Assessing Climate Change Risks in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations INS I GH T S AND REC O M M E N DA TIO N S FR O M A GLO B A L ANA L Y S IS SCALING-UP CLIMATE RESILIENCE INVESTMENT IN FCV 2 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT- AFFECTED SITUATIONS Insights and Recommendations from a Global Analysis Caio de Araújo Barbosa Shaadee Ahmadnia © 2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. 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Design: Sergio Andres Moreno Tellez Table of Contents Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................1 Methodology.......................................................................................................................................................2 Addressing Fragility and Conflict in Financing for Development.....................................................................3 Challenges and Opportunities for Decarbonization in FCS...............................................................................5 Climate Risk and Resilience in FCS.............................................................................................................................8 Breakdown of Climate Change in FCV Settings...................................................................................................10 Drought and Near-Term Climate Change Projections........................................................................................12 Discussion and Future Directions................................................................................................................................18 References...........................................................................................................................................................................21 Annex 1. Classification Tree for Assigning Economies to the World Bank List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations..........................................................................................................................................22 List of Figures 1. Global FCS Footprint by FCS Category, 2006—2023…………………………………………………..........………1 2. Breakdown of IDA and LDC Countries Listed on the FCS List Over Multiple Years, 2006—2023………………...............................................................................................................................…4 3. Average Annual Per Capita CO2 Emissions Across FCS Categories, 1950—2023…..………......…5 4. Average Total GHG Emissions in FCS Countries, 1950–2023…………………………………….........…….....6 5. Fossil Fuel Subsidies Estimates for FCS and Non-FCS Countries: Total as Share of GDP (2023), Average per Capita (2023), and Average Total Transport Oil Subsidies (2010—2023)………...........................………………….………6 6. Countries with NDCs Submitted to the UNFCCC Broken Down by FCS Category……………..….…7 7. Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters by FCS Category: (a) Average Number of Deaths (b) Average Total Economic Damage, 2008—2023…………………...........................................…………8 8. Displaced Persons Associated with Natural Hazards in FCS Countries, 2008–2023…..………......................................................………..………..……………..………..………..………..…...9 9. Average Number of Internally Displaced People vs Total Number of Climate-Related Disasters by FCS Category, 2008—2023…………………………...........................................…………....9 10. Total Violent Conflict Fatalities in FCS Countries, 2016–2023…...........................................................10 11. Average Change in Number of Conflict Events Between the Lean Season and Other Months Across FCS Categories, 2008—2023……..………………….................…………11 12. FCS Countries Average Percentage of Total Crop Area that is Rainfed, 2016–2020....................................................................................................................................................12 13. Average PDSI Probability Density Representations by FCS Category, 2006–2023...................13 14. FCS and Non-FCS Countries Regional PDSI Averages, 2006–2023……………………………..........…14 15. Average Climate Water Deficit Probability Density Representations by FCS Category, 2006–2023…………………………………………………………...............................................................................15 16. FCS Countries Projected Global Differences in Average Minimum Temperature for RCP Scenario 8.5, 2006–2040…………………...…............................................................................……………16 17. Projected Difference in Average Minimum Temperature for RCP Scenario 8.5 by FCS Category and Region, 2006–2040………………….......................................................……………………17 18. Average Precipitation Anomalies Against the Difference in Average Minimum Temperature for Projections under RCP Scenario 8.5 by FCS Category, 2006–2040……………..............17 A.1 Classification Tree for Assigning Economies to the World Bank List of Fragile and Conflict- Affected Situations......................................................................................................................................23 Abbreviations ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Project Database CCDR Country Climate and Development Report CHIRPS Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data C MIP Coupled Model Intercomparison Project CO2 carbon dioxide C RED Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters C WD Climate Water Deficit EM-DAT Emergency Events Database FCS fragile and conflict-affected situations FCV fragility, conflict, and violence GDP gross domestic product GFSAD Food-Support Analysis Data GHG greenhouse gas IDA International Development Association IEA International Energy Agency LDC least developed country NDC Nationally Determined Contribution PDSI Palmer Drought Severity Index RCP