WPS3933 Internationalization and the Evolution of Corporate Valuation* Juan Carlos Gozzi , Ross Levine , Sergio L. Schmukler a b,c a Abstract By documenting the evolution of Tobin's q before, during, and after firms internationalize, this paper provides evidence on the bonding, segmentation, and market timing theories of internationalization. Using new data on 9,096 firms across 74 countries over the period 1989-2000, we find that Tobin's q does not rise after internationalization, even relative to firms that do not internationalize. Instead, q rises significantly before internationalization and during the internationalization year. But then q falls sharply in the year after internationalization, quickly relinquishing the increases of the previous years. To account for these dynamics, we show that market capitalization rises before internationalization and remains high, while corporate assets increase during internationalization. The evidence supports models stressing that financial internationalization facilitates corporate expansion, but challenges models stressing that internationalization produces an enduring effect on q by bonding firms to a better corporate governance system. JEL classification codes: G15, F36, F20 Keywords: international financial markets; financial integration; Tobin's q; bonding; segmentation; cross-listing; depositary receipts; ADRs World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3933, June 2006 The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org. aWorld Bank, Brown University, NBER b c *For helpful comments, we thank Malcolm Baker, Anusha Chari, Peter Henry, Rich Lyons, Michael Schill, Andrei Shleifer, David Smith, Rene Stulz, Charles Trzcinka, and Dan Wolfenzon as well as seminar participants at the AEA 2005 Annual Meetings, Brown University, the Darden/JFE/World Bank Emerging Markets Conference, the Eleventh Georgia Tech Conference on International Finance, the LACEA Annual Meetings in Paris, the NBER IFM Meetings, and the University of Minnesota. We are grateful to Tatiana Didier, for excellent research assistance at the initial stages of the paper. We thank the World Bank Latin American Regional Studies Program and Research Support Budget for ample financial support. This paper was written while Schmukler was visiting the IMF Research Department. Email addresses: jgozzi@worldbank.org, ross_levine@brown.edu, sschmukler@worldbank.org. 1. Introduction Between 1989 and 2000, almost 2,300 firms with a market capitalization of over eight trillion U.S. dollars "internationalized" by cross-listing, issuing depositary receipts, or raising equity capital in major financial centers. These "international firms" account for more than 40 percent of the market capitalization of their home markets and in many countries value traded abroad exceeds domestic market activity. Yet, there are sharp disagreements over the causes and effects of internationalization. To distinguish among theories of internationalization, we provide the first documentation of the evolution of Tobin's q and its components ­ corporate assets, market capitalization, and debt ­ before, during, and after firms internationalize. We also examine the time-series patterns of international firms relative to those of "domestic firms" (firms that do not internationalize) and thus abstract from country-specific factors influencing all firms within a country. To conduct the analysis, we compile a new database of over 9,000 international and domestic firms across 74 countries over the period 1989-2000, comprising almost 67,000 firm-year observations. The major findings are as follows. First, on average, firms that internationalize at some point in the sample have higher qs than firms that never internationalize, but this difference exists years before firms actually access international equity markets. Thus, a country's higher valued firms are more likely to internationalize than its lower valued firms. Second, when comparing the average value of q in the years before firms internationalize with the average value of q in the years after they internationalize, we find that q does not change after internationalization, nor does it change relative to that of domestic firms. Thus, internationalization is not associated with an enduring change in q. Third, when tracing out the 1 dynamics in more detail, we find that q peaks in the internationalization year, rising significantly before firms access international equity markets and then falling sharply afterwards. Indeed, one year after internationalization, the q of international firms is lower than one year before internationalization. Moreover, the temporary increase in q vanishes by the second year after internationalization. Fourth, while q does not change permanently after internationalization, its components do. Market capitalization rises before internationalization and remains high thereafter, while corporate assets and debt expand after internationalization. Thus, internationalization is associated with firm growth, with international firms expanding relative to domestic ones. The findings provide information on three views of internationalization. First, segmentation theories argue that firms internationalize to circumvent regulations, poor accounting systems, taxes, and illiquid domestic markets that discourage investors from purchasing their shares.1 Consequently, internationalization can lower firms' cost of capital and facilitate corporate expansion relative to firms that do not internationalize.2 These models do not predict, however, that internationalization produces an enduring increase in q (Chari and Henry, 2002). The reduction in the cost of capital increases the market value of corporate assets, which boosts q, but then firms increase their capital stocks until the replacement cost of assets equals their market value, which reduces q to its pre-internationalization level (Tobin and Brainard, 1 See Black (1974), Solnik (1974), Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), Stulz (1981), Errunza and Losq (1985), Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1987), Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998), Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002), and Lorenzoni and Walentin (2004), as well as the review by Stulz (1999). 2 Consistent with segmentation theories, existing empirical works finds that internationalization is accompanied by positive abnormal returns and then abnormal returns turn negative or disappear after integration (Errunza and Losq, 1985; Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan, 1988; Jayaraman, Shastri, and Tandon, 1993; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000; and Sarkissian and Schill, 2003). Research also suggests that cross- listing increases international analyst coverage and lowers the information costs faced by international investors (Baker, Nosfinger, and Weaver, 2002; Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004; and Ammer, Holland, Smith, and Warnock, 2004). Furthermore, research finds that internationalization allows firms to have their stocks traded in more liquid markets (Werner and Kleidon, 1996; and Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998), with potentially beneficial ramifications on the cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; and Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). 2 1977). If the market anticipates that the firm will lower its capital costs by internationalizing, then q rises before the firm actually internationalizes, and then falls after internationalizing as the firm uses cheaper capital to expand. Thus, although segmentation theories allow for a rise and fall in q, the drop in the cost of capital alone does not necessarily imply that internationalization induces a lasting increase in q. Our results are consistent with three key predictions from segmentation theories: (i) firms expand after they internationalize and grow relative to domestic firms that have not lowered their capital costs; (ii) q rises before internationalization and then quickly returns to its pre- internationalization level; and (iii) the qs of firms that internationalize do not increase relative those of domestic firms. Thus, segmentation models account for our main time-series and cross- sectional findings. Second, this paper also provides empirical evidence on "bonding" theories, which argue that firms internationalize to bond themselves to a better corporate governance framework. Improved governance both (i) lowers firms' cost of capital, which facilitates firm expansion and (ii) reduces expropriation of corporate resources by firm insiders, which fosters an enduring increase in q. Like segmentation theories, bonding theories predict that internationalization lowers capital costs, causing q to rise and then fall as firms expand. Unlike segmentation theories, however, bonding models tend to imply a long-run increase in q, as firms improve their corporate governance through internationalization. Thus, while bonding models predict that q will rise and then fall, these models also predict that (i) the long-run value of q will be higher after internationalization compared with before and (ii) the long-run qs of firms that internationalize will increase relative to those of domestic firms, which do not commit to a higher level of shareholder protection. 3 There are two parts to the bonding view that internationalization boosts long-run q. First, corporate insiders can exploit their positions of control for private gain, with adverse implications on the price that others are willing to pay for the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, there is a wedge between the value of the firm to outsiders and insiders, who both make investment decisions and enjoy private benefits. Since q reflects the valuation of the firm from the perspective of outsiders, the governance framework can influence the steady-state ratio of market value to the replacement cost of assets. For example, some models show that better corporate governance reduces the diversion of firms' cash-flows by insiders, which reduces the valuation wedge between insiders and outsiders and yields a higher q (La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; and Durnev and Kim, 2005). Others stress that better governance increases steady-state q by impeding value-reducing overinvestment that arises if the private benefits of control are positively associated with corporate investment (Lan and Wang, 2004; and Albuquerque and Wang, 2005). Empirical research finds that better governance boosts corporate valuations (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2004). The second part argues that by internationalizing into markets with stronger investor protection laws, firm insiders "bond" themselves to a better governance system, which ­ according to the theory's first part ­ increases long-run q (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999, 2002; and Benos and Weisbach, 2004). There is a growing empirical debate about the bonding view. Doidge (2004) finds that cross-listed firms have lower voting premia, which is consistent with the bonding hypothesis. Reese and Weisbach (2002) also argue that firms from high shareholder protection countries list in the U.S. to raise capital, while those from weak shareholder protection countries list in the U.S. to bond themselves to a better corporate governance mechanism. Others disagree. Licht 4 (2003, 2004) and Pinegar and Ravichandran (2003) argue that internationalization does not effectively bond firms to improved governance standards. Siegel (2005) finds that cross-listing in the U.S. did not deter Mexican firm insiders from expropriating corporate resources. Our work is most closely related to Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004). They examine a cross-section of firms and find that firms cross-listed in the U.S. have higher qs than domestic firms, which they interpret as supporting the bonding view. We contribute to the debate over the bonding view by conducting a natural test of its predictions: we examine the evolution of q.3 Although both segmentation and bonding theories predict that internationalization lowers the cost of capital and facilitates firm expansion, they generally make conflicting predictions about the long-run relation between internationalization and q. Furthermore, by adding the time-series dimension, we alleviate some endogeneity concerns that complicate pure cross-sectional analyses of q. In particular, higher valued firms might internationalize more frequently than lower valued ones. Thus, observing that international firms have higher qs than domestic ones does not necessarily imply that internationalization boosts corporate valuations. We tackle this problem by analyzing the time- series patterns of the qs of international firms and comparing them to those of domestic firms. Our results challenge models predicting that internationalization bonds firms to a better governance system. Internationalization produces neither an enduring increase in q, nor an increase in the value of international firms relative to domestic ones. Moreover, since bonding models predict that internationalization induces a lasting increase in q only when firms bond themselves to a better corporate governance system, we examine (i) a subsample of firms from 3 For example, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004, p. 234) note: "We expect firms that are not listed in 1995 but are listed in 1997 to experience an increase in q relative to firms from their country that did not list over the period of time." By examining the evolution of q, we directly test whether firms that internationalize experience an increase in q relative to firms from the same country that do not internationalize. 