, the political sector must promote actions aimed at effecting this control through the institutionalization of these procedures and without provoking sporadic "witch-hunts." - Developing laws that provide permanent solutions and not merely interim solutions (solución de coyuntura.) We have given several examples of interim solutions (from the reform of the system of precautionary measures to the current intention to use the trial in absentia to "combat corruption.") We believe that it is necessary to exert pressure not with the aim of obtaining interim solutions, which only paper over the cracks, but to develop laws that are efficient in terms of meeting people's needs and that help establish control mechanisms that encourage participation by community members and that promote community awareness regarding the existence of laws and informed participation in their enforcement. C- At the social level: enhancing participation and social control - Programs for monitoring institutions involved in the administration of justice. Our observations regarding individuals involved in the administration of justice also apply to this category: citizen involvement in the monitoring of the work performed by institutions is key to the consolidation of the democratic practice that the reform of the criminal procedure entails. - Dissemination of information through alternative news media that promote a culture of respect for constitutional guarantees. The reason we mention alternative news media in this category is that one of the lessons that have been learned regarding the publicity of the reform is that in a country where half the population lives in rural areas, mass media is hardly the best channel to reach citizens. The creation of spaces for reflection, debate and education appears to 25 For instance, during the last week of August 2007 the current Justice Minister of Bolivia maintained in several radio programs that the criminal reform has not addressed the needs of Bolivian people as it has not been designed by them. 26 be a more realistic and appropriate means for raising awareness regarding a sophisticated and complex issue like the reform of the criminal procedure. 7b - Recommendations in the case of Honduras In the case of Honduras, the report suggests a series of recommendations for improving judicial independence and giving a fresh impetus to criminal reforms, in an attempt to achieve success. A- Recommendations regarding judicial independence The mechanisms for nomination and appointment of the members of the Supreme Court of Justice should be reviewed. Also important in this respect is ensuring that the merits, skills and integrity of candidates, as well as their sense of duty and respect for the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras (Constitución Política de la República) and other laws, are not influenced by the personal interests of political and economic groups so that, in this way, the foundations of common good can be laid. None of the above can be achieved without political will. Passing the law that creates and regulates the Judicial Council and the Judicial Career is essential to promote the structuring of the judicial career, to reorganize the system for the selection and appointment of judicial officers, as well as their training, and to improve their judicial performance. Such law shall guarantee that judges will remain in office, that their performance will be regularly assessed and that they will be promoted to higher ranking positions on the basis of objective criteria, without taking into account any kind of patronage. This, in turn, will secure the independence and impartiality of judges and magistrates in their rulings. Again, none of the above is possible without political will. Another key issue is the independence of judicial and administrative powers: they should be exercised by separate bodies, thus allowing transparent management and reducing the risk of corruption of judicial officers. It would also be advisable to promote the enactment of the Law Regulating the Judiciary as a strategic measure for strengthening the independence of this power of the State. Law schools and other judicial and prosecutors training programs are the right place for promoting academic training in accordance with the requirements of democratic judicial practice. It would also be positive if justice personnel could be trained to work in an independent and impartial judiciary. Last, the civil society should be encouraged to conduct social audits on the justice system that would help improve court activity in the country and to require from institutions of the justice system greater efficacy and efficiency in the resolution of issues submitted to them. B- Recommendations regarding the reform of criminal procedure in general 27 It is of utmost importance to develop case law that guides the application of criminal laws, as the academic literature on the subject of fundamental rights is scarce. This will result in a more democratic judiciary that dispenses with guidelines for the application of criminal procedure laws. A new impulse should be given to a criminal procedure in which accusatory principles prevail over inquisitorial ones, and in which evidence is offered, submitted, produced and discussed by the parties to assert their claims. Then, it is weighed by the judge in order to control its probative value and its legality, according to the principles of due process and other constitutional rights and guarantees. The exercise of the functions and powers of the Public Prosecutor's Office requires that the institution be devoid of any partisan influence, promote the professional education of prosecutors, have an adequate budget and a criminal investigation body so that criminal actions can be brought in an effective and efficient manner. The law on criminal procedure should be revised to do away with provisions of inquisitorial nature that prevent the transition to a procedure that is respectful of civil rights. It would also be desirable to resume oral procedures; in this way, evidence could be produced and arguments could be presented by the parties before the court that will rule on the case. Finally, law schools and other judicial and prosecutor programs should offer an academic education that is respectful of civil rights and provide training to justice personnel on the specifics of oral proceedings as well as on the theory and practice of criminal evidence. C- Recommendations regarding pretrial detention We believe that the following recommendations are of crucial importance:  Within the framework of the new Criminal Procedure Code, the institutions that make up the system of criminal justice must promote institutional policies that advance the respect for civil rights within the criminal procedure.  Developing the institutional conditions and budgetary requirements for the use and general enforcement of precautionary measures different from pretrial detention, which shall be considered as an extraordinary measure, and developing guidelines for each of them.  Designing inter-institutional training programs that provide judicial personnel, prosecutors, police officers and public defenders with a solid education on human rights issues—with specific emphasis on the right to freedom and personal integrity, judicial guarantees and the use of precautionary measures other than pre-trial detention—is of vital importance. 28  Developing case law in amparo proceedings on the right to personal freedom, advancing the conditions for this right and extending its scope, respecting its essential elements and taking into consideration the international law on human rights.  The determination that the absence of strong ties in the country (arraigo) involves a risk of flight from the jurisdiction should be based on objective criteria. In this regard, the circumstances to be taken into consideration should be whether the person is settled in a certain municipality or city, his residence in the country, domicile (which should not imply ownership of a home); family and social bonds, profession or occupation (rather than income); and a minimum standard of arraigo.  Strengthening institutional accountability, encouraging detention centers to keep a single, complete and transparent record indicating the reasons for detention and any relevant information regarding individuals subject to pre-trial detention.  Ensuring that detention centers separate individuals subject to pre-trial detention from those who have been sentenced to prison; improving the conditions of facilities and securing the life as well as physical and psychological integrity of detainees.  Promoting a public safety policy that offers comprehensive solutions to crime rates and helps reduce victimization levels within Honduran population.  Launching information campaigns on the civil rights values reflected in the new criminal procedure and raising greater awareness among society regarding the role of precautionary measures other than pre-trial detention.  Providing the Public Prosecutor's Office with a criminal investigation body that guarantees that its activities are carried out effectively and efficiently, specifically regarding individuals subject to pre-trial detention.  Strengthening the institutional character of the Public Defender's Office, so that defenders can conduct a professional and autonomous technical defense, on an equal standing, and ensuring that public defenders can actively defend the fundamental rights and judicial guarantees of detainees.  Encouraging judges in charge of the enforcement of judgments (jueces de ejecución) to exercise their duty to control the legality of pre-trial detention in compliance with the corresponding provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code; to that end, judges must have the necessary resources at their disposal.  Designing a penitentiary system, under the authority of an autonomous institution, separate from the Department of Safety (Secretaría de Seguridad) and the National Police (Policía 29 Nacional,) with a proper infrastructure and resources, and that is under the technical and administrative direction of professional penitentiary personnel. 30 Annex to Section 1: Consultations with Civil Society in Honduras Objetivo: Realizar actividades de difusión en las distintas regiones del país en los grupos de la sociedad civil (empresa privada, las ONG, universidades, etc.), para fomentar un cambio de actitud hacia la corrupción. Este es el segundo informe de la consultoría para difundir los resultados recogidos en el ―Informe Alternativo con Participación de la Sociedad, de Honduras 2006‖, que fue presentado al ―Mecanismo de Seguimiento a la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción‖ (MESICIC), el 17 de julio de 2007. El presente informe se divide en dos partes, la primera de actividades para continuar la difusión del Informe Alternativo del Mecanismo de Seguimiento de la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción (MESICIC); la segunda parte, corresponde a la constitución de redes y alianzas para la aplicación de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, como instrumento de seguimiento de los compromisos contraídos por el Estado de Honduras en la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción (CICC). I.- Difusión del Informe del MESIC y del Informe Alterno de la Sociedad Civil Como ya se explicó en el anterior informe, la Sociedad Civil, por medio de la Asociación para una Ciudadanía Participativa (ACI-PARTICIPA), presentó al MESICIC un informe alternativo al presentado por el Gobierno de Honduras. El MESICIC, emitió su informe con recomendaciones para el Estado de Honduras, el 15 de diciembre de 2006, sin embargo, este informe no fue publicado por las autoridades hondureñas. a) Foro público para divulgar el informe y las recomendaciones del Informe del MESICIC, con la participación del Tribunal Superior de Cuentas. Para que este informe se publicara, el consultor, junto con ACI-PARTICIPA, promovió un foro público con la participación de representantes del Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, que es la institución que representa al Estado de Honduras ante el MESICIC. El foro se celebró el miércoles 7 de febrero de 2007, asistiendo más de 60 personas, representantes de organizaciones de la sociedad civil, profesores universitarios y académicos, representantes del sector privado, representantes de organismos de cooperación internacional, medios de comunicación, y de diversas instituciones del Estado como: Fiscalía Contra la Corrupción, Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, representantes de la Policía Nacional, Secretaría de Estado en el Despacho de Finanzas, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción. A todos los asistentes se les entregó copia del Informe Alterno desde la Sociedad Civil y de las recomendaciones que el MESICIC hizo al Gobierno de Honduras. Los temas que se trataron, de conformidad con el informe del MESICIC, fueron los siguientes: 31 a) Sistema de contratación de funcionarios y empleados públicos; b) Compras y contrataciones del Estado; c) Sistemas para proteger a funcionarios públicos y ciudadanos particulares que denuncien, de buena fe, actos de corrupción; y d) La tipificación de actos de corrupción. Es importante destacar que, por primera vez, el Experto Titular de Honduras ante el MESICIC, Magistrado del Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, Abogado Renan Sagastume, presentó el informe y explicó las dificultades que existen para aplicar la Ley de Servicio Civil y garantizar la estabilidad de los funcionarios públicos que son removidos cada cuatro años, cuando cambia el gobierno, y son nombrados no por capacidad sino por ingerencias políticas. También explicó las dificultades que existen en el proceso de compras y contrataciones por parte del Estado..Pero en relación a la protección de los funcionarios públicos que denuncien actos de corrupción, y la tipificación de actos de corrupción explicó que había avances, lo que ha resultado cierto porque, en el mes de mayo del presente año, el Congreso Nacional aprobó la Ley de Protección a Testigos y el Código de Ética de los Funcionarios Públicos que tipifica los conflictos de intereses y los actos de nepotismo. Con la intensa participación de los asistentes se llegó a la conclusión que un instrumento eficaz para conocer los avances del Estado Hondureño en la lucha contra la corrupción y para dar cumplimiento a la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción(CICC) era necesaria la puesta en práctica de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública. b) Foro para discutir el Capítulo XVIII sobre “Transparencia� del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre la República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos (DR-CAFTA). También en el Tratado de Libre Comercio celebrado entre Estados Unidos, República Dominicana y Centroamérica (CAFTA), en el Capítulo XVIII, se hace mención del cumplimiento de la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción (CICC), por lo que se consideró oportuno la realización de un foro público sobre el contenido del mencionado Capítulo XVIII. El foro se realizo el 12 de Febrero, asistiendo representantes de sectores de la sociedad civil, universitarios y académicos, Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción y personal de las Secretarías de Estado, de Comercio, Trabajo y Finanzas, miembros de la Inspectoría de Juzgados y Tribunales, y del Tribunal Superior de Cuentas (asistieron 40 personas), agencias de cooperación internacional y representantes de los medios de comunicación. Se entregaron a los todos los participantes copias del Capítulo XVIII del CAFTA y de la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción (CICC). Los asistentes al foro enfatizaron en la necesidad por parte de las autoridades y de la población hondureña, de conocer estas cláusulas de transparencia que exigen transparencia, rendición de cuentas, evitar las prácticas fraudulentas, y la aplicación de las reglas del debido proceso en la solución de los conflictos comerciales. También se destacó la importancia de aplicar la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública. 32 c) Apoyo al monitoreo sobre aplicación de conocimientos sobre la Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza (ERP), en la ciudad de Marcala, Departamento de La Paz. Como una continuación de la actividad realizada en noviembre de 2006 (véase informe anterior del consultor), cuando se desarrollo un taller sobre el Informe Alterno desde la Sociedad Civil, en la Ciudad de Marcala, se apoyó una investigación y monitoreo para determinar si las personas que fueron capacitadas por la ―Asociación para una Ciudadanía Participativa‖ (ACI-PARTICIPA) en el año 2005, habían puesto en práctica sus conocimientos sobre la Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza (ERP), Para este monitoreo se contó con la participación de la Cooperativa ―Mujeres de la Sierra‖. El resultado fue positivo pues se constató que la mitad de las personas pusieron en práctica los conocimientos adquiridos. Aci-Participa produjo un informe sobre esta actividad, impulsada por el Consultor. d) La CICC y el MESICIC en la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras. En la clase de Ética Jurídica, se impartió un curso de 2 horas, 12 y 13 de abril, a 40 estudiantes sobre la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción y sobre su Mecanismo de Seguimiento (MESICIC9. Se contó con la colaboración del Magistrado del Tribunal Superior de Cuentas y representante ante el MESIC, Abogado Renán Sagastume. II. Apoyo a la difusión de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública. Construcción de una red para su aplicación El 30 de diciembre de 2006 el Congreso Nacional aprobó la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, concluyendo un proceso de casi cuatro años, que fue impulsado por organizaciones de la sociedad civil, y luego apoyado por el Gobierno del Presidente Manuel Zelaya. Fue el Comité por la Libre Expresión (C-Libre) quien promovió la idea de promover la emisión de una Ley de Acceso a la Información. Se unieron a este esfuerzo ACI-PARTICIPA, el Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH), la Federación de Asociaciones Privadas de Desarrollo (FOPRIDEH), y otras organizaciones más que, finalmente, en septiembre de 2005 constituyeron la ―Alianza 72‖ para luchar por la aprobación de la Ley de Acceso a la Información, que finalmente, se llamó ―Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública‖. La Alianza 72 suspendió sus actividades cuando se aprobó la ley. a) Constitución de la RED POR LA TRANSPARENCIA EN HONDURAS (RETHO) En febrero del corriente año 2007, un grupo de organizaciones, preocupadas por la pronta aplicación de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, con la asesoría del Consultor, se reunieron para unir esfuerzos en un trabajo conjunto. Estas organizaciones son: C- Libre, CIPRODEH, Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (COFADEH), ACI- 33 PARTICIPA y el Equipo de Reflexión Investigación y Comunicación 8ERIC-SJ), Las cuatro primeras organizaciones tienen sus oficinas en Tegucigalpa, mientras que la última, en la ciudad de Progreso, Departamento de Yoro, en el norte de Honduras. Estas cinco organizaciones, con sus propios recursos, iniciaron un proceso de planificación estratégica que dio como resultado la constitución de la RED POR LA TRANSPARENCIA EN HONDURAS (RETHO). Son objetivos de RETHO, los siguientes: 1) General: Contribuir a la creación de una cultura de transparencia y rendición de cuentas en el manejo de los recursos públicos de Honduras; II) Específicos: a) Propiciar la participación ciudadana en la toma de decisiones de interés común; b) Fortalecer las instituciones y las organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil en el marco de la transparencia; c) Garantizar el uso apropiado de los recursos públicos. Sus valores y principios: a) Creemos que la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas fortalecen las instituciones y las organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil; b) Estamos conscientes de las capacidades y experiencias institucionales complementarias de nuestras organizaciones; c) Estamos convencidos que nuestro trabajo se inspira en el servicio a los demás especialmente a los más vulnerables; d) Confiamos en el respeto de los principios democráticos para la solución de conflictos; c) Compartimos el enfoque de Derechos Humanos alrededor de la Transparencia y el Acceso a la Información Pública; f) Confiamos en la riqueza ciudadana para impulsar la transparencia y rendición de cuentas; g) Estamos convencidos que la integridad debe ser una norma de nuestras actuaciones. Organización y funcionamiento: a) La Asamblea, conformada por las cinco organizaciones integrantes: define políticas, aprueba los planes estratégicos y operativos, aprueba el presupuesto anual; b) La Coordinación es el órgano técnico con funciones de secretaría ejecutiva, responsable de la conducción administrativa, que será asumida por las organizaciones integrantes que designe la Asamblea. Unidades Ejecutivas son las responsable del funcionamiento operativo y ejecutor de la Red, y las integran cada una de las cinco organizaciones que conforman la Red. Las ventajas que ofrece RETHO:  El esfuerzo de (5) cinco organizaciones para trabajar conjuntamente en un mismo campo.  Evitar dispersión y duplicidad de esfuerzos.  Ponerse al servicio de otras organizaciones.  Crear capacidades.  Confianza en los propios esfuerzos. En la actualidad RETHO tiene elaborado sus planes estratégicos y operativo, y está negociando el financiamiento con la Cooperación Sueca, Canadiense y Británica, con resultados positivos. RETHO está trabajando conjuntamente con la ―Alianza 72‖, que decidió continuar trabajando en la incidencia política a favor de la aplicación de la Ley de Transparencia, a diferencia de RETHO que trabaja su aplicación concreta y en el monitoreo de su cumplimiento. b) Difusión de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública. 34 De común acuerdo con RETHO y la Alianza 72, el Consultor ha participado como conferencista en varias actividades de capacitación en el conocimiento de la Ley:  San Pedro Sula, segunda ciudad en importancia del país. Asistieron autoridades municipales, del Poder Judicial, Colegio de Abogados, profesores y estudiantes universitarios y población en general. El seminario-taller tuvo lugar el 5 de del presente mes de junio, asistiendo 140 personas, y el número que se habían estimado eran solamente 50.  La Ceiba, 6 de junio, para un auditorio con similares participantes, con una asistencia de más de 80 personas.  Santa Rosa de Copán (7 de junio). Conversación con representantes de la Red de Comisiones Ciudadanas de Transparencia (17 municipios en el Occidente de Honduras), que han formado la ―Escuela de Auditoría). Se acordó que la Red de Comisiones de Transparencia trabajará con RETHO para la aplicación de la Ley de Transparencia.  