Representative Concentration Pathway UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS Introduction Low- and middle-income geographies affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) are confronted with major development challenges, which threaten their efforts to end extreme povertyM]Q produce a more equitable future. At least two-thirds of the global extreme poor will be living in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) by 2030. Geographies dominated by latent, manifest, and escalating violent conflict receive 80 percent of all financing available to humanitarian organizations globally.1 Violent conflict has spiked dramatically in the last decade, and the global fragility footprint continues to grow and is followed by increasing complexity2 (Figure 1). The latest global developments add to a multitude of risks and long-lasting impacts on FCV, and these are linked and/or exacerbated by variability and climate change (e.g., food insecurity, environmental degradation, inequalities in access to natural resources, and migration).3 FIGURE 1 Global FCS Footprint by FCS Category 2006—2023. Source: World Bank. See methodology for details on how the categories are defined. 1 tatement Climate variability and change impact fragility and conflict through multiple channels. They disrupt agriculture, leading to food scarcity, malnutrition, and increased social tensions. Environmental degradation trajectories, such as deforestation, loss of soil fertility and erosion, and pollution can ignite violent conflict over natural resources. Such dynamics can intensify resource competition, particularly for water and arable land, causing conflicts between groups and/or countries. Climate-induced migration and displacement put pressure on natural resources, driving resource scarcity and fueling social tensions. Economic decline and loss of livelihoods due to the impacts of climate change contribute to instability and pre-existing social and political divisions–intensifying conflict and increasing societal fragmentation, exacerbating grievances and divisions, and pushing nations into a persistent cycle of conflict and fragility. Climate change affects different regions and populations unevenly, with fragile and conflict-affected geographies bearing a disproportionate burden.4 Methodology The primary objective of the analysis is to highlight climate risk in FCV settings with compelling analytics on climate change and conflict trends in FCS. The purpose is to motivate a deeper examination of these dynamics and to reinforce the need for the World Bank Group to engage and invest in environment, natural resource management, and climate change resilience in FCS. The analytics refer to “FCS countries” and “FCS categories.” FCS countries are those that have been listed by the World Bank Group’s annual classification of fragile and conflict-affected situations since 2006. The analysis refers to FCS countries that have been on such an “FCS List” in its various forms and names from 2006—2023.5 FCS categories were defined using an updated version of backcasted FCV groups identified by Corral et al. (2020). Corral et al.’s methodology breaks down FCS economies into the following: • Chronic FCS: economies that would have been classified as FCS every year from 2000 to 2019; • Entered FCS: economies that entered FCS during this period and remained there; • Recurrent FCS: economies that appear on the backcasted list more than twice and move in and out at least twice; • Escaped FCS: economies that appeared on the backcasted list consistently early in the period but since then have fully escaped; and • Rarely FCS: economies that appear on the backcasted list at most twice. The FCS groupings between 2000—2019 identified in Corral et al. were expanded to include 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. Annex 1 demonstrates the backcasting methodology. 2 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS Addressing Fragility and Conflict in Financing for Development Within the climate change body of work that relates to financing for development, agencies still struggle to address and recognize the central role conflict and fragility play in shaping solutions and pathways for green, inclusive, and resilient development. This struggle exists even though many of the countries at the forefront of the climate emergency also struggle with fragility and conflict. The World Bank estimates that an additional 20 million people have been living in extreme poverty in countries affected by FCV since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and by 2023 the gross domestic product (GDP) of countries affected by FCV is expected to be 7.5 percent below pre-pandemic projections.6 Compounding multidimensional challenges (e.g., climate change shocks, forced displacement, and food insecurity) pile on to already unstable social, environmental, and economic conditions due to weak institutions and governance, unequal access to resources and services for vulnerable groups, and community mistrust of government. Chronic FCV challenges intersect with development and can undermine efforts to mitigate and adapt to increasing climate variability and change. The countries most vulnerable to climate change also suffer from fragility, and International Development Association (IDA) borrowing nations represent over 67 percent of countries on the World Bank's FCS List. In addition, more than 80 percent of countries with the Least Developed Country (LDC) designation, which are amongst the most vulnerable to climate change, are also classified as FCS (Figure 2). The legally binding Paris Agreement, adopted by 196 parties to the convention, continues to inspire and drive climate action globally, as it pushes for a net-zero emissions future that can limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.7 To that end, the World Bank has committed to aligning 100 percent of Board-approved real sector operations with the Paris Agreement starting July 1, 2025 (85 percent starting July 1, 2023). However, it is worth noting that the Paris Agreement does not refer to fragility and conflict (nor peace and security for that matter). In the context of international climate change negotiations, multilateral agreements, interventions, and aid prioritization, the explicit recognition of the role that FCV play in the development trajectories of countries most vulnerable to climate change is, therefore, imperative. 