5 weak investor protection systems that internationalize into countries with stronger governance systems and (ii) subsamples of firms that internationalize in ways that are more likely to induce bonding, such as, public cross-listings and listings in U.S. public exchanges. The results, however, do not change across different subsamples, further challenging the bonding view. Third, this paper's findings also relate to research on market timing. Firms could list abroad to exploit a temporarily "hot" market. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2004) find that firms raise capital in the U.S. and U.K. in "boom" markets, before returns fall. Others, however, do not find evidence of post-listing underperformance by capital raising firms, as the market timing hypothesis predicts.4 Consistent with market timing, we find that q rises before internationalization and then falls immediately afterwards. However, when we control for market sentiment by including price-earnings ratios, U.S. stock returns, local stock returns, the global industry q of each firm, and international capital flows, this does not alter the time-series pattern of q. Furthermore, firms keep expanding many years after they internationalize, which suggests that they are not simply exploiting a short-term boom in the market. Taken together, these results suggest that market timing is not the only force underlying internationalization. Finally, our work also relates to a broader research on the impact of financial integration in general on economic growth, national investment, and financial development.5 We do not examine these aggregate issues. Rather, we focus on the cross-firm distributional implications of firms that access international markets by comparing international and domestic firms.6 4See Foerster and Karolyi (1999, 2000) and Errunza and Miller (2000). 5 See Levine and Zervos (1998a,b), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000a,b, 2003), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001, 2004); Chari and Henry (2002, 2004), Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2006), and reviews by Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Slot (2002) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003). 6Several other papers examine the effects of internationalization at the firm level. See Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002), Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2003), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), Levine and Schmukler (2006a,b), Patro and Wald (2005), and Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006), among others. 6 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Sections 3 and 4 present the results. We conclude in Section 5. 2. Data To document the time-series patterns of q and its components as firms internationalize and compare these patterns to firms that remain domestic, we collect substantially more data than previous studies. First, previous studies examine cross-sectional data, but theory provides predictions about the time-series patterns of q and its components. Thus, we collect accounting, balance sheet, and stock market data on both international and domestic firms over a twelve year period for firms from many countries. Second, most papers examine only the American Depositary Receipt (ADR) market, but theoretical predictions apply to internationalization beyond ADRs and firms internationalize into other countries and access the U.S market through vehicles other than ADRs. Furthermore, some theories stress that the effects of internationalization depend on the comparative effectiveness of corporate governance in a firm's home country relative to the market into which it internationalizes. Thus, it is important to examine internationalization into financial centers other than the U.S. Moreover, many models argue that the impact of internationalization is a function of the legal characteristics and regulatory requirements associated with the particular financial vehicle used to internationalize. Thus, we gain analytical power by considering internationalization through non-ADR instruments. Besides the ADR market, we include firms that internationalize (i) by issuing depositary receipts in other international financial markets, (ii) by cross-listing in the U.S. and other financial centers, and (iii) by raising equity capital through private or public placements in the U.S. or other international equity markets. We use these different subsamples of 7 international firms to assess whether the evolution of q differs across distinct methods of internationalization. The data for identifying and dating each firm's international activities come from the following sources. First, besides the Bank of New York's standard database (the Complete Depositary Receipt Directory) that contains information on current depositary receipt activities, we received access to their historical databases and reports on (i) depositary receipt program initiation dates, (ii) termination dates (if any), (iii) capital raisings, and (iv) trading activity. These data form a comprehensive database on American and Global depositary receipt programs. The historical data start in January 1956, but most programs begin after 1980. Second, Euromoney provides the dates when firms raise equity capital in international markets, including cross-listings and issuance of Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs). Thus, the Euromoney data substantively enhance the identification of international firms. The Euromoney database we use covers 8,795 cross-border equity issuances and cross-listing operations from 5,665 firms in 86 countries over the period January 1983 - April 2001. Finally, information on dating the initiation of international equity market activities was augmented with data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE), NASDAQ, and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on listing dates by foreign corporations.7 To measure firm valuation we use Tobin's q based on data from Worldscope (Thomson Financial Company), Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB), and Bloomberg. Given data availability, we calculate q as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt 7 We also have data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange's Regulated Unofficial Market (Open Market), where shares from more than 60 countries are traded. The decision to have shares traded in this market is not made by the issuing firm; rather, the decision is made by trading participants, who only need to notify the Deutsche Bourse of the type of securities to be traded and inform the issuer. There are no legal obligations for the issuing firm. Thus, we do not consider these firms as international firms. In the regressions presented below, we exclude these Open Market firms unless we have other information that indicates that they have chosen to cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or raise capital abroad. In robustness tests, we categorized these firms as domestic firms and confirmed all the paper's findings. 8 (computed as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity) divided by the book value of assets.8 Our estimate of Tobin's q does not use the market value of debt in the numerator and does not attempt to use the replacement cost of assets in the denominator. It is difficult to avoid these simplifications in a database that covers over 9,000 firms from 74 countries.9 Similar definitions of Tobin's q have been widely used in the literature (see, for example, Chari and Henry, 2002; Claesssens and Laeven, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; La Porta et al., 2002; and Shin and Stulz, 2000). Although Worldscope provides firm-level data using local GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and attempts to make data consistent across countries, these efforts have limitations. To address concerns regarding possible biases introduced by cross-country differences in accounting practices, we conduct two procedures. First, we include country fixed effects in our regressions. Second, we use the relative q of international firms (defined as the q of each international firm divided by the average q of all domestic firms in the firm's home country) as a dependent variable in some specifications. Relative q focuses on within country variation in q and is unaffected by national differences in accounting practices.10 We control for firm- and industry-specific traits commonly used in studies of firm value. The average sales growth over the last two years proxies for a firm's growth prospects. We use 8We also estimated regressions using the logarithm of this measure and obtained the same results as those reported below. 9We did not attempt to calculate the replacement cost of assets in the denominator since the required data are generally not available for our sample of firms. Moreover, countries have different ways for accounting for depreciation of physical assets. In addition, we did not want to impose a fixed depreciation formula, since the age of assets varies by economy. We also did not attempt to calculate the market value of debt, as this would require us to use data on corporate bond rates (see Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 1993), which are not available for most countries in our sample. Rather than making further assumptions, we follow the alternative convention of using the book value of debt as a proxy for its market value and the book value of assets as a proxy for their replacement cost. 10Potential biases in q from inflation may be a particular concern. In inflationary economies, using historic costs to compute the book value of assets will bias q upwards. Thus, we estimated regressions including inflation as a control variable. This did not alter the results. Also, using the relative q of international firms mitigates inflation biases because inflation exerts a similar effect on the historic asset values for international and domestic firms from the same economy. 9 sales rather than earnings to avoid the problems generated by the volatility and manipulability of earnings. To control for time-varying industry-level effects, we include each firm's global industry q, which is computed by averaging across all corporations within the firm's industry. To control for country factors, we include real GDP growth, which comes form the World Bank World Development Indicators. In robustness tests, we control for additional country traits that might affect not only a firm's q but also its willingness and ability to access international markets, including a country's institutional quality, shareholder rights, legal origin, domestic market capitalization, and an index of accounting standards. After removing financial firms (since highly leveraged and heavily regulated financial institutions could be valued differently from nonfinancial firms), firms with missing data, firms from the United States and the United Kingdom (since these are financial centers where most internationalization is taking place), and firms with less than three observations, we are left with a sample of 9,096 firms from 74 countries covering the period 1989 to 2000, totaling 66,963 firm-year observations. Appendix Table 1 lists the countries, the number of domestic and international firms per country, the coverage period for each country, and summary statistics on q. Some countries do not have any international firms. We keep these in the sample as a control group, but emphasize that this paper's results hold when we exclude countries with zero or only one international firm. Also, Japanese firms represent about 30 percent of the total firms in our sample. We therefore re-did our analyses excluding Japanese firms and reached the same conclusions reported below. 