Ocotepeque (8 junio). Reunión con la Profesora Alicia Carías de Pineda, Presidenta de la Comisión de Transparencia, y miembros de la Delegación del Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos. Se les explicó la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública. La Comisión de Transparencia de Ocotepeque se incorporará a RETHO.  Para el 29 de junio próximo está prevista una conferencia sobre la Ley de Transparencia para el Consejo Nacional de la Juventud, con una asistencia de más de 200 jóvenes. c) Apoyo a la redacción del proyecto de Reglamento de la Ley de Transparencia. Por solicitud de RETHO y de ―Alianza 72‖, trabajé directamente en la redacción del Proyecto de Reglamento de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública. La versión final del Proyecto de Reglamento fue examinada por miembros de RETHO y la ―Alianza 72‖, y será presentado al Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública cuando el Congreso Nacional elija a sus tres comisionados integrantes. III. Otras actividades complementarias Durante la última etapa de la consultorio he realizado numerosas actividades, conferencias, seminarios, pero quiero destacar que participe como expositor en el ―I Encuentro Iberoamericano sobre Transparencia y Lucha Contra la Corrupción‖, titulado ―La Corrupción como Obstáculo para el Desarrollo‖, en los temas:‖La Corrupción en el Sector Privado en Honduras‖ y ―La ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública‖. El seminario fue auspiciado por ―Transparencia International España‖y se celebró en Madrid, los días 16 y 17 de abril de 2007. 35 Una actividad académica en otro campo fue la Conferencia: ―El Centenario del Código Civil Hondureño‖, el 19 de abril, por invitación de la Real Academia de Legislación y Jurisprudencia de España. Debo aclarar que, durante el mes de mayo no realicé actividades de la consultoría por una pulmonía que me tuvo en reposo durante dos semanas. IV. Conclusiones Los objetivos de la Consultoría se han cumplido ampliamente.  La realización de las actividades, conferencias, talleres, seminarios (en total 15), sirvió como una fuente de información para académicos, agencias de cooperación internacional, investigadores, instituciones públicas, organizaciones de la sociedad civil medios de comunicación y ciudadanía en general. Estas actividades se realizaron en: Tegucigalpa, Marcala, San Pero Sula, La Ceiba, Santa Rosa de Copán y Ocotepeque, abarcando las principales zonas del país.  Se benefició al sector público, mediante la proporción de los datos producto de la investigación, así mismo se procuró generar mejores canales de diálogo entre la sociedad y el gobierno. Particularmente fue importante el diálogo que se estableció entre el Tribunal Superior de Cuentas y representantes de la sociedad civil.  Se realizó la divulgación del informe sobre los avances de Honduras en el cumplimiento del convenio de la CICC ratificado por Honduras. Varias organizaciones mostrar sus interés en participar en el seguimiento de las recomendaciones hechas a Honduras por el MESICI.  Se promovieron las herramientas para la lucha contra la corrupción, y se facilitó a los participantes los resultados objetivos, así como la proporción a los funcionarios del gobierno local (municipios), de los resultados de la investigación.  Se propició en la ciudadanía hondureña, el conocimiento sobre los mecanismos de lucha contra la corrupción, para aplicarlos mediante la participación ciudadana y el interés personal sobre el tema; Se les proporcionó un panorama de la situación real del cumplimiento que Honduras ha dado a la CICC.  Además de los logros que se han enumerado anteriormente, se ha contribuido a crear capacidades y habilidades en las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y en la población en general. Por eso, hay dos logros particularmente importantes: o Haber contribuido a la formación de la RED POR LA TRANSPARENCIA EN HONDURAS (RETHO), formada por cinco organizaciones. Con este esfuerzo se está haciendo un llamado a otras organizaciones que trabajen conjuntamente, y no lo sigan haciendo en forma dispersa. Esta Red ya está trabajando en el monitoreo de la aplicación de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información; 36 o La participación del Consultor en la elaboración del Proyecto de Reglamento de la Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública, así como a la divulgación de esta Ley, que es el instrumento básico en la lucha por la transparencia y rendición de cuentas, y así combatir eficazmente la corrupción. 37 2. Civil and Commercial Justice in Paraguay Abstract and Conclusions: The report annexed here is one of three studies on Paraguay conducted under the grant.26 All focused on a central question: why reforms conducted over the past ten years, financed with both national and donor funds, had not produced the promised improvements in the efficiency and efficacy of Paraguay‘s civil and commercial courts. The present report examined courtroom-level performance. The other two focused on system-wide administration and on an automated case management system as a source of information for tracking and improving output. During the period covered, most of the reforms were financed through an IADB (Inter American Development Bank) loan, although other donors (most notably USAID, and to a much lesser extent, the World Bank) funded related activities. Most recently, USAID through its Millennium Challenge Corporation has provided additional funding ($22 million in grant moneys) to improve court management, statistics, and oversight, all with an emphasis on criminal justice. The Supreme Court also provided funding, both for new infrastructure and to expand the IADB automation program, when delays in the approval of a second loan put those activities in jeopardy. As it was the IADB loan (in effect from 1997-2004) that financed the reforms most central to improving civil and commercial justice, most of the focus here is on the measures it introduced. However, the report does not attempt to evaluate the loan (or for that matter any of the donor projects), but rather to identify obstacles to its intended goals of improving case processing. The core element in the loan was the introduction of an automated case tracking system (Judisoft) which is now installed in 45 percent of Paraguay‘s courts. Parallel to this program, but financed largely with the judiciary‘s own funds, new judicial districts and courts were created and infrastructure was provided to house them. Paraguay now has 11.8 judges per 100,000 inhabitants, above the Latin American average of 8.1, and arguably sufficient given current levels of demand. Nonetheless, handling of cases is slow, there are reports of widespread corruption (among judges, staff, prosecutors, and independent lawyers), and backlog continues to accumulate. Unfortunately, the program prioritized improvements in the less congested courtrooms in the interior of the country, meaning that it had barely reached the most congested courtrooms in Asunción when it terminated. Civil (and criminal) courts in Asunción are now receiving automation equipment, but the justice of the peace courts (jueces letrados and jueces de paz) there, which receive the highest number of new cases, have still not been attended. While strongly endorsing the use of an automated case tracking system to improve judicial performance, the report notes that more attention should have gone to altering organization and procedures at the courtroom level and to securing the full involvement of judges and their staff. It also notes a failure to utilize the system fully in the Asunción courts arising in a lack of adequate equipment, technical support, and training, as well as the judicial governance body‘s failure to 26 The other two, which are available on request, are Carlos Gregorio, ―Diagnóstico sobre la producción de estadísticas jurisdiccionales,‖ and Fernando Grafe, ―Diagnóstico área administrativa.‖ While these documents are not included here, some of their observations are noted in this abstract. 38 provide sufficient incentives. As this and the accompanying reports note, management statistics derived from Judisoft have been extremely controversial, with some external observers contending that ―the system does not work.‖ However, the problem is not Jurisoft but rather its incomplete and inconsistent use for documenting judicial actions. There are steps, detailed in all three reports that could be taken to overcome these problems. All will require greater involvement by the Supreme Court (the judicial governance body) as well as adequate consultations with judges (and with the external critics of the system). In brief the recommendations from the three reports include:  Promoting greater delegation of non-jurisdictional functions still performed by judges to other count room staff or to centralized offices (for example, expanding the functions of the mesa de entradas, to include all documents submitted by lawyers and not just the initial demand)  Dividing the two secretarías (responsible for overall administration and direct support to the judge) in each courtroom into two areas: one for case processing and the other for managing files. Reviewing, revising, and formalizing job descriptions (via procedural manuals) for each support staff member.  Reviewing case processing to eliminate practices not mandated by law that add to processing times. Identification of good practices used by some judges and their adoption system wide.  Simplification, where necessary with targeted legal change, of basic procedures. 27  Creation of an office (and recruitment and training of its staff) of judicial management analysis to help in the above task and to do general statistical analysis. Redefinition of the activities of the current ―statistical‖ offices to concentrate on statistics, giving their current task of maintaining a file of definitive judgments to another office (and automating the latter).  Providing more training in the use of Jurisoft and developing policies to ensure it is used. Creation of an office for follow-up and support (similar to what already exists in the districts of Guairá and Amambay).  Use of existing statistics generated by Jurisoft to do initial analyses of caseloads and their handling. Even where statistics are incomplete this is nonetheless feasible (Gregorio, 2007) and can help identify bottlenecks and irregularities.  Further reorganization of administrative offices and the creation of a separate set of offices to serve the Asunción courts (Grafe, 2007). These are the only courts without dedicated administrators. While the report describes in detail a series of technical flaws in implementation and makes recommendations as to how to overcome them, it also recognizes the many political obstacles to doing so – most of them linked to the series of vested interests supporting business as usual and reducing the incentives for judges and staff to change their behavior. Among those meriting mention are the following: 27 Note that as throughout Latin America, a distinction is made between practices (bureaucratic routing of documents within an organization) and procedures or processes (the legal steps required to process a case). The former often evolve from staff preferences while the latter have some basis in the law, or staff interpretations of its application. 39 Political parties and governmental elites: the selection of the Supreme Court remains highly politicized as is that of the lower level judges. Both are pre-selected by a politically dominated Judicial Council, and lists of candidates are then forwarded to the Senate and Supreme Court respectively. In the case of the Court, the President must ratify the Senate decisions. At both levels, judges hold five year terms subject to reelection (Supreme Court) or ratification (other judges), and thus continue to depend on their external patrons in the Executive, the Congress, and the Council. Promotions and discipline are also negotiated politically meaning that judges have few incentives for performing objectively given that contacts and patronage inevitably trump merit. Supreme Court: although justices are thus politically beholding, they do enjoy some benefits of the job, especially as regards control of resources and some internal appointments. As is not uncommon in the region, the Court has divided responsibility for overseeing judicial districts among its members, a practice said to improve oversight, but also lending itself to abuses. The justices have similarly divided responsibility for certain administrative tasks, thereby making uniform policies hard to adopt. As the chief justice and two vice-presidents only hold their positions for one year, their ability to introduce changes is limited and subject to considerable negotiation with the other justices. There are, in short, few incentives for effective court governance, and the structures in place present further obstacles. Other judges: ordinary judges are likewise subject to a variety of irregular pressures, and as a result of past devaluations, their salaries have lost a good part of their former value. Incentives for good performance are lacking, and judges may find it easier and more professionally (as well as materially) profitable to succumb to bribes or requests for favorable treatment from well-placed clients. Judges‘ oversight and management of their courtroom staff is largely a matter of individual talent and preferences as none of the reform programs has provided assistance here. The greatest disincentive for using Judisoft to manage their cases may be lack of adequate training and, in some cases, equipment, as well as the Supreme Court‘s lack of attention to the process. However, there may also be resistance arising in a wish not to be monitored. Administrative staff: the numbers are excessive by regional standards and salaries tend to be higher than those of courtroom support staff. High level administrators also earn more than judges. Unlike judges, administrative personnel have permanent tenure (as part of the civil service) and as occurs throughout Paraguay‘s public administration, are difficult to remove, even for cause. Career staff may be removed from high level positions (to which they are named by the Supreme Court), but remain on the payroll. Generally, the justices seem suspicious of their administrators, and attempt to micromanage their decisions, with the predictable negative impact on overall performance. The same administrative officers in Asunción serve the Supreme Court, the judicial system as a whole, and the courts of the capital city. Consequently, ordinary judges in Asunción are said to get the worst service. The separate report on administration recommended a separate set of administrators for Asunción as a solution to this problem of perverse incentives. Summons servers (ujieres), auctioneers (rematadores), practicantes,28 and other support staff: This staff tends to be poorly remunerated (or in the case of practicantes, not at all). This, the lack of standards governing their functions, and ineffective supervision by the judges make them 28 These are unpaid law students who work in the courts, a common practice throughout the region and an equally common source of abuses. 40 extremely vulnerable to corruption. They can be paid for not doing their jobs, or for prioritizing services for external clients. The reform programs have not focused on improving their performance or even providing guidelines for their work, and until they do, their potential for undermining the intended results will continue to be enormous. Private attorneys: As the report notes, despite widespread complaints of judicial inefficiency and corruption, those surveyed did not see this as an impediment to business activities. The reason is that well-placed lawyers know how to manipulate the system to their own ends, paying judges and staff for special attention. On a lesser scale (lesser only because they do not handle the same quantities of cases), all lawyers are believed to do this, and, while not mentioned in any of the reports, the lack of a strong bar association exercising oversight on its members is an additional problem. A body within the Supreme Court oversees discipline of attorneys, but usually does very little because in the end, the attorneys have better political contacts. The report concludes that the major obstacles to improving the efficiency and efficacy of Paraguay‘s justice system are more organizational than legal or technological, and that overcoming them will involve promoting a process of institutionalization within the judiciary, based on the adoption of clear, stable rules of the game. To do this it will be necessary to identify and understand the variety of external and internal groups whose interests do not completely support that process and to find ways to overcome their resistance. In a system without transparent, clear rules, vested interests are likely to prevail. Changing that situation requires exiting a vicious circle, but if outside supporters, and especially civil society organizations can be rallied to the cause, they can help the judiciary effect that process, even over the resistance of many of its members. La Justicia Civil y Comercial en Paraguay Laura Louza 2.1. Introducción  Algunas consideraciones sobre los procesos de reforma judicial en América Latina 41 Varios expertos y el propio Banco Mundial han expresado que los resultados de las reformas iniciadas hace por lo menos dos décadas no han sido satisfactorios en la mayoría de los países de América Latina (DPLF, 2007, p. 4 y 5). Las causas del bajo impacto de los procesos de modernización, se encuentran en muchas ocasiones en fallas importantes del mismo proceso de reforma. En efecto, en buena medida la mayoría de estos procesos se ha dirigido a mejorar la infraestructura física y tecnológica del Poder Judicial, pero no sus procesos de gestión, cuando precisamente la falla fundamental de los órganos jurisdiccionales se encuentra en la forma de gestionar los casos, en que normalmente se usan métodos gerenciales y reglas de inicios del siglo XX. Sin embargo, aún en los casos en que con estos proyectos se haya logrado mejorar la gestión de forma parcial o incluso importante con la introducción de sistemas de gestión modernos y técnicas gerenciales actualizadas, esto suele perdurar mientras haya en la instancia judicial un líder de la modernización o una voluntad de mejora, pero en la mayoría de los casos, aunque ese líder o esa voluntad duren un tiempo, hay un gran riesgo de que se pierda lo hecho en cualquier momento en que haya un cambio. Es decir, es difícil que se establezca un punto de no retorno al pasado, por lo menos en lo que respecta a la eficacia y eficiencia de la gestión. Esto ocurre probablemente porque existen ciertos intereses creados que prevalecen en un momento dado que pueden socavar el proceso de modernización ya adelantado. Estos intereses pueden estar dentro y fuera del Poder Judicial. Ahora bien, ¿por qué prevalecen estos intereses creados en un momento dado si son contrarios al bien común y a lo que quiere la ciudadanía, e incluso significan un retroceso respecto de lo logrado? ¿Cómo se garantiza que esto no ocurra? El análisis económico del derecho y la economía institucional responden a esto. El ser humano tiende a maximizar su utilidad, por ello es común que los intereses creados prevalezcan si las reglas de juego no están claras y las instituciones no son fuertes. Para reforzarlas es necesario que garantizar “fuertes derechos de propiedad, sistemas legales que posibiliten las transacciones y eliminen los altos costos de obtener la información y otras instituciones� (Douglass North, 2004, p. 32). Las ciencias políticas responden de una manera parecida indicando que no es suficiente que haya democracia para que haya instituciones, sino que es necesario que ésta se consolide para lo cual deben haber reglas de juego estables, que hagan predecible la acción de los órganos de poder (Valades, 2000, p. 79-82), porque en caso contrario toda reforma será volátil. Así, la clave de los procesos de reforma judicial no es atacar estos intereses de manera directa, sino crear reglas de juego transparentes y estables. Las reglas de juego de los países latinoamericanos siguen siendo personales, mientras que en Europa Occidental y en Estados Unidos se ha logrado que sean impersonales (Douglass North, 2004, p. 33). Esto es lo que hay que alcanzar en América Latina. Para lograr este objetivo se requiere de tiempo, pero también es clave mejorar en el camino la rendición de cuentas del Poder Judicial29 y, por la otra, en el ámbito de la 29 Está claro en la actualidad que la independencia judicial no es un concepto contrapuesto al de la rendición de cuentas. Más bien, es importante que la independencia cuente con el contrapeso de la responsabilidad. En efecto, independencia sin responsabilidad da origen a jueces intocables que pueden abusar de su poder. Por otra parte, la 42 administración de justicia civil y comercial, mejorar los procesos relacionados con los derechos de propiedad y transacciones comerciales, así como las reglas de juego en la administración de justicia. Para obtener estos logros, hay que dirigir la modernización al juzgado más que a la administración, a los casos y procesos judiciales más que a la implantación de sistemas de gestión automatizada y a la evaluación de desempeño más que a cambios de sueldos y cursos de capacitación. Además, para conocer las reglas del juego es necesario estudiar los casos y de las operaciones de los juzgados para conocer la realidad y elaborar programas de modernización adaptados a los problemas reales de la administración de justicia más que basados en suposiciones y fórmulas que no necesariamente se aplican en cada caso y que incluso pueden no ser la solución al problema como se ha demostrado en muchos casos y países (Argentina y México son un ejemplo, Banco Mundial, 2002, p. 1-3). Sólo el análisis de los casos, puede demostrar qué intereses hay en juego, cómo actúa el juez, cómo actúan las partes, es decir, cuáles son las reglas del juego. Hasta ahora se han mejorado las condiciones de trabajo del Poder Judicial con los proyectos de reforma judicial, pero no se ha logrado el objetivo final perseguido que es mayor eficacia, eficiencia e imparcialidad porque no se ha estudiado a fondo el verdadero objetivo de la mejora: el juzgado y sobre todo, sus procesos judiciales. Evidentemente Paraguay no es una excepción a lo comentado. Su proceso de modernización en el ámbito civil y comercial se ha dirigido sobre todo a la mejora de la infraestructura y a la incorporación de tecnología de punta, pero no a la modernización de la gestión jurisdiccional. Aunque se haya instalado un sistema de gestión jurisdiccional (case management system), llamado Judisoft (SGJ), sobre todo en las regiones, que es moderno y que, sin duda, ha traído alguna mejora en los tiempos de respuesta, no se ha cambiado el modelo organizacional, ni los procesos para dictar sentencias, ni tampoco se han simplificado los procesos. Además, el cambio no se ha hecho dentro del juzgado y con el juzgado, sino desde la administración y el gobierno judicial, por eso el juzgado no lo ha internalizado. Parte de la clave de los procesos de reforma es que hay que ―empoderar‖ a los jueces de su proceso de cambio. En Paraguay, quien tiene el poder es la administración que presenta un número de funcionarios muy superior al promedio de la región y los ministros que de distintas formas pueden controlar a los jueces y los procesos judiciales. También, los abogados de firmas reconocidas son un grupo de poder, ya que para lograr sus transacciones comerciales logran ―comprar‖ la celeridad requerida. Existen además otros órganos como los rematadores y oficiales judiciales se ocupan de un ámbito del proceso judicial fundamental sin mayor control institucional. Paraguay en la región se ubica en el grupo de países con mayor grado de corrupción y con un alto nivel de opacidad en la justicia (Ceja, 2004-2005, p. 26-27), lo que indica que las reglas formales no se aplican, sino otras, por lo que en el momento de rendición de cuentas es la que puede legitimar al Poder Judicial y así darle fortaleza y en consecuencia, garantizar su independencia. Sólo si se conoce qué hace el poder judicial y cómo lo hace, se puede tener confianza en él. Para comprender mejor esto, y en particular, el sutil lindero entre rendición de cuentas e intromisión en los asuntos judiciales, es importante aclarar que la rendición de cuentas es “un control posterior, y se refiere al requerimiento de que el Poder Judicial relate y explique tanto sus operaci ones administrativas y funcionales como los resultados�… “La rendición de cuentas requiere que justifique sus actos en términos del cumplimiento de la ley� (Hammergren, Linn, 2002, p. 170). Concebida de esta forma la rendición de cuentas, puede reducir la vulnerabilidad del Poder Judicial frente a presiones externas, puesto que la única explicación aceptable será que la ley lo establece y no por ejemplo que “el presidente me obligó a hacerlo� (Hammergren, Linn, 2002, p. 170). 