3 ADDRESSING FRAGILITY AND CONFLICT IN FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT FIGURE 2 Breakdown of IDA and LDC Designated Countries Listed on the FCS List Over Multiple Years, 2006—2023. Source: World Bank. IDA and LDC designated countries in 2022. Climate change is a threat multiplier, with the potential to overwhelm state institutions' ability to foster and regulate peace while meeting the basic needs of their population. Food insecurity, extreme weather events, environmental degradation, and uneven access to natural resources, as well as sea-level rise and coastal erosion, threaten livelihoods and increase the fierce competition for ever-scarcer resources in FCV and globally. Furthermore, mass migration of people driven by increased climate variability puts pressure on labor markets, government service delivery, infrastructure, and land. These pressures interact with uneven distributions of wealth (and natural capital), social tensions, and grievances within communities, between affected communities, and the state itself.8 The evolving knowledge surrounding climate change impacts does not yet fully inform our discussions on financing for climate change in FCV settings. Efforts on mitigation and adaptation in FCV will invariably need to be conflict-sensitive, and the development of strategies that answer to the needs of vulnerable populations affected by climate change needs to also consider the distribution of power, access to natural resources, observed development pathways, and the evolving social order.9 The problems which climate change exacerbates are interlinked, and thus donor financing must recognize and ensure responses linked to such investments are integrated. Climate change can increase risks related to fragility and conflict across multiple channels that go beyond the effects of climate variability foreseen in the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios. The linkages between climate change, fragility, and conflict exceed the observed historical experience. Therefore, linear relationships and extrapolations from historical relationships will carry high levels of uncertainty. This is also due to the complexity of climate-conflict relationships and dependency on future pathways associated with development, macroeconomic stability, ideological shifts, increased/reduced state capacities, the ongoing status of world security, and commitment to international cooperation. 4 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS Challenges and Opportunities for Decarbonization in FCS FCV-affected countries are not able to appropriately engage in the kinds of “triple- win” approaches that seek to capture benefits from development, emissions reduction, and enhanced resilience to the changing climate. FCS are still highly dependent on high carbon-intensive ways of development, which pose major risks to the development and execution of decarbonization efforts. However, FCV-affected countries bring a much narrower contribution to the global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions footprint (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Reducing emissions and striving to build resilience into the system in FCS does, nevertheless, require major social, economic, and technological changes supported by conflict-sensitive climate change financing. The majority of FCV-affected countries are dependent on fossil fuels for economic growth and development, and these countries should strive for emissions reduction as a key policy priority. However, the low historical contributions of FCV contexts to CO2 emissions, combined with the need to finance poverty reduction and stability efforts, place public revenues from fossil fuel production and consumption center stage in terms of general government revenue. FIGURE 3 Average Annual Per Capita CO2 Emissions Across FCS Categories, 1950—2023. Source: World Bank. Based on Global Carbon Project (2024) emissions data from the burning of fossil fuels for energy and cement production. Emissions from land-use change are not included.10 5 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DECARBONIZATION IN FCS FIGURE 4 Average Total GHG Emissions in FCS Countries, 1950—2023. Source: World Bank. Based on Global Carbon Project (2024) emissions data from the burning of fossil fuels for energy and cement production. Emissions from land-use change are not included.10 FIGURE 5 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Estimates for FCS and Non-FCS Countries: Total as Share of GDP (2023), Average per Capita (2023), and Average Total Transport Oil Subsidies (2010—2023). Source: World Bank. Based on the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook (2024).11 6 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS Existing fossil fuel subsidies reduce the price of fossil fuels, distort energy markets, and create and further increase dependency on their use, which then feeds back into worsening climate variability and change. Figure 5 breaks down fossil fuel subsidy estimates between FCS and non-FCS countries. Oil subsidies in FCS have been declining over time, following a global trend pushing for national reforms limiting fossil fuel subsidies. Strengthening climate actions and narratives to address energy emissions (including fossil fuel subsidies) need to consider individual FCS contexts. Key