SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 Connecting Social HIGHLIGHT Protection and People in the fisheries sector have limited access to social protection, despite Fisheries Management experiencing increasing risks linked to climate change and overfishing. While for Sustainability: social protection and labor programs can enable and incentivize households A Conceptual Framework to engage in more sustainable practices and more resilient livelihoods, they rarely Annabelle Bladon, respond to the specific needs of fishers and fish workers. This policy note outlines Gunilla Tegelskär Greig, how social protection and labor policies and Yuko Okamura and programs might be extended to better assist fisheries actors, and how these Annabelle Bladon is a Senior Researcher at the policies and programs could be better International Institute for Environment and Development. leveraged to support acceptance of and Gunilla Tegelskär Greig is a Senior Fisheries Specialist compliance with rules and regulations and Yuko Okamura is a Senior Social Protection Economist at the World Bank. The authors are grateful and, ultimately, to better achieve fisheries to Ugo  Gentilini, Loli Arribas-Banos, and Margaret management objectives. While there are Grosh for their comments and guidance, and to Luz numerous challenges, there are also clear Rodriguez, Yashodhan Ghorpade, Anita Kendrick, and opportunities to adapt social protection Xavier Vincent for peer review. This note was produced and labor instruments to the fisheries sector under the activity “Blue Social Protection: Connecting Social Protection and Fisheries Management,” with in order to reduce overall vulnerability—of support from PROBLUE, a multidonor trust fund people, and of the ecosystems that support administered by the World Bank that supports the them—for a more sustainable future. sustainable and integrated development of marine and coastal resources in healthy oceans. Administ r d b SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 1. Introduction Bank 2012a; FAO 2020). While marine and coastal resources tend to overshadow inland resources in The fisheries sector1 is a critical component national and international policy arenas, inland of the Blue Economy,2 providing employment, fisheries—which are mostly small-scale—provide food, and cultural value for billions of people critical nutrition in rural areas and employ even more globally. Fisheries and aquaculture support the people (particularly women) globally than marine livelihoods—directly or indirectly—of around fisheries do6 (World Bank 2012a; Funge-Smith & 10 percent of the world’s population (FAO 2020).3 Bennett 2019). The vast majority (approximately 97 percent) of people employed in capture fisheries and related Despite the importance of the sector, fishers, activities live in lower- and middle-income countries fish workers, and their communities in (LMICs) and, of them, more than 90 percent are LMICs experience increasingly high levels in the small-scale fisheries (SSF) sector4 (World of risk, and rarely have access to effective Bank 2012a; FAO 2020).5 Fish is also an important risk-management mechanisms. Not only are source of nutrition, providing more than 3.3 billion they greatly exposed to climate-related hazards, but people with almost 20  percent of their average they also tend to be vulnerable to a range of other animal protein intake, and up to 50 percent or shocks and stresses—particularly in the SSF sector. more in some LMICs (FAO 2020). SSF have been This vulnerability is a function of high sensitivity to estimated to produce around half of the global the impacts of shocks and stresses (for example, fish catch destined for human consumption (World due to high nutritional or economic dependence 1 The fisheries sector encompasses all actors and activities undertaken throughout the capture fisheries value chain, including fishing and fishing-related activities such as processing, trading, marketing, netmaking, and boat building. 2 While definitions vary, the term “Blue Economy” describes the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and job creation while preserving the health of ocean ecosystems (World Bank 2021a). 3 This estimate includes fishers, pre- and post-harvest fish workers, and their dependents. 4 For the purposes of this note, the fisheries sector is divided into two broad subsectors: small-scale fisheries (SSF), including artisanal and subsistence fisheries, and large-scale fisheries (LSF), including industrial and semi-industrial fisheries. The SSF sector is usually understood to be comprised of relatively small production units (that is, individuals, household units, or microenterprises) with low input and output, and low levels of technology or capital investment (World Bank 2012a; FAO 2015). However, the distinction between SSF and LSF is not always well defined. The SSF sector is extremely diverse, and what is considered a small-scale operation in one country may be considered large-scale in another (Smith & Basurto 2019; Short et al. 2021). Some countries also use other categories based on location of fishing (for example, inshore and offshore). 5 The Illuminating Hidden Harvests initiative has been generating new evidence on the benefits, interactions, and impacts of small-scale fisheries; a forthcoming report will provide an update on estimates last made in 2012 (FAO, Duke University and WorldFish 2021). 6 While it is not uncommon for fishers and fish workers across the sector to engage in multiple livelihood activities, inland fishery activities are typically conducted on a part-time or seasonal basis together with agricultural activities—in part, due to seasonal variations in river levels and floodplains (Funge-Smith and Bennett 2019). The resulting gaps in data on the sector perpetuate its low profile. 2 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 on aquatic resources) and low adaptive capacity 2020; Short et al. 2021; Gozzer-Wuest et al. 2022). due to constraints such as limited access to basic While large-scale fishery (LSF) enterprises are services, or inequitable governance. typically formal, there is also widespread informal employment within their fisheries and associated Social protection and labor (SPL)7 programs value chains, meaning that an unknown number can help to buffer these risks. However, the of LSF workers (particularly migrant workers) also current provision is inadequate, with less than half lack access to SP (Jones et al. 2019; Vandergeest of the global population being effectively covered 2019). In particular, women—who make up nearly by at least one social protection (SP) benefit. half of the total workforce in the fisheries sector— This coverage gap tends to be associated with tend to hold the lowest-paid, lowest-status, informality (ILO 2021a; 2021b). Informal workers and least-protected jobs, mostly in post-harvest usually lack access to the contributory social activities such as processing and trading, as well insurance schemes that are typically provided with as gleaning and other forms of harvesting on the formal-sector employment; and they also tend to shoreline (World Bank 2012a; FAO 2020). This be ineligible for social assistance (which is usually heightens their vulnerability. poverty-targeted), because they own assets or are otherwise considered “not poor enough” to qualify In parallel, the aquatic biodiversity and (ILO 2021b). Some informal workers prefer to stay ecosystems that support the fisheries sector this way in order to avoid tax obligations and other are in decline due to direct exploitation (and regulations, especially when the costs of these particularly overexploitation) of fish, changes in exceed (or are perceived to exceed) the benefits. land- and sea-use, and pollution—which is further undermining climate resilience. The main driver Informality—and therefore low SP coverage—is of change in marine and coastal ecosystems is typical in the SSF sector and particularly prevalent fishing, and marine fish stocks are declining in the context of weak governance (Pomeroy et al. around the world (IPBES 2019).8 Around a third of 7 Social protection and labor policies, systems, and programs “help individuals and societies manage risk and volatility and protect them from poverty and destitution—through instruments that improve resilience, equity, and opportunity” (World Bank 2012b). Social protection encompasses social assistance (such as cash transfers and food assistance) and social insurance (such as pensions and unemployment insurance); active labor market policies and programs aim to help unemployed or vulnerable individuals find employment through, for example, training, wage subsidies, or job intermediation. 