43 una reforma judicial hay que considerar los intereses creados alrededor de un sistema corrupto y proponer incentivos para cambiar las prácticas existentes y crear reglas de juego claras y estables.  La modernización de la justicia en Paraguay El proyecto de modernización de Paraguay fue financiado por el Banco Interamericano para el Desarrollo (BID) y administrado por el Programa de Naciones Unidas (PNUD). Tuvo su inicio en el año 1997 y finalizó en el 2004. Su objetivo fundamental era automatizar la justicia paraguaya y modernizar su infraestructura edilicia. Se logró implantar el SGJ aproximadamente en 41% de los juzgados del país y se creó una infraestructura edilicia moderna y funcional en seis circunscripciones judiciales de las nueve que existían para el momento de la conclusión del proyecto en Paraguay30. El proyecto mencionado estuvo dirigido fundamentalmente al interior del país. En efecto, el servicio de administración de justicia de la capital no fue objeto prácticamente de modernización; sólo en la etapa final del proyecto y durante los años sucesivos, y en buena medida, con recursos propios del Poder Judicial. Está prevista una segunda etapa del proyecto con el BID que debería cubrir, entre otros, la modernización de los juzgados de la capital, pero el Congreso no ha aprobado el nuevo préstamo. La razón de esto se encuentra en que existe un amplio debate nacional sobre si el costo de la implantación del proyecto mencionado, ha traído los beneficios esperados a la justicia paraguaya. Por ahora, se ha aprobado un adelanto que está financiando la modernización de la justicia penal y no de la civil. En vista de esta mora en la aprobación del nuevo proyecto, la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha continuado financiando, en la medida de lo posible, con recursos propios el programa, en especial, en lo que se refiere a la modernización de la infraestructura edilicia. El debate nacional sobre el costo-beneficio del programa mencionado, en cierta modo, ha desembocado en la aprobación de dos nuevos proyectos, que son donaciones de USAID al gobierno paraguayo, con los que se pretende cubrir algunas áreas que se consideran de gran importancia en la justicia paraguaya a las que no se refería de manera directa el proyecto del BID ya ejecutado, ni tampoco el nuevo. El primero de estos proyectos pretende hacer más transparente la gestión del Poder Judicial, reforzando la función disciplinaria de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Para lograr este objetivo se busca fortalecer fundamentalmente la gestión de la Superintendencia General (órgano que auxilia a la Corte en el ejercicio de su función disciplinaria) y del Consejo de la Judicatura (órgano encargado de apoyarla en la selección de los jueces), así como construir indicadores que permitan a estos órganos y a la propia Corte evaluar el desempeño de los jueces, juzgados y tribunales. También, se están emprendiendo acciones para la aprobación de un Código de Ética Judicial y el diseño de una carrera judicial. Durante su ejecución, el proyecto se ha centrado más en el fortalecimiento de la función disciplinaria que de la carrera judicial. No se han creado mecanismos 30 Actualmente, son quince circunscripciones judiciales. 44 para la mejora del desempeño de los jueces, sino que se han fortalecido los medios de inspección de su función. Esto aparentemente está dando lugar a la creación de un órgano represivo, y no, como se pretendía, de un órgano que premia la meritocracia. El segundo proyecto se refiere al presupuesto judicial y con éste se pretende mejorar su administración y lograr una gestión por resultados. Ambos proyectos se empezaron a ejecutar el año 2007 y deben ser concluidos en un plazo de dos años.  Alcance del informe Este estudio financiado por el Banco Mundial pretende analizar la situación actual del servicio de justicia civil y comercial, especialmente, en Asunción, con el propósito de hacer recomendaciones, a la luz de su estado actual, para mejorar su funcionamiento y organización. No se persigue analizar el proyecto del Banco Interamericano, ni el de USAID, sino los problemas de la justicia en el ámbito civil y comercial en Paraguay. Sin embargo, es posible que alguna de las recomendaciones esté dirigida a que alguno de los proyectos en curso o por aprobar, haga hincapié en determinados aspectos necesarios para proseguir de forma exitosa con el proceso de modernización de la justicia paraguaya. El análisis va a estar centrado en la justicia de primera instancia civil y comercial de Asunción, aunque también se van a hacer algunas observaciones sobre la justicia letrada y la justicia de paz, que hace parte de la jurisdicción civil y comercial, y sobre la modernización llevada adelante hasta la fecha en el interior del país. También, se pretende hacer mención a algunos de los obstáculos que se individualizaron por causa de ciertos intereses creados que probablemente han influido en evitar que la modernización de la justicia avance y sugerir qué pueden hacer las agencias de cooperación o los bancos de desarrollo frente a esta situación.  Metodología utilizada La opción metodológica de este trabajo fue la de buscar información empírica, es decir, recabar todos aquellos datos que diesen cuenta del funcionamiento real de la justicia comercial y civil en Paraguay. Esto se hizo a través de entrevistas en que se puso el acento en la indagación de hechos y no de opiniones y, mediante la obtención de datos duros sobre el funcionamiento del Judisoft y de los juzgados que se ocupan de asuntos civiles y comerciales. Los instrumentos utilizados fueron: - El examen de estadísticas sobre el funcionamiento de la justicia civil y comercial; - Las entrevistas semi-estructuradas a: abogados litigantes, representantes de organismos internacionales, administradores o gerentes del Poder Judicial, funcionarios responsables de estadísticas, jueces y magistrados, secretarios, ujieres, y usuarios del sistema. Además, se participó en un taller en Washington por dos días en que se presentaron las reformas judiciales de los países más pobres de la región: Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras y Guyana y, en 45 particular qué grupos de interés podían haber sido un obstáculo para que estas reformas tuvieran mejores resultados.  Contenido del informe El informe se estructura en tres grandes partes: el diagnóstico sobre la organización y procesos judiciales, las recomendaciones y los intereses creados. El diagnóstico se divide, a su vez, en tres secciones, que son las siguientes: - Rasgos básicos de la justicia civil y comercial en Paraguay. - El modelo de gestión de los juzgados: su organización y procesos. - El Judisoft. Las recomendaciones se estructuran en tres secciones: - Reorganización de los juzgados. - Reingeniería de los procesos. - Fortalecimiento del Judisoft. Asimismo, la sección sobre los intereses creados: - El gobierno y la administración judicial en Paraguay. - El estado de derecho. - La falta de incentivos y los intereses creados. 2.2. Diagnóstico sobre la Organización y Procesos Judiciales Generalmente, se atribuye de forma exclusiva la ineficiencia e ineficacia de los juzgados a factores normativos y procedimentales. Sin duda, estos factores son causa importante del problema, pero no la única razón. Suele suceder que aun el procedimiento más expedito y sencillo regulado por la ley, si no está acompañado de una organización del servicio de justicia adecuada, se torne engorroso. Esto es lo que ocurre en Paraguay en que la justicia resulta lenta e ineficaz, a pesar de tener procedimientos con un nivel de complejidad similar al de otros países latinoamericanos, como por ejemplo Chile (Galindo, 2002: 10), en que el grado de eficacia y eficiencia de la justicia es muy superior al de Paraguay. Por ello, este estudio hace hincapié más en aspectos organizacionales del servicio de justicia que legales. En esta sección, nos referiremos, precisamente, a los factores estrechamente relacionados con la organización de los juzgados y con los sistemas de gestión instalados en Paraguay; pero, previamente, presentaremos de manera sencilla y breve, algunos rasgos definitorios de la justicia civil y comercial en Paraguay, referidos a la organización del Poder Judicial, y en particular, de la jurisdicción civil y comercial. 46  Rasgos de la justicia civil y comercial en Paraguay La justicia civil y comercial en Paraguay está integrada por los siguientes órganos en el ámbito jurisdiccional: los juzgados de primera instancia, la justicia letrada, los juzgados de paz, los tribunales de apelación y la Corte Suprema de Justicia en Sala Civil y Comercial. Los juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial conocen de aquellos asuntos o juicios que excedan de los 300 jornales diarios. Los de justicia letrada sólo funcionan en la capital, son seis en total, y tienen competencia en aquellos juicios o asuntos que tengan un valor entre 300 y 60 jornales diarios. Los de paz conocen de juicios civiles y comerciales que no superen los 60 jornales diarios. Las Cortes de Apelaciones conocen de las apelaciones contra las sentencias o decisiones de los juzgados de primera instancia. Éstos, por su parte, son competentes para resolver las apelaciones contra las sentencias o decisiones de los juzgados de paz y de la justicia letrada. La Corte Suprema de Justicia en Sala de Casación Civil conoce y decide ―las cuestiones que sean revisables en tercera instancia‖ (artículo 14 de la ley 609/95 que organiza la Corte Suprema de Justicia del 23 de junio de 1995). Entre los juicios más numerosos en esta jurisdicción se encuentran: el juicio ejecutivo comercial que constituye aproximadamente un 22%31 de los juicios que ingresan cada año a esa jurisdicción, la sucesión intestada (13%)32, el juicio ordinario (11%)33 y el divorcio y/o separación (9%)34. Esta jurisdicción, también, es competente para conocer sobre determinados asuntos en materia de constitucionalidad, que, sin embargo, constituyen un pequeño porcentaje de los juicios civiles y comerciales propiamente dichos (aproximadamente el 5% de la totalidad de los juicios35), y además, los juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial actúan como jurisdicción voluntaria en asuntos societarios, ya que todo lo relativo a la constitución de las sociedades, cambios de asamblea, y otros similares, debe ser autorizado por esos juzgados.  El modelo de gestión de los juzgados La forma de trabajar de los juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial en Asunción no es la más adecuada, en efecto, las tareas se solapan, y no están bien asignadas, ni repartidas, ni tampoco reguladas. La estructura de cada juzgado es básicamente la siguiente: a cada juzgado corresponden dos secretarías y un solo juez, quien, a su vez, es la máxima autoridad del juzgado. Cada secretaría está constituida por un secretario o actuario, quien la preside, y tiene a su cargo: un ujier, un 31 Fuente: Mesa de Entrada Civil, año 2005, estadísticas de los juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial. 32 Idem. 33 Idem. 34 Idem. 35 Idem. 47 oficial de secretaría, dactilógrafos y auxiliares, además de ―practicantes‖. El juez, por su parte, puede tener asignado algún dactilógrafo de manera directa para la función de sentenciar. En consecuencia, las competencias de tramitación y resolución de los juicios están repartidas fundamentalmente entre el propio juez y los secretarios, y las responsabilidades de cada funcionario del juzgado son las siguientes: - El juez es el director del proceso y del juzgado, y tiene como función primordial la de tomar decisiones sobre los juicios que ingresan a su juzgado, para lo cual recibe el apoyo de los actuarios o secretarios, así como de dactilógrafos, que lo ayudan a preparar los proyectos de decisión; - El secretario o actuario refrenda las decisiones del juez; controla la tramitación de los juicios y el personal, y da fe pública de los actos del juzgado, - El ujier está encargado de organizar el trabajo de notificación, citación o comunicaciones hacia entes externos a la sede judicial, así como de redactar las comunicaciones y cédulas para practicar dichas citaciones y notificaciones. - El oficial de secretaría se ocupa del archivo, de dar información al público, de entregar a los abogados y partes los expedientes requeridos, para su consulta o revisión, y sobre todo, de recibir los escritos que ingresan a la secretaría. - El personal de apoyo judicial, constituido por auxiliares no abogados y dactilógrafos. Estos últimos sí son abogados o licenciados en derecho. Este personal está dirigido principalmente por el oficial de secretaría y el secretario. - Los practicantes no son funcionarios, pero trabajan en los juzgados: son estudiantes de derecho que colaboran ad honorem en las funciones antes mencionadas. Puede ocurrir que después de unos años se les otorgue un cargo de dactilógrafo. Resulta interesante la asignación de dos servicios de secretaría a un único juez. En efecto, es una forma de dividir claramente las competencias de tramitación de los juicios de las de resolución de conflictos, asignando, en especial, la primera a los secretarios de modo que el juez se dedique, sobre todo, a la segunda. De hecho, la tramitación de los juicios suele ocupar la mayor parte del tiempo del proceso, resultando en la práctica un ―cuello de botella"36 para lograr la resolución expedita de los conflictos. Así, con este modelo se logran ciertas economías y mayor eficiencia, en efecto, se obtiene que el juez dedique más tiempo a su labor esencial que es la de resolver conflictos, y un personal menos caro a la labor de sustanciar el proceso, como es el secretario y el personal, adscrito a la secretaría. Sin embargo, los beneficios de este modo de dividir las competencias en los juzgados y de organizarlos se pueden anular si no existen manuales funcionales aprobados que reglamenten el 36 Quizás la expresión de ―cuello de botella‖ no es la más adecuada porque sin duda que existen etapas en la tramitación de los juicios que son esenciales para permitir la defensa de las partes, pero sucede que el conflicto planteado no se resuelve hasta que ello concluye y muchas veces, las partes utilizan esta etapa más que para lograr presentar de la mejor manera sus alegatos y pruebas frente al juez, para retrasar la solución del caso. 48 funcionamiento operativo de las secretarías y de los juzgados. La ausencia de normas operativas y un modelo de gestión uniforme, obligaría al juez a prestar especial dedicación a la labor de organizar cada secretaría para lograr uniformidad, y así, seguridad jurídica, lo que le restaría tiempo importante para la tarea propiamente jurisdiccional. Asimismo, si no existe un modelo de gestión para el funcionamiento de cada juzgado, el juez deberá ocuparse de los aspectos organizacionales en su condición de máxima autoridad del juzgado. Esto es lo que sucede en la jurisdicción civil y comercial de Asunción, ya que la forma en que está organizada cada secretaría depende de los criterios propios de cada secretario, y así, en un mismo juzgado pudieran haber dos formas de hacer las cosas, si el juez no tiene una importante ingerencia en este aspecto. Esto se agrava porque, tampoco, hay un modelo de gestión estandarizado para el funcionamiento de los diferentes juzgados que se ubican en Asunción, por lo que el juez, en principio, debe dedicar tiempo a la labor de organizar el juzgado. Un ejemplo interesante de esta diversidad de formas de trabajar y de la falta de controles, se encuentra en que el uso del Judisoft no es uniforme en cada uno de los trece juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial de Asunción. De hecho, como demuestra la estadística de la Mesa de Entrada Civil, no hay uniformidad en el uso del SGJ (Judisoft) entre los juzgados: unos lo usan más y otros mucho menos, pero tampoco entre las secretarías de un mismo juzgado. La ausencia de normas adecuadas para el funcionamiento de los juzgados, además, conduce a que las metas y objetivos de cada funcionario no estén completamente definidos, es decir, no estén suficientemente claras las funciones, los cometidos y cuál es la organización más apropiada para que cada persona cumpla con su tarea, ni haya controles suficientes para supervisar la labor del personal. Esta situación tiene consecuencias negativas, sobre todo, en los funcionarios que no son personal clave del juzgado. En efecto, está bastante claro, en términos generales, cuáles son las funciones del juez, del secretario o actuario, del ujier y del oficial de secretaría; pero, no están muy bien definidas las funciones y metas de los dactilógrafos, auxiliares y practicantes. En la práctica, éstos ayudan tanto al secretario como al juez en lo que haga falta, aunque fundamentalmente en labores administrativas como atención del público, suministro de expedientes a éste o registro de casos, y colaboran menos en labores de índole propiamente jurisdiccional. La situación descrita puede ocasionar retrasos por una inadecuada división del trabajo entre el personal existente. Adicionalmente se observa que la condición de los practicantes, como trabajadores ad honorem, sin aparente remuneración en contrapartida a sus servicios, es preocupante, porque puede inducir a prácticas corruptas y poco eficientes. Por una parte, porque no tienen responsabilidad alguna y se considera que le ―hacen un favor‖ a los juzgados al estar allí, y por ello, no se les puede exigir como es debido y evidentemente su única contraprestación puede fácilmente provenir de los abogados. Y por otra parte, porque su presencia puede ocasionar que se diluya la responsabilidad de los funcionarios del juzgado, al ser muy fácil atribuir a los practicantes cualquier conducta o práctica inadecuada, en vista de que no existe control efectivo sobre su trabajo al no ser posible exigirles responsabilidad alguna. 49 Pero lo que hace más grave la ausencia de un modelo de gestión con normas claras de funcionamiento, es que no existan incentivos para ―hacerlo bien‖ o para ser responsables. En efecto, los sueldos son bajos, los ascensos no se basan en los méritos, así como tampoco el otorgamiento de nuevos cargos, sino aparentemente en las relaciones políticas del juez o en su capacidad de insistencia o perseverancia en cuanto a solicitar repetidas veces lo mismo ante la Corte, por lo que resulta determinante, para lograr mayor eficacia y eficiencia en la gestión, implantar un modelo de gestión y reglamentarla para poder crear controles y establecer metas. Por otra parte, existen ciertas funciones jurisdiccionales organizadas en servicio común37 que son las siguientes: - Las de registro de casos y distribución de los juicios, que están asignadas a una oficina: la mesa de entrada civil, que apoya en esta tarea a todos los juzgados civiles y comerciales. - Las de recopilación y organización de las sentencias definitivas, que lo hace la oficina de estadística civil. - Las de ejecución de los juicios, que es competencia de los ―rematadores‖ que son profesionales en libre ejercicio, matriculados ante la Corte que cobran una tasa por su servicio. - Las de embargar y comunicar que corresponden a los ―oficiales de justicia‖, quienes también son profesionales en libre ejercicio, matriculados ante la Corte. En términos generales, los modelos de servicios comunes judiciales son relativamente variados y la diferencia fundamental entre ellos estriba en cuántos de éstos se ponen en común. Entre otros servicios, los agrupamientos más frecuentes abarcan: los servicios de información, registro y reparto; los de notificaciones y comunicaciones; los de archivo general y los de publicación y difusión de las sentencias. En Asunción, existe un servicio común de registro y reparto que es la Mesa de Entrada, sin embargo, se reciben en cada secretaría todos los escritos de los casos en curso y no en la Mesa de Entrada. Si se considera que hay aproximadamente casi 10.000 juicios en trámite en cada juzgado de primera instancia civil de Asunción38, queda claro que, aunque la mesa de entrada reciba los juicios nuevos que son unos 100 al día, cada juzgado de todas formas se encuentre congestionado. También, existe un servicio de notificaciones ―privado‖ y común que es el que prestan los oficiales de justicia. Lo que no está organizado en servicio común es la labor de preparar las cédulas de notificaciones y citaciones, que realiza el ujier de cada secretaría de juzgado. Esta función como hace parte de la labor de tramitación de los juicios no suele organizarse en servicio común, pero el ujier está congestionado, porque debe también atender al público, por lo que es evidente que existe un problema en cuanto a cómo está funcionando este servicio. 