considerations, for example, are long-standing national sovereignty concerns, FCV-specific policy trade-offs, and potential asymmetric impacts on the local economy, including workers and businesses in high-emitting sectors and poor households that cannot cope with higher fuel and electricity tariffs. In addition to the potential for increased fragility, the path toward decarbonization might also be followed by power shifts and changes in trade patterns between states. The path towards net zero could significantly destabilize FCS countries which heavily depend on fossil fuel revenues. Additionally, the transition towards cleaner energy may also have profound implications on the relationship between states (e.g., between FCS and non- FCS). Sustained investment in the energy transition (in tandem with energy security) in FCS is paramount, given the need to reduce energy-related emissions and ensure investments in adaptation and resilience building are not done against increasingly disastrous climate change outlooks. The decarbonization of the energy sector in FCS requires urgent action, and under the Paris Agreement, countries have submitted their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) declaring ambitious emission mitigation pledges, with this picture looking very different for FCS and non-FCS countries (Figure 6). FIGURE 6 Countries with NDCs Submitted to the UNFCCC Broken Down by FCS Category. Source: World Bank. Based on UNFCCC NDC Registry. 7 CLIMATE RISK AND RESILIENCE IN FCS Climate Risk and Resilience in FCS Countries affected by FCV that are featured on the World Bank's FCS List between 2006–2022 bear a disproportionate cost of climate change-related impacts, despite being home to only 15 percent of the world’s population and contributing to less than 3 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. On average, in every year from 1990–2020, at least 60 percent of all fatalities linked to climate-related disasters globally happened in FCS countries. The average number of deaths and total economic losses in FCS resulting from climate extremes represented in Figure 7 show the severity of these extreme climate shocks. These shocks maximize the risk of conflict, including by reducing opportunity costs for violence (e.g., adverse effects on people and livelihoods may render participation in violence more attractive), triggering irregular economic impacts, jeopardizing intergroup bargains, contributing to the collapse of institutions, and producing deleterious effects on long-term development gains. FCS are also faced with the displacement of millions of people (Figure 8 and Figure 9), loss and damage of physical infrastructure and natural resources, and worsening of existing inequalities. Under multiple scenarios, climate-related disasters are expected to continue increasing in frequency and intensity. These disasters may be followed by damaging and destabilizing effects felt widely across regions, sectors, and society. This contributes to increased fragility and conflict and makes it difficult for countries (some stuck in continuous cycles of fragility and violence) to develop and maximize climate change resilience as they strive to develop. FIGURE 7 Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters by FCS Category: (a) Average Number of Deaths (b) Average Total Economic Damage, 2008—2023. Source: World Bank. Based on data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) and Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). 8 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS FIGURE 8 Displaced Persons Associated with Natural Hazards in FCS Countries, 2008—2023. Source: World Bank. Based on data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (2024). FIGURE 9 Average Number of Internally Displaced People vs Total Number of Climate-Related Disasters by FCS Category, 2008—2023. Source: World Bank. Based on data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (2024), Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), and Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). 9 BREAKDOWN OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN FCV SETTINGS Breakdown of Climate Change in FCV Settings The availability of real-time data allows for timely, granular resolution data on global fatalities reported as a result of protests, riots, violence against civilians, and remote violence events. Figure 10 aggregates this data to the country level and accounts for events between 2016–2023. The graph in Figure 11 shows the change in number of conflict events (in this case riots, explosions, and remote violence) between the lean season and other months in FCS. The number of conflict events (Figure 11) increases considerably during the lean season in comparison to the number of conflicts observed during the rest of the year. Food security can rapidly deteriorate across many drought-stricken pastoral areas in FCS and during the lean season, households will rely primarily on markets to secure food and may be unable to meet basic food needs. This may be a consequence of high price fluctuations due to proximate and distal factors (e.g., war in Ukraine, droughts, localized conflict) as well as limited income and livelihood opportunities during the lean season. FIGURE 10 Total Violent Conflict Fatalities in FCS Countries, 2016–2023. Source: World Bank. Based on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Includes protests, riots, violence against civilians, explosions, and remote violence events. 