3. Results: Before and After Internationalization This section tests whether there is a significant increase in q after firms internationalize. We compare the average valuation of firms in the years before they internationalize to average 10 valuations in the years after they internationalize (including the year of internationalization). Moreover, since the bonding view holds that internationalization will only induce an enduring increase in q if firms internationalize in a manner that improves corporate governance, we examine numerous subsamples of firms that are categorized according to the legal form of internationalization, whether they raise new equity capital while internationalizing, whether they cross-list or raise capital in major international public exchanges, and whether their home country has weak shareholder protection laws. Since averaging across the years before internationalization and comparing this to the average after internationalization might hide valuable information concerning the time-series patterns of corporate valuations during the internationalization process, Section 4 below traces the year-by-year evolution of q and its components. 3.1. Do International Firms Have Higher Qs? As a preliminary step, the top panel of Figure 1 compares the average q of international firms with the average q of domestic firms. Domestic firms are firms that never issue depositary receipts, raise equity capital in international markets, or cross-list on the LSE, NASDAQ, or NYSE. We compute the average q across all domestic firms, across all years in the sample, which includes 57,876 firm-year observations. International firms are firms that at some point "internationalize."11 We characterize a firm as international even if it has not yet issued a depositary receipt, raised capital abroad, or cross-listed in an international market. Given this definition, we compute the average q across all international firms, across all years. This includes 9,087 firm-year observations. 11There are a few firms that internationalized prior to our estimation period. We include these firms in the sample of international firms. However, the results are robust to excluding them. 11 As shown in Figure 1, international firms have an average q of 1.55, while domestic firms have an average q of 1.39. The difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. The difference of 0.16 is over ten percent of the sample mean of 1.41 and is 18 percent of the standard deviation of Tobin's q across all the firms in the sample (0.86). While international firms have higher qs on average, this does not necessarily imply that the qs of international firms increase after they internationalize. Firms that internationalize might be more highly valued than domestic firms before they internationalize. 3.2. Is Q Higher After Internationalization? Next, we examine whether q rises after firms become international. The bottom panel of Figure 1 compares the average q of international firms before and after internationalization. As shown, the q of international firms does not increase after they internationalize. In fact, the average q is lower after internationalization, although the difference is not statistically significant. Table 1 provides formal tests of whether q increases following internationalization, conditional on country, industry, and firm characteristics. In Table 1, the dependent variable is Tobin's q for firm f from country c in year t (qc,f,t) for a panel of domestic and international firms across the period 1989 to 2000. All of the regressions include country and year dummy variables as well as (i) the size of the firm, as measured by the logarithm of the firm's total assets, (ii) the natural logarithm of one plus the growth rate of sales over the last two years, (iii) the natural logarithm of one plus the national rate of economic growth of each firm's home country over the last year, and (iv) the global industry q (averaged across all firms in the industry) of each firm's industry. We control for these firm, industry, and country traits because they could 12 simultaneously affect both the firm's q and its access to international markets and we want to identify the independent relation between internationalization and valuation. We examine the full sample of firms (regressions 1-6) and also restrict the sample to firms with more than 100 million U.S. dollars in average assets (regressions 7-9) because both valuations and access to international markets might differ for small firms. Excluding small firms, therefore, might improve the comparability of firms in the sample. The first result from Table 1 confirms that international firms are more highly valued than domestic firms both before and after they internationalize. This result holds when conditioning on firm, industry, and country characteristics. Regressions 1, 2, and 7 include a dummy variable, After Internationalization Dummyc,f,t, that equals one in the year that firm f from country c internationalizes and in all subsequent years. This dummy variable equals zero for domestic firms and for international firms before they internationalize. Consistent with Figure 1, the average valuation of firms that have internationalized is higher than the average of domestic firms and firms that have not yet internationalized. Furthermore, after controlling for firm size, the national rate of economic growth of each firm's home country, sales growth, global industry q, and both country and year dummy variables, we continue to find that the After Internationalization Dummy enters positively and significantly. Second, there is no evidence that q rises after internationalization. In Table 1's regressions 3, 4, and 8, we include the International Dummyc,f,t, which equals one for all years if a firm internationalizes at some point in the sample and zero for all time t otherwise. We include this in addition to the After Internationalization Dummyc,f,t, which equals one only after a firm internationalizes. Including International Dummyc,f,t drives out the significance of After Internationalization Dummyc,f,t. This suggests that it is not the act of internationalizing that is 13 associated with higher valuation. Rather, the big difference is between firms that internationalize at some point and firms that do not, consistent with the idea that higher valued firms are more likely to access international markets. In fact, when running simple cross-sectional regressions for different years, we always find that international firms have higher qs. Third, we provide a more direct test of the hypothesis that q rises after internationalization. We simultaneously include the After Internationalization Dummy and a dummy variable that equals one before a firm becomes international and zero otherwise (Before Internationalization Dummyc,f,t). For domestic firms (firms that never internationalize), the Before Internationalization Dummy equals zero throughout. If q rises after internationalization, then the estimated coefficient on the After Internationalization Dummy should be significantly larger than the coefficient on the Before Internationalization Dummy. We do not find this. In Table 1's regressions 5, 6, and 9, the difference between the Before Internationalization Dummy and the After Internationalization Dummy, is not statistically significant. In sum, the results suggest that firms that internationalize at some point in the sample tend to have higher qs than domestic firms, but contrary to some theories of internationalization q does not rise after internationalization. 3.3. Internationalization: Different Subsamples Bonding theories argue that only internationalization procedures that involve enhanced corporate governance will boost q. Pooling all types of internationalization together, therefore, would not represent a convincing test of the bonding effect. Consequently, we analyze whether the results hold when differentiating firms by (i) whether they list in a major public exchange or not when internationalizing, (ii) whether they 14 raise new equity capital or not when they internationalize, (iii) whether firms raising capital abroad do this through private placements or public offerings, (iv) whether firms internationalize into U.S. markets through Level III ADRs or through different arrangements, and (v) whether the firms' home country has weak shareholder protection laws. Some firms could have several types of listings or equity offerings in international markets. For example, a firm might first raise capital in international markets through a private placement and then cross-list in a public exchange. We classify firms according to their first activity in international markets. So, if a firm privately raises capital abroad and then lists on a major international exchange, we use the date of the private capital raising as the year of internationalization and include the firm in the private capital raising sample. Note that many of these categorizations overlap. For brevity, we only include firms with more than 100 million U.S. dollars in average assets, which is most directly comparable to the sample of firms in regressions 7-9 of Table 1. The results hold, however, when including all the firms. 3.3.1. Differentiating by Exchange Type Firms that internationalize into major public exchanges (e.g., the NYSE, LSE, etc.) are typically required to disclose more information than firms that internationalize through the U.S. OTC market or private placements in international markets. Therefore, we might expect to find that internationalization induces an enduring increase in q for exchange listed firms but not for OTC/private placement firms. Table 2 presents regression specifications similar to those in Table 1, but regressions 1­3 use a subsample of firms that internationalize via the U.S. OTC market and private placements in international markets and regressions 4­6 use a subsample of firms that cross-listed or raised 15 equity capital in a major public exchange. We also estimated regressions for firms that internationalize via the U.S. OTC market and private placements in international markets separately and obtained similar results. The Table 2 results on the subsample of OTC/private placements and the subsample of exchange listings are the same as those for the full sample: international firms have higher qs than domestic firms, but their valuations do not rise after internationalization. These findings do not support arguments that internationalizing into major public exchanges (with arguably better governance mechanisms) has a different impact on firms' valuation than using the OTC market or private placements. Regressions (1) and (4) include both domestic firms and firms that internationalize, where the domestic firms form a control group that allows us to assess whether the q of firms that internationalize rises relative to the valuations of domestic firms.12 For the OTC/private placements subsample (regression 1) and the exchange listings subsample (regression 4), the After Internationalization Dummy does not enter with a coefficient that is significantly larger than the coefficient on the Before Internationalization Dummy. In regressions 2, 3, 5, and 6, we only include firms that internationalize at some point in the sample. As shown, q is not larger after internationalization when examining either the OTC/private placements sample (regression 2) or the exchange listings sample (regression 5).13 It is possible that country-specific factors around periods of internationalization would induce fluctuations in q that make it difficult to identify the independent relation between 12Regressions 1 and 4 include all domestic firms and only the international firms being considered in each case (those with OTC/private offerings in regression 1 and those listed in major public exchanges in regression 4). Since both of these regressions include domestic firms, the total number of observations in these regressions sum to more than total observations of regression 7 of Table 1. 13In terms of matching observations between Tables 1 and 2, Table 2 only includes firms with more than 100 million U.S. dollars in average assets. In Table 2, there are 3,521 observations of OTC/private placements and 3,351 observations of exchange listed international firms. The total number of international firm observations is 6,872. There are also 32,251 domestic firm observations, so the total number of observations is 39,123, which equals the total numbers of observations in columns 7-9 of Table 1. The same demarcations hold in Tables 3-5. 16 internationalization and changes in q. For instance, a regulatory change could put downward pressure on the qs of both domestic and international firms. In this scenario, even if internationalization bonds firms to a better governance system, the net impact on q might be zero if the negative effect of the regulatory change offsets the positive effect from bonding. Consequently, we examine relative Tobin's q, which equals an international firm's q divided by the average q of domestic firms from the same country in the same year. Relative q reduces the chances that our findings are distorted by country factors driving fluctuations in the valuations of all firms in a country. Furthermore, the bonding hypothesis predicts that a firm that internationalizes into a foreign market with better corporate governance will experience a rise in q relative to domestic firms that do not internationalize and therefore do not commit to a higher level of shareholder protection, which provides an additional rational to study relative q. The results in Table 2 indicate that relative q does not increase after internationalization. The internationalization dummy does not enter significantly in either the OTC/private placements subsample (regression 3) or the exchange listings subsample (regression 6). The results do not depend on whether we focus on a subsample of firms that lists on major public exchanges or a subsample that internationalizes through the OTC market or private placements. 