37 Es decir, en oficinas centralizadas en que se delegan tareas comunes a los juzgados que son de tipo administrativo: como archivo, información al público o registro de casos. 38 Nos referimos a un número promedio de aquellos que están activos en cada juzgado. Este número incluye los ingresados por año que son unos 1.200 en promedio por juzgado. Fuente: Mesa de entrada Civil, estadísticas de los juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial. 50 La razón de ello es que no existe un servicio común de atención al público encargado de proveer información a las personas que la requieran en momentos y lugares adecuados. Esto no sólo trae consecuencias en el trabajo del ujier, sino también en el del resto del personal del juzgado. De hecho, hay una interrupción continua del trabajo en los juzgados por las constantes irrupciones de abogados que solicitan información. Esto ocasiona que los juzgados no tengan tiempo suficiente para dedicarse a la labor jurisdiccional y de tramitación de los casos durante el horario de trabajo en que también deben atender al público. Por ello, los funcionarios en las entrevistas insistieron en la necesidad de ampliar el horario para que haya horas administrativas dedicadas al trabajo sin la interrupción del público. La solución, no obstante, a este problema, no parece ser necesariamente la indicada por los entrevistados, sino separar de manera clara la función de atención del público de la de tramitación de los casos. Respecto del servicio común de decisiones y sentencias, esto lo lleva adelante la oficina de estadística civil. Llama la atención que una oficina de estadística haga este trabajo, pero lo que es más impactante es la forma en que trabaja. En efecto, por una parte, recibe copias de las sentencias de parte de los juzgados y las recopila, organizándolas en libros, lo que requiere de mucho espacio y tiene un alto costo de papel. Por la otra, esta oficina no cuenta con el presupuesto suficiente para organizarlas en los libros correspondientes por lo que existe retraso. No queda claro por qué no se automatiza esta labor y se ahorran así costos y tiempo. En cuanto al servicio de archivo inactivo común, ocurre que no tiene suficiente espacio para recibir los expedientes y copias de todas las sentencias, lo que hace que los expedientes se acumulen en los juzgados donde tampoco hay espacio. No queda tampoco claro, por qué no se usan nuevas tecnologías en este campo y sistemas de microfilmado para eliminar los documentos más antiguos y así, obtener más espacio. Finalmente, los juzgados tienen importantes carencias en cuanto a insumos, infraestructura física y tecnológica, y recursos humanos. Respecto de los insumos, los entrevistados explicaron que las direcciones administrativas encargadas de ello, no suministran ni de forma suficiente ni oportuna el material de oficina, y muchas veces incluso el que se suministra no se corresponde con las necesidades existentes. Por ejemplo, ha sucedido que la tinta para impresora suministrada no se corresponda con la realmente requerida. Esto obliga a los jueces y a los secretarios a ocuparse de estos asuntos, y esto les resta tiempo para la labor jurisdiccional, y además, puede incentivar prácticas inadecuadas, ya que podría ocurrir que los abogados para obtener un servicio de justicia pronto y adecuado, suministren el material a cambio evidentemente de algo. Tampoco hay mobiliario adecuado para la ubicación y organización de los expedientes, menos aún existe un sistema de archivos para su localización. Un problema adicional en este aspecto es la ausencia de un servicio de fotocopiado en el Palacio de Justicia, así se prestan los expedientes a los abogados para que fuera del palacio y sin sistema de control alguno, hagan las copias que requieran. Esto da lugar al robo de expedientes o por lo menos a su desaparición, que es una práctica relativamente común según los entrevistados. En cuanto a la infraestructura física, el espacio es inadecuado y está organizado de forma poco funcional para las labores jurisdiccionales. En efecto, no sólo es insuficiente, sino que obliga a un contacto importante entre el público y el personal del juzgado, incluso de aquel que debe ocuparse 51 de labores que requieren de cierta concentración. Esto tiene un gran impacto en el funcionamiento del archivo de cada secretaría de juzgado, porque, en el mismo espacio físico se entregan los expedientes, se reciben los escritos de los casos en curso, y se da información sobre el estado del juicio. Esto ocasiona retraso en la búsqueda de los expedientes e incluso su pérdida. En cuanto a la infraestructura tecnológica, se observó que cada juzgado está en red, pero hay pocas computadoras por secretaría, de modo que, a pesar de estar instalado el Judisoft39, no se puede utilizar de la manera adecuada, porque no hay suficientes equipos para generar las actuaciones correspondientes por el sistema. Además, según indicaron los entrevistados, no hay a quien acudir en caso de falla de un equipo, ya que la dirección de informática no presta servicio. De hecho, tampoco hay una política de reposición y actualizaciones de equipos. La consecuencia más grave del uso inadecuado del Judisoft es que hay una ausencia absoluta de una agenda de trabajo propia en cada juzgado y secretaría, en efecto, la repartición del trabajo obedece a la solicitud de las partes. Respecto de esto se observa que, sin duda, en derecho privado rige el principio dispositivo, según el cual el proceso debe ser impulsado por las partes, pero ello no significa que el juez deje de ser el director del proceso y no tenga el control. En este sentido, los sistemas de gestión de casos, como el Judisoft, tienen un rol importante, porque permiten organizar el trabajo del juzgado y hacer que el juez pueda conocer la situación de sus casos sin tener que depender del abogado para hacer su trabajo, y cada funcionario sepa en qué fase está el caso y realizar o llevar a cabo la providencia correspondiente. En el ámbito de los recursos humanos, se observa que la plantilla de los juzgados está desfasada, de hecho, no se ha adecuado a las necesidades de las tecnologías modernas. Ejemplo de esto es el cargo de dactilógrafo, que es desempeñado por un abogado y que además no es evidentemente sólo dactilógrafo40. Otro ejemplo, es la inexistencia de funcionarios especializados para ejercer funciones de organización de archivo en el ámbito de los archivos activos, lo que lleva al desorden actual y a los problemas operativos ya comentados. Tampoco, existe una política clara de ascensos ni de ingresos, lo que promueve un ambiente de desmotivación y conductas no necesariamente acordes a hacerlo mejor, porque no hay recompensa por ello. Es evidente que el modelo de gestión descrito conduce a la ineficiencia e ineficacia de la justicia, porque obliga al juez, que es el funcionario más caro del juzgado, a dedicar buena parte de su tiempo a resolver asuntos de tipo administrativo, lo que le resta tiempo para resolver conflictos, que es su tarea fundamental y que sólo él puede ejercer. Por su parte, el personal del juzgado, en lugar de apoyar al juez en la labor jurisdiccional propiamente dicha, debe ocuparse de un sinfín de asuntos administrativos, como por ejemplo, atender al público y dar información, que afectan la productividad y rendimiento del juzgado. El secretario evidentemente en este modelo organizacional es el más afectado, porque, además de prestar apoyo al juez en su función jurisdiccional, debe dirigir la tramitación de los casos sin tener las herramientas de trabajo necesarias para hacerlo. 39 El Judisoft es una herramienta de apoyo a la labor jurisdiccional que da vida al expediente, por lo que es necesario que todos los funcionarios involucrados en la gestión judicial tengan acceso a un equipo de computación para el uso del sistema. 40 Dactilógrafo es mecanógrafo, http://diccionarios.elmundo.es/diccionarios/cgi/lee_diccionario.html?busca=dactilografo&diccionario=1. 52 Adicionalmente, la ausencia de normas que regulen la actividad de los funcionarios, de incentivos al logro, de controles de gestión, una inadecuada política de recursos humanos y condiciones de trabajo pésimas, son ingredientes suficientes para que haya retrasos y prácticas fraudulentas, que, según los entrevistados, que son usuarios del servicio de justicia, son las características más comunes en Asunción. Se observa que los juzgados letrados en Asunción tienen las mismas características que los de primera instancia, aunque presentan tres particularidades: no tienen Judisoft, no tienen un servicio común de registro y reparto, y sus condiciones de trabajo son peores que las de los de primera instancia, es decir, su infraestructura física y tecnológica es aún más precaria, y tampoco, cuentan con insumos suficientes. Las condiciones de los de paz dependen en buena medida del sitio donde se encuentren, ya que normalmente hay uno por Municipio en Asunción, pero en muchas ocasiones presentan condiciones de trabajo aún peores que los de la justicia letrada, sobre todo, fuera de Asunción. En cambio, los juzgados de primera instancia del interior del país en las circunscripciones en que se ha llevado adelante el proceso de modernización de forma integral, tienen condiciones de trabajo adecuadas, cuentan con un modelo de gestión acorde a lograr una eficiente y eficaz administración de justicia y tienen herramientas de trabajo como por ejemplo, el Judisoft, que permiten tener la información necesaria para conocer dónde están los cuellos de botella en la tramitación de los juicios o en la resolución de los asuntos. El problema en estas circunscripciones modernizadas es que no existe una política de recursos humanos que incentive a una mejor gestión, por ello, aunque haya habido mejoras, hay mucha resistencia al cambio y no se aprovecha la tecnología de la manera adecuada, ni la información que ésta genera, según se explicará mejor en la siguiente sección, lo que también tiene impacto en la eficiencia y eficacia de la justicia.  El Judisoft El Sistema de Gestión Jurisdiccional se desarrolló e implantó en el marco del proyecto de modernización de juzgados, financiado por el Banco Interamericano para el Desarrollo (BID) y administrado por el Programa de Naciones Unidas (PNUD). Actualmente, está implantado aproximadamente en el 45% de los juzgados del país41. En ese porcentaje se incluyen los juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial de Asunción, aunque la implantación del SGJ no ha implicado una modernización integral de la infraestructura física ni de la forma de trabajar. Es evidente que la implantación parcial de un sistema, no trae los mismos beneficios que su implantación integral. Nos referiremos en esta sección, primero, a los beneficios que aporta la implantación de cualquier sistema de gestión de casos que tenga las características del Judisoft sin tomar en cuenta las particularidades de la implantación en Paraguay, y sucesivamente, a la implantación integral o parcial del Judisoft como sistema de gestión jurisdiccional en Paraguay, así como a los problemas y beneficios que se han derivado de ello. 41 Fuente: Corte Suprema de Justicia, Mesa de Entrada Civil, 2006. 53 En términos generales, los beneficios de la implantación de una herramienta como el Judisoft son los siguientes: - La Asignación Automatizada de Casos. En virtud de esta herramienta, los nuevos asuntos o juicios que ingresan en los juzgados, se distribuyen mediante el sistema, de manera automática, equitativa y objetiva entre los jueces. De esta manera, se deja atrás el sistema manual que generalmente es subjetivo, en que la asignación del caso depende de algún juzgado o de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en Asunción (en el resto del país, donde no está implantado el Judisoft, es por fechas), y además, no permite dividir el trabajo de manera equitativa, creando más carga de trabajo para un juez que para otro. - La Automatización del Expediente. Esto implica que todas las actuaciones se deban producir en el sistema: desde el ingreso del caso con la asignación automática del número de expediente, el registro de las partes en litigio, el tipo de juicio y procedimiento, la asignación automatizada; la tramitación del caso a través de la inserción de datos en los formatos de los autos y providencias que ya están en el sistema, hasta la propia elaboración de la sentencia. Esto garantiza un registro organizado y sistemático del juicio, lo que permite dar mayor seguridad a las partes sobre la actuación del juzgado. - El reporte de las actuaciones en el juicio. Esto sin la presencia de un sistema, se suele hacer a mano en libros que tienen los juzgados, lo que toma mucho tiempo y no brinda seguridad jurídica, ya que, por ejemplo, se puede agregar una actuación al libro en una fecha distinta a la real. En cambio, el sistema de gestión genera el reporte de forma automática y no permite este tipo de abuso si se toman las medidas adecuadas, dejando, además, rastro de toda actuación, así como de su fecha. - La Sistematización y Acceso a la Información. Con la automatización del expediente, todo lo que va hacer el juzgado se realiza a través del sistema, es decir, en la medida en que las actuaciones se producen en los juzgados sobre las diversas causas, la información se refleja en el sistema, dándole la posibilidad, a todo ciudadano interesado de acceder a la información de manera rápida y oportuna. Siendo esto así, el interesado tiene diferentes vías y medios para acceder y controlar que sus juicios y asuntos se desenvuelvan de la manera adecuada, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en los juzgados en los cuales no ha sido implantado un sistema de gestión de casos, donde el acceso a la información sólo es posible mediante la visita a cada archivo de cada juzgado y el análisis del expediente físico. - La Estandarización de los Procesos. Por virtud del sistema, los métodos de trabajo tienden a ser iguales en todos los juzgados, porque las providencias y autos que se producen tienden a estar bajo un formato estandarizado y previamente aprobado, y las causas se tramitan según un único criterio, lo que da seguridad jurídica. - La incorporación de Indicadores de Gestión, que permiten conocer el funcionamiento real de los juzgados. En efecto, el sistema contiene toda la información, tanto relativa a los datos que conforman los juicios como en cuanto a su tramitación, por lo que puede generar de forma automática toda clase de reportes, información sobre indicadores, e inclusive, estadísticas. 54 - La Eliminación de tareas manuales como: recoger la información para elaborar estadísticas o reportes de gestión, elaborar la carátula del expediente, asignar el juicio a un juez determinado, colocar el número del expediente. De lo anterior queda claro que los sistemas de gestión jurisdiccional introducen, en términos generales, importantes beneficios porque agilizan la función jurisdiccional al automatizarse tareas manuales; permiten llevar el efectivo control de la gestión judicial, ya que el propio juez puede conocer qué está ocurriendo de una manera sencilla en su juzgado y en cada uno de sus casos, sin tener que recurrir al expediente, y además, otorgan transparencia a la gestión judicial, porque tanto el usuario como el juez pueden obtener una información precisa y oportuna de los juicios. Sin embargo, para el adecuado funcionamiento del sistema, y sobre todo, para obtener los beneficios antes mencionados, es necesario que: - Todo el personal de los juzgados esté interconectado a una red informática. - Exista una reglamentación interna, que estandarice criterios y establezca las reglas y pautas conforme a las cuales debe funcionar el sistema. - Las condiciones de trabajo sean adecuadas y la infraestructura edilicia responda a la forma de trabajar que introduce el sistema. - Haya un equipo de jueces dedicado a adaptarlo a los cambios legales y a nuevos y más modernos procesos operativos. - Se haga una capacitación continua de los funcionarios. - Exista un modelo de gestión que acompañe al sistema. - Haya un equipo técnico que controle el funcionamiento del sistema tanto desde un punto de vista técnico-informático, como jurídico. - Se designe una autoridad que supervise el engranaje de todo lo anterior y tenga una gerencia adecuada. Ahora bien, ¿se cumplieron estas condiciones en Paraguay cuando se implantó el Judisoft? Es evidente que la respuesta en Asunción es negativa, por lo explicado en la sección anterior. En efecto, no hay equipos de computación suficientes, no existe un servicio técnico de apoyo para el uso del SGJ (Judisoft), no hay capacitación continua en su uso, no hay reposición de equipos informáticos, no hay modelo de gestión alguno, las condiciones de trabajo son pésimas. Y lo más importante es que no hay un control sistémico y formal del uso del Judisoft. De hecho, se han asignado a la Mesa de Entrada Civil algunas funciones de control, pero no se le han dotado de los recursos humanos, técnicos y materiales para ejercer dicha función. Menos aún se ha otorgado a esa dependencia la autoridad necesaria para que en caso de falta de uso del sistema o de uso inadecuado, tome las medidas requeridas. Es por ello que el uso del Judisoft no es absoluto en los juzgados de primera instancia civil. Las cifras revelan que todos los juzgados lo usan, y además, en buena medida ya que sólo en un cuatrimestre se generaron por el sistema más de 90.000 actuaciones, habiendo ingresado en ese periodo un poco más de 5.000 casos nuevos. Sin embargo, también indican que no todos lo usan de forma adecuada, porque en algunos aparece un número importante de actuaciones sin contenido y otras sin finalizar. 55 Adicionalmente, de lo que se pudo constatar en las visitas realizadas, algunos juzgados usan el Judisoft como sistema de gestión judicial, pero, otros, que constituyen la mayoría, más bien como un sistema de registro. En el primer caso, se usa como un sistema de gestión jurisdiccional, es decir, como una herramienta que apoya la elaboración de las actuaciones diarias y la tramitación del proceso judicial. Mientras que en el segundo supuesto, se utiliza como un sistema de registro de casos, de manera tal que sólo una vez que se han llevado a cabo las actuaciones, se deja constancia en el sistema de las mismas, por lo que el sistema puede ser percibido por los funcionarios como una tarea adicional a la propiamente jurisdiccional, y no como una herramienta de apoyo para esta labor. A pesar de lo anterior, el Judisoft en Asunción ha traído importantes beneficios: - ha descongestionado el ingreso de más de 10 casos por día de cada uno de los juzgados que ahora ingresan por la Mesa de Entrada Civil, - ha hecho posible la asignación automática, equitativa y aleatoria de los juicios, - ha permitido la reconstrucción del expediente en caso de pérdida, - ha permitido sistematizar datos sobre los juicios como las partes, los abogados, el tipo de juicio, el petitorio, - ha hecho posible conocer el número de casos activos, paralizados, caducados, y sentenciados, lo que permite tomar medidas al respecto. Por ello, aunque la implantación de Judisoft en Asunción no haya sido hecha de la manera más adecuada, eso no significa que el Judisoft no sea una herramienta útil y que no deba continuarse con el proceso de implantación, incluso en Asunción donde ha sido parcial. Esta afirmación se demuestra al analizar los índices de uso del sistema en las circunscripciones judiciales del resto del país en que son mucho mayores, probablemente, porque su implantación se ha hecho de la manera adecuada y no se presentan los problemas de insumos ni infraestructura que existen en Asunción. Además el funcionamiento operativo de los juzgados en esas circunscripciones es más adecuado, ya que existe una distribución y organización de los juzgados y una distribución del espacio físico para hacer más eficiente la labor jurisdiccional, y se ha creado una oficina de apoyo al Judisoft que constituye una importante fortaleza del Poder Judicial, porque permite conocer la gestión de los juzgados. Esta oficina, en efecto, presta apoyo técnico y jurídico continuo en cuanto al uso del Judisoft al personal del Palacio de Justicia, e inclusive, ha diseñado indicadores para determinar: valores de producción, índices de congestión, índices de conciliación, promedios institucionales de producción y duración de los procesos, procedimientos y objetos de causas más frecuentes en desuso y posibles prácticas dilatorias y abusivas del derecho. No obstante, aun en las circunscripciones en que se ha instalado de manera integral y adecuada el Judisoft, hay algunas resistencias al cambio, que deben corregirse porque tienen un gran impacto en el funcionamiento del servicio de justicia. 56 La causa de esta resistencia estriba en que ni la oficina de seguimiento del Judisoft, ni el Consejo de Magistrados, tienen la autoridad para tomar medidas en caso de que se detecten fallas en la gestión. De hecho, esto es competencia de la Corte, y ésta, no necesariamente adopta las medidas adecuadas en caso de fallas y problemas, ni otorga la autoridad a la circunscripción correspondiente para que las tome, y así depende mucho de la personalidad del ministro al que está adscrita la circunscripción, la aplicación de ciertas medidas. Esto no es que sea totalmente negativo, pero las instituciones deben tener diseños organizacionales y estructuras que garanticen un buen funcionamiento, independientemente de las personas que las dirijan. Es evidente que si el uso inadecuado del Judisoft o las fallas de gestión que se detectan a través de él no conllevan a medidas determinadas tanto en cuanto al personal que lo gestiona, como en cuanto al proceso judicial, su uso será siempre parcial y su utilidad muy baja, ya que no se podrá utilizar como una herramienta para la mejora de la gestión jurisdiccional, que constituye el aporte fundamental de este tipo de sistemas. Actualmente, sin duda, el Judisoft mejora la operatividad de los juzgados, pero no hay un control efectivo de su desempeño y de los juicios a través de este sistema. Mientras esto no ocurra la implantación del Judisoft sólo automatizará el funcionamiento de la justicia y la hará en cierta forma más expedita, e incluso más transparente en la medida en que es más accesible la información de los juicios, pero no aportará cambios importantes en cuanto a la gestión judicial y en especial en cuanto al grado de eficacia y eficiencia de los juzgados y de los propios jueces. 2.3. Recomendaciones sobre la Organización y Procesos Judiciales Las recomendaciones se referirán a los juzgados civiles de primera instancia de Asunción. Cuando se refieran a juzgados de otra índole o de otra circunscripción judicial se indicará de forma expresa.  