2023/128 A KNOWLEDGE NOTE SERIES FOR THE ENERGY & EXTRACTIVES GLOBAL PRACTICE Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector The bottom line. This Live Wire—based on Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of Infrastructure (2023)—presents a systematic assessment of the magnitude and prevalence of fiscal risks from power investments and their root causes across a range of low- and middle-income countries. Drawing on important new sources of evidence, it shows just how much is at stake in the good governance of the power sector, how fiscal risks vary across contexts, and how they can be mitigated. What are the fiscal risks from the power Matías Herrera Dappe is a senior economist in the sector and why are they important? Infrastructure Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. However power infrastructure is provided, there are risks of fiscal surprises—that is, infrastructure costing more than projected—depleting scarce fiscal resources Vivien Foster is a principal research fellow at Imperial College London and former chief Numerous governance challenges undermine the efficiency economist in the Infrastructure Vice-Presidency of spending on infrastructure and absorb scarce fiscal space. of the World Bank. Whether governments spend directly on budget, spend at arm’s length through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or Aldo Musacchio is a professor of management Authors delegate spending via public-private partnerships (PPPs), the risk of fiscal surprises is high. Because of these risks, infra- and economics at the Brandeis International structure service delivery may end up costing significantly Business School and a faculty research associate more than initially expected, eroding limited fiscal space for at the National Bureau of Economic Research. productive spending. Teresa Ter-Minassian is an international eco- If policy makers are to make reforms where they can have nomic consultant and the former director of the the greatest impact, they must understand the potential fis- Fiscal Affairs Department of the International cal risks of different provision modalities, how the magnitude Monetary Fund. and frequency of those risks varies across modalities, what their root causes are, and how they can be mitigated. This Burak Turkgulu is a consultant in the note—based on Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating Infrastructure Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. the Fiscal Risks of Infrastructure (Herrera Dappe and others 2023)—aims to improve our understanding of these issues, drawing on important new sources of evidence, including Supported by the World Bank Infrastructure SOEs Database, which was built for the report on which this Live Wire is based. 2 Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector Fiscal risks from power infrastructure manifest themselves in PPPs entail fiscal commitments of a different nature that different ways, depending on how that infrastructure is pro- can also lead to fiscal surprises. Liabilities such as upfront vided (figure 1). capital subsidies and availability payments arise even if the PPP proceeds according to plan. These direct liabilities can Direct public provision of electricity can lead to fiscal surprises lead to fiscal surprises if PPPs are kept off the fiscal balance through unanticipated additional spending caused by cost sheet and off the budget. In addition, PPPs create contin- overruns or the need to repair deteriorated assets (because gent liabilities. Explicit contingent liabilities arise from con- of neglect or natural disasters, including extreme weather tractual guarantees provided by the government to ensure events). the commercial feasibility and bankability (for example, minimum revenue or demand guarantees, foreign exchange Power SOEs can create substantial risks for public finances. rate guarantees, and debt guarantees). Implicit contingent These risks arise from explicit guarantees and public insur- liabilities result from the risks of contract renegotiation and ance schemes—such as insurance against disasters and early termination. extreme weather events—as well as cashflow and bailout risk. Cashflow risk stems from the volatility of the SOE’s net The power sector tends to rely more heavily on SOEs and income, which requires fiscal transfers to cover occasional PPPs than on budget spending. For the 19 countries covered and modest losses associated with exogenous shocks and by the World Bank Infrastructure SOEs Database in 2009–18,1 inefficiencies related to soft budget constraints. Bailout risk direct public provision represents on average just 9 percent of refers to the risk associated with having to recapitalize an capital spending in electricity, while SOEs represent 60 per- SOE, help it avoid default or bankruptcy, or cancel a large cent and PPPs 31 percent of total capital spending (figure 2). SOE’s liabilities because it has insufficient capital buffers 1. The countries included are Albania, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, to deal with large, unexpected shocks and continuous Burundi, Croatia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Kosovo, Peru, write-offs. Romania, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, Ukraine, and Uruguay. Figure 1. Sources of fiscal costs and risks associated with the provision of power infrastructure Modality-specific sources of risk Fiscal risk Flaws in public Direct public • Cost overrun risk investment provision • Asset impairment risk management Common sources of risk • Infrastructure- • SOE guarantees/insurance schemes Flaws in fiscal specific factors State-owned and corporate • Cashflow risk • Economic factors enterprises governance • Bailout risk • Natural disasters • Direct liabilities Public-private Flaws in • Guarantees partnerships governance • Renegotiation risk • Early termination risk Source: Herrera Dappe and others (2023). Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector 3 Figure 2. Capital spending in the power sector of a set of countries, by modality, 2009–18 100 Share of capital spending (%) 80 60 Direct provision State-owned enterprises Public-private partnerships 40 20 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Source: Herrera Dappe and others (2023). Note: Capital spending by PPPs was distributed over a five-year period beginning in the investment year indicated in the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database (https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppi). Expenditures through direct public provision are for the government as a whole. When spending through direct public provision in a country’s power sector is not available in the BOOST data, total energy spending is used. Countries included are Albania, Argentina, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Ethiopia, Georgia, Indonesia, Kenya, Kosovo, Peru, Romania, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, and Ukraine. How important are the fiscal risks from The near term, and most direct, fiscal risk is that the con- direct public provision of electricity? struction phase of the infrastructure project may cost the government more to deliver than it had anticipated. The fiscal risks of direct public provision materialize over Underexecution of the budget may signify delays in project different time horizons—near, medium, and long term— implementation, which usually translate into cost overruns. with varied prevalence Therefore, the prevalence of the near-term risk manifests On-budget public investment in power infrastructure has itself in budget data as underexecution of infrastructure been low in recent years. According to the World Bank’s capital spending. BOOST database, total public investment in infrastructure (defined throughout to include the power and transport Underexecution of planned infrastructure investment bud- sectors) has been low and declining, falling from 1.8 percent gets is observed in more than 80 percent of the 65 developing of GDP in 2011 to 1.2 percent in 2020.2 Public investment countries studied using the World Bank’s BOOST database in electricity has been particularly low, oscillating around (Foster, Rana, and Gorgulu 2022). Budget execution ratios 0.2–0.3 percent of GDP, with no clear trend (figure 3). Overall, are much lower for the power sector (37 percent) than the low- and lower-middle-income countries have tended to roads sector (69 percent). The difference may reflect the fact devote slightly larger budgetary shares to public investment that electricity projects tend to be larger and more idiosyn- in electricity than upper-middle-income countries. cratic than road projects. The medium-term risk is that even after the initial investment 2. The BOOST database (https:/ /www.worldbank.org/en/programs/ phase of the project has been completed, the infrastructure boost-portal/about-boost) covers more than 70 economies over the may continue to make further unplanned calls on the gov- 2010–20 period and is broadly representative of developing countries out- ernment’s capital budget during its lifetime to sustain the side of China and India. asset’s capacity to deliver the intended stream of services. 4 Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector Figure 3. Government budgetary capital spending on electricity as a percentage of GDP, 2010–20 0.5 0.4 Percentage of GDP 0.3 Low income Lower-middle income 0.2 Upper-middle income Total 0.1 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Source: Herrera Dappe and others (2023). Note: Countries included are Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, St. Lucia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Ukraine. The extent of capital bias—that is, the relative preference public investments in infrastructure between 2011 and 2020 for capital spending over maintenance spending—indicates reflects a lower priority for infrastructure rather than a decline the prevalence of the medium-term risk. In the power sector, in total government expenditure. In times of economic SOEs usually handle maintenance. Therefore, to assess the downturn, on-budget infrastructure spending is particularly extent to which undermaintenance can lead to unexpected vulnerable to cuts, given that it is less socially sensitive than capital costs, on-budget and off-budget spending must be other budget items and the damage caused by underin- combined. The analysis shows a pattern of capital bias in vestment may take some time to materialize. the power sector, where countries spend about four times as much on investment as on maintenance. How important are the fiscal risks from power SOEs? Over the longer term, the vulnerability of infrastructure Fiscal risks from SOEs tend to take the form of a series spending to budget cuts and its pronounced procyclicality of small to medium fiscal injections—punctuated by the raise the risk that infrastructure sectors may