3.3.2. Differentiating by Equity Offering Type Next, we differentiate firms by whether they raise capital when they internationalize or not. To the extent that raising capital requires greater information disclosure and hence enhances market discipline, internationalization that involves raising capital will have a bigger impact on q than internationalization without raising new funds. International firms are classified as "capital raising" if they raised new equity through a public or a private offering in international markets. 17 All of the international capital raisings in our sample take place in developed markets (e.g., Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London, Luxembourg, New York, and Zurich). Level III ADRs involve capital raisings in public U.S. exchanges so these primary market activities are part of the capital raising sample. Similarly, the capital raising sample includes GDRs that involve new equity issuance, direct listings that entail capital raising in the U.S. and other financial centers, and private placements, such as Regulation 144A offerings in the U.S. and private placements in other international markets. We again find that q does not rise after internationalization for either the sample of firms that raise capital, or the sample that does not. The first three regressions in Table 3 use a subsample of international firms that raise new equity capital when they internationalize. The next three regressions use a subsample consisting of international firms that do not raise new equity capital. As shown, the patterns replicate all of our earlier findings. 3.3.3. Differentiating by Capital Raising Type Next, we focus only on the subsample of firms that raise new equity capital when they internationalize, but we divide them into two groups: private capital raisings and public capital raisings. Some firms raise capital when they list on major public exchanges, such as the LSE, NASDAQ, and NYSE. Other firms raise capital through private placements in international markets that do not involve an exchange listing. We examine each of these groups separately to assess whether raising new equity and listing on a major exchange bonds firms to an improved governance regime. Table 4 indicates that q does not rise after internationalization, even for firms that simultaneously raise capital and list on major exchanges. The estimates indicate exactly the 18 same pattern for private and public capital raisings, and this pattern is the same as that reported above for the full sample and other subsamples. While international firms tend to have higher qs than domestic firms (regressions 1 and 4), q does not rise after internationalization. 3.3.4. Differentiating by Listing in U.S. Markets There might be concerns that examining the full sample of international markets produces noise that makes it difficult to isolate the relation between internationalization and valuation. Furthermore, if U.S. markets have a particularly effective shareholder protection environment, then focusing on the U.S. would provide a more powerful test of whether firms that internationalize into stronger shareholder protection regimes enjoy a boost in q. Table 5 presents regressions on two samples of firms that internationalize into U.S. markets. The first sample includes all types of U.S. listings (regressions 1-3). This includes all ADR programs, firms that raise equity capital in U.S. markets (including through Regulation 144A private placements), and cross-listings on the NASDAQ and NYSE.14 The second sample only includes Level III ADRs, which are ADRs listed on a U.S. exchange that involve a capital raising component (regressions 4-6). These ADR programs are subject to more strict disclosure requirements and liability standards. In particular, they require full SEC disclosure with Form 20-F, reconciliation of financial statements to U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), and compliance with the exchange's listing rules and corporate governance standards.15 Issuers are also subject to the strict liability provisions of Section 11 of the 14 We also estimated the regressions for different subsamples (Level I and II ADRs and Regulation 144A placements), obtaining similar results. 15Form 20-F is used by foreign firms to file annual reports with the SEC (equivalent to Form 10-K for U.S. issuers). There are two sets of financial statement requirements, referred to as Item 17 ("low disclosure") and Item 18 ("high disclosure"). Level III ADRs issuers are required to file an Item 18 Form 20-F, which requires disclosures on income taxes, leases, pensions, non-consolidated affiliates, related parties, and industry and geographic segment information. 19 Securities Act of 1933, which implies that they face direct liability for any material misleading statement or omission.16 To the extent that Level III ADRs offer better investor protection than other forms of internationalization, the bonding hypothesis would predict that this type of listings will induce a particularly pronounced and enduring increase in q. Table 5 indicates that the valuation patterns for U.S. listings do not differ from the results presented above: q does not rise significantly after internationalization. Moreover, these patterns hold for the full sample of U.S. listings (regressions 1-3) and for the much smaller sample of Level III ADRs (regressions 4-6). 3.3.5. Firms from Countries with Weak Shareholder Rights La Porta et al. (2002) find that firms in countries with better investor protection laws have higher qs than comparable firms in countries with weaker governance systems. The bonding view stresses that firms internationalize to commit themselves to a stronger investor protection framework. If this is the case, then the bonding effect should be particularly large for firms from countries with very weak shareholder protection laws. Put differently, if a firm's home country has very strong shareholder protection laws then it is unlikely to enjoy an enduring boost in valuations from internationalizing into a market with similar investor protection systems. Consequently, we re-do our analyses for only those firms from countries with weak shareholder protection laws. We define a country as having weak shareholder protection laws if the index of the strength of shareholder rights developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and extended to additional countries by Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000), is 16 Firms with Level I and II ADRs and Regulation 144A placements are subject to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. Liability under these provisions requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with intent to defraud ("scienter"). Therefore, firms with Level III ADRs are subject to stricter liability standards (see Greene et al., 2000). 20 three or below out of a maximum value of six.17 Table 6 presents these regressions for all firms from weak shareholder protection countries and for various subsamples of firms where bonding theories predict that the effects on q will be largest, i.e., firms that list in public exchanges, firms that raise capital in public markets, and firms that list in the U.S. markets. We again find the same basic pattern. Internationalization is not associated with an enduring increase in q. We also confirm the results when including the shareholder protection index directly in the regressions, or when controlling for legal origin. These are the same variables used by La Porta et al. (2002). We also included interaction terms between the internationalization dummy variable and shareholder protection to assess further whether internationalization has a different effect on firms from different legal systems. We find that these interaction terms enter insignificantly. In additional (unreported) robustness tests, we included measures of institutional quality, such as an index of the efficiency of the judicial system produced by Business International Corporation and an index of accounting standards produced by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research, and obtained similar results. Including these controls did not affect our conclusions. Also, we included interactions between these institutional indexes and the internationalization dummies. These interactions are not significant, and our results were not affected by their inclusion. 4. Results: Dynamics The analyses in Tables 1-6 compare average valuations before internationalization with average valuations after internationalization, which is a natural test of conflicting theories of internationalization. Nevertheless, averaging over the pre- and post-internationalization periods 17We combine these two sources in order to increase the coverage in terms of countries. Results are similar to those reported if we only consider the shareholder rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). We also estimated the regressions including those countries with a shareholder rights index of two or less and obtained similar results. 21 may miss important patterns. For instance, market timing and some segmentation models predict that q will rise before internationalization and then quickly fall. In this section, we trace the year-by-year evolution of q before, during, and after internationalization. Furthermore, theory provides predictions about the evolution of the components of q. For instance, segmentation theories predict that stock prices, and hence market capitalization, will jump before internationalization, and then corporate assets will rise after internationalization. Thus, we also document the year-by-year dynamics of the components of q. After describing the results, we link them to the different theories of internationalization. 4.1. Results on the Evolution of Q and its Components As a preliminary step, Figure 2 plots the evolution of q during the internationalization process. To construct this figure, we make year 0 the year that a firm internationalizes. Then, year -1 is the year before internationalization, year -2 is the year two years before internationalization and so forth. Symmetrically, year +1 is the year after internationalization, year +2 is the year two years after internationalization, etc. We then compute the average q for firms in year -3, -2, etc., and plot these averages in the top panel of Figure 2. Figure 2 illustrates that internationalization is only associated with a short, temporary increase in q. The top panel shows that q tends to increase before internationalization, reaching its maximum level during the internationalization year, and then falls. The bottom panel documents a similar pattern for relative q. This panel is constructed in a similar manner, except that the q of each firm is divided by the average q of domestic firms from the same country in the same year. As shown, the valuation of international firms increases before internationalization relative to that of domestic firms and then falls after internationalization. Note that relative q is 22 always greater than one, indicating that international firms have higher qs before, during, and after internationalization. While relative q rises and falls during the internationalization process, the difference between international and domestic valuations is always positive. Tables 7 and 8 provide more formal statistical tests of the evolution of q and its components, controlling for other factors. Table 7 examines each firm's q and relative q. As stressed above, we use relative q to control for country-specific phenomena that may influence the valuations of all firms, which might confound our ability to document accurately the dynamics of q and its components during the internationalization process. To provide additional evidence on bonding, Table 7 traces the dynamics of q and relative q for four subsamples of firms: (a) all international firms, (b) only firms that internationalize into public exchanges, (c) only firms that raise capital through public exchanges, and (d) only firms that internationalize into the U.S. market. Again, the goal of examining these subsamples is to assess whether the dynamics of q and relative q differ for firms that internationalize in ways that are more likely to bond them to a more effective corporate governance system. In Table 8, we examine the components of q for the full sample of international firms. Thus, we separately document the time-series patterns of (i) the numerator of q, defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, (ii) the denominator of q, which equals the book value of assets of the firm, (iii) the market value of equity (market capitalization), and (iv) the book value of debt.18 Furthermore, for each of these four components of q, we examine their values relative to the average values for domestic firms from the same country. Specifically, we 18When analyzing q in the earlier tables, we do not take the logarithm of q. Some researchers use the logarithm of q to control for outliers. We have instead removed outliers. When examining the components of q, most researchers take logarithms, e.g., the logarithm of total assets, to control for outliers. Thus, in Table 8, we use the logarithm of the components of q to make the results comparable with the literature. We do not remove the outliers of the components so that we maintain the same sample that we use in the regressions of q. For robustness, we conducted all of the analyses using the logarithm of q, and obtained the same conclusions. 