Reorganización de los juzgados La actual forma de trabajar lleva a un mal uso de las economías de escala y alcance 42, lo que tiene efectos sobre los tiempos involucrados en la resolución de las causas, afectando los costos para los agentes que utilizan el sistema judicial. En ese sentido parece importante impulsar la desconcentración o delegación de funciones del juez y del secretario a otros funcionarios con la creación de oficinas centralizadas de apoyo judicial con Coordinadores de �rea de las Oficinas, permitiendo que los jueces tengan mayor tiempo para resolver los casos y sentenciar y los secretarios para tramitar y haya así un mejor uso del personal judicial auxiliar. En efecto, está demostrado que la implantación de los servicios comunes constituye una de las mejoras sustanciales de la organización del sistema judicial, porque permiten que el juez dedique más tiempo a estudiar el problema sometido a su conocimiento, al no tener que llevar directamente los asuntos administrativos del juzgado y al existir un único personal asignado a todos los jueces que hacen estas tareas (Santos Pastor, 2003: 6 y ss). 42 Las economías de escala se producen cuando se duplica el nivel de producción sin duplicar los costos y las de alcance cuando una empresa produce dos productos a un costo menor que si lo hicieran dos (Pindyck, Robert y Rubinfield, Daniel, Microeconomía, Prentice Hall, traducción de Esther Tabasco y Luis Toharía, Madrid, 2001, p. 231 y 235. 57 Según lo que se constató en las visitas a los juzgados, parece importante organizar en servicios comunes en algunas de estas áreas y fortalecer otras que ya están organizadas de esta manera, creando u organizando las siguientes oficinas: - La Oficina de Atención al Público, para dar información a los usuarios de los juzgados que estén en un mismo edificio sobre el curso de los expedientes y las actuaciones realizadas en éstos. - La Mesa de Entrada Civil, de manera que reciba todos los escritos que ingresan a los juzgados de primera instancia civil, no sólo los de los casos nuevos, sino también de aquellos que están en trámite. También debería crearse dentro de esta oficina, una unidad correo interno, que entregara en la secretaría correspondiente, el mismo día de su presentación ante esa oficina, cualquier tipo de escrito o documento recibido. - La Biblioteca, de modo que se transforme también en un Centro de Información Documental y recopile las sentencias de los juzgados en formato electrónico. Así, los abogados podrían solicitar en ese centro la copia de la decisión correspondiente y obtenerla en forma oportuna. Se recomienda que se elimine la práctica de compilarlas en un libro, y que más bien, se dote a este centro de un servidor que se puede manejar desde la Dirección de Informática y Sistemas para almacenar todas las sentencias electrónicamente y de un servicio de copiado e impresión que funcione en ese centro para suministrar de manera oportuna a los abogados el contenido de las decisiones. También, se sugiere que se compilen en un CD cada seis meses las decisiones, para que estén a disposición del público. Sería ideal poder adquirir algún programa para la sistematización de la información documental que permita hacer búsquedas de las sentencias por año, por juez, por materia y que las sentencias estén disponibles por Internet. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, se recomienda que la oficina de estadística se dedique a su labor técnica, cual es la de hacer estadísticas sobre la gestión de los juzgados, lo que puede llevar a cabo de manera sencilla por virtud del Judisoft que contiene la información necesaria aunque es evidente que es necesario capacitar al personal. - La Unidad de Análisis de Gestión Judicial43: se sugiere crear una oficina en la capital que supervise el modelo de gestión de los juzgados y el uso del Judisoft y los apoye en lo que requieran, y que coordine las oficinas de las circunscripciones de modo de proponer a la Corte Suprema de Justicia la formulación de determinadas políticas judiciales para la mejora de la gestión y el uso del SGJ (Judisoft). En cuanto a las secretarías de cada juzgado, se propone que cada una se divida en dos áreas: - La de tramitación, que se ocuparía de la sustanciación de los juicios con especial hincapié en el control de la gestión de los casos, siendo su producto principal las decisiones de trámite y sentencias interlocutorias; 43 Existe una propuesta de la Dirección de Planificación que prevé crear esta oficina. Esta propuesta está bien formulada, así que debería tomarse en cuenta. 58 - La oficina de archivo, donde estarían los expedientes y sería la única área del juzgado y de las secretarías accesible para el público para que éste revise en esta instancia sus expedientes. Respecto a la organización de la oficina del juez se sugiere reforzar su labor de elaborar proyectos de sentencia definitiva, aumentando la plantilla actual y dotando a los juzgados de abogados para hacer proyectos de sentencia. Sería suficiente con un abogado adicional por juzgado. Es importante aclarar que esta nueva organización implica una remodelación de las instalaciones de los juzgados, de modo que lo único visible serían las taquillas del archivo, detrás de las cuales estarían las oficinas de tramitación y decisión no accesibles para el público. Esto tendría la ventaja adicional de permitir la debida concentración del personal del juzgado en su labor de tramitación y decisión. Si se pusieran en marcha las anteriores medidas, los jueces y secretarios podrían verse liberados de las funciones de administración, y serían así, fortalecidas sus funciones de decisión y tramitación, lo cual traería como consecuencia que harían mejor su labor y producirían mayor cantidad de resoluciones. También sería importante ampliar el espacio físico de la Mesa de Entrada para que haya más taquillas y además se le dote de más personal, para recibir los documentos de los casos en trámite, y construir la Oficina de Atención al Público que daría información al público sobre el estado de los juicios en curso. Antes que esta oficina se cree es necesario que el Judisoft sea usado de forma integral por los juzgados y que la información sobre los juicios en curso esté cargada en el sistema. En los juzgados de paz y la justicia letrada, se recomienda antes de comenzar cualquier reorganización judicial, organizar la infraestructura física y tecnológica para luego implantar un nuevo modelo de gestión y trabajo conjuntamente con el Judisoft.  Reingeniería de los procesos Existe una enorme reiteración de documentos y trámites en los procesos judiciales. Esto es por la cultura rígida y formalista que generalmente impone el derecho civil en los sistemas de civil law. Sin duda, que las formalidades son necesarias, pero, si en materia judicial, la mejor práctica es ―aquella que con la menor cantidad de actividades que no agregan valor, se cumple con el mismo fin‖ (Marcet y del Carril 2004), es necesario hacer que la práctica prevaleciente se acerque a ese objetivo. Con ello no se propone necesariamente un cambio legal, aunque sería muy conveniente en la justicia ejecutiva44, sino disminuir la ritualización de los procesos y promover criterios para su simplificación. La propuesta consiste en revisar los procesos operativos, eliminar las prácticas que constituyen formalidades innecesarias, y aclarar las lagunas operativas que existen actualmente en la tramitación de los juicios, que originan retrasos. Adicionalmente, se sugiere detectar las buenas 44 Por ésta entendemos fundamentalmente: los juicios ejecutivos y la ejecución hipotecaria, que si fueran procesos más expeditos, al constituir un número importante de juicios, el grado de eficacia y eficiencia de la justicia paraguaya aumentaría de forma considerable. 59 prácticas en la tramitación de los juicios en los juzgados donde las haya, y promoverlas en los que no las lleven adelante para que todos sean más eficientes. Para lograr estos objetivos se sugiere que la oficina de análisis de la gestión judicial analice con un equipo técnico adecuado los procesos, y luego, la Corte Suprema de Justicia a través de acordadas establezca los criterios necesarios para una mejor gestión. Además, es importante reducir el congestionamiento de los juzgados, es decir, depurarlos, eliminando la existencia de casos pendientes de resolución, en trámite, paralizados o suspendidos. Para lograr esto, se recomienda implantar mecanismos específicos, con la finalidad de reducir la congestión mencionada sin que ello afecte el proceso de decisión de los nuevos juicios que ingresan45. Para ello, se presentan dos posibles opciones no excluyentes: - Crear un servicio común integrado por abogados, al estilo del que se estableció en Venezuela, de apoyo a los jueces. El pool revisaría la carga de trabajo actual, clasificándola para que se tomen decisiones expeditas y comunes para la descongestión. En cuanto se presenten en un juicio desistimientos, caducidades, o excepciones procésales, el caso automáticamente pasa al pool para la elaboración del proyecto de decisión, que estará en un formato preestablecido. - Establecer criterios por parte de la Corte Suprema de Justicia para la descongestión de los juzgados a través de acordadas. No se recomienda acudir a la reingeniería de los procesos ni a la reorganización de los juzgados de paz y la justicia letrada, hasta que se modernice la infraestructura física y tecnológica.  El fortalecimiento del Judisoft Para el adecuado funcionamiento del Judisoft en Asunción, sin duda, es fundamental adecuar la infraestructura física y tecnológica. También es importante que los juzgados cuenten con los insumos necesarios para desempeñar su labor. No tiene sentido que haya computadoras y que no haya papel para imprimir. Sin embargo, una vez que se hayan resueltos estos problemas de índole administrativa, lo más importante en el ámbito jurisdiccional, es dar la capacitación adecuada en cuanto a la nueva forma de trabajar. Debe quedar claro que no se trata de enseñar en pocos días el funcionamiento de una herramienta tecnológica, sino de hacer un cambio cultural. Esto evidentemente, requiere, no sólo de capacitación especial, sino que se cree una oficina de seguimiento y asistencia continua para ello, como se hizo en las circunscripciones judiciales de Guairá o de Amambay. 45 En Venezuela hubo una experiencia interesante a este respecto, en la Corte Suprema de Justicia, cuando estaba en marcha un proyecto de modernización en el año 1998 con el Banco Mundial, que, a pesar de haber sido poco divulgada, recibió un premio por eficiencia del Banco Mundial. Se creó un servicio común de apoyo a las salas, integrado por abogados, al que se llamó ―pool de abogados‖, separado del equipo de decisión y tramitación asignado a cada magistrado, cuya tarea era revisar los casos rezagados o en trámite en las salas y elaborar el proyecto de decisión correspondiente. Cada semana el pool debía presentar a los magistrados un número determinado de proyectos de decisión, los cuales dedicaban un día a la semana exclusivamente para su revisión y firma. Se exigía un número determinado de decisiones aprobadas por semana. 60 Por ello, es fundamental que se capacite no sólo sobre cómo funciona el sistema, sino también que se difunda el modelo de gestión que lo soporta, como se ha hecho en las circunscripciones del interior. También se requiere que la máxima autoridad, la Corte Suprema de Justicia, se comprometa en esta labor, precisamente porque lo que se pretende no es crear una cultura tecnológica en la administración de justicia, sino una nueva cultura de trabajo. De esta manera, es necesario que se haga seguimiento sobre el uso del Judisoft a través de la creación de la oficina de análisis de la gestión judicial y se tomen las medidas adecuadas según los resultados de la gestión judicial y el desempeño de los jueces. Se sugiere que una vez que haya concluido la remodelación que está en curso en el Palacio de Justicia de Asunción, el Programa Umbral dote de los equipos adecuados a los juzgados, haga la capacitación necesaria en el uso del Judisoft e implante como piloto en la capital su programa de transparencia, tomando como base la información que se derive del Judisoft. En las cabeceras de circunscripciones donde hay Judisoft: se recomienda fortalecer la labor de seguimiento de la gestión jurisdiccional a través de su reglamentación por parte de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Este reglamento debe indicar cuál es la autoridad competente para tomar las medidas que sugiera la oficina de seguimiento de la circunscripción y establecer incentivos en caso de que se use adecuadamente el sistema y haya un buen desempeño del juez y del juzgado. 2.4. Obstáculos para la Modernización: los Intereses Creados  El gobierno judicial y la administración del Poder Judicial La Corte Suprema de Justicia es la máxima autoridad en el ámbito administrativo, disciplinario y de gobierno del Poder Judicial. Está integrada por nueve ministros, entre los que se elige un presidente con mandato anual y dos vicepresidentes. Los ministros son nombrados por un periodo de cinco años, renovable hasta dos veces. La función administrativa la ejerce a través del Consejo de la Superintendencia, que está compuesto por tres ministros, de los cuales, uno por ser el Presidente de la Corte, es además Presidente del Consejo. Este Consejo para el ejercicio de sus funciones recibe el apoyo de una Dirección General de Administración, integrada por direcciones generales con competencia técnica según la materia de que se trate. La función disciplinaria la ejerce a través de la Superintendencia General de Justicia. La Corte en Pleno se encarga de la función de gobierno. Asimismo, la selección y nombramiento de los jueces es competencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, quien los nombra sobre la base de una terna que propone el Consejo de la Magistratura. El Consejo de la Magistratura está compuesto por 8 miembros, a saber: un miembro de la Corte Suprema de Justicia; un representante del Poder Ejecutivo; un Senador y un Diputado; dos Abogados nombrados por sus pares en elección directa; un profesor de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional; y un profesor de la Facultad de Derecho representando a la universidades privadas. La máxima autoridad de la institución es el Presidente del Consejo de la Magistratura. 61 Los deberes y atribuciones del Consejo de la Magistratura son: proponer las ternas de candidatos para integrar la Corte Suprema de Justicia, previa selección basada en la idoneidad, con consideración de méritos y aptitudes, y elevarlas a la Cámara de Senadores para que los designe, con acuerdo del Poder Ejecutivo; proponer en ternas a la Corte Suprema de Justicia, con igual criterio de selección y examen, los nombres de candidatos para los cargos de miembros de los tribunales inferiores, los de los jueces y los de los agentes fiscales. La administración de los recursos asignados a las circunscripciones judiciales está a cargo de un Consejo de Magistrados, que está constituido por tres miembros de la Corte de Apelación de una circunscripción determinada que puede tener competencia en esa o más circunscripciones. Este consejo reporta a uno de los ministros de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. El Consejo, a su vez, recibe el apoyo para el ejercicio de sus funciones de un Administrador. Los magistrados ejercen, así, tareas administrativas y jurisdiccionales. Son nombrados por un periodo de cinco años, renovable hasta dos veces. Los jueces también tienen una duración determinada y no existe una carrera judicial clara, ni parámetros objetivos para su evaluación y garantizar su continuidad y crecimiento profesional. El siguiente gráfico presenta de manera sencilla y clara la organización del sistema administrativo y de gobierno del Poder Judicial (Fernando Grafe, 2007, p. 5): Gráfico 1. Organigrama básico del sistema administrativo y de gobierno del Poder Judicial Corte Suprema de Justicia A Gabinete p GOBIERNO o y o Secretaría General Consejo de Superintendencia Superintendencia General de Justicia Dirección General Dirección General Unidad Operativa Dirección de de Auditoría Estadística Civil de Administración y de Contrataciones Recursos Humanos Interna Finanzas Contraloría Estadística Penal Interna Dirección de Planificación y Desarrollo Planificación y Gestión de Gestión de Gestión de control Estadísticas recursos recursos adquisiciones 62  El estado de derecho En Paraguay, desde hace unos años ha habido una importante voluntad de mejora del funcionamiento del Poder Judicial y del estado de derecho. A pesar de ello, los cambios no han sido impactantes, ya que, aunque ha habido ciertos avances institucionales, en cuanto al estado de derecho46 la mejora no ha sido muy significativa. Así, lo demuestra el cuadro que a continuación se copia. Cuadro 1. Governance Indicator Sources Year Percentile Rank Governance Score (0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5) 12 2006 35.1 -0.36 Voice and Accountability 9 2002 32.7 -0.54 6 1998 36.1 -0.45 7 2006 30.3 -0.48 Political Stability 6 2002 16.8 -1.07 4 1998 15.9 -1.01 11 2006 20.4 -0.88 Government Effectiveness 9 2002 10.0 -1.12 4 1998 15.2 -0.97 9 2006 24.4 -0.68 Regulatory Quality 8 2002 32.2 -0.55 5 1998 27.3 -0.50 15 2006 18.1 -0.93 Rule of Law 11 2002 12.4 -1.13 8 1998 15.7 -1.02 12 2006 13.6 -1.02 Control of Corruption 8 2002 5.3 -1.20 6 1998 5.8 -1.29 Fuente: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996- 2006 46 Es el indicador que precisamente se refiere a la administración de justicia ya que mide la independencia del poder judicial, la imprevisibilidad de la justicia, la protección de derechos de la propiedad, la delincuencia como obstáculo para los negocios, el costo y pérdidas asociadas a la delincuencia. 63 Este lento avance hacia la mejora de la justicia se debe probablemente a que existen muchos intereses creados dentro y alrededor del Poder Judicial que no permiten cambios radicales y de fondo como los que deberían de hacerse. Aunque este estudio no se dirigió específicamente a ello, sí se detectaron varios intereses creados en las entrevistas y en la data recogida.  La falta de incentivos y los intereses creados Los intereses creados se fundamentan en que no hay suficientes incentivos para cambiar el status quo de una manera radical. En el campo de la administración de justicia esto se hace evidente, porque, como se explicó a lo largo de este estudio, no existen incentivos para ―hacerlo bien‖ o para ser responsables. Los sueldos son bajos, los ascensos no se basan en los méritos, así como tampoco el otorgamiento de nuevos cargos. Tampoco las reglas de juego están claras, las metas y objetivos de cada funcionario no están establecidos. Un índice de corrupción tan alto ratifica la poca de transparencia e intereses para no cambiar y mejorar. A continuación, enumeramos algunas de las causas de la falta de incentivos para el cambio, así como los intereses creados alrededor del sistema actual que pueden haber obstaculizado la reforma judicial: - Los magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia no tienen mayor estabilidad y por ello, pueden responder a los intereses de quienes los nombraron. Duran cinco años en su cargo, su nombramiento es político y la renovación en el cargo obviamente también depende de factores políticos. Una de las demostraciones de la relación entre la política y el funcionamiento del Poder Judicial es que hace no mucho hubo una división del territorio desde el punto de vista político y administrativo en 17 departamentos y muy rápidamente, el Poder Judicial dividió el territorio a nivel judicial de forma similar. También, llama la atención la repartición de tareas de gobierno y administración por zonas territoriales de forma que de cada circunscripción judicial se ocupa un magistrado según la relación que tenga con esa zona. No cabe duda que hay que lograr en un nuevo proceso de modernización que los magistrados se sientan motivados a mejorar la gestión judicial. - La relación de personal administrativo no judicial por juez es de casi 3 personas, cuando en Chile no llega a 0,4 por juez y aún en Venezuela, que podría ser un ejemplo más cercano al de Paraguay por tener similares indicadores de justicia, es de 1 por juez. Lo que más impacta es que este personal reciba una mejor remuneración que el judicial y que los directores administrativos que los jueces. Esto crea un circulo vicioso por el cual el área administrativa que maneja el presupuesto y, en buena medida, la información relacionada con el gobierno judicial no tenga incentivos para mejorar la gestión judicial, ni para crear mejores condiciones de trabajo porque en ese caso perderían poder y sus condiciones actuales. Sin duda en la actualidad, el área de apoyo administrativo es un interés creado al que hay que prestarle especial atención en el momento de llevar adelante cualquier cambio en lo jurisdiccional. - En Paraguay hay una serie de asuntos que se tramitan ante el Poder Judicial como el registro de una sociedad que son de naturaleza no contenciosa y que no deberían estar en el ámbito judicial. Sin embargo, hay una importante cantidad de gestores que se ocupan de 64 estos asuntos, así como profesionales. Ésta es otra área en que existen importantes intereses creados. - En Paraguay hay 11,8 jueces por cada 100.000 habitantes, mientras que en Chile hay 7,8 y en Venezuela 6,8, y Paraguay, a pesar de tan alto número de jueces, presenta una productividad bajísima. Esto hace pensar que no hay suficientes incentivos para que los jueces sean más eficaces y eficientes y que tampoco existen mecanismos de evaluación del desempeño adecuados. De nuestra investigación no queda claro que esto sea por causa de los jueces, quienes no parecen tener mucho poder, pareciera más bien que los ministros pueden constituir en este sentido un importante interés creado que en vez de usar incentivos para que la gestión judicial mejore, crean mecanismos de represión que no garantizan una mejor gestión judicial pero sí un mayor control sobre los jueces. Una posible demostración de esto es lo que está ocurriendo en la actualidad con el proyecto Umbral que está reforzando a tal punto la Superintendencia General de Justicia sin fortalecer la carrera judicial y la evaluación de desempeño basada en criterios objetivos, que aquella comete abusos, de modo que los jueces se han sentido amedrentados. - Llama la atención que los abogados y las empresas se quejan de que no funciona bien el Poder Judicial, pero no consideran un obstáculo para hacer negocios el mal funcionamiento de los juzgados y tribunales (Ceja, 2004-2005, p. 26). La razón de ello se encuentra probablemente en que las grandes empresas y escritorios jurídicos pueden manejar a su antojo a los jueces y hacer negocios a pesar de las trabas. Sin duda, aquí hay otro interés creado. Esto se demuestra por el alto índice de corrupción y opacidad de Paraguay (Ceja, 2004-2005, p. 26-27). Evidentemente los jueces y funcionarios constituyen también una importante traba para hacer cambios, ya que probablemente ―viven‖ del sistema actual. - Sobre los rematadores y oficiales de justicia hay muchos rumores y anécdotas sobre los negocios que hacen conjuntamente con los jueces al ejecutar o notificar. Éste es otro interés creado para que no haya cambios. - Llama la atención que el Consejo de la Magistratura esté compuesto por 8 miembros de los cuales 4 pertenecen a la sociedad civil y, sin embargo, no parece haber transparencia en cuanto a los criterios de nombramiento de los jueces y magistrados. Sin duda el Consejo de la Magistratura es un grupo de poder importante y en particular los abogados y profesores de derecho que lo integran. Ahora bien, ¿cómo se logra un cambio? el quid del problema está en la institución, el sector privado se adecua a las reglas del juego y busca su máximo beneficio, es un problema de mercado, así si cambian las reglas de juego, el sector privado tenderá a cambiar. Por ello, el cambio debe provenir de la institución, aunque sin duda para que haya esos cambios es necesario que la sociedad civil los reclame. Es necesario por ello que las instituciones se fortalezcan y para lograrlo las reformas judiciales deben ir hacia ese fortalecimiento y probablemente, el apoyo de los organismos multilaterales y agencias de cooperación sea importante para dar poder a las instituciones de la sociedad civil que reclaman esos cambios, así como a las personas que dentro de las instituciones quieran esos cambios47. 