bear the brunt of occasional large one fiscal adjustment. Such adjustment can squeeze spending below the levels needed for maintenance and investments Power SOEs perform relatively well in the 19 countries covered to support long-term economic growth. by the World Bank Infrastructure SOEs Database in 2009–18, providing a modest positive rate of return on average assets. On-budget spending on infrastructure was procyclical The average return for power SOEs is 1.9 percent. It drops between 2005 and 2020, suggesting that public infrastruc- to just 1.0 percent, however, once operations subsidies from ture spending is a soft target for budget cuts. The decline in the government are stripped out of the accounts. Although Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector 5 these returns are low, they still compare favorably with the Governments use numerous instruments to deliver fiscal average negative return of transport sector SOEs. Overall, injections to SOEs. Aside from operations subsidies, they use around a third of power SOEs lose money after netting out equity injections and loans from the government and other subsidies, about half the share in the transport sector. SOEs. On average, SOE loans, including loans from state- owned banks, are more widely used in the power sector than Average annual fiscal injections to power in the transport sector. SOEs represent 0.25 percent of GDP, The financials of power SOEs are highly exposed to fuel equivalent to 10 percent of average assets. price volatility and to tariffs that are too low to recover costs. Power SOEs have manageable payroll costs (17 percent of revenues on average), but they are highly exposed to fluc- The fiscal risk of SOEs is often thought of as stemming from tuations in fuel prices, which account for a substantial share extreme events (so-called tail risk). The evidence from our of revenues (40 percent on average). They are also subject analysis indicates that fiscal risks are actually a series of to unpredictable movements, which rapidly affect their prof- small to medium-size deviations from budgeted figures— itability. Several governments cap electricity tariffs at below with occasional large events. The 180 country-year observa- cost-recovery levels and in many cases do not properly com- tions captured for the power sector include 59 instances of pensate SOEs. fiscal injections (a third of all observations). While two-thirds of these fiscal injections were under 0.2 percent of GDP, Far from acting as countercyclical spending vehicles during 17 percent exceeded 0.6 percent. As a result, average annual a crisis, SOEs amplify negative macroeconomic shocks. fiscal injections to power SOEs represent 0.25 percent of GDP Because infrastructure SOEs use most of their revenues to (figure 4), equivalent to 10 percent of average assets. cover payroll, fuel, and maintenance expenses, they have little left over that can be posted as retained earnings or reserves to buffer negative shocks. As a result, a significant negative Figure 4. Fiscal injections to state-owned shock that leads to a deterioration in financial performance enterprises in the power and transport prompts affected SOEs to ask for sizable fiscal injections and sectors as a percentage of GDP cut their capital spending. Our analysis shows that following 0.25 a negative macroeconomic shock SOEs receive an increase in total fiscal injections (as a percentage of average assets) as percentage of GDP 0.20 of about 3.5 percentage points the year after the shock— Fiscal injections Operations subsidies equivalent to a significant recapitalization. SOEs need fiscal 0.15 Government equity injections precisely when governments are under pressure injections 0.10 from the decline in total tax revenues. Furthermore, capital Government loans spending as a percentage of average assets in fully owned 0.05 SOE loans infrastructure SOEs decreases by 3.5 percentage points the year after the negative shock—equivalent to about 40 per- 0 Power Transport cent of average capital expenditure in the sample studied. Source: Original figure for this publication, based on data from the World Bank Infrastructure SOE Database. Case studies compiled for the report on which this Live Wire Note: Data are for 2009–18. Averages are computed over positive fiscal is based show that in response to adverse demand and fuel injection events. Government loans and loans from state-owned banks capture long-term debt or loans. Government and SOE loans are the cost shocks, power distribution SOEs respond with a more positive changes from the previous year. The figure was created by adding than proportional decline in profitability. If demand declines operations subsidies, government equity injections, government loans, and SOE loans and subtracting changes in SOE assets from the previous by 5 percent, the Indonesian vertically integrated utility year by SOE for each year to detect the presence of a fiscal injection (that Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) and the Kenyan power is, a positive difference). Fiscal injections by sector in each country were then added in for each year and the sum divided by GDP. All country-year distributor Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) are observations by sector were then averaged. projected to lose an additional 8 percent and 20 percent, GDP = gross domestic product; SOE = state-owned enterprise. 