23 examine each firm's market capitalization and divide it by the average market capitalization of domestic firms from the corporation's home market. We do this for each component of q. Methodologically, we include a series of dummy variables that trace out annual patterns. The dummy variable "three years before internationalization dummy" equals one three years before the firm internationalizes and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dummy variable called "two years before internationalization dummy" equals one two years before the firm internationalizes and zero otherwise. We construct corresponding dummy variables for each of the years surrounding internationalization and the internationalization year itself. As shown in Table 7's column 1, two years before a firm internationalizes its q is significantly (at the five percent level) higher than its long-run pre-internationalization value (i.e., its value more than three years before internationalization). Tobin's q rises even further in the year before internationalization and the internationalization year. However, in the first year after internationalization, q falls sharply and it is lower than one year before firms internationalize (as shown by the size of the coefficients). By the second year, q relinquishes virtually all of its previous years' gain and is no longer significantly (at the five percent) higher than its value more than three years before internationalization.19 Relative q follows a similar pattern, rising before internationalization and even further during the year of internationalization, and then relinquishing these gains after internationalization. Relative q falls sharply in the year after internationalization and the dummy variable for the two years after internationalization does not enter with a significant coefficient in any specification. As noted above when discussing Figure 2, relative q rises and then quickly 19While it enters significantly at the ten percent level, there are almost 7,000 observations, suggesting that it is more appropriate to use a five (or one) percent significance level. 24 falls back to its pre-internationalization level, but relative q remains greater than one throughout the process. Turning to the components of q, the numerator of Tobin's q rises one year before internationalization, rises further in the year of internationalization, and remains high thereafter (Table 8). These dynamics are driven primarily by market capitalization, which rises before internationalization, even further during internationalization, and then stays at a higher level than before internationalization. The book value of debt does not rise significantly until the year of internationalization. This suggests that markets anticipate internationalization and view it positively, which is reflected in higher prices before firms actually internationalize. This pattern could also reflect market timing, as firms internationalize when their valuation increases. Table 8 demonstrates that the denominator of Tobin's q, total assets, follows a different pattern. Total assets rise significantly when the firm internationalizes, not before. Assets remain higher after internationalization. This is consistent with the view that internationalization coincides with corporate expansion, possibly because of a lower cost of capital and additional capital raisings. The patterns of q and its components tell a distinct story. Market capitalization rises before the firm internationalizes and then remains high. Assets do not increase before internationalization. Rather, assets rise when the firm internationalizes and then remain higher than they were before internationalization. Tobin's q rises before internationalization and even further during the year of internationalization as market capitalization increases. Then, q drops sharply in the year after internationalization as firms expand. 25 4.2. Robustness Tests Regarding Market Timing To assess whether market timing fully explains the time-series patterns documented above, we controlled for a wide array of variables that proxy for movements in international stock markets, foreign investor demand, and local market conditions. We controlled for market conditions because market timing theories suggest that firms issue equity in "hot" markets to exploit what they view as a temporarily high price for their shares, which would explain the temporary rise in q before internationalization. In particular, we experimented with the global average value of q for each firm's industry, the annual rate of return of U.S. stock market indexes, and the price-earnings ratio of the S&P 500 index. We also controlled for international investor demand for a country's firms by including portfolio equity flows and total equity flows (the sum of foreign direct investment and portfolio equity flows) into the country, both in U.S. dollars and as a percentage of GDP. We also included variables measuring the degree of internationalization of domestic equity markets, such as the number of international firms over the total number of firms listed in the domestic stock market and the ratio of stock market capitalization of international firms to that of domestic firms. These variables might also proxy for foreign investor interest in local firms. Finally, we included measures of domestic stock market performance, such as local stock index returns and the average q of all firms in the domestic market. Even after including these proxies for market conditions, we find the same time-series patterns as described above. Some of these control variables enter significantly, but the results on the evolution of q were not affected by their inclusion. If these proxies capture market timing forces, then the robustness of our results suggests that market timing is not the only explanation of the times-series pattern of corporate valuation. 26 5. Conclusions By documenting the time-series patterns of q and its components for firms that internationalize and comparing those patterns to firms that do not internationalize, this paper provides a natural test of theoretical predictions concerning the causes and consequences of internationalization and presents information on the cross-distributional effects of internationalization. This paper has four key findings. First, international firms tend to have higher valuations than domestic firms; namely, the average q of firms that internationalize at some point in the sample is higher than the q of firms that never internationalize. Second, corporations do not experience an enduring increase in q after they internationalize. Valuations are not higher after internationalization and valuations of firms that internationalize do not increase relative to those of domestic firms (i.e., relative q does not increase after internationalization). Third, in terms of the dynamics, q rises before internationalization, peaking in the internationalization year, and then falls rapidly following internationalization. One year after internationalization the q of international firms is lower than it is one year before they internationalize. Furthermore, the relative q of international firms follows the same pattern: rising before internationalization and during the internationalization year, but quickly relinquishing these increases after internationalization. Finally, a firm's market capitalization tends to rise prior to internationalization and remains high thereafter, while the firm's assets increase during internationalization. Furthermore, firms that internationalize expand relative to domestic firms. The results provide new evidence on different theories of internationalization. First, our findings pose a challenge to bonding explanations. Several models predict that internationalization provides a vehicle for firms to bond themselves to a more effective corporate 27 governance regime that reduces the diversion of corporate resources for private gain. The reduction in diversion, in turn, should boost valuations. We do not find this. We find that q and relative q rise immediately prior to internationalization and then fall very quickly after internationalization back to their pre-internationalization levels. To the extent that bonding effects are present, this finding means other factors must also play an important role in explaining the evolution of q. Second, the evidence is consistent with market segmentation theories, which hold that internationalization boosts firm size but exerts only a fleeting impact on q. We find that internationalization is associated with a permanent increase in market capitalization, a temporary increase in q, and a subsequent jump in corporate assets. Future research could further investigate the causes and consequences of the expansion of firms that internationalize relative to those that do not. Third, market timing might also explain some of the documented patterns. Firms could respond to positive shocks to the expected price of their shares abroad by raising capital in international markets. Since the increase in market value before internationalization is also consistent with markets anticipating that the firm is going to enjoy positive future benefits from internationalization (due to a reduction in segmentation, bonding, or any other cause), it is difficult to distinguish market timing from other theories of internationalization. Towards this end, we attempt to control for market timing by conditioning on stock market returns in the U.S. and the domestic market, price-earnings ratios, and global industry q values, among other country, industry, and firm traits. Our results are robust to including these factors. These findings do not rule out overvaluation or market timing. 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Brainard, 1977. Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital, in B. Balassa and R. Nelson (eds.), Economic Progress, Private Values, and Public Policy, North Holland, Amsterdam, 235-262. Werner, I., and A. Kleidon, 1996. U.S. and U.K. Trading of British Cross-Listed Stocks: An Intraday Analysis of Market Integration, Review of Financial Studies 9, 619-664. 34 Figure 1 Tobin's Q of Domestic and International Firms The top panel displays the average Tobin's q of domestic and international firms over the whole sample period. The bottom panel shows the average Tobin's q of international firms before and after internationalization. International firms are those identified as having at least one active depositary receipt program, having raised equity capital in international markets, or being listed on the London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, or NYSE. All Firms Average Tobin's Q 1.8 1.55 1.5 1.39 1.2 0.9 0.6 Domestic Firms International Firms International Firms Average Tobin's Q 1.8 1.64 1.53 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 Before Internationalization After Internationalization 35 Figure 2 Internationalization and the Evolution of Tobin's Q The top panel shows the evolution of Tobin's q of international firms around internationalization. The data are the average Tobin's q in each year around the internationalization date (date zero). The bottom panel shows the evolution of the relative Tobin's q of international firms, defined as the Tobin's q of each international firm over the average Tobin's q of all domestic firms in the firm's home country. The data are the average relative Tobin's q in each year around the internationalization date (date zero). International firms are those identified as having at least one active depositary receipt program, having raised equity capital in international markets, or being listed on the London Stock Exchange, NYSE, or NASDAQ. Tobin's Q 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Year Relative to Internationalization Relative Tobin's Q 1.35 1.30 1.25 1.20 1.15 1.10 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Year Relative to Internationalization 36 mrif se l d m nul era S.. U *** *** *** *** *** *** a active fi ecobti( enot het tics se se 68 one stset udelcxe (9) 281 663] 278 332] 051 994] 553 448] 318 112] 517 738] Y Y 123 195 308 003 956 107 era atist illion 0. 