47 Esto ocurrió en Venezuela con el proyecto de modernización de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, financiado por el 65 Pero, para lograrlos se debe poner más atención en la formulación del proyecto, tomar en cuenta qué intereses están en juego y qué se debe cambiar para que se establezcan reglas de juego claras y estables, y no mejore sólo la apariencia del Poder Judicial, que es lo que normalmente han logrado los procesos de modernización. Como ya se dijo que en el campo civil y comercial debe hacerse hincapié en crear“fuertes derechos de propiedad, sistemas legales que posibiliten las transacciones y eliminen los altos costos de obtener la información y otras instituciones� (Douglass North, 2004, p. 32). Para ello, es necesario ir a los procesos y analizarlos para ver qué ocurre y cómo se establecen reglas de juego claras y estables. 2.5. Conclusiones A. El informe que se presenta analiza el funcionamiento y la organización de los juzgados civiles y comerciales en Paraguay, y en particular, en Asunción. Hace especial hincapié en los posibles aportes que un sistema de gestión jurisdiccional (case management system), llamado Judisoft (SGJ)48, ha traído a esa jurisdicción. B. Este estudio, financiado por el Banco Mundial, no persigue entrar en el debate nacional sobre el costo-beneficio del proyecto financiado por el Banco Interamericano para el Desarrollo (BID), administrado por el Programa de Naciones Unidas (PNUD), ni tampoco evaluar los proyectos de USAID en curso, entre los cuales resalta el proyecto ―Umbral‖, cuyo objetivo primordial es crear un sistema de evaluación y desempeño de los jueces. C. Se pretende más bien hacer un punto y aparte en ese debate, y analizar la situación actual del servicio de justicia civil y comercial de primera instancia en Asunción, con el propósito de hacer recomendaciones, a la luz de su estado actual, para mejorar su funcionamiento y organización. D. Se analizan, sobre todo, aspectos organizacionales del servicio de justicia que legales. Pareciera, en efecto, que la lentitud e ineficacia de la justicia en Paraguay obedecen fundamentalmente a problemas organizacionales y operativos, ya que los procedimientos legales presentan un nivel de complejidad similar al de otros países latinoamericanos, como por ejemplo Chile, y sin embargo, son inferiores los índices de eficiencia y eficacia. Banco Mundial a partir de 1998. Para conocer los deta lles de cómo la sociedad civil se ―despertó‖ frente a una necesidad de cambio y actuó con la Corte Suprema de Justicia porque empezó a dar muestras de voluntad de cambio real, se puede ver: Louza, Laura, (2007), ―La sociedad civil frente a la justicia‖, Revista Derecho y Democracia, Cuadernos Unimetanos, Universidad Metropolitana, Caracas. 48 El diseño, desarrollo e implantación del Judisoft fue financiado por el Banco Interamericano para el Desarrollo (BID) en el marco de un programa de modernización del Poder Judicial que fue administrado por el Programa de Naciones Unidas (PNUD), 66 E. El diagnóstico realizado por el Banco Mundial en el ámbito jurisdiccional ha arrojado los siguientes resultados: - La forma de trabajar de los juzgados de primera instancia civil y comercial en Asunción no es adecuada, porque las tareas se solapan, y no están bien asignadas, ni repartidas, ni tampoco reguladas. Una de las causas de ello es que hay una importante ausencia de normas sistematizadas, y no existe un modelo de gestión para los juzgados. Las metas y objetivos de cada funcionario no están completamente definidos. No existen incentivos para ―hacerlo bien‖ o para ser responsables. En efecto, los sueldos son bajos, los ascensos no se basan en los méritos, así como tampoco el otorgamiento de nuevos cargos. - Hay una interrupción continua del trabajo en los juzgados por las constantes irrupciones de abogados que solicitan información. Esto ocasiona que los juzgados no tengan tiempo suficiente para dedicarse a la labor jurisdiccional y de tramitación de los casos durante el horario de trabajo en que también deben atender al público. - El servicio de información y recopilación de decisiones y sentencias, no funciona adecuadamente. No queda claro por qué no se automatiza esta labor y se ahorran así costos y tiempo. - En cuanto al servicio de archivo común, ocurre que no tiene suficiente espacio para recibir los expedientes y copias de todas las sentencias, lo que hace que los expedientes se acumulen en los juzgados donde están los expedientes activos donde tampoco hay espacio. No queda tampoco claro, por qué no se usan nuevas tecnologías en este campo y sistemas de microfilmado para eliminar los documentos más antiguos y así, obtener más espacio. - Los juzgados tienen importantes carencias en cuanto a insumos, infraestructura física y tecnológica, y recursos humanos. - La implantación del SGJ (Judisoft) ha sido realizada sin crear las condiciones de trabajo adecuadas. Es decir, no hay suficientes equipos de computación, no existe un servicio técnico de apoyo para el uso del Judisoft, no hay capacitación continua en el uso del sistema, la infraestructura física y mobiliario son pésimos, y lo más grave es que no hay un control sistémico y formal del uso del Judisoft. De hecho, se han asignado a la Mesa de Entrada Civil algunas funciones de control, pero no se le han dotado de los recursos humanos, técnicos y materiales para ejercer dicha función. Menos aún se ha otorgado a esa dependencia la autoridad necesaria para que en caso de falta de uso del sistema o de uso inadecuado, tome las medidas requeridas. La consecuencia fundamental de esta implantación es que el Judisoft no se utiliza como un sistema de gestión jurisdiccional con todos los beneficios que ello acarrearía, sino como un sistema de registro. - En cambio, los juzgados del interior del país en las circunscripciones en que se ha llevado adelante el proceso de modernización de forma integral, a diferencia de Asunción, presentan condiciones de trabajo adecuadas, y usan el Judisoft, de modo de tener la información necesaria para conocer dónde están los cuellos de botella en la tramitación de los juicios o en la resolución de los asuntos. El problema en estas circunscripciones modernizadas es que no existe un modelo organizacional, ni una idea clara de una nueva forma de tabajar, ni tampoco una política de recursos humanos que incentive a una mejor gestión, de esta manera, aunque haya habido mejoras, hay mucha resistencia al cambio y no se aprovecha la tecnología de la manera adecuada, ni la 67 información que ésta genera, lo que también tiene impacto negativo en la eficiencia y eficacia de la justicia. Por ello no hay un control efectivo del desempeño del capital humano jueces y funcionarios, ni de los juicios a través de este sistema. Mientras esto no ocurra la implantación del Judisoft sólo automatizará el funcionamiento de la justicia y la hará en cierta forma más expedita, e incluso más transparente en la medida en que será más accesible la información de los juicios, pero no aportará cambios importantes en cuanto a la gestión judicial y en especial en cuanto al grado de eficacia y eficiencia de los juzgados y de los propios jueces. F. Vista la problemática antes descrita se recomienda en términos generales, llevar adelante el proceso de modernización en Asunción, de la manera integral en que se ha hecho en otras jurisdicciones. Más específicamente, se recomienda lo siguiente: - Impulsar la desconcentración o delegación de funciones del juez y del secretario a otros funcionarios con la creación de oficinas centralizadas de apoyo judicial con Coordinadores de �rea de las Oficinas, permitiendo que los jueces tengan mayor tiempo para resolver los casos y sentenciar y los secretarios para tramitar y haya así un mejor uso del personal judicial auxiliar. - Dividir las secretarías de cada juzgado en dos áreas: la de tramitación y la de archivo. - Reforzar la labor del juez de elaborar proyectos de sentencia definitiva, aumentando la plantilla actual y dotando a los juzgados de abogados para hacer proyectos de sentencia. Sería suficiente con un abogado adicional por juzgado. - Revisar los procesos operativos, eliminar las prácticas que constituyen formalidades innecesarias, y aclarar las lagunas operativas que existen actualmente en la tramitación de los juicios que originan importantes retrasos. - Detectar las buenas prácticas en la tramitación de los juicios en los juzgados donde las haya, y promoverlas en los que no las lleven adelante para que todos sean más eficientes. Para lograr estos objetivos se sugiere que se cree una oficina de análisis de la gestión judicial, la cual examine los procesos con un equipo técnico adecuado, y luego, que la Corte Suprema de Justicia a través de acordadas establezca los criterios necesarios para una mejor gestión. - Crear una política para depurar los juzgados de juicios inactivos. - Adecuar la infraestructura física y tecnológica para el adecuado funcionamiento del Judisoft en Asunción. - Capacitar al personal judicial en el uso del Judisoft y sensibilizarlo en cuanto al cambio organizacional que éste conlleva. - Crear una oficina de seguimiento y asistencia continua para ello, como se hizo en las circunscripciones judiciales de Guairá o de Amambay. G. También, este estudio analiza de manera somera si determinados intereses creados pueden haber dificultado cambios de fondo. Paraguay está mejor a nivel de gobernabilidad que hace diez años pero en relación con el estado de derecho donde el rol del Poder Judicial es fundamental hay poca mejora. Por ello, es necesario que el Poder Judicial se establezca como institución y en ese sentido, que haya reglas de juego claras y estables en la administración de justicia. Para lograrlo se debe poner más atención en la formulación del proyecto, tomar en cuenta qué intereses están en juego, y qué se debe cambiar para que cambien las reglas de juego y no sólo la apariencia del 68 Poder Judicial, que es lo que normalmente logran los procesos de modernización. Como ya se dijo que en el campo civil y comercial debe hacerse hincapié en crear“fuertes de derechos de propiedad, sistemas legales que posibiliten las transacciones y eliminen los altos costos de obtener la información y otras instituciones� (Douglass North, 2004, p. 32). Para ello, es necesario ir a los procesos y analizarlos para ver qué ocurre y cómo se establecen reglas de juego claras y estables. 69 2.6. Referencias Bibliográficas BANCO MUNDIAL (2001); Proyecto de Modernización de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Venezuela, Information Completion Report. BANCO MUNDIAL, (2002); Premnotes Public Sector N° 65. CEJA (2005), Reporte sobre la Justicia en las Américas, 2004-2005. FUNDACIÓN PARA EL DEBIDO PROCESO LEGAL (2007), Las reformas a la Administración de Justicia en Honduras y Bolivia. Razones que han obstaculizado su éxito y como enfrentarlas. GALINDO (2003); El peso externo, calificaciones Internacionales de los Sistemas de Justicia, Ponderaciones Recientes para las Américas, CEJA. GRAFE, Fernando (2007), Poder Judicial de Paraguay, Diagnóstico �rea Administrativa, trabajo no publicado. GREGORIO, Carlos (2007), Diagnóstico de Estadísticas Judiciales en Paraguay, trabajo no publicado. HAMMERGREN, Linn (2002), Independencia Judicial y Rendición de Cuentas: el Balance cambiante en las metas de reforma, Pautas para promover la independencia y la imparcialidad judicial, USAID/IFES, USA. KAUFMANN D, A. KRAAY, and M. MASTRUZZI (2007), Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, www.govindicators.org. LOUZA, LAURA, (2007), La sociedad civil frente a la justicia, Revista Derecho y Democracia, Cuadernos Unimetanos, Universidad Metropolitana, Caracas. MARCET, J. P. y DEL CARRIL, S. (2004); Mejores Prácticas en la Gestión Judicial en La Gestión del Fuero Comercial. Análisis y Propuestas, Foro de Estudios sobre la Administración de Justicia. Buenos Aires. NORTH, Douglass, (2004), Perspectiva N° 5, Instituto de Ciencias Políticas, www.icpcolombia.org/archivos/revista/No%205/10_produzcan_crecimiento.pdf. PASTOR, Santos (2003); Los nuevos sistemas de organización y gestión de la justicia: ¿mito o realidad? Tercera Conferencia sobre Justicia y Desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe: Principales tendencias de la última década y hacia dónde vamos. Banco Interamericano para el Desarrollo. Quito, Ecuador. PINDYCK, Robert Y RUBINFIELD (2001), Daniel, Microeconomía, Prentice Hall, traducción de Esther Tabasco y Luis Toharía, Madrid. 70 VALADES, Diego (2000), Constitución y Democracia, México, UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. 71 2.7. Lista de Entrevistados Se entrevistaron a 34 personas, relacionadas con la administración de justicia, que podemos clasificar de la siguiente forma: Perfil Número Ministro 1 Magistrado o Juez (Primera Instancia o letrado) 9 Juez de Paz 2 Secretario 2 Ujier 1 Oficial de Secretaría 2 Coordinadores 2 Personal auxiliar judicial 5 Directores del área administrativa, Administradores o Jefes 5 Personal de administración 3 Abogados Litigantes 2 Representantes de organismos internacionales 2 Total 34 Las personas entrevistadas fueron las siguientes: 1. Alicia Beatriz Pucheta de Correa, Ministra de la Corte Suprema. 2. Miguel �ngel González Britez, Presidente del Consejo de Administración de Caguazú y San Pedro. 3. Maria Angélica Calvo, Jueza del primer turno de lo Civil y Comercial de Asunción. 4. Enrique Mongalós, Juez del decimosegundo turno de lo Civil y Comercial de Asunción. 5. Ana María O‘Campos, Secretaria del quinto turno del juzgado del tercer turno de lo Civil y Comercial de Asunción. 6. Mirta Escovar Rodriguez, Secretaria del primer turno del juzgado del primer turno de lo Civil y Comercial de Asunción. 7. Oficiales de secretaría de Asunción (2 personas). 8. Claudia Fiore, Ujier del juzgado del primer turno de lo Civil y Comercial de Asunción. 9. Dactilógrafos del juzgado del primer turno de lo Civil y Comercial de Asunción (2 personas). 10. German Recalde D‘Andrea, Dactilógrafo de la secretaría del quinto turno del juzgado del tercer turno de lo Civil y Comercial de Asunción. 11. Juezas letradas de La Asunción (6 juezas). 12. Marta Marlene Machuca, Coordinadora de Mesa de entrada Jurisdiccional Civil en Asunción. 13. Oswaldo Vera Ramírez, Sub-coordinador de Mesa de entrada Jurisdiccional Civil en Asunción. 14. Francia Sian, Coordinadora de la Unidad de Seguimiento del Judisoft en Coronel Oviedo. 15. Lourdes Sanabria, Presidenta de Jueces de paz. 72 16. Leticia Frachi, Jueza de Paz en Recoletas, Asunción. 17. Director General de Administración. 18. Lina Matto, Directora de Planificación. 19. Julia Centurión de Morales, Directora de Informática y Sistemas. 20. Jefa de la Oficina de Estadísticas Civil en Asunción. 21. Administrador del Consejo de Administración de Caguazú y San Pedro. 22. Personal del proyecto BID-PNUD, adscrito a la Dirección de Planificación y Desarrollo (3 personas). 23. José Ignacio Santiviago, Abogado litigante. 24. Gustavo Olmedo, Abogado litigante. 25. Personal de USAID adscrito al Proyecto Umbral (2 personas). 73 3. Vested Interests in Legal and Judicial Reform Projects in Guyana 3.1. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to determine what recent changes have occurred within the legal and judicial system in Guyana. These include Alternate Dispute Resolution, Revision of the Rules of the High Court, the establishment of a specialized court and a number of other legal and judicial reform (LJR) projects. However, it must be recognized that these projects are inextricably linked to and have a direct impact on a wide set of interests in the Guyanese society such as the private sector, civil society organizations, professional bodies, trade unions, advocacy groups, donors and individuals who champion a particular cause. Therefore, these vested interests can and often do intercede in the reform process. In this regard, the extent to which legal and judicial reform has influenced or has been affected by the interests of various sectors and groups will also be examined. The justice sector is generally understood to comprise state institutions directly involved with the oversight, procurement and delivery of justice-related services. These services extend from the investigation and prosecution of alleged criminal acts to the resolution of disputes between individuals or agencies. It would be agreed that promoting the rule of law is fundamental to the development of good governance, an important measure of which is the effective functioning of the justice system. ―The central characteristics of a justice system that is able to perform its functions effectively are fairness and impartiality, sound decisions, accessibility, efficiency, independence, accountability, and credibility.‖49 The justice system in Guyana faces challenges in virtually all of these areas. 3.2. Challenges - Background to Reforms An overview of Guyana‘s justice system reveals serious deficiencies in the provision of services to the public. Some of these challenges are discussed below. 3.2.1 Delayed access to justice A common symptom of deficiencies in the delivery of justice is a large case backlog and indeed this is one of the key issues facing the High Court. There are currently around 12, 000 cases pending in the High Courts of Guyana and the backlog is constantly 49 Assessment of IDB Experience in Justice Reform: Recommendations for Policy Formulation, Christina Biebesheimer, J Mark Payne. Nov. 2001 74 increasing. Approximately one hundred criminal cases are listed for each quarterly session of the High Court, but generally only about 16 are disposed of. Magistrates Courts handle about 90% of all litigation in Guyana. The key institutional issue facing the Magistrate Courts is trying to manage the current backlog of cases. The backlog of criminal cases, preliminary inquires and civil cases is large and growing. Each year the Magistrate Courts determine fewer cases than are filed (see Table 1 below). Table 1 Case Backlog for Selected Years Criminal cases Preliminary Inquires Civil cases No. of No. of cases Cases Cases criminal determined Indictable Preliminary filed determined cases filed offences inquires 1998 70,959 35,832 filed heard 1998 3,334 1,107 1999 37,148 33,598 1998 4,006 1,293 1999 3,275 2,227 2004 29,029 27,930 1999 3,876 1,212 2004 2,297 2,569 2004 3,367 195 Source: Guyana Justice Sector Reform Strategy 2006-2010 At the end of 2005, there were 20, 468 criminal cases pending in the Magistrates Courts. It is also important to note that Magistrates take handwritten notes and reportedly the typing up of a deposition for submission to the High Court can take as long as 2 years. Another indicator of delayed access to justice is a recent survey of Guyanese manufacturing firms, which showed that 43% of those who had used the courts over the last two (2) years identified the legal system and conflict resolution in Guyana as a major obstacle to their business operations.50 It currently takes 525 days to resolve a payment dispute in Guyana, much longer than in other Caribbean countries with similar common– law legal systems, and the direct cost of the process is equivalent to almost ¼ of the value of the debt.51 Table 2 below reflects this problem in an international comparative context. 50 Guyana Investment Climate Assessment , World Bank, 2006. 51 Doing Business database, World Bank. 75 Table 2 Enforcing a contract in Guyana – international benchmarking52 Region or Time (days) Cost (% of debt) Economy Tunisia 27 12.0 Netherlands 48 17.0 United States 250 7.5 El Salvador 275 12.5 Paraguay 285 30.4 United Kingdom 288 17.2 Chile 305 10.4 Canada 346 12.0 Guyana 525 24.4 Uruguay 620 25.8 Guatemala 1,459 14.5 If Guyana‘s formal private sector is to grow, it must be backed up by a well -functioning justice system – particularly a civil justice system that can efficiently and effectively enforce contracts and enable debts to be recovered. 3.2.2 Inefficiencies in Justice Sector affecting Economic Growth Deficiencies in the justice sector are having an impact on Guyana‘s economic development. Guyana is currently facing declining private investment and weak economic performance. Growth stagnated during the period 1998-2003 to an average of 0.5% and private investment declined from over 13% in 1998 to under 5% in 2003. It is important to understand that the problems in the justice system have a direct impact on investment levels, with representatives of the private sector citing both the recent increase in rate of crime and the inefficient justice system as key constraints. 52 Source: Doing Business, 2006 http://rru.worldbank.org. The database is derived from surveys of 130 economies. The indicators are constructed on a hypothetical case of a payment dispute of more than 50% of income per capita in the countries‘ most populous city. The original methodology and data come from ―Courts‖ by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez -de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. 76 3.2.3 Outdated Rules of the Court Outdated rules of procedure are contributing to significant delays in the court system in Guyana. The present system is lawyer–driven, so an attorney can repeatedly ask for extensions of time for case preparation. 