6 Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector respectively, of their earnings before interest and taxes. The GDP grew rapidly during the 1990s, reaching 3 percent in decline in profitability is even sharper in the case of a fuel 2002. After falling in the mid-2000s, they started growing cost shock. In response to a 5 percent increase in fuel costs, again, remaining at 2.5–3 percent of developing world GDP the two companies’ earnings before interest and taxes are between 2015 and 2021 (figure 5, panel b). projected to fall by 27 percent and 55 percent, respectively. PPPs in the power sector present significantly lower levels of How important are the fiscal risks from fiscal risk than in the transport sector, because the probabil- power PPPs? ity of contract renegotiation and early termination is much lower. Moreover, even when these events occur, the resulting PPPs in the power sector present relatively low levels fiscal demands are more manageable for power PPPs than of fiscal risk, in part because electricity tariffs can be for transport concessions. adjusted to preserve profitability, though the risks of early termination increase significantly in times of Power PPPs are less likely to be renegotiated than trans- macroeconomic crisis port PPPs; 24–41 percent are renegotiated (depending on The power sector has been relatively successful in attracting the country), about half as many as in the transport sector. private capital through PPPs. Just over half of all PPP projects Even when renegotiation does take place in power PPPs, it and associated investments in 1990–2021 were in the sector. takes longer to materialize, occurring on average about 1.7 Cumulative investments in the power sector through PPPs years after contract signature, compared with just one year have grown steadily since the 1990s, reaching $927 billion in for transport PPPs. Renegotiation of power PPPs also leads the developing world in 2021 (figure 5, panel a). Cumulative to lower fiscal transfers because electricity tariffs paid by investments as a percentage of the developing world’s final consumers are regulated and can be readily adjusted Figure 5. Total investment in public-private partnerships in the power sector in the developing world, 1990–2021 a. In billions of dollars b. As percentage of GDP 1,000 3.0 2.5 800 Billions of 2020 US dollars Percentage of GDP 2.0 600 1.5 400 1.0 200 0.5 0 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 Source: Herrera Dappe and others (2023). GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = public-private partnership. Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector 7 to retain the profitability of electricity PPPs, including PPPs How can fiscal risks of the power sector be in the transmission and generation segments. In Peru, for mitigated? example, even though transmission projects are awarded Alleviating fiscal risks requires integrated management on the basis of required payments for investment and main- of public investment, strong fiscal and corporate tenance of the infrastructure, concessionaires are compen- governance of SOEs, robust PPP governance, and sated through electricity tariffs that are routinely adjusted to integrated risk management make them whole (Marchesi 2022). In contrast, the revenues of transport PPPs are more likely to come from government All modalities of public infrastructure service provision are payments, and it is usually more challenging politically to susceptible to significant fiscal risks, particularly during eco- increase tolls or railways fares. nomic downturns. A combination of vulnerability to exoge- nous shocks and the perverse incentives faced by all actors explains the prevalence of fiscal risks in infrastructure service PPPs in the power sector present significantly provision. lower levels of fiscal risk than in the transport Off-budget forms of provision, like SOEs and PPPs, call on sector because the probability of contract public finances more often and more deeply than is gener- renegotiation and early termination is much ally assumed. Moreover, when it rains, it pours. During bad times, on-budget spending on infrastructure tends to be cut, lower. and the impact on SOEs and PPPs can further weaken the overall fiscal situation, amplifying the negative macroeco- Power PPPs represent much less of a potential fiscal drain nomic shock. when it comes to early termination. The risk of early termi- nation of a power PPP is only a fifth that of road or rail PPPs. Weaknesses in public investment management can lead to The average fiscal risk of early termination is 2–4 percent of fiscal risks. Because of lack of coordination in planning and the size of the PPP portfolio in the power sector, depending budgeting across and within levels of government, many on the scenario considered—substantially less than the 6–14 projects are only partially implemented. The political benefit percent in the transport sector. If early termination does take of new infrastructure and low capacity often create incentives place, the capital at risk is also relatively small, given that the to prioritize capital spending over maintenance spending average size of an energy PPP is $288 million. (so-called capital bias) and underestimate the likelihood and impact of possible adverse shocks. Flaws in management Early terminations of PPPs are procyclical, as negative of contracts and assets can lead to inefficient spending. All macro-financial shocks increase the probability of early these weaknesses