8 Inland fisheries in rivers, lakes, and floodplains—which have even more severe data limitations than do marine fisheries— also suffer the effects of overexploitation and destructive fishing practices. These in turn interact with the complex set of additional threats arising from human activities on land (IPBES 2019). 3 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 marine fish stocks with assessments9 are fished at degree of informality poses a particular challenge levels that exceed long-term maximum biological for management; since small-scale enterprises are production (that is, they are “overfished“), and rarely registered as formal businesses, SSF catch is another 60  percent are fished at the maximum chronically underreported11 (World Bank 2012a; “maximally sustainably fished“ (FAO 2020). But Pomeroy et al. 2020; Short et al. 2021). Additionally, at least 75 percent of global fish catch by volume management measures that restrict the numbers comes from stocks without reliable scientific of fishers or their behavior can have usually assessments, which are thus even more likely to short-term yet substantial negative economic be overexploited (Costello et al. 2012; Hilborn et and/or social impacts on fishers and fish workers al. 2020). (particularly the poorest and most vulnerable); this can undermine acceptance of and compliance with rules and regulations (Wallace et al. 2015; Effective management based on stock Oyanedel, Gelcich & Milner-Gulland 2020). assessment can rebuild depleted fisheries; this has been demonstrated in some data-rich countries. However, government spending tends SPL programs can compensate for such to prioritize short-term production over long-term costs and incentivize behavior change for sustainability. Nearly two thirds of global marine sustainable outcomes. Various SPL instruments fisheries subsidies10 (in particular, fuel subsidies) are have demonstrated the potential to enable and allocated to promote overexploitation by keeping incentivize vulnerable households and communities unprofitable fleets at sea (Sumaila et al. 2019). to engage in more sustainable use of resources Furthermore, most LMICs have limited capacity and more resilient livelihoods, and better manage to implement these approaches (Anderson et al. risks, including in a fisheries context (FAO 2017; 2018; Hilborn et al. 2020). The SSF sector’s high Béné, Devereux, and Edwards 2015; Porras, Steele 9 The FAO uses a wide spectrum of data and methods to extend its assessment to the fish stocks that account for the majority (80 percent) of the global catch. While scientific stock assessments combine structural population models with data to estimate a species’ population size and trajectories under various harvest scenarios, less formal analysis and local knowledge can also indicate biological status. 10 Fisheries subsidies are direct or indirect financial transfers from public entities to the fisheries sector that enable fishing (and related) enterprises to make a greater profit than they would otherwise. Subsidies for fisheries management, research and development, and marine protected areas support sustainability, while other subsidy types—fuel subsidies, tax exemptions, investments in marketing infrastructure, vessel modernization, and port development, which constitute the majority of global spending on fisheries—undermine sustainability when access is not controlled. There are also some subsidy types (fisher assistance, vessel buyback, and community development) that have the potential for either positive or negative impacts on fish stocks (Schuhbauer et al. 2020). This is the category that social protection and labor would fall into. 11 For example, global inland fish catches, which are mostly small-scale, are underreported by an estimated 70 percent (World Bank 2012a), and the total catch of Pacific island small-scale fisheries in 2010 was estimated to be 1.7 times that reported (Zeller et al. 2014). 4 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 and Mohammed 2016; Barr, Bruner and Edwards In this context, this note aims to guide 2019; Costella et al. 2021). As momentum builds policymakers and practitioners working to make SP more universal12 and adaptive,13 within or with governments on SPL and/or there is an opportunity to design SPL policies fisheries policies and programs toward a more and programs in such a way that they reduce meaningful and more integrated approach vulnerability and poverty, build climate to SPL and fisheries management. First it resilience, and support a shift in focus toward describes the social-ecological risks faced by the long-term sustainability of fisheries. This fisheries sector; summarizes the current provision would help countries to develop more sustainable of SPL; and outlines the main potential pathways and equitable blue economies that represent the to better align SPL with fisheries management. It interests and rights of all fishers and fish workers. then provides key recommendations for expanding and leveraging SPL to enable and incentivize sustainability in the fisheries sector. However, fisheries management and SPL are typically led by different ministries with very different mandates. Ministries of fisheries and 2. Risks in the Fisheries Sector agriculture tend to focus on production and related environmental issues, and have only a Human activities are driving changes in limited understanding of the potential benefits natural systems that are reshaping and of SPL, while ministries of social affairs and labor increasing risks in the fisheries sector. tend to prioritize the poor over the vulnerable Following the approach of the Intergovernmental (including fishers and fish workers) and do not Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), risk can be consider environmental sustainability as part of viewed as the interaction of hazard, exposure, and their main agenda. Traditionally, these ministries vulnerability (Oppenheimer et al 2014). These core also have limited interaction with each other, components of risk are underpinned by various restricting the potential for information sharing interlinked drivers of risk—some of which directly and policy coherence. increase hazards, and some of which influence risk via their effects on vulnerability and exposure. 12 The Universal Social Protection 2030 initiative is a global partnership to promote universal social protection, by supporting countries to “implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all […] and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable,” in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 1.3) (ILO 2017). 13 Some countries have embarked on efforts to develop adaptive social protection systems that build the resilience of poor and vulnerable households by investing in their capacity to prepare for, cope with, and adapt to shocks, ensuring that they do not fall (deeper) into poverty (Bowen et al. 2020). 