3.2.4 Lack of Accountability on the part of Judicial Officers In Guyana‘s justice sector, there is the issue of judges not writing their decisions in a reasonable time. For example, at the end of 2005, there were a total of 346 civil appeals to be heard. Of that number, only 61 were completed. Of the remaining 285, 230 cases could not be listed for hearing because the Court of Appeal was awaiting the written decisions of High Court judges.53 Secondly, magistrates are not working for the length of time expected particularly in the hinterland districts such as sub-registries in Berbice, Essequibo, etc). According to the Strategy Report54, ―Magistrates sit for a morning session only thereby reducing the number of cases that can be dealt with in any given day‖. The Registrar of the Supreme Court further explained during our interview that cases which should be completed, they are disposing of as ―sine die‖. Thirdly, there are several instances where magistrates are not completing preliminary enquiries. The listing procedure means that preliminary enquires are not conducted on subsequent days if they cannot be completed in one day, therefore preliminary enquiries may take many hearings. 3.2.5 Deficiencies in Human Resources All institutions in the justice sector face serious challenges in recruiting, motivating and retaining a high calibre of staff at all levels. For example, the Magistracy is 50% understaffed. ―What I do is internal juggling‖, declared the Registrar of the Supreme Court. ―When I look at the number of cases to be heard and I see that a specific district needs more staff, I will take from one Unit and send to another. I do that constantly. That is the only way I know how to manage‖, she stated. Secondly, salaries are not attractive enough to encourage quality lawyers to give up private practice and come into the public service. A magistrate‘s take-home pay is about $1,000 US per month. There is a trend whereby lawyers might take an appointment as a Magistrate just to get enough experience in order to enhance their resume and then move on and take a job elsewhere in the Caribbean where they would be better paid and receive benefits. With an average salary of $1,800 per month, judges are also poorly paid and their allowances are negligible. For example, a judge‘s entertainment allowance is the equivalent to $10US per month and the housing allowances is $25, 000Guy (approximately $125.00US per month). During our interview, the Registrar of the 53 See ―Annual Report for the Year 2005 Supreme Court Registry‖ prepared by Sita Ramlal, Registrar of the Supreme Court, July 2006. 54 Guyana Justice Sector Reform Strategy 2006-2010 77 Supreme Court did not hesitate to say that the quality of judges is reflective of the monies paid. ―So how does this affect the delivery of justice, I asked. ― Well if you don‘t have quality judges, it means that their decisions are always going to be questioned. And that‘s what happens here. I just explained that when you look at the number of matters that are at the Court of Appeal, you will see that a whole set cannot be listed for hearing because the judges have not written their decisions,‖ she stated. When asked why High Court judges were not writing decisions, she reiterated, ―because there is no system of accountability. Years ago there was, but that system has fallen into disuse.‖ However, Justice Roxanne George countered that by stating that while there is indeed a major problem with judges not writing decisions in a timely manner, one of the challenges is that judges don‘t have any legal assistance. ―There is no provision for it. That means that they have to do all their research themselves. There is provision for a clerk for the Chancellor (of the Judiciary) and a Clerk for the Chief Justice but judges have no legal assistants assigned to them. One of the reasons why judges give so many adjournments is in order to slow the process down, so that they can pace themselves a bit more,‖ she contended. These views were fully endorsed by the representatives of the Guyana‘s Association of Women Lawyers (GAWL)55 who stated during our meeting that ―if we are going to place the blame squarely at the feet of the judges we have to recognize that they lack supports in terms of their ability to deliver. They have no research assistance and until very recently, very limited literary resources. They have to find their own Internet services and have very limited assistance in terms of typing.‖ In other Caribbean territories, judges have an assistant who in some cases is an attorney but there is no such concept in Guyana. There is also a shortage of judges. Guyana currently has approximately 1.7 judges per 100,000 of the population. ―The number of judges that the law has made provision for is just too limited‖, said one judge. There are 10 judges plus the Chief Justice but his work is mainly administrative. The vastness of the country also poses a challenge in the assignment of judges. At any one time three (3) judges have to be out of town in the sub- registries. That leaves seven (7) in Georgetown-the capital of Guyana. One is assigned to the commercial court; one is assigned to the Bail Court (which adjudicates matters related to money judgements, possession of property and mortgage debts); and one is assigned to the Chamber court. Of the four (4) judges that remain, 2 are assigned to civil work and 2 to criminal work. ―We are a very litigatious society. We need a greater complement of judges ….even 3 more judges,‖ suggested a GAWL member. 55 The Guyana Association of Women Lawyers (GAWL) was formed to give a voice to female attorneys in that country. When the GAWL was formed, most of the state attorneys were women and state attorneys cannot be full members of the Guyana Bar Association. There was also need for an interest group to speak to issues affecting women and their d ependants. ―We do a lot of outreach work in the far -flung regions (interior of Guyana) where we educate women about their rights,‖ said a senior member of the group. The Association has also published a number of booklets designed to raise awareness about a number of legal and social issues and about new pieces of legislation. It is noteworthy that Legal Aid was started by the GAWL. 78 Another challenge is the high turnover of staff in the justice sector. Indians by and large do not stay in the public service. They will not work for a public servant‘s salary for any length of time because it is less than what they would get if they go into business. ―When I hire them, they work here for (about) 3 months, they learn the system, and then the lawyers pick them up and the banks pick them up and double their pay,‖ explained the Registrar of the Supreme Court. ―Young blacks are not working/(remaining) in the public sector either, (many of them) are migrating‖. A similar view was expressed by the Head of the Private Sector Commission. ―We are losing a lot of our skilled people and with the introduction of the common market under the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) in January 2008, we are going to have a greater problem. If you don‘t have skilled labour, you can‘t maintain your productive capacity,‖ he stated. According to him eighty-three percent (83%) of graduates from the University of Guyana leave to go overseas. ―Guyana is in a difficult position. If the World Bank wants to see CSME take place and Guyana takes its place in the world economy, then all countries in the region should be on par. You could therefore see the reasons for Guyana‘s reluctance so far with respect to CSME. Guyana is educating people for foreign employment and we the taxpayers are paying for that,‖ he explained. With respect to the judicial system, the Registrar of the Supreme Court concluded ―So when I recruit, those who stay are the ones who can go no place and who are very mediocre and when you have that, you have a problem with corruption.‖ 3.2.6 Corruption During my interview with the Chief Justice, who is also Acting Chancellor of the Judiciary of Guyana, I said that corruption is a phenomenon that officials don‘t wish to admit exists within their organization, they don‘t even like to mention the word ―corruption‖. He however replied ―I am not afraid to say it, corruption has been happening. Papers get lost, pages are torn out due to corruption‖. Who tears them out, I asked ― Clerks…for an inducement, that happens. Clerks would tamper with and destroy records. Files have disappeared,‖ explained the Chief Justice. This allegation/admission of corruption in the justice department was confirmed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court. ―They come in and learn the system very quickly and they get involved in the disappearance of files, in changing court orders, and the (unauthorized) provision of copies of documents. ―So people from outside will pay your staff to do this?‖ I asked ―Yes, including the banks. Some are on retainer with the banks‖, she explained. 3.3. Legal and Judicial Reform Projects 3.3.1 Alternate Dispute Resolution - Addressing the Problem of Case Backlog 79 A mediation programme at the level of the High Court was introduced in 2004 as one of the ways to address the problem of delays in the court system in Guyana. However under the existing rules of procedure, this mediation pilot program is voluntary, mediators are not paid and there is the problem of attorney resistance to mediation. According to the Chief Justice of Guyana, in late 2006 a program was held to sensitize members of the Bar about the benefits and practicality of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) and it was poorly attended. Another troubling feature with respect to mediation is that there is an inordinate delay between resolution by the parties at mediation and getting a court date so that the terms of settlement can be made an order of the court. ―My experience is that you have a waiting period of about 8 months between settlement at mediation and appearing before the judge‖, said one attorney who is a member of the Guyana‘s Association of Women Lawyers (GAWL). Two interest groups, Red Thread - a women‘s organization which advocates for the rights and interests of women and children- and the GAWL have both indicated there are also other problems associated with the mediation program. ―ADR is a pilot program that is piloting without a pilot,‖ said one GAWL lawyer facetiously. She further explained that there is a need for more trained mediators, as many have moved on and those who have remained have become overwhelmed. More support staff and a basic telecommunication facility i.e. a telephone is needed for the mediation center. ―Mediation is a one–man show. He is the coordinator, clerk, court manager and his own office assistant‖, said a senior representative of Red Thread. ―Also I don‘t think lawyers are taking mediation seriously, especially the more seasoned lawyers‖, she stated thereby endorsing the Chief Justice‘s position. 3.3.2 Rules Revision- Addressing the Problem of Outdated Rules of the Court The Rules of the High Court in Guyana are in the process of being revised. United Kingdom‘s Department for International Development (DFID) funded a study to review the rules for the administration of the courts of justice. The Rules Committee, which is headed by the Chief Justice, has prepared a draft of the new Rules which was circulated to the main group which would have a vested interest in this reform – namely the Bar Association. The members of the Bar have come up with views, suggestions and criticisms which the Chief Justice explained will result in a comprehensive revision of the new rules which were drafted. ―Our Rules Committee is going to meet shortly to begin the revision so we can take on board the comments that the Bar (Association) made. This is a major undertaking because we will go back to the Bar with what we consider to be the end product,‖ stated the Chief Justice. USAID has a 3-year program of assistance with the legal and judicial department in Guyana and has undertaken to facilitate the revision of the High Court Rules. Asked during the interview what are some of the rules that are being revised, the Chief Justice cited the following examples. Mediation is going to be made mandatory. Secondly, access to justice will be simplified. At present, the procedure of applying to the 80 High Court is cumbersome. The method of approach to the court is going to be completely revolutionized. To bring an issue before the court in the future, all applicants will simply do is complete a claim form as opposed to using various procedural forms such as generally endorsed writs, specially endorsed writs, petitions, etc. A similar approach obtains in the UK, OECS, Jamaica and Trinidad. Thirdly, under the new rules, if an attorney does not file certain papers by a certain time, the matter will get knocked out of the system. At present, under the old rules, attorneys can prolong a matter in the preliminary stages for a very long time thus contributing to problem of case backlog. 3.3.3 Introduction of a Specialized Court – Addressing the Legal Needs of the Private Sector Another recent development in Guyana‘s legal and judicial landscape is the establishment of a commercial court in June 2006. This court handles litigation related to banks, insurance companies, ship registries, admiralty matters and contracts of all types. Before such matters were handled by the Bail Court which, despite its name, is in no way related to bail in the usual sense of the word. It essentially functions as a petty civil court but now a huge chunk of the workload of that court had been transferred to the jurisdiction of the new Commercial Court. The Inter-American Development also contributed to the establishment of this Court through technical co-operation (ATN/SF-8432-GY) which was approved in September 2003.56 The rationale for establishing the Commercial Court was to speed up proceedings related to commercial claims. The business community had been complaining about the length of time it took for the completion of these types of litigation. Secondly, the private sector was also able to successfully convince the authorities that in order to improve the investment climate in Guyana, a court to hear commercial claims exclusively should be introduced. ―If someone reneges on a contract, how quickly can I get the matter resolved? This is one of the first questions that investors ask. So they need to know that we have this court and that it functions efficiently and effectively‖, explained the Chief Justice. Although the court‘s jurisdiction is limited to commercial matters, it handles a wide range of litigation – contracts of all types. An interview with the head of the Private Sector Commission revealed that the business community is pleased with the introduction of the Commercial Court. It should also be noted that there was wide consultation during the planning stages. A Steering Committee made up of representatives of the commercial community, the Bar Association, the Consumers Association was set up to guide the introduction of the court. A broad cross- section of persons was consulted and apprised along the way up to the point of implementation. The Chief Justice further indicated that a Jamaican firm is currently evaluating the Commercial Court, however, a group of local attorneys, the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers, has already given the following assessment of this 56 To date, 73% of approved TC funds of $500,000 has been disbursed. 81 court. ―The Commercial Court is very effective…it is a very meaningful reform. You feel very good going there and practicing, and a lot of cases are being settled in this new Court,‖ the group stated. 3.3.4 Case Management Reform – Addressing the Problems associated with the Manual Management of Case Records A number of Information Technology (IT) developments are taking place in Guyana in an attempt to make the system of recording evidence and case management more efficient and to reduce corruption. Under this USAID funded program, all judges were provided with laptops and printers and it is hoped that the government of Guyana will pay for them to have Internet access. The intention is to provide them with electronic case reporting databases such as Lexus Nexus. Secondly, judges and magistrates are still taking evidence verbatim by long hand. A witness that should take 1 hour to give evidence, will take 2 ½ hours. In order to eventually dispense with manually recorded ledgers, computers will be introduced in the courts. Thirdly, the introduction of case management reform is one measure being adopted to deal with the challenge of corruption. Case management software is being introduced into the record system in the Registry. Before the system was manual, burdensome and easily facilitated the corrupt practices of some Registry staff. Papers got lost, pages got torn out of records and files have disappeared. The introduction of the case management software will correct all this, explained the Chief Justice, because the data entry clerk will only have access to electronic files for the purpose of inputting data but would not be able to delete anything. ―Most people will have ‗read-only‘ access. The Registrar and I will have unlimited access to the electronic files but no one else unless authorized. This measure should completely eliminate these irregularities,‖ stated the Chief Justice. 3.4. Specific Legislative Reforms 3.4.1 The Amerindian Act of 2006 - A case of Vested Interests Ignored The headline in the Press that ―Parliament approves Amerindian Bill‖ was met with resentment by the indigenous people of Guyana. The Amerindian Bill, which was passed into law in the National Assembly on February 16, 2006, is a classic example of vested interests being ignored in the reform process. While the Minister of Amerindian Affairs informed the House that the legislation saw wide consultations with members of the Amerindian communities; according to the Amerindian Peoples‘ Association, ―indigenous peoples of Guyana consider the Bill…to be discriminatory and unacceptable because it fails to reflect their recommendations submitted in 2005.‖ The Minister of Amerindian Affairs, who tabled the report of the Special Select Committee which was established to fine-tune the Bill, said ―during November last year, the Special Select Committee met on 11 occasions, receiving written and oral submissions from 32 individuals and organizations‖. But herein lies the bone of contention. While there were 82 indeed consultations, the Amerindian community is furious that their views and proposals were, for the most part, not taken on board. A February 15th 2006 Press Release of the Joint Indigenous Peoples NGOs states: ―We are most disappointed to find that after reading the report of the Special Select Committee of the National Assembly that the Bill will be presented to the National Assembly in virtually the same form as when it was first tabled in August of 2005. We are as a consequence led to the grim conclusion that the Public Hearings of the Select Committee amounted to nothing more than a farce. ―We have repeatedly stated that the Bill‘s treatment of lands, territories and resources contravenes international law and undermines Indigenous Peoples‘ integrity. This is evident from the fact that the Bill does not adequately clarify and guarantee indigenous peoples or their communities‘ rights to own and control their traditional lands, territories and resources and does little to alleviate the legal insecurity our peoples have experienced in this respect for generations. Moreover, the procedures in the Bill for resolving land issues are arbitrary and unfair. In this regard, the Bill fails to recognize and specify any rights that could form the basis for delimitation, demarcation and titling of indigenous peoples‘ lands, territories and resources. All that is provided for is a procedure for applying for title or extension of title that results in a decision determined solely and arbitrarily by the Minister of Amerindian Affairs (sections 59-64). ―We strongly reject the provisions in the Bill that vests arbitrary and overly broad powers in the Minister and which permit substantial interference in the democratic functioning of indigenous governmental entities. Such conditions do not apply to non-indigenous local government bodies. In this respect, it should also be noted that the Bill imposes term limits (two terms) on elected indigenous leaders, where such limits do not apply to any other elected official in Guyana [sec. 71(2) (b)]. ―Discrimination against indigenous peoples remains entrenched and manifest in the draft, and our rights to lands, territories, and resources and to self- determination are neither adequately recognised nor protected. Discrimination against indigenous peoples even extends to the State‘s refusal to accede to indigenous peoples‘ desire to be referred to as such in the law – as they are in the Constitution – rather than as Amerindians, a term that we do not believe is appropriate. We are unaware of any other racial or ethnic group in Guyana that is forced by the State to be called by a name that it has vociferously rejected. ―The Amerindian Peoples Association of Guyana (APA), the Amerindian Action Movement of Guyana (TAAMOG) and the Guyanese Organization of Indigenous Peoples (GOIP) are recommending to the National Assembly that the imminent passage of the Amerindian Bill 2005 (Bill No. 13 of 2005) in its present form will result in racially discriminatory legislation that violates the rights of the Indigenous Peoples of Guyana. We strongly urge the members of the National Assembly to heed the call of the majority of the Indigenous peoples of Guyana and their organizations to amend the Bill to adequately protect the rights of the Indigenous Peoples before it is passed into law.‖ 83 The very next day after the above Press Release was issued, the Amerindian Bill was passed into law on February 16th 2006. On March 14, 2006 President Bharrat Jagdeo gave assent to the Bill saying that ―the Amerindian Bill was passed in the National Assembly earlier this year after thorough consultations. The new Amerindian Act is comprehensive and protects the rights of Amerindians. I urge you to read the Act yourself and not listen to hear say.‖ The Minister of Amerindian Affairs, Carolyn Rodrigues, noted that ―as Amerindians we should all be proud of the new Act and the rights it gives us.‖ Meanwhile, the Amerindian people of Guyana are wholly dissatisfied since they believe that many of the provisions in the legislation represent a retrograde step for the indigenous population. The Amerindian Act of 2006 is a classic example of legislation being prepared ―for‖ and not ―by‖ the people who have a vested interest and who have to ―live the legislation‖. 3.4.2 The “Children’s Bill� A legal reform that has remained in the wings for a very long time in Guyana is a piece of draft legislation commonly referred to as the Children‘s Bill. According to one High Court Judge, the Children‘s Bill is NGO-driven to the extent that the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers (GAWL) is drafting it and UNICEF is funding and supporting it. There was a decision to have 5 different Acts rather than one thick piece of legislation. There are a total of five (5) Bills. 