10 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS Under certain scenarios for climate change, this situation can be effectively exacerbated. Violent conflict in FCVs may continue to rise and increasingly challenge the ability of local institutions to respond. Responding to emerging and recurrent crises will continue to be prioritized in lieu of future investment and action aimed at ensuring long-term, multi-sector development set on a low emissions pathway aligned with commitments to the Paris Agreement. FIGURE 11 Average Change in Number of Conflict Events Between the Lean Season and Other Months Across FCS Categories, 2008–2023. Source: World Bank. Based on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data on riots, explosions, and remote violence and on Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) data on lean seasons. Lean seasons are defined as "the time of year when a household's access to food and/or cash income is typically most constrained [and] households tend to be at greater risk of food insecurity."12 11 DROUGHT AND NEAR-TERM CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS Drought and Near-Term Climate Change Projections A large portion of the population in FCV-affected countries is employed and directly dependent on smallholder and primarily rainfed agriculture for their subsistence (Figure 12).a This makes the case for greater investment in climate change adaptation, given that greater climate variability, extreme weather events, increased temperature, and declining rainfall will directly impact FCS and favor further instability and crisis. Such scenarios can be compounded by sudden increases in the price of fuel and fertilizer in the global market, which severely impact food security and can generate further conflict and violence in FCV. Furthermore, empirical research based on surveys of affected communities indicates that loss of livelihoods and high levels of unemployment render young people more susceptible to joining extremist groups.14 FIGURE 12 FCS Countries Average Percentage of Total Crop Area that is Rainfed, 2016–2020. Source: World Bank. Based on Global Food-Support Analysis Data, GFSAD1000: Cropland Extent 1 km Multi-Study Crop Mask. a. The number of farming systems globally is estimated to be more than 570 million, of which 84 percent are smaller than 2 ha.1. 12 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS Further investigation into the current climatic conditions in FCS using the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) reveals important characteristics. The PDSI is a standardized index that spans from -10 (dry) to +10 (wet) and has been successful at quantifying long-term droughts globally. It uses temperature data and a physical water balance model to try and capture the basic effects of global warming on drought through changes in potential evapotranspiration. In Figure 13, the dark blue line at the center of the density curves shows that most FCS contexts experience consistently drier, more severe drought periods. While there is variability within FCS categories, the dark blue line in the density curve for countries under Chronic FCS is skewed towards the left, which indicates countries have experienced more severe droughts on average between 2006–2023. FIGURE 13 Average PDSI Probability Density Representations by FCS Category, 2006–2023. Note: The darker line/color at the center of the curve represents the most likely observation. Source: World Bank. Based on monthly Climate and Climatic Water Balance for Global Terrestrial Surfaces (TerraClimate).15 13 DROUGHT AND NEAR-TERM CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS The aggregation of the PDSI data by region provides more information on geographic distribution and how the severity of dry spells is expected to be realized across FCS and non-FCS countries globally (Figure 14). Due to climate change, this reality might continue to move towards the extremes, contributing to warmer temperatures, enhanced water evaporation, reduced surface water, drier soils, and decreased vegetation health. Producing disaggregated information on which geographies are currently under more/ less stress enables improved foresight (in light of climate scenarios) and targeting of actions supported by evidence that can build conflict sensitivity into the required financing for climate change. For Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions, drought might play a bigger role in FCV; in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean regions, FCV issues may be more closely related to political upheaval and less so to climate-related stressors. FIGURE 14 FCS and Non-FCS Countries Regional PDSI Averages, 2006–2023. Source: World Bank. Based on monthly Climate and Climatic Water Balance for Global Terrestrial Surfaces (TerraClimate).15 14 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS The Climate Water Deficit (CWD) represented for all regions of the world and disaggregated by FCS and non-FCS in Figure 15 is directly linked to ecosystem productivity and availability of water resources. The information presented here shows that water availability varies considerably in FCS and non-FCS contexts across the world. However, there are more severe (and expected) deficits observed for the Middle East and North Africa region. Worth noting are the contrasts in CWD for the Sub-Saharan, South Asian, European, and Central Asian states classified as FCS on the World Bank's FCS List. The long-term water deficit affects crop production and ecological water demand.16 FIGURE 15 Average Climate Water Deficit Probability Density Representations by FCS Category, 2006–2023. Source: World Bank. Based on monthly Climate and Climatic Water Balance for Global Terrestrial Surfaces (TerraClimate).15 15 DROUGHT AND NEAR-TERM CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS The growing risk of climate-related conflict under current climate change scenarios is expected to produce additional demands on countries to ramp up efforts to prepare and respond to economic, humanitarian, and military crises. Figure 16 represents the projected differences in average minimum temperatures between 2006 and 2040 for FCS countries. FIGURE 16 FCS Countries Projected Global Differences in Average Minimum Temperature for RCP Scenario 8.5, 2006–2040. Source: World Bank. Based on downscaled Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6) climate projection.17 Data represents the mean of the daily-minimum near-surface air temperature for the RCP scenario 8.5. Further insights into climate change projections are provided in Figure 17, where the RCP scenario 8.5 is averaged for FCS countries and represented for different world regions. In Figure 18, the biplot places the RCP 8.5 projected differences in minimum temperature against the observed average precipitation anomalies by FCS category. 