5 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 Fisheries, which are social-ecological systems,14 ECOLOGICAL DRIVERS OF RISK face a range of different drivers of risk arising from Changes in the natural system (which are heavily both natural and human sources.15 Ecological influenced by the socioeconomic system) drive a risk measures the potential impact of a change range of hazards in the fisheries sector (see Fig. 1, on ecosystems and species, determined by their Arrow ①). Anthropogenic climate change is vulnerability and exposure to that hazard. In turn, altering and exacerbating natural climate variability this risk or its impact can present an ecological which is increasing the frequency, intensity, hazard to socioeconomic dimensions of the and duration of hazards. These include acute fisheries sector. Social-ecological risk measures shocks to aquatic ecosystems, such as extreme the overall potential impact of such a change on weather events, as well as more gradual trends the socioeconomic (human) system, determined (stresses) such as habitat degradation, ocean by the vulnerability and exposure of people and acidification, biodiversity loss, and—critically— their fisheries activities to those impacts (see Box declines in and destabilization of fish populations. 1). This note focuses on social-ecological risk At the same time, socioeconomic processes as opposed to ecological risk, because this risk are driving unsustainable practices such as can be directly addressed through SPL. It also overexploitation, pollution, and changes concentrates on the types of social-ecological risk in land- and sea-use (Fig. 1, Arrow  ②). These that have the greatest potential to be addressed practices interact with and exacerbate the through an integrated approach to SPL and ecological impacts of climate change to produce fisheries management. more uncertain and more severe hazards. These ecological hazards have potential socioeconomic Figure 1 conceptualizes the social-ecological risk impacts on the fisheries sector, such as damage to framework for the fisheries sector and illustrates fishing gear, loss of income, and injury or death at how SPL and fisheries policies and programs can sea, but the ultimate size of the impacts depends play a greater role in reducing social-ecological on the vulnerability of fishers, fish workers, and risks and actual impacts. their communities, as well as their degree of exposure to hazards. 14 Social-ecological systems are complex interlinked human (socioeconomic) and natural systems (ecosystems). 15 Examples include technological hazards such as oil spills, natural and climate-related hazards such as earthquakes and storms, and ecological hazards such as overexploitation and ecosystem degradation; and social and political stresses such as marginalization, conflict, and exploitative working conditions. 6 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25  EFINITIONS OF SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RISK AND ITS CORE COMPONENTS, BOX 1. D ADAPTED FOR THE FISHERIES SECTOR RISK HAZARD The potential socioeconomic impact of a The impact of a change (climate-related or climate-related or other ecological hazard otherwise) on aquatic ecosystems. on the fisheries sector, determined by its exposure and vulnerability. Whereas risk describes potential impact, impact refers to the observed effects when a risk is realized. VULNERABILITY A function of sensitivity minus adaptive EXPOSURE capacity. The presence of people and exploited aquatic SENSITIVITY: The intrinsic degree to •  resources that could be adversely affected. which people and economies depend on fisheries.  DAPTIVE CAPACITY: The ability of people •  A and socioeconomic systems to anticipate, respond to, and adjust to the impacts of a change (hazard), and to minimize, cope with, and recover from the consequences. Source: Oppenheimer et al. (2014) and World Bank (2019a) climate-related hazards due to their living and SOCIOECONOMIC DRIVERS OF RISK working at sea, on coastlines and in floodplains. Vulnerability and exposure are largely SSF communities also tend to experience a high determined by socioeconomic processes, level of structural constraints and inequities that including policies, governance, norms, and heighten their sensitivity and restrict their adaptive practices, many of which interact with ecological capacity, thus increasing their vulnerability and, in change (Fig. 1, Arrow ③). Fisheries and their some cases, their exposure (Fig. 1, Arrow ④) to a communities are particularly exposed to variety of ecological hazards and other shocks and 7 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 stresses (for example, market disruption, illness, mechanisms to mitigate negative impacts and unemployment). This often leads to a vicious and incentivize behavioral change. Despite the cycle of poverty and unsustainable fishing in order long-term environmental, social, and economic to meet daily needs, enabled by weak governance, benefits, these measures carry usually short- to a short-term focus on economic gain, and medium-term social and/or economic costs for ineffective management (Fig. 1, Arrow  ②). The fishers and fish workers. For example, the loss of latter is usually related to a lack of mechanisms to income or employment that can result from fishing mitigate negative impacts or incentivize behavior regulations can be insurmountable for the most change. Subsequent declines in biodiversity and vulnerable, and in any case unacceptable for any productivity are likely to exacerbate the impacts group, and can often undermine the impact of of climate change on aquatic ecosystems, and the regulations. ultimately on the people, who often have little choice but to ignore regulations and intensify their SPL programs can mitigate or compensate fishing effort in response to the situation. for the costs imposed by these measures on affected actors, thereby strengthening their potential to achieve their objectives, POLICY SOLUTIONS and ultimately reduce social-ecological risk. Policies and programs that are designed At the same time, SPL can directly help to reduce to enhance the sustainability of fisheries the vulnerability of people in the fisheries sector (including fisheries management,16 fisheries- by investing in their capacity to better prepare for, subsidy reform, and habitat conservation cope with, and adapt to shocks, ensuring that they and restoration) can reduce the social- will not fall (deeper) into poverty. ecological risk, particularly if combined with 16 Fisheries management measures can be divided into three broad sets of approaches: 1) limiting catch through regulating who can fish and how much they can catch (e.g., catch quotas); 2) limiting effort through harvest guidelines, and restricting technical input controls (e.g., size of vessels, type and amount of fishing gear, or seasonal closures); and 3) limiting spatial access through regulated-take or closed no-take areas (Anderson et al. 2018). 8 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 FIGURE 1. SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RISK AND POLICY SOLUTIONS IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR Changes in the natural system ① and in the socioeconomic system ③ are central drivers of the three core components that constitute social-ecological risk in the fisheries sector—vulnerability, exposure, and hazards. Unsustainable practices, underpinned by socioeconomic processes—including governance, policies, and norms—drive changes in the natural system ②. When social-ecological risks are realized, the socioeconomic impacts feed back onto socioeconomic processes ④. This increases vulnerability and, potentially, exposure ③ and perpetuates unsustainable practices ②, which ultimately exacerbates the ecological hazards (extreme weather events and gradual fish stock decline/destabilization) ①. Regulations (and other measures taken to enhance the sustainability of fisheries) can reduce these risks in the longer term, but they usually have short- to medium-term socioeconomic costs. Social protection and labor policies and programs directly reduce vulnerability, and can also compensate for these costs, enabling and incentivizing sustainability. Source: Adapted from Oppenheimer et al (2014); World Bank (2019a); and Costella et al (2021).  