1. The Adoption of Children (Amendment) Bill; 2. The Custody, Guardianship and Maintenance (Amendment) Bill. 3. The Child Care and Development Services (Amendment) Bill. 4. Protection of Children Bill 5. Status of Children Bill Some are amendments to legislation that already exists, but 2 Bills are new. According to the recently-appointed Minister of Human Services and Social Security, who has lead responsibility for children‘s affairs, ―the Children‘s Bill has been on the cards at least for 7 years‖, a statement that was endorsed by High Court judge Madame Roxanne George who indicated that ―the original draft legislation actually goes back to 1997/1998.‖ The Minister explained that ―the problem encountered by the Bill is that is was done ‗back to front.‘ Instead of determining what was needed and then put pen-to- paper and draft, people sat down and drafted. So you had all these people reading the draft and saying ‗but you don‘t have this, you don‘t have that‘… and that is why we are stuck in this process of trying to put in things and take out things.‖ Asked during my interview with the Minister whether the various organizations that deal with children were consulted in the process, she indicated ― Oh yes, they were. Last year I myself did what was called final consultations.‖ She mentioned that the Guyana Human Rights Association, GAWL, Red Tread-an advocacy group, Help and Shelter, Legal Aid, Guyana United Women for Special Children, all the political parties and other individuals 84 who have expressed an interest in work with children were all consulted. ―There have been consultations regarding the Children‘s Bill for some 5 or 6 years. So at some stage you will have to stop and say that‘s it but I believe the process started wrong in the first place, you don‘t just sit down and start drafting a Bill without first determining what is policy and what you want in the Bill,‖ the Minister added. GAWL members however indicated that while the Bill was indeed languishing in the wings for a long time, there were decisions taken before their involvement in 2004 that produced those delays. ―What had initially been decided from way back was that amendments would just be done to the Infancy Act and the Adoption Act but then it was found that it would not be adequate. So what the person who was mandated to draft those amendments decided to do was to prepare a Bill that would deal with children‘s issues in a holistic manner. Then the GAWL was invited to take that first draft and bring it to the point where it could be taken to National Assembly. At this point, the final Bills are being sent into the Ministry –three (3) have been put forward already‖, a GAWL spokesperson explained. 3.4.3 Sexual Offences Legislation Guyana‘s Ministry of Human Services is in the process of drafting a White Paper to inform the Sexual Offences legislation. During our interview, the Minister explained that the GAWL had submitted to the Ministry a draft for the Sexual Offences Bill but it is still not clear who commissioned that draft or why. Moreover, there was much furore about what they had or did not have in the Bill. ―You sit down and draft a Bill with out determining what you want or what people want. This is one organization determining what should be in the Bill but they can‘t be the only people who get to decide what should be in the Bill and then we consult around it. That to me is very limited. So what the Ministry has done, with the help of UNICEF, is hired a consultant to draft a White Paper discussing all the things we could possibly discuss for the Sexual Offences Act. Then we will consult around that White Paper and depending on what comes out of the consultation, that is what we will put in the draft legislation,‖ the Minister stated. In 2004, an amendment to the Criminal Law Offences Act of 1893 raising the age of consent from 12 to 16 years of age was introduced. During our interview, Madame Justice Roxanne George mentioned that there was some resistance by the Muslim community. Members wrote letters in the Press stating that the amendment was contrary to the interpretation of their faith. They argued that puberty started at the age of 12 and that their females should be allowed to get married at that age. They were not in agreement with the age being raised to 16 years of age. However the Minister of Human Services and Social Security insisted that when the age of consent was raised there was wide consultation – religious bodies (Bahai, Christians, etc); the Guyana Human Rights Association, the GAWL, the Guyana Bar Association. ―There was consultation across the board and we determined as a country that the age of consent should move from 12 to 16…and that was done last year,‖ Minister Manickchand explained. 85 3.4.4 Disability Legislation A ―Persons With Disabilities‖ Bill is in the final stages of being drafted. Comments have been received from the private sector, various Ministries, and the National Commission on Disabilities and are being considered in the drafting process. A senior official with the advocacy group ―Red Thread‖ said that up to this point very little consideration was given to the needs of persons with disabilities such as the need for physical access. She gave the following example. One of the women that Red Thread works with is wheelchair bound, she needed to go to court and the court is 2 stories up. There is no elevator and therefore no access and no sense of obligation on the part of judicial authorities to make provision for such persons. Fortunately on this occasion, someone from Red Thread had accompanied her to court, heard her case being called and, when the judicial officer was about to put the case aside, the person told the court that the complainant was in fact present but unable to get upstairs to the court. A member of GAWL who also commented on the development of the legislation indicated that the ―Persons With Disabilities‖ legislation would be addressing these concerns. 3.4.5 Domestic Violence Act The Domestic Violence Act of 1996 is intended to give protection to victims in cases involving domestic violence however judicial officers are seemingly so entrenched in the traditional ways of doing things that the reforms have not taken root. It is the view of members of certain interest groups - Red Thread and GAWL in particular - that the Act is not being implemented as it should be and that the demands of the court are defeating the very purpose of the law. ―Survivors of violence can apply to the Magistrate‘s Court without recourse to a lawyer. That is the intent of the law. But Magistrates for the most part insist that the application under the law has to be accompanied by a sworn affidavit,‖ stated Karen De Souza of the Red Thread advocacy group. She further explained that this demand pushes the applicant to get a lawyer, apply for the services of a state-paid attorney if he/she is indigent and burden an already over-burdened legal aid system. All of this, in turn, causes a delay in access to court-ordered protection from the perpetrator. So women have really been negatively affected by the way in which the Domestic Violence Act is being implemented. One of the GAWL lawyers confirmed that there is no requirement in the Act for there to be an affidavit but the Principal Clerk of the Court has been asking for it and it may be assumed that he is making the request at the behest of the presiding Judicial Officer. ―Magistrates have got to be told by somebody, perhaps the Chief Justice, that actions brought under the Domestic Violence Act are summary proceedings,‖ she said. If the Principal Clerk of the Court does not accept an application unless it has an affidavit attached, then abused women/men are not getting the immediate access to protection they expect to get under the law. The principle of ―justice delayed is justice denied‖ seems to be relevant in these circumstances. 86 Secondly, the Ministry of Human Services has not done what is required to have the Domestic Violence Act operating as intended. The Ministry was suppose to pass regulations in order to put certain ancillary services in place such as the provision of a Director of Social Services and a team of social workers to facilitate counseling for the abused and the abuser. ―I think one of the things that has caused this legislation not to be as effective as it should be is the lack of support systems and structures like Safe Houses. There are not enough Safe Houses where victims can go. Most of the time victims have to return to the same abusive environment from which they fled and that is why some of them wind up dead,‖ said one outspoken GAWL lawyer. ―I am not quite sure if any regulations have been passed but now we have a very vibrant Minister of Human Services who will be anxious to get these services and facilities in place‖, she added. ―Police used to tell victims who came to the station to make a report that domestic violence is a private matter, go home and make up with the man, but now they are more aware of the seriousness of the charge and are more sensitive to domestic violence issues,‖ said the group of GAWL lawyers who were interviewed. 3.4.6 The Married Persons Property Act Before this Act was amended in 1990, the High Court had no power to alter property rights in disputes between husband and wife. This caused great hardship. For example, if the matrimonial home was in the husband‘s name alone the Court could not award the wife a share in it unless she had put money towards its purchase or improvement, although for many years she may have looked after the home, her husband and the children. But now the High Court can make any order (including an order for sale) in relation to any property in dispute between husband and wife. Moreover, the couple does not have to be legally married because this Act creates what is called a ―statutory spouse‖. So provided that both parties are single (i.e. widowed, divorced, etc) and have been living together for an extended period, then the aggrieved party has rights under the Married Persons Property (Amendment) Act. 3.4.7 The Family and Dependants Provision Act, 1990 The purpose of this Act is to prevent family members from being left without proper means of support when the person on whom they were dependant dies. Before the Act, a person could leave his/her property by Will to whosoever they wanted. Family members could be left with nothing. But under the Act, family members and dependants can apply to the High Court for financial provision to be made for them out of the property left by the deceased on the grounds that what, if anything, they are to get under the Will is not enough. Secondly, before the Act, if a person dies in testate i.e. without leaving a Will, his/her property would go to the nearest relatives regardless of whether others would be left in need. This led to great hardship. But under the Act, whatever category you were in - ―statutory spouse‖ (those living together for more than 7 years before the date of the death), child of the deceased, person who was wholly or partly maintained by the 87 deceased - you can apply to the High Court for redress if you believe that adequate provision has not been made for you. It should be noted that under this piece of legislation, the Court has very wide powers to act. 3.5. Suggested Reforms – Identifying Strategies/Mechanisms for Addressing Obstacles Some interest groups are advocating for a number of other legal and judicial reforms. They believe that these are necessary in order to address certain problems and deficiencies affecting the efficient and effective functioning of the legal and judicial system in Guyana. One such call has come from the Guyana Bar Association, the President of which has stated that there is a need for reform of the regulations and statutory framework governing the legal profession in Guyana. 3.5.1 Call for Greater Regulation of Attorneys The Legal Practitioner‘s Act establishes a body called the Legal Practitioners‘ Committee but this does not currently operate as a satisfactory regulatory body. ―Guyana is one of the few countries in the world where you can actually practice as an attorney without being a member of the professional association. This does not happen anywhere else in the Commonwealth Caribbean. You just practice and this is a very anomalous situation,‖ claimed the President of the Bar Association. Secondly there is no monitoring of standards and no institutionalized system of professional development through ongoing training and exposure to international developments in legal practice. Thirdly, the procedures laid out under the Legal Practitioners‘ Act are fairly antiquated in terms of disciplinary measures. If an allegation of misconduct is made against an attorney and the allegation is proven, the next step is for the Committee to recommend that the matter be heard in the High Court. If the matter is heard in the High Court and the attorney is found guilty of that misconduct, then there is only one thing that can be done to that attorney, disbar him/her. In other words, there is no intermediate action that can be taken against the attorney. Whether the offence is a minor one or a major one, there is only one remedy – disbarment. Median responses to the offence such as censorship, suspension or even the imposition of a monetary penalty do not exist. This, in large part, means that nothing gets done about complaints because ―you always reach the stage where you ask whether the offence is of sufficient gravity that the attorney deserves not to practice anymore and, more often than not, the answer is ‗no’. But, on the other hand, what you have are these cumulative misdemeanors which go unpunished,‖ explained the President of the Guyana Bar Association. In emphasizing the need for reform of the Legal Practitioner‘s Act, one member of the GAWL stated ―the Act needs to be reformed and sanctions need to be imposed. There are lawyers who have been charged with criminal offences and are still practicing. One female lawyer is actually listed in the upcoming High Court Assizes and she is still practicing. We don‘t have a code of conduct.‖ 88 According to President of the Bar Association, there is a definite need for the whole regulatory regime as it related to the practice of law in Guyana to be revamped. ―It has been recognized for some time now that that we need to do a complete overhaul of the Legal Practitioner‘s Act but the socio-political context has, to a large degree, mitigated against the process of engagement with the political establishment which would allow for that change,‖ he stated during our interview. 3.5.2 Family Court Recommended During a lengthy interview with the members of the GAWL, a number of reforms were suggested, one of which was the establishment of a Family Court. One of the members indicated that some of the matters that are now being heard by the Magistrate‘s Court, such as maintenance, need to be diverted to a specialized court. Moreover, this proposed Family Court needs to be a ―quasi‖ High court so it is capable of handling matters of a certain gravity. She further added that the Chief Justice had identified a location for the court to be established but gave no idea as to when it will come on stream. 3.5.3 Bail Act needed In the opinion of a number of stakeholders, too much discretion rests with Magistrates with respect to the granting or refusal of bail. ―Magistrates are refusing bail for very minor offences and overcrowding the prison as a result. Spardam Prison is full. It is March and the Magistrates are giving June trial dates‖, one GAWL member exclaimed. ―A Bail Act would take care of the problem of the refusal of bail for minor offe nces and frivolous matters‖, stated Karen De Souza of Red Thread. A 2004 Final Report of the Criminal Justice Review Committee (CJRC) states that the consensus of opinion is that there should be the enactment of a Bail Act in order to achieve some degree of uniformity in the granting of bail, which at present depends on the personal views of a particular magistrate or judge. 3.5.4 Call for Sentencing Policy The Criminal Justice Review Committee endorsed the position of the GAWL by suggesting the establishment of sentencing guidelines which would outline various categories of offences and offenders and the recommended sentences. Secondly, the Committee‘s final report states that sentencing guidelines should make provision for the courts, when sentencing, to take into account the time an accused has spent in prison awaiting trial. Thirdly, it was recommended that greater use be made of the statutory provision for imposing community penalties. It was however also acknowledged that these options require the supervision of Probation Service personnel and this has proved difficult in the past due to the shortage of staff, particularly staff with specialized skills. ―The establishment for probation officers is 50 but there are currently only 38 on staff,‖ states the Strategy Report prepared in 2005. It should be noted nonetheless that the 2004 recommendation of the Criminal Justice Review Committee that ―the Probation Service be strengthened or an effective 89 mechanism be developed through the Government social services…..for the supervision of persons sentenced to a period a community service‖ has been heeded to some extent. As of 2005, an extra 30 social workers were attached to the amalgamated departments of the Probation Service and the Family Welfare Service. In addition to the above recommendations, GAWL, the professional body of women lawyers, emphasized the need for a sentencing policy particularly for the Magistrates Courts which handle about 90% of all litigation in Guyana. This group also specifically called for Alternate Dispute Resolution i.e. mediation to be extended to the Magistracy. 3.6. Conclusion A number of challenges, reforms and recommended strategies for addressing concerns raised by relevant stakeholders have been discussed in the preceding sections of this Report. It will be agreed that one of the indicators of good governance is the extent to which a country‘s legal and judicial system is functioning effectively and efficiently. Section 2 of this Report entitled ―Challenges–Background to Reforms‖ provides ample detail of some of the serious problems confronting the justice sector in Guyana. Section 3 on Legal and Judicial Reform Projects speaks to a number of the steps that are being or have been taken to address these challenges. However, there is one serious deficiency that affects virtually all institutions across the broad spectrum of the Government service in Guyana, including the justice sector, and to which the authorities have no immediate response. It is the crippling lack of financial and human resources. ―I am not too sure which is the more acute of the two problems‖, stated the President of the Guyana Bar Association. The reality of course is that the two phenomena are linked –salaries are generally low and Guyanese of all walks of life are searching for greener pastures abroad. As expected, this dilemma has obstructed the effective implementation of a number of legal and judicial reforms. Guyana, being a Heavily Indebted Poor (HIPC) Country and the third poorest country in the western hemisphere, has found itself strapped for resources-both human and financial. In addition, political instability, non-capitalist policies at times and racial tensions over the years have all served to dampen the climate for both foreign and domestic investment, contributing to a significant downturn in the economy. The country‘s fiscal position has deteriorated over years, from a fiscal deficit of 1.7% of GDP in 1999 to 8.7% of GDP in 2003 and reached 13.4% of GDP in 2005. Public institutions are weak and years of emigration have drained the country of technical and professional skills and leadership. Since people are leaving, there is a difficulty in maintaining a competent caliber of people to execute the functions of various offices which are part of the institutional framework for the implementation of reforms. ―We lose 90 our best and brightest every year who graduate from the University of Guyana. This is one of the challenges the country faces – trying to keep its skilled and talented people. It affects us pretty badly. We try any number of inducements - salaries, compensation packages, benefits but there is only so much that can be done with limited financial resources‖, stated the President of the Bar Association with a sense of despair. Therefore while the legislative and judicial reforms mentioned in the previous sections are welcomed in Guyana, it is important to ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place to facilitate meaningful implementation. 91 3.7. References 1. Guyana Justice Sector Reform Strategy 2006-2010, June 06, 2006. 2. Modernization of the Justice Administration System-GUYANA, Loan Proposal (GYL1009), Inter-American Development Bank, 2006 3. 2005 Annual Report of the Supreme Court Registry of Guyana, July 2006 4. Guyana Government Information Agency (GINA), March 17, 2006 5. Final Report of the Criminal Justice Review Committee, prepared by Desiree Bernard, former Chancellor of the Judiciary of Guyana, July 2004 6. What You Need to Know about the Law and You III, prepared by the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers, 2004 7. What You Need to Know about the Law and You II, prepared by the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers, 2000 8. USAID Congressional Presentation FY2000: Guyana 3.8. Interviews in Guyana  Interview with Bishop Juan Edghill, Chairman of Ethnic Relations Commission, 14th March, 2007  Interview with Carl Singh, Chief Justice and Acting Chancellor of the Judiciary, 14th March, 2007  Interview with Sita Ramlal, Registrar of the Supreme Court, 14th March, 2007  Interview with Yesu Persaud, Head of Private Sector Commission, 15 March, 2007  Interview with Javier Reyes, Modernization of the State Specialist, IADB, 15 March, 2007  Interview with Karen De Souza, Social Activist of ―Red Thread‖, 15 March, 2007  Interview with members of the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers, 15th March, 2007  Interview with Merle Mendonca, representative of Guyana Human Rights Association, 16th March, 2007  Interview with Hon. Priya Manickchand, Minister of Human Services & Social Security, 16th March, 2007  Interview with Kashir A. Khan, President of Guyana Bar Association, 16th March, 2007  Interview with Gloria Richards-Johnson, Governance Specialist and Daune Pratt, Civil Society Specialist, USAID Guyana Democratic Consolidation and Conflict Resolution Project, 16th March, 2007  Interview with Justice Roxanne George, Supreme Court of the Judicature, 18th March, 2007 92