0. -0. 2. 0. 0. 6, 1. 39, -0. 0. 0. M 9.[ 5.[ 7.[ ts 15.[ 10.[ 8.[ sl sei s w 100 sse quae er easlta omt es y tho g bot mriflai t-sfo A than Q *** *** *** *** *** m o avinh zer hetta valu nc sse egarev s n' se se 68 te 004 277 051 552 318 517 123 195 308 107 L Y Y A bio 8)( 085] 401] 000] 445] 114] 739] 0. 0. 2. 0. 0. 6, 1. 0. dum l onait dnalan sa -0. 39, ied de naiF.se luosb thi in T 0.[ 5.[ 8.[ 8.[ w sr 15.[ 10.[ s nare ation tifnedi bla A. rmi llao F D *** *** *** *** *** nti ter eso portertset riav e ng he in th -0. 2. 0. 0. 6, 1. 0. T es era Th niia tedropertont se se 68 (7) 258 143] 045 283] 533 283] 323 341] 530 911] Y Y 123 195 308 103 0. cludingx 9.[ 7.[ 15.[ 10.[ 8.[ 39, E q. s'n omc s be mrifl mer bu eht obi deta T si mrif NASDAQ. fo a onait n or mitse *** *** *** *** *** *** se se 71 elba n he nare itio si 6)( 305 470] 319 141] 063 677] 752 103] 325 122] 682 572] Y Y 608 031 355 014 788 112 0. 0. in 6.[ -0. 2. 0. 0. 9, 1. 0. 0. 0. 51, riav sno nt wraey ntI.esi NYSE, efd ntat 10.[ 11.[ 18.[ 12.[ 12.[ e e, th onsc wr *** *** ressi ndeeped hetre he ot fta hangcx rof A. 2 rse se se 74 (5) 176 217 Y Y 963 096 413 040 389 060 0. 9, 1. 0. 0. 0. Reg eh nda orez E le 763] 676] 0. 66, ab 6.[ 4.[ s nel Pa - T.level ock T on ndal St nteclai nc na one fi Firmlan *** *** *** *** *** Q rm sl onait xidnepp se se A 71 s fi 1 n' nare ondonL der iota 4)( 011 211] 316 206] 063 679] 752 100] 325 124] 682 575] Y Y 608 031 355 112 -0. 0. -0. 2. 0. 0. 9, 1. 0. 51, elb bio het quae het dei s 0.[ 6.[ y nti m Q 11.[ 18.[ 12.[ 12.[ T ta s 37 m Ta se no eeS.y m onsc erntnI Fir n' and no atizi gniretsulc dum omc detsil mud rea ll bio A T *** y dna onitazil be n se se 74 mrif ng het eib e ictse (3) 039 839] 215 696] Y Y 963 096 413 060 -0. 0.[ 0. 4.[ 9, 1. 0. 66, for a nalo detsujda onait fore ro,ste lizatioan ncis mo D e rnae be tioan pl ark mas *** *** *** *** *** Internati ntire one m ertni se se sl het 2)( 71 283 968] 058 013] 733 926] 329 313] 695 770] Y Y 608 031 355 109 rrorse fta onali ero 0. 9.[ 0.- 2. 0. 0. 9, 1. 0. quae 11.[ 17.[ 12.[ 12.[ 51, rd he efb from ndaats T.s y d m ernat e nti th rm fi dum hti nilat lsau udelcxe .ylevitcepser,tnecrep *** se se w citse eno 74 963 096 413 059 onsisserg onitazil Y Y eq era (1) 166.0 491] y 6.[ 9, 1. 0. 66, capi m dom yt orf onait mud dom ngi n re orez equi K rnae re nti eds det dna,evif,netta quas nda rai lizatioan Uni tsael nt fore ngi be poi tioan nda mmyu he hav, ecnacifingis h)t wor (b)-(a), ) G (b se (a) y Sal m mmyu e D ry na nyatal T ertni setatS mu D e ram ter det nae D n m )st agrev t.nIr h)t abl A tef af ordi prog ni noi tioa ria s onait d).etsil de pt eht *** y sse V zati are A- m A wor G s nt porter nare si U.e **, izlan pl naloi Q um alto P Y-o nsoi eulav-P D T D w s at se nde rm recei taht tioa T yr ri mmyu e nti rn G fi + + mmieu rv s unt pee D blat se afi ryat mas het naloi tenI fo go D d (1 (1 ndustI D mmieu bse O rmiF Co fo t.nI sih omc rnate reof (L fo fo (b)-(a)=0; T be orez deposi sisehtopyh *,.stekcarb an ze from ni rnatetnIretf go go albol Drae fo.o fo.o fo.o A ntI rytnuo reofe ste Be Si L L G C Y N N N Me B T R-square s n' retfa ero s l of as het Q obiT efb onait ated ied sl ited ,**,* *** *** *** si e heT.yr itaryso mrifl Un s s ehT epd e bin'so 46 e onait nare th quae ets. T (6) Ye Ye 523 nti y dna e 0.017 0.170 0.387 0.503 3,327 1.232 0.177 blairav ). is lassifc -0.088 ountc nare Only 0.266][ 4.760][ 0.421][ 3.264][ 2.864][ activ ep is m ackrb nti ty dum tatesS lativ in irms Re e F nt elistedd eno detsil e e eg it,eg at ng an ited rea nde hom is iv an s' ch pe eastl pr hacx ch onitazil Un. de mr ex ex fi rmif ta *** *** *** *** nda E lep isticsta Q Listings s s 50 het a eht onait het fi ngiv C st-t International Ye Ye 527 sam (5) 0.011 1.855 0.521 0.732 3,351 1.576 0.182 5)( ni a of bin'so -0.122 ha OT ets.kra ot licbup g nare s eht s T 0.120][ 5.148][ 3.469][ 3.332][ 3.155][ change nda, mr zero sa m in in nti rd m fi rof uelav Ex 4)(, 2)(, citse mes deifi retfa quitye acco e ut nt ecob NASDAQ. ss-listed dei rmsif hett edd irms Q 1)( domlla or, cro hat clu bsol s F and *** *** *** *** *** *** s s (it Ye Ye ns hoset national gniyi en s ex A 67 th si are d.et Asset (4) 0.373 0.322 2.601 0.323 0.529 5,664 1.300 0.540 0.111 of he bin'so 8.873][ 4.109][ -0.052 8.021][ 9.591][ 8.492][ 35,602 -0.051 NYSE um nteri s T 14.858][ e q olc erwise era s e, Domestic tho ni dnat pot rmif porer erage International Typ ge anh nI.level s'niboT mrif hyl l hangcx ent classifrof not Av nul cial in an Q e zero E but d onait lacemenp mr lacemp ered het inF *** *** erag an s s Exc fi av nare ate deta bin'so 46 Stock idsn Ye Ye 530 ate yb eht co ntI. iv ivrp stset es.l Dollars T e (3) 0.274 0.180 0.171 3,512 1.100 0.115 Q hetta aln a mitse Only -0.066 1.204][ -0.048 2.607][ 0.766][ 2.927][ 1.186][ pr atio sei ondonL a ated omt n hgu ariabv si U.S. lativ bot irms Re 2 bin's ngire ervo erntni wr h g ro nta F he het th To irmf oug ot no hrt hetta in illion ain M 38 Table ustlc ets onstc nda aln mes for orez alization det rem 100 lacements ark P *** *** *** n atio listed atio m eht Q s s 47 iot de ecob A.sre Ye Ye 531 nda capital tern aln fo anht International rivate bin'so (2) -0.070 -0.070 2.083 0.253 0.276 3,521 1.383 0.148 ust tern l ed in n P T 1.018][ 2.978][ 4.122][ 2.984][ 1.545][ liza dja in irmf eingb porertset a na s onait atio ro isar ehT itio nteclai Less and in nc iot orrre each en fo nare or hti e.g erntni heT. efd na w fi wh s OTC dr q nti ts,ek ar tsek an in d)er e s se m ar ch de th irms F *** *** *** *** *** *** Interna ndaa n' eary m ital ex rof der de ) 64 st hti obiT e omc th be CT 0.220 -0.041 2.517 0.276 0.466 5,668 1.283 0.040 0.531 0.096 35,772 national O( licbup cap onsic 2 Ye Ye si le onsic .ylevitceps rmi F and Q s s bin'so (1) 0.179 5.416][ 3.329][ 6.404][ 9.215][ 7.985][ w het ert T 14.607][ si af mrif a raised ng abT era Domestic y Excluding ons e d ni a nteri ni xid re,tne International ssierger blairav het an e ounterc irstf ital siiarlat no enp e for rcep nc Ap si er nt eno be capital one nde he-t-revo cap irmf a piac e eno if wth) pl ., m Gro quastsael (b)-(a),y pe alsu sl s m equity .S. aisedrro etavi eeS.y pr sa dna, (b) (e.g de s m (a) y eq quae U ity hit het y m Sale Dum yr het m y m isedar ni mud e of n Dum na 6)( di mmyud ss-listed et omrf veif,netta Dum rage n nt.Ir dum ngi listed cro da d n ts) Av or nda activlan wth) n ar Variable st 3)( porer ns onitazil hav, atht het Afte- Asse alue atio alization y nalizatio Gro -Ye s ns nt y mar ss-orc udelcxe ecnacifi Q m atio nalizatio talo ie s P-v tern onl wo m s atio nde e um alization hatt eso in rnatio GDP T ie rv 0; og th era gnis s pe rnatio + + Dum blat olc onait pr nda tern in na Tfo m untrie atio are irstf nteI g (1 ndustryI Dum dom Dum Defo nt.I d s hiT nI. nare hoset reo me nteIr re (Lo (1fo fo re (b)-(a)= bal tern e eir fo g g untry ar an fo q in nti eceiptr ar rmsif etavi ngi Obsefo. Firmfo. Cofo. th pr efb ste K *** Afte Be Size Lo Lo Glo Co Ye No No No Me Be T R-square s n' retfa ero are ited obiT efb itaryso s stekra lan g ero Q atio efb ,**,* ** * ** si e blairav heT.yr aisinr Un s s ehT epd irmf m e bin'so th ets. 38 T Ye Ye 399 e aln ngie tern ital dna (6) in -0.046 0.783 0.132 0.162 2,884 1.123 0.079 ). orf cap lsau e ackrb Only -0.077 1.111][ 2.230][ 1.724][ 2.236][ 0.931][ ountc activ atio ni irstf lativ as eq in e nt elistedd eno y tatesS irms Re tern F in nde hom ite is pe s' eastl gn detsilt eir ied m d th rea fo mud Un de mr fi rmif ta aisir hat tead lassifc n ** *** ** is le.p isticsta Raisings Q s s 39 het a het fi ngiv st-t Ye Ye 400 5)( ni oseht eht it,e lizatio International sam of bin'so (5) -0.088 -0.063 3.154 0.196 0.302 2,888 1.387 0.124 ha is s T 0.980][ 2.414][ 5.226][ 2.371][ 1.288][ s Capital nda, mr zero sa era pe onait s chang eht ty fi ex nare m uelav Non-Capital 4)(, 2)(, citse mes deifi nt mrifl ecob ngiref dei NASDAQ. onait of public a ntiretfa rof e ut edd irms bsol s F and *** *** *** *** *** *** Q 1)( domlla (it or, s s ni clu A 64 Ye Ye ns hoset nare hett ex equity d.et Asset bin'so (4) 0.213 0.252 -0.042 2.609 0.269 0.468 5,537 1.281 0.038 0.643 0.097 35,139 pe of nti T 5.973][ 2.940][ 6.424][ 14.809][ 8.868][ 7.877][ um q NYSE hat listed are Ty olc erwise era het s Domestic s tho e, ng s porer mrif ot si erage International eringff O nI.level s'niboT l ingd pot in e zero hangcx siiarlat oss- he cr rmif not Av en Q E cial but d onait th hyl an *** * *** *** mr erag an piac accor s s fi av nare s nda nul inF deta bin'so 49 Stock on- Dollars T het e (3) Ye Ye 515 0.009 0.512 0.623 2,874 1.188 0.247 Equity by hetta eht aln ntI. mrif ent es.l mitse Only 0.113][ -0.075 3.538][ -0.649 1.694][ 3.746][ 3.161][ atio si U.S. lativ 3 Q ngire ervo sei erntni wr ondonL N.stekra ngiyi stset lacemp ariabv nta irms Re F he het ml omt illion g ate M 39 bin's Table ustlc irmf ot no lassifc bot in iv onstc To aln mes onait rof pr ain 100 *** *** *** for a Q s s nda de atio ecob orez listed ed h hetta rem A.sre 53 Raisings 519 n nda nare Ye Ye tern l nti 0.475 0.673 0.829 2,903 1.531 0.232 oug det eht anht International bin'so (2) -0.014 -0.112 iot ust irmf T 0.142][ 4.171][ 0.873][ 3.815][ 3.171][ dja in ni thr a liza s onait eingbro fo Less onsiderc nteclai Capital n nc hti na iot orrre each en tsek fo nare reffo wh ated ar porertset itio na w fi s dr q nti ts,ek tea m in ar s m heT. efd der rmi irms F *** *** *** *** *** *** ndaa n' eary se rivp e de F and Q s s a th 67 Interna st hti obiT e omc th ro d)er Ye Ye national be de rof onsic .ylevitceps bin'so (1) 0.323 6.906][ 0.324 4.427][ -0.049 7.379][ 2.433 0.324 9.595][ 0.526 8.411][ 5,656 1.293 0.001 0.993 0.107 35,154 w het ert national T 14.109][ si af mrif nteri 2 nationalization ni onsic era Domestic le y Excluding ons e d a nteri licbup a si re,tne International ssierger blairav an e ni nteri het no for hgu ng abT be ehT e capital si er nt eno ro capital th e. siiarlat xid rcep nc enp e eno wth) pl one nde er tim equity quastsael e Ap m Gro (b)-(a),y pe alsu sl equity ithe piac sa dna, (b) s m de eq quae sam eeS (a) y het y m Sale Dum yr het ital isedar m e y m isedar etavi .y st pr m Dum na 6)( cap di mmyud hetta irf s omrf veif,netta Dum rage n nt.Ir dum ngi m hit d n ts) Av or nda mud n irf wth) of n ar Variable st 3)( porer ns onitazil hav, ityuqe Afte- capital a et Asse alue nalizatio Gro -Ye s ns nt y mar if udelcxe ecnacifi Q m da nalizatio talo ie s P-v wo m s atio nde e um alization rnatio GDP T ie rv 0; og het alization era gnis s pe rnatio + + Dum blat olc onait Tfo m untrie pr atio aisedrtaht ., isingar .ge( y na atio nteI g (1 ndustryI Dum ity dom Dum Defo nt.I d s hiT nI. onl me re (Lo fo re (b)-(a)= bal tern nare eso nteIr (1fo tern ngi fo g g untry ar Obsefo. Firmfo. Cofo. an fo q in nti eceiptr th without activ nda ste in K *** Afte Be Size Lo Lo Glo Co Ye No No No Me Be T R-square s n' retfa ero s n is e t, are Q obiT efb itaryso mrif ni g l ital blaT ey *** *** ** si e blairav heT.yr x s s ehT epd cap listin th ercenp bin'so 39 e onait alization ndi ce ate eno T Ye Ye 267 e (6) 0.770 0.614 1,613 1.279 0.288 ). atio Only -0.052 -0.101 -0.648 ountc activ nare raised ivrp ppe ins 0.481][ 3.353][ 1.242][ 4.248][ 2.190][ d A el lativ an e nt elistedd eno nti erntni is irms Re e, F fo amps nde hom is ehT irstf th fo eeS.y ivf, m pe s' eastl ple irmf eht ent de mr fi rmif ta ams ets. a tead dum m at Raisings *** *** ** Q s s if 41 het a rof het fi ngiv ehT eht 269 mark Ye Ye ., (5) -0.047 -0.143 0.739 1.000 0.806 1,630 1.622 0.277 5)( ni ha aln bin'so 0.347][ 3.759][ 1.079][ 4.282][ 2.192][ (e.g only onitazil ec International edd ican Capital T s nda, mr zero sa clu atio ity nda ifn fi onait ex sig ublic P 4)(, 2)(, citse mes deifi tern are NASDAQ. nt in activ ecob dei or, in lan nare ean listing nti m irms s F g e and *** *** *** *** *** *** Q 1)( domlla (it tioa modg s s orf in 65 Ye Ye ns hoset teavirp K Asset (4) 0.441 0.417 2.524 0.320 0.518 5,406 1.288 0.857 0.109 NYSE of a be bin'so -0.049 33,881 -0.024 pe um q erwise era rineffo T 6.862][ 3.300][ 7.317][ 14.200][ 9.389][ 8.168][ e, erntni het ited ***,**,* Domestic Ty olc s tea ngi tho sl Un erage ets. International ising Ral nI.level s'niboT mrif hangcx rivp rstif hav d Av l a E as quae an in zero y ackrb Q e ro ireht d onait edi m in ** * ** mr erag an s s pita fi av nare Stock licbup fo tatesS dum rea bin'so 44 ated lassifc Dollars T e (3) Ye Ye 248 0.260 0.416 1,261 1.072 0.287 Ca by hetta eht aln ntI. a ited e Only -0.055 0.663][ -0.056 2.108][ -0.637 1.231][ 1.786][ 1.970][ th Un U.S. lativ 4 Q ngire ervo atio sei ondonL hgu is onitazil irms erntni wr ro siti,e Re het th ep F he onait le.p t-statistics ni er ty fo illion chang sam M 40 bin's Table ustlc irmf ot g es To aln mes ithe ex nare eht 100 Raisings *** * * Q nda for listed lic s s de atio ecob orez ital m luav 46 250 n nda rineffo pub cap a ntiretfa rof te anht International (2) Ye Ye -0.096 -0.019 0.367 0.520 1,273 1.414 0.266 iot ust tern irmf l eingb lu bin'so -0.144 Capital 1.171][ 2.701][ 0.026][ 1.919][ 1.887][ dja in ni edd so T a liza