ocial Protection and Labor 3. S part of a national or other broad approach, they Programs in the Fisheries rarely have the specific features required for these Sector groups to participate in or benefit from them, Provision of SPL to the fisheries sector is particularly in the SSF sector (FAO 2019a; FAO limited, particularly in LMICs. While mainstream 2019b). Despite their vulnerability, SSF workers SPL policies and programs (as summarized in Fig. 2) and informal workers in LSF are rarely eligible are sometimes open to fishers and fish workers as for noncontributory social assistance programs 9 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 because they tend not to be classified as “poor work in remote areas with poor infrastructure, and enough” by national standards17 (ILO 2021b). Yet fishers (particularly crew informally employed in they also tend to not have access to contributory LSF) can spend long periods at sea in distant waters social insurance because this is traditionally based and be left unprotected when they disembark. on formal employment. More fundamentally, socioeconomic and Even when fishery actors are eligible for some form demographic data on SSF and informal workers of SPL, coverage gaps usually remain, particularly in LSF are scarce and patchy (Teh et al. 2020).20 for women and informal workers involved in This makes it challenging to design any type of post-harvest activities. Program registration and appropriate support, including SPL. Instead, these eligibility are often linked to, or conditional upon, actors typically rely on informal mechanisms21 registration of fishing assets (for example, vessel such as remittances, cooperative labor-sharing, registration), or payment of a fisheries tax or mutual assistance, and rotating savings and license fee,18 which can exclude some workers.19 credit associations (see FAO 2017; FAO 2019a The seasonality and irregularity of income flow for examples). from fishing and related activities can also make it difficult to meet regular social insurance Nevertheless, some countries have made progress contributions. Likewise, physical locations may in deliberately extending mainstream SPL policies restrict contributions to and the collection of and programs to the SSF sector, which in some benefits from any scheme; many SSF actors live and cases have been coordinated and aligned with 17 Fishers and fish workers are often below the poverty line, but they are not always the poorest in society in economic terms; for example, in all regions except North America, marine fishing delivers higher returns, on average, than agricultural work (Teh et al. 2020). This income (although it can be variable and unpredictable), as well as assets such as fishing vessels, can prevent them from accessing social assistance. Similarly, households involved in the fisheries sector are unlikely to be included in social registries, which tend to focus on the most commonly used categories of vulnerability, such as widows, the elderly, children in female-headed households, people with disabilities, and so on. 18 These processes, in turn, usually require registration in foundational ID systems such as civil registers, and national ID and population registers, which are created to provide identification to the general population for a wide variety of transactions. 19 Informal activities persist in the fisheries sector for a variety of reasons, including lack of awareness of how to formalize; lack of understanding of the benefits, or uncertainty over the implications of formalizing; avoidance of taxation, fishing regulations, or other costs associated with formalization; and lack of trust in government. 20 Socioeconomic and demographic data (e.g., livelihood, income, expenditure) are collected through various surveys (official labor force surveys, household income and expenditure surveys, population and housing censuses, etc.) and are used to inform public policies. However, these surveys rarely have an adequate or accurate representation of fisheries actors. They often aggregate fisheries with agriculture and other rural livelihoods, and rarely accurately reflect the multiple livelihood strategies that many poor rural households employ. 21 Formal social protection and labor programs are usually implemented by government (either alone or in conjunction with other parties such as NGOs), or sometimes by the private sector with legal backing; whereas informal social protection involves arrangements and actions taken by an individual or group to minimize risks or enable coping during difficult times, and is not guided by formal legal regulations (Stavropoulou, Holmes, and Jones 2017). 10 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 fisheries policies and programs to maximize Action 1, the first step, is the registration of synergies. There are also some ad hoc examples actors in some form of information system(s) of SPL policies and programs that have been that can provide essential data for fisheries deliberately adapted or conceived for specific management and a basis for SPL provision. fisheries, subsectors, or communities, often as Fisheries management requires information on part of fisheries management, conservation, or the actors (individual fishers and fish workers, development interventions that combine SPL-type businesses, cooperatives, and collectives), as well instruments with other objectives. Examples as their assets (vessels, gear, etc.) and their activities include social assistance for compliance with (production, species composition, sale prices, etc.) fisheries management measures—for example, This information is typically collected by ministries compensation for closed fishing seasons in of fisheries or environment through, for example, Bangladesh (see Appendix, Example 2); social- vessel registries, crew lists, trade and processor insurance schemes with flexible and/or reduced registries, and organizations such as cooperatives contribution requirements (FAO 2017); parametric and associations. To benefit from SPL programs, fisheries insurance for bad weather events, like the fishers and fish workers also need to be registered Caribbean’s COAST product (World Bank 2019b); in the databases that are typically managed by the livelihood diversification and re-skilling support for ministries of social affairs or labor (for example, exiting the fisheries sector22 (Avila-Forcada et al. social registries for social assistance and/or social 2019); and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), insurance databases). While informal workers are which are not a conventional SP instrument, but often not represented in these information systems, natural resource management mechanisms that the right institutional structures and incentives use conditional transfers (Bladon et al. 2014).23 can encourage them to register their assets and activities, which can in turn link them to SPL Based on stocktaking activities, we have identified programs, leading to a mutually reinforcing cycle three main approaches that can be taken to of benefits for the sustainability of fisheries and deliberately align SPL with fisheries management for fisheries actors, and potentially encouraging objectives. Each facilitates and incentivizes a specific formalization (see Appendix for an example of type of “action” that enhances environmental extending SP to small-scale fishers in Morocco). sustainability, while reducing vulnerability and, thus, improving livelihoods (Fig. 2). 22 See the Appendix for a description of Peru’s compensation fund for fisheries management. 