16 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS FIGURE 17 Projected Difference in Average Minimum Temperature for RCP Scenario 8.5 by FCS Category and Region, 2006–2040. Source: World Bank. Based on downscaled CMIP6 climate projections.17 Data represents the mean of the daily-minimum near-surface air temperature for the RCP scenario 8.5. FIGURE 18 Average Precipitation Anomalies Against the Difference in Average Minimum Temperature for Projections under RCP Scenario 8.5 by FCS Category, 2006–2040. Source: World Bank. Based on Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) and downscaled CMIP6 climate projections for the RCP scenario 8.5.17 17 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS Discussion and Future Directions Recognizing the interconnectedness of climate change, fragility, and conflict in FCS is vital for formulating comprehensive strategies that address the root causes of fragility and foster sustainable, climate-resilient development. The impacts of climate variability and change interact with and exacerbate vulnerabilities and existing tensions, leading to heightened risks and instability. This complexity unfolds within an environment prone to disrupted social cohesion, livelihood insecurity, a rapidly changing security situation, limited capacities, and deepening inequalities. The repercussions on food and water availability disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, exacerbating negative feedback loops that transcend national boundaries. The effective management of natural resources plays a pivotal role in mediating these challenges. Whether resource availability changes due to conflict or climate-related factors, natural resource management influences how those changes affect local communities, making it a powerful driver of conflict or a tool for peace and prosperity. The challenges faced by multilateral and bilateral institutions and national and international agencies in recognizing the central role of conflict and state fragility in climate change solutions and financing for development stem from several factors. There has traditionally been a separation between the domains of climate change and conflict/fragility, with different agencies and institutions responsible for addressing these issues. This siloed approach often hinders the recognition of their interconnectedness and the need for integrated strategies. Moreover, identifying the systemic links between conflict, state fragility, climate, and natural resource issues can be challenging due to the complex multidimensional nature of the dynamics at play. Policy and institutional silos play a major role, given that government/institutional structures, forms, and systems may not have been designed to facilitate coordination on FCV issues. This may lead to fragmented approaches that give rise to economy-wide harmful incentive mechanisms linked to natural resources that prioritize short-term gains over long-term stability. Climate change solutions and financing for development are often focused on addressing environmental and socio-economic dimensions linked to mitigation and adaptation, while often overlooking the underlying conflict and fragility dynamics in FCS. This narrow perspective fails to acknowledge the complex ecological, political, and socioeconomic dynamics that shape vulnerability and exposure to climate change in FCV- affected geographies. Additionally, the complexity and unpredictability of conflict, cascading impacts, and compounding effects (e.g., disasters) make it challenging to incorporate them into climate change solutions and development financing frameworks. Addressing and helping countries withstand the volatility and complex interplay of these factors requires flexibility, innovation, and continued support. Furthermore, a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which states enter and emerge from multiple cycles of fragility and conflict, which may be compounded by extreme climate and competition for access and use of natural resources, is essential to appropriately develop and implement programmatic financial support. 18 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS The lack of explicit recognition of fragility and conflict in international climate change negotiations, multilateral agreements, and aid prioritization has significant implications. Conflict-affected and fragile contexts require context-specific approaches, tailored interventions, and a nuanced understanding of local FCV dynamics, which can be difficult to mainstream within broader climate change agendas. It hampers the effectiveness of climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. By not identifying and positioning themselves to address the complex interactions between climate change, fragility, and conflict, strategies and policies may fail to adequately address the root causes of conflict and instability. Furthermore, there is a lack of adequate data and analysis on the relationship between climate change, conflict, and fragility. This knowledge gap renders it difficult to quantify the impact of conflict and fragility on climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, impacting the allocation of appropriate resources and policy actions thereof. This undermines the ability to develop context-specific and integrated