s onait ro ityuqe hett Less clu Ab. hti rivate na iot orrre each en ex P fo nare ts,ek wh aisedrtaht d hat an s w si s dr q nti ar eg capital are tedro s se m he an s rmi irms F ** *** *** *** *** *** ndaa n' eary eso th ch isedar pot rmif F Q s s 65 Interna st hti obiT e omc as ex th hyl (1) Ye Ye be national ed eht 0.137 0.233 then -0.042 2.476 0.284 0.485 5,387 1.277 0.096 0.245 0.099 nul cial reptontub and bin'so T 2.474][ 3.083][ 6.426][ 13.960][ 8.911][ 7.966][ 33,524 w het ert si af mrif in nteri ot nda an Domestic het ated Excluding ons e d a ni g inF International ent ssierger blairav efd,s an e in rd stset es.l no for acco lacemp omt ist er nt eno be capital irmflan estim ariabv wth) one ate bot g nde quastsael pe alsu sl atio rmsif iv in tansn Gro (b)-(a),y equity pr co (b) s m de tern ain (a) y eq quae a hetta in A y h m Sale Dum yr het y m isedar g gniyi det rem m e oug ters. Dum na 6)( di mmyud eht Dum rage n nt.Ir dum ngi aisinr lassifc thr cen n ts) Av or nda fo wth) n ital n ar Variable st 3)( porer ns onitazil hav, rof tsek porertset Afte- Asse Gro -Ye s ns nt y alue ar mar cap itio nalizatio Q m m in nalizatio talo ie s P-v . wo m s atio nde e um alization ered heT. og efd ialcnanif rnatio GDP T ie rv 0; s pe rnatio + + Dum blat olc onait ylno ely Tfo m pr untrie atio sed idsn d)er e g (1 Dum d co de th ered nteI ndustryI Dum Defo nt.I s hiT nI. ationaln ectiv nteIr re (Lo (1fo fo re (b)-(a)= bal tern nare clu q in nti eceiptr in tead idsn fo g g untry ar Obsefo. Firmfo. Cofo. an fo inter onsic rof ste 2 co resp Afte Be Size Lo Lo Glo Co Ye No No No Me Be T R-square s n' retfa ero ni ro n rof e si th les. Q obiT efb etavi nta *** * si e blairav heT.yr dezil pr s s ehT NYSE lizatioan ered tests riabav bin'so 29 T Ye Ye 629 110 onait e m 1.079 0.879 1.463 0.457 ). th atio 144A gni onstc e (6) 0.118 A Only 0.557][ -0.060 1.290][ -0.841 0.888][ 3.336][ 1.891][ ountc nare idsnoc no lativ tern e e nti in ated onita ttoob .sre irms Re F nt elistedd th t n ulg emainr listed str at e ntec nde hom is hat fi th pe s' Re e g a lai de mr fi rmif rtedo fo nc *** * host einb het( h Q n na ADRs s s 29 het a y het ro e pl lizatioanoit epr ougr fi Ye Ye 633 110 fi itio III International (5) m 0.251 1.001 1.174 1.114 1.784 0.453 5)( ni onl s ets, sa nare th estt in . bin'so T 1.055][ -0.073 1.246][ 0.847][ 2.702][ 1.925][ s tse efd der ely de nda, mr zero udel ark het nti ehT Level e fi m ni ark th ectiv 4)(, 2)(, citse mes nci m d heT. s U.S. d) rof onsic ADR). resp ecob mrif ni udel U.S. udel ni III 2 era t, irms y s F le and *** *** *** *** *** *** Q 1)( domlla l nci (it ital nci el het s s 63 Ye Ye ns onait ital abT e rcenep Asset (4) not 0.694 0.736 2.499 0.297 0.504 5,247 1.281 0.042 0.858 0.109 of cap evL bin'so not 6.010][ 3.146][ -0.044 6.549][ 8.885][ 7.968][ 32,884 cap um sa nc si eno T 13.658][ q Domestic Q olc erwise nare ityu era.S. siti xidnep e erage pl International bin's To nI.level s'niboT tho nti eq ded U R raised Ap m dna, Av of D clu e het sa A in e zero Q pl d raised n na irstf m d inton eeS .y het *** *** *** nda mr erag an sa gni hat r irmf s s fi av aln avh he ssuei a dna m omrf veif,netta bin'so 51 Dollars T e (3) Ye Ye 838 0.267 0.257 0.452 5,375 1.177 0.165 ets rk hetta eht heT. ot if g d Only -0.016 -0.064 n mud 0.331][ 4.269][ 0.919][ 4.075][ 3.228][ ., n U.S. lativ irms Re 5 Ma ngire ervo atio sei het erntni wr he ram,gorp stekra (e.g listin ecnacifi F ml illion ity tea t lizatioan udelcxe gnis M 41 U.S. Table ustlc irmf ot nda.S. rivp era na in aln mes n for orez onait U a tioa Listings me 100 *** *** *** *** Q s s iot de atio ecob receip nda nare het activlan 56 n atio erntni dom U.S. ngi *** anht International (2) Ye Ye 843 of -0.014 -0.088 1.963 0.343 0.655 5,406 1.485 0.177 liza ust tern l nti gnivah K bin'so 0.225][ 4.628][ 4.859][ 4.093][ 3.483][ in irmf hatr rn **, T na dja itaryso ni as ero pes a iot s onait he te det Less epd Ty orrre each en fo nare ngitsil ot in edi efb ni *,.st wh dr q nti stekra e U hti irstf th w All s eir classif Interna s se ml th is lsau nda kecarb ni rmi irms F *** *** *** *** *** *** ndaa n' eary oss-rc F and American e fo Q it eq s s 68 st hti obiT omc e th be orlat onait y setatS era Ye Ye m det bin'so (1) 0.298 T 9.205][ 0.303 5.108][ -0.050 7.764][ 2.500 0.304 14.807][ 9.743][ 0.525 8.670][ 5,980 1.302 0.005 0.938 0.108 37,657 w het ert tead si af mrif activ nare U Excluding ons e d a eno piac nti eht ram,gorp mud ni Domestic n International ssierger blairav III an e .e pl no for eastl ngisiar nilat be sileveL el scitsitats-tfo at by evL lizatioan m sa seul er nt eno piac g a one in tioa het va wth) nde ADR ed quastsael pe alsu sl dezil avh desiar Gro (b)-(a),y eht lish (b) s m (a) de y eq quae d m Sale Dum yr het y esoht onait mr erntni omrf ot etulosb y m nare fi g estab ter m e a in s af Dum na 6)( di mmyud as dum ntit fi. rage rd .ge eht udelcxe Dum n nt.Ir n ts) Av or nda n hat A.detrop wth) acco ar Variable st 3)( porer ns onitazil edni Afte- efd s d,er terward taht era Asse alue af s nalizatio Gro -Ye s ns nt y nalizatio Q ie s m P-v de rmsif d talo wo m s atio nde e um alization mriF ets, Q. ant mrif retontub rnatio GDP T ie rv 0; s pe rnatio + + Dum blat olc onait onsic atio lai Tfo m untrie g (1 Dum d mark si gniyi sisehtopyh det nteI ndustryI Dum Defo nt.I s hiT nI. nc nteIr re (Lo (1fo fo re (b)-(a)= bal tern nare ASDA et q in nti U.S. N da classif acemenlp llun naiF maitse fo g g untry ar Obsefo. Firmfo. Cofo. an fo ste Afte Be Size Lo Lo Glo Co Ye No No No Me Be T R-square s ghtirredl orez s seoht ro si t- , ES retfa eht fo rmi *** *** nda e ar Y morf es s es es 34 l s N cationi hett ing 6)( Y Y 382 hoer naoit m , hat ded luav Flanoi Only 0.004 at 0.058][ -0.103 3.556][ 0.775 1.368][ 0.389 2.610][ 0.417 1.190][ 2,282 1.471 0.233 nge pecifs s te has si lu List a nare irflan ha h ernt xc hti nti e ation E eac U.S. ar w se seir ternI kco in hetopyhl lucxe sob Q In s A. s s fo bin'o T untoc moceb St edsu m rmi nul irf pes and ise. no eht Ty icts wre ndo riestn Flanoi *** *** *** *** *** *** 40 (5) Yes Yes morf mrif st ialcna tedroperton All 0.382 0.311 1.175 0.220 0.624 2,268 1.302 at 14,116 -0.070 0.331 0.152 L meo 7.286][ 4.397][ -0.047 4.886][ 5.671][ 5.360][ 5.313][ a tho s n o eht est cou inF tub D ernt In m he fo mot es.l ated ts irf w zer no ghi R sed raey ple bot iab ted s lis ams arv estim erd lucni g is rmi het dnalan n eh ehtta in ** * *** * T de t es es ol reh ylno retfa tioan eigb ina etss s 23 e. 4)( Y Y 838 134 ertni ro mer tansn As Flanoi Only at -0.193 1.031][ -0.107 2.286][ -1.312 1.684][ 1.280 4.296][ 0.908 1.968][ 1.575 0.323 Sha elp , cas co ising nda se tse eht ernt k ams no Q m reporttset ark each fo A.s Rala In s Average Wea eh m in eh n ter T neo ecob pit la T s in bin'o hti l.e sl cen Ca rmi T ibed w lev uaqe mrif *** *** *** *** *** *** ation cr and a 39 Dollars mrif y m ero erntni esd Public icts (3) Yes Yes 0.124 g (2000)..late itionifed eht ialcnanif Flanoi 0.453 meo at 5.683][ 0.576 2.918][ -0.045 4.623][ 1.203 5.516][ 0.225 5.051][ 0.705 5.711][ 2,020 1.289 0.526 0.152 12,672 Countries 6 ehtta umd efb ni tin rof ed U.S. D eno lis 2 er ernt fo g elba idsn In illion ble from in lsau rotsiP capital d T co M 42 Ta s noitazil an s ster eq epyt ity y e era 100 Firm - lucrof naoit rmi m th equ *** *** * Q nare mud ed ith (1998) ixdnepp yeht than w al A Flanoi es es 31 (2) Y Y 232 nti n rais s ec et sse Only 1.041 0.650 1,388 1.576 0.281 at -0.134 -0.093 -0.861 bin's steduj 1.191][ 2.753][ 1.169][ 4.155][ 1.717][ ad retfa L gni irmf a eeS.y sin gsn lep y.levitcepser,tnecrep thi tisi ernt Q To nda sror he lizatioan avh la ortP m eno w L In s a s er T. , tiona L mud sam ge s bin'o n q ram n an T iot drad ation yb eht Firm rmi liza s'nibo ter in prog erntni de chx and *** *** *** *** *** *** E e icts 40 Yes Yes stan T th lizatioan morf na report ded Flanoi (1) 0.442 0.018 cludingx at 7.291][ 0.460 3.928][ 0.048- 4.898][ 1.209 5.593][ 0.236 5.268][ 0.685 5.708][ 2,118 1.301 0.878 0.156 13,222 iot ith is erofeb dna,evif,netta meo w E le sn eh receipt esd tioan D ernt erna Int ssioer egr abiravtned T.) clu itary in as,sthg ertni lucxe In e s ri or ero ar ) e listeded eposd irmf th) e la efb modg ecnacifingis en e na w aruqs is in epd th K me Gro (b)-(a,y eh mrif activ tiona rectiditna r lsau (b) m ited *** (a) y T least afi eno D t erntni eiht y m Sales mu eq **, m y Un yranidro ess.l o easl fo of m erage Int.r ro zer si dna Dum Dum n ) n eer se at ple Av tef g asb mud tses th) w m in tsro ams n Variable th eht tatesS A- As y nalizatio Gro ns to ecob avh eh *,.stekcarb Q m ni nalizatio talo Year-o esi lueav-P epr it( T on w m atio as . GDP T try esi mu el aluqe itedn rve s D Q ise ied edni lizatioan U era Tfo + + m untries )=0; Internatio go (1 Dum Indus y tab Internatio Dependentfo Int. ish xed T in wrehto tif (L Dum SDA rme ation le.p ter iden NA det in sam scitsitats (1fo fo alb ter reo go go untr Obsfo. Firmfo. Cofo. ean reofe (b)-(atse quared Af Bef Size L L Glo Co Year No No No M B T R-s s (4), ie se m in m m the the co no fro e Q ** ** *** *** ** *** *** *** sts are d (2), s'n es es dum be d te tiva (8) 51 101 265] 118 188] 158 012] 210 251] 143 308] 099 639] 034 543] 000 004] 060 105] 131 448] 224 737] 422 024] Y Y 375 838 172 156 ns n (it m Listings Rel obi 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 5, 1. 0. liste lum re tto cludexe T [2. [2. [3. [3. [2. [1. [0. [0. 0.- [4. [0. [3. [3. co fo ing bo t-statistics U.S. nI nalizatio be be are the s fo of ro q. ro at s ze pes Q * ** *** *** ** * *** *** *** *** rnatio ts, d firm rte aluev Ty s'n (7) 56 107 144 231 281 194 162 044 001 083 851 299 626 Yes Yes 406 843 485 185 bin'so and obi 691] 964] 050] 116] 232] 880] 502] 006] 431] 560] 732] 297] inte po 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. All T 0.- 1. 0. 0. 5, 1. 0. T n arke [1. [1. [3. [3. [2. [1. [0. [0. [4. [4. [3. [3. is arey m re lute st nal inancialF te le s. Abso nalizatio he ariablev sing rnatio T. d. e Q ** *** ** *** *** ** rte nt he es es 39 T. rnatio inte case ariablev po tiva s'n 6)( 164 114 286 244 173 053 081 047 098 783 730 608 Y Y 613 267 279 292 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1, 1. 0. nde inte in ret Rel obi 040] 364] 635] 081] 300] 436] 616] 312] 175] 458] 944] 173] Raisings T [2. [1. [2. [2. [1. [0. [0. [0. 0.- [3. 0.- [1. [3. [2. pe g ache no de untry aining co win apitalc in m but the e d re llo d Capital m fo pe the ate Q ** * *** *** ** *** *** ** (7) ho Ty 's and arey quitye scribe fo s'n ublic (5) 41 318 213 428 422 345 170 149 090 136 517 924 799 Yes Yes 630 269 622 285 d de n stime P obi 412] 934] 426] 247] 423] 262] 991] 492] 449] 747] 853] 167] 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. T [2. [1. [3. [3. [2. [1. [0. [0. 0.- 0. 0. 0. 1, 1. 0. [3. [0. [3. [2. firm is Assets (5), third raise the listing finitio (3), in the ing fo de nstant s r (1), afte hav, pe the co e Q ** ** * *** *** *** ty r Average A ns firm fo in tiva s'n 4)( es es 46 033 042 148 190 147 118 049 023 081 061 352 493 Y Y 327 523 232 181 neo ramg the 2 rs. Rel obi 563] 697] 196] 306] 848] 543] 614] 265] 363] 150] 013] 820] 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. T [0. [0. [2. [2. [1. [1. [0. [0. 0.- 0. 0. 0. 3, 1. 0. Internationalization lum stice [4. [0. [3. [2. nte co m pro Listings by nI with able ce do qualse ipt s T Dollars Q l.ev all y ce m re ndix Only le fo firm U.S. change Q * *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** financial 7 q nal s'n 50 dum Appe d irms Ex (3) 138 147 294 313 292 234 107 062 112 660 463 712 Yes Yes 351 527 576 189 Tobin's firm n sitary e re F obi 518] 785] 298] 936] 865] 315] 023] 543] 610] 155] 023] 082] 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. T [1. [1. [3. [2. [2. [2. [1. [0. 0.- 1. 0. 0. 3, 1. 0. of Million [4. [3. [3. [3. 43 the Table bin'so po rnatio at T de Se.y nside 100 e e inte m nalizatio co ring rage the activ s dum are than e Q ** ** ** *** ** *** *** *** Evolution av n rnatio y International irms tiva s'n es es (2) 52 the cluste neo the 090 Less 095 123 162 122 087 021 020 054 212 265 370 Y Y 839 053 164 135 r the F inte Rel obi 280] 006] 551] 834] 189] 626] 366] 326] 238] 790] 340] 076] 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. T [2. [2. [2. [2. [2. [1. [0. 0.- [0. 0.- 0. 0. 0. 6, 1, 1. 0. fo and d revo r ast include [4. [0. [4. [3. ith le s nalizatio since afte at .y w firm uste firm adj arsey ple ing rnatio irms nal velit F sam rs nal e hav inte ecp Q * ** *** *** ** * *** *** *** *** International s'n (1) 57 rroe 019 360 thre as 113 034 477 rnatio re the 131 191 221 165 138 079 024 551 Yes Yes 872 058 155 All obi 956] 005] 798] 807] 180] 847] 436] 232] 771] 535] 394] 471] 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 2. 0. 0. 6, 1, 1. 0. rnatio d fo m esr,t T 0.- 0.