23 While PES schemes do not typically target poor and vulnerable groups, they can in some circumstances benefit them. 11 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 This registration also provides information that Longer term strategies can also be designed to can be used to design, adapt, and implement permanently reduce the total numbers of fishers and programs that enable and incentivize fishers and fish workers in a specific fishery, area, or subsector fish workers to change their behavior and/or (Action 3). In particular, active labor market partially or completely leave the sector (Actions programs, as well as broader livelihood/productive 2 and 3, respectively). Both social assistance economic-inclusion programs that combine and social insurance have been used to training and re-skilling support with conditional enable and incentivize behavior change transfers and financial services,25 can support a within a specific fishery, area, or fishery-related fishery exit by reallocating labor to other parts activity (Action 2), by compensating for short- to of the fisheries sector26 and/or other sectors, or medium-term socioeconomic costs.24 This can help by providing additional income activities (typically to legitimize and enhance the impact of fisheries aquaculture, tourism, or agriculture27) that divert management or other measures taken to enhance pressure from overexploited resources.28 Pensions sustainability. The behavior change usually involves can also provide the financial means to exit the compliance with new fishing regulations, but fisheries sector through early retirement programs. it can also be a voluntary change (for example, switching gear types, or engaging in a parallel habitat conservation or restoration activity, such as mangrove reforestation). 24 In theory, this type of SP should only be required for as long as it takes to achieve management objectives, but in reality some continuation of support (e.g., labor market programs) may be required in order to discourage future overexploitation. 25 Financial services include savings, credit, insurance, and investment services. While these are not SPL instruments, they are important complementary tools, particularly to ensure the long-term success of labor programs. 26 Strategies that aim to reallocate labor from one part of the fisheries sector to another must avoid redistributing fishing effort to other areas that may not be able to support it. 27 For maximum uptake and lasting change, opportunities should ideally be aligned with workers’ existing skills, needs, and desires, and should contribute to longer-term social, ecological, and economic resilience. Target sectors must also have the potential to absorb additional labor. 28 Equipping workers with an alternative means of producing food or income does not always reduce the need or desire to exploit fisheries resources; therefore, these programs tend to be most effective in combination with fishery access controls. 12 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 POTENTIAL PATHWAYS FOR SPL INSTRUMENTS TO FACILITATE AND FIGURE 2.  INCENTIVIZE SUSTAINABILITY Source: Authors’ compilation 13 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 4. Recommendations 4.1.1 Institutional Arrangements and Opportunities Governments can increase fisheries and SPL policy The following recommendations highlight key coherence and impact by: opportunities for policymakers and practitioners who are looking to translate the potential • Enhancing intra- and interministerial pathways described in Figure 2 from concept to coordination, particularly between the reality—expanding and leveraging SPL to reduce ministries that are responsible for fisheries social-ecological risk in fisheries by enabling management and social affairs, and related and incentivizing sustainability, while improving agencies, at the national and subnational livelihoods and reducing the vulnerability of levels. This may involve removing restrictions people. The recommendations are divided into two or barriers to cross-sector collaboration, categories: (i) institutional and policy factors that and incentivizing interministerial synergies, create an enabling environment for aligning SPL for example via common monitoring with fisheries management; and (ii) program-level and evaluation frameworks, or through considerations related to key design and delivery performance-based budgets. features in the context of the fisheries sector. • Enhancing coordination and cooperation with and between NGOs, private companies 4.1 Governance and Policy (for example, insurance companies), fisheries organizations (cooperatives, The vision and process of extending SPL coverage to collectives, etc.), and community-based the fisheries sector, and better aligning that SPL with organizations. These institutions can be fisheries management requires: (i) improvements particularly valuable where government in institutional coordination; (ii) more effective and capacity and resources are limited, although equitable fisheries management and governance; many of them will require some support in and (iii) adequate and sustainable financing. order to strengthen their own capacity.29 For example, they can share data and use their influence to encourage registration of fishers and fish workers. (See Appendix for the role they have played in Morocco). 29 Where fisheries or community-based organizations already provide an informal SPL function in SSF, they can offer a starting point or complementary mechanism for governments that are trying to expand formal SPL. It is critical that formal policies and programs do not crowd these out or damage important social networks (Stavropoulou, Holmes, and Jones 2017). 14 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 4.1.2 Fisheries Management: • Use this information to develop evidence- Assessment, Regulation, Monitoring, based and enforceable regulations and Enforcement supported by mechanisms to enable and incentivize behavior change, leveraging Fisheries management can complement SPL (and SPL where appropriate. Monitoring and vice versa) when these practices and principles enforcement of compliance with regulations are followed: is particularly important when conditions are attached to SPL (Bladon et al. 2014). • Collect and analyze data on the environmental, economic, social, and • For social equity, fisheries management demographic aspects of fisheries, (and related SPL programming) should including basic information on fishers and fish be transparent and participatory; should workers (gender-disaggregated), and fishing acknowledge and respect key stakeholders and and marketing patterns. This requires the their rights (including traditional knowledge registration of these actors (including informal systems and management practices); and workers, businesses, and cooperatives), should fairly distribute costs and benefits (FAO as well as their assets and activities. This 2015). Community-based or co-management should form the basis of a broader fisheries institutions can facilitate this. information system holding data on catch, effort, market prices, etc. It can also draw • Where government capacity for on social information systems (for example, monitoring and enforcement is limited (as social registries) for socioeconomic and in many LMICs), strong community-based demographic data. Traditional knowledge and fisheries organizations (including is a valuable source of information, particularly informal ones) and co-management where financial resources and scientific data institutions can play a critical role in are limited. filling this gap (Nguyen, Momtaz, and Pham 2018)30. SPL has in some instances been designed to directly support these activities (Méndez-Medina et al. 2020). 30 Management of SSF has generally been most effective when governance structures enable the participation of resource users in management, as seen in co-management regimes and fishery cooperatives—particularly when combined with no-take areas and group fishing rights, or territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFs), which can create incentives for sustainable use and conservation instead of overexploitation (Gelcich et al. 2019). 