can lead to inadequate maintenance termination, which increases fiscal risks. A profound macro- and poor-quality construction, eventually requiring addi- economic crisis would increase the fiscal risks from early ter- tional spending to avoid asset impairment, which disaster mination of PPPs by an order of magnitude in the immediate and extreme weather events can exacerbate. The fact that aftermath of the shock. Simulation of a representative pro- public spending on infrastructure tends to be the first victim found macroeconomic crisis—comprising a near 50 percent of fiscal crises adds to the risk of asset impairment. currency devaluation combined with both a banking and debt crisis—shows that the year after the shock, the fiscal A combination of vulnerability to exogenous risks would be 12–19 times the fiscal risks without a shock, depending on the country, with an average multiple of 16. shocks and the perverse incentives faced by all actors explains the prevalence of fiscal risks in infrastructure service provision. 8 Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector Flaws in fiscal and corporate governance that soften bud- fiscal implications (and risks) of the project. In making such get constraints, encourage SOEs to take excessive risks, and decisions, efficiency gains take a back seat. Moreover, the erode the incentive to be efficient are the main SOE-specific off-budget nature and information asymmetries between source of fiscal risks. The imposition of public policy objec- different government authorities may give awarding author- tives and practices on SOEs is common, notably the pricing ities the incentive to behave strategically and to use rene- of electricity at levels that do not allow cost recovery and gotiations to fulfill political objectives. Similarly, the private the failure to update prices often enough. In many instances, partner may be inclined to behave strategically or opportu- SOEs are not fully or timely compensated by the government nistically if the government is unable to make a commitment for the losses resulting from unrealistic tariffs. These policies not to renegotiate a PPP or where there is significant uncer- are generally motivated by governments’ desire to moder- tainty regarding the return on investment of a PPP, triggering ate headline inflation or avoid social discontent and the fact renegotiations or even early termination. that the costs of such policies are disguised—at least for a time. But they weaken the incentives of SOE managers and A reform agenda to mitigate the fiscal risks from infrastruc- boards. ture should remove the flaws in governance that create per- verse incentives and build adequate capacity in government to mitigate those fiscal risks that cannot be eliminated or All reform agendas must include four building that the government is best placed to deal with. All coun- tries are different; the content and pace of implementation blocks—integrated public investment of each reform agenda therefore need to be tailored to the management; effective fiscal and corporate sources of risk and the institutional and socio-political char- acteristics of each country, as well as to the government’s governance of SOEs; robust PPP preparation, capacity. Country-specific strategies will involve different procurement, and contract management; mixes of preventive and corrective actions. and integrated fiscal risk management—and All reform agendas, however, must include the following four be grounded in efforts to build adequate building blocks and be grounded in efforts to build adequate government capacity. government capacity. Robust integrated public investment management leads Access to financing that is unrelated to the creditworthi- to projects being selected because they are aligned with a ness of SOEs also softens budget constraints, distorting the country’s development goals and yield the highest net bene- incentives to take reasonable risks and be efficient. Other fits and to provision modalities being selected based on value causes of soft budget constraints are information asymme- for money and fiscal affordability. Robust integrated public tries between SOEs and their owners and flaws in corporate investment management requires consistent assessment of governance that exacerbate those asymmetries and allow all potential projects and consistent fiscal treatment of all government interference in the selection of SOE boards and projects implemented through direct public provision, PPPs, management. and, in some cases, SOEs. Such management is needed to ensure that projects and modalities are not selected because Flaws in PPP governance (including keeping PPPs off the fiscal of differential fiscal treatment. Countries should also adopt balance sheet and off the budget), the uncertainty around rolling medium-term fiscal frameworks that include PPPs in infrastructure, and the long-term contractual nature of PPPs order to ensure alignment of investment plans with available can give public authorities and private partners incentives to funding. The effectiveness of integrated public investment behave opportunistically, creating fiscal risks. Governments management rests on granting the ministry of finance final often have incentives to deliver projects through PPPs rather authority to approve projects and contract renegotiations than directly because doing so allows them to obscure the and modifications. Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector 9 Effective fiscal and corporate governance of SOEs allows terminations and establishing alternative dispute-resolution and incentivizes boards and managers to operate SOEs effi- mechanisms are important measures for mitigating fiscal ciently, thereby mitigating fiscal risks. It requires clearly speci- risks. fying SOEs’ mandates and avoiding government interference in their operations, particularly through the imposition of Integrated fiscal risk management leads to the most effi- policy mandates or quasi-fiscal operations. If interference cient outcomes because it can handle potential interactions cannot be avoided, SOEs should be compensated in a among different risks and portfolio effects. Integrated risk commensurate, timely, and transparent manner. Where an management requires a central institutional structure within independent sector regulator exists, it should work with the the ministry of finance (or chaired by the minister) that is ministry of finance to determine appropriate compensation. responsible for managing all fiscal risks. It also requires com- SOEs’ access to financing should be based on their debt-ser- prehensive disclosure of fiscal information. A risk-mitigation vicing capacity and approved by the ministry of finance in strategy should start with sound macroeconomic and debt a nondiscretionary manner. To mitigate the need for fiscal management. Risks from natural disasters, for example, par- injections, the government should establish clear require- ticularly disasters related to extreme weather events, affect ments for financial management and monitoring. different types of infrastructure and noninfrastructure assets, requiring integrated approaches to mitigate those risks. A robust PPP preparation, procurement, and contract management framework that allocates risk optimally and Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks limits opportunistic behavior is needed to mitigate the risks of Infrastructure, upon which this Live Wire is based, was peer from renegotiation and early termination of PPPs. A robust reviewed by Ani Balabanyan (practice manager, World Bank); framework should avoid allocating demand risk to the pri- Sudarshan Gooptu (senior director, Millennium Challenge vate partner when it has no or minimal control over demand. Corporation); Fernanda Ruiz Nunez (senior economist, World Flexible-term contracts, such as present-value-of-revenue Bank); Binyam Reja (practice manager, World Bank); and Eivind contracts, are a good option for allocating the demand risk Tandberg (technical assistance officer, International Monetary to the government in such cases. Measures to reduce financ- Fund). The authors thank them for their insights, advice, and ing risk can help reduce the risk of early termination. Clearly contributions. regulating contract renegotiations, modifications, and early References Foster, Vivien, Anshul Rana, and Nisan Gorgulu. 2022. Infrastructure. Sustainable Infrastructure Series. Washington, “Understanding Public Spending Trends for Infrastructure in DC: World Bank. Developing Countries.” Policy Research Working Paper 9903, Marchesi, Giancarlo. 2022. “Fiscal Cost and Risks of Electricity World Bank, Washington, DC. and Transport PPPs: The Case of Peru.” Background paper Herrera Dappe, Matías, Vivien Foster, Aldo Musacchio, prepared for Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Teresa Ter-Minassian, and Burak Turkgulu. 2023. Off the Fiscal Risks of Infrastructure. World Bank, Washington, DC. Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of 10 Off the Books: Understanding and Mitigating the Fiscal Risks of the Power Sector Make further connections Live Wire 2014/17. “Incorporating Energy from Renewable Live Wire 2017/84. “Disaster Preparedness Offers Big Payoffs Resources into Power System Planning,” by Marcelino for Utilities,” by Samuel Oguah and Sunil Khosla. Madrigal and Rhonda Lenai Jordan. Live Wire 2019/105. “Attracting Private Participation and Live Wire 2015/38. “Integrating Variable Renewable Energy Financing in the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: Findings into Power System Operations,” by Thomas Nikolakakis and from a Survey of Investors and Financiers,” by Benedict Probst, Debabrata Chattopadhyay. Richard Holcroft, Joern Huenteler, Ani Balabanyan, Andrew Tipping, and Peter Robinson. Live Wire 2015/48. “Supporting Transmission and Distribution Projects: World Bank Investments since 2010,” by Samuel Live Wire 2020/108. “Rethinking Power Sector Reform: Oguah, Debabrata Chattopadhyay, and Morgan Bazilian. Positive Lessons for the Middle East and North Africa,” by Tu Chi Nguyen, Anshul Rana, Erik Magnus Fernstrom, and Vivien Live Wire 2017/73. “Forecasting Electricity Demand: An Aid Foster. for Practitioners,” by Jevgenijs Steinbuks, Joeri de Wit, Arthur Kochnakyan, and Vivien Foster. Live Wire 2021/117. “Climate and Disaster Risk Screening,” by Eskedar Bahru Gessesse. Live Wire 2017/76. “Increasing the Potential of Concessions to Expand Rural Electrification in Sub-Saharan Africa,” by Richard Live Wire 2022/124. “Powering through the Storm: Climate Hosier, Morgan Bazilian, and Tatia Lemondzhava. Resilience for Energy Systems,” by Amy Schweikert, Celine Ramstein, and Claire Nicolas. Live Wire 2017/83. “Shedding Light on Electricity Utilities in the Middle East and North Africa: Insights from a Performance Diagnostic,” by Daniel Camos, Robert Bacon, Antonio Estache, and Mohamad Mahgoub Hamid.