solutions that account for the unique challenges faced by FCV-affected countries. Recognizing the need for conflict-sensitive climate change financing strategies is crucial, as they must go beyond purely technical approaches and consider the dynamics of power distribution, access to resources, and social order within vulnerable populations. Such strategies should acknowledge that climate change interventions can inadvertently exacerbate existing tensions or create new conflicts if they do not address adaptation and mitigation issues in tandem with the underlying drivers of fragility. This may disrupt the shaky equilibrium among local groups, reinforce disparities, fuel existing conflicts, or introduce new sources of contention. Conflict-sensitive financing strategies must strive to empower communities, including those that are marginalized, and ensure their meaningful participation and decision- making. Access to resources, such as land, water, and energy, are increasingly impacted by climate change and can become a source of conflict and competition in FCV-affected geographies. Unequal power relations contribute to marginalized groups bearing a disproportionate burden of climate impacts and natural resource competition. Local social dynamics, cultural norms, and customary institutions influence how communities respond to and cope with climate change. Therefore, strategies must prioritize equitable distribution of interventions and resources, considering the needs and rights of populations in contexts where these basic conditions for program implementation may not be in place. This involves promoting fair resource management practices, supporting existing and traditional livelihoods, and addressing underlying grievances related to resource access and control. Ultimately, this will look different within and across FCV geographies, where internationally recognized national boundaries may diverge from existing social and cultural boundaries. The security implications of low-carbon development have often been overlooked, with limited discussion on the potential risks and conflicts that may arise. Discussions linked to climate action promote the idea of low-carbon development as a potential benefit emerging from the challenges posed by climate change. In FCV-affected countries, the transition away from carbon-based energy systems and the implementation of alternative energy sources is beneficial, while also opening the way for further geographical disparities and uneven development. This spatial differentiation may create new territories where power and authority are established, resulting in unequal access to benefits and resources. The pursuit of low-carbon development in FCV contexts may introduce new 19 DISCUSSION security considerations (e.g., in ungoverned spaces) and reinforce pre-existing ones (e.g., marginalization and dispossession). Overcoming these challenges requires a paradigm shift in how agencies navigate the nexus of fragility and conflict in climate change financing mechanisms and international discourse. It entails recognizing the central role of FCV and integrating conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and resilience-building measures into climate change strategies from the outset. Addressing this would require the integration of fragility and conflict considerations into the core principles, strategies, and funding frameworks for climate change in ways that are explicit and readily intentional. 20 ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS: INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A GLOBAL ANALYSIS References 1. Saez, Patrick, and Rose Worden. 2021. "Beyond the Grand Bargain: The Humanitarian Financing Model Needs More Radical Change." Center for Global Development (blog), July 7, 2021. 2. Corral, Paul, et al. 2020. Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight against Poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank. 3. Smith, Dan, and Janani Vivekananda. 2009. Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Understanding the Linkages, Shaping Effective Responses. London: International Alert. 4. United Nations and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank. 5. World Bank. 2024. FCS Lists from FY06 to FY2023. Washington, DC: World Bank. 6. World Bank. 2022. Global Economic Prospects, June 2022. Washington, DC: World Bank. 7. "Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." Conclusion date: December 12, 2015. T.I.A.S. no. 16–1104. 8. Mach, Katharine J., et al. 2019. "Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict." Nature 571: 193–197. 9. Ahmadnia, Shaadee, et al. 2022. Defueling Conflict: Environment and Natural Resource Management as a Pathway to Peace. Washington, DC: World Bank. 10. Global Carbon Project. 2024. Data Supplement to the Global Carbon Budget 2023. 11. International Energy Agency. 2024. World Energy Outlook. Paris, France: IEA. 12. Famine Early Warning Systems Network. 2018. "Developing Price Projections for Food Security Early Warning." Guidance Document No. 3. 13. Lowder, Sarah, Jakob Skoet, and Terri Raney. 2016. "The Number, Size, and Distribution of Farms, Smallholder Farms, and Family Farms Worldwide." World Development 87: 16–29. 14. Onuoha, Freedom C. 2014. Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. 15. Abatzoglou, John T., et al. 2018. "TerraClimate, a High-Resolution Global Dataset of Monthly Climate and Climatic Water Balance from 1958–2015." Scientific Data 5: 1–12. 16. Green, Julia K., et al. 2019. "Large Influence of Soil Moisture on Long-Term Terrestrial Carbon Uptake." Nature 565: 476–479. 17. Program for Climate Model Diagnosis & Intercomparison. Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6). 21 Annex 1 FIGURE A.1 Classification Tree for Assigning Economies to the World Bank List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations Source: Corral et al. (2020). 22