15 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 4.1.3 Adequate and Sustainable Reforming • and strengthening the Financing collection of taxes and fees from the fisheries sector. This will usually require Although financing is one of the main challenges i) upgrading existing taxes and fees to in expanding SPL programs to the fisheries sector generate new forms of revenue (for example, and improving fisheries management in LMICs, improving the way licenses are priced and adapting existing infrastructures can minimize allocated so that they better target actors costs, and joint programming can optimize the use who remain in the value chain and capture of scarce resources. There are also opportunities the most profit, such as LSF businesses); and for governments to mobilize domestic resources ii)  improving the efficiency of revenue for this purpose through fiscal reform (Porras collection by properly enforcing (and 2019). Options include: incentivizing compliance with) regulations to eliminate illicit activities such as tax evasion. Removing socially regressive, distortive, • (See Bladon et al. 2020, and a description and environmentally destructive fisheries of Peru’s Compensation Fund for Fisheries subsidies. Instead of subsidizing mostly Management in the Appendix). large-scale fleets that overexploit resources, reallocate this fiscal space toward measures Debt instruments linked to climate and nature that have positive socioeconomic and outcomes also offer opportunities to mobilize funds ecological impacts, including better fisheries for investment in SPL and fisheries management management integrated with effective SPL. (Steele & Patel 2020). To put this potential into context, nearly two thirds of global marine fisheries subsidies Furthermore, there are innovative financing promote overfishing, with developing mechanisms that can attract private capital and countries31 alone spending $16 billion on potentially offer a longer-term source of finance these types of subsidies in 2018 (Sumaila et than can be guaranteed through national budget al. 2019). Furthermore, more than 80 percent allocations. For example: of fisheries subsidies are currently allocated to LSF), despite the much larger numbers Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) • of people employed in SSF (Schuhbauer et is a mechanism that can channel both public al. 2020). and private financing to fishing communities by connecting them to the beneficiaries 31 As classified by the United Nations. 16 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 of effective fisheries management and 4.2 Program-Level Considerations biodiversity conservation (Bladon et al. 2014). for Social Protection and Labor in the Fisheries Sector Blue carbon credits can be generated by • the actions of fishing communities and sold to To extend SPL to the fisheries sector and optimize organizations or individuals seeking to offset synergies with fisheries management, systems emissions (Wylie et al. 2016). and processes at each phase of the SPL delivery chain require consideration, as shown in Fig. 3. Conservation Trust Funds can be a • These include the registration and assessment of long-term source of diverse financing for needs; the design and provision of benefits and effective fisheries management and related contributions; and monitoring and evaluation. SPL programs, reducing financial burdens on governments (Bladon, Mohammed, and Milner-Gulland 2014).32 SPL DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES TO BE CONSIDERED IN A FISHERIES FIGURE 3.  CONTEXT Source: Adapted from Lindert et al. (2020). 32 As legally independent grant-making institutions, they can offer a level of transparency and accountability that is attractive to donors, and provide an appropriate institutional framework for the administration of mechanisms like PES. 17 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 4.2.1 ASSESS: Intake and Registration, by fisheries organizations and community- and Assessment of Needs and based organizations, as well as databases Conditions held by ministries of fisheries or environment on fishing and marketing patterns. These can As a first step, more fishers and fish workers strengthen the information base for assessing must be included in some form of social the needs and conditions of fishers and fish registry, ideally linked to a fisheries information workers and defining the target populations system. The right incentives, institutional structures, and eligibility criteria for complementary SPL and outreach can encourage registration, even and fisheries programs.33 They should have for informal workers. (See Fig. 2, Action 1 and mechanisms to include all fishers and fish Appendix, Example 1). workers, including women and pre- and post- harvest workers. Social registries are information systems that • support inclusion in social programs (Leite et Linking these complementary information • al. 2017). While they often start by focusing on systems requires a good foundational the poor, countries are increasingly adopting identification system (for example, national broader, more dynamic, and more integrated ID or civil registry IDs) to uniquely match systems that cover more of the population individuals across registries/databases. and provide a gateway to multiple programs, including SPL programs and beyond. Many 4.2.2 ENROLL: Design or Adapt countries are also moving toward social Program Features to Meet the Needs registries with georeferenced information that of Fisheries Actors can be used to target interventions in specific areas and develop hazard maps. Inclusion of Programs should be designed or adapted based fishers and fish workers in these registries on objectives, context, and the needs of the would improve the assessment of needs and target population. In particular, they should conditions in the sector. consider fisheries management objectives that might be achieved through behavior change Fisheries information systems include • and partial or complete exit from the fisheries vessel registries, crew lists, trade and sector (Actions 2 and 3 in Fig. 2). Key design processing registries, and information held features that require special consideration in the 33 For example, linking a social registry to a fisheries database could provide data on other livelihoods and skills of fishers and fish workers; these could then be considered when assessing their eligibility for and the scope of initiatives that aim to diversify livelihoods or reallocate labor to other fisheries and sectors. 18 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 context of fisheries include, among other things, groups within the fisheries sector —for eligibility criteria, type and level of benefits, example, by increasing the social-assistance and conditionality. eligibility threshold for those in the sector, or by adjusting social insurance schemes to • The socioeconomic profiles of fishers and accommodate informal fishers and fish workers fish workers are highly heterogeneous, even who are willing to register. To achieve fisheries within communities. If SPL systems/programs management objectives in a cost-effective are extended to the fisheries sector or way, a geographic, community-based, or leveraged to support fisheries management sector-based approach may be preferable to objectives, eligibility criteria may need to targeting specific groups, including the poor be deliberately adapted to reach target (Box 2).  