- inte be cluding [1. [2. [2. [2. [2. [1. [0. [0. [4. [5. [4. [3. inte than ntifie fo fro enc Ex d Internationalization standard reo the erp ache ide ple e m on with fo se he sam qualse cludexe y q ns T. tho he y dna m T m are are um ssio m D reg bin'so rwise s dum do ve,if, T n y re theo firm the King entta m y y m y y um m y m m noitazil h)t ro nal is NASDAQ. d wor ze ro D G square nalizatio and rnatio Unite ast ecnacifi D um m um um noitazil D um le ariablev arey nteI rnatio noitazil D um D D y m noitazil naoit rnae selaS nt d d). NYSE,,e and gnis noitazil noitazil noitazil inte s n naoit naoit um naoit ntIretf egarev nde rre rnae naoit naoit naoit A elba h)t rdinaryo ria pe fe liste the State mea rnae Drae rnae re de chang d ntI ntI rnae Y rnae srae )stess Arae V rts de that *** ntI rnae Y G nt is Ex e Alat wor P Y-o Q po the the esi ck sis reofe ntIretf re in Unite. **, D m nsoita se B reofe B reofe noitazil ntIretf ntIretf A ri A Thre G Tw yrt m esi s (8) firm the + ndeepe a Sto n Tofo + m table neo d n po ple *,.s srae srae naoit srae srae go (1 Du m rvesb unto re and if Tha Dfo hy sam e Y Y Y Y e (L fo Du his ro ndo o o re na T (6), quale ze Lo null the etkcarb Y Brae Arae Y ne rnae (1fo ne Ofo.o Cfo.o Thre Tw O ntI O Tw Thre Mo eziS goL goL ndusIlabol rytnuo rmiFfo.o uaqs- G C Year N N N Me R the revo t e s ,e d ,e nal ie as arke firm fiv lativ m a evital of d m t re if chang Unite n, eula ** * *** *** *** *** *** se es es 52 firm rnatio the fo dum te Re V (8) 137 099 180 282 245 334 442 897 295 300 Y Y Y 838 053 739 233 n ro Ex 231] 805] 349] 011] 648] 162] 766] 007] 614] 284] and at of Deb 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 6, 1, 0. 0. nal inte [1. [0. [1. [2. [1. [2. [2. [5. [2. [3. as ze ck s calculate ache d se ogL Book rnatio fo fine arithmg m Sto State nalizatio n lo co d llars, inte de nificance ts be ndo t do n, (8) sig rnatio (it Lo ** * ** *** *** *** ache asse and re Unite. ane Book se 57 U.S. fo inte Debfo tal fo the ple 121 136 263 357 473 927 499 871 058 881 378 m of (7) 091] 076 636] 050] 275 002] 788] 334] 992] 221] 019] 305 360] Y Yes Yes 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 6, 1, 6. 0. in r to r llars; arey eu be in [1. [0. [1. [2. [1. [2. [2. [5. [1. [3. ro d sam ogL Val ratoe ratoe the capitalizatio do le ze as t liste the num d sing U.S. and m ***,**,* n num q ne arke he n ing fro ts. q fi m * ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** in s'ni de e T. be d evital et tioa bt ro Re iz se es es 52 bin'so 177 268 438 610 515 524 479 799 086 561 839 053 341 272 ts, ude (6) 776] 368] 723] 893] 769] 723] 289] 838] 011] 448] Y Y Y lativ de of ital ts, 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 5. 0. 6, 1, 0. 0. ob T T re fo untry nalizatio asse clxe bracke Mark [1. [2. [3. [4. [3. [3. [3. [4. [4. in co ogL Cap [10. the of tal fo arke e m m are are mhtir as rnatio d to aluev s e thm ho inte nal t n 's fine arig g firm istics kera tioa * ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ogal) de lativ koob re lo r, fo iz se firm win rnatioe M 57 t-stat (5) 165 of ital 717] 244 268] 395 543] 602 006] 520 917] 540 933] 502 528] 824 075] 040 021] 578 533] Y Yes Yes 872 058 954 343 Q (1: fo 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 5. 0. 6, 1, 6. 0. (6) the llo int fo [1. [2. [3. [5. [3. [3. [3. [5. [4. ratoe fo s in in Financial Assets ogL Cap [10. are s arithmg s s. Tobin's num arithmg llars; arey lo aluev firm q of lo do capital firm ariablev (7); third lute Average *** ** *** *** *** *** *** (4) U.S. stice nal evital ssets se es es nt bin'so in Re A 52 m Abso (4) 127 234] 128 155] 195 644] 323 596] 299 234] 360 590] 447 092] 878 343] 056 523] 257 237] Y Y Y 839 053 888 258 T in ther quitye untry of 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 6, 1, 0. 0. do nde e d. [1. [1. [1. [2. [2. [2. [3. [5. [2. [3. llars; n d rnatio talo co afte T pe do e all rte ogL Components de lativ m fo neo raise inte Dollars po re he the T fo ho U.S. bt ing ret Only 's nlyo U.S. in de s no la *** *** *** *** *** ** *** 8 of l.ev capitalizatio qualse ot ts t firm fo y hav, but irms T ts se F 57 le arithmg m 114 108 154 317 304 376 468 904 036 273 872 058 499 372 d of sse (3) 124] 012] 343] 611] 322] 750] 291] 579] 506] 450] Y Yes Yes asse arke the ramg include Million A 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 6, 1, 7. 0. 44 [1. [1. [1. [2. [2. [2. [3. [5. [2. [3. Table lo aluev ate firm tal m in dum ogL n ple 100 Evolution (2) to fo s ko pro the n; fo bo ipt stime sam the at firm e ce is than he r nalizatio Q * ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** and ring arithmg re stice rage T International evital arithmg lo m av s. Less nstant Re s'n ratoe se es es 52 (2) 169 175 275 420 364 395 422 828 241 414 Y Y Y 839 053 970 256 lo do the sitary ith m 667] 618] 384] 448] 749] 869] 958] 083] 843] 699] 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 6, 1, 0. 0. cluster (5) rnatio co of obi capitalizatiot ; Nu [1. [1. [2. [3. [2. [2. [2. [5. [2. [4. fo (3); all fo revo po A w T inter de ariablev ogL d e rs. arke untry irms n nte F m untry uste co firm afte ce Q co e activ aining r ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** adj plus e m s'n nal m rs ) m arsey neo re ho obi e cluding ratoe se 57 Internationalization T (1) 148 162 254 424 377 425 460 852 214 445 Y Yes Yes 872 058 774 377 ho rroe 's m 515] 569] 310] 586] 930] 166] 297] 324] 276] 972] ast rnatio the 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 2. 0. 6, 1, 7. 0. quitye 's capitalizatiot Ex of thre le financial Nu [1. [1. [2. [3. [2. [3. [3. [5. [5. [4. d fo firm fo firm inte at n re ogL the arke than the m standard aluev in e ache ing nside in s fo reo m hav finitio co with ko s rage de bt he as y bo firm are m ns firm av de T. d the r y um ssio inus stice stice the fo fo the ntifie D 2 reg m m rwise m ide y y re ts do revo aluev do since m y se able m y y m h)t all ko theo T um m y m noitazil asse all fo firm ro tho ple D um m um um wor square tal fo bo ze to r ts nal the are ndix sam ast and s the noitazil D um D um D D naoit G D y rnae as selaS le d ratoe asse as rnatio d tal arey noitazil firm Appe .y m e naoit noitazil m um noitazil noitazil noitazil fine num to inte fine d ntIretf nal Se fro velit naoit naoit naoit egarev elba e d naoit A rdinaryo (de q de rre ecp rnae rnae Drae naoit rnae h)t ria bt rage ache fe Y bt, re rnatio rnae rnae srae Arae V Y wor rts de bin'so av fo de cludexe esr,t ntI ntI rnae ntI nt e G P Y-o sei esi po fo T n fo the nteI reofe B reofe ntIretf ntIretf A D m m nsoita se re e the in NASDAQ. enc ri are B reofe noitazil ntIretf G Tw esi s d). ro m erp A Thre m n + + um m ndeepe D d table aluev rage revo aluev neo e srae srae naoit srae srae (1 Du m rvesb unto do Y Brae Arae Y liste Tha yrt Du Dfo re his ko av ko on e Y Y Y Y e (1fo fo de o o re na T bo the firm capitalizatio bo quale is NYSE, King dna ne rnae ne Ofo.o Cfo.o Thre Tw O ntI O Tw Thre Mo goL goL rytnuo rmiFfo.o ndusI uaqs- C Year N N N Me R Appendix Table 1 Basic Statistics This table reports summary statistics by country. It displays the total number of firms, the number of international firms, the number of domestic firms, the sample coverage, and the sample average of Tobin's q . International firms are those identified as having at least one active depositary receipt program, having raised equity capital in international markets, or being listed on the London Stock Exchange, NYSE, or NASDAQ. Number of Number of Tobin's Q of Tobin's Q of Number of Sample Country Domestic International Tobin's Q Domestic International Firms Period Firms Firms Firms Firms 1 Argentina 42 27 15 1989 - 2000 1.11 1.04 1.23 2 Australia 219 161 58 1989 - 2000 1.51 1.49 1.55 3 Austria 71 55 16 1989 - 2000 1.33 1.32 1.37 4 Bahamas 1 0 1 1996 - 2000 1.08 - 1.08 5 Belgium 97 84 13 1989 - 2000 1.59 1.50 2.48 6 Bermuda 1 1 0 1996 - 1999 1.11 1.11 - 7 Botswana 2 2 0 1996 - 2000 1.87 1.87 - 8 Brazil 137 94 43 1989 - 2000 0.91 0.91 0.91 9 Bulgaria 6 5 1 1998 - 2000 1.57 1.78 0.52 10 Canada 516 390 126 1989 - 2000 1.57 1.43 1.94 11 Channel Islands 1 1 0 1991 - 1998 1.54 1.54 - 12 Chile 88 71 17 1989 - 2000 1.41 1.34 1.61 13 China 115 70 45 1992 - 2000 1.42 1.56 1.15 14 Colombia 18 15 3 1989 - 2000 0.99 0.97 1.11 15 Cote d'Ivoire 1 1 0 1998 - 2000 2.28 2.28 - 16 Croatia 2 1 1 1997 - 2000 1.36 0.63 2.08 17 Czech Republic 28 26 2 1995 - 2000 0.96 0.87 1.83 18 Denmark 150 145 5 1989 - 2000 1.38 1.36 1.83 19 Egypt 4 1 3 1997 - 2000 2.02 1.38 2.21 20 Estonia 4 4 0 1997 - 2000 1.10 1.10 - 21 Finland 96 77 19 1989 - 2000 1.30 1.33 1.21 22 France 560 511 49 1989 - 2000 1.39 1.36 1.61 23 Germany 526 491 35 1989 - 2000 1.55 1.54 1.59 24 Ghana 4 3 1 1996 - 2000 1.08 1.03 1.23 25 Greece 124 119 5 1989 - 2000 2.09 2.10 1.78 26 Hong Kong 228 155 73 1989 - 2000 1.29 1.21 1.45 27 Hungary 22 8 14 1992 - 2000 1.39 1.37 1.40 28 India 293 233 60 1990 - 2000 1.65 1.70 1.45 29 Indonesia 93 85 8 1989 - 2000 1.34 1.33 1.44 30 Ireland 58 27 31 1989 - 2000 1.55 1.48 1.60 31 Israel 41 23 18 1993 - 2000 1.43 1.18 1.71 32 Italy 135 114 21 1989 - 2000 1.29 1.24 1.56 33 Jamaica 2 2 0 1998 - 2000 0.84 0.84 - 34 Japan 2,647 2,533 114 1989 - 2000 1.34 1.34 1.42 35 Jordan 1 0 1 1997 - 2000 1.27 - 1.27 36 Kenya 9 9 0 1996 - 2000 1.24 1.24 - 37 Latvia 5 4 1 1997 - 2000 0.72 0.70 0.80 38 Liechtenstein 1 1 0 1989 - 2000 1.42 1.42 - 45 Appendix Table 1 (Continued) Basic Statistics This table reports summary statistics by country. It displays the total number of firms, the number of international firms, the number of domestic firms, the sample coverage, and the sample average of Tobin's q . International firms are those identified as having at least one active depositary receipt program, having raised equity capital in international markets, or being listed on the London Stock Exchange, NYSE, or NASDAQ. Number of Number of Tobin's Q of Tobin's Q of Number of Sample Country Domestic International Tobin's Q Domestic International Firms Period Firms Firms Firms Firms 39 Lithuania 3 3 0 1996 - 2000 1.18 1.18 - 40 Luxembourg 9 5 4 1989 - 2000 1.41 1.44 1.36 41 Malaysia 300 289 11 1989 - 2000 1.70 1.69 1.85 42 Mauritius 7 7 0 1997 - 2000 1.12 1.12 - 43 Mexico 96 37 59 1989 - 2000 1.18 1.03 1.25 44 Netherlands 145 110 35 1989 - 2000 1.63 1.51 2.05 45 New Zealand 53 44 9 1989 - 2000 1.46 1.41 1.78 46 Nigeria 15 15 0 1992 - 2000 1.27 1.27 - 47 Norway 147 128 19 1989 - 2000 1.60 1.61 1.52 48 Pakistan 80 77 3 1989 - 2000 1.30 1.30 1.10 49 Panama 1 0 1 1995 - 2000 1.46 - 1.46 50 Papua New Guinea 1 0 1 1996 - 1998 1.20 - 1.20 51 Peru 26 21 5 1992 - 2000 1.14 0.90 1.75 52 Philippines 65 54 11 1989 - 2000 1.40 1.37 1.51 53 Poland 46 38 8 1992 - 2000 1.26 1.24 1.34 54 Portugal 64 58 6 1989 - 2000 1.06 1.06 0.96 55 Romania 8 8 0 1997 - 2000 0.91 0.91 - 56 Russia 15 4 11 1996 - 2000 1.00 0.99 1.01 57 Saudi Arabia 10 10 0 1997 - 2000 1.11 1.11 - 58 Senegal 1 1 0 1998 - 2000 1.27 1.27 - 59 Singapore 171 158 13 1989 - 2000 1.45 1.42 1.79 60 Slovak Republic 7 5 2 1996 - 2000 0.73 0.66 0.90 61 Slovenia 8 8 0 1996 - 2000 0.86 0.86 - 62 South Africa 232 196 36 1989 - 2000 1.53 1.50 1.70 63 South Korea 327 302 25 1989 - 2000 1.04 1.03 1.10 64 Spain 123 116 7 1989 - 2000 1.28 1.28 1.36 65 Sri Lanka 11 10 1 1993 - 2000 1.16 1.16 1.15 66 Sweden 189 162 27 1989 - 2000 1.59 1.57 1.68 67 Switzerland 139 120 19 1989 - 2000 1.37 1.29 1.87 68 Taiwan, Province of China 187 157 30 1989 - 2000 1.65 1.58 2.04 69 Thailand 171 160 11 1989 - 2000 1.28 1.24 1.87 70 Tunisia 3 3 0 1997 - 2000 1.47 1.47 - 71 Turkey 67 61 6 1989 - 2000 2.03 1.97 2.51 72 Ukraine 3 2 1 1997 - 2000 0.80 0.66 1.03 73 Venezuela 12 3 9 1989 - 2000 0.89 0.68 0.93 74 Zimbabwe 6 5 1 1994 - 2000 0.85 0.88 0.67 Total 9,096 7,926 1,170 1.41 1.39 1.55 46 gni gni ors cat gni di erg erg erg Int Em) berg Em) berg en Em) berg C C C IFre oom Bl IFre oom Bl d d opmleve IFre oom Bl orm orm D d orm (f P an,e (f P an,e d (f P an,e &S basata &S basata Worl:k &S basata ec D D D cope, s cope, s cope Ban cope cope, s ds et ds et ds d ds ds et Sour Worl Mark Worl Mark Worl Worl Worl Worl Mark d en eht . of .S all e as th eulav etss era era U U.S. as lacol s ni of ni sel m of at e t, lated des q nta Sa s' Fir eds Sources book nstoc .y 2 e taa cost calcu trsud s.n D en is suni aluvt pres obin T resp ni s.raey en ex o e ex )P m rea D wt in isio Tabl and etss x G(t ams eplacemr as stessa se erag ear,y av tsal e replacem 47 abl of fo eh eht cal e eir e isf eht th ivdroja m th t to Appendi scriptione to aluv eulav T. riav ll ucdorP revo g ten ity ht C D sources. etss et ecenr citse irmf wo ingn SI as ark e book equfo A.stessa revo .yrtnu t co os mo D gr th their s' M loeb as fo la e m g Series e s and rmif th ssor m in a ear.y fo edtup eulav moh selas w ation s' G l irf cal tern used e mrif of fo . d all lloof isf t com, capitalization in e en nge nnuaa rsal fo ies data aluv et book th e q et ebtd in th hac ark each gear s dol.S. s' the no ecenr eht strud at m U in ark t fo s of vea of tip m os of m e eulav yb ni obin in lup, dei q mrif etss T .s s'n as .s ntecrepl .yc cirte des e ied th ity estic atio prox nnua rren moe pres eragv Descri R of book equ si llarod obi T mod talo T llarod A cu G ex A classif description the lesas se q e s' q shows inbo erag ht ryts av Nam q T etss wo duni table es s'n e as gr eary ht ish P o- T eriS obi talo D w wo oball T Relativ T G T gr G