OTENTIAL TRADE-OFFS AND CHALLENGES OF TARGETING SPL IN THE CONTEXT BOX 2. P OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT Targeting the poorest or most vulnerable households in a population, which is the norm for social assistance programs, does not always deliver the best environmental outcomes, since the poorest or most vulnerable fishers are not always the ones with the greatest impact on fish stocks and their habitats. Furthermore, programs that are designed to enable or incentivize compliance with fisheries management measures might be perceived as unfair if only some of those affected receive benefits; this can undermine the overall effectiveness of such programs (Bladon et al. 2018). Blanket coverage of affected communities or fisheries can be more appropriate and more cost-effective than individual targeting of the poor in such circumstances. On the other hand, SPL benefits targeted specifically to fishers can create perverse incentives for people to enter a fishery, if only on paper. For example, when unemployment insurance was extended to small-scale fishers in Brazil during closed fishing seasons, large numbers of non-fishers fraudulently registered to receive benefits (FAO 2017). Strong and interoperable systems for the identification of fishers and fish workers and reporting of their activities are therefore required to avoid these kinds of issues. Finally, interventions that aim to incentivize exit from the fisheries sector must be targeted at individuals who are willing to exit (even if they are not the poorest or most vulnerable), but not to those who were planning to exit anyway. Fisheries livelihoods are often closely tied to identity; some people want to stay in a specific fishery or at least in the sector even when there could be better income opportunities outside (Daw et al. 2012; Blythe 2014). This is most common among seniors; hence, targeting youth may be more appropriate and programmatic. 19 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 The types and levels of benefits need • annual or seasonal contributions as opposed to be adequate, appropriate, and coherent to stringently requiring continuous monthly with any fisheries management objectives. In contributions (FAO 2019a). Furthermore, cross- other words, they need to be acceptable, and subsidies within the social insurance fund, and attractive enough to the target population to government subsidies can reduce exclusion by encourage them to participate in the program, lowering or exempting contributions. and to effectively compensate and incentivize behavior change, without creating perverse 4.2.3 PROVIDE: Provision of Benefits incentives. For example, the benefit amount could be linked to the cost of compliance with Benefits should be delivered, and contributions regulations; or it could be provided during collected, in a way that is convenient and practical periods of the year when fishers and fish for fisheries actors. In particular, monetary workers experience specific forms of hardship payment modes should be accessible and (data that would be derived from fisheries secure, and programs can be supported by information systems). efforts to promote financial inclusion. Conditionality • can help achieve In some contexts, mobile money/wallets can • sustainability. Conditional transfers are make it easier for fishers and fish workers one option, but other modalities, such as to receive benefits (such as cash transfers), social insurance and public works, can also and to pay their contributions. By promoting be conditional on behaviors that support exposure to formal financial services, it can sustainable fisheries, including partial or also improve financial inclusion, which is complete exit from the sector. Similarly, active currently a significant barrier to economic labor market programs and economic inclusion resilience in small-scale fishing communities strategies can be supported by transfers and and to accessing SPL (Pomeroy et al. 2020). financial services that are conditional on the fulfillment of specific targets (for example, the Other important steps toward improving • completion of training, or exit from a fishery). financial inclusion include financial and digital literacy initiatives, to help households start • Adjustment and alignment of social building a financial profile; and registration, insurance contribution amounts, which provides individuals with a formal frequency, and terms with the fishery identity and facilitates the collection of data production cycle can reduce the exclusion on business transactions. of some actors—for example, by accepting 20 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 Enabling access to formal financial products • to avoid unintended consequences, including and services is also crucial in providing labor perverse incentives for exploitation. (See the market programs for informal actors; acquiring example from Bangladesh in the Appendix). Given new skills and opportunities is not enough the limited state capacity for the monitoring and to support a transition to other livelihood enforcement of fisheries in most LMICs, this will activities or sectors without financial means. often require the involvement of community or fishery institutions (as discussed in Section 4.1.2). Similarly, there must be monitoring mechanisms 4.2.4 MANAGE: Monitoring in place to flag changes in eligibility status (i.e., and Evaluation recertification), and to move beneficiaries out of programs. If SPL benefits are linked to a specific Rigorous monitoring and evaluation of programs fishery and its management objectives, then (environmental, social, and economic aspects) is program exit decisions should be based not only on needed to: socioeconomic data, but also on the status of the fishery; once the management objectives have been Learn from both successes and challenges • achieved (for example, fish stocks have recovered) (for example, targeting errors); support the and/or regulations changed, the benefits can be flexibility needed to address challenges; adjusted, scaled down, or withdrawn, keeping in and enable adaptation to change, including mind that some level of SPL may be required to climate change. discourage future overexploitation. 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The market programs and financial compensation to first example is from Morocco, where national LSF vessel crews affected by regulations designed social protection was extended to SSF under a to reduce the numbers of vessels, and therefore concerted effort across sectors and stakeholders. the amount of fishing. Each of these examples has The second comes from Bangladesh, which flaws and challenges, but they are presented here adapted a national social assistance program to illustrate how the approaches recommended in to compensate vulnerable small-scale fishers this note can be applied in practice. for income foregone as a result of fisheries Example 1. Morocco: Social Protection (SP) for Small-Scale Fishers. Holistic, coordinated efforts across institutions to extend the national social protection system to small-scale fishers. Formalization and relatively high registration for fishing practices, and connected them to export SP34 in Morocco’s small-scale fisheries sector was and/or luxury markets. In addition to registering made possible through close cooperation between boats and workers and providing fishing permits, the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, they also started providing small-scale fishers the National Social Security Fund, the Department with access to water, ice, subsidized inputs, of Maritime Fisheries, and the National Office of and basic health care. The National Office of Fisheries (FAO 2019). The Department of Maritime Fisheries automatically deducts social insurance Fisheries created a formal fisheries infrastructure contributions at the point of sale in the in-port along the coast, including accessible facilities for markets, which removes the practical barriers to improved storage, preservation, compliance with contributing. The benefits that small-scale fishers international sanitary standards, and marketing receive are also cross subsidized by workers in facilities, all of which enhanced the value of catch. other sectors, meaning that they should receive They also provided market access for high-quality more from the social insurance fund than products that were caught using sustainable they contribute. 34 Compared with surrounding countries. 24 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 Together, these benefits have incentivized some However, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic fishers to formalize their activities, and thereby have highlighted persistent gaps in SP coverage have encouraged registration in and contribution within small-scale fisheries, and weaknesses to the SP system (FAO 2019). It has now been in the institutional structures supporting its made a legal requirement to market catch through extension (World Bank 2021b). For example, the government-run ports, enroll with the fisher cooperatives and associations are still, National Social Security Fund, and contribute to in general, poorly organized and have little health insurance. In addition, fisher organizations influence. Also, fishers are not entitled to (cooperatives and associations) are reported receive unemployment benefits. Furthermore, to have been instrumental in communicating the institutional mechanisms described support the benefits of formal operation within port boat owners and fishers working on vessels facilities to small-scale fishers, thereby supporting to access SP, but not gleaners or the informal the process of formalization, valorization, and workers supporting pre- and post-harvest SP registration. activities—the very groups who tend to be the most vulnerable workers in the sector. Workers in the processing sector, for example, were the most affected by COVID-19. Example 2. Bangladesh: Jatka Fisher Rehabilitation Scheme. Adaptation of a national social assistance program to compensate vulnerable small-scale fishers for the cost of fishery regulations. The Bangladesh hilsa fishery is a small-scale coastal In recognition of the socioeconomic hardship marine and freshwater fishery that supports the imposed by these regulations, the government livelihoods of up to 500,000 people, many of also introduced a “rehabilitation” program for whom are extremely vulnerable (Bladon et al. fishers living inside and around the sanctuary 2018). With hilsa production in decline since the areas, largely based on in-kind transfers, 1970s, in 2003 the government began introducing with some alternative livelihood support and various regulations for the protection of juvenile awareness-raising activities (Bladon et al. 2018). hilsa fish (locally known as jatka), including various During the closure of the sanctuaries to fishing, seasonal fishing bans, and the designation of the government distributes rice to around half of sanctuary areas (Dewhurst-Richman 2016). the affected households (nearly 250,000  across 25 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 15 districts). Each local council is invited to put meaning that some households end up with less forward a list of jatka fishers (who are now than their allocation (Dewhurst-Richman et al. required to have identity cards), which is finalized 2016). There is evidence that disproportionate through a complex process involving the Ministries benefits have been accrued by landowners, rather of Fisheries and Livestock, Disaster Management than by the most vulnerable (landless fishing and Rehabilitation, and others, after which rice is households with the lowest income levels); this has distributed by local council officials. The rice comes affected acceptance and support for the scheme from a pre-existing national Vulnerable Group (Bladon et al. 2018; Islam et al. 2016). There Feeding Program; so the scheme has the primary is also evidence of unintended consequences, goal of reducing vulnerability and food insecurity. including perverse incentives for jatka fishing, and But by compensating for income foregone during negative impacts on local rice, microfinance, and fishing bans, it also aims to incentivize compliance labor markets (Dewhurst-Richman et al. 2016; with fishing regulations. Islam et al. 2016). Furthermore, the nature of the in-kind transfer may also be limiting its impact While there has been no rigorous impact evaluation, on compliance with regulations; since rice does the scheme has had a direct socioeconomic impact not address the problem of malnutrition or help on hilsa fishing communities, and is thought to fishers continue to pay interest on their debts to have contributed to the increase in stocks that has moneylenders during fishing bans, many fishers been reported since it was introduced (Bladon et are compelled to continue fishing during these al. 2016). However, since there are no officially bans (Bladon et al. 2016). Weak governance and prescribed selection criteria, the process is very limited capacity for monitoring and enforcement subjective and open to corruption (Bladon et al. of regulations allows this fishing to continue. 2018). Rice is lost or siphoned off at each level, Example 3. Peru: The Compensation Fund for Fisheries Management (FONCOPES). Labor market programs and financial compensation to support exit of vessel crews from the industrial anchoveta fishery and reduce fishing effort. In response to declining stocks, in 2008 the among other regulations (Garteizgogeascoa et Peruvian government implemented an individual al. 2020). This system aimed to reduce fishing vessel quota (IVQ) system for its anchoveta fishery, effort and rebuild stocks. The government also 26 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 created the Compensation Fund for Fisheries Early 3.  Retirement: Aimed at workers Management (FONCOPES) to support the crews ages 50-55, this allows workers who have of vessels that would no longer participate in the contributed to the Fund up to age 55 to then fishery (ILO 2015). This is an independent entity receive a pension. They also receive a temporary that administers mandatory contributions from financial subsidy from the date of entry into the industrial companies in the fishery. Contributions program until they reach 55 years of age. are based on the amount of quota per vessel and the number of crew members. The government The IVQ system has successfully increased profitability has also established programs aimed at formalizing and sustainability of the fishery by reducing effort. workers in the sector. During its first three years, FONCOPES assisted in the voluntary retirement of 350 workers, and FONCOPES runs three support programs helped 400 transition out of the fishery. In 2014, (ILO 2015): the International Labour Organization reported that 2,283 workers had been contacted by the Retraining Incentives: This aims to facilitate 1.  Fund that year: 1,347 workers participated in the workers’ transition into other productive sectors Retraining Incentives program, and 315  workers through a compensation package for voluntary took part in the Development and Promotion of redundancy; technical courses; temporary SMEs program (ILO 2015). (The latter was mainly economic subsidies during the training period; boat owners and captains, who had better salaries and specialized advice. and higher compensation packages). Development and Promotion of Small 2.  But FONCOPES only covers fishers, not workers in and Medium Enterprises (SME): This aims the fishmeal plants who also lost work due to fishery to support the creation of SMEs through reform (ILO 2015). Furthermore, small-scale and a compensation package for voluntary artisanal fleets fish the same stock in the nearshore redundancy; technical courses related to area, primarily for human consumption, but they business management to assist in starting operate outside of the IVQ system. Improved stock or developing a micro or small enterprise; status encouraged small-scale and artisanal fishers temporary economic subsidies during the to catch anchoveta for sale on the lucrative fishmeal training period; and specialized advice on black market—highlighting the importance of either setting up micro and small enterprises, taking all subsectors of a fishery into account for or strengthening existing businesses. management (Garteizgogeascoa et al. 2020). 27 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2